INNER MONGOLIA AND THE PROBLEMS OF REVOLUTIONARY WORK.

Report of D.Ochireff, December,1925.

CONTENTS

Introduction 1

Commercial Centres and other Cities in Inner Mongolia. . . 2

Population. 7

Princes. 8

Organization of Princes. 10

Lamas. 10

Colonization and Administrative Reforms. 11

Awakening of the National Consciousness of the Population. 15

Pan-Mongolism. 17

Relations between Mongolian and Chinese Peasants 18

Secret Peasant Organizations: "Dogoilun" and "Golchyi" . . 19

Banditry. 21

Detachments of Territorial Self-Defense. 22

Revolutionary Organizations. 24

National Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia 25

Pressing Problems. 27

Annexes 1-3: Characteristics of Mongol Leaders. 29

Annex 4: "League of Workmen, Peasants and Soldiers" . . . 32

Annex 5: Report of D. Ochireff, "Organization of the . . 34
Mongolian Cavalry and its Tasks"

Overtures made to Soviets by the Mongols of Inner. 42
Mongolia and the Special Area of Chahar
(1925)

Plan for Work in Jehol. 45

Introduction.

Regions which form these Special Administrative Areas, i.e. Jehol, Chahar and Suiyuan, are usually called Inner Mongolia. These Special Areas were organized comparatively recently. As the Southern Mongols who are aborigines of these regions, have preserved until the present time their peculiar forms of self-government and their peculiar household and living conditions, the political meaning of the formation of these so-called Special Administrative Areas which really have several specific features, becomes understandable.

There are two principal groups of population in these areas: Chinese and Mongolian. These groups are not equal as to their numerical strength: whereas the Chinese number about 10,000,000, the number of Mongolians probably does not exceed 3,000,000. If one takes into consideration that in Outer Mongolia the Mongolian population is less than 1,000,000, it will become evident that the principal mass of the Mongolian population, the so-called Southern Mongols, are concentrated in Inner Mongolia.

The ethnographical boundaries of Inner Mongolia, however, go beyond the confines of the above-mentioned Special Administrative Areas, because the Mongolian population also lives in the following provinces: Heilungkiang, Nuhdem, Kirin and Kansu.

Occupying the northern part of China, bordering upon Outer Mongolia to the extent of several thousands of versts and being within the sphere of influence of Chang Tso-lin, on the one hand (Jehol), and of Feng Yü-hsiang, on the other hand (Chahar and Suiyuan), Inner Mongolia acquires now a special political importance.

The purpose of this report is to throw a sufficient light upon the general situation in Inner Mongolia and to point out the problems which in the near future will confront the Mongolian, as well as the Chinese population. Unfortunately I have not at my disposal even the most elementary materials (statistical etc.) which could characterize, for instance, the economic conditions both of the Mongolian population and of the Chinese peasantry, or the questions pertaining to colonization which has the

greatest political-economic importance. This lack of necessary materials precludes the possibility of dealing with a sufficient fulness and on the basis of positive data a proper light upon several important questions.

In this report I want only to sum up those impressions which I brought back from my journey in Inner Mongolia. I left Peking on August 10, 1925 and returned on September 24. During this time I have been at Kalgan (Chahar), Kuhuhote (Suiyuan) and to the east of Dolonnor.

Commercial Centres and Other Cities in Inner Mongolia.

Cities in Inner Mongolia are centres of Chinese and foreign trade. As a general rule, there are absolutely no Mongols as permanent inhabitants in cities, with the exception of some individual Mongol officials who serve in governmental institutions. Such cities as Dolonnor, Kuhuhote etc. which in times past were Mongolian administrative and religious centres, belong now to the usual type of remote Chinese towns. There are still in these cities very big monasteries or "datsang" containing several tens or even hundreds of lamas as, for instance in the Dolonnor "datsang". These cities are, properly speaking, nodal centres of Chinese commercial capital the apparatus of which is scattered and penetrates into the remotest corners of Inner Mongolia. There are more than ten such cities in the whole of Inner Mongolia. The following are the most important of them: Ch'engte (Jehol), Ch'ihfeng, Weich'ang, Chiang'ang, K'ailu, Pao't'ou etc. Being of a sufficiently large commercial importance and having concentrated all raw materials which go out of Inner Mongolia, these cities play, however, an absolutely insignificant cultural role. Being very remote centres, they do not possess good schools or other cultural institutions. The majority of these cities are also administrative centres of district administration. In each of these cities some military unit is stationed at present.

A Special administrative area of Jehol.

The city of Chinfeng which is situated in the mountains, is the administrative centre of this area. It is also called Jehol, after the Jehol river on the right bank of which it is located. Ch'engte is an important strategical point. At the same time it possesses also a great commercial importance, being situated just in the centre of the cattle-breeding region, and has a great future, provided the plan for the construction of a railway between Peking and Jehol is realised.

The old Manchu city of Ch'ihfeng which is situated on the right bank of the Yinchiangho river, is the second important centre in the Jehol area. This city is also an important strategical centre, because it is located just in the centre of the Jehol area and covers the pass leading from Manchuria into Inner Mongolia. It has a mixed i.e. Mongolian and Chinese, population which may be estimated at 100,000. There are about 8,000 commercial firms in the city. The following are the chief items of trade: wool, bristles, horse hides and hides of other animals, horse hair, sheepskins and foxskins. About 300,000 "chin" (Chinese catties) of hides and about 150,000 "chin" of bristles are exported from the city annually. Many agents of foreign firms have their permanent residence here and are carrying on directly both the purchase and the forwarding of local raw materials. In addition there are Chinese commissioners who are playing the role of middlemen in this trade. Until quite recently this city was the foremost point of the Chinese colonisation, but now it is the centre of the agricultural region which is densely populated by Chinese. It is planned that the projected railway which is to connect Jehol (Ch'engte) with Ch'aoyang, will pass through Ch'ihfeng. There is now in this city the "Ch'ihfeng Electric Light Co.", K.W. 100, with a capital of 100,000 dollars. In a Presidential mandate issued in 1914, Ch'ihfeng was declared open to international trade. The Japanese Consulate was established in that city at that time.

The small town of Ch'aoyang is located on the Taliaoho river to the south-east of Ch'ihfeng. The highway which leads from Inner Mongolia

into Manchuria, passes through Sh'uyang. This region is very rich in mineral resources.

The district town of Hsinhsing was a hsuanhua ssuh during the reign of the Manchu Dynasty. Afterwards a Colonization Bureau was established there and is now carrying on a very intensive work.

By Special Administrative Area of Chahar.

The district town of Changpei or Kalgan is the administrative centre of this area. It is 70 kilometres from the nearest station of the Peking-Suiyuan Railway. Changpei is an important strategical point, because it covers approaches to Peking through the Kalgan pass, and also has a very great commercial importance as regards trade with Mongolia.

The city of Dolonnor (Mongolian name which means "Seven Lakes", Chinese name "Lanmiao", now Yolan hsien) which can be reached from Kalgan in six days on horseback, is the second important centre in the Chahar area and has a population of about 200,000. By its outward aspect, however, it resembles rather a village than a city. By Presidential mandate issued in 1914, Dolonnor was declared open to international trade. It is a centre of horse-breeding in Inner Mongolia. An annual fair is held here in the month of August and then Mongols not only from Inner Mongolia, but also from the Republic of Outer Mongolia arrive at Dolonnor. The following prices for horses may be quoted. The price of race-horses and draft-horses of which about 500 and 12,000 respectively are sold yearly, is about $ 70. The price of pack-horses of which about 13,000 are sold a year, is about $ 30. A private company called "Tuchsing Colonization Company", with a capital of 200,000 taels, has been operating in the region of Dolonnor since 1911. It has for its aim the utilization of Mongolian lands both for pasturage and agricultural purposes. It started by buying a herd of good cattle consisting of 1,000 pieces. Agents of various foreign firms come to Dolonnor very frequently.

The city of Kuaiyüan, formerly Tuchih k'ou or Tuchih hsien is after Kalgan the next important pass which leads from Mongolia into China

proper. It is a kind of "gateway" in the defensive line formed by the Great Wall of China, and is accessible only on horseback.

Kuanhsien is the third pass which leads from Mongolia into China proper and is also accessible only on horseback.

5/ Special Administrative Area of Suiyüan.

The district city of Kueisui (formerly Kueihua ch'eng, Mongolian name Kukuhoto or "Blue City" and Suiyüan ch'eng) is the administrative centre of the Suiyüan area and the biggest city on the southern border of the Gobi desert. Being located at the foot of the Yinshan mountains, it was formerly an important strategical point, as it covered the approaches from Mongolia into Shensi. By Presidential mandate issued in 1914, Kueihua ch'eng was declared open to international trade. There is in this city the "Kueisui Electric Light Co.", K.W.100, with a capital of $ 200,000.

Paotu (Post'ou) or Paotouchen, terminal station of the Peking - Suiyüan Railway, 1,200 miles distant from Peking, is the second important city in the Suiyüan area and has a very great commercial importance as a point of transshipment of goods from Hsin'an (Alashan), Kansu, Sarchuan, Kobdo and Uliasutai. It is growing very rapidly and it is planned to convert it into a mart open to international trade. There is in this city the "Paotow Electric Light Co.", K.W.70, with a capital of $ 100,000. A motor road has been constructed recently to connect Post'ou with Kuyuan (Sui - yüan?).

The district city of Salach'i (Sarutai) lies to the north of the Yellow river, not far from the border of Shansi province, in the centre of a very fertile region. A mountain named "Tach'ing shan", in Mongolian "Ba-dantu", is 30 Chinese li from Salach'i.

P'intich'üan, station on the Peking-Suiyüan Railway, recently acquired a certain importance, as a terminal point of the motor road from Urga.

The district city of Wuyüan is in the centre of Hot'ao (Ordos). It is covered by Yinshan mountains from the north and by the Yellow river from the south. Formerly Wuyüan was the centre of Government Pastures and

now is a starting point for the colonisation movement.

D) Kalgan.

Kalgan (Changchiak'ou) occupies quite a special place as the centre of the economic and commercial life of Inner Mongolia. By Presidential mandate issued in 1914, Kalgan was declared open to international trade.

Kalgan is located on the mountain river Tangho, right inside the Great Wall which passes on the outskirts of the city, and has a population of 75,000, according to official sources, but, in all probability, it actually has a much larger population. The city is divided by the river into two sections, i.e. "Shangpu" (upper section) and "Heiapu" (lower section). Government organs, such as Tut'ung's yamen, Police Headquarters, Salt Bureau, Financial Bureau, Customs, Post Office, Telegraph Office etc, are located in the "Shangpu". Commercial firms are located in the "Heiapu". The Kalgan Radio Station is located near the railway station. Its radio call signal is XQL and its normal range is 600 miles for day-time and 1,200 miles for night-time transmission. It is equipped with German radio apparatuses which were supplied by the "Telefunken Gesellschaft" firm and is operating on a wave - length of 1,600 to 2,100 meters. There is in this city the "North China Light Co. Ltd.", K.W. 120, with a capital of $ 350,000.

Kalgan has a very great importance as regards trade in raw materials and furs. According to Chinese sources, the Kalgan trade turnover amounts to 9,000,000 taels for imported goods and to 15,000,000 taels for exported goods and these figures refer only to trade with the Independent or Outer Mongolia. At the same time Kalgan is the centre of a big region of home industry, where everything necessary in a Mongolian household is manufactured, viz. dyed native stuffs, various utensils, articles pertaining to the religious cult, cutlery, articles of jewellery, saddles, horse trappings, gowns, tents, carpets etc. The reason of the great attention which was always paid to Kalgan, lies not only in its direct commercial significance. Kalgan served formerly and continues to serve now as a central intermediary point for the trade of the vast region which gravitates to Kalgan, i.e. Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia and the Mongolian Republic (Outer Mongolia).

Mongolian Population.

The Mongolian population which numbers about 3,000,000 is scattered throughout a very extensive area, about 3,000 versts (about 3,215 kilometres) long and reaches the city of Taitsinbar on the east and various Tibetan tribes on the west. The chief occupation of the Mongolian population is cattle-breeding which is carried on on a very extensive scale. The economic and household conditions of a cattle-breeder in Inner Mongolia do not differ in anything from those which prevail in Khalka (Outer Mongolia) or in the Transbaikal province, i.e. there are the same herds of sheep and of horned cattle and droves of horses, the same nomad felt tent (yurt) and primitive household utensils, the same careless attitude of mind of a steppe nomad who sets no value upon time. The number of cattle which a Mongol possesses, is regarded as the indicator of his economic well-being. Not even approximate official data, however, are available in this respect. In local administrative organs it was impossible to obtain information not only as to the total number of cattle, but also as to the number of households in a Hoshun.

In the Chao Uda and the Silinghol Leagues which I visited, the population may be divided approximately into the following three groups according to their wealth:

1. Rich cattle-breeders who constitute about 20%. They possess about 2,000 sheeps, 600 cows and 400 horses.

2. Middle class cattle-breeders who constitute about 45%. They possess about 500 sheep, 30 cows and 40 horses.

3. Poor cattle-breeders who constitute about 35%. They possess about 50 sheeps, 3 cows and 2 horses.

The group of rich cattle-breeders is composed of feudal lords (Dzassaks, i.e. Chieftains or Heads of a Hoshun or Banner), of high priests (Lamas) and of officials of every grade, the so-called "Noyon" (Ruling Princes). Usually the poor seek shelter around "yurts" of the rich and make their living "by favor" of the latter. This "favor", however, is based entirely upon the exploitation of the poor family as a whole. Such work as

pastoring cattle, mining coal etc., is done by the poor, as it is called, "for a piece of bread". That has been said above refers to [illegible]

There are, however, several regions in which the Mongolian population has started [illegible]. Within recent years the tempo of colonization by the Chinese of this region has become a somewhat accelerated one. Farther and the Mongols, having lost their vast pasture-grounds and being surrounded by Chinese farmers, began to change gradually their old way of living. Not being used, however, to the hard physical labor of a farmer and lacking both agricultural implements and necessary, even most elementary, knowledge, such Mongols are very often brought on the very brink of financial ruin and impoverishment. The more well-to-do elements, however, manage somehow to adapt themselves to new conditions and are beginning now to exploit the Chinese colonists using them as farm laborers. The southern "hoshuns" in the Chahar Special Administrative Area, the so-called "agricultural hoshuns", present the most peculiar features in this respect. The fundamental mass of the Mongolian population there which has lost its cattle and was not able within a short space of time to take to agriculture, is quite impoverished now. At the same time, however, a new class of the rich was formed, i.e. of those Mongolian landowners who are exploiting Chinese peasants.

Mongolian Princes.

The so-called Southern Mongols or Mongols of Inner Mongolia have not as yet shaken off the shackles which date from the feudal epoch. With the exception of the Barga or Hulunpeir region in the Heilungkiang province and of eight Chahar "Hoshuns" or Banners, the power of feudal princes has been preserved in all Hoshuns of Inner Mongolia, even up to this time. It is true, however, that the absolutism of the princely power has been somewhat impaired, as a result of the crushing of the national movement in Inner and Outer Mongolia which during the years of 1911 and 1912 took the form of a military outbreak. The princes of Inner Mongolia form now the ruling class.

"Hoshun" (Banner or Principality) is called for the most part after the name of the ruling prince and forms in fact his hereditary fief or apanage. In order to be able to manage the affairs of his "Hoshun", the prince has at his disposal a special administrative apparatus which relies upon an armed force called Territorial Self-defense. This administrative apparatus consists of numerous officials of various rank and is subordinated to the prince who plays the role of a "supreme ruler" for his "Hoshun". The whole administrative apparatus and the numerous henchmen of princes, so to speak "the whole court", are maintained with funds which are collected from the population, because most of the "Hoshuns" have no other kinds of revenues, except endless bribes which constitute "personal revenues" of the officialdom. Funds collected from the population, are wholly employed for the maintenance of the administrative apparatus, i.e. officials, forces of "Territorial self-defense" etc. No funds are expended for public utilities, and schools and such institutions are rather an exception.

Numerically the class of princes is quite insignificant. In the whole of Inner Mongolia there are about 100 ruling princes and several hundreds of those who bear only nominal or honorary titles. The Chinese Government has been striving during many years to convert the Mongol princes into a docile tool of its policy. In the majority of cases this aim is attained either by means of direct bribery or by conferring on them honorary titles and ranks. The Mongol princes constitute now a class which is degenerated and rotten through and through. They continue holding their positions exclusively owing to their formal connections with the official circles of China. They pass most of their time in Peking where they squander in feasting large sums of money, and all the expenses connected with their prolonged stays in Peking are defrayed by the population of their "Hoshuns".

The dissatisfaction of the Mongolian population directed against the princes and higher officials generally, more than once took the form of an open revolt. Such a revolt broke out in 1924 in the Djerim League. Several hundreds of armed Mongols tried to attack the residence of the prince but the latter succeeded in suppressing this revolt with the aid of Chinese

soldiers. In connection with the struggle against the princes and high officials the population formed in several places various secret associations among which the organization called "Dogeilun" plays the most conspicuous role (for details see below).

Organization of Mongolian Princes.

During recent years the Mongol princes began to show some signs of resisting to political events. Revolutionary events in Outer Mongolia which put an end to the power of feudal lords, served as an impetus. These events revealed the utter powerlessness of the Chinese Central Government which up to that time was omnipotent in the eyes of the Mongol princes, and the latter being frightened, took their new orientation from Japan. It is universally known that Japan takes a great interest in Mongolia generally, but particularly in Inner Mongolia as well as in Manchuria. In a concrete form this new "orientation from Japan" found its expression in the organization of a Mongolian Bank, with the notorious Ataman Semenoff as its chief promoter.

Lamas.

Having succeeded in converting the Mongol princes into a docile tool of its policy, the Peking Government is trying now to utilize for its own purposes also the lamaist church organization. It takes recourse to the same methods which it successfully used with regard to the Mongol princes, in order to win over to its side Hutuhtus or the various grades of "Living Buddhas", Hubilgans (or reembodiments of Bodhisattvas and eminent promoters of Buddhism) and higher lamaist church dignitaries generally. It cannot, however, succeed in utilizing in its own interests the lamaist church as a single whole. This circumstance can be explained by the fact that the lamaist church is not homogeneous as regards its constitution and that the masses of lamas are closely connected with the local population.

It is obvious enough that the purpose of the Peking Government of making such a "bustle" around the Panchen Erdeni Lama, is to gain influence not so much in Tibet as in Mongolia. It is necessary to mention here that in Inner Mongolia the lamas play a somewhat less important role than in Outer Mongolia which circumstance can be explained by several causes. In the first place, the number of lamas there is considerably less than in Outer Mongolia. Whereas it is estimated that in Outer Mongolia lamas constitute about 40% of the male population, their number in Inner Mongolia does not exceed 20% of it. Secondly, in Inner Mongolia the lamaist church organization was not so centralized and so closely connected with the governmental apparatus as in Outer Mongolia. Among the lamas of lower and middle grades there are groups whose attitude towards high church dignitaries and feudal lords is unquestionably very hostile.

Colonization and Administrative Reform.

The Chinese governmental organs, having on their side Mongol princes, higher lamaist church dignitaries and Mongol higher officials, are carrying into effect in Inner Mongolia two important measures which in their substance are two sides of one and the same policy. These measures are: Colonization and Administrative Reform.

1. Colonization. Leaving out of consideration the problem of colonization from the point of view of principle, I only want to dwell upon the methods and forms which bear an extremely primitive character and which without exception are all based upon bribery and venality.

The governmental organs do not carry out any preliminary study or investigation of regions, in order to ascertain the total area of uncultivated land suitable for colonization purposes, and all work is done "on sight", i. e. only approximately. A Mongol prince is bribed and "sells" them to the Hsie some definite territory. The Mongol population either is turned out or remains in the old place, but in the latter case it is obliged to

"purchase its own land" from the governmental organs. This "State or governmental" land, however, does not fall into the hands of peasants in a direct way, but is concentrated in the hands of speculators, dealers and officials who hand it over to peasants on the most onerous conditions. Besides, peasants take the land only on lease and must give up one half of their harvest. Therefore this circumstance gives birth in Inner Mongolia to a new class of large landowners who, considering the forms of their exploitation of peasants' labor, are nothing but "country squires".

The colonization of Inner Mongolia is the factor which rouses even the most backward masses of the Mongolian population. In the Chahar area I happened to witness the eviction of 700 Mongolian households. Twenty Chinese officials were very busy clearing the lands of their former inhabitants and colonizing them with new settlers. The whole population of a vast region was greatly alarmed by this fact. These 700 households which had been evicted, intended to migrate in a northerly direction into other "Ho-shuns" located in the sandy region. This event took place within the area which is controlled by Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang, but the same active policy of colonization is being also pursued in the Special Administrative Area of Jehol and in other regions within the sphere of Chang Tso-lin's influence.

Statistical data relating to the colonization of Inner Mongolia by Chinese settlers. Inner Mongolia is rapidly losing its former character of a territory inhabited by the Mongolian nomads, and is being gradually transformed into a typical Chinese province which is assuming an agricultural character and the Chinese population is growing very rapidly.

As early as during the last years of the reign of the Manchu dynasty some definite steps were taken to colonize vast dominions of the Mongol princes of Inner Mongolia. A Central Colonization Bureau was established by the Peking Government at Kuaihuach'eng, with branches in the areas of Chahar and Jehol. All these Bureaux were carrying on their work as agents for the Mongol landowners. They leased the lands to Chinese farmers and collected from the latter rents and taxes which were then equally divided

between the Yiks and the landowners.

Colonization Bureaux were under control of the Ministry of Finance, and usually the Commissioner of Agriculture and Industry held concurrently the post of Superintendent of Colonization Affairs. These Bureaux were doing their work successfully enough and during the last thirty years of their activities over 3,000,000 Chinese "mu" or 500,000 acres of Mongolian lands have been taken over by Chinese settlers. These Bureaux are still carrying on this work.

From the point of view of the subsequent right with regard to the landholding, all lands which constitute the so-called "reserve area suitable for colonization purposes", may be divided into two categories:

1. Lands for sale, in Chinese "fang-keng ti". The land of this category when sold becomes the property of the buyer who receives a legal title deed (a deed of purchase).

2. Lands for perpetual lease, in Chinese "yung-tse ti". The land of this category is given on perpetual lease to the Chinese settler, but nominally remains still the property of its Mongolian owner.

As regards the procedure of turning lands over to the "colonization reserve area", the scheme is roughly as follows: The Mongolian landowner, either of his own free will or under pressure on the part of the authorities, passes over his land to the Colonization Bureau which makes an approximative survey and a rough map and divides the land into several sections according to their value.

Lands which constitute the so-called "colonization reserve area", are divided into five categories dependent upon the thickness of the layer of black-earth on them. Lands belonging to the first three categories must have a layer of black-earth not less than three feet, two feet and one feet deep respectively. The land belonging to the fourth category is covered with sand and that of the fifth category is nothing but an alkaline desert.

When a "fang-keng ti" or "land for sale" is bought, the settler chooses the section, pays down some money the amount of which is fixed in a special table depending upon the category to which the land in question

belongs, and proceeds to its cultivation. Later he makes payments by instalments, and after the total amount due for the land bought has been paid in, he receives the legal title deed.

The following schedule shows the amounts paid for lands of different categories:

1/ for land of the first category: from 90 to 120 taels for 100 Chinese "mu",

2/ for land of the second category: from 60 to 90 taels for 100 Chinese "mu",

3/ for land of the third category: from 40 to 60 taels for 100 Chinese "mu",

4/ for land of the fourth category: from 10 to 40 taels for 100 Chinese "mu", and

5/ for land of the fifth category: 10 taels for 100 Chinese "mu".

One must take into account, however, that in Inner Mongolia one Chinese "mu" contains 360 "kung", whereas in China proper it contains only 240 "kung".

There are very few unoccupied lands in Inner Mongolia now. By July 1st, 1935, there were in the Special Administrative area of Chahar:

1/ 3,000,000 Chinese "mu" of a very fertile soil in the north-western corner of the district of Dolonnor (Lamaiao or Tolun hsien).

2/ 1,500,000 Chinese "mu" in Kangpo in the western part of the Chahar area.

3/ 513,000 Chinese "mu" in the district of Pao'an in the north-western part of the Chahar area.

4/ There are no vacant lands at all in the district of Shangtu hsien.

5/ Not more than 20,000 Chinese "mu" of land of a very poor quality remain in the district of T'aolin.

2. Administrative Reform. The administrative reform is being carried into effect in an extremely supple and cautious manner. In its essentials this reform consists in the curtailing of administrative, judicial and other functions of the Mongolian "Hoshuns" and in the concentration of them in the hands of district magistrates (Hsien chih-chih). The final result of this reform will apparently be to preserve the nominal authority of the Mongol princes with regard to their "Hoshuns" and to hand over the actual administration of "Hoshuns" to Chinese authorities. The Mongol officials who are taking part in the local administrative organs, come into conflict on this ground with the district magistrates. As to the princes, they do not show any resistance so long as from the formal point of view the reform does not concern them, and try to keep in the background, as if not attaching any great value thereto. On the same ground therefore there grows the antagonism of the Mongol officials towards their feudal lords or princes. It is of course quite understandable that the Mongol officials fight in a most energetic way all attempts at curtailing the administrative and judicial functions of "Hoshuns" and make still louder and louder declarations concerning attempts on the part of the Chinese authorities on the national rights of the Mongols, concerning national oppression of the Mongols etc.

In short, these two facts, i.e. colonization and administrative reform, give an impetus to the awakening of the masses of the Mongolian population.

Awakening of the National Consciousness of the Mongolian Population.

As has been already pointed out, the masses of the Mongol people, being crushed under the weight of endless taxes, arose several times in an elemental manner for the purpose of overthrowing the domination of feudal lords. The present moment is characterized by the fact that among the great masses of the Mongolian population national self-consciousness and readiness to fight for national rights and interests are waking up. Both

colonization and administrative reform which have assumed a more intensive character during recent years, compel the Mongolian population to take a hostile attitude towards feudal lords, as well as towards the Chinese Government organs. Finally such fact as the liberation of Outer Mongolia plays quite an important part in the process of awakening the national self-consciousness of the population and, besides, political events which are developing in China, also awaken in the foremost classes of the population an interest in politics.

There is one factor more which bears perhaps the most decisive character in this respect, viz. the appearance of the young Mongolian intelligentsia which is being drawn into the political life.

I have already mentioned quite superficially the attitude of feudal lords towards Outer Mongolia. They are spreading rumors that Outer Mongolia is "under the subjection of the Red Party" which has the intention of conquering Inner Mongolia too. Communists are meant by the "Red Party". The great masses of the population have of course not even an approximatively true idea as to Outer Mongolia. Nevertheless, along with rumors that "Outer Mongolia is under the subjection of the Red Party", it is also reported that at Urga no taxes are levied from the Mongols, but that the Chinese are taxed. All this apparently makes many people think deeply about it.....

All sympathies of the intelligentsia and of petty officials are unquestionably in favor of Outer Mongolia. In view of the absence of postal communication between Urga and Kalgan, no written information, such as newspapers etc., penetrates from Urga into Inner Mongolia. One small pamphlet which had been written by comrade Nerso under the title of "New Mongolia" and which was printed in the Chinese language at Peking in 1934, played a very great role in the dissipating of all absurdities which were being spread regarding Revolutionary Mongolia. This pamphlet can be found in the house of almost every Mongol who knows how to read and write and who holds progressive views. Among the foremost classes of the Mongolian population a very great interest is evinced both in Outer Mongolia and in Buriatia.

It may be said quite positively that the foremost part of the Mongolian population takes its orientation from Urga, as the centre of the national revolutionary movement.

Pan-mongolism.

In connection with the above, it is necessary to touch upon the question relating to pan-mongolism. As I have already mentioned, there occurred in the years of 1911 and 1912 in Inner Mongolia an armed outbreak which ended in a complete rout of the Mongols. This was the Pan-mongol Movement for the unification of the whole of Mongolia under the centre of Urga and for its liberation from the power of China. It was directed by princes and lamas and was conducted under the slogan of "holy struggle against the Chinese".

The origin of this movement lay in the discontent of Outer Mongolia with the active colonization policy and administrative reforms which were being carried into effect by the Chinese Government. Later this discontent was utilized by the Tsarist Government which rendered assistance to Outer Mongolia in its fight for the separation from China.

In 1911, after the revolution had broken out in China, independence of Outer Mongolia was proclaimed at Urga, and Bogdo Gegen was elevated to the throne. Armed detachments were sent out to Inner Mongolia where the ground had been prepared beforehand. Several Leagues took an oath of allegiance to Bogdo and sent men to serve in his army, the numerical strength of which in Inner Mongolia was thus brought up to 10,000 horsemen. Several small towns were taken by insurgents who, however, were not able to hold them and were later forced to retreat by government regular troops which were more numerous. During my journey into Inner Mongolia I often held conversations with persons who had taken an active part in this movement. It cost Inner Mongolia much, and nothing came of it except utter defeat. Outer Mongolia obtained the so-called "autonomy" as a result of this movement, but Inner Mongolia was forced to capitulate to China. Remnants of armed detach-

ments of the years of 1911 and 1912, having been transformed into bandits' gangs, remained as late as 1917 or 1918. In 1917 one of these detachments took Hailar and remained in mastery of it for about three months. Finally the last detachment was utilized by Atamen Semenoff for his "wild division".

The masses of the Mongolian population, being taught a "bitter lesson", are now afraid of the repetition of similar events and therefore it is not without reason that these princes who hate Outer Mongolia, base all their agitation against it upon the allegation that "the Red Party wants to liberate Inner Mongolia". Even the most ardent nationalists cannot of course leave out of consideration the "bitter lesson" which Inner Mongolia has experienced, and taking into account such a state of mind of the masses, I believe that at the present moment the "Pan-mongol Movement" has no real base, no matter from whom the initiative may come and by whom it may be supported.

Relations between Mongolian and Chinese Peasants.

In the Chahar Special Administrative Area and in the northern part of the Jehol Area, i.e. in the regions which have been investigated by me, the question as to relations between Mongolian and Chinese peasants did not assume such an acute character as could apparently be expected on account of the problems in connection with the land problem. There is in the masses of the Mongolian population a certain national antagonism towards the Chinese generally and everything connected with them. There is, however, nothing new in this phenomenon. But no acute conflicts resulting in open or latent collisions occur between Mongolian and Chinese peasants in connection with problems arising from the ownership of land. This circumstance can be explained by the fact that Chinese peasants as such do not arbitrarily seize Mongolian lands. I have already mentioned the procedure in accordance with which Mongolian lands were being alienated, but did not fall into a direct possession of the Chinese peasants. The latter take land only on lease and, as a whole, are completely enslaved by the so-called "big landowners". On the other hand, the Mongolian population is well aware of the

role which the ruling upper classes of Inner Mongolia play in selling Mongolian lands. Therein lies the explanation of the fact that, notwithstanding the national antagonism which naturally exists between the Mongolians and the Chinese populations, the question concerning relations between Mongol and Chinese peasants has not the same acuteness by which, for instance, relations between Russian peasants and the native populations in the borderlands of the former Tsarist Russia were characterised.

Secret Peasant Organizations.

It is known that two secret peasant organizations exist now in Inner Mongolia, viz. "Dogeilun", a Mongolian organization, and "Gelohyi" (Ke lao hui), the organization of the Chinese peasantry.

1. "Dogeilun" exists in six "Hoshuns" or Banners of the Ikechao League, i.e. on territory of the Special Administrative Area of Suiyuan. This is the organization of the poorer classes of Inner Mongolia. Neither officials nor rich people take part in it. "Dogeilun" came into existence at the time of the Boxer movement as a result of the elemental rising of the Mongolian population of the Ikechao League. This movement was directed against foreign missionaries, and the insurgents burned down French churches. Both the Manchurian and the Mongolian authorities acted in complete accord with the insurgents. After the suppression of the Boxer Uprising, however, the whole burden of responsibility for the rising was put on the population alone which was charged with the obligation of paying indemnity. In connection with the refusal of paying this indemnity which the local authorities, being eager to expiate their guilt, began to exact with zeal, the secret organization of "Dogeilun" which has for its aim the overthrow of feudal lords and the fight against abuses on the part of officials, came into existence. The rising of the population against the despotism of princes which had been organized by "Dogeilun", was suppressed. In the

beginning the insurgents were armed only with short sticks. Later, however, the "Dogeilun" began to provide fire arms for its members. At present the "Dogeilun" has a membership of 10,000 men of whom seven hundred are fully armed. The organization of the "Dogeilun" which maintains the most rigid discipline among its members and bears a strictly secret character, enforces various regulations like those which were peculiar to organizations of the type of masonic lodges in the middle of the eighteenth century.

2. "Gelehyi" is the mass organization of the Chinese peasantry and numbers very few Mongols among its members. It exists in the Special Administrative Area of Suiyuan and has about 600 thousand members. Its origin dates from remote antiquity, and it played a great "role" during the Taiping Rebellion. As regards the social status of its members, the composition of "Gelehyi" is at present approximately as follows: 70% of peasants, 16% of employees and 20% of petty traders. The total population of whole regions, without distiction of sex or age, belongs to this organization. Forms of organization of "Gelehyi" are also very peculiar. The chief of the organization is called "Dragon's Head". He holds full powers and enforces his authority through a centralized apparatus. Until quite recently the political program of the organization aimed at the overthrow of the Manchus. "Gelehyi" relies on armed forces and aims at providing all its members with arms. No exact data are available concerning the numerical strength of its armed forces. These detachments of "Gelehyi" which inter alia are engaged with lasting, number about 3,000 horsemen and are concentrated in the region of Kukuhoto or Kuoihuach'eng.

(Translator's Note: "Gelehyi" is probably the Mongolian name for "Ko-las-hui" or "Elder Brother Society").

Banditry.

The banditry exists in all Special Administrative Areas which constitute Inner Mongolia. The largest groups of bandits are concentrated in the region of Dolonnor and also along the border of the Special Administrative Areas of Chahar and Jehol. These bandits are recruited from among various social outcasts, chiefly from the masses of soldiers.

Groups which consist of several tens of mounted bandits, act quite independently in their everyday work, but they are still subordinated to a unified command.

The existence of the following groups of bandits is known:

1.	Shih-la-po	80 men
2.	Shanbun Chir	80 "
3.	Loukanar	20 "
4.	Shangkuei	50 "
5.	Wang Shatza	30 "
6.	Tsantar	40 "
7.	Langsandyar	300 "

All these groups are subordinated to a general command of Langsandyar. As to the composition of these groups according to nationalities, the bandits as a whole are of Chinese origin. There are very few Mongols among them. Only in the band of Langsandyar who himself is a Mongol from the Keshikhteng tribe, there are several bandits of Mongolian origin.

The army units both of Gen. Feng Yü-hsiang and of Gen. Chang Tso-lin which were stationed in Inner Mongolia, not only were not able to suppress these bandits, but could not even cause them any considerable damage. The bandits chiefly loot the merchants, take hostages etc. They also take away horses and food from peasants.

It is interesting to point out that the Mongolian population is looted by bandits comparatively less often than the Chinese. This circumstance can be explained by the fact that the Mongols of the well-to-do class

usually have no cash in hand. Moreover, the Mongol Hoshuns with the aid of their own "Detachments of territorial self-defense", make a stand against bandits and do not allow them to invade their territory.

From certain facts it can be seen that the chiefs of these groups of bandits, especially Lungsandyar, aim at the organization from all these separate groups of one cavalry unit to be subordinated to a unified command. They also aim at regulating their relations with the peasantry. For instance, they sometimes pay cash down for products, horses etc. which they take away from the population. Besides that, as I was told, Lungsandyar gives peasants funds for the repair of roads and bridges, and fifteen bridges have been already built with this money.

The bandits do not place their confidence either in Feng Yü-hsiang or in Chang Tso-lin. At the same time they have no objection to enter the service of either of them, provided they are given definite guarantees. I am under the impression that they are afraid of entering the service of either side, because they are not sure which side will eventually gain the victory. Therefore they have apparently decided to carry on negotiations with both sides, in order to gain time and at the same time to try to regulate their mutual relations with the population on a more sound basis.

Detachments of Territorial Self-Defense.

I have already mentioned in a casual way the role which the "detachments of territorial self-defense" are playing. There are such detachments in each Mongolian Hoshun so that the Hoshuns of Inner Mongolia present now an armed camp. They are maintained with funds which are collected from the population, and are subordinated to the authorities of the Hoshun, i.e. to its Dzassak or prince as the last resort. They are stationed along the border of the Hoshun, in order to prevent the invasion of bandits. In the majority of cases these detachments have no military preparation or training. They are also fulfilling the duties of militia in the Hoshuns.

Their number is steadily increasing. Each Hoshun aims at the creation of a strong detachment, fully capable of fighting. This aim of the Hoshuns to create special armed force is in full harmony with the martial spirit which is inherently a part of the characteristics of Mongols of Inner Mongolia, especially of the Chahars, and which distinguishes them from all other Mongolian tribes.

The numerical strength of "detachments of territorial self-defense" is as follows:

1. The Chao Uda League:
   - a/ in the Hoshun of the Keshiktong tribe: 300 horsemen
   - b/ in the Hoshun of the Barin tribe: 300 "
   - c/ in the Hoshun of the Aru-Khorchin tribe: 100 "
   - d/ in the Hoshun of the Naiman tribe: 300 "
2. The Cheest'u League: 500 "
3. The Djerim League: 3,000 "
4. The Ulan Ch'ap League: 600 "
5. The Zakhaisu League: 700 "
6. Barga: 900 "
7. The Mongols of Dauria: 1,000 "

Armed forces which are at the present moment at the disposal of all Mongolian Hoshuns of Inner Mongolia, amount to about 10,000 horsemen. The armament of the "detachments of territorial self-defense" is most various. At any rate they are all armed with rifles of some army type.

I became thoroughly acquainted with the condition of the "detachments of territorial self-defense" in the Hoshuns of the Keshiktong, the Barin and the Abaga tribes. These detachments are recruited <u>on the principle of voluntary enlistment</u>. Each combatant who must provide himself with his own horse, is paid $5. per month. Moreover, all military "trophies" which are taken from the bandits, remain at the disposal of the detachments. This circumstance renders each combatant materially interested in fighting the bandits. No wonder therefore that the combatants in chasing the bandits

consider it as a kind of "sporting pursuit". It follows as a matter of course, however, that the "detachments of territorial self-defense" are not destined for fighting bandits only. They are a real force upon which the administrative authorities of the Jehol or Chahar in fact depend. The "detachments of territorial self-defense" which belonged to the Djerim League, have been successfully utilized in 1924 by Chang Tso-lin during his military operations against the units of Gen.Wu P'ei-fu. This circumstance seems that, in case military operations occur on the territory of Inner Mongolia, the "detachments of territorial self-defense" of various Mongolian Hoshuns will hardly remain in the attitude of indifferent spectators.

Revolutionary Organizations in Inner Mongolia.

The formation of revolutionary organizations in Inner Mongolia began comparatively recently. Kuomintang party organizations have been formed in several cities of Inner Mongolia during the winter of 1924. Kuomintang organizations can exist in the Chahar and Suiyuan Special Administrative Areas on quite a legal ground. Notwithstanding this fact, however, Kuomintang organizations are extremely weak and not numerous even in these two regions, let alone the Area of Jehol. These organizations are headed by communists who are actually working in the "League of Workmen, Peasants and Soldiers" (see Annex 4). This League is not authorized by law and as such leads its existence under the banner of Kuomintang. Its aim is to organize peasants and workmen of Inner Mongolia, under the direction of the Chinese Communist Party. At present this League has its organs established almost in all district centers and the number of its members amounts to 6,000 of whom 20% are of Mongol origin. I became acquainted with the activity of these organs which the League had established in Kalgan, Kuelhua ch'eng and Dolonnor. In all these organizations there are permanent workers who have made great progress in their work during the last three or four months. The Kuelhua ch'eng organ of the League has carried out important work within the organi-

nation of "Galchyi" with the aid of workers whom it had specially detailed for that purpose. At present the League maintains close connections both with the leaders of "Galchyi" and with military detachments of this organization. The Balemner organization of the League has also established connections with bandits and is now conducting negotiations concerning their going over to the side of Feng Yü-hsiang and their entering the service in one of his army units. This Balemner organization is publishing a monthly newspaper which is issued in 400 copies.

The work among the peasantry is considerably hindered by the absence of suitable workers. Peasants belonging to the Party and well acquainted with the conditions of peasant life, are needed for this purpose. The agitation work which is being carried on among the Chinese and the Mongolian peasantry, is therefore insufficiently "concrete" and as such not clear enough to peasants. Pamphlets and leaflets which are being issued by the League, speak only about general problems of the fight against imperialism and militarism, but fail to show clearly enough the close connection between this fight and those interests of the peasantry for which the latter is willing to fight. It is necessary to create within the League a special Mongolian Section and to attract for work in it the Mongol intelligentsia, in order to put the agitation and propaganda work of the League among the Mongolian population on a more rational footing. At any rate the initial steps in connection with the work among the peasantry of Inner Mongolia have been already made. Now it is necessary to call a conference of the League in the near future, in order to sum up the results which have been accomplished by its local organs as well as the experience in work which has been acquired by them.

National Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia.

The National (or People's) Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia numbers about 300 members and about 2,000 sympathizers. The greater part of sympathizers are members of the "Dogailun" organization with which the National Revolutionary Party is closely connected. There are groups of the

National Revolutionary Party [illegible] all Mongolian problems. I will [illegible] on program, because their internal organization has so far no definite form, but they are in constant touch with the leaders of the Party. During the winter of 1924 and 1925 these groups were called to Peking for a conference which was attended by 17 persons. This conference elected a Provisional Central Committee of the National Revolutionary Party and decided to develop an organized political work among the Mongolian population and first of all in groups the National Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia. Gonsuico Bayanti, Nerse and Fulintai are initiators and leaders of the National Revolutionary Party. They are the representatives of the young national intelligentsia which has grown up within the last ten years. Numerically the national intelligentsia of Inner Mongolia is incomparably stronger than that in Outer Mongolia. The growth of the national self-consciousness within the population generally is fully reflected in the frame of mind of the Mongolian intelligentsia which takes a great interest in the political work and is willing "to go among the people". The rise of the movement for national liberation in China itself and the successful results which have been accomplished in Outer Mongolia and Buryatia with regard to the constructive work in a national revolutionary spirit, have a great influence upon the revolutionization of the state of mind of the national Mongolian intelligentsia. It is this intelligentsia which comes to the forefront now as the foremost revolutionary part of the Mongolian population.

The agitation work which was directed both against feudal lords and the politico-national oppression of the Mongols, was a great success among the Mongolian peasantry and the lamaist clergy of lower and middle grades. The Central Committee of the National Revolutionary Party published several pamphlets and leaflets in the Mongolian language. The 1st Congress of the National Revolutionary Party will be held in the near future. The political platform of the Party, its resolutions etc. will be passed upon at this congress.

At present the National Revolutionary Party has no clear-cut political program or platform and uses for its guidance the well known 10m

points of the original platform of the National Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia which were drawn up in 1921 by the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. The leaders of the National Revolutionary Party in Inner Mongolia are actually in constant touch with the Central Committee of the National Revolutionary Party of Outer Mongolia which is giving them a moral as well as material support. At present about 70 persons from Inner Mongolia are studying in the Party School at Urga.

Pressing Problems.

1. In order to sum up the experience which has been gained in connection with the work among the peasant masses and to outline more precise forms for agitation and propaganda work, as well as for the work of an organizing character, a conference of the "League of Workers, Peasants and Soldiers" must be called.

2. The National Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia must be assisted in adopting a clear-cut political platform based upon the proper evaluation of the movement of the Mongolian population for national liberation.

3. It is necessary to bring together as closely as possible the leading organizations both of the "League of Workers, Peasants and Soldiers" and the National Revolutionary Party and to connect them as regards their forms of organization upon the basis of common problems of the revolutionary work in Inner Mongolia.

4. Special attention must be paid to the work inside the secret peasant organizations, such as "Golchi" and "Dagelim", and next problem must be the reorganization of them upon a new basis.

5. It is necessary to win over the "detachments of territorial self-defense" to the side of the National Revolutionary Party by means of developing the party work among these units.

4. A Mongolian Cavalry unit must be organized within the Kuomintang Army of General Feng Yü-hsiang (see a special report:" Organization of the Mongolian Cavalry and its Tasks" prepared by M. Ochiroff on December 17, 1925: Annex 3).

Annexes 1-2: Short characteristics of comrades Yao Jen-t'an, Shin hair and Altan.

Annex 4: "League of Workmen, Peasants and Soldiers".

Annex 3: D. Ochiroff's report: "Organization of the Mongolian Cavalry and its Tasks".

(Signed:) M. Ochiroff.

Peking, December 17th, 1925.

Annex 1.

Yao Jen-t'ao, Mongol name: [illegible]. 40 to 45 years old, an old social and political worker, formerly member of the 1st Chinese Parliament, now at the head of the Keshikteng "Meshun". After the Chinese Revolution, he actually deprived the Prince (Dzassak) who was at the head of the "Meshun" (Banner), of all his rights, concentrated in his own hands the whole administration and under the guise of a territorial self-defense force created a cavalry detachment consisting of 300 horsemen. Until 1922 or 1923 he conducted a sinophile policy with regard to the Mongolian question. In 1911 and 1912, after the troops of the Bogdokhan of Urga had been sent to liberate Inner Mongolia and a part of the Mongolian population had risen against the Chinese, Yao Jen-t'ao at the head of a small detachment actually took sides with the Chinese Government, but did not take an active part in military operations. In 1922 he got into touch with comrades Moroz and Bayanti and since then worked jointly with them.

Yao Jen-t'ao is a good administrator, but can hardly be considered a real military leader. He has a good knowledge of the Chinese and Mongolian languages. He is a judicious and calculating man and is working now very energetically and sincerely.

Yao Jen-t'ao has spent two or three years at Canton.

(Signed:) D. Ochiroff.

(Noted on the margin:) "He needs a good chief of staff".

(Signed:) A. Egoroff.

December 18th, 1925.

Annex 2.

Sain Bair is a native of the Djerim League, about 30 or 35 years of age. He speaks the Chinese as well as Mongolian. He has been in a middle grade School, but did not complete the course. He enjoys a great reputation in the Djerim League, where he made several moves against feudal lords in the "Hoshum" of Fe-wang. He tried to cause a general rising of the population but actually was expelled from there. Having organised a detachment of Mongolian partisans, he fought last year in the ranks of Chang Tso-lin's forces against Wu P'ei-fu. He explained his participation in the fight on the side of Mukden by his desire to create a Mongolian unit to combat feudal lords. His detachment numbered about 1,500 men. Afterwards, however, on account of complications with Chang Tso-lin's commanders, he was compelled to disband his detachment and to break off all connections with Chang Tso-lin's army. Some time later he got into touch with the group of Horse and Bayunti and started the work in connection with the creation of the National Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia.

Sain Bair is a very sincere, active, energetic and persevering man. I believe that in time he will become one of the biggest social workers of "the new formation" in Mongolia. He acts now as assistant to Yao Jen-t'ao and has been given the mission of rousing the Djerim League.

(Signed:) B. Ochiroff.

(Inscription on the margin:) "He can become one of the most active assistants to Murunga (alias Yao Jen-t'ao)".

(Signed:) A. Egoroff.

December 18th, 1925.

Annex 2.

Comrade Altan, Chinese name: Cheng Yung-ch'ang, 26 years of age, is a teacher by profession. He received his education in Japan, where he graduated from Military and Agricultural Schools. He held at one time the post of Director of the Mongolian and Tibetan School at Peking. He was member of the 1st Chinese Parliament and has spent about 3 or 4 years at Canton. In 1914 and 1918 he busied himself with Mongolian problems and went for that purpose to Outer Mongolia and Kiakhta. At that time he was connected with the Japanese. Afterwards, however, he became disappointed with the policy of Japan and started the work of unifying various social elements of Mongolia. Since 1923 he has been working in contact with the group of Noyon and Bayunti for the purpose of creating the National Revolutionary Party. In 1925 he spent two or three months at Ulan Bator Hoto (Urga).

Comrade Altan is attached now to the staff headquarters of Yao Jen-t'ao as the representative of the Central Committee of the National Revolutionary Party.

As man of action he is inferior to Yao Jen-t'ao and Hsin Hsin, but surely surpasses both of them as regards education. He knows the Chinese, Mongol and Japanese language.

(Signed:) M. Cobiroff.

(Inscription on the margin:) "It is a good sign, if he has sincerely joined the National Revolutionary Party. Apparently he is a man who knows how to analyze critically social and political problems".

(Signed:) A. Egoroff.

December 18th, 1925.

Annex 4.

League of Workmen, Peasants and Soldiers.

(Extract from a conversation of comrade Voronin with the representatives of Partisan Detachments).

1. With reference to the choice of a place for the organisation of "the League of Workmen, Peasants and Soldiers" where this League would carry on its political work without being under the threat of repressive measures on the part of Chang Tsa-lin, it has been agreed to concentrate this organisation within the territory which is occupied by the troops of Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang. The program of work for this League which was presented to Feng Yü-hsiang for approval, did not evoke any objections on his part except in connection with the question relating to the denomination of this organisation. Gen. Feng insisted that the League should be interpenetrated into his army and bear the same name, i.e. Kuominchün, whereas the Chinese comrades insisted on calling the League "Min t'uan". As Marshal Feng Yü - hsiang had no objections as to the admission of Russian comrades into this organisation as workers, the Russian comrades, on their part, agreed not to protest against the proposal of Feng Yü-hsiang to give to the League the name of "Kuominchün", provided the internal direction of the work within the League was reserved for their comrades.

Now this League organised at Kuiydan, 200 versts from Kalgan, along a road suitable for automobile travel, a detachment consisting of 300 men. The Chinese comrades having expressed a desire that some Russian comrade be dispatched to carry instructions for this detachment and to decide the whole question pertaining to the selection of places for the formation of such detachments within the territory occupied by Feng Yü-hsiang, it was decided to send comrade A. Khmeleff accompanied by a Chinese interpreter for the purpose of investigating conditions on the spot (comrade A. Khmeleff presented his report relating to this journey on June 29, 1925).

2. The League has also a detachment consisting of 3,[illegible] men at Suiyuan. This detachment has been incorporated into the Kuomintang army of Gen. Feng Yü-hsiang, but as regards its internal organization it is directed by Russian comrades and carries out their instructions. A close union exists among its ranks, but the detachment suffers from the shortage of rifle cartridges. One cannot say that Gen. Feng Yü-hsiang is well disposed towards this detachment, as he has no confidence in it and is afraid that in some future time the detachment might possibly move against him. The Chinese suggested that some Russian comrade be sent for the purpose of inspecting and instructing this detachment. The Russian comrades agreed to this suggestion.

3. In the opinion of the Chinese, the upkeep of four organizations of the League in Inner Mongolia and in three Special Administrative Areas of Jehol, Suiyuan and Chahar and of 40 instructors will cost a little over 1,800 roubles a month. It is necessary to cover the expenses in connection with the upkeep of these organizations and of instructors for July 1925. The Russian comrades did not give any definite reply to this question.

Annex 3. [redacted]

Organization of the Mongolian Cavalry and its Tasks.

(Report of D.Sokolov, December 17, 1935, Peking).

About two months ago the Central Committee of the National Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia came to an agreement with Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang in regards to the organization of a Mongolian Cavalry which is to be incorporated later into the 1st Kuominchün Army. Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang decided to organize a People's Army of Eastern Mongolia relying for that purpose upon local detachments of Territorial self-defense which exist in Mongolian "Hoshuns" (Principalities) and in Chinese settlements. According to the original plan, this People's Army of Eastern Mongolia was to consist of three detachments: a Mongolian unit numbering 3,000 horsemen and two Chinese units of 3,000 horsemen each.

General Chang, former plenipotentiary delegate of Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang at Ulan Bator Hote (Urga), was appointed Commander-in-Chief of this People's Army of Eastern Mongolia. A Mongol named Tao Jen-t'ao (alias Murunga), member of the Central Committee of the National Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia, was appointed by Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang Commander of Mongolian units, upon the recommendation of the Central Committee. Chinese communist comrades ..... and ..... who had been recommended by the League of Workmen, Peasants and Soldiers of Inner Mongolia (see Annex 4), were appointed Commanders of Chinese units.

One may conclude from the above that Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang consented from the very outset that the organization of the People's Army of Eastern Mongolia should be carried out with the most active participation both of the National Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia and of the League. A complete agreement on all questions relating to the organization was reached between General Chang and the Central Committee of the National

Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia and the Leagues, with regard to problems of a political nature, particularly with reference to the Mongolian question, the leaders of the Central Committee of the National Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia, such as Bayanti, Norso and others, raised before Marshal Feng the question to the effect that the active participation of the population of Inner Mongolia, under the alliance with the Kuomintang army, in the campaign both against Chang Tso-lin and the reactionary forces, internal and external, generally could be secured, provided Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang defined his attitude towards Mongolian problems in a declaration drawn up in conformity with the following principal demands:

1/ the abolition of all rights and privileges of Mongolian feudal lords and the complete discontinuation of all support to them;

2/ the self-government (autonomy) for Inner Mongolia on the basis of the participation of the large strata of the population in government affairs.

In his conversations with the delegates of the Central Committee of the National Revolutionary Party Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang assured in principle to these demands, but on account of considerations of a "tactical" character did not find it opportune to define at that time in a public declaration his attitude towards these questions. The Central Committee of the National Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia did not insist on them. It did not even raise the question as to the possible conclusion with Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang of some written contract or agreement embodying these demands, because it was afraid of delaying thereby the settlement of practical questions relating to the organization of the Mongolian cavalry. In addition, the Central Committee was of the opinion that the consent of Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang to the organization of a special Mongolian unit to be actually under a Mongolian commander recommended by the Central Committee itself, was creating conditions under which the National Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia could and should immediately develop its work in this direction.

From the very outset Marshal Feng declared definitely that, in view of financial difficulties, he was unable to allot sufficient funds

for the organization of the People's Army of Eastern Mongolia. The Central Committee of the National Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia considered that funds would be required only during the period of formation of a nucleus consisting of 1,000 to 1,500 horsemen until the time when the cavalry would march to Jehol. It was planned that questions relating to horses, equipment and own upkeep would be settled locally in places where the units were formed, and that the Mongolian "Hoshuns" (Principalities) would give definite assistance. At first it was thought that some time would be required for the elementary military training of units etc.

As to funds, Gen. Chang alloted at first only $3,000 Mex., we gave $10,000 and the Central Committee hoped to obtain about $10,000 more.

The question relating to arms and rifle cartridges proved, however to be the most vital problem. It was known that local detachments of "Territorial Self-defence" were armed with rifles of a great variety of models and needed rifle cartridges very badly. Besides, during the preliminary negotiations with the Mongolian "Hoshuns" it was found that they were able without difficulty to supply men fully equipped and provided with horses, but without arms, because they had to keep all arms available for the purpose of defending territories of "Hoshuns" from sudden attacks of bandits, which was true to a considerable degree. It was absolutely impossible to reckon on obtaining from Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang arms and rifle cartridges. Both Gen. Chang and the Central Committee of the National Revolutionary Party were well aware of the fact that it would be to no purpose to start this question with Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang and decided therefore to apply to comrade Voronin. After long negotiations with comrades Voronin and Gregory, it was agreed that Gen. Chang would be supplied for the purpose of organizing a Mongolian Cavalry with 1,000 rifles, 12 machine guns and 1,500,000 rifle cartridges, Russian and Japanese in equal proportion. It must be mentioned that Gen. Chang acted in this matter with the knowledge and consent of Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang. The Central Committee of the National Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia hoped that the transportation of arms and rifle cartridges from Ulan Bator Hoto (Urga) would be done with the aid of

the Central Committee of the National Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia. It was decided that all this shipment would be forwarded to the monastery of Bandid-Gegen-Hoto, about 800 versts from Kulunnor in the north-western direction, within the territory of the Silingol League. Comrade Pentetel, plenipotentiary delegate of the Central Committee of the National Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia, left Ulan Bator Hoto on November 12. or 13., and was given the task of forwarding the arms which he had received at Ulan Bator Hoto, to the place of destination within a fortnight after his departure, i.e. not later than November 27. In order to hurry up the forwarding of these arms, the following practical plan was developed: the Revolutionary Council of the Mongolian Army had to dispatch from Urga its own arms and rifle cartridges which were to be replaced in the near future by Moscow and telegrams to that effect were sent to Ulan Bator Hoto under the signatures of comrades Veremin and Gregory.

Consequently we hoped to be able to form within a fortnight a nucleus consisting of 1,000 to 1,300 horsemen, to give them some preliminary training, provided there would be time to do that, and at the right moment to begin military operations.

Having come to an agreement concerning all these questions, a group of organizing workers, consisting of 30 Mongols and 35 Chinese, members of Gen.Chang's staff headquarters and workers of the Central Committee of the National Revolutionary Party and of the League, left for Kulunnor.

Actually, however, the work in connection with the organization of the Mongolian cavalry was carried on along the following lines.

The following tasks were set by the higher command of the Kuomintchin army:

1/ the Mongolian units shall march along the line Chingp'eng-Linhsi-K'aila for the purpose of capturing these district centres;

2/ Gen.Chang himself, at the head of the Chinese units, shall march in the direction of Ch'ihfeng hsien.

In the beginning of December Yao Jen-t'ao (alias Murunga), commander of the Mongolian units, was given orders to move against Chingp'eng and to

capture it within five days. At the time when this order was received, the Mongolian units, numbering 200 armed and 200 to 300 absolutely unarmed horsemen, were in the vicinity of Burhan Ula monastery, on the western bank of the Dolonnor lake, 80 to 90 versts to the west of Chingp'eng. About 500 men of Chang Tso-lin's armed forces were in the city of Chingp'eng itself and about the same number in the Chingp'eng region.

Chingp'eng was captured by the Mongolian units without difficulty, because Chang Tso-lin's units were panic-stricken and actually fled; a detachment of 300 men in the Chingp'eng region surrendered voluntarily. On December 6 or 7 the Mongolian units which numbered at that time 1,500 horsemen, some armed and some without arms, left Chingp'eng and moved against Linhsi which was captured with the same quickness, because Chang Tso-lin's forces were concentrating around Wutaneh'eng, situated between Ch'ihfeng and Linhsi to the south of Linhsi. After capturing Linhsi, the Mongolian units moved immediately against Wutaneh'eng, where an engagement with Chang Tso-lin's forces took place during the night of December 10th. In this engagement they took about 1,000 prisoners, many officers, even the chief of the divisional staff, eight guns and a large convoy. Thus within a week the Mongolian units succeeded in capturing, Chingp'eng, Linhsi and Wutaneh'eng. At present they consist of 3,000 horsemen and are stationed in the above - mentioned places. Losses of the Mongolian units were insignificant: one killed and four wounded. They joined now the forces of Gen. Chang who, after leaving Dolonnor, succeeded in reaching Chihfeng hsien. I have at my disposal no data as to the numerical strength of the Chinese units under Gen. Chang but I suppose that they too are 3,000 to 4,000 strong. The commander of the Mongolian units Yao Jen-t'ao reported in his last telegram dated December 13th that he had captured Wutaneh'eng and continued pursuing the enemy who was moving along the K'ailu-T'aonan line.

I left these regions just at the time when the Mongolian units captured Linhsi, and started their move against Wutaneh'eng.

(Translator's Note: A detailed account as to Military operations of the Mongolian Cavalry is contained in the report of Tchupreff, adviser to

to the Mongolian Group, to comrade Egoroff, Military Attaché at Peking, dated December 26th, 1925).

The present conditions are very favorable to the further development of the work in connection with the formation of the Mongolian Cavalry and I believe that in the near future, provided the Mongolian units succeed in capturing K'alu, i.e. when they reach the territory of the Djerim League, the numerical strength of the Mongolian cavalry will increase to 5,000 horsemen. It was supposed that the Djerim League would supply about 2,000 horsemen who would be under the command of comrade Sain Nair (see Annex.I). As early as a month ago we dispatched to the Djerim League a group consisting of five men who were given the task of organizing there partisan units and were then to go to join the main units of the Mongolian cavalry.

At present when three district cities are occupied and organs of three district administrations and of several Mongolian "Hoshuns" are in the hands of our military command, there is the possibility of coping comparatively easily with problems relating to the supplying of units. Worth noting is the fact that the Mongolian as well as the Chinese population is most friendly towards the units of the Kuomintang army and particularly towards the Mongolian units. There were no misunderstandings between the troops and the population, no looting or robbery of the population were committed by the soldiers. The morale of the Mongolian horsemen is very good. As political workers are absolutely lacking, the political work is being carried on only to a slight extent. A very limited quantity of literature is available: only leaflets, books and pamphlets which have been sent from Kalgan by the Central Committee of the Party.

Inspite of the fact that a great amount of artillery guns, convoys and probably, of small arms was captured at Wutanch'eng, the problem relating to arms and particularly to rifle cartridges is apparently still unsolved, because Yao Jen-t'ao in his latest telegrams asks to hurry up the delivery of these arms which have been promised. It is especially important to deliver as quickly as possible machine guns and rifle cartridges.

The Central Committee of the National Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia has adopted the following plan for work to be carried on in the near future:

1. To consolidate our position in the above-mentioned cities by leaving there small garrisons and to keep in our hands the administration of these regions.

2. To establish immediately a Politico-Military School for officers, with an enrollment of 200, and to obtain 10,000 to 15,000 dollars for the maintenance of it.

3. To bring the numerical strength of the Mongolian units up to 3,000 horsemen, paying special attention to a proper centralized organization, and to obtain instructors and political workers of Mongolian and Buriat origin, altogether 15 to 20 men.

4. To raise before Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang and Gen. Chang the question as to moving the units which are under the command of Gen. Chang along the T'ienan-Taitaikar line for the purpose of conquering the province of Heilungkiang. In that case the Mongolian units of about 3,000 horsemen may take part in the operation.

5. To start simultaneously the work in the Barga region for the purpose of restoring its autonomy. The Central Committee of the Party decided to send a group of 7 to 8 workers to Barga to carry on work there and to appoint comrade Fumintai who is now at Urga, as a plenipotentiary delegate. The question relating to the move against the province of Heilungkiang was started some time ago by Gen. Chang himself who intends to obtain the post of Military Governor there.

This plan was adopted some days ago but no agreement as to it has as yet been reached with Gen. Chang.

Such is in brief outlines the present state of the question relating to the organization of the Mongolian Cavalry.

(Signed:) D. Ochiroff.

Peking, December 17th, 1925.

Semicolle record.

(Inscription on the margin:)

"To be attached to the file on Mongolia".

(Signed:) A.Egoroff.

December 18th,1925.

"It is necessary:

1. To bring the numerical strength of the People's Army of Eastern Mongolia to 5,000 Mongol horsemen and to 5,000 Chinese horsemen.

2. To bring the numerical strength of the People's Army of Barga to 2,000 horsemen.

3. The quantity of arms so far obtained is insufficient. As the further delivery will prove to be extremely difficult, one must reckon upon capturing arms from the enemy.

4. To work out a plan of operations and to bring it into accord as regards time of putting it into execution".

(Signed:) A.Egoroff.

December 18th, 1925.

Very secret.

Report

as to the overtures made to us by the Mongols of Inner Mongolia and the Special Area of Chahar (May 1925).

There hardly ever was a civil war in China in which hung - hutze (bandits) did not participate. In the majority of cases their participation was on the side which was able to offer the greatest advantages, and though by its nature the hunghutze movement is a revolutionary one, yet of late it has played the part of mercenary troops.

In the coming war between Chang Tso-lin and Feng Yü-hsiang the bandits are bound to take a very active part. Even now there is a rumor that Chang Tso-lin is negotiatieng with the leader of the hunghutse, Chang Ching-hui, who is residing in the British concession at Tientsin. He has been already instructed to recruit bands of bandits in the region of Tientsin.

It would not be reasonable if Feng Yü-hsiang should not make use of the hunghutze. It must be said that the rear of Feng Yü-hsiang and especially his left flank, i. e. the northern part of the Chahar Area and the Area of Jehol, are to a great extent inhabited by Chinese and Mongol bandits.

Their bands which have been wandering about in these regions were dispersed by the troops of Chang Tso-lin and retreated into the western part of Jehol and the Chahar Area.

There the bandits amalgamated with the local peasant movement known under the name of "Revolutionary League of Peasants, Workmen and Soldiers".

Delegates of these amalgamated organizations began to visit us one by one beginning in the month of April. They informed us that they had at the present moment about 3,000 men, that they had sufficient rifles

for that number of men, but they were badly in need of ammunition. They state that their aim is to fight against Chang Tso-lin, and ask us to help them with cartridges and to intercede with Feng Yü-hsiang on their behalf asking him not to touch them and to give them opportunity to concentrate and organize themselves. The fact is that Feng Yü-hsiang taking them for ordinary bandits and wishing to show the people his power seized them, threw them in jail and very often had them shot.

Our problem at present is to ascertain on the spot the real condition of these bands. To that end our agent has been despatched to the Chahar Area to visit Areas in which they live. Unfortunately a personal inspection did not succeed. In view of the coming visit of our representative, the leaders of the movement collected in a village a detachment of about 2,000 men. The troops of Chang Tso-lin, having gotten wind of that gathering, attacked them, and in the fight which ensued the bandits were dispersed, and their leader Pei-Shai-en-wang was killed.

Thus we were obliged to give up the personal inspection. However, we have taken some steps to organize this movement.

Later, about the second half of May, we were visited by other delegates who came from Inner Mongolia independent of the others.

These delegates were: Morse-Gabei, representative of Barga (whom we know as the leader of the national movement in Barga) the commander of the guard detachment of the Keshikhteng tribe, a member of the left wing of the Kuomintang, and another Mongol.

They informed us that they were authorized to speak on behalf of the newly organized revolutionary committee of Inner Mongolia. The aim of the committee was the struggle for the autonomy of Inner Mongolia. They think that this end can be attained through the defeat of Chang Tso-lin, and an agreement with Feng Yü-hsiang. Simultaneously, their delegates are negotiating with Feng and with the Government of Outer Mongolia. They will coordinate all their activities with the Central Committee of the Kuomintang. To our question as to the forces at their disposal, they stated that the strength of their troops can be brought to 10,000 men. Horses undoubtedly

will be sufficient for that number. There may be some shortage of arms; but this difficulty can be overcome as they hope to get rifles from the above mentioned group of bandits who, as it is supposed, will be in alliance with them. But they need cartridges badly, and that was the principal reason for their visit to us. So far they did not indicate the amount of cartridges wanted, as this will depend on the number of men put under arms. We may also state here that besides cartridges, they also want light machine guns.

Summing up our conversations with the bandits and with the Mongols and taking into account that in this case Barga is also concerned, we must admit that the above statements are very important. Even supposing that these organizations as a whole will be able to get together only one half of the number of men they promised, i.e. 5,000, still such a mass of cavalry in the rear of Chang Tso-lin may decide the issue of the war. It must be also taken into account that a cavalry recruited of the inhabitants of other regions never would be able to pass through the localities where the native nomads, who, by the way, all are splendid riders and not less excellent marksmen, find their way easily.

Organization of the bandit bands in North Manchuria would also be an important question as in that way a considerable part of Chang Tso-lin's troops could be diverted from their principal mission.

Conclusions.

As we find the overtures made to us by the bandit leaders and the delegates of Inner Mongolia very important, we consider it necessary:

1. To supply them with cartridges (500 for each rifle) on payment in goods for this ammunition.

2. To supply them with at least 10 Lewis machine guns (or some other pattern of the light type).

3. To start training the staff necessary for directing cavalry in the coming war. (It is partly being done now in the military school at Urga, and negotiations are going on with Feng about admission of the men into the projected cavalry school).

4. To give them a political and military instructor.

Plan for Work in Jehol.

We must on no account confuse these armed detachments with bandits who are oppressing people, because they are in fact guerrilla armies for self-defense who are fighting the aggressive army of Nukan and who are imbued with a strong revolutionary spirit.

Under the political conditions prevailing now, the military strength of the Kuominchun is rather weak and therefore, if it wants to win the war, it must train and organize good revolutionary fighters. The most important problem, however, is concerning with the masses of the people. If this army becomes an armed force of the whole people, 400,000,000 will back it and then world's oppressors will be unable to annihilate it.

Conditions being such we must give our support to the armed bands in Jehol and not disband them. This support shall consist in propaganda and educational work among these masses for the purpose of making them into a real revolutionary force. The old method of subjugating the masses and of utilizing their arms and horses must not be applied.

There are now in the Jehol region not less than 30,000 armed peasants, policemen, military and bandits all of whom are protesting against Nukan. They are all under the influence of the Party and taking into consideration their fighting value and their knowledge of local conditions and of the population, they may be considered as real armies of Nukan.

The majority of these men are now concealed among the population of the region; a part of them are bandits.

1. In the district of P'ingch'ian hsien:

Wu Tung-hsien	2,000 men,
Kuo Chin-hsien	1,000 men,
Li Chin-hsin	1,000 men,
T'an P'ing-cang	1,000 men,
Ni Lan-t'ien	500 men,

P'eng Tê-lin 1,000 men

Wen Wu-hsun 2,000 men.

2. In the district of Hsich'eng hsien:

Chang Yung-hung

Yao Yün-chang 2,000 men.

3. In the district of Hsincheng hsien:

Wang Hai-yen

Ts'ao Ts'u-chen 3,000 men.

4. In the district of Chiang'an hsien:

Liu Shu-yüh

Chang Feng-Yi 3,000 men.

Jen Tsu-lan

5. In the district of Ch'ihfeng hsien:

T'ien P'ei-lan 500 men.

6. 2,000 men, under the leadership of Ch'e Tsu-hsiang and others, among these four regiments which formerly belonged to bandit organizations and afterwards went over to Mukden.

7. More than 1,000 men of the gendarmerie.

8. 1,000 men under the leadership of Liu Wei-feng and Chang Chên-feng belonging to the Jehol mixed brigade.

9. In the district of Chiang'an hsien:

Liu Ching-t'ang: the number of men under him is unknown.

With the exception of those who are among the local military units, all the rest belong to the organization of the people and to the police. A small part belongs to bandits; part of them is along the border of the Chahar and Jehol regions:

1. Pai Feng-hsiang
2. Ch'ê Hung-ming 1,000 men,
3. Jung Hsien-tien 500 men.

4. Small groups consisting of more than 1,000 men.

In a concrete form, the work may be carried on in two directions.

First, the nearby work in the Jehol region: with reference to the Kuominchün it is necessary to show that this army goes hand in hand with the masses, that it consists of armed forces of the people, that it can be on our side and supply us in case of need with munitions (shells) and that the population of the Jehol region should not entertain any suspicions. These masses can now be organized into a self-defense force which shall act under the direction of the Kuominchün.

Secondly, one could find a suitable place in the vicinity of Hsuitunico, to the north of Bolenner, and assemble there more than 2,000 men who are scattered now, in order to train them and to create a base for the self-defense forces of the Kuominchün army.

This plan presents the following advantages:

1. The masses of the people will understand that Nanking rules the people and that the Kuominchün army, on the contrary, serves them.

2. The masses of the people will understand that the Kuominchün army in giving them support does not aim only at utilizing or "swallowing" them.

3. The Kuominchün does not need to supply the masses of the people with food and arms and will be able to preserve thereby its own forces.

4. If the armed masses of the people were incorporated into the Kuominchün itself, they would not observe its discipline and would be excluded from the army and become dispersed.

5. The Kuominchün army will have at its disposal several millions of people which will be known under the designation of "self-defense forces of the Kuominchün". The organization of the people into a military force shall therefore be included into the general plan of the army.

Such is the plan in its general outlines and details can be worked out in the due course of time.

(Signed) Han Lin-fu.

39 1-1

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INT. DIV.
1927 2657-9-28 117
WAR DEPARTMENT
NOV 17

A BRIEF SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY (C.C.P.).

Introduction.

Within the last two or three years the national revolutionary movement in China has made very great progress and embraced most widely the large masses of the Chinese people.

This movement bears a well organized character and has set before itself very clear problems, which may be summarized as follows:

I. The national liberation of China. For that purpose it is necessary first of all to drive away imperialism.

2. The national unification and consolidation of the country. To attain this purpose it is necessary to carry on the struggle against the internal enemy, i.e. militarism.

The two slogans which three years ago were unknown not only to the large masses of the Chinese people, but even to the foremost classes of the society, are now the property of the whole Chinese people. This result has been attained through the persevering work of a very small group, the Chinese Communist Party. We call it "group", because from I920 to I923 the Chinese Communist Party numbered not more than I000 members, or if the "Comsomol" (Communistic Youth League) is to be included, 3000 members. Only as late as I925 the Party succeeded in increasing its membership tenfold, i.e. the number of its members was 30.000 in I926.

The Chinese Communist Party however now, as well as before, is measured not by quantity, but by quality, i.e. by its moral power and weight.

China is an exclusively agricultural country and very backward

as regards it cultural development. In such a country 30000 well organised, rigidly disciplined and perfectly conscious members of one compact organisation, although they represent only an insignificant part of the whole Chinese people, can play a most decisive role, because they possess a clear cut program which gives them not only a plan for carrying on the struggle now, but at the same time also good prospects for the future.

The revolution in the West, that is in Europe, to say nothing of America, has been somewhat delayed, and although the stabilisation of the capital was not absolutely successful, the fact however cannot be denied that capitalism succeeded in delaying for some time the day of its destruction.

As we know from a historical example, a successful social revolution can take place even in an agricultural country (the U.S.S.R.) for that reason we believe that China which is now passing through an epoch in some respects similar to the period of 1905 in Russia, can in a few years become the second country, where the power will fall into the hands of the workmen and peasants. But a persevering work and a persevering struggle are required, in order to attain this end.

The Chinese Communist Party will unquestionably be at the head of this struggle and will guide the masses, because more than any other party it has absorbed the idea and the substance of Internationalism.

The fact that the representatives of the bourgeoisie of all big capitalistic countries of Europe and America come to China as its enslavers has already compelled the world's proletariat and the communist parties of several countries to proceed to the study of the Chinese problem and to give substantial assistance to the movement for the national liberation of China and to the Chinese Communist Party.

First of all this assistance must come and has already come from the Russian proletariat and its advance guard, the All-Russia Communist Party.

The great masses of the Russian workmen and peasants must be acquainted not only with the struggle of the great masses of the Chinese people, they must also know, who is at the head of this struggle and who directs it. In other words they must know, what the Chinese Communist Party is.

It is a generally known fact which has been already noted at the last plenary session of the Communist International that in furthering the world revolution the greatest attention and support must be given to the successful development of the British and the Chinese Communist Parties.

In our survey we shall try to prove with the aid of facts, of what kind these successes are. They are really very great. Provided the process of the development of the Chinese Communist Party will go still further along the same lines, it may positively be said that the Chinese proletariat has found in the C.C.P. a loyal guide and the Communist International (Comintern) a worthy member.

It is of course impossible to embrace in a brief sketch the complete history of the revolutionary movement in China and particularly of the Chinese Communist Party (the same may be said about the history of China generally), but if we succeed in the present work in helping the comrades, who take interest in this question, to find the way for its further study, we shall consider our task as accomplished.

This survey has been compiled exclusively on the basis of Chinese materials. The author is absolutely unacquainted with the Chinese language. On account of this he has met with many difficulties and several defects will unquestionably be found in his work. The author will be very grateful if these defects are pointed out to him.

As early as ten years ago there was in China not even an embryo of anything that could have served as a foundation for the present day Chinese Communist Party. The sentence "there was not even an embryo" must be interpreted in the sense that at that time there was no organised group of comrades, who making a study of Marxism, could at some future date serve as a nucleus for the creation of a new mass organisation. We mention this fact, because in China did not exist an organised Social Democratic Party which could detach from among its members men most devoted to the revolutionary cause (such a phenomen actually took place in several countries of Europe and America).

There were of course revolutionaries in China but their ideas were very far from Marxian. They were followers of Dr. Sun or anarchists. Some individuals, who professed socialistic convictions, were also to be met with.

It would, however, not be very difficult to discover those, who have laid the foundations of the Chinese Communist Party. There were individual prominent revolutionaries, usually old but sometimes young, who even then were interested in the Marxism and devoted much time to its study. But although many revolutionaries possessed their own "ideas", none of them (either individually or in groups, if there were any) had any practical program of action, and there were no slogans which could embrace and organize the masses.

The World War into which China happened to get involved, played its part in this respect also. This war had the following consequences for China:

a/ Imperialism of the capitalistic countries, especially of Europe, compelled the bourgeoisie of these countries to let China alone and to attend to its own internal affairs. As a consequence, it became possible for the national bourgeoisie of China to develop itself. On the other hand, it became possible for those countries which formerly had occupied a secondary position in China, i.e. Japan and America, to ex-

tend further their spheres of influence.

b/ For the same reasons the national capital in China and the national industry (factories) expanded to a considerable degree and Japanese and American capitalism made a great step forward.

c/ What is more important for us is the fact that in consequence of such a growth of the Chinese national and foreign, i.e. Japanese and American, capital, the national industry in China also grew to a considerable extent, because neither England nor France or Germany could supply the Chinese market with necessary goods to the same extent as before, and the manufacturing of such goods for the use on Chinese territory began to be carried on in Chinese factories.

d/ The growth of the national industry (not, however, in the sense that it grew at the expense of the national capital, but in the sense that it grew on the Chinese territory) was accompanied with the corresponding growth of the Chinese proletariat.

At the end of the World War the number of factory workers grew to a very considerable figure. These workers were receiving in the factories an "education" on the part of Japanese and British instructors and foremen. Besides this "education", the Chinese workmen and working women in the factories were meeting face to face directly with their enemies who for several tens of years had been enslaving the country.

After the end of the imperialistic war, during the Peace Conference at Versailles, where the victors despoiled the vanquished, China, being one of the victors, demanded "Justice". Its representatives demanded the return of Shantung, of Tsingtao, of Weihaiwei and of several other territories, which had been formerly seized by Germany, but as a result of the imperialistic war had fallen into the hands of the "allies", the Japanese and the British.

The imperialistic powers which met at Versailles least of all were thinking of enslaved China and most of all of the protection of their interests. China was injured, not for the first time, it is true, but this once the injury proved to be particularly painful. It was shared

by the foremost masses of the Chinese people, especially by terrorism.

The growth of the working class, the moral and physical injury which was done at the Versailles Conference are the events by which the year of 1919 was characterized for China.

These two factors were of momentous importance and were duly utilized by real revolutionaries, who joined, but as individuals only, the communistic movement for the purposes of organizing a nucleus of the future communist party .

There were many revolutionaries who were studying anarchism, socialism and communism, but who confined themselves to the study only. They had nothing to do with the agitation . The revolutionary movement which existed before the Revolution of 1911 and continued to exist afterwards, embraced very insignificant masses, mostly "the rabble proletariat", except of course the intelligentsia, because the factories workers were keeping entirely in the background .

It is true that even as early as 1912 and 1913 there could be discerned in China the beginning of labor movements. These, however, were not purely labor organizations, but organizations of petty bourgeoisie, of handicraftsmen and of political intriguers. Political intriguers in these organizations were the agents of the Chinese bourgeoisie and of the propertied classes generally. The bourgeoisie, towns-people and landowners, was greatly interested in the existence of these organizations. Its chief interest was in the fact that by means of these organizations it could collect votes for the Parliament. Strictly speaking, this bourgeoisie practised deception and through its intriguers propounded to the masses belonging to these trade organizations the following: "China is a Republic. Now each citizen has the right to elect members of Parliament and to be himself elected as such. Everybody has the right to hold Government posts. And in order to obtain all these blessings, it is necessary to be organized and to elect good people into the Parliament".

Each intriguer organized a trade union, came to its assistance

in case of need and thereby enlisted people who had to vote afterwards for their master. To all members of these trade unions, which included handicraftsmen, shopkeepers and "the rabble proletariat" generally, the intriguers promised to secure positions, provided they elected Mr. so-and-so into the Parliament.

Such a character did the labor movement bear during the first years of its existence. As a result, however, of the imperialistic war and the consequences which it had for China, the labor movement also assumed quite another aspect and another turn. The labor movement, which had originated in 1912 and 1913, gradually came to nothing and in its stead began to appear real labor organizations in labor centers, i. e. where there was proletariat consisting of industrial workmen.

The proletariat of this kind was the eldest on railways, because railways were in China before the Great War. The foreign bourgeoisie was interested in the Chinese railways even before the imperialistic war. The foreigners are in need of railways for two purposes: on the one hand, to drain the national riches of China such as raw materials and, on the other, to import into China on these railways their own manufactured goods to be sold at fabulous prices.

In such a manner railway proletariat became the eldest proletariat in China. When Gen. Wu P'ei-fu was dreaming of becoming a national hero and of uniting the whole country by force, he was compelled to pay serious attention to this railway proletariat in order to bring it to his side. He permitted and even to a certain extent helped the workers of the Peking-Hankow Railway to organize their own union. Gen. Wu P'ei-fu hoped to make these railway workers his allies. At the same time he understood that the economic struggle between workers and their employers was an unavoidable phenomenon. He did not of course admit the possibility of a political struggle and had no intention of sanctioning it. He preferred to be on record as approving the organization of labor unions, before the workers themselves started an active struggle for the creation of these organizations.

The war, however, and the results of this war created certain economic conditions under which the working classes of China found it very difficult to live. The cost of living became higher, the purchasing power of the wages diminished and, as a result, the first strike on the Peking-Hankow railway took place in 1922. For the first few days, it is true, this strike bore an exclusively economic character, but afterwards assumed a political aspect also. It is worth while to dwell on these events more in detail.

The workers of the Peking-Hankow Railway presented to the Administration in February, 1924 several demands of an economic character. The moment of the strike coincided with the time fixed for the convocation of the I-st Congress of representatives of the Peking - Hankow Railway Union. The convocation of this Congress was sanctioned by Gen. Wu P'ei-fu. When, however, in consequence of the refusal on the part of the Administration to satisfy the just economic demands, a conflict occured between the workers and the owners of the railway, Gen. Wu P'ei-fu put forth the opinion that it was necessary to defend the interests of the capitalists and prohibited the convocation of the Congress, regardless of the fact that he himself had already sanctioned the convocation of this Congress. Such a prohibition cannot of course be considered as anything except a direct provocation on the part of Wu P'ei-fu and the capitalists who were backing him. They knew perfectly well that the workers would interpret the prohibition of the convocation of the Congress as a provocation, that the strike would assume a political character and that, as soon as it assumed such a character, it would be possible to take drastic measures against it in full accordance with martial law. What happened, fully justified their expectations. The prohibition of the convocation of the Congress and the categorical refusal on the part of the capitalists to meet the economic demands of the workers, brought the atmosphere among them to such a white heat that they actually put forth several demands of a political character. As a result, Wu P'ei-fu not only put down the strike, but

closed the trade organisations along the whole railway and arrested all ringleaders. The most active of them were shot and many were imprisoned. A crushing blow was dealt the professional movement in the most vital part, because at that time the Peking-Hankow Railway Union was the most powerful mass organisation. But the strike did not bear a well organised character and the measures taken were not thought out fully enough. On account of all that this strike was put down almost without any resistance on the part of the workers.

We have somewhat digressed from our main theme, but that was necessary, in order to throw sufficient light on this factor of a momentous historical importance. We shall, however, revert later to this theme once more.

This lesson, however, bore its fruits, because from that time the professional movement began to draw upon itself a greater portion of the attention, and the working masses perceived that the weakness of their organisation was first of all their own fault.

In the beginning, however, the organisation of trade unions met with some resistance even on the part of the workers themselves. We speak now about <u>the real trade or labor unions</u> which were being organised by the Chinese Communist Party. This resistance can principally be explained by the fact that the workers did not quite understand at that time the tasks which they were expected to accomplish and treated therefore with distrust every innovation which was being proposed from the outside. Also, they considered communists to be outsiders, because the majority of them were not connected with the manufacturing industry. The workers moreover were still keeping in mind the lessons of the past, i.e. those professional organisations which had been created for the purpose of collecting votes.

These difficulties, however, did not stop the communists and they continued stubbornly to carry on agitation among the working masses and to explain to them the importance of the organisation of trade unions. The propaganda work attained at last its end. The working masses

began gradually to understand the idea of trade unions and finally accepted it in its entireness.

The work in this domain was done exclusively by the Communist Party and, in spite of its numerical weakness, this Party succeeded in accomplishing great results.

After the end of the European War we began to witness the powerful rise of the movement for the national liberation in all oppressed countries, such as Korea, Philippines, India. With particular vigor, however, this movement spread over all China, which actually became something like a centre for all these movements. This phenomenon is of course easy to understand. All the above mentioned countries have been enslaved de facto and de jure up to IOO%. In other words, they have been simply converted into colonies. China, although enslaved in no lesser degree, succeeded, however, in preserving its national independence as a state. China is not a colony. It is usually called "a semi-colony". This circumstance does not actually alleviate in any degree the hard condition of the Chinese people but, on the other hand, facilitates to a certain extent the development of the movement for national liberation. This thesis is easy to understand and therefore does not require special elucidations. Whereas in Korea, in the Philippines, in India etc. foreign troops are quartered and the Government is in the hands of the foreigners, such a state of affairs does not exist in China. The presence of foreign garrisons at Peking, Shanghai, Tientsin and in some other cities does not mean at all that this system is to be extended to all China. China has its own administrative organs which, however, not always and, particularly, not everywhere are able to cope in a sufficient degree with the national revolutionary movement. It may seem strange, but can be fully proved by the historical facts of the recent times. As an example, the events of I925 can be cited, when such a confounded reactionary and militarist to the core as Marshal Chang Tso-lin was compelled to give to this movement a material as well as moral support!

The movement, which took such colossal dimensions immediately after the end of the imperialistic war (1919), was chiefly directed against the Japanese and at the same time against the Japanophile Government wich was composed of the members of the Anfu Party.

The whole country was seized with the most violent movement against the Government. Most of the newspapers were unanimously shouting everywhere that the Government was selling the country to the Japanese, which was absolutely true. People masses began even then to understand that mere protests and peaceful demonstrations against the Government and against the imperialism of Japan would not lead to the solution of the problem. All the previous movements (beginning from 1912 or 1914) bore an exclusively peaceful character. Only in 1919 there arose among the masses a fermentation of minds which finally brought them to the conviction that it was necessary to give up the peaceful struggle and to start an active, possibly even armed, struggle. These troubles of 1919 are to be considered as a turning point as regards the frame of mind of masses and the methods of struggle applied by them.

If we had to fix some date as a period from which to date the origin of the Chinese Communist Party, the most precise date would be May 1919. We deliberately choose this date because on May 4, 1919, a wave of anti-Japanese movement rolled over all the country. This movement was the result of the following causes: Members of the Anfu Party, headed by Tuan Ch'i-jui, were at the head of the Central Government. They were selling their country in every possible manner. The Japanese succeeded at that time in concluding with this Government an agreement, the terms of which were very onerous for China. According to this agreement, several railways, these most important nerves of the country, fell into the hands of the Japanese. The conclusion of this agreement coincided with the Peace Treaty of Versailles and with "the slap in the face" which China received at the Versailles Conference. The youth of China, chiefly the students, who cherished the hope that after the end of the war China would breathe quite freely, were in the state of great agitation.

At that time the students have already passed to "direct actions",but of an unorganized character, and terroristic methods were being applied. The Chinese Minister in Japan was severely beaten. Several governmental institutions were assaulted by students. An attempt was made at Paris on the life of the Chinese Minister and of the leader of the Communications Party (Chiao-t'ung P'ai). This was a moment of the highest tension which may be considered the beginning of an active revolutionary movement of masses. The peculiar characteristic feature of this moment is the fact that the movement which in the beginning was guided exclusively by students and in which only the students participated, afterwards caught the working masses too. They began to take interest in the events and during the May days of 1919 not only the students and the intelligentsia, but the working masses too took part in the movement at Shanghai,Peking etc. At that time the working masses began to perceive the difference between their own class interests and those of the masses of the "people" generally. In North China, especially in Peking and Tientsin, this new class consciousness took form in the desire of workmen to form their own political organizations. Just about that time there appeared in these regions a new organization, the so-called "Unions of Ten", i.e. organizations of groups, each consisting of not more than ten workers. As we see, the workers had a very strong desire to obtain their own political organization, but they were as yet not developed enough for attaining this end, i.e. to form a party.

These revolutionaries who existed at that time in China, were studying various theories as to the direction which the revolution in China would take, but nobody proposed or was doing anything concrete and practical.

It is of course an axiom for every Marxist that the man does not make history, but that, on the contrary, history creates the man. On the other hand, however, we know from history that "the man" created by history plays an important part in the development of various social and other movements. Before proceeding therefore to the detailed exposition

of the genesis of the Chinese Communist Party, it is worth noting the fact that comrade Chien Tu-hsiu, now the leader of the C.C.P. and its Secretary General, has played a very prominent and important part. He was the only revolutionary who in 1918 started the real work. He began by organising around himself the best revolutionary individuals (at that time he was chief professor at the Faculty of Literature in the Peking Government University. We do not dwell here in detail on his biography). History repeats itself, prominent individuals come forth, organise themselves into groups and attract the best elements of the society, chiefly among the working classes.

Ch'en started at Peking the publication of a weekly newspaper under the title "Mei-chou P'ing-lun" and began to elucidate most cautiously in this newspaper questions relating to the development of the working class and to the necessity of creating its political organisation. He was the chief and the most active editor and collaborator of this newspaper and only afterwards received some support from several of his friends. Besides this newspaper, he also issued periodically a leaflet, under the title "To the Peking people". His activity, however, did not last long, because some months later he was arrested and imprisoned.

In view, however, of the vigorous agitation for national liberation which was taking place just then, the authorities did not consider it expedient to deal summarily with him and after several months' imprisonment he was released. After his release Ch'en left for Shanghai, because there was no possibility for him to continue his work at Peking. At Shanghai he met T'ai Chih-t'ao, who lived and worked there, and who also issued his organ in which he was expounding Marxian ideas and theories. Ch'en Tu-hsiu began to take an active part in this organ of T'ai Chih-t'ao.

Shanghai with its highly developed industry and comparatively numerous working class attracted Ch'en Tu-hsiu at once, and finally he chose the labor movement as the main point for his work. We can say with confidence that at that time Ch'en Tu-hsiu devoted the maximum of his

attention to the problem of the labor movement. He was well aware that the question of the organization of the party was closely connected with the organization of the working classes and as neither of them existed then in China, Ch'en Tu-hsiu quite rightly started his work in both directions, i.e. in organizing simultaneously both the party and the trade unions. During the whole year (1919) the work of Ch'en Tu-hsiu consisted chiefly in the assembling of forces for the purposes of creating at first an active group and afterwards of organizing the Communist Party in China.

In the beginning of 1920, the 9-th year of the Chinese Republic, Ch'en Tu-hsiu succeeded in assembling around himself at Shanghai a group which consisted of the following seven comrades:

1/ Ch'en Tu-hsiu,

2/ T'ai Chih-t'ao,

3/ Sen Ch'ih-lu,now a reactionary,

4/ Ch'en Wang-t'ao, who soon after left the Communist Party,

5/ Li Hang-ching, who too left the Communist Party,

6/ Sou Ch'eng-t'ung, who still belongs to the Communist Party,

7/ Yung Hsiao-sung, who is still a member of the Chinese Communist Party.

We see from this list that of seven comrades four have left the party, or it would be more correct to say "have left the group", and only three remained. One of this group is worth special mentioning, namely T'ai Chih-t'ao. He took the most active part in the creation of this group, finally, however, he broke off all relations with the Chinese Communist Party and belongs now to the right wing of the Kuomintang. T'ai Chih-t'ao is a very able man, educated along Marxian lines. Now he is carrying on all the time a theoretical struggle against the Chinese Communist Party. T'ai Chih-t'ao is an ideologist of the type in the Kuomintang who says that "Communism is not for China and communists are not for the Kuomintang".

In the beginning this group started the publication of a news-

paper for workers under the title "The Worker" and of another, especially for Shanghai, under the title "The Employee". In view of the violent reaction which prevailed at that time, they were compelled to have recourse to various devices in order to be able to enlist young revolutionaries. This group organised at Shanghai the so-called "School of Foreign Language" and assembled there the best revolutionaries, in order to prepare them either for the work in China, or to be sent afterwards to the U.S.S.R. to study in the Communist University of the Far East. In 1920 the enrollment of this School was about 60 students, most of whom belonged to the Gemsemol or "Communistic Youth League". In some places of China the Gemsemol was organised prior to the creation of the Communist Party and in other simultaneously with it.

Some of the students, who were destined for the work in China, formed at Shanghai under the guidance of Ch'en and his comrades the basic nucleus of the party. First of all this group proceeded to the organization at Shanghai of trade unions which at that time did not exist at all in Shanghai.

The Mechanics' Union was the first of the trade unions which was successfully organized at Shanghai. The Printers' Union and the Union of textile workers followed. One may conclude from the above that the work of organising trade unions yielded successful results first of all among skilled workmen. Comrade Ch'en Tu-hsiu was at the head of all this work and all directives were issued by him. Many difficulties, however, were constantly to be met with. Funds were required for the organization of trade unions, as well as for the carrying on of other work, but it was almost impossible to procure them. Receipts from the sale of the "New Youth" magazine were the only source from which funds were derived. This fact alone is very significant. It proves that the youth was caught with a great revolutionary impulse and that it was taking a lively interest in everything that could assist it in analysing all acute questions. These questions were especially expounded in the "New Youth" magazine.

A nucleus of the Chinese Communist Party was organised at

Shanghai in the beginning of 1920, and in the middle of the same year this organization numbered about 70 comrades. It enjoyed considerable influence among the workers and was busy with organizing and directing the labor movement.

It is quite easy to understand that this movement could not by any means be restricted to Shanghai alone. Had that been possible, it would have surely meant a prompt "natural death" for the whole organization. As it happened, the appearance at Shanghai of a well organized group of comrades was quickly followed by similar organizations in other large centres of this country.

Even as early as September 1920, the first communistic group was organized at Peking. It consisted of eight comrades, of whom six were former anarchists and two were communists. Among the anarchists was their leader Wang Ling-sheng. The communists were Li Ta-chao and Ch'en Ku-t'a who are now members of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. The composition of the first groups which included both anarchists and communists was mixed in Shanghai the same as in Peking. This "bloc", however, between anarchists and communists did not last long and three anarchists left the Peking organization, but the latter became much stronger in spite of their departure, because their places were soon taken by four new comrades: Teng Chui-hsia, Liu Chang-lung and Liu Jen-ching (the name of the fourth is unknown).

This Peking group started at once the publication of leaflets, of pamphlets and of the weekly newspaper "The Proletarian Echo".

In Peking itself the reaction was most violent at that time, and it was found quite impossible to carry on activities there in a more concrete direction. Only some time after the Peking group succeeded in establishing at Ch'ang-hsin-tien, a station on the Peking-Hankow railway, evening courses for workers. The development of the work, however, was meeting with great difficulties, particularly because the workers themselves were mentally even more backward, than the Shanghai proletariat. Taking into account all measures which were carried out by the Peking grou

such as issue of various kinds of literature for agitation purposes, publication of the newspaper and establishment of the school, one may come to the conclusion that this group was working if not under the direct guidance of the Shanghai organisation, then at least in accordance with its advices. The fact must be emphasised that Ch'en Tu-hsiu and his group laid the real foundations of the Communist Party for all China and that Shanghai was the real centre of the Party.

In any case two organisations of the Communist Party were in existence in the beginning of the second half of 1920, one at Shanghai and the other in Peking.

In the fall of the same year a reactionary Governor, Mo Yung-hsin, was driven out of Kwangtung and his place at Canton was taken by Gen. Ch'en Chiung-ming, who at that time still considered himself a revolutionary and a member of the Kuomintang. Having occupied Canton, Ch'en Chiung-ming invited Dr. Sun, who lived at Shanghai, to come to Canton, in order to take charge of the political direction of affairs in Kwangtung. At the same time, Ch'en Chiung-ming addressed himself to Ch'en Tu-hsiu, it was not possible to establish exactly, whether he did it directly or through Dr. Sun, and proposed to him to come to Canton in order to carry on the work in connection with the public instruction. Ch'en Tu-hsiu was at Shanghai at that time. As the work pertaining to the assembling and organisation of communistic forces had been already put by him on a more or less proper footing, he hastened to seize this opportunity and went to Canton. Least of all, however, he intended to take upon himself the work in connection with the public instruction, but he decided not to let this opportunity pass, to attend to the organisation of a communistic nucleus.

After his arrival at Canton, comrade Ch'en immediately proceeded to the assembling of forces for the organisation of this nucleus. He succeeded actually in enlisting three comrades: T'ang P'ing-san, Ch'en Kung-p'o and T'ang Chih-t'ao and several anarchists. Ch'en Tu-hsiu was able to work at Canton in more peaceful surroundings,

and besides he had already some experience as a result of his previous long work at Peking and Shanghai. All these circumstances enabled comrade Ch'en Tu-hsiu to outline a draft program for the Communist Party and to present it to the Canton group for examination. Some anarchists, however, found that the program, as outlined by comrade Ch'en Tu-hsiu, contra - dicted their basic points of view and declared therefore that they could not remain any longer in the organisation. The departure of these anarchists of course did not do any harm to the organisation and, as at Peking and Shanghai, was not accompanied by any consequences. There was hardly any difference berween the anarchists generally and those working in China. They did not carry on any work among the masses. So the masses knew them very little, it would be nearer the truth to say that they hardly knew them all, and, therefore, their departure was nowhere accompanied by any manifestations on the part of the masses, as far as it is generally permissible to say "masses", when speaking of that period of time. The basic group at Canton accepted the program which had been outlined by Ch'en Tu-hsiu, although not unanimously, and proceeded to work. A school of agitators and propagandists was organised at Canton with the aim of training workers, and not only for work in Canton. The group also started the publication of a daily newspaper under the title "The Voice of the Proletariat" which was a great success.

One may say that with the organisation of the Canton group " the first line on the first page " in the history of the Communist Party was written.

Shanghai, Peking and Canton, the three centres which embrace the country almost from all sides, are the principal centres of the social and revolutionary movement in China. It was of course to be expected, and it could not be otherwise, that the work in connection with the development of the Chinese Communist Party would go in these very directions. And, as has been already mentioned, the foundations for all these groups were laid by comrade Ch'en Tu-hsiu.

After foundations had been laid in these three main centres of

the country, i.e. Shanghai, the industrial, commercial and political centre of all China, Peking, principally the centre of the political life and the big university-centre, and Canton, for a long time the centre of the revolutionary movement of all China, the movement had inevitably to grow and to spread to other places. Soon after, within less than six months, communistic nuclei had been organised in Hupei, Hunan and Honan. This movement for the organisation of the communist party began also among Chinese students abroad and soon after individual communists appeared and even small groups of communists were organised among the students at Tokio, Paris and other places.

The work was developing. In the very beginning of its development, however, the lack and weakness of forces to direct the growth and the movement of the germinating Communist Party was being felt. On account of this shortage of forces, the organisation was facing several difficulties. The question of the scope of the work was one of the difficulties. It is quite conceivable that first of all the organisation took into account the fact that it was virtually impossible with such insufficient forces to extend its activities so as to embrace the whole social movement in its entireness, and that it was therefore necessary to concentrate its efforts on some more "vulnerable" points. At that time the organisation of working masses, in other words the trade union movement, was considered as such a vulnerable point and for that reason the best forces were thrown in this direction. It was also necessary to concentrate the blow in this very direction for one more reason. Although the working class had already considerably grown as regards numerical strength, the trade union movement, was progressing very slowly and the reactionary elements began to penetrate into the working masses. The decision to use all the best forces for the organisation of labor unions among the masses, was for that period of time the most proper one. One may now say and even prove that, from the historical point of view, this decision has been already justified by subsequent facts.

The three years, 1918, 1919 and 1920, were spent in order to assemble individual revolutionaries, to create small groups of them in the largest centres of the country, to put the publishing work on a more or less proper footing and to sound the ground among the masses, so that at the beginning of 1921 it was possible to say that the "rough outline" of the Communist Party was ready. These three years must be considered as forming the period of the preliminary work in connection with collecting of materials, in order to be able to lay the final foundation of the party.

After the persevering work of three years' duration on the part of a small group of comrades who were carrying on this work under the guidance of comrade Ch'en Tu-hsiu, the following results have been obtained. There was some sort of an organisation at Shanghai which numbered about 70 partisans or supportes, not members of the party, because such was not yet in existence. There were about 10 partisans at Peking and about the same number of them at Canton. Three newspapers were published one at Peking, one at Shanghai and one at Canton. There was an organisation of the youth (Comsomol) which numbered twice as many partisans as the party itself. And last, but not least, the organisation had already acquired some experience in the work. This experience, it is true, belonged to individual comrades and not to the organisation as a whole, but in any case it could be made the basis of the further work. Having attained all these results, the party entered the year of 1921.

Under the political conditions which prevailed at that time in China, this small group of comrades who succeeded in attaining the above mentioned results, had to be shaped into a more formal organisation, without which its further work could not be sufficiently successful.

In May 1921 the <u>first Congress of the Chinese Communist Party</u> took place at Shanghai. At the time of the Congress the party numbered not more than 60 to 70 members who were more or less closely connected with the organisation, and who were really taking an active part in its work. The rest could be classified rather as "sympathizers". Eleven

delegates, all of whom were the most active members, attended the Congress. This Congress was held in the French Concession at Shanghai most secretly and went off quite safely, in spite of the efforts of the police and gendarmerie to discover its location. The initiators of the Congress, including Ch'en Tu-hsiu, hoped that this Congress would succeed in solving all problems in connection with the communistic movement. Ch'en Tu-hsiu being busy at Canton could not attend the Congress in person, but he sent a program outlined by him for its consideration. The Congress reflected the real picture of the condition of the Chinese Communist Party at that time. Men of different opinions, political views and frames of mind assembled at the Congress. The same phenomenon which could be previously observed at Peking, Shanghai and Canton during the organisation of local groups or nuclei, i.e. a complete heterogeneity as to their composition, repeated itself once more at the Congress. Among the eleven delegates there were followers of the biblical socialism, of social democracy, of anarchism and of communism. So it was very difficult to come to some definite agreement. Then the program which had been outlined by Ch'en Tu-hsiu and sent by him from Canton, was brought forward for discussion. In drawing up this program Ch'en Tu-hsiu was very cautious and most of all treated the following points: the necessity of giving education to the members of the party, the guidance of this party in a democratic spirit, party discipline and the necessity of approaching the masses very cautiously, in order to bring them into the party fold. He said in this program that "the party was not yet facing the question of taking power into its own hands, that this question belonged to the problems of the future, and that before handling this question it was necessary to carry out a great work of a preparatory character". In spite, however, of such a moderate character of this program to some delegates it still appeared to be too radical. Others, on the contrary, held the opinion that it was not necessary at all to accept some definite program. The following characteristic episode may be cited in order to make the general atmosphere prevailing at the Congress and the state of

mind of its delegates more clear. During the discussion of this program of Ch'en Tu-hsiu, one of the delegates Li Hang-ching (he is no more in the ranks of the C.C.P.) gave the following opinion: "We have at present a revolution in Germany and a revolution in Russia. Both these revolutions took different roads. We see in Russia the power in the hands of the communists and the dictatorship of the proletariat, and in Germany the democratic regime. We do not know which of these countries is right, because our connection with them is very weak. We must make first a thorough study of these two revolutions, before we are able to decide the question which has been brought up by Ch'en Tu-hsiu, i.e. the question relating to the program and, consequently, to party tactics. And for that purpose some of our comrades must go to these countries and make there a study of these questions". In such manner did he approach one of the most important and vital questions of the party. It is quite clear that, as such currents of thought of a manifestly opportunistic character were to be observed at the Congress, it was not to be expected that this Congress would or could discuss the question as to the Chinese Communist Party joining the Comintern. In fact this question was not even raised at the Congress. The tendencies which were most brilliantly expounded by Li Hang-ching, went even to such a length as to reject all active revolutionary work. They were against the interference of the party with the affairs pertaining to the trade union movement, against the publication of special communistic literature and even against "politics" generally. They admitted only "the study". That was "academism" sui generis, which was "the regurgitation" of specific Chinese conditions and, to a certain extent, had some connection with the theory of Dr. Sun who used to say: " It is easy to act, but difficult to know (to learn)". One may draw this conclusion from the fact that they considered it necessary, first to "study" in order to "know", and then to "act". They usually expressed their idea in the following words: "If we succeed, as a result of our study of revolutions in Russia, Germany and in the West generally, in getting acquainted with the real substance of the revolution and, after

gaining this knowledge, in choosing the right path, it will be afterwards easier for us to act". The same opinion was expressed by Dr. Sun, when he was speaking against the old point of view of the Chinese people to the effect that "It is easy to know, but difficult to act".

Such dispute, as between Dr. Sun and the old Chinese ideology as to what is easier: "to know or to act", has of course nothing in common with Marxism and its ideology generally, but in particular had no relation to the Chinese Communist Party during the first Congress. Had not the majority of the delegates at the first Congress shown resistance to this dangerous tendency of Li Mang-ching (Ch'en Kung-p'o also joined him) the party would have been doomed to ruin. Or it would be nearer the truth to say that the party would not have received any regular organization at all and its embryo would have withered away. Notwithstanding the fact, however, that the working masses and the masses which had any relation at all to the revolutionary movement, were not of such a calibre as to be able to exert pressure on their guides or leaders (in this case the Congress played to a certain extent the part of a leader or guide), and the general surroundings were not such as to admit the possibility of such a pressure, the majority of the delegates themselves perceived that it was necessary to show a decisive resistance to this current, that the very existence of the party was at stake and that half-measures would be of no avail. The Congress took up the question from this very view-point. A decisive resistance was shown to all these dangerous currents and almost all proposals of Ch'en Tu-hsiu relating to the centralization, to party discipline and to the final goals of the party (seizure of power) were decided in a positive sense. But all these decisions were taken as a basis to be included as such in the future program of the party. It was decided at the Congress that the party would be the <u>Communist Party</u>, that in its work it must follow communistic principles and that <u>the final result</u> of this work must be the organization of the proletariat and <u>the seizure of the power by it</u> under the guidance of the party. This point about the seizure of power proved to be most dis-

concerting for such opportunists as Li Hung-ching and Ch'en Kung-p'o. It is a very characteristic fact that as early as during the first Congress it was decided that all members of the organization who were holding non-communistic tendencies or views, would ex ipso place themselves outside the ranks of the party. Such a clear-cut program of course helped the party in many ways and afforded it the possibility of carrying on successful work in the future. The first elections of members for the Central Committee took place at this Congress and Ch'en Tu-hsiu was elected General Secretary.

Immediately after this election, Ch'en Tu-hsiu left Canton for Shanghai and proceeded to take charge of the Central Committee of the Party as its General Secretary. Here, however, difficulties were also awaiting him. On his arrival at Shanghai, Ch'en Tu-hsiu was almost immediately arrested and was able to start his work only after his release.

For this time also Ch'en Tu-hsiu remained true to his old principles and first of all began to intensify the work in connection with the trade union movement, the more so because the ground was favorable for that purpose.

In order to direct the trade union movement, a special Bureau was organized and Ch'en Ku-t'a was placed at the head of it. Then the organization of the publishing work was started.

An organization called "Book Business" was established which proceeded to publishing of communistic literature. The following works were published: "Program of the Communist Party", "Labor and Capital", "The Communistic Manifest" by K.Marx, "Soviet System of Power", "Program of the Russian Communist Party", "History of the Russian Revolution". Most of these works were translations from English and also from Russian into Chinese. At first, however, this publishing organization proved to be a financial failure and that for a very simple reason. Persons in whose hands the direction of this work had been placed, were under the impression that this literature was to be distributed gratis, because it would hardly find a ready sale. This proposal was carried into effect and as a result the

publishing organization failed. This was the mistake not only on the part of persons who directed the organization, but chiefly on the part of the Central Committee to which belonged the general guidance of the publishing work. This episode is characteristic enough, because it shows that even such stalwart communists, as Ch'en Tu-hsiu and others were not quite sure of their own forces and entertained doubts as to whether their literature would find a ready sale on the book market, although this literature, one may assume, was not being published in millions of copies, but certainly in much smaller quantity! This of course was a mistaken opinion on their part, the under-estimation of their own forces which resulted in a mistaken decision. It is also worth noting that besides the fact that the agitation and propaganda work was progressing very slowly, the work in connection with the distribution of the literature was proceeding equally slowly. This fact, however, rather bore testimony to the improper footing on which the publishing work was put and to the inability of selecting materials suitable for publication, than to the absence of interest among the readers whose trend of mind was quite revolutionary.

Whereas, however, the agitation and propaganda work, generally speaking, was developing slowly and was meeting only with little success especially among the working classes, the trade union movement, on the contrary, was making at the same time a very good progress.

The labor movement was making rapid progress throughout all China, especially in regions with developed industries. The rapid growth of the labor movement afforded the Communist Party the possibility of proceeding to the mass organization of trade unions, instead of small nuclei which had been formerly founded by the Party among the working masses. The mass trade union movement went along the same lines. Trade unions on a larger scale were started at Shanghai first among mecanics, then among textile workers and printers etc. The chief impertance of that period, however, lies in the fact that trade unions were not confined to working masses only, but included employees generally. This mass labor

movement coincided with the rise of industry, its growth and prosperity. Whereas, however, such positive phenomena could be observed in the general state of industry, the condition of workers at the same time left very much to be desired. Then there started the so-called "active labor movement" which bore an exclusively economic character and found its expression in an economic strike. The first strikes took place at Shanghai in the large industrial undertaking which belongs to the British American Tobacco Company. Members of the Chinese Communist Party took an active part in the organization of this movement. They went into the very "thickness" of working masses, into workers quarters, carried on an agitation for the economic struggle and proved the necessity of creating mass labor unions. The Chinese Communist Party met, however, with great many difficulties in this struggle. In spite of the excited state of mind of the working masses, this move on the part of the communists appeared to them to be very bold and risky, because the working masses always believed that this mass trade union movement should be only legal, i.e. sanctioned by law. The most backward elements among the workers simply had doubts about the "purity" of this move and suspected some provocation. This was the consequence of former "trade unions" the history of which was at that time well known to the workers ("trade unions" of 1912-1913). In fact the communists generally were quite unknown to workers; besides their status was illegal and they could not always show their "real face". Therefore the workers suspected that they were agents of the bourgeoisie or, at best, agitators sent out by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. In both cases, they supposed that the communists wanted to utilize them for the purpose of armed struggle. In connection with this some curious facts took place which were the direct result of the stagnation of the real Chinese life. The communists proposed at one meeting to write simply " the year of 1921 " instead of "the 10-th year of the Chinese Republic" . The workers, however, the backward elements among them of course, began to express quite openly suspicions that these communists were emissaries of the Manchu agents who were against the Republic, and proposed therefore to write " the year of 1921 " instead of "the 10-th year" ! And in connection with such a simple and clear question

which even for the least conscious person left no doubts whatever, the Chinese Communist Party was compelled to sustain quite a fight, to carry on a special agitation, and only after prolonged elucidations the workers finally understood and gave their consent. Under such difficulties the Chinese Communist Party had to carry on its work.

As the growth of the Communist Party had a strictly gradual character, beginning in the large proletarian centre, Shanghai, and moved gradually to Peking, Canton, Hankow etc., so did the trade union movement follow the path which the party was taking.

About the same time a trade union movement began to develop in North China also, i.e. at Peking and Tientsin. As had been already mentioned, even evening courses for workers, chiefly for railwaymen, were organized in the North. As at Shanghai the courses of foreign languages were the place for the development of propaganda of communistic ideas and for the training of workers of the Chinese Communist Party, likewise the evening courses at the station of Ch'ang-hsin-tien served as a place for agitation, for the propaganda of communistic ideas and for the enlisting of members of the party. Therein lay the difference between these courses and the courses of foreign languages at Shanghai, where members of the party were not enlisted, only received their training. Besides this school, the evening courses at Ch'ang-hsin-tien, the communists often visited places such as tea-houses, restaurants, eating-houses, etc., where they could meet workers during rest-hours. Here also they had to overcome several difficulties. Workers in China, except most of the railway men, are in a complete dependence on their contractors, and however strange it may seem at first, the communists were compelled in the beginning to endeavor to establish connections with contractors, foremen, in a word with all those who in some way stood over the worker in the manufacturing enterprises. It is quite easy to understand that actually the communists had nothing to do with contractors, because they had nothing to tell them and it would be absolutely useless to try to find a language in common with them. They had therefore to endeavor to divert workers from their

contractors, foremen etc. They had, however, many difficulties in connection with this work. Only after six months, in May 1921, did they finally succeed in obtaining some results. A meeting which was attended by more than 1000 workers took place at the station of Ch'ang-hsin-tien and the question relating to contractors was brought up for discussion. This meeting was a part of the campaign which the communists were carrying on constantly with great cautiousness among individual workers and small groups. The communists succeeded at this meeting in making one point quite clear, namely that the influence of contractors over workmen could be considered almost as " liquidated " , and that the time and possibilities had arrived to take the guidance of the masses into their own hands. Here also the Communist Party put forward as its slogan the necessity of organizing a mass trade union and obtained the full approval of the working masses. In such a manner the beginning of the mass trade union movement was made also in North China, in May 1921.

We can venture to say with confidence that in 1921 the mass trade union movement was started in all industrial centres of the country. During this year there were formed at Shanghai trade unions of almost all branches of labor. The professional organization of railway workers was brought into existence on all the railways throughout all China. The trade union movement gradually embraced also the workers in the mining industry in Honan, Chihli, Hunan and other provinces. This time the trade union movement bore a well organized and quite proper character. The word "proper" is used in the sense that this movement was the work of the workers and of the party of the working class, as distinguished from the "labor movement" of 1912 and 1913 which had been organized by political intriguers and adventurers of all kinds. A beginning in this direction had been made, it was only necessary to strengthen the positions which had been gained and not to let the adventurers of former times to penetrate there again. The task was not easy and all the work in this connection, from beginning to end, was carried out by the Chinese Communist Party and under its exclusive guidance.

The significance of this year (1921) for the Chinese Communist Party and its work was marked by another event. Owing to the efforts of this party, China took part in the Conference of Peoples of the Far East which was held in 1921 at Moscow. The principal aim of the convocation of this Conference was to organise a move on the part of the peoples of the Far East against the Washington Conference and its resolutions. The Chinese Communist Party took all measures in order to have the Chinese people represented at this Conference. It developed in the columns of its periodical press and at the meetings the widest agitation, trying to prove the necessity of sending a delegation to Moscow. In this matter, however, the Chinese Communist Party had many opponents who not only assumed a negative attitude towards this idea, but were even carrying on active struggle against its realization. In spite of this stubborn opposition, however, the communists finally succeeded in getting together a delegation which was sent to Moscow to participate in the Conference of Peoples of the Far East. This delegation which numbered about 30 delegates, consisted of the representatives of students, of workers and of the Kuomintang and also included some communists. Worth noting is the fact that this delegation was composed of representatives of almost four organizations or, which will be more true, of "three strata of the Chinese Social structure" , i.e. workers, intelligentsia (students) and, to a certain extent, petty bourgeoisie of towns (the Kuomintang "milieu" is meant, because the Kuomintang, particularly at that time, was especially connected with the petty bourgeoisie). As to their political convictions, most of the delegates with few exceptions had no well defined views in this respect. The delegation went to the conference without a definite program and without coordinated points of view. The Communist Party had no time to and really could not accomplish this work of coordination. The delegation itself would not have brought forward at the Conference a political program etc. because it really did not understand clearly enough the meaning of the tasks with which it was confronted. This circumstance, however, did not lessen at all its importance, which lay in the fact that the delegation took part in the

Conference which had an international significance. The importance of the Chinese Delegation was moreover greatly enhanced by the fact that the Washington Conference devoted 90% of its work and time to the so-called "Pacific problem" and the Pacific problem consists to a considerable degree of the "Chinese question". So we venture to say with confidence that had not the Chinese Delegation attended the Moscow Conference, the latter would have lost all its importance. That is the reason, why we dwell so much in detail on this fact and consider that even then a colossal work was carried out by the Chinese Communist Party in this direction. It would also not be superfluous to mention the fact that even a woman was among the delegates, one named Wang F'i-huang who, when at Moscow, went to see comrade Kollontay (Translator's note: Ambassadress to Norway and then to Mexico) and represented herself as being the leader of the women's movement in China. This delegate, however, did not show herself in a particularly good light when at Moscow. First of all she asked for money for the purpose of organizing the work among women. On her return to China, she proved to be an " agent provocateur " sent out by Ch'en Chün-ming. At his instigation she attempted on the life of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and at the order of the latter was shot. It is true that this example from the domain of the women's movement in China is not very promising; still it proves that even at that time there were some embryons of such a movement and that the initiative in this respect also belonged to the Chinese Communist Party. It must be said, however, that although this journey of the Chinese Delegation to Moscow for participation in the Conference did some good, it was also accompanied by some un - pleasantness (it would hardly be true to say "harm") . It is a generally known fact that there was a famine in Russia just at that time. The food with which the Chinese Delegates were provided at Moscow, though not quite good, still was considerably better than that which was usually doled out to the Russian workers and to the population generally. It was not a question of principle or a political question and for the politically conscious man not even a question at all; however, it played to a

certain extent its role. Famine, disorder and other defects which were the result of the internecine war and which were striking sharply the eyes of everybody, produced a very oppressing impression on some of the delegates, particularly on the Kuomintang men. The communistic members of the Delegation, very young as to age and having an insufficient experience as to political work, did not give themselves the trouble of explaining to their fellow-delegates the causes of disorder, of famine and of other defects in Russia. Instead of doing this, they simply started a quarrel and without using any arguments demanded that their interlocutors should admit that their communistic point of view was right. They formulated their thesis in the following words: "All is well, but to you all seems to be bad". Besides, these words were usually accompanied by insults on the part of the communists. Many members of the Delegation, especially the Kuomintang men, on their return to China, declared that, during their journey together with the communists and during their stay in Russia generally, they had come to the conviction that the communists would hardly be able to do any good. They based this conclusion on the actual conditions prevailing at that time in Russia. As regards the Chinese communists, some of the delegates, such as Chang Chiu-pei and other Kuomintang men, made even the following declaration: "The Chinese communists are unquestionably our opponents and we must beware of them".

The abovementioned facts are a brief resumé of what was done and what took place in the life of the Chinese Communist Party during the period from the first Congress until the middle of 1922. Soon after the Moscow Conference of the Peoples of the Far East, in June or July, 1922, the Second Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held. The party at that time, in comparison with its position during the first Congress was considerably stronger and had grown both as regards their numerical strength and quality. It had received some practical lessons and acquired experience in its work. This Congress, as distinguished from the first Congress, may be called a reunion of partisans who were united in aim, held a common Marxian platform and were capable of dialectic

reasoning. At this Congress the party finally adopted a well defined program and, what was most important, finally and unanimously decided to join the Third Communistic International. This congress approved a corresponding declaration in which the views of the party as to the internal and international situation were expesed in detail. The party has already become conscious of itself, of its force and its role. One of the most important questions which were brought up for discussion at this Congress was the resolution relating to the necessity of carrying on the struggle for the creation of a united democratic front. We have already mentioned that the party became conscious of itself, i.e. learned how to know itself, and we may add now that the masses learned to a considerable degree how to know the party. The party had to put forth its political demands, had to show its "political face" and the Congress brought forward a political program which consisted of the following seven points:

1. To fight militarism, in order that the country might enjoy an internal peace.

2. To fight foreign imperialism until its final expulsion from China. In other words, to carry on the struggle for the complete independence of the Chinese people and of its Government.

3. The creation of a united Chinese democratic state (Republic).

4. Borderlands, such as Mongolia, Tibet and Sinkiang, must obtain the right to self-determination.

5. The Chinese Republic must be organized in accordance with the federal system, similar to the United States of America.

6. The universal, direct, equal and secret suffrage, freedom of speech and of meetings, freedom of the press and of strikes.

7. The following legislation relating to labor and peasant questions etc. must be enacted:

A/ Labor legislation .

The bettering of living and working conditions of the workers must be provided for. The system of contractors shall be abolished. The eight hour working day in the factories, mills, mines, on the railways etc. shall be enforced by law. Workers shall receive medical treatment free of charge, dispensaries shall be established in the factories and mills. All rules of hygiene shall be observed. Life insurance of workers shall be introduced. Work of juvenile workers and of old men shall be protected by a special law. The organization of assistance to be given in case of unemployment shall be enforced by law .

B/ Legislation relating to the peasant question.

a/ Likin and other abnormal taxes shall be abolished. A consolidated income tax shall be introduced in their place.

b/ Fixed land rent shall be enforced by law.

C/ Other legislation .

a/ All laws which restrict the freedom of women shall be abolished. Women shall be made equal to men both in their political and economic rights.

b/ The system of the education of the people shall be improved.

All the above mentioned points were included into the manifesto or Declaration of the Second Congress.

Resolutions which were passed by the 2-nd Congress, embraced all principal problems with which the national revolutionary movement in China was confronted at that time. The Congress could not of course confine its activity to paper resolutions only. It is quite easy to understand, however, that in order to carry them into effect, it was necessary first of all to unite all democratic and revolutionary forces of China. For that purpose the Congress passed the resolution that the newly elected Central Committee should exert all its efforts in order to arrange the convocation of a United Conference of all really democratic-revolutionary forces; in other

words, that it should exert all its efforts in order to create a united front of revolutionary elements of the Chinese "social structure". The importance of the 2-nd Congress in the history of the Chinese Communist Party is proved by its deeds as follows:

1/ The Congress adopted a well defined program which defined the aims and problems of the Chinese Communist Party both as regards present day problem and those of the future.

2/ By adopting this program and taking a definite designation for the party, i.e. Communistic, the Congress unveiled its "face" and showed that it intended to follow the Marxian path.

3/ The Congress passed a resolution that the Chinese Communist Party was an integral part of the world's communistic movement and that it had joined the Third International. It defined thereby its attitude towards the international revolution.

4/ The Congress demonstrated that inspite of its small numerical strength the Chinese Communist Party had succeeded in gaining sufficient experience in work and could find proper solutions for the national problems of China. This was proved by the resolution of the Congress relating to the necessity of straining every effort in order to create at any price a united front of revolutionary forces of China.

5/ The Congress pointed out, and quite rightly, that, notwithstanding many problems which were facing the Chinese Communist Party, its main problem was the development of the trade union movement, i.e. the gaining over of working masses to the Party.

At the time when the 2-nd Congress was held, the frame of mind of the masses had changed and they began to take a lively interest in the party. The most striking proof of this interest is the fact that all literature that was being published by the Party was immediately bought up. The masses were eager to know, what the party was saying, how it was thinking and what proposals it was making. More than twenty delegates attended the 2-nd Congress.

In 1922 the revolutionary movement made good progress not so

much with regard to the increase of numbers, but especially as regards the improvement of quality . One could feel that the moral weight of the real revolutionary forces was growing and that these forces would stop at nothing in order to attain their aims and to solve all the problems which they had set themselves. This was especially perceived by those quasi-democratic elements who in the bottom of their hearts were cherishing non-democratic principles and aspirations. The first blow at the real revolutionary movement was struck at Canton. Although this blow was not aimed directly at the Chinese Communist Party, still this blow caused it at that time much unpleasantness.

This blow was struck on July 12, 1922, almost immediately after the close of the Second Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, by Ch'en Chün-ming who on that day made at Canton his coup d'Etat and drove out Dr. Sun Yat-sen. This coup was caused by persistent demands of Dr. Sun that the Northern Expedition should be organized at any price. He made these demands in the interests of the revolution, but possibly did not suffi - ciently take into account the real forces and possibilities. The only real fence upon which Dr. Sun Yat-sen could reckon was the support of the Chinese people and of his personal followers, and it must be admitted that Dr. Sun was making his calculations accordingly. Ch'en Chün-ming also pretended playing the role of the old revolutionary, but the difference between him and Dr. Sun Yat-sen lay in the fact that Ch'en Chün-ming did not set himself such vast tasks as the unification of China etc. Ch'en Chün-ming had already become then a typical Chinese militarist whose only aim was to loot and enrich himself. At that time Ch'en Chün-ming was closely connected with the propertied classes of Kwangtung and himself had become a "rich" merchant. As a counterbalance to Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Ch'en Chün-ming insisted first on the putting in order of the affairs of Kwangtung and was saying that after all has been put in order in Kwangtung, it would be then possible to raise the question as to the Northern Expedition. There is no room to doubt that Ch'en Chün-ming was the spokesman of the desires of compradore

and other propertied elements of Kwangtung, as well as of Hongkong. They were very well aware that such project, as the Northern Expedition would prove to be very expensive for them, because Dr. Sun Yat-sen would drain all out of their pockets, and that it would be much easier for them to maintain Ch'en Chün-ming, no matter how griedy he was, and his army at Canton, than to provide the Northern Expedition with the necessary financial means. Were we to consider and to weigh now all the chances which Dr. Sun Yat-sen had at that time, it would of course be perfectly clear that the Northern Expedition was doomed to failure. And strange as it may seem, the Chinese Communist Party did not take Dr. Sun's part at that time. On the other hand, it did not openly support Ch'en Chün-ming. At that time the Chinese Communist Party could not yet give its definite opinion as to the question of the Northern Expedition, because it was as yet playing a very insignificant role, and because it did not believe in the success of this expedition. As to the opinion of the political and revolutionary elements generally, it also was not in favor of Dr. Sun in this matter. The best, the educated and most democratic elements of that time, supported Ch'en Chün-ming and were dissatisfied with the policy of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Dr. Hu Shih, the famous Chinese scholar and social worker, for instance, in all his literary writings and public speeches was trying to prove that Ch'en Chün-ming was a real revolutionary, that all his actions were truly revolutionary and that Dr. Sun Yat-sen was quite wrong. Many former friends of Dr. Sun and his followers advised him to retire from all political activity, because he had demonstrated his inefficiency. And finally Dr. Sun Yat-sen left Canton for Shanghai.

The Chinese Communist Party remaining true to its resolutions came to the conclusion that it was time for the party to enter actively the political stage and that first of all it was necessary to carry into effect the principal resolution of the 2-nd Congress, i.e. the creation of a united front. Disregarding the fact that Dr. Sun Yat-sen was a negligible quantity at that time, because he had lost his main base, i.e. the Kwangtung province with Canton, the Chinese Communist Party understood never-

theleap that Dr.Sun and his followers, the Kuomintang Party, were the only really democratic element which, under certain conditions, could count upon success, and some representatives were sent to Dr.Sun to expound its views and to propose the joint work of the Kuomintang and of the Communist Party, in other words, the creation of a united front. The Communist Party promised to Dr.Sun Yat-sen every support, and it must be recognized that he did not belie the confidence the Communist Party had put in him. Disregarding the fact that he was being severely criticized at that time by many and that attacks were aimed at him from all sides, Dr.Sun Yat-sen at once gave his consent to this proposition of the Chinese Communist Party. It is true that in this respect he succeeded in finding a powerful support among the most prominent Kuomintang members who also were living at that time at Shanghai, such as Wang Ching-wei, Liao Chung-k'ai, Hu Han-min and others. On the other hand, there was even then a group of right members who were against such a unification (bloc) and who claimed that all this question of the "united front" was a humbug and that the Chinese Communist Party wanted to create this united front only to be able to grow at the expense of the Kuomintang. They assert even now that the Chinese Communist Party has grown and is still growing at the expense of the Kuomintang. This, however, is sheer nonsense from the beginning to the end. The honest Kuomintang members admit even among themselves that just the contrary has actually taken place, i.e. that the Kuomintang has grown only due to the fact that the Communist Party was giving it every support in its work.

These negotiations which were being conducted between the representatives of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and Dr.Sun Yat-sen, lead to definite results. Only in August, 1922, the Chinese Communist Party called a plenary meeting of its Central Committee, at Hangchow, the provincial capital of Chekiang, at which this question was again raised in a broader sense. The resolution was adopted at this plenary meeting that the Chinese Communist Party should endeavor to effect an amalgamation of both parties, the Kuomintang and the C.C.P., as far as their internal organization was concerned. This resolution was passed unanimously,

because at that time this question did not call forth any dissents among the party members, except among some individual comrades. The conditions then required the passing of such a resolution, because it had been found that the working class and its party would not be able to cope with their colossal problems, relying on their own forces only. It was especially difficult to extend the work to the large masses of the whole social structure, the interest of which in politics was growing daily. The Kuomintang itself did not show any activity, because in fact such a party did not even exist. The Chinese Communist Party communicated this resolution to Dr. Sun Yat-sen who was very pleased with it and again gave his full consent. The Kuomintang was so weak at that time that all principal members, even those who, such as Hu Han-min, never professed left principles, approved this decision of Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

The Chinese Communist Party, in passing this resolution relating to its amalgamation with the Kuomintang, fully perceived and took into account those difficulties which it would encounter in the future in connection with this resolution. At that time the Kuomintang was not yet properly speaking a party. There were groups and individuals who shared political views of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, but were not connected among themselves by anything more than common political convictions. There was a total absence of party discipline, total absence of any program whatever. In addition the whole mass of the party was permeated with prejudices. It will be sufficient to cite only one instance in this respect, in order to show how backward this Kuomintang "party" was at that time. The admission into the party was accompanied with several ceremonies of just an ordinary "bourgeois" character, without any sign pertaining to the revolutionary nature of the party. Every candidate who was admitted into the party took the oath of fealty to its President, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, and in lieu of the seal made an impression with his finger. These were the most characteristic ceremonies, but in addition to these there were still numberless rites which bore testimony to the fact that this was rather a sect than a party. To such a "party" the Chinese Communist Party was willing to bind

itself by concluding an alliance with Dr. Sun Yat-sen. The Party, however, was ready to do it because this was the only means of obtaining legal access to the mass movement. First of all the Chinese Communist Party decided to raise before the Kuomintang the most pressing questions, to work them up accordingly and then to broadcast them as battle-slogans of the day. These two slogans were " Down with Imperialism " and " Down with Militarism ". These two slogans embraced everything that was living in the Chinese social structure and contained the vital problems of the day, questions both of internal and external character. "Down with Imperialism" and "Down with Militarism" were for the large people masses almost the same what "the discovery of America" was for the Middle Ages. Nobody, not only the lower classes, but even the intelligentsia, this " foremost layer of the Chinese social structure ", had previously any notion as to these two slogans, and before followers could be found, the Communist Party had to carry on a wide agitation and fight for their recognition. The agitation was carried on among the lower and the middle classes of the society. As to the fight, the communists were compelled to conduct it, strange as it may seem, against the foremost part of the society, against professors etc. Of these two slogans the first one, " Down with Militarism ", was easier both to understand and to adopt, because militarism is an exclusively national phenomenon, the burden of which was being and is still being felt daily and directly by large masses of the people in all its entireness. It affects unfavorably their well being and, in short, does not let them live in peace. As to the second slogan, " Down with Imperialism ", it was more difficult to grasp and still more difficult to adopt, because it met with a violent opposition, even among the revolutionary circles. The same Dr. Hu Shih printed in his newspaper " Nu-li jih-pao " a series of articles in which he developed the following idea: " The Chinese were never oppressed by imperialism. Imperialism, on the contrary, did China much good. It treated the Chinese very well. So there cannot be a question as to mal - treatment etc. " Dr. Hu Shih expressed the opinion not only of the Chinese foremost intelligentsia, but his point of view also coincided with that of

larger circles of the Chinese society. This circumstance is explained by the fact that imperialism usually did not carry out its policy directly but chiefly through its creatures, the bourgeoisie of the compradore class and Chinese militarists. It has been pointed out quite rightly by some people that imperialism conducted its abominable affairs in China so neatly that in the eyes of large people masses it sometimes seemed to play the part of a "pacifiator" . The Japanese made the only exception to this general rule. The masses of the people hated the Japanese and were ready at any moment to tear them to pieces, but this anti-Japanese movement had nothing in common with the fight for the expulsion of imperialists from China. Not only the large masses of the people, but the foremost elements of the society followed the same line of thinking in connection with this question. Even the Kuomintang men and also some other revolutionary groups were of the opinion that the Japanese were enemies of the Chinese people, but did not say a word about other imperialists. The anti-Japanese movement did not bear quite an independent character, but was then closely connected with the anti-government movement generally, i.e. it was directed against members of the Anfu Party. This circumstance also did not afford the opportunity to comprehend fully the real state of affairs, because the hate of the Japanese was even somewhat obscured by this hatred of the Government. And all these "good - neighborly" relations with foreigners and the "hospitable" attitude towards them may be considered as a consequence of the policy which the foreigners were conducting in China. Parallel with robberies and violences which they were committing in China, foreigners established newspapers, schools, peasant societies etc. Taken as a whole these acts on their part were an all embracing apparatus for agitation and propaganda in favor of imperialism. One must keep in mind that this agitation bore a character of "monopoly", that during many years there was nothing to oppose it. It is quite easy to understand therefore that in such a backward country, as China, the results of such a "monopolistic" agitation must tell and they really told. The people were so benighted by missionary

Schools, mendacious newspapers etc. that at first they did not react at all on the most urgent question concerning the fight against its bitterest foe, imperialism.

Two whole years of an energetic propaganda and work in this direction on the part of the Chinese Communist Party were required, in order to make the masses of the people understand this slogan and take interest in it. After two years, however, both these slogans swept all over China and became most popular among the large masses of the people. There is hardly any man in China now who is not familiar with both these slogans or does not understand their meaning. All without exception understand their meaning. All are permeated with the feeling of hatred towards the authors of imperialism and militarism in China, with the exception of confounded reactionaries, of the tools of imperialism and of those nationalists who are mentally quite childish and who are dreaming about the return of "old times".

After the 2-nd Congress of the C.C.P. the whole of China began to be covered with a net of trade unions, in places of course where proletariat and the suitable surroundings existed. But the difference between this trade union movement and the former one lay in the fact that following it a strike movement began also to develop. In some places, however, this strike movement grew even quicker than the trade union movement itself, which meant that the organization was not able to cope with the quick growth of the activity on the part of the working class. For instance, almost all the railways were affected by the strike movement. This strike movement unquestionably did not correspond with the strength and power of the leading organs of labor organizations . There were cases, when strikes were declared quite suddenly. The liquidation of such strikes was equally quick. Of 18 railways of China only nine, which were situated in the very centre of the country, possessed more or less powerful trade organizations, the rest were very weak. Despite the fact that the Chinese Communist Party itself was very weak as regards numbers and was not able to embrace all this movement, the guidance of the work of these unions was

almost everywhere in the hands of the Communist Party. The Party at that time numbered not more than 200 to 300 members, Comsomol included; the number of trade unions, however, was very considerable. Shanghai alone numbered then about 30 separate trade unions; there were more than 10 trade unions at Ch'ang-sha and about the same number at Hankow, Tientsin, Canton and other cities. All these trade unions numbered 125 to 150 thousands organised workers. All these organizations, all these masses were under the guidance of the Chinese Communist Party. Many strikes which took place at that time ended in victories for the workers. This bears testimony to the fact that at many places the movement bore an organised character and that trade unions were powerful enough to defend successfully the interests of the workers. Such a state of affairs, however, did not exist everywhere. This period of the flourishing success of the labor movement came to an end on February 7, 1923, when, as has been already mentioned above, a crushing blow was dealt by reactionary forces to the labor movement in China. When the events began to develop on the Peking-Hankow railway, the frame of mind of the masses was very revolutionary and very active. At first the authorities had to "play" with this movement and even sanctioned the convocation of a congress. Afterwards, however, when the bourgeoisie and militarists became convinced that the movement did not end there, that it would inevitably grow and would consequently threaten the existing state of affairs, it was decided to deal with it summarily, and this actually took place on February 7, 1923. This date, February 7, 1923, marks one of "historical" days in the general history of the labor movement in China and of the Chinese Communist Party.

Turning to the examination of causes which have lead to these results, we find first of all that the Chinese Communist Party was too weak to embrace the whole movement. The events developed very quickly and the communist leaders were not able to pay adequate attention to all questions arising daily, because the surrounding conditions changed with incredible swiftness. For instance, some demands even of a purely economic character which were set forth at that time by workers, had thorough consideration

been given to them, should not have taken place at all. In any case these demands were by far out of proportion to the strength which labor organizations had at their disposal to defend their demands. Passionate feelings prevailed over reason, when these demands were being set forth. The Chinese Communist Party warned the workers and their representatives that the general situation required extreme cautiousness on their part, that they should reduce their appetites, that the time was not fit for the carrying on of an offensive policy and that their moves would do them no good. But, we repeat once more, the communist leaders could not keep up with the growth of the movement. The fact that the Chinese Communist Party actually warned the workers and their representatives, when their passions had already become red-hot, i.e. during the development of events, did not of course diminish in any measure its responsibility and did not lessen the importance of these mistakes which had unquestionably been committed by the Chinese Communist Party. The majority of the workers of the Chinese Communist Party belonged to the intelligentsia and, inspite of the fact that their living conditions in some cases were even worse than those of the workers and that they showed in this respect a self-denial rarely met with, they were only superficially acquainted with the interests of workers and with their everyday working life. They particularly sheltered themselves in the "high places", i.e. in the central organizations of the working class, and did not come down to the "lower places". Had they taken hold at the proper time of the guidance of the "lower" (labor) organizations or even had they only penetrated into these organizations, they would have known, how the working masses were living and breathing, and would have been able to give them a timely warning. This mistake, however, was made by the Chinese Communist Party and it played of course a great role.

Events of February 7, 1923, dealt a violent blow not only to local forces, but also to the Communist Party as a whole. Like a heavy stone, this blow fell upon the whole organization of the Party. Young members of the Party who survived this blow, began to become nervous. Several disagreements arose among the members. These disagreements especially

grew in violence, when many comrades assembled at Shanghai. Many were of the opinion and had come to the conclusions that the leaders in the centre were responsible for all these failures, that these failures were a direct consequence of the mistaken policy of the centre. The centre in its turn laid the blame, and not without reason, at the door of workers. Such a negative phenomenon as these disagreements did not however last long and in a short time order was restored among party members. This period in the Chinese revolution and in the history of the Chinese Communist Party somehow reminds one of the period after the Revolution of 1905 in Russia and of the corresponding period in the history of the Russian Communist Party. For this time the Chinese Communist Party trend in the footsteps of the late comrade Lenin who had made in 1905, the following statement: "One must hurry up with the revolution. One must, however, remember that the revolution cannot be made in one day. The communists must have the courage to admit their own mistakes and to put them right. Only by putting our mistakes right, we will be able to make a step forward". The Chinese Communist Party perceived that it was useless to be down - hearted and to despair, because only by such hard experience and by work was the Party able to check up on its own strength and on the firmness of individual party members.

During the whole year that followed the 2-nd Congress, the Party had to tread a very hard path; "hard" in the sense that in that year it suffered a serious defeat, but succeeded in escaping a complete destruction.

In June 1923 the 3-rd Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held at Canton. This Congress took place under much more difficult conditions than the two previous ones. Difficulties lay in the fact that whereas the first two congresses had for their only aim the laying of a foundation for the Party, at the 3-rd Congress the Chinese Communist Party was already confronted with broader problems. The Party was almost con - nected with the Kuomintang and this circumstance alone charged it with great responsibilities. It was already known to the masses. The organised labor movement was under its guidance. The party, on the other hand, had

very few forces at its disposal and an insufficient experience in work. Such were the conditions under which the 3-rd Congress of the Party had to carry on its work.

The following are the more important resolutions of this Congress:

a/ The Congress takes notice of the fact that the centre of activities of the Chinese Communist Party must lie in the sphere of the development of the national revolutionary movement.

b/ The Party recognizes the fact that the Kuomintang is the centre around which the national revolutionary movement must be organized. In virtue of historical causes the Kuomintang must be recognized as leader of this national movement.

c/ For these reasons the Chinese Communist Party must join the Kuomintang.

d/ The Chinese Communist Party must carry on an energetic work for the creation and formal organization of the Kuomintang as a party of large masses of the people .

e/ The Chinese Communist Party must contribute to the growth of the influence of the Kuomintang even among the workers and especially among the peasants .

f/ The Chinese Communist Party must take into its own hands the initiative as regards the reorganisation of the Kuomintang, in order to transform it into a real political party.

Thus the 3-rd Congress confirmed the decision of the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee, which took place between the 2-nd and the 3-rd Congress, concerning the amalgamation of the Chinese Communist Party with, or its entry into, the Kuomintang. At this Congress the Chinese Communist Party came to the conclusion that the working class was not able

to carry on the struggle by itself alone, and that the success of the struggle of the working class was closely connected with the development of the national revolutionary movement of the masses of the people. The Congress in its resolutions laid particular stress on the necessity of creating a party which would be able to embrace and to direct a large national revolutionary movement. At this Congress the question concerning the Kuomintang caused long debates and only as a result of these debates it was resolved that the Kuomintang should exercise its influence among working masses and particularly among peasants, in so far as the Chinese Communist Party could not count upon the possibility of gaining ever in the near future hundred percent of these masses. Had the Chinese Communist Party passed the resolution to the contrary, i.e. that the Kuomintang should not have access to the working masses and to the peasantry, all these negociations relating to the bloc with the Kuomintang would then have lost all interest, because the Chinese Communist Party was in need of the Kuomintang, as it intended through it to organize the large masses, to exert influence over them and to direct the national revolutionary movement.

The Chinese Communist Party definitively decided at the 3-rd Congress the question concerning its bloc with the Kuomintang and their mutual relations. This decision, however, was not made final , because the last word in this matter rested with the Kuomintang which definitively decided this question in the affirmative sense as late as 1924 .

The importance of the 3-rd Congress is still increased by the fact that it adopted the following 18 points as a basis of its political program:

I/ All unequal treaties concluded between China and imperialistic powers shall be annulled. Foreigners shall be restricted in their rights as regards the development of their economic and political influence, i.e. the right of developing industry, such as the construction of fasteries and other enterprises, the obtainment of concessions etc. shall be restricted; establishing of schools, organizing of peasant societies etc. also shall be

restricted. A new law shall be enacted to regulate the Customs policy, without consulting the will of foreigners in this respect.

2/ Militarism shall be "liquidated". The property of militaristic generals shall be confiscated and used for the development of national industry.

3/ Large industrial undertakings, such as railways, banks, mines etc. shall pass into the hands of the state, i.e. shall be nationalised.

4/ Universal, direct and secret suffrage shall be introduced. Elections shall take place during vacations or on holidays.

5/ Freedom of speech, of press and of meetings shall be authorised. Special police rights relating to the struggle against political freedom which were enacted by Yuan Shih-k'ai, but have not been abolished as yet, shall be annulled. Special laws relating to strikes shall be repealed.

6/ Women shall be given absolutely equal rights.

7/ The people shall obtain the possibility to express freely, orally or in written form, their political views. The people shall exert influence over the selection of officials and have the right to vote the appointment of inefficient officials. The people shall exert influence over the appointment of higher government officials as well as of diplomatic representatives, including delegates to international conferences. Local government officials to be selected by the people.

8/ Borderlands, such as Tibet, Mongolia, Sinkiang etc. shall obtain the right of self-determination and may join China only if their peoples so desire.

9/ In cities and villages throughout the whole country local self-governments shall be organised to direct affairs of local character.

IO/ The financial policy shall be made uniform and a single money

system shall be introduced throughout the whole country. The uncontrolled issue of an unlimited amount of small coins shall be categorically prohibited. The circulation on the market of foreign paper money shall be prohibited. Wide publicity shall be given to the whole financial policy of the country in order to make this policy clear to large masses of the people.

I1/ "Likin" (tax on goods which pass the frontier of every province and, even, district) shall be abolished. An income tax on movable and immovable properties shall be introduced. Norms of taxes shall be fixed every year and then enforced by law.

I2/ Public instruction shall become free and universal. The teaching of religion shall be excluded from schools, i.e. the church shall be separated from the school (or from the state which is practically the same). Funds which have been fixed by the budget and are destined to be used for public instruction, shall remain invielable, i.e. not be employed for other purposes. Teachers shall be given every year one month of rest with double salary for that period. Pensions, in case of old age, sickness etc., shall be provided for those whose work is connected with public instruction.

I3/ The work of law organs shall be improved and put on a more proper footing. Death penalty and corperal punishments shall be absolutely abolished. Law Courts shall charge no fees.

I4/ Voluntary enlistment in the army shall be prohibited. Compulsory military service shall be introduced. Pay for military men shall be regulated by specially enacted laws.

I5/ New houses for poor people shall be built and old houses shall be repaired and improved. House rents shall be regulated by special laws.

I6/ Fixed (maximum) prices for necessities shall be enforced by law .

I7/ Interests of peasantry shall be defended and protected by law as follows:

a/ A uniform land tax shall be established and regulated by law throughout the whole of China. The land tax shall be onerous for the peasantry. Such abnormal practices in connection with the collection of taxes from peasants, as, for instance, ugly deeds committed usually by tax collectors etc. shall be discontinued. (A tax collector is called "ts'e - yün " and does not receive any salary. His earnings consist of a percentage of the taxes which he is collecting. His functions remind one of those of the public officer in charge of the execution of decisions rendered by Law Courts, with the only difference that the latter is a Government official, whereas the " ts'e-yün " is a private person).

b/ The question relating to the farming of lands shall be regulated by specially enacted laws. Peasant unions shall be given the right of collective renting of land.

c/ The question relating to the distribution of water sources, i.e. the order of their utilization, shall be regulated by special legislation. Works of improvement in connection with the cultivation of grain and the tilling of soil shall be carried out.

d/ The state shall help the poor peasantry with grain and agricultural implements.

e/ Minimum prices for agricultural products shall be fixed by special legislation.

I8/ The following measures relating to the labor legislation shall be undertaken:

a/ The system of contractors relating to the hiring and exploitation of workers shall be abolished by law; the further application of this system shall be also prohibited by law. Trade unions shall be legalized and authorized. Trade unions shall be given the right to conclude collective contracts.

b/ The eight hour working day shall be enforced by law. The use of

day shift workers for night work shall be prohibited.

c/ Workers shall be given a 36 hour rest weekly.

d/ The same wages shall be paid both male and female workers having the same qualifications. Women workers shall be given rest three weeks before and three weeks after confinement, with full wages for the whole of this period.

e/ For children who have not yet reached 14 years all work shall be prohibited. Children 14 to 18 year of age shall work six hours a day.

f/ The maintenance, at the expense of employers, of proper hygienic conditions in the factories and in all industrial undertakings generally shall be enforced by law. This protection of labor shall be under the supervision of government organs with full participation of union workmen in these organizations (factory inspection).

g/ A law governing insurance of workers' life and health shall be enacted. Union workmen shall be represented in these organs of insurance.

h/ Assistance, as provided for in the laws relating to labor, shall be given in cases of unemployment.-

Notwithstanding the fact that the numerical strength of the Chinese Communist Party was still very small at that time, in comparison with its present numbers, the Party at this 3-rd Congress was conscious of its moral force and of the ensuing responsibility to the masses. The moral force of the Communist Party depended principally on the influence which the Party was enjoying among the masses. Due to that influence the Communist Party had the right as well as the duty to show in a more or less complete form its "political face". From the program, to say more correctly, "draft program", which was adopted at the 3-rd Congress, we can see that the Chinese Communist Party not only reckoned upon the organization of working masses, but also intended to gain a proper place in the national revolutionary movement generally. For that purpose the Party included several points which related to the peasantry, intelligentsia and to the petty bourgeoisie. In all these points and in the whole program

generally the Communist Party took quite properly a position which in a very short time made it possible for the Party to win a leading place in the national revolutionary movement. All these results have been attained owing to the efforts of the Chinese Communist Party and its leaders, who understood the situation in China and properly estimated the future development of the national revolution. That the merit in this respect belonged to the Chinese Communist Party and that no extraneous influences were at hand, can be proved by the fact that all these resolutions had been passed before the reorganization of the Kuomintang and prior to the time, when the question relating to the entry of the Chinese Communist Party into the Kuomintang was decided by the Kuomintang itself. We can venture to say with confidence that the resolutions which were passed at the 3-rd Congress, and the comprehensive program which it had adopted, facilitated to a considerable degree the unification of the Chinese Communist Party and of the Kuomintang, because the Kuomintang, at that time its leaders, perceived that the communists really expressed in their program the desire to work jointly and to direct the national revolutionary movement.

Only in August, 1924, the Kuomintang called its plenary meeting and at this meeting the question relating to the participation of communists in the Kuomintang was definitively decided in the affirmative sense.

The Central Committee of the Kuomintang agreed at this plenary meeting to all proposals of the Chinese Communist Party in connection with the question relating to the participation of communists in the Kuomintang. This event raised the morale of those members of the Chinese Communist Party who had been somewhat downhearted. This downheartedness was caused by the fact that the question relating to the united front was one of the most important questions. It was raised in its entireness as early as the 2-nd Congress of the Party and it is quite understandable that the delay on the part of the Kuomintang in deciding this question caused some members of the Party to be nervous, the more so because the

national revolutionary movement was growing and required guidance, the Kuomintang, however, delayed the organization of the party the duty of which was to proceed to the assembling and formation of national revolutionary forces, particularly of more active ones. The decision of the Kuomintang relating to this question finally brought in "a current of fresh air" and encouraged the Chinese Communist Party. During almost the whole year of 1924 and in the beginning of 1925 the Chinese Communist Party was carrying on a most energetic work in connection with the creation and the consolidation of the organization of the Kuomintang Party and it must be mentioned that this work was progressing very quickly.

The Party was growing, but more with regard to the influence it exercised upon the masses, than numerically. It is necessary to sum up the work which had been done during the period following the 3-rd Congress, i.e. since 1923. During this period the Party also had to live through several difficult moments. It suffered defeat, but also gained several victories. Events of February 7, 1923 on the Peking-Hankow Railway must be considered a defeat, because they were followed by some confusion among party circles which, however, did not last long. On the other hand, these events cannot be considered exclusively as a defeat. They called forth the rise of the national revolutionary movement and this rise continued to widen and to deepen daily. It would hardly be a mistake to say that these events and, as a result of them, the rise of the national revolutionary consciousness facilitated to a considerable degree the final settlement of such a cardinal question as the creation of a bloc between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. The definite settlement, in the affirmative sense, of the question relating to the union of the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party must be considered a victory. The particular importance of this question rests in the fact that the national revolutionary movement was growing, but there was no guidance.

In consequence of all these events the Chinese Communist Party called in the beginning of May, 1925, <u>the Fourth Party Congress</u> which coincided with the period of important events in China, i.e. with the moment

of a new periodical conflict between two struggling militaristic forces, Mukden and Chihli parties. This conflict took place in the end of 1924 and lead to the famous coup d'état in the Chihli group. The Christian General Feng Yü-hsiang was the initiator and leader of this coup. It is as yet very difficult to determine the exact causes which were the moving factors of the coup. These events were unquestionably provoked by disagreements of a specifically Chinese character inside the Chihli group, i.e. by the lack of complete understanding between Wu P'ei-fu and Feng Yü-hsiang, or possibly by the affront put upon Feng Yü-hsiang by Wu P'ei-fu. On the other hand, however, had there not been at that time in China the growth of the national revolutionary consciousness of the masses, Feng Yü-hsiang would hardly have persuaded himself to carry into effect such a coup. At the most, there would have been on his part a simple armed conflict with Wu, but for that purpose he easily could have joined some other militaristic group. The significance, however, of this coup lay in the fact that Feng, having accomplished it apparently in an alliance with Chang Tso-lin, actually remained independent and preferred to bind himself to the national revolutionary movement. For the first time in the history of Chinese militarism during the last 12 or 13 years, except of course Kwangtung and its armed forces, there came forth an army which took its orientation from the people and adopted the name of People's Army (Kuominchün). We must repeat it once more that had there not been such a revolutionary situation, judging from quite an objective point of view, we would hardly have seen the appearance in 1924 and 1925 of three People's Armies in North China.

The rise of the national revolutionary movement, the appearance of national revolutionary armed forces in the North, as well as the rapid rise of the peasant movement quickened the growth of the Chinese Communist Party. About that time the Party numbered 900 to 1000 members and the Comsomol about 2000. Having these forces at its disposal the Party called its 4-th Congress. This Congress was principally occupied with a thorough study of the work which had been accomplished in accordance with resolutions of the previous congresses. It summed up this work and had only to

make some concrete directions and to mark the defects which had been admitted in connection with the work during the expired period, but was not obliged to pass new resolutions which would have altered the resolutions of the previous congresses. One of the most important questions which had been brought before the 4-th Congress for discussion, was its attitude towards the then existing political conditions in North China. This Congress discussed also the question relating to the convocation of the so-called " People's Conference ", a project which had been brought forward by the late Sun Yat-sen. This movement for the convocation of a People's Conference just coincided with the arrival of Dr. Sun in North China. The Communist Party had to withstand all the blows which were directed against this Conference and at the same time had to carry on the struggle against the attempt of Tuan Ch'i-jui to call a Conference within narrow limits only, i.e. composed of propertied classes. The question relating to these two Conferences was then the most important problem of the moment. Imperialists were perfectly well aware of the fact that a People's or National Conference when convoked would give a juridically legal form to all demands and desires of the large masses of the people which were then embraced by the national revolutionary movement. They wanted therefore to bring at any cost this project of calling a People's Conference to naught and at their order the Anfu Party headed by Tuan Ch'i-jui brought forward a plan of calling a Preliminary Administrative Conference the principal aim of which was to put the convocation of a People's Conference into background. Imperialists had of course their own designs in this respect. They wanted to put off the convocation of a Chinese People's Conference, to organise a blow to be dealt to the national revolutionary movement and in this way to ward off the danger which threatened them.

Simultaneously with the growth of the national revolutionary movement the labor movement continued to grow and to develop, and embraced all the important centres of the country. This time this movement was accompanied by the growth of the strike movement. At Shanghai alone, for instance, twenty Japanese factories which employed about 40000 workers, were

on strike in the beginning of 1925. The same developments occurred at Tsingtao, Hankow and other places .

The labor movement was making rapid progress and was to be merged later into the movement on a national scale.

On May 1-st, 1925, the 1-st Labor Congress was called and proceeded to the discussion of the labor movement in the country. This Congress bore testimony to the fact that the labor movement in China was leaving the embryonic state and was becoming a definite force which would have to be reckoned with in the near future. It is quite understandable that first of all the question was to be raised about the legalization of this movement which heretofore could only exist underground.

Imperialists perceived the growth and strength of this movement, and could not believe that within such a short period of time a mass revolutionary movement of such dimensions could have grown in China. It is true that imperialists did not believe it possible that this movement could be active at that time but they were perfectly well aware of the fact that the gradual growth of it would inevitably lead to a greater activity and decided therefore to provoke it and then to drown it in " a sea of blood ".

The events of May 30, 1925, were the provocations to which imperialism had resorted. It would be untrue to assert that imperialists acted alone in these provocations, because the Chinese bourgeoisie and the compradore elements went hand in hand with them. There arose at that time at Shanghai, Tientsin, Peking, Canton and in several of the other larger centres of the country a revolutionary movement the like of which had never been seen or heard of before. Revolutionary movements of great dimensions quickly spread all over China. Workers were the most active elements in this movement; Shanghai alone numbered more than 500000 workers on strike. All this movement was under the guidance of the Chinese Communist Party and we can venture to say with confidence that had it not been guided at that time by the Chinese Communist Party, the movement would never have attained such vast dimensions. As a result of this movement the Hongkong strike broke out in South China. Had there been no guidance on the part of the Chinese

Communist Party in Kwangtung, the Hongkong strike would hardly have been a political factor on a all-China scale, a factor which unquestionably had a world significance, because it was dealing blows to the most powerful imperialistic state, Great Britain. Should it be admitted that, even without the guidance on the part of the Chinese Communist Party, the strike still would have taken place as a result of the indignation of the people on account of the shooting affairs at Shanghai, Teingtao, Shameen etc., in such case the strike, firstly, would not have born such an organized character; in the second place, it would not have lasted for such a long time; and thirdly, would not have entailed the boycott of British goods etc. This strike had and still has an enormous political significance because it has afforded the possibility of carrying through successfully the work for the unification of Kwangtung. (The Kwangtung province, base of the national revolution of China, during many years has been rent by internecine war of several militarists within the province. Only in the beginning of 1926 the national revolutionary forces of the Kuomintang succeeded in accomplishing the unification of the province. The strike and boycott unquestionably have played their part in this matter).

Events of May 30, 1925, provoked an unprecedented rise of feeling and indignation among the great masses of the people. It was then very easy to provoke these masses actually to fight imperialism and militarism. It was only the clever guidance on the part of the Chinese Communist Party which restrained the national revolutionary movement from attempting some premature move, because such move, had it taken place, would have only lead to one result, viz. that this national revolutionary movement would have been drowned in blood. The Chinese Communist Party followed very closely the development of events, noting the smallest details of this movement, and acted very oppertunely in adapting its tactics to the requirements of the moment. In the beginning of this movement, after May 30, the main forces, i.e. the active forces of the national revolutionary movement, such as workers and students, were separated and acted independently of each other. The Chinese Communist Party at once took into account this

defect and proceeded to the organisation of centres of these two main forces. In other words the Party took necessary measures to centralize the guidance of active elements of this movement. Under the guidance of the Chinese Communist Party, a Central Council for the labor movement and a central organ to guide the student movement were organized. But that was not all. Besides workers and students, the petty bourgeoisie, intelligentsia etc. were also taking part in the national revolutionary movement. It was necessary to unify the whole movement, i.e. to organise a unified guidance for it, and in this question also it was the Chinese Communist Party which found a proper solution in creating under its guidance a single organ which consisted of the representatives of labor organezations, of students and of the united small shopkeepers and traders (the petty bourgeoisie). In so far as the guidance of the labor and student movement was concentrated in the hands of communists who had unified the whole movement by the creation of a single organ in which workers and students were both the majority and the most active part, the communists succeeded in such a manner in attaining their principal aim, i.e. in taking the guidance of the whole movement into their own hands. The work which was being done during this period, all the decisions of the Chinese Communist Party, the success which it had with the masses, all these bore testimony to the fact that by that time the Party had grown to such an extent that it was able to guide this movement. Difficulties which were confronting the Party at that time were not fewer and very often even more than before. Take, for instance, the question relating to the Hongkong strike. All difficulties in this respect fell to the lot of the Chinese Communist Party both as regards the organezation of the strike and the carrying of it into effect. Whereas the right Kuomintang men were against the strike, as well as against the fight against imperialism generally, and all the time were taking measures to liquidate the strike in its bud, the left elements were falling into another extreme and went even to such a length as to raise the question in a quite preposterous form of war against Great Britain and the return of Hangkong

to China. In view of the corelation of forces at that time, it was quite inadmissible to raise such a question as fight against England. Only silly idealists could reach such absurdities in their talking. The Chinese Communist Party in such manner had to sustain struggle on two fronts; on one hand, against the right elements who generally opposed struggle against imperialism in any form, and on the other hand, against the left who fell into another extreme which was equally harmful and impossible. The Chinese Communist Party proved even then that it was quite able to conduct a wise state policy. Its standpoint was to take " a prudent course ", by no means to force the events and not to yield to provocations on the part of the British. (Quite recently, in September 1926, the British made an attempt to provoke the National Government of Canton, in order to cause disturbances in the rear and in such a way to undermine the success of the Northern Expedition. We have in mind the case, when two British gunboats approched the very city of Canton and seized landing places on the river. This provocation, however, fell short of British expectations, but not without the interference of communists who restrained strike Committees from imprudent actions).

All activities of the Chinese Communist Party during this period can serve as the best proofs for the fact that it is the only political party in China which is able to handle any question in a sober and business-like manner, as well as conduct a state policy.

One must not lose sight, however, of the fact that at that moment, May 1926, the Chinese Communist Party still numbered in its ranks the same 1000 members, plus about 2000 members of the Comsomol, whereas its influence was so great that it was able to guide the whole movement.

Large masses perceived at once the significance and the raison d'être of the Chinese Communist Party which attracted the widest attention to itself and gained a great popularity among these masses. From that time on it began to grow very quickly and in half a year numbered already about 10,000 members of the Party and as many members of the Comsomol. Thus it can be seen that within half a year it grew tenfold. Such a success passed

all expectations. Within one year the Chinese Communist Party became many times the size it had been during all the preceding years of its existence.

This growth, however, which on the whole can be considered as a positive phenomenon, has also its negative traits. The Chinese Communist Party is a young party with less than ten years of existence, and such a rapid growth cannot of course happen quite painlessly. Recently the Party began to feel more particularly the lack of a sufficient number of workers to direct the work on the spot and among the masses. These workers whom the Party has now at its disposal on the spot, are inexperienced and unable to direct the work among the masses. And one can say quite definitely that no good results will be attained, if the further growth of the Party continues to be that rapid, as the guidance will not keep up with the growth. On the contrary, if the Party succeeds in finding and training a sufficient number of workers able to direct the work among the masses, its further development will have a most brilliant future.

Passing now to the indication of defects which could be discerned during this period, we must repeat once more that the principal defect lies in the inability of many members of the Party to direct the work among the masses.

The second defect lies in the tendency on the part of many members of the Party to launch into "big politics" and not to pay sufficient attention to more pressing everyday questions concerning the masses.

The third defect is not very prevalent, but is very dangerous even as an exception, and lies in the fact that many comrades very often do not distinguish problems of the national revolution from those of the communist labor movement. One newspaper article approached the question concerning further problems of the national revolutionary movement in a somewhat incautious manner by advocating the "communisation" of this movement, in other words, claimed all success on the behalf of the Communist Party and, as a result, representatives of the petty bourgeoisie left the Unified Committee at Shanghai. Our comrades still made another mistake in this direction, viz. they began in a quite conventional manner to divide

the masses into "left", "right", "centre" etc. which unquestionably is wrong and harmful. There is no set rule according to which every worker can be classed as a left, that all students are the center or that the petty bourgeoisie as a whole belongs to the right wing. Granted it is generally so, but even then this question must not be approached in such a conventional way, especially if one takes into consideration that there may be exceptions to this rule.

The general condition of the Party in 1926 considerably differs from that of former years. Whereas formerly the Party was nothing but an academic group which was principally occupied with study and not with practical work, now, on the contrary, the Party is principally occupied with practical work, but not neglecting of course its theoretical side.

Formerly, two or three years ago, the Chinese Communist Party was only taking interest in politics, but now it "makes" politics itself and exerts a great influence upon it. Even a small mistake on the part of a single member, to say nothing of the organization, unfavorably affects the Party as a whole. In this respect the thorough study of events of March 20 and May 15, 1926, at Canton would be of a particularly great value. It is necessary to understand that all these events were chiefly the consequence of those false steps which the Party had made in connection with its work among the masses. All these questions must be made a subject for a careful study in order to avoid the repetition of such mistakes.

The following are the fundamental problems of the Chinese Communist Party for the next period of time: to gain influence among 100% of the working masses and to approach the peasantry. That the Party can work successfully among the peasantry is proved best of all by its experience in Kwangtung where it has almost "monopolised" the guidance of the peasant movement, notwithstanding the fact that the Kuomintang influence is stronger in Kwangtung than in any other place. The Party must also gain a leading position among students. Former mistakes in this respect lay in the fact that the guidance of students was in the hands of young comrades, members of the Comsomol, and it is to be expected that the work in this

direction will considerably improve, as soon as this guidance passes into the hands of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. As regards bourgeoisie, there may be only the question about "the petty bourgeoisie", or the question about the neutralization of "middle class bourgeoisie" may be also admitted. As to "the big bourgeoisie", however, it must be regarded as a most dangerous enemy, because it will ally itself only with imperialists and never on no account with the national revolutionary movement. This is realized perfectly well by imperialists who are now taking all measures, in order to establish closer connections with the "big bourgeoisie" and, through it also with the "middle class bourgeoisie", not neglecting of course the "petty bourgeoisie". At Shanghai, for instance, the Chinese bourgeoisie is afforded the possibility "to feel as at home" in foreign concessions and, speaking generally, this Chinese bourgeoisie and imperialists will always find a common language, because in the long run the revolution threatens them in an equal degree. The Chinese Communist Party fully realised this fact and recently its slogans speak least of all about "big stuff", but chiefly about pressing questions of the day. It is paying now in its work particular attention to questions of local character, in other words to questions which affect the interests of large masses of the population, because it is the only way to win the confidence of the "petty bougeoisie" and to divert it from the "big bourgeoisie".

In accordance with what has been already pointed out by the 4-th Congress, the work of the Party in the future must be organised in such a manner as to enable both the local organs and the centre to wield a combined influence upon the work. The absence of a well established connection in the past between the local organs and the centre must be regarded as a serious defect and therefore the Party shall take in the future all measures in order to eliminate such defects completely.

As regards the new question of special importance with which the Party was recently confronted, viz. the question of the Northern Expedition, there was at first no united opinion among Party members. There were, for

instance, organizations and individual comrades who spoke against the Northern Expedition. Such a state of affairs, if unduly prolonged, could of course have done much harm, because these comrades did not at all take into account the fact that the Northern Expedition, i.e. its successful conclusion, was to be regarded as a beginning of the liquidation of militarism and, consequently, of imperialism. Assuming even that the "liquidation" of Wu P'ei-fu, Chang Tso-lin etc. does not signify the final elimination of militarism, the Northern Expedition in case of success is still to be regarded as an asset in the national revolutionary movement, because "new" militarists are better disposed toward the national revolutionary movement than the "old" (we use here the term "new" not as a definite, but only as a purely conventional designation, in order to distinguish the militarists who are supporting the Kuomintang and the national revolutionary movement from those who are carrying on the fight against the Kuomintang and the national revolutionary movement). In connection with this question the Party issued quite clear directives to the effect that it was necessary to support the Northern Expedition, that a campaign on behalf of this expedition was to be conducted and that the attention of the large masses of workers and peasants was to be attracted to it. Now the Party is continuing to "deepen" its policy relating to the establishment of a united front of all revolutionary forces, notwithstanding the fact that some individual comrades have a tendency of breaking off all relations with the Kuomintang and of entering the wide political arena quite independently. At first sight this tendency may seem to be very revolutionary; at the bottom, however, it conceals danger, because in breaking off all relations with the Kuomintang the Party will lose such an important factor as the possibility of carrying on lawfully its work among the masses.

The communistic movement is growing and as time goes on will grow more and more. Real causes of the growth of the Chinese Communist Party do not lie in those "cock and bull stories" about "the Russian rouble", "Russian agitators" etc. which are disseminated and exaggerated by the imperialistic press. The growth of the Chinese Communist Party is chiefly the

result of poverty, famine and the policy of imperialism and militarism. This policy pushes the masses of the Chinese people into the arms of the force which shows them the first and only way out of their difficult conditions. This force is the Chinese Communist Party, the only political party which is able and is willing to carry on the fight itself and to direct the fight for the liberation of the Chinese people. The Chinese Communist Party showed not in words only, but in deeds that it was capable both of carrying on the fight and of making sacrifices in the interests of the masses.

The whole history of the Chinese Communist Party during the past 7 or 8 years bears testimony to the fact that the Party has passed along a very difficult path and has written some beautiful pages into its history. Fundamental difficulties, however, still lie before the Party.

Only now the Chinese Communist Party is approaching the moment, when it must become a real Communist Party for the masses. The Party is just now confronted with the most important problems and one of them is the question, whether the Party will progress, in case it pursues the proper policy, or will roll backwards, in case it pursues a wrong policy. Now the time has already come, when the influence of the Party is so widespread that the least mistake on its part can cost very dearly both the Party and the masses which are following it.

We can now establish the fact that the Party has already obtained a manifest and very tangible success among the working masses in the cities.

For the next period of time the Party is confronted with the problem of strengthening and deepening its position in the cities and of gaining influence in the village.

The most difficult problems are awaiting the Party in the Chinese village, because the villages are in a very backward state and by no means can be compared with the city. At the same time, however, one cannot say that the situation is hopeless in this respect. The Party has some experience in working and succeeded in attaining successful results

in the village, viz. in the Kwangtung province, in which the Communist Party has taken solid and widespreading roots in the villages, where a considerable percentage of party members consists of peasants.

This last circumstance proves the possibility for the Party of organizing its own, even if small, nuclei also among the peasantry.

Before, however, proceeding to the organisation of Party nuclei, it is necessary to organize all active elements in the villages. First of all of course attention must be paid to poorer elements of which the absolute majority of the village consists.

Particular attention was being paid and is now being paid to <u>military work,</u> i.e. among the military, and the Party succeeded in attaining some definite results in this respect.

Despite the events of March 20, it proved to be impossible, as will also prove to be impossible in the future, to blot out the activities of the Party in the National Revolutionary Army during the period of time which preceded March 20, 1926. Political sections and the political work in the National Revolutionary Army still remained. Some delay, it is true, has occured. There are signs, however, that at the first opportunity this work will develop even more than before March 20, 1926.-

True copy:

(Signed) Kisseleff.


Representative of the Third International: one of the Vice Consuls of the Soviet Consulate at Shanghai.
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (Shanghai; seven persons)
Special Agent at Peking: Li Ta-chao
Agents' Department; Chief: Chang T'e-shu
Agrarian and Industrial Department; Chief: Wang I-fei
Military Department; Chief: P'eng Shu-chih
Department of Organization; Chief: (name illegible)
Technical Secretary Wang Je-fei.
General Secretary: Ch'en Tu-hsiu
Committee of five Regions
Canton Region
Kiangsu, Kiangsi and Chekiang Region
Henan, Hupei and Hunan Region
Shantung, Shansi and Shensi Region
Peking Region
Three localities form a region
Provincial Committees
Over 30 sections form a locality
Sections
Towns as special sections:
Shanghai
Peking
Hankow
Canton

POLITICAL DECLARATION OF THE

CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, January 26, 1927

After " the Hankow events ", Great Britain used every effort to call forth a unanimous reaction on these events both on an international scale, i.e. on the part of other imperialistic powers, and inside its own country. These plans, however, have been so far unsuccessful.

I/ On account of conflicts which arose in connection with the question relating to 2½% surtaxes, the British were of the opinion that their tactics were very clever, because the Southern Government had already put these surtaxes into effect, and they thought that their consent not only would change the attitude of the Chinese people in their favor, but would also give the same increase of revenues to Chang Tso-lin and Sun Ch'uan-fang. Besides this increase of customs duties would cause the greatest losses to Japan; as to losses to England, they would be comparatively small. On the other hand, the increase of customs duties would also give a powerful support to Northern militarists, because as a result of 2½% surtaxes, about 80% of additional revenues would go to the Northern militarists and only 20% to the Southern Government. Actually, however, this question had only one result, i.e. it made the conflict between England and Japan still more acute.

2/ Italy and France, because their interests were not yet affected, temporarily assumed a watching attitude and did not give active support to England.

3/ The American Senator Borah still holds his former opinion that the movement for national equality of China and the demands put forth in connection with this movement must be respected.

4/ In England the Manchester party is in favor of concessions to

China, the attitude of the Liberal party is perfectly quiet and only the opinion of the leaders of the Labor party is comparatively unfavorable to the Government.

British imperialism did not attain the desired unity of action either within the country or abroad. As regards its recent position in China, it tries to attract to its side the moderate party in China, the Kuomintang, and at the same time is making a demonstration with the aid of its navy.

As to militarists, they are also making a demonstration against the South relying upon their armed forces and at the same time they are trying to attract to their side the moderate elements of the Kuomintang; besides, they are spreading rumors that they can adopt " Sunyatsenism " in case the Kuomintang cuts itself off from Red Russia and all radical elements are removed. In order to appease the people, they even put forth such slogans, as the return of Concessions, the abolition of unequal treaties and the convocation of a national conference.

Imperialists and militarists both use the same tactics, both act in two directions. The future will show, whether this tactics will yield results or not.

Were the Nationalist Government and the Kuomintang united in aims and action, these tactics would of course yield no results at all. Unluckily, however, the internal situation now is extremely unfavorable. The right wing of the Kuomintang is daily becoming more and more powerful. Although, since the Heishan and Shanghai conferences, this right wing suffered a defeat as regards organisation and with reference to its ideology and tactics, it still gained a victory. Now there is a very strong and serious sentiment inside the Kuomintang against Soviet Russia, against the Communist Party and against the workers' and peasant movement. This attitude was called forth by the following three causes.

I/ Gen. Chiang K'ai-shih is convinced that there must be only one party in the state, that all classes must be reconciliated among them-

selves, that the class struggle must not take place and that the Communist Party is unnecessary. There are many persons who, being politically unconscious, share these bourgeois convictions.

2/ There is a widely spread opinion that the present nationalist revolution will end very soon and in its place a new revolution, the class or social revolution will come. Thus the Communist Party is the greatest enemy at present and not imperialism or militarism. Therefore a resistance is shown to Russia, to the Communist Party and to the workers' and peasant movement.

3/ Some persons who perceive that the development of the Northern Expedition and the development of the workers' and peasant movement are successfully proceeding under the guidance of the Communist Party, are beginning to be jealous and afraid of this party.

These three causes called forth a very strong movement within the ranks of the Kuomintang Party which is directed against the Communist Party. But all conflicts which arise on the ground of these causes are comparatively unimportant. The main cause is of course the contradiction based on class differences. Convictions held by the bourgeoisie are of course opposed to ours. It was our fault that we did not pay sufficient attention to making small concessions to the petty bourgeoisie and to the proletariat in cases when their views and ours did not seriously contradict each other. Therefore now even the left wing is ill-disposed towards us. With the development of the nationalist revolution these contradictions will develop more and more daily and it will be impossible to avoid them. Now the principal question which is worth most serious consideration is the possibility of an alliance of foreign imperialists with the right or moderate wing of the Kuomintang, which may lead to a concerted movement against Russia, against communism and against the workers' and peasant movement, both from within and from without.

As the situation may become extremely dangerous in connection with the possibility of such an alliance, our Party has worked out the

following tactics:

1/ To make the masses rise and give military and financial support to the National Government. The purpose of this policy is to let the Kuomintang understand that the nationalist revolution is still in the period of a most acute struggle, that it requires support on the part of the masses of the people and that the time of the final victory has not yet come. On the other hand, this policy will lessen the feeling of fear which the Kuomintang has towards the Communist Party (now the Kuomintang Party is afraid that the masses of the people may ally themselves with the Communist Party and it suspects that the Communist Party works against the National Government and that the communistic revolution will come very soon).

2/ The centre, as well as the local organs shall use every effort to carry on in all our publications the following agitation:

a. to make it quite clear that the nationalist revolution is not yet accomplished, that the purpose of this revolution lies not in the transfer of political power into the hands of the Kuomintang and that the successful accomplishment of it must be accompanied by political and social changes, whereas now all power in the towns and villages still belongs to imperialistic and feudal forces;

b. to criticize the development of the bourgeois ideology within the Kuomintang, in order to refute radically the bougeois ideology of such persons as Tai Chi-tao, Kan Nai-kwang and others. The attitude of our Party towards the bourgeoisie generally may be now regarded as being gradually established in the sense that in China bureaucrats and compradores in the cities, and landowners and gentry in the villages are in our opinion counter revolutionary forces, and workers, peasants and the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie are revolutionary forces. The middle class bourgeoisie, being very weak, is constantly vacillating between the leaders of the revolution and of the counter revolution and does not take any definite course. In any case it cannot be included into revolutionary forces. Its real forces are insufficient to enable it to shake off

restrictions imposed upon it by the class which possesses real power, and the absence of revolutionary resolutenoss and of the political consciousness hinders it from taking part in the revolution. Shanghai, for instance, is the greatest stronghold of the bourgeoisie and yet the newspapers there dare not write anything about politics, being afraid of oppressive measures on the part of Sun Ch'uan-fang. Therefore we must warn the Kuomintang that if it does not take active measures against the bourgeoisie, but if it believes in the dreams of the bourgeoisie and directs the revolution with the aid of its forces, it will place itself into the bourgeois camp and oppress the real revolutionary forces of the peasant and working masses. We must adapt our tactics so as to save the Kuomintang from the passive inclination to the right.

3/ As to foreign relations we must concentrate our forces upon the anti-British movement. We cannot positively say that the British policy of creating an international alliance against us will not be crowned with a success. For a while we can forbear from extending the anti-imperialistic movement to Japan, France and America, in order to keep Great Britain isolated.

All the above mentioned points are very important, and if we succeed in accomplishing them, there will be no united offensive movement against us on the part of all the powers and, as regards internal politics, the Kuomintang will have no reason to be afraid of the Communist Party. All our party organs must clearly understand these tactics and put them into effect. In that case only it will be possible to ward off the present danger. The danger of the present situation lies in the fact that the anti-red movement may become a united one both within the country and outside of it. Then a much more serious situation will arise, than the events of March 20, 1926, because then only Chiang K'ai-shih personally and " the Society for the study of Sunyatsenism " moved against us, whereas now we are confronted with the anti-communist movement not only on the part of the right wing and of the centre of the Kuomintang, but also of a part of its left wing.

RESOLUTION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY ON THE MONGOLIAN QUESTION.

The revolutionary work among peasant and working masses of the backward borderlands is not less important for the Party than the work in central parts of China. The Chinese Communist Party must pay particular attention to the work in Inner Mongolia which embraces northern regions with Chinese and Mongolian population.

The Party must take into account the peculiar conditions which prevail in Inner Mongolia and which on the whole are the result of the existence of two national groups of the population, Mongolian and Chinese. The interests of these two groups are interlaced along economic as well as cultural and national lines.

Notwithstanding their cultural and political backwardness, the masses both of the Mongolian peasantry which is under the authority of feudal lords (" Dzassak " or princes), in the spiritual subjugation to the Lamas and in the economic enslavement of Chinese commercial capital, and of the Chinese peasantry which is being mercilessly exploited by big landowners, Chinese and Mongolian, will be unavoidably drawn into the active political struggle during the further development of revolutionary events in China. Signs of the awakening of peasant masses can be seen even now. Heavy taxes, endless extortions and land speculation assumed quite undisguised forms of despoliation of Chinese peasants in Inner Mongolia whose discontent finds vent in the form of sudden elemental outbursts against local officials.

National self-consciousness and readiness to fight for national rights and interests is awakening among the masses of the Mongolian population.

It will be the aim of the Chinese Communist Party to bring the movement for national liberation of the Mongolian population nearer the

general revolutionary movement for the national liberation of China. The Party does not overlook the fact that feudal lords, i.e. princes and lamas, will try to utilize this movement of the Mongolian population for the national liberation in their own interests, namely for the purpose of a still greater strengthening of their influence over the masses of the Mongolian population. Therfore to gain over to the Revolution the foremost democratic strata of the Mongolian population and, first of all, the Mongolian intelligentsia will be one of the most pressing problems of the Party.

The revolutionary work among the peasantry of Inner Mongolia shall consist in uniting the Chinese and the Mongolian population in the fight against their common enemies, i.e. big landowners, feudal lords, imperialists, militarists etc. On no account, however, shall the national interests of the Mongolian minority be affected. In conformity with this aim, it is necessary to carry on the work inside " the League of Workmen, Peasants and Soldiers ". This League, under the direction of the Chinese Communist Party, must unite the masses of the Chinese and Mongolian peasantry in Inner Mongolia for the purpose of the revolutionary struggle.

In carrying on agitation and propaganda work among both parts of the population, one must take into consideration national peculiar features relating to living conditions, language etc.

The Chinese Communist Party believes that it will be expedient to organise an independent National Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia which will put forward national and political problems of the Mongolian population. At the same time the Party considers that the well coordinated work of the National Revolutionary Party of Inner Mongolia and of the League is one of the principal conditions which will ensure the success of the revolutionary work among both the Mongolian and the Chinese peasantry of Inner Mongolia.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
NOV 17
WAR DEPARTMENT

40

2657-J-281

REPORT ON THE COMMUNISTIC MOVEMENT OF THE YOUTH IN CHINA.

A. Origin.

On the ground where remnants of the past and germs of the future are mixed up, two classes are conspicuous, viz. Bourgeoisie and proletariat which are constantly carrying on a class struggle among themselves.

The present day proletariat, the poor peasants and workers, is the main base on which the communistic movement is developing in China. The fight against foreign imperialism extends this base and causes the large masses of the petty bourgeoisie and of the intelligentsia to join this movement.

Within the last 20 years, the years of the intensive development of capitalism in China, the bourgeoisie did not produce either its own philosophers or outstanding literary men and writers; it did not manifest itself by anything in the domain of arts; neither did it do away with the ideology of feudal ages. The proplotariat, however, succeeded in proclaiming a new ideology and in giving a new impetus to the social struggle. Communism became the object of a great attention on the part of the intelli - gentsia which had broken away from the feudal ideology. For that reason the majority of students were allured by communist theories. At that time communism was rather an intelectual current than a political movement. Therefore the communistic movement in China grew out of the left wing of the students' movement and did not appear at once as a movement of the working youth.

In the middle of 1920, on account of the separation of classes, the students " movement of May 4 " also divided itself into several currents

the most extreme of which were socialism, anarchism and communism (which represented Marxism in China) .

The left wing with all its socialist, anarchist and communist branches, as opposed to the other wing of the students' movement, began then to become consolidated into a single organization called the Socialistic Youth League. Thus, since its origin, there were hidden cross-purposes inside this organization which were caused by its heterogeneous composition. The first peculiar feature of these organizations was heterogeneity and not homogeneity.

The first organization of the Socialistic Youth was created on July 22, 1920, at Shanghai, then at Peking, Tientsin, Ch'angsha and other places. By January, 1921, there were eight such organizations with more than 300 members.

These organizations grew out of the students' "movement of May 4 " which bore an exclusively political character. General surroundings, however, were extremely unfaverable for new political movements. The frame of mind of students, with their slogan " back to studies ", was also reflected in these organizations. Some students fervently began to study Chinese philosophers of old times, others proceeded to the study of the new doctrine of socialism.

The political inactivity and the aloofness from the masses, because actually they were only circles, mainly for the study of socialism, were the second peculiar feature of these organizations.

At the first meeting of the socialistic youth at Wuch'ang it was specially pointed out that the main problem of these organizations was not the participation in the class struggle or in the political life, but the study of socialism, as a new achievement of world's culture which was opposed to the Chinese culture of feudal ages.

One of the members of the Hankow organization began his speech with the following proposal: "Theories which are studied by the League shall be gradually applied in practice. We must treat servants as our

equals and must do ourselves, without calling servants, all the work which we are able to do without the aid of somebody else". Such was the point of view of members of the League as to the way in which " theory must be applied in practice ". They clung to this point of view, instead of trying to find the real causes of inequality in human relations and to raise the question referring to the organisation of the proletariat, and of servants in particular. This point of view may be regarded as the third peculiar feature which characterized students' organisations at that time.

Finally, as to the question relating to the seizure of power, they expressed themselves in the following sense: "We must conquer the power by means of oral and written propaganda and oppose the "living word" to the rifles and guns of militarists". They expected by means of agitation to put socialism into practice.

To sum up, socialistic organisations of youth of that time were characterised by the following peculiar traits: they belonged to the petty bourgeoisie as regards their composition; they did not consider it necessary to take part in the political struggle; their studies bore a purely "academic" or theoretical character; it was a study of socialism along theoretical lines; their ideology was of a very confused character.

These characteristics, however, cannot be extended to all organisations of that time and to all members. Some of the members carried on an energetic agitation among workers, published special literature for that purpose and distributed it among the masses etc. In short, theory with them did not differ from practice. These members belonged to the communist elements of these socialistic organisations.

These two parts of students' organisations could not live in harmony with one another. An internal struggle broke out very soon. This struggle was carried on around the question relating to the necessity of doing work among the masses and of organising the proletariat.

Speaking generally, these cross-purposes which in a more or less latent form existed ever since the creation of socialist organisations of

the youth, finally found their practical expression against right anarchist elements and, as a consequence of this struggle, these organisations were dissolved in August 1921, i.e. just one year after their creation.

During this struggle the real revolutionary part of students was consolidated into a new and, as regards its ideology, more homogeneous organisation, the Communistic Youth League.

B. The Communistic Youth League.

An active work inside the socialistic organisations of the youth was carried on by communistic elements which, after becoming stronger in this struggle against idealists and oppertunists, dissolved the socialistic organisations of the youth and created in their place a communistic league.

New communistic organisations first of all began to carry on work among the masses and started independent political movements.

The new League started at that time the publication of a central organ "The Pioneer" which obtained a very wide circulation and was printed in 5.000 copies.

The first mass movement of the Chinese Communistic Youth League took place on January 15, 1922, the commemoration day of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg. On that day this League organised at Shanghai, Ch'angsha, Wuch'ang, Canton and Peking mass meetings of the youth for the propagation, both in oral and printed form, of the ideas of Karl Liebknecht.

The experience thus gained was afterwards utilised during the anti-christian movement which began in March or April, 1922, and was organised and guided by the Communistic Youth League.

This was the period of mass propaganda not only of communistic ideas generally, but of the aims of the League in particular. The rapid growth of the league can be explained by the success of this propaganda. The League had at that time 17 organisations and numbered 3.000 members. This may be regarded as a very great achievement of the communistic move-

ment of the Youth in China.

After the anti-christian movement the League began openly to take part in the labor movement and sometimes even quite independently to direct strikes. At Ch'angsha five members of the League who directed the strike, were executed by being cut into small pieces by executioners in a public place by order of the Hunan Tuchün. At Shanghai five members of the League were arrested by the foreign municipal police for the same offence, i.e. instigation and direction of the strike.

Finally, the League took an active part in the May Day Celebrations. At Canton the League, jointly with the Communist Party, succeeded in organising on May I a demonstration in which 50,000 participated. Ever since May Day celebrations with the participation of workers began to take place annually.

Having attained some success in the work among the masses and having created new organisations, the Shanghai organisation took upon itself the initiative in consolidating separate organisations into a single Communistic Youth League and convoked the I-st All-China Congress.

The opening ceremony of this Congress took place at Canton on May 5, 1922, the 104-th anniversary of the birth of Karl Marx. In selecting this date for the opening of the Congress the League specially pointed out its fidelity to the Marxian revolutionary ideology.

The principal questions which were brought before the Congress for discussion, were the Regulations of the League and its program. The League also defined its aims as follows:

As regards politics: the establishment of a democratic form of government of China, abolishing the domination of militarists and foreign imperialists.

As regards economics: the League puts forth a demand that child and juvenile labor be properly regulated, especially with to regard to working hours, regular rests, sanitary conditions and increase of wages; also another demand of a special character, viz. that " employers and their wives should be forbidden to send apprentices on errands".

As regards instruction: the League demands the training in some trade of working youth, universal free education, the introduction of a phonetic alphabet and the abolition of the hieroglyphic writing.

As regards education: members of the League, as well as the masses of the Chinese Youth shall be educated in a revolutionary spirit.

In addition to all this, the attitude of the League towards various political organisations generally and towards the youth in particular was clearly defined in the program of the League.

After the I-st Congress the growth of membership continued and the number of members of the League reached 4.000. During the period of time between the first and the second Congress the League developed its activities in the following directions: participation in the struggle of workers by instigating and guiding strikes, organisation of workers into trade unions, guidance of the student movement and propaganda in oral and printed form.

The 2-nd Congress took place in August, 1923, at Nanking. This was the period of the victory of reactionary forces, when Ts'ao K'un was making preparations for his election as President of the Republic and when all student and other social movements were being crushed. Therefore the League was compelled to assume almost everywhere a secret character as an organisation unauthorised by law. Its membership at that time decreased to 2.500, because during the period of reaction the less steady elements left the League. This decrease in membership, however, was accompanied by the corresponding improvement in quality: the working elements, after the less steady members had left, constituted 25% of the total number of members of the League.

Principal questions which have been brought before the 2-nd Congress for discussion were those relating to the centralisation of authority and to discipline in the League, also to the necessity of transferring the main work of the League into the working masses and of organising League nuclei in the factories and mills.

The period which followed the 2-nd Congress was the period of

propaganda and of organising work.

Instead of one central organ " The Pioneer ", three central organs were published since that time: " Bulletin " for members of the League, " The Chinese Youth " for students and " The Young Worker " for workers. These publications are organs for communistic propaganda generally and not for the youth only. Almost all articles in them are devoted to general questions of the national revolution and to the theory and practice of communism. Questions concerning the youth movement occupy an insignificant place in these publications.

During the so-called " Lenin days " in 1924, enormous meetings took place. These were days of the national mourning in China. " Lenin days" were observed during the whole month. At that time the League was carrying on among the masses the widest propaganda of the ideas of Lenin .

C. The part played by the Communistic Youth League in the revolutionary movement of China.

The Communistic Youth League is an important political force in the country. Therefore it is compelled to come into contact with, and to define its attitude towards, various trade, revolutionary and bourgeois organisations, such as I/ bourgeois organisations, such as " Young Men Christian Association" and " Boy scouts ", 2/ national revolutionary organisations, such as the Kuomintang party, various democratic societies and student unions, 3/ workers' organisations, the trade unions.

Americans who direct the work of the Young Men Christian Association are bringing up the Chinese youth in the spirit of submission to foreign imperialism. But it would be a mistake to think that this Association is an exclusively bourgeois organisation as regards its composition. It comprises young men belonging to the typical petty bourgeoisie and to the employees' and students' class. In addition, the Association attracted into its ranks a portion of the Chinese working youth. Therefore the struggle against the Young Men Christian Association has for its exclusive aim the unveiling of its true character, in order to tear the

masses of the Chinese youth away from the harmful and pernicious influence of this imperialistic organisation. This struggle is carried on by two means: by revealing its true character and by undermining it from within.

Boy scouts are organized either by the Young Men Christian Association or by Christian Schools. Mere revelation of the true character of boy scouts is insufficient. It is necessary to oppose them by organising organisations revolutionary in spirit. Only then it will be possible to attract into them Chinese children from christian boy scout organisations.

The second group is composed of national revolutionary organisations. With reference to them the I-st Congress of the League expressed the opinion that a moral support should be given to the national revolutionary movement.

When, however, the question of giving also a practical support arose and when the Communist Party had resolved to enter the national revolutionary party of Kuomintang, in order to exert its influence upon it and to direct its work, the Communistic Youth League made an attempt to evade the entry into the Kuomintang. The 2-nd Congress of the League passed a resolution approving the decision of the Communist Party to join the Kuomintang, but with the following amendment: " This entry must not cause the weakening of the independent work of the Party and of the League among the working class ". The purport of this amendment lay in the fact that this work, i.e. among the working classes, was opposed to the general work of the Kuomintang, as having nothing in common with it. Some disagreements occured on this ground between the Party and the League. Experience proved, however, the expediency of the work of the Party inside the Kuomintang and the League also began to work actively with the Kuomintang.

The league succeeded in drawing into the general national revolutionary movement various democratic societies which were by their character decentralized and heterogeneous.

With reference to student organisations the 2-nd Congress pointed

and the revolutionary role of the student movement and the necessity of directing it. There was not a single student movement of which the League was not the inspirer and the spiritual guide.

To the third group belonged peasants' and workers' organizations.

Taking into account the role of peasants in the revolutionary movement, the Communistic Youth League proceeded to their organization. In the Kwantung province the peasant movement directed by the League began to carry on an armed struggle against the militarist in the south of China, Gen.Ch'en Chün-ming. Notwithstanding the fact that it was suppressed by the force of arms, it played an important role in the revolutionization of Chinese peasants. In Hunan the Communistic Youth League succeeded in organizing the " Union of workers and peasants " which numbered several thousands of members and which put forth the following demands: a/ the decrease of tax-rates, b/ the reduction of land rent and c/ other demands of an economic character. Similar organizations were created in other provinces also and the League always played the organizing and guiding part.

As regards the labor movement, the Communistic Youth League takes an active part in the organization of trade unions and very frequently directs the struggle which the Chinese proletariat is carrying on by means of strikes. It succeeded even in attracting adult persons into its organization. Thus the Communistic Youth League takes an active part not only in the revolutionary movement of the youth generally, but in the organization of the labor movement in the country in particular. This, however, has as many merits, as defects.

D. The League and the Party.

The League was " born " during the period of the social and political work and struggle. The energetic revolutionary Chinese youth took upon itself the mission of organizing not only the youth, but also adult people. This is the revolutionary merit of the League for which history will unquestionably give thanks. Such a state of affairs, however, is

admissible only to a certain extent. One must not lose sight of the fact that there is in China the Communist Party. It is compelled to work in a more secret way, because it has been driven " underground ", it is re - served and less numerous than the League, but its quality is better. When the League had grown up, it embraced a greater territory than the Party. In many localities there were no party "cells" (nuclei), but there existed organizations of the League. Thus the League assumed functions of the Party. About the middle of 1923 internal disagreements occured in connection with the question of joining the Kuomintang. " Left " elements entered the more " left " League. A certain tendency was noticeable at that time to transform the League into another party along lines different from those of the real Communist Party. This tendency was favored by the fact that the League consisted of many adult persons, as according to regulations, persons of 18 to 28 years are admitted as members to the League. The moment approached when the good points of the League threatened to assume a very dangerous tendency. Therefore the question was raised of " rejuvenating " the League as regards the age of its members, as well as its work. The League must set before itself the task of strengthening the Party, i.e. members of the Comsomol more than 26 years of age shall leave and join the Communistic Party. The second task of the League is to carry on direct work among the youth, first of all among the working and peasant youth.

The Communistic Youth League is the School through which masses of the peasant and working youth and the revolutionary youth of the in - telligentsia class must pass, in order to be able afterwards to join the Communist Party. To the lot of the Communistic Youth League falls the task of strengthening and developing the Party under the direction of which it must carry on its work.

E. Conclusions .

(At the time of the 6-th plenary session of the Executive Committee of the Chinese Communistic Youth League, " Comsomol ", held on November 12, 1926).

The Chinese Comsomol is growing and getting stronger. Quite

recently this League numbered only 2.300 members, but now there are 12.500 members, subdivided into 900 cells (nuclei), 40% of these members being workmen, 35% students, 5% peasants and the remaining 20% belonging to other classes. Lately, however, the League has considerably improved: young workmen constitute now 43% of its total membership.

In spite of the persecutions and the most difficult conditions of the " underground work " under which the Chinese Comsomol has to carry on its activities, this League is gradually succeeding in winning over to its side the working youth of the oppressed country and is bringing up this youth in such a manner as to inculcate in it the hatred of the imperialists of all countries, the conquerers of China with its many millions of inhabitants.

But of particular importance is the fact that the Chinese Comsomol is beginning to direct now its activities towards the social work chiefly among the youth; whereas formerly, on account of the weakness of the Communist Party, this League was merely carrying on social and political work in general.

This change of tactics on the part of the Chinese Comsomol will ensure for this League the development into a real mass organization of the working youth.

(Translator's note. "To Malysheff" is written with a blue pencil on the margin of this report. Malysheff is the name of one of the Russians arrested during the raid on the Embassy premises on April 6, 1927).

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
1928 24 3700 2-28
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Present Trend of Chinese Communist Party.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JAN 24 1928

During and since the consummation of the Russian Revolution of 1917, communism has sought to attain its ends as a guiding rather than a motivating force. The kinetic energy of mass movements, such as agrarianism, trades' unionism, nationalism, and of political party organisation is utilized to provide an impetus that can be directed at the appropriate time into the channel of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In the past a similar course has been pursued in China. The nucleus of the Communist Party in this country was formed in 1920 when a group of seven men met at Shanghai under the leadership of Ch'en Tu-hsin, and definitely organised the party with centers at Shanghai, Peking and Canton. For three years the Party existed as an assemblage of doctrinaires, with its membership numbered in the tens. As early as 1921, however, the Communist Party had espoused the mass trade union movement, and in 1922 it was decided that an opportunity had arrived for entry upon the political stage. Sun Yat-sen had become persuaded that profit could be extracted from what he undoubtedly conceived as patronage of communism, and amalgamation of the communist party with the Kuomintang was decreed at a plenary session of the former group in August of that year. At this time the orthodox party membership amounted to about 1,000, or together with the Communist Youth League, which had just been called into active existence, to about 3,000.

Here enter the Russians. China had been selected by the Soviets as a major theatre of action, not only because of the opportunities afforded for the propagation of communist doctrine, but also in its capacity of a "sub-colony" the disruption of which would increase the pressure that the U.S.S.R. was bringing to bear on the imperialist and bourgeois states, notably England. Borodin arrived at Canton in 1923, armed with the ability to supply money and war materiel, and by that fact empowered to direct the Party and the Kuomintang and to insist successfully that his Chinese political and military pensioners should subordinate their personal ambitions and greed to the policies and operations dictated by him and his assistants. Events justified the expediency of basing on Canton. In February, 1923, the ruthlessness with which Wu P'ei-fu suppressed the Kin-Han railway strike at Changsintien definitely scotched communist activity in the mass trade union movement in the North, while the death of Sun Yat-sen in Peking in 1925 ruined his adventure, based on his personality and a political coup de main, that aimed at the capture of the entire country for the Kuomintang. Meanwhile the Chinese Communist Party had rounded out its program by affiliating itself with mass agrarianism: the third congress of June, 1923 laid special emphasis on righting the wrongs of the peasants. Party membership from 1922 to 1926 remained practically stationary. Here then was a small, compact group, imbued with the communist ideology, oriented in the directions prescribed by the Third International, standing on the threshold of its subsequent sensational career.

The denouement was sudden and dramatic. The Communist Party mushroomed over China in the wake of the Northern Expedition. By November, 1926, its membership had increased to 10,000, plus 20,000 additional members of the Youth League. At this time the enrolment in

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Present Trend of Chinese Communist Party.

Peasant Unions in Kwangtung province alone amounted to between six and seven hundred thousand according to Russian authorities. This was only midway in the movement, which reached its peak just before the crash of April, 1927. At that period if the party had detached itself from the Kuomintang and acted vigorously along destructively revolutionary lines there existed more than a fair chance of all South China's being faced with red ruin in the shape of universal agrarian disorders, complete stoppage of commerce and the dictatorship of that fraction of the Chinese people that had arrogated to itself the title of the proletariat. This did not occur. The Moscow directors of the movement decided that the time was not ripe to cut loose from the Party's acquired motive power and to proceed under its own propulsion. They chose what they thought was the safer method in a delicate situation of trying to continue to work with the Chinese militarists that they had called to power. The militarists fell away from them, debacle ensued and communism became a hissing and a bywork in Chinese politics and expressed public opinion.

At the present time the Party has been divorced from the Kuomintang, and its control of militarists is limited to a few obscure individuals whose forces in all amount to not more than ten or twenty thousand soldiers. The fear of the renewal of Russian domination has inspired general suppressive activities throughout China on the part of the great majority of those in power, who while they possess the utmost tolerance, and frequently an abysmal ignorance of governmental principles, are most averse to fitting on their necks the yoke of any form of extraneous domination, domestic or foreign. This repression has undoubtedly resulted in the elimination by execution of many of the Chinese communist leaders, and has put an effective end to agitation over large areas of the country; for in China successful revolt always implies a certain amount of acquiescence on the part of the authorities even when the revolt is directed against them.

But the breakdown described above does not necessarily imply the passing of the Communist Party as an important force in China. Despite casualties and repression membership is on the increase. In Moscow the strength of the Chinese branch of the Party was reported in August as from 40,000 to 60,000 by various spokesmen of the Comintern. Losses in agrarian districts seem to have been made up in industrial centers. While coordination of party activities has been rendered more difficult by the collapse of Borodin's organization, the agents of the Soviets continue to direct, inspire and finance the movement. Finally there must be noted the spread in the field for agitation; as the bleeding of China continues under the exactions of militarists regardless of party or belief larger and larger masses of the Chinese populace are becoming destitute and desperate, immediately responsive to the call to destruction and violence which constitutes the first step in the Communist Party's program.

At the present time the main foci of communist effort are four: Canton, Shanghai, Hankow and Tientsin. These cities possess in common a number of significant attributes: each is a seaport, an industrial and financial center, at each there is located a Russian directive nucleus

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Present Trend of Chinese Communist Party.

under the guise of a consulate, each has a place of refuge in the shape of a foreign concession. Of the four the most important is Canton, both because of the turbulent character of its population, and because the work of the communist party in the hinterland has been longest established and was originally more thorough than elsewhere in China. In Kwangtung there are still many districts governed by the peasants' councils set up on the Russian model. The inflammability of this area is attested by the recent unsuccessful coup of December 12th, when 5,000 men are reliably reported as having taken up arms in aid of lawlessness overnight. Next in importance comes Shanghai, the first industrial center of the country. Here for the time being the question of any political coup seems to be in abeyance; but a most unsavory unrest is continuously in process of fomentation. The labor troubles in Shanghai, measured by their extent at any one time, could not be characterized as extremely serious, but there is no end to them, and they are accompanied by an uninterrupted series of violences and murders. It may also be regarded as significant of the progress of communistic propaganda in this area that the only agrarian outbreaks of definitely red inspiration that have recently occurred outside Kwangtung were located around Wusih, some fifty miles West of Shanghai. In Wuhan at present there is little concrete evidence of communist agitation; but the economic wreckage incident to the Nationalist regime in that city is an obvious and permanent breeding ground for unrest. Communist outbreaks may be expected there automatically upon the slightest relaxation of governmental control. In Tientsin there is little evidence of positive accomplishment on the part of the communists. By the capture of Chen Chih-yuan at that city in November the authorities obtained possession of documents outlining the organization and methods of the party in this area, but the record of accomplishment was actually negative, showing once again the extraordinary deference of the Chinese to governmental restraint.

Important but nevertheless minor centers of communist effort must be noted at Peking, Tongshan (Chihli) and Changsha.

The break between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang has resulted in a considerable modification in the orientation of the red directive. For the time being efforts at legal cooperation between the communists and the Kuomintang, or any other Chinese political party have been abandoned. Schemes to drive two or more militarists abreast have also lapsed, with a consequent decrease in the requisitions on Russia for subsidies and munitions. This does not imply an unwillingness on the part of the Party and of its Russian directors to embark once again on politico-military adventures; it simply means that for the time being there are no Chinese war lords who can see a profit in accepting Russian tutelage. There exists no guarantee that this state of affairs will continue. Also this abstention of the Soviets from thrusting themselves into the situation in their governmental aspects tends to remove from the activities of the Chinese Communist Party much of the atmosphere of weltpolitk that previously was so pervasive. There is very little emphasis at present on the struggle with England, and anti-foreignism is noticeably absent from the slogans of the Party. Its glance is now

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Present Trend of Chinese Communist Party.

turned inward instead of outward; its mission is one of fomentation of China's domestic troubles and unrests. It labors for the spread of agrarianism among the farmers, for the development of class consciousness among industrial laborers. It preaches the class struggle unceasingly, and urges the masses to revolts that in themselves are foredoomed to failure, but which won or lost will add their quota to the unrest within the country and sap the resistance of the bourgeoisie. To sum up the Chinese Communist Party has reverted to the methods prevalent at its inception; it is appealing to the proletariat to create itself and accomplish its own revolution.

On its face there would not seem to be much future for such a movement in China. The respect for vested property is too strong in the land, subordination to expressed authority is too innate for the definite realization of a dictatorship of the proletariat. Furthermore the trend of Chinese governmental activity is away from Moscow at present, and it seems more than likely that the task of the Party will be further complicated by the ejection from the country of the Soviet consulates and governmental agencies, thereby making more difficult the problem of safely and efficiently providing foreign direction to the movement. At the same time there must not be overlooked the stored and directed energy of the Party. This energy, peculiarly effective in a land of inertia and laissez faire, acquires special value in the light of the contrast between the definite and unchanging political objective of the communists and the opportunist maneuvres of all other Chinese political bodies. Activities of any kind once undertaken tend to persist in China long beyond their term in foreign lands; communism and communists will continue to exist in spite of the most strenuous efforts at their extirpation. And inevitably times will come when it will be to the fleeting interest of evanescent administrations to avail themselves of the concrete help offered by a striking force such as the Party. Whenever these eventualities occur, when authority for whatever reason licenses the Party, the old sores will open and perhaps locally, perhaps nationally the red menace will rematerialize.

John Magruder
John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

Distribution:
4 MID
1 Tientsin
1 File

AMERICAN LEGATION
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE.
PEKING, CHINA.

December 22, 1927

#7185

Subject: Russian Captured Documents.

To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D. C.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JAN 24 1928

1. With reference to letter No. 7074 from this office, dated June 21, 1927, there are forwarded herewith:

Document No. A-45 - "Counter Espionage Work in Kwangtung, November, 1925".

Document No. A-46 - "Report on the Chinese Navy, November 1926", by a Chinese Communist in the pay of the Soviet Embassy.

2. Document A-46, together with Document A-17, contain all information about the Chinese Navy found in the captured Soviet documents.

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

encls.as above
elh

A-45
8926 2657-d 28
Very secret.
122
WAR DEPARTMENT

Report relating to the counter-espionage work in Kwangtung during November 1925.

(No. 3: December 1925).

Contents.

1. Beginning of the work. General conditions.
2. Work during November 1925.
3. Conditions of work.
4. Personnel.
5. Considerations as to the future.
6. Conclusions.

---

1. Beginning of the work. General conditions.

I arrived at Canton on October 25th, 1925, and in accordance with the order which I had received in Peking, presented myself to comrade Borodin. I gave him an account of instructions which I had received and got from him an order to start the work.

About the time of my arrival at Canton, the fight against criminal activities in the Kwangtung province, from capital crimes to espionage cases, fell principally to the so-called "Department of Public Safety" at the head of which at Canton stood Gen. Wu T'i-hsing. We cannot of course fully entrust the fight against counter-revolution and espionage to this Department which, however, cannot be abolished, notwithstanding the fact that there are many reasons, on the strength of which such an abolition is urgently required. For instance, we may point out that the assassination of comrade Liao Chung-k'ai was known to Wu T'i-hsing long before it has been actually committed, but he did not take any measures to prevent it. This

has not been proved officially, but there are some data which point in his (i.e. Gen. Wu T'i-hsing) direction. Another peculiar instance took place, when one of the bandit chiefs (belonging to an organization called "Blood brothers") was arrested. This bandit was killed and proved to be a nephew of the person who was in charge of the criminal investigation section in the Department of Public Safety. In spite of all these facts, however, we cannot raise the question as to the abolition of this Department or even as to some "cleaning" of it, because it could not be replaced by anything else. About the middle of September, at a secret meeting of our workers and the Chinese communists it was decided to start the work in this direction. Two comrades who of course had no preparatory training, were selected and entrusted with this work. Officially this organization existed as an Intelligence Section attached to the local Garrison. The work was carried on just from case to case, as these comrades did not receive any advices or directions. After a month's work they succeeded in organizing a small agency and get sometimes interesting materials. In any case the work was started.

Of these two comrades who have been entrusted with the work, one named Fu Li, secretary to the Military Commission, has been in the U.S.S.R. He is an intelligent steady and clever man, well developed politically. He is not able, however, to carry on the work directly, because he does not know the Canton dialect.

The other one, Yang Ying, is somewhat inferior to Fu Li, but is an excellent organizer of minor work. He is a Cantonese. Therefore all organizing work among the lower strata of the population fell to him.

There were no more workers available. In the beginning general conditions were favorable, but the absence of a properly organized work was felt by everybody. Only an impetus was wanted to put the machine in motion. Assassination of comrade Liao Chung-k'ai and several cases of treason on the part of generals were such an impetus. The necessity of a systematic counter-espionage work became more and more pressing and, as a makeshift, the above-mentioned organ was created. Therefore the beginning of a serious organization of this work met with sympathy and support on the part both of our two workers

and of the Chinese communists.

2. Work during November 1925.

Our problem was to create an organisation which would be able to secure the safety of the province.

In conformity with this plan which was approved both by comrade Boredin and comrade Kissanka, it was decided to establish schools, for the training of workers.

Students for the first short term courses were selected from among the best military commissaries and political workers. Teaching (first 24 hours per week, but afterwards the number of hours was increased to 32) was done almost exclusively by means of lectures and only partly by means of lectures combined with colloquies (on account of lack of time). Summaries of all lectures were previously translated and distributed among students, which circumstance enabled the latter to master the subjects more easily. As a result twenty four efficient comrades completed their studies. Some of them returned to their units and will continue the work there in political sections in which they had been engaged previously, doing our work at the same time. Others entered the service either in local organs (in prefectures) or in the central apparatus and will do exclusively our work.

It has been decided, as a general principle, to have two men in each army corps and also two men in each prefecture. In practice, however, it proved impossible to put everywhere this proportion into effect. For instance, we succeeded in sending only one worker into the 5th army corps of Gen. Fu-lin, but with great difficulties and that only in a very secret manner. The question relating to salaries of workers was decided at the meeting of November 25. These 24 men, together with some workers of the central apparatus, will form the basis of the future Chinese G.P.U. (the Soviet secret police).

It is not to be expected that a great number of communists will join our work, and 60 communists in the apparatus will be the maximum which it will be possible to get.

The chief work during this month was done at meetings of the

Collegiate and at conferences with workers. There were 6 official (with minutes) and 2 preliminary meetings of the Collegiate. In accordance with my plan, at each meeting some new theoretical question was brought up for discussion and, when approved, was then put into execution in due order of time. Meetings bore a serious character, because the attitude of all members towards their work was also very serious. At present the organization of the Collegiate is as follows. T'ang P'ing-san, President of the Collegiate, co-ordinates and directs the whole work. Fu Li, first assistant, directs the work of counter-espionage, and of the secret and economic sections. Yang Yi, second assistant, directs the work of our agencies and economic and banditry sections. I am holding the post of adviser and member of the Collegiate. Comrade Ch'eng, assistant chief of the political section in the 3rd army corps and member of the Communist Party, will also enter the Collegiate shortly, as a member, and will work in the organizing and preparatory training sections. Thus the Collegiate will consist of five members. There is also a section of information and censure. A comrade, graduate of the school, is in charge of this section, but he is not member of the Collegiate. Altogether seven persons, constitute the central apparatus, T'ang P'ing-san included. Such a staff is of course absolutely insufficient.

We are just beginning to put the information service on a proper footing.

Some system as regards enlistment of agents is being introduced. There is a small net of agents which is increasing daily. So far, however, it is too early to speak about the really serious organization of the work. For instance, such question as banditry, which is of great urgency for Kwangtung has not as yet been taken up in all its entireness, on account of the lack both of time and of men. Actual fighting against banditry is done exclusively by military commanders, and our task consists only in registering what is done in this direction.

No work is done on the frontiers. A question was raised about sending men for the examination of incoming vessels, but had to be dropped on account of the lack of personnel.

All these questions are unavoidably put off on account of this same lack of a suitable staff. As under such conditions the work cannot be carried on in all required directions, I have decided for the moment to confine myself to the work of the most important and urgent character, in order not to split up our forces, and to leave out altogether all other questions. At present the army and some regions are of the most importance for us. Therefore workers have been sent there. Nobody here knows anything about the army. Even the numerical strength of most units is unknown, to say nothing of making a more detailed study of them. As a result, unexpected treasons take place constantly, as, for instance, the case of desertion of the 13th division which took place only a month ago.

On the other hand, 95% of officials here are guilty of embezzlement of government funds, but we absolutely cannot take up this matter, because it is impossible to divert the attention of our workers with such questions as malfeasances in office. Fighting these offences has to be postponed.

In addition to counter-espionage, the Collegiate is busy also with questions relating to intelligence service. We have agencies in Hongkong and in Kwangsi. We had to pay attention to these questions also because no other organ with the exception of our Collegiate is capable to take charge of them.

During the last month we had to consider the question relating to the protection of responsible workers here. A new system of passes which is more perfect than the former system of badges, has been introduced, and the question pertaining to a greater systemization of the protection service is now being worked out.

Regulations governing schools have been drawn up and approved at the meeting of the Collegiate on November 25, 1925.

As a result of the work of agents, several cases have been put on record, partly occasionally and partly in consequence of systematic work. As some of these cases concern foreigners, the work is carried on in two directions: from the Chinese side through agents enlisted among the Chinese, and from our side through foreign agents working for us. The work in connection with these cases is developing satisfactorily, connections are being esta-

blished, and several agents have been enlisted and are now at our disposal.

Until November the information work consisted in arranging materials furnished by the Canton press, but no systematic arranging of these materials for the purposes of intelligence and counter-espionage service was done. Now materials furnished by the British press are arranged systematically. Moreover, Chinese newspapers have been ordered from the neighbering provinces, also from Hongkong and Macao.

Bulletins containing all materials which were obtained through the information service were issued,not regularly, however, but dependent upon the quantity of materials available. Only materials relating to individual cases were not utilized for bulletins.

3. Conditions of work.

The conditions of work, generally speaking, did not change, but remained the same as in the beginning, when the work was only started. The work developed in an energetic manner and some results have been attained. We met with sympathy and support from everywhere, and our position here has been firmly consolidated. Sympathy and support alone, however, cannot give us all that is absolutely necessary for the work.

The proper organisation of a secret service is based generally upon three, and here even upon four, conditions. The work cannot go on successfully, when even one of these conditions is absent. These conditions are: 1/ money, 2/ personnel, 3/ support of party organizations and 4/ interpreters. So far the first and the third did not fail, but the second and the fourth conditions were absolutely lacking.

The money question stands now as follows. The whole organisation is so far kept at our expense. For the time being monthly expenses are about $5,000, but in two or three months will increase up to $20,000. But even this sum is small in comparison with the work we have to do. We cannot seriously count upon receiving this money from the Government (i.e. of Canton), at least not until we win its confidence and are quite sure of our own forces. Thus we will have only the same source of obtaining money as now. No special

agreement in this respect exists between Peking and comrade Borodin, and I was asked quite a natural question, as to whether money would be given for this work. A complete clearness as regards this question is necessary. Otherwise it may turn out that some day I shall find myself without money for carrying on the work. Another question concerns expenses which are not connected with the Chinese work. It is absolutely necessary for me to have at my disposal a certain amount of money and to send accounts regarding expenditure of this money directly to Peking. Then there will be a certain independence in the work, because it is quite understandable that the organization which gives money, shall of course have the right to demand that this money should be used only for purposes which this organization thinks proper. Therefore please remit me at the next opportunity $1,000 Gold and I, on my part, shall send accounts concerning the expenditure of this money directly to Peking.

I always obtain all necessary support both from party organizations and from our comrades. Owing to their support, excellent students were selected for the first courses, and I am able almost always to obtain workers which I need. For instance, I succeeded in obtaining comrade Ch'eng (one of our responsible comrades) for our work. Russian workers also give assistance in every way. Still neither of them can help in solving the urgent problem as to personnel and interpreters.

The question relating to personnel is of the utmost importance and affects the whole work. It must be divided, however, into two parts: 1/ the Chinese personnel, 2/ the Russian personnel. As regards the Chinese personnel, all measures are taken to secure the needed men, and all that is possible, will be done in this respect. With reference to the Russian personnel (instructors) "things followed their usual course". When I was leaving, I was positively promised (upon word of honor which was quite unnecessary) that Brailovsky and Katiushin for the work in the G.P.U. and somebody for the work in the Intelligence Department (R.U.) would be sent here immediately. Being still in Peking, I permitted myself to express doubts as to the fulfilment of this promise. Now I am convinced that I made a mistake in that I left without awaiting the arrival of all these men. To say the least, it would be strange

to think that it is possible to organize the work of the G.P.U. without obtaining a suitable personnel. All my doubts and considerations which I expressed when at Peking, are now realized. I shall not repeat my arguments, but unless two men whom I asked for are at once dispatched from Moscow, and unless those workers who were promised me, are immediately sent from Peking, I shall be compelled to believe that the work of the G.P.U. here is considered to be of secondary importance. In that case I will concentrate my attention on a more important (apparently) work, i.e. military work, in which I will probably be of more use. The school cannot be established without instructors, without the school Chinese workers cannot be obtained, and without workers the work of the G.P.U. cannot be organized. I cannot hold myself responsible for the work which it is impossible to organize.

(In three lists of collaborators of the South-China group for the period June to October, 1926, Katiushin is mentioned as adviser to the Inspectorate of Communication of the General Staff. Translator's note).

The problem relating to the interpreter is still worse. Granted that I alone, just as an ordinary plenipotentiary, am able to do something as regards sending instructions and directions to agents, but without interpreter I am compelled to remain idle. I cannot obtain interpreters locally, because those who are here, are overcharged with work and cannot be detached for our work. Li who was promised me, did not as yet arrive. I leave it to you to form a judgment as to whether it is possible to carry on the work without interpreter. The talk about using the English language is nonsense, because there are very few party men who can speak this language, and I do not venture to engage some "speculator" even for translating lectures, to say nothing about translating materials obtained through agents. The attitude of Peking towards this question is quite incomprehensible and makes me have doubts as to the seriousness of the work I am doing here.

I do not see any sense in my work, unless these two questions (i.e. relating to personnel and interpreter) are solved satisfactorily,

because it is hardly expedient for me to sit here only to have once a week a conversation with the Chinese.

4. Personnel.

As to the personnel available here, there are now 2½ men (because one is doing only a part time work) who are doing the work of instructors.

Nikitin carries on the work in the Collegiate, delivers lectures in the school, draws up instructions schedules, directs agents, collects from the English press materials relating to information and is in charge of the organizing work.

Nikhaileff is in charge of all matters, enlists foreign (non-Chinese) agents and keeps in touch with them, directs educational matters and delivers lectures in the School, prepares financial accounts.

Fred Beredin acts as English secretary of the Collegiate and arranges English materials for information purposes (does this work only, when he has spare time, because he has other, regular work).

The personnel as available now is overcharged with work and cannot do anything more. So if materials in a greater quantity are obtained, they will remain not utilized.

5. Considerations as to the further work.

Considerations as to the further development of the work are based upon the supposition that the work is recognized as important, and that the defects which are indicated in paragraph 3, will be eliminated.

In accordance with the plan for work (which has been already approved) about December 14th a School will be organized to train workers for counter-espionage and intelligence work. The organization of this School has been approved at the meeting of the Collegiate on November 25, 1925. Provided this undertaking does not end in a failure, our work in the future will develop in a systematical manner.

As to the organization of the work generally, it is done now in a secret manner, under the guise of an Intelligence Section attached to the local garrison. As this section is to be abolished, the new official de-

signation will be: Bureau of Detectives attached to the 1st Army Corps. In accordance with the project drawn up by Wang Ching-wei, the Political Bureau of the Kuomintang intends to organise a Political Investigation Bureau which will prove to be entirely "secret", because T'ang P'ing-sun is designated as its chief. In that case our work will assume quite a legal character. Otherwise the work will be carried on in a semi-legal manner, until our organisation becomes powerful enough.

It is planned that in its final form our organisation will be called "Commission for the Defense of the Revolution", with the Collegiate at its head and the following sections: counter-espionage, special, economic, inquiry, bandit, information, agents, censure and specially secret. There is also a project to organise special troops for this commission. The work beyond the borders of the province is also developing. Workers to be employed by Residencies will be trained in the school. Permanent agents for Hongkong and Macao will be selected among strikers. These will be given proper instructions and will then be able to throw a complete light on the situation at Hongkong and Macao. It is also intended to organise a kind of bureau for letters to which all strikers will send information concerning local state of mind, general situation etc.

6. Conclusions.

My general conclusion is that the ground and the conditions at Canton are favorable for the organisation of the counter-espionage work. This work can be successfully developed, and even if it will not be possible to put it on the same footing as in the U. S. S. R., in any case we shall succeed in securing ourselves from such dangers as unexpected betrayals of whole army units, mutiny, assassination of responsible workers and impudent espionage work which is done here without any constraint.

The work has been started, and our task is not to let it step, but develop it at the same speed. For that purpose main defects, such as insufficient number of instructors and absence of an interpreter, must be eliminated. Otherwise there cannot be any question about the further development of the work.

(November..... 1925).

Very secret.

Draft project of the Organization of the School of Counter-espionage and Intelligence Service in Kwangtung.

(No.10: December 14, 1925).

(Note: The organization of this School has been approved at the meeting of the Collegiate on November 25, 1925).

1. The aim of the School is to train theoretically chiefs of counter-espionage and intelligence groups, also ordinary agents and plenipotentiaries (delegates or representatives).

2. This School shall be accordingly divided into two Sections: Counter-espionage section and Intelligence section.

3. Students, middle and junior grade officers, members of trade unions, of peasant and other organizations, strikers etc. are admitted into this School, but only after a careful selection and checking up on their political reliability.

4. A part of the students shall be so selected as to their dialect as to be able to work in different regions of the Kwangtung province.

5. Students of the School are considered to be in the military service and are at the absolute disposal of the School.

6. Students of the School are enrolled upon the basis of the following calculations:

A. Counter-espionage Section:

a/ for the army and navy	15 men
b/ for six prefectures (4 men for each prefecture)	24 "
c/ for Canton and borders	9 "
Total	48 "

B. Intelligence Section: 12 men.

Total enrollment: 60 men.

7. The duration of the course shall be three months or about 624 working hours reckoned upon the basis of eight working hours per day (drilling not included).

8. The teaching shall be done by means of lectures or seminaries and practical exercises.

9. For seminaries and practical exercises students shall be divided into five groups, each consisting of twelve students.

10. Subjects shall be divided into a/ obligatory for both sections, b/ obligatory for one section only.

11. Approximate distribution of hours according to subjects.

Subjects	Lectures and seminaries	Pract. Exercises	Total
a/ Course of political subjects: elements of political science, political parties and political problems.	100	---	100
b/ Elements of military science: arms, firing, work in connection with dynamiting.	20	30	50
c/ Elements of civil administration. Functions and aims of different organs.	14	---	14
d/ Elements of secret work. Rules of maintaining strict secrecy. Elements of counter-espionage and intelligence service.	4	---	4
e/ Organization.	4	---	4
f/ Elements of information service.	15	15	30
g/ Secret writing (Steganography).	10	10	20
Total:	167	55	222

Intelligence Section:

a/ Military science and army reconnaitering work.	64	50	114
b/ Intelligence service through agents.	85	25	110
c/ Information service.	30	30	60
d/ Organization.	6	--	6
e/ Counter-espionage.	20	30	50
f/ Enemy.	40	--	40
g/ Extra hours (to be kept in reserve).	--	--	22
Total:	245	135	402

Counter-espionage Section:

a/ Counter-espionage service (Okhrana).	4	--	4
b/ Outside observation.	45	70	115
c/ Information service.	30	30	60
d/ Enquiry.	58	33	91
e/ Banditry.	20	--	20
f/ Auxiliary services.	10	10	20
g/ Official services.	30	--	30
h/ History of our enemies in Kwangtung.	20	--	20
i/ Intelligence service	20	--	20
j/ Extra hours.	--	--	22
Total:	237	143	402

Grand total for Intelligence section (22 extra hours included):	412	190	624
Grand total for Counter - espionage section (22 extra hours included):	404	198	624

12. Each student shall study one of the European languages. Preference will be given to the Russian language, the English and the French will follow next. There will be about six groups, each consisting of ten students:

three groups for the Russian language, one for the English and one for the French.

10/ Chief director of the School: Nikitin.

11/ Chief director of the Intelligence section: Tereshateff (Deputy Chief of the General Staff and Secretary of the Russian Military Council).

12/ Chief director of the Counter-espionage section: [illegible].

13/ Teachers of special subjects: Mikhaileff and Fred Boredin. These were teachers are wanted.

14/ Military subjects can be taken up by insert forces of the Group which are available now.

15/ As Chinese teachers of special subjects, those may be utilized who have completed their studies and who are now working at Canton.

16/ Instructors for political work are wanted.

---

16. After completing their course, students shall receive certificates.

A. Personnel of the School.

1/ Teachers of special subjects (not less than five) are wanted; they also shall be charged with the direction of groups.

2/ One chief director of the School.

3/ One chief director of the Intelligence section.

4/ One chief director of the Counter-espionage section.

5/ Instructors in military subjects.

6/ Teachers of languages: 3 for Russian, two for English and one for French. Chinese teachers may be used for teaching English and French.

B. Chinese Staff.

7/ Teachers of special subjects (not less than five) are wanted; they also will be charged with the direction of groups.

8/ Teachers of political subjects (for groups) are wanted.

9/ Instructors in military subjects are also wanted.

A-46
2657-9-1
WAR DEPARTMENT

THE REPORT ON THE CHINESE NAVY.

(Dated November 3rd, 1926. No. 690).

Contents: Pages.

A. Administrative Organs of the Navy: 1

1. Squadrons: "

a/ the Training Squadron, 4

b/ the First Squadron 6

c/ the Second Squadron. 12

Conditions of Life on the Ships. 19

A Brief Résumé of the Incident with the cruiser Haiyung. 20

2. The First Mixed Brigade of Marines. 22

The Ministry of Navy. 23

B. Shipbuilding Organs of the Navy (Navy Yards): 24

1. The Pagoda Arsenal and Dockyard at Makiang, Foochow. Aeroplane Workshop. Mint. "

2. The Kiangnan Dock and Engineering Works at Kaoch'angmiao, Shanghai. 27

3. The Navy Yard at Taku. 28

C. Organs of Naval Training: 29

1. The Naval Training Battalion at Chefoo. "

2. The Torpedo boat Training Battalion at Nanking. "

3. The Naval Garrison Detachment at Makiang, Foochow. "

4. The School for Marines at Amoy. 30

Conclusion. "

Contents: Pages.

D. Location of the Organs of the Navy 31

E. Groupings among the most important men of the Navy. 33

F. Plans for the Development of the Work. 35

G. Conditions prevailing in the Kwangtung Navy. 39.

A. ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANS OF THE NAVY.

All organs of the Chinese Navy are divided into two organizations:

1. Squadrons, viz.: a/ the Training Squadron, b/ the First Squadron and c/ the Second Squadron.

2. The 1st Mixed Brigade of Marines.

I will now make my report in the above-mentioned order, and as new materials will gradually be forthcoming, I will not fail to draw up in future supplementary reports.

---

1. Squadrons.

The Staff of the Commander-in-chief of the Naval Forces is the highest organ with regard to squadrons.

The Staff has the following organization:

1. One Commander in Chief.

2. One Chief of Staff.

3. Ten Sections each headed by one Chief, viz.:

a/ the Section of operations,

b/ the Adjutant Section,

c/ the Secretariat,

d/ the Statistical Section,

e/ the Artillery Section,

f/ the Supply Section (Commissariat),

g/ the Section of Military Jurisprudence,

h/ the Medical Section (headed by the Chief Medical Inspector of the Navy),

i/ the Telegraph Section and

g/ the Engineer (Mechanical) Section.

Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces: Yang Shu-chuang, called Yao-ching, native of the Fukien province. Studied in the Naval Training School, but did not complete the course. He is timid in character, very much addicted to opium smoking and suffers from tuberculosis. He gets up only after sunset, works with a complete absence of mind and is quite unreliable. Yang Shu-chuang only bears the name of the Commander-in-Chief, he obeys blindly the orders of Tu Hsi-kwei to whom he is entirely subservient, and "from below", completely fell under the influence of Teng Pao-ch'ing. Notwithstanding the fact that he has been holding this office only for quite a short time, Yang Shu-chuang succeeded in laying by several millions, because he embezzles public money without any restraint. In short, Yang Shu-chuang is now in the state of complete demoralization and depravity. He belongs to the Chihli clique and supports Gen. Sun Ch'uan-fang.

(Translator's Note: Later Adm. Yang Shu-chuang went over to the side of the Nationalist Government of Canteng and is now Commander-in-Chief of its naval forces).

Chief of Staff: Lin Kuo-keng who studied in England. Formerly he belonged to the Kuomintang party, but now he is a close adherent of Admiral Yang Shu-chuang. He is quite a young man, very reliable and sedate in character, having "new ideas" and great aspirations. His relations with the Commander of the "Model Squadron" Rear Admiral Ch'en Shao-k'wan are quite friendly, and he maintains with the latter a very lively correspondence. At present Lin Kuo-keng resides in the headquarters of the garrison at Amoy, where he is in charge of everything, and his posts are temporarily filled by Wu Kwang-tsung who is closely connected with him and who is completely imbued with convictions which are professed by the "New Seamen's League". He is a close adherent of Admiral Tu Hsi-kwei.

Chief of the Adjutant Section: Meng Hsiu-ch'ung, about 30 years of age, graduate of the Naval College at Chefoo. He is very fond of women,

a bribe-taker, bureaucrat in character and also belongs to the decadent elements of the society. He is a close adherent of Adm. Yang Shu-chuang.

Chief of the Secretariat or the General Secretary: Cheng Hsien-sheng, just "old rubbish". He began his naval career during the reign of the Manchu dynasty and therefore did not yet reconcile himself to the republican form of government. There can hardly be anything more to say about him.

Chief of the Statistical Section: Ho Pao-yen, Rear-Admiral, is quite a demoralized man who cannot even be held responsible for his own words.

Chief of the Artillery Section: Lin Hsien-ch'in, elder brother of Lin Kuo-keng, is a young man, studied in America where he received a good education. At present he is chief instructor in torpedo matters and is very much esteemed by his students. He is comparatively "modern" man as regards political convictions and enjoys great influence with the personnel of the navy.

Chief of the Supply Section (Commissariat): Lo Hsü-ho.

Chief of the Section of Military Jurisprudence: Yeh Lung-hsiang.

Chief of the Medical Section or the Chief Medical Inspector of the Navy: Hsü Shih-fan.

Chief of the Telegraph Section: Ch'en Ke-chiang, a young man who studied in America.

Chief of the Engineer (Mechanical) Section: T'ang Te-hsin, a man who is very devoted to his superiors and uses all his energy in defending their interests.

Chief of the Administrative Department of the Navy at Foochow: (name not given), "feathers his own nest."

A. The Training Squadron.

The Staff of the Training Squadron consists of the following officers:

a/ Commander of the Training Squadron,

b/ Chief of Staff of the Training Squadron,

c/ Several Adjutants,

d/ Chief of the Technical Section and

e/ Chief of the Secretariat or the General Secretary.

The following four ships belong to the Training Squadron: 1/ Yingjui, 2/ T'ungchi, 3/ Chaoho, and 4/ Chinan.

Commander of the Training Squadron: Li Ching-hai, was formerly the Chief of the Naval School. He is an able enough man and is not addicted to opium smoking, but is very fond of money. He tries to curry favor with his superiors, but is arrogant with the subordinates. Therefore the higher authorities like him "as their own son", but the cadets dislike and even hate him. At one time he collaborated with Gen. Ch'en Chiung-ming. He belongs to the party of Adm. Tu Hsi-kwei and is now partisan of Han Chia-tse to whom he owes his present appointment. Quite recently, however, he sent in a resignation from this office.

Training ship (formerly cruiser) Yingjui: Length: 330 ft., beam: 39.5 ft., displacement: 2,460 tons, draught: 13 ft., speed: 22 miles. Built by Vickers, launched in 1911, construction cost: 204,000 pounds. The construction was under the supervision of Li Ho, Wang Hsiao-fan and Hu En-ch'ao. Guns: 2-6 in. and 4-4 in. Torpedo tubes, caliber 18-2 : 6. Complement: about 100 and 6 cadets in training. The ship is kept in good order and its fighting value is also good. In this respect Yingjui may be ranked as being at the head of the whole navy. Rear-Admiral Ch'en Shao-k'wan, commander of Yingjui, takes care of it himself, and this ship increases the value of his whole squadron.

Commander of Yingjui: Rear-Admiral Ch'en Shao-k'wan, native

of the Fukien province, a young brave naval officer, quite "modern" as regards his political convictions who considers that his duty is to put the Chinese navy in order and thereby to raise the general status of China. His convictions can be ranked as "a narrow patriotism", there is not a trace of party element in them, and therefore he is esteemed by the whole personnel of the navy. He is very careful both as regards educational matters and the enlisted men, and therefore junior naval officers, as well as the enlisted men put all their hopes in him. Ch'en Shao-k'wan is a strict disciplinarian and considers himself obliged only to perform his duty. Therefore his ship occupies quite a peculiar place in the whole navy which is in the state of a gradual decay, and what is more, the name of Ch'en Shao-k'wan is the best known and serves as a "compass" for the whole personnel of the navy. I succeeded in obtaining from him a hearty consent to my work in connection with the organization of nuclei of the "New Seamen's League."

In consequence of a conflict with Admiral Tu Hsi-kuei, Ch'en Shao-k'wan sent in his resignation from his office and deserted the ship, and Lt. Commander Sa Fu-show, former commander of the steel gunboat Chiangchen, who belongs to the party of Adm. Tu Hsi-kuei, was appointed in his place.

(Translator's Note: Later Rear-Admiral Ch'en Shao-k'wan went over to the side of the Nationalist Government of Canton and is now commander of the nationalist fleet on the Yangtze).

Steel Training Ship Tungchi: one of the oldest ships of the Chinese navy, built by the Foochow Arsenal, launched in 1895. At present has no fighting value. Complement: 60 enlisted men and over 10 cadets in training.

Commander of Tunchi: Captain Jen Hsiao (or Kuang?) - yü, native of the Fukien province, over 30 years of age. He is a very quiet man who always acts resolutely, but is also a typical bureaucrat. He belongs to the party of Adm. Tu Hsi-kuei.

Training ship (formerly cruiser) Chaoho. Displacement: 2,600 tons. Built by Armstrong in Great Britain, launched in 1912, construction cost: 210,000 pounds. No information is available as to its complement. At present Chaoho is at the disposal of Pi Shu-ch'eng.

Training ship Chinan. Displacement: 1,015 tons. Former transport, built in Germany, later requisitioned by China and now used as a training ship. Complement: over 60 enlisted men and several cadets in training, one or two of whom are very intelligent.

Commander of Chinan: Rear-Admiral Yü Chen-hsing, native of the Shantung province, is a surly man, very fond of money, quite unreliable, without morals and entirely ignorant as regards the service on warships. He is ready to permit absolutely everything, except expenditure of money. He belongs to the party of Adm. Tu Hsi-kuei.

His assistant: Sun Wei-ch'eng is a very straightforward and truthful man who belongs to the party of Ch'en Shao-k'wan.

B. The First Squadron.

The Staff of the First Squadron is organized along the same lines as in the Training Squadron.

Commander of the First Squadron: Ch'en Chi-liang, an intelligent, cunning and brave officer who always acts resolutely, but embezzles public funds without any restraint. In consequence of the "incident with the cruiser Haiyung", Ch'en Chi-liang was despatched by the headquarters of the navy to put things straight and acted very adroitly so as, on the one hand, to avoid a conflict with the commander of Haiyung Wang Shou-t'ing and, on the other hand, to observe the order of Admiral Tu Hsi-kuei. As a result of his activities on board the cruiser Haiyung, Wang Shou-t'ing was shortly relieved of his post and put at the disposal of the headquarters of the navy. Therefore it may be said that Ch'en Chi-liang makes his plans very cleverly. As to his attitude

towards his subordinates, he oppresses them very strongly so that even "a saint" would not be able to keep on good terms with him. Ch'en Chi-liang belongs to the Chihli clique and is partisan of Adm. Tu Hsi-kuei.

The following ships are at the disposal of the First Squadron:

The 3rd class steel protected cruiser Haiyung possesses great fighting value, hardly differing in this respect from the training ship Yingjui. Complement: 50 to 60 enlisted men and 2 cadets in training. The enlisted men are very hostile towards their commanders and even hate them, which circumstance affects their service very unfavorably. Recently they openly moved against the commander of Haiyung Wang Shou-t'ing, and Adm. Tu Hsi-kuei ordered to stop their pay and food rations, in order to compel them to submit. When, however, the training ship Yingjui joined this mutiny, the situation became serious, and the commander of the 1st squadron Ch'en Chi-liang made Haiyung his flagship, in order to "liquidate" this incident.

Commander of Haiyung: Wang Shou-t'ing, native of the Kiangsu province, formerly commander of the gunboat Yungchien, creature of Admiral Tu Hsi-kuei, then Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to whose party he belongs. When during the 2nd Chihli-Fengt'ien War the latter resigned from this post, Wang Shou-t'ing, being a bureaucrat to the core and conscious of the fact that without the support on the part of Adm. Tu it would be difficult for him to remain in the service, followed him as his faithful "flunky". Therefore, with the ascendency of Tu Hsi-kuei to power, as Minister of Navy, Wang Shou-t'ing conceived again great hopes as to his own future. Consequently as soon as the post of commander of Haiyung became vacant, Admiral Tu Hsi-kuei appointed Wang Shou-t'ing to this ship which was off the province of Fukien at that time. Being in character very ambitious and fond of power, Wang Shou-t'ing assumed from the very outset an overbearing attitude towards the enlisted men and provoked thereby the so-called "incident with the cruiser Haiyung" (for details see below). As a result of measures taken by the Commander of

the 1st Squadron Ch'en Chi-liang who was despatched to straighten matters out, Wang Shou-t'ing was shortly relieved of his functions and put at the disposal of the headquarters of the navy.

The 3rd class steel protected cruiser Haichew has the same dimensions and the same displacement, as the training ship Yingjui. At present it still possesses some fighting value, but as soon as munitions of war are all used up, it will become quite a "useless thing", because it is a very old ship and its guns will be unserviceable. It is such a pity, however, because Haichew is our Chinese large ship. Complement: over 100 enlisted men.

Commander of Haichew: Ch'en Hsün-yung, native of the Fukien province, about 40 years of age. He is a brave hard-working naval officer, but has only personal interest at heart and promotes only his own partisans. He "dances attendance" on his superior officers, but his subordinates dislike him and his relations with them are bad. He belongs to the party of Adm. Tu Hsi-kuei.

The 2nd class steel protected cruiser Haichi and the 3rd class protected cruiser Haishen have been taken away from Canton by the "bandit" Wen (Shu-teh?) and put by him at the disposal of Gen. Wu P'ei-fu. They are now under command of Pi Shu-ch'eng. No detailed information as to these two ships is available.

The gunboat Yungchi: Displacement: 850 tons. Built by the Kiangnan Dock, launched in 1915. This gunboat which possesses very good fighting value, has been stationed for a long time in Hongkong and rendered much assistance to Gen. Ch'en Chiung-ming in his struggle against the Nationalist Government of Kwangtung. Complement: over 100 enlisted men.

Commander of Yungchi: Kao Hsien-shen, native of the Fukien province, about 30 years of age. Formerly, prior to his appointment to the gunboat Yungchi, Kao Hsien-shen was Chief of the Adjutant Section in the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the naval forces. He belongs to the politically unconscious and thoroughly demoralized elements

of the navy, although is reputed to profess quite "modern" convictions. He belongs to the party of Admiral Tu Hsi-kuei.

His chief engineer officer Chang Hua-chung, also native of the Fukien province, is a partisan of Chi Wan-li.

The gunboat Yungchien. Displacement: 560 tons. Built by the Kiangnan Dock, launched in 1915. Complement: over 100 enlisted men.

Commander of Yungchien: Lt. Commander Ch'en Yung-ch'in, native of the Fukien province, about 40 years of age. Formerly was commander of the gunboat Ch'ukwan, but got this appointment, when the former commander of the gunboat Yungchien Wang Shou-t'ing resigned. No information is available as to his personal characteristics. He belongs to the party of Admiral Tu Hsi-kuei.

The gunboat Lienchin. Displacement: 500 tons. Built by the Kiangnan Dock, launched in 1910. Has now no fighting value. Complement: 70 enlisted men. Formerly an admiral had his quarters on board this gunboat.

Commander of Lienchin: Lin Chin-huan, native of the Fukien province, over 40 years of age. He is only thinking about either getting promotion or becoming rich. He belongs to the party of Adm. Tu Hsi-kuei.

The destroyer Kienkong. Displacement: 390 tons. Built in Germany by Schihau, launched in 1912, construction cost: 57,965 pounds. Complement: over 70 enlisted men. This destroyer is good for fighting our torpedo boats, but not foreign ones.

Commander of Kienkong: Lt. Commander Yang Shu-han, native of the Fukien province, is very fond of money. He belongs to the party of Adm. Tu Hsi-kuei.

The transport Tingan, requisitioned during the European War. Complement: over 80 enlisted men.

Commander of Tingan: Chou En (or Ssu?) - hsien (No personal characteristics given). He belongs to the party of Adm. Tu Hsi-kuei.

The coast defense gunboat Haihung. Displacement: 190 tons. Built by the Foochow Dockyard, launched in 1917. This gunboat has fighting value only in shallow water and is chiefly used against smugglers.

Its officer personnel consists of one commander, one assistant, one engineer officer and one boatswain.

Commander of Haihung: Chang T'an-tsu, former commander of the gunboat Chienwei (no personal characteristics given). He belongs to the party of Adm. Yang Shu-chuang.

The coast defense gunboat Haiou. Displacement: 166 tons. Built by the Kiangnan Dock, launched in 1917. Its officer personnel is the same as on board the gunboat Haihung.

Commander of Haiou: Lieutenant Shen I-mou, native of the Fukien province, over 30 years of age, former torpedo officer of the cruiser Haiyung (No personal characteristics given). He belongs to the party of Adm. Yang Shu-chuang.

The coast defense gunboat Haifu. Is the same in every respect as the gunboat Haiou. Built by the Kiangnan Dock.

Commander of Haifu: Lieutenant Li Pao-ch'i, native of the Fukien province (No personal characteristics given). He belongs to the party of Adm. Tu Hsi-kuei.

The coast defense gunboat Haihu is the same in every respect as the gunboat Haihung. Built by the Foochow Dockyard.

Commander of Haihu: Lieutenant Lu Ching-hsien, native of the Fukien province, over 30 years of age, former assistant commander of the gunboat Chiangchen. He is of a very malicious character, also very fond of money. He belongs to the party of Adm. Tu Hsi-kuei.

The transport P'uan. Formerly a German ship, requisitioned during the European War. As regards details of construction it is about the same as the transport Tingan. Complement: over 100 enlisted men.

Commander of P'uan: Captain Li Meng-pin, of a very ferocious

character, a very close adherent of Admiral Tu Hsi-kuei. When he was at the head of the "Bureau for the Protection of Peace" which had been created at his instigation in the Fukien province, the population of this province suffered very much from his activities. As regards his subordinates, Li Meng-pin defends their interests as much as possible. Everybody in the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief is afraid of him and therefore complies with all his demands.

The transport Huaan, requisitioned during the European War. Is the same as the other two transports, viz. P'uan and Tingan.

Commander of Huaan: captain Chia Ch'in, native of the Fukien province. It is reported that he is an opium smoker and a man without morals. He belongs to the party of Adm. Tu Hsi-kuei.

His assistant: Lieutenant T'ang Yao-min, native of Kwangtung, is a young man of good morals, partisan of Kuo Shou-sheng. Provided we succeed in winning him over to our side, it will be possible to start and carry on agitation work.

The destroyer Tungan. Displacement: 390 tons. Built in Germany by Schihau, launched in 1912, construction cost 57,965 pounds. At present it is under command of Pi Shu-ch'eng. No detailed information is available.

The destroyer Yüchang. Is of the same kind as the destroyer Tungan. When Wen (Shu-teh) took away the fleet from Canton to the north, this destroyer got damaged and could not proceed further. Therefore it was left for repairs in the Foochow Dockyard and is now at Makiang.

Commander of Yüchang: Lieutenant Kan Yi-chuang, native of the Fukien province, formerly 2nd gunnery officer of the training ship Yingjui.

His assistant: Lieutenant Li Meng-yüan, native of the Fukien province, younger brother of the commander of the transport P'uan captain Li Meng-pin. He is a hare-brained, hot-headed, inefficient man, very fond of money and having all bad habits.

The gunboat Yungfung. Displacement: 780 tons. Built in Japan by Mitsu Bishi, construction cost: 680,000 paper yen. It is now at the disposal of the Nationalist Government.

The gunboat Yunghsiang. Displacement: 780 tons. Built in Japan by the Kawasaki Dockyard. Construction cost: 680,000 paper yen. At present it is under command of Pi Shu-ch'eng and is stationed at Chefoo. Supplementary information will be reported later.

The transport Fuan. Now it is at the disposal of the Nationalist Government. Detailed information will be given later.

The gunboat Woofeng. Displacement: 200 tons. Built in Tsingtao, launched in 1910. Now it is at the disposal of the Nationalist Government. Supplementary information will be given later.

The torpedo gunboat Feiying. Now it is at the disposal of the Nationalist Government and is stationed at Canton. Detailed information will be given later.

C. The Second Squadron.

The headquarters of the Staff of the Second Squadron are located at Kaoch'angmiao, Shanghai, in the Artillery Department.

Commander of the Second Squadron: Hsü Chien-t'ing, a bannerman from Fukien, is an inveterate opium smoker and low-minded man without morals. He belongs to the Anfu party, is a "flunky" of Adm. Lin Chien-chang and tries now to ingratiate himself with various navy commanders. At present he resides at Shanghai.

The steel gunboat Chienan. Displacement: 872 tons. Built by the Foochow Dockyard, launched in 1901. Complement: over 100 enlisted men.

Commander of Chienan: Captain Tu Tsung-k'ai, native of the Fukien province, elder brother of Admiral Tu Hsi-kuei. He is fond of money,

has no ability and is of a timid character.

The steel gunboat Chienwei. Displacement: 872 tons. Built by the Foochow Dockyard, launched in 1901. In other respects has the same organization as the gunboat Chienan.

Commander of Chienwei: Sa Ying, a man of great natural abilities, but, unfortunately, addicted to opium smoking, entirely without morals and therefore one of the worst navy commanders, who for a long time has not set foot on board of this ship. He is a very close adherent of Adm. Tu Hsi-kuei.

The steel gunboat Chutung. Displacement: 740 tons. Built in Japan by the Kawasaki Dockyard, launched in 1906. Complement: over 100 enlisted men. As to its fighting value, it is only sufficient for cruising purposes.

Commander of Chutung: Li Shih-shia, native of the Fukien province. Studied in England and had Ch'en Chi-k'uang as his school-fellow. He is a very young man, fond of women and dreaming of promotion. For some time he has been instructor in the Training Squadron. Formerly he was closely connected with the Kuomintang Party, but now belongs to the party of Adm. Yang Shu-chuang.

The steel gunboat Chuyu. In every respect it is the same as the gunboat Chutung.

Commander of Chuyu: Lieutenant Commander Lin Yüan-ch'üan, native of the Fukien province, over 40 years of age, former assistant commander of the training ship Yingjui. Is a good worker, belongs to the party of Adm. Tu Hsi-kuei.

The steel gunboat Chuchien. In every respect it is the same as the gunboats Chutung and Chuyu.

Commander of Chuchien: Yang Ch'ing-chan, native of the Fukien province, belongs to the party of Adm. Yang Shu-chuang.

The steel gunboat Chutai. In every respect is the same as the three previous ones.

Commander of Chutai: Lin Ping-hsun, native of the Fukien province. Belongs to the party of Admiral Lin Chien-chang. In character he is as cowardly "as a hare" and is very fond of money. Being afraid of fighting, he tendered his resignation and wants now to return home. Yü Chü-chieh, former Chief of Staff of the 2nd Squadron, was appointed to the post of commander of Chutai.

The steel gunboat Chukuan. In every respect it is the same as the four previous ones.

Commander of Chukuan: Lt. commander Yang Shou hua , native of the Fukien province, former commander of the destroyer Kienkong. Belongs to the party of Adm. Tu Hsi-kuei.

The steel gunboat Chiangyuan. Displacement: 550 tons. Built in Japan, by the Kawasaki Dockyard, launched in 1906. Fit only for the purposes of civil war.

Commander of Chiangyuan: Lt. Commander Ou-yang-Hsün, native of the Fukien province. Formerly he belonged to the party of Admiral Lin Chien-chang, but later went over to the side of Admiral Tu Hsi-kuei.

The steel gunboat Chiangli. In every respect it is the same as the gunboat Chiangyüan.

Commander of Chiangli: Lt-Commander P'eng Ying, native of the Fukien province. Belongs to the party of Adm. Tu Hsi-kuei.

The steel gunboat Chiangchen. In every respect it is the same as the gunboats Chiangyüan and Chiangli. At present it is stationed at Wuch'ang.

Commander of Chiangchen: Lt.- Commander Sa Fu-shou, native of the Fukien province and partisan of Adm. Tu Hsi-kuei, was appointed commander of the training ship Yingjui (see above p. 5) and this post remains so far vacant.

Assistant commander Lieutenant Lu Ching-hsien was appointed commander of the coast defense gunboat Haihu (for his personal characteristics see above p. 10).

The river gunboat Chiangkun. Displacement: 140 tons. Built in Stettin, Germany, by the Vulcan Shipyard Company, launched in 1906. Complement: over 50 enlisted men.

Commander of Chiangkun: Ch'en T'ien-ching, native of the Fukien Province. Belongs to the party of Adm. Tu Hsi-kuei.

The river gunboat Chianghsi. In every respect it is the same as the gunboat Chiangkun.

Commander of Chianghsi: Lieutenant Liu Huan-ch'ien, native of the Fukien province, former Adjutant in the Staff of the 1st Squadron. He belongs to the party of Adm. Tu Hsi-kuei.

The river gunboat Kungchen. Displacement: 90 tons. Built by the Yantze Dockyard near Hankow, construction cost: $ 100,000.

Commander of Kungchen: Lt.-Commander Kao Hsien-ch'ien, native of the Fukien province, is a young, straightforward man who may be utilized for the purposes of our work. Belongs to the party of Adm. Tu Hsi-kuei.

The river gunboat Yungan. In every respect it is the same as the gunboat Kungchen.

Commander of Yungan: Wang Chi-yeh, native of the Fukien province, is a bribe-taker and opium smoker. Belongs to the party of Adm. Tu Hsi-kuei.

The river boat Chienchung. In every respect it is the same as the gunboats Kungchen and Yungan.

Commander of Chienchung: Lt.-Commander Ch'en Ta-hsi, native of the Fukien province. He belongs to the party of Adm. Tu Hsi-kuei.

The torpedo boat Chentzu. It is more or less fit for its purposes, but is insufficiently provided with torpedoes. When these are all used up, it will be impossible to obtain a new supply of them.

Commander of Chentzu: Lieutenant Yü Chün-wei, native of the Fukien province. Belongs to the party of Adm. Tu Hsi-kuei.

The torpedo boat Sutsu. Belongs to the same type as the torpedo boat Chentsu.

Commander of Sutsu: Lieutenant Huang Chung-lu, native of the Fukien province, former assistant commander of the gunboat Chienan. Belongs to the party of Adm. Tu Hsi-kuei.

The torpedo boat Liehtsu.

Commander of Liehtsu: Lieutenant Tsêng Kuan-ying, native of the Fukien province. A very clever man, but not devoid of aspirations to promotion and riches. Belongs to the party of Adm. Tu Hsi-kuei.

The torpedo boat Changtsu. Commander of Changtsu: Lt.-Commander Lo Chih-ho, native of the Kwangtung province. Belongs to the party of Adm. Tu Hsi-kuei.

The torpedo boat Huying. Displacement: 96 tons. Built in Japan by the Kawasaki Dockyard, launched in 1907.

Commander of Huying: Lieutenant Yang Chên-sheng, native of the Fukien province. Belongs to the party of Adm. Tu Hsi-kuei.

The torpedo boat Hupeng. Belongs to the same type as the torpedo boat Huying.

Commander of Hupeng: Lt.-Commander Chang Chao-hsian, native of the Szechuan province. Belongs to the party of Adm. Tu Hsi-kuei.

The torpedo boat Huchung. Belongs to the same type as torpedo-boats Huying and Hupeng.

Commander of Huchung: Lt.-Commander Lu Chieh-hsi, native of the Kwangtung province. Belongs to the party of Adm. Tu Hsi-kuei.

The torpedo boat Huao. Belongs to the same type as the three previous ones.

Commander of Huao: Lieutenant Shih Kuo-hsien, native of the Fukien province, former Adjutant at the headquarters of the 1st Squadron. Belongs to the party of Adm. Tu Hsi-kuei.

The gunboat Kanch'ian. Displacement: 250 tons. Built by the Kiangnan Dockyard, launched in 1906. Complement over 30 enlisted men.

Commander of Kanch'ian: Lieutenant Wang Ch'un-yen, native of the Fukien province, former assistant commander of the gunboat Chienwei. Belongs to the party of Adm. Tu Hsi-kuei.

The light gunboat Litung.

Commander of Litung: Lieutenant Chou Shu-hsün, native of the Fukien province. Belongs to the party of Admiral Tu Hsi-kuei.

The light gunboat Chihsheng. Is used as a floating storehouse, stationed at Nanking. Complement: 12 enlisted men.

Commander of Chihsheng: Lt.-Commander Ch'en Chao-k'un. Is cruel in character and much addicted to opium smoking.

The gunboat Chiangcheng. Displacement: 550 tons. Built in Japan by the Kawasaki Dockyard, launched in 19o7. Belongs to the Squadron which is in charge of the coast defense of Three Eastern Provinces (Manchuria), and is under command of Mao Chung-ts'ai.

The gunboats: Lich'uan, Lishui, Lichi, Anchien and Chiangan and former merchant ships, now transformed into gunboats: Chenhai and Weihai belong all to the Squadron of Three Eastern Provinces (Manchuria). Detailed information as to these ships will be reported by me later.

The steel gunboat Chuyü. Displacement: 740 tons. Built in Japan by the Kawasaki Dockyard. At present it is stationed at Chefoo and is under command of Pi Shu-ch'eng.

Below are enumerated light gunboats which are directly subordinated to the administrative authorities of various provinces. They are put at the disposal of the police authorities which use them for cruising purposes and for the coast defense:

1. At the disposal of the port authorities of Woosung and Shanghai: Ts'etien, Huwei, Chünhe and Feihu.

2. In the Chekiang province: T'aian, Chuowu, Haip'ing and Haiching.

3. In the Anhui province: Lichi, Antien, Anfeng and Anou.

4. In the Hupei province: Ch'uts'ai, Ch'uam, Ch'uyi, Ch'uhsin, Achsün and Hsiangsun.

5. At Haikiang: Yünank'ai, Paemin and Chinghai.

6. In the Kwangtung province: Shenhang, Jenhai, Ch'ingyüan, P'engchewhai, Pingcheng, Chenchow, Suiching, Paopi, Lungheiang, Kwangchi, Kwangch'eng, Kwanglow, Kwangyü, Kwanghai, Kwangtung, Kiangta, Kianghan, Kianghun, Kiangku, Kiangan, Leich'ien, Leik'un, Leihsüan, Leihen, Leijen, Leik'an, Leili, Leijui, Leit'ien, Leichung, Leilung, Leihu, Haichangch'ing, Haichingch'ing and Haitungch'ing. (Note: It is quite possible that some of these gunboats have been already "scraped", but I am not quite sure of that).

Only the most important information relating to the above-mentioned ships was given. As regards their fighting value, it is barely sufficient for rendering assistance during the civil war or for suppressing pirates. Were they to be used, however, for the purposes of resisting encroachments and insults on the part of the foreigners, it would be the same as if "a swine were to wage war against a tiger".

Supplementary information relating to all these ships will be given by me later.

Summing up the personal characteristics of the navy officers, one has to admit that the majority of them are very fond of money and have only their own interests at heart.

As to the enlisted men, they are peaceful and for the most part

without morale. Their pay is comparatively large. Therefore they set great value upon their places and, in order to keep them, prefer to bear all sorts of oppression without murmur. Only on board the cruiser Haiyung sailors and soldiers found sufficient energy to show some resistance. Unfortunately, not possessing any clear-cut political views, they soon came into conflict with various elements of the province (for details see below).

Conditions of Life on the Ships.

Now I must dwell upon the conditions of life on the ships and hope that you will pay special attention to them, because they are a very important element for the studying of conditions in the navy generally.

I give below a general table showing the scale of pay which is in force on all ships generally.

Commander of a ship gets $ 440 or 260, dependent upon the dimensions of the ship.

Assistants: $ 180, 160, 150 or 140.

Chief engineer officers, chief pilots, officers in charge of torpedo matters and others: $ 110 to 130.

Assistants for matters connected with torpedoes, artillery etc.: $ 85 to 105.

The following is the scale of pay for the enlisted men:

Boatswain:	$ 70.
Boatswain's-mate:	" 50.
Seaman 1st class	" 30.
Seaman 2nd "	" 27.
Seaman 3rd "	" 21.
Private 1st "	" 19.
Private 2nd "	" 17.
Private 3rd "	" 15.

Seamen and privates who are employed in gun turrets, get additional pay of $ 2.

The cost of food is deducted from the pay. For instance, the nominal pay of a seaman 3rd class is $ 21, but actually he gets only about $ 15, because a certain amount is deducted from the pay for food.

A private in training gets $ 13.

Money for the maintenance of ships is allotted in accordance with three classes:

1. $ 10,000 for the maintenance of ships of the 1st class.
2. $ 4,000 for the maintenance of ships of the 2nd class.
3. $ 1,000 for the maintenance of ships of the 3rd class.

The training ship Yingjui and the cruisers Haiyung and Haichow belong to the 1st class.

The steel gunboats Chiangyuan, Chiangheng, Chiangli, Chiangchen, Chutung, Chuyu, Chuchien, Chutai, Chuyü and Chukuan, the training ship Tungchi and the transport Tingan belong to the 2nd class.

The torpedo boats belong to the 3rd class.

A brief résumé of the incident with the cruiser Haiyung.

The cruiser Haiyung (for details see above p.7) had been for a long time under command of Ts'eng Yi-ting. Lately, however, in consequence of the resignation of Admiral Lin Chien-chang, Ts'eng also resigned of his own desire, on account of party differences, and Admiral Tu Hsi-kuei appointed former commander of the gunboat Yungchien Wang Shou-t'ing (for personal characteristics see above p.p. 7-8) to the post of commander of Haiyung which was at that time stationed off the Fukien province. After this appointment Wang Shou-ting went to Fukien, took over the command and on the following day discharged several sailors and privates. By this action he brought upon himself the general wrath and resistance of the men. Adm. Tu Hsi-kuei generally considers that his orders bear an almost "sacred" character and therefore does not

admit that any resistance could be shown to them. When therefore sailors and privates dared after all to make their protest, he regarded this protest to be contrary to law and ordered the training ship Yingjui to stop giving the mutineers their food and pay. Unexpectedly, however, the whole crew of Yingjui, being stirred up by this act of injustice, opposed the order of Admiral Tu Hsi-kuei and, answering to a call of the sailors from Haiyung, rendered them assistance. As a result, Adm. Tu Hsi-kuei sent out a circular telegram announcing his resignation, the commander-in-chief of the naval forces Adm. Yang Shu-chuang "fell ill", and an internal demoralization of the whole navy began. At the same time the man in whom great expectations were put by everybody, viz. the commander of Yingjui Ch'en Shao-k'wan, deserted his ship and, as the report has it, is now in hiding in the foreign hotel "Garden". At the first opportunity we will start our work on him (for details concerning Ch'en Shao-k'wan see above p.p. 4-5). Later commander of the 1st Squadron Ch'en Chi-liang (see above p.p. 6-7) was dispatched by the headquarters of the navy to straighten matters and acted very adroitly so as, on the one hand, to avoid an open conflict with the commander of Haiyung Wang Shou-t'ing and on the other hand, to observe the order of Admiral Tu Hsi-kuei. As a result of his activities on board the cruiser Haiyung, Wang Shou-t'ing who with the arrival of Ch'en Chi-liang naturally lost all his authority, was shortly relieved of his functions, and Haiyung became for the time being the flagship of the commander of the 1st Squadron. At the same time internal dissensions broke out on board the training ship Yingjui, and as these are not yet settled, such a state of affairs unquestionably exerts a demoralizing influence upon the whole navy.

---

2. The First Mixed Brigade of Marines.

The 1st Mixed Brigade of Marines was organized by Yang Chih-chung. Only two thirds of the men who compose this brigade, are provided with arms. Those sums of public money which Yang Chih-chung succeeded in obtaining, were not used by him "to line his own pocket", but were actually employed for the organization of this brigade. These aggressive intentions on the part of Yang Chih-chung ultimately lead to his ruin. It was chiefly through the instrumentality of the late Rear-Admiral Lin Chi-yin (chief of the Naval School at Chefoo) that the shooting of Yang Chih-chung and the surrender of his troops were effected.

Former commander of the 1st regiment Lin Chih-t'ang is now the commander of this brigade. He is over 40 years of age and received his military education in a primary military school. Formerly he was member of the Kuomintang Party. After obtaining this appointment, however, he fell into error of which he absolutely cannot rid himself, and turned bureaucrat. Recently Lin Chih-t'ang, holding the rank of Major General, was appointed chief of the School for Marines at Amoy (see below).

Commander of the 1st regiment colonel Lin Chung, native of the Fukien province, received his military education in the same school as Lin Chih-t'ang. He belongs to the party of Adm. Tu Hsi-kuei and was recently promoted to be Commander of the Brigade.

Commander of the 2nd regiment T'ang Tai-yün, native of the Fukien province, about 30 years of age, is of a cowardly character, but holds a very high opinion about himself.

Commander of the independent battalion Sa Chün-t'ai, native of the Fukien province, former instructor in the Shipbuilding School at Makiang, Foochow. He had some inclination towards the Kuomintang Party, but afterwards he too changed his political convictions and became bureaucrat. He took part in the fight on behalf of his regimental commander Ch'en Ch'i-mei (also a bureaucrat) and got an abdominal wound. His sub-

ordinates who for the most part are natives of the Northern provinces, have good fighting qualities. They were reorganized from the former Marine Detachment which was organised by the late Admiral Liu Kuan-hsiung.

The remaining two regiments are mostly "tufei" or bandits from the Fukien border. Formerly they were units under Sun Kuo-chen and Ou - yang Ch'un. They are quite disorderly and have no fighting value. They were scattered over the area of four districts of the Fukien province, viz. Ch'angloh, Amoy, Kut'ien and Hsinghua, where they pillaged the local population, committed all kind of lawless acts, compelled to grow opium, made enforced levies of taxes and caused thereby incalculable miseries to the people. At last the population could bear them no longer and slaughtered one half of them.

Soldiers who belong to this Marine brigade, are divided into <u>three grades</u> and are paid $ 11, 10 and 9 respectively. Platoon commanders get $ 32. In addition to this regular pay, however, there are sums of money which are obtained "from outside", and the exact amount of which it is very difficult to fix. Utilizing their name of "soldiers", they get very substantial "revenues".

In all these units, "from top to bottom", everything is based upon "friendly relations", and nobody voices a protest against the pillages which are committed. At present these units are being numerically increased and at the same time they continue to commit pillages. Being officially designated as "marines", they actually deserve to be called "tufei" or bandits. The soldiers do not understand anything. The detachment is completely demoralized and does not obey the orders which are issued by the headquarters.

<u>The Ministry of Navy</u> (Haichünpu).

In the Ministry of Navy in which a shortage of money is constantly felt, everything depends upon admirals and officials. After the resignation of Admiral Tu Hsi-kuei, the Vice-Minister Wu Jen-li fulfils

the ministerial duties. Nominally the Ministry of Navy is the highest organ. Actually, however, its orders do not go beyond the gate of the Ministry. Such is the so-called "highest organ of the navy". In order to be able to start our work "from below", it is necessary, first of all, to pay special attention to the lowest personnel, but it is difficult to get into touch with it. As regards "the top", however, everybody is extremely fond of money. Nothing can be attained by means of oral agitation only, but perhaps it will be possible to carry on our work through written propaganda, and to that end the issue of a magazine is quite necessary. Political convictions of sailors and soldiers are of a very primitive character, but as all is based upon friendship, every soldier whom we succeed in converting with propaganda, will win over to our side many others. It is still more difficult to carry on the work through officers, because officers and enlisted men are hostile towards each other. Only by means of a magazine it will be possible to carry on agitation work in the organs of the Ministry of Navy.

As the above information is insufficient, I will not fail to make supplementary reports, as soon as new materials are forthcoming.

E. Shipbuilding Organs of the Navy (Navy Yards).

The proper development of the Chinese navy is hardly possible, in view of the fact that there are very few shipbuilding establishments, viz. only three:

1/ Chinese Government Pagoda Arsenal and Dockyard at Foochow,

2/ Chinese Government Kiangnan Dock and Engineering Works at Kaoch'angmiao and

3/ Chinese Government Navy Yard at Taku.

1. Pagoda Arsenal and Dockyard at Makiang (Mawee), Foochow.

The Pagoda Arsenal and Dockyard, the place to which the Chinese navy owes its origin, was built at the initiative of Shen Pao-cheng.

(Translator's Note: Shen Pao-cheng, customised as Wen Su,1819-1879, became in 1867 Director of the Foochow Arsenal which he started with the aid of Mr.Prosper Giquel, and in the face of much opposition,the first vessel was completed in 1869).

Formerly it was put on a quite satisfactory footing, being fit both for building and repairing purposes. Recently, however, on account of the shortage of money (over $ 300,000 are required annually for its upkeep), its Director was compelled to sell part of the machinery, so that now only the repairing of ships can be done.

The Pagoda Arsenal and Dockyard consist of the following workshops:

1/ Machine shop,

2/ iron rolling-mill,

3/ ship-carpenter's shop,

4/ erecting shop,

5/ for building sailing ships,

6/ iron foundry,

7/ copper foundry,

8/ for moulding purposes,

9/ for pressing iron,

10/ copper-works,

11/ aeroplane workshop,

12/ for manufacturing electric lamps,

13/ for building hulls of ships.

The Director of the Arsenal Ma Te-chi studied shipbuilding in England. He is a young arrogant man. When Ma Te-chi came back from England, he had no money. Using great efforts and flattery he succeeded in obtaining this post and has now over $ 100,000. The Arsenal levies taxes in the cities which are situated within the area of Makiang, and these taxes are a source of revenue for Ma Te-chi, because, after paying salaries and wages, he uses the remainder "to line his own pocket". It is nothing else than the embezzlement of public money on his part. Ma Te-chi

belongs to the party of Admiral Yang Shu-chuang.

Workmen. Usually the Pagoda Arsenal and Dockyard employ 500 to 600 workmen, but "during the season", i. e. when urgent work is done their number is not less than 1,000 men. Workmen are divided into three grades:

1/ skilled workmen who get 360 coppers to $1.50 a day,

2/ apprentices who get 120 to 266 coppers a day, and

3/ unskilled workmen who get 226 to 420 coppers.

Wages are paid for the work actually done. Therefore workmen get nothing for Sundays. Usually money was paid at fixed dates. Recently, however, there was a shortage of funds, and this fact affects the material condition of the workmen very unfavorably. Their general living conditions are very hard: they are being exploited to an extreme degree, and cases of discharge without adequate reasons are very frequent. Therefore it is easy to stir up a movement among them, and I request you to pay special attention to this circumstance.

Aeroplane Workshop attached to the Pagoda Arsenal and Dockyard.

This workshop is building exclusively hydroplanes. Altogether 4 hydroplanes have been already built, two large and two small. It was planned that two machines would be built a year. At present, however, the work stopped temporarily, on account of the shortage of funds. Workmen who are employed in this workshop, get large pay. In addition, there are over twenty graduates of the Submarine and Aviation School who are trained to put in practice the theoretical knowledge they have acquired in the school. Ts'eng Yi-ching, Pa Yü-ts'ao and Wang Chu-yü are in charge of this workshop. All three studied the building of aeroplanes in England and know this business quite well, but their behavior is very timid, because they do not think about anything else but "the earning of their daily bread".

Mint.

This Mint is a semi-governmental and semi-commercial undertaking. It is located in the premises which are occupied by the workshop

for building hulls of ships, and is subordinated to the Commander of the Naval Garrison at Makiang. The Director of the Pagoda Anchorage and Dockyard Ma Te-chi is also in charge of the Mint which circumstance furnishes him with a new opportunity of embezzling government funds. This Mint is capable of turning out about 10,000 ten cent pieces a day.

2. Chinese Government Kiangnan Dock and Engineering Works at Kaoch'angmiao, Shanghai.

The Kiangnan Dock which possesses the most modern facilities for repairs in the port, is the best developed of the shipbuilding establishments and is much better equipped than the Pagoda Arsenal and Dockyard. It is provided with new machinery and succeeded in building many ships. Not less than several millions dollars are forthcoming annually. "During the season", i. e. when urgent work is done, about 1,000 workmen are employed, and in ordinary times their number is fluctuating. Their living conditions are comparatively good: they are paid suffi - ciently large wages and, in addition, there is always a hope for them of participating in profits.

Many foreign specialists are working in this Dockyard, but they act with a high hand and succeeded in taking everything into their own hands. Now, after the resignation of the former Director Ch'en Chao - chiang, a foreign engineer named Maoch'en (romanized name) actually transacts all business in connection with the Kiangnan Dock.

The Director Vice-Admiral Ch'en Chao-chiang, specialist in mechanics, is a cheerful and straightforward man. He could not put up with Admiral Tu Hsi-kuei, and when the latter had come into power, resigned from the office of Director of the Pagoda Anchorage and Dock - yard (he was previously the first director of the Submarine School at Makiang, Foochow), but after Admiral Lin Chien-chang had replaced Adm. Tu Hsi-kuei, he again called Ch'en Chao-kiang to active service and appointed him to the post of Director of the Kiangnan Dock and Engineer-

ing Works. Shortly, however, Ch'en Chao-chiang came into conflict with the above-mentioned foreign engineer. Maech'en in connection with the question relating to the mutual delimitation of authority, refused to work together with him and in high dudgeone resigned from this office of his own desire and returned to Fukien. His is the spirit which yields to nobody and is worthy of imitation.

His former assistant Kuang Ko-hua who belongs to the party of Adm. Tu Hsi-kuei, performs now the duties of Director of the Kiangnan Dock and Engineering Works and former Director of the Shipbuilding School at Makiang Ch'en Tsao-fan, who also belongs to the party of Adm. Tu Hsi-kuei, was appointed to the post of Associate Director.

3. Chinese Government Navy Yard (Dock) at Taku.

The Navy Yard at Taku is mostly engaged in building ships for the navigation in inland waters and also is used for docking the ships.

As I am so far unacquainted with the general conditions which prevail in the Navy Yard at Taku, I will draw up a supplementary report later on.

Conclusion.

In short, of the above-mentioned three Shipbuilding organs I put my greatest expectations in the Kiangnan Dock and Engineering Works. As to others, it is not worth while even to think of them. On the other hand, in view of the hardest living conditions in which the workmen who are employed by the Pagoda Arsenal and Dockyard, are placed, to bring forth the awakening of these workmen is the easiest thing to do.

C. Organs of Naval Training.

Altogether there are four organs in which the naval training is carried on, viz.:

1/ The Naval Training Battalion at Chefoo,

2/ the Torpedo boat Training Battalion at Nanking,

3/ the Naval Garrison Detachment at Makiang and

4/ the School for Marines at Amoy.

1. Naval Training Battalion at Chefoo.

The Naval Training Battalion at Chefoo was the only place where enlisted men of the whole navy could receive a proper naval training, but in view of the fact that it was in the state of a complete demoralization, this Battalion was dispersed by order of Pi Shu-ch'eng. Only over 10 men remain now.

The Naval Training Battalion at Chefoo is under command of Hsieh K'o-chün who belongs to the party of Admiral Tu Hsi-kuei.

2. Torpedo boat Training Battalion at Nanking.

The Torpedo boat Training Battalion at Nanking is the place where sailors were trained in the use of torpedoes. The majority of the men have become demoralized and dispersed. Over 30 men remain now.

The Torpedo boat Training Battalion at Nanking is under command of Ch'ang Chao-kan who belongs to the party of Adm. Tu Hsi-kuei.

3. Naval Garrison Detachment at Makiang, Foochow.

The Naval Garrison Detachment at Makiang is subordinated to the headquarters of the Naval Garrison and, being officially designated as "the Naval Garrison Detachment", actually is "the Training Battalion". Its enrollment is 100 and recently it began to procure enlisted men for ships. Originally it was planned that in this Naval Garrison Detachment a

preliminary training would be given to those who intend to enter the Training Battalion at Chefoo. At present, however, just the opposite procedure is observed.

4. School for Marines at Amoy.

The School for Marines at Amoy is subordinated directly to the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the naval forces, and its establishment is a preparatory step for the organization of the 2nd Mixed Brigade of Marines (see above p.p. 22-23). In order to avoid the inconvenience of using the designation of "the Brigade", it was officially called "the School". It is reported that Canton assists this School with arms, because its Chief is an old Kuomintang man who maintains regular relations with Canton. At present a new enrollment is made, the School is enlarged and will soon be transformed into a Brigade.

The Chief of this School Major-General Lin Chih-t'ang, former commander of the 1st regiment and later of the 1st Mixed Brigade of Marines, has a very good military education. He is an old Kuomintang man and maintains relations with Kwangtung. He is busy now with making various aggressive plans. (See also above: p. 22).

Conclusion.

Generally speaking, the above-mentioned organs of naval training are places where we can start our work. I invite your special attention to this circumstance.

Places where there are mechanical facilities for stowing coal:

Altogether there are ten places which are provided with such facilities, viz. 1/ Foochow, 2/ Amoy, 3/ Kiangyin, 4/ Nanking, 5/ Tat'ung, 6/ Hukow, 7/ Wuch'ang, 8/ Yüehchow, 9/ Shanghai and 10/ Chefoo.

At Chefoo there are several storehouses in which many artillery

shells are stored. Chao Yin is in charge of these storehouses.

D. Location of the Organs of the Navy.

The Ministry of Navy: at Peking.

The Staff Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the naval forces: at Kaoch'angmiao, Shanghai.

The Staff Headquarters of the 1st Squadron: on board the cruiser Haiyung and at Makiang, Foochow.

The Staff Headquarters of the 2nd Squadron: at Kaoch'angmiao (in the Artillery Department), Shanghai.

The Staff Headquarters of the Training Squadron: on board the gunboat "Chutai" at Hongkong (later abolished).

The Headquarters of the defense forces: in the old premises of the Submarine School at Makiang, Foochow, and at Yingmen.

The 1st Mixed Brigade of Marines: detachments at Foochow, Makiang and Hsienshan.

The 1st regiment: at Lienchiang hsien.

The 2nd regiment: at Amoy.

The independent battalion: at Tungshan, Amoy.

The machine gun battalion: at Makiang, Foochow.

The guard detachment of the Marine Headquarters: in the Staff Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces.

Schools:

The Naval School: at Makiang, Foochow (attached to the Steamship section of the Administrative Department of the Navy) with a/the Submarine, b/ Shipbuilding, c/ Technical and d/ Draughtsmen Schools.

The Aviation School: at Makiang, Foochow (attached to the Aviation and Engineering Department of the Navy).

The Naval School: at Chefoo.

The Radio (Wireless) School: at Nanking.

The Kiangnan Naval Training School for gunnery and torpedo officers: at Nanking.

Organs of Naval Training (Training units):

The Naval Training Battalion: at Chefoo.

The Torpedo boat Training Battalion: at Hsiakwan, Nanking.

The Naval Garrison Detachment: at Makiang.

The School for Marines: at Amoy.

Shipbuilding Organs:

The Pagoda Arsenal and Dockyard: at Makiang, Foochow, with an Aeroplane Workshop.

The Kiangnan Dock and Engineering Works at Kaoch'angmiao, Shanghai.

The Navy Yard: at Taku.

Organs which are directly subordinated to the Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces:

The Administrative Section in charge of plans relating to sea routes: at Shanghai, Aidolu Road.

The Naval Hospital: at Woosung, Changhuapang.

The Naval Hospital: at Makiang, Foochow, attached to the Administrative Department of the Navy.

The Naval Hospital: at Nanking.

The Naval Hospital: at Chefoo.

E. Groupings among the most important men of the Navy.

There are very few revolutionary elements in the Navy.

There are three main political groups in the Navy, viz.:

1. The group of Admiral Tu Hsi-kuei or the Chihli clique which follows the orders of Gen. Wu P'ei-fu.

2. The group of Admiral Yang Shu-chuang which is very close to the group of Admiral Tu Hsi-kuei and, as such, also follows the orders of General Wu P'ei-fu, but at the same time supports General Sun Ch'uan-fang in view of his strong financial position.

3. The group of Admiral Lin Chien-chang or the Anfu clique which follows the orders of Hsü Shih-ying.

The Ministry of Navy: The Minister of the Navy, Admiral Tu-Hsi-kuei, belongs to the Chihli clique and supports Gen. Wu P'ei-fu.

The Vice-Minister of the Navy, Adm. Wu Jen-li, who is in charge of the Ministry now, belongs to the Anfu clique and supports Hsü Shih-ying.

The Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces: Commander-in-Chief Admiral Yang Shu-chuang belongs to the Chihli clique and supports General Sun Ch'uan-fang.

The Chief of Staff Lin Kuo-keng belonged formerly to the Kuomintang Party, but now is a close adherent of Admiral Yang Shu-chuang.

As Lin Kuo-keng resides now in the headquarters of the Garrison at Amoy where he is in charge of all naval matters, his duties of the Chief of Staff are temporarily filled by Wu Kuang-tsung who is a close adherent of Admiral Tu Hsi-kuei.

The Chief of the Adjutant Section Meng Hsiu-ch'ung is a close adherent of Admiral Yang Shu-chuang.

The Staff of the Training Squadron: Commander of the Training Squadron Li Ching-hsi belongs to the party of Adm. Tu Hsi-kuei.

Sa Fu-chou, Jen Hsiao-yü and Yü Chen-hsing, commanders respecti-

vely of Yingjui, Tungchi and Chinan, also belong to the same party, i.e. to the Chihli clique.

The First Squadron: Commander of the 1st Squadron Ch'en Chi-liang belongs to the party of Admiral Tu Hsi-kuei, i.e. to the Chihli clique.

Of commanders of the ships which constitute the 1st Squadron, almost all belong to the party of Admiral Tu Hsi-kuei. Only two, viz. Chang T'an-tzu and Shen Yi-mou, commanders of the coast defense gunboats Haihung and Haiou, are more closely connected with the party of Admiral Yang Shu-chuang.

The Second Squadron: Commander of the 2nd Suadron Hsü Chien-t'ing belongs to the party of Admiral Lin Chien-chang, i.e. to the Anfu clique.

The great majority of commanders of the ships which constitute the 2nd Squadron, belong to the party of Admiral Tu Hsi-kuei, with the following insignificant exceptions:

Lin Ping-heng and Ou-yang Hsün, commanders of the gunboats Chutai and Chiangyuan, belonged to the party of Admiral Lin Chien-chang, but the former tendered his resignation and Ou-yang Hsün transferred recently his allegiance to the party of Admiral Tu Hsi-kuei.

Two commanders beleng to the party of Admiral Yang Shu-chuang: Yang Ch'ing-chan, commander of the gunboat Chuchien, and Li Shih-chia, commander of the gunboat Chutung, who formerly was closely connected with the Kuomintang Party.

The 1st Mixed Brigade of Marines: Commander of the brigade Lin Chung belongs to the party of Admiral Tu Hsi-kuei.

The regimental commander Ch'en Ch'i-mei and commander of the independent battalion Sa Chün-t'ai both are typical bureaucrats now, although formerly Sa Chün-t'ai had some inclination towards the Kuomintang Party.

Educational Organs of the Navy: Of the Chiefs of various naval schools two, Ch'en Te-hsien of the Technical School and Huang Ch'eng-hsü of the Aviation and Submarine Schools, belong to the party of Adm. Lin Chien-chang whose influence extends also to the Naval School at Chefoo, and two belong to the party of Admiral Tu Hsi-kuei, viz. Chang Pin-yüan of the Naval School at Makiang and Ch'en Tsao-fan of the Shipbuilding School (now Associate Director of the Kiangnan Dock and Engineering Works).

Organs of Naval Training: Both Hsieh K'o-chün and Ch'ang Chao-kan who respectively command the Naval Training Battalion at Chefoo and the Torpedo boat Training Battalion at Nanking, belong to the party of Admiral Tu Hsi-kuei, and Chief of the School for Marines at Amoy Major-General Lin Chih-t'ang is an old Kuomintang man and maintains relations with Kwangtung.

Shipbuilding Organs of the Navy: Ma Te-chi, Director of the Pagoda Arsenal and Dockyard, belongs to the party of Admiral Yang Shu-chuang and Kuang Kuo-hua, Director of the Kiangnan Dock and Engineering Works, belongs to the party of Admiral Tu Hsi-kuei.

F. Plans for the Development of the Work.

It is especially difficult to develop our work in such a disorderly navy which is in the state of a gradual moral disintegration. It is well-nigh impossible to carry on the work on a maximum scale. At the same time should we carry on our work on a minimum scale, we will hardly succeed in attaining tangible results within a short space of time. When I use the term on a maximum scale, I mean "to draw the whole navy into the sphere of our influence", and the term on a minimum scale means "to disseminate gradually our comrades among the personnel of the navy". However, we who are engaged in revolutionary activities, must not give ourselves to too much meditation or stick to "retrograde" principles. Therefore I give below my project based upon experience which I have gained

as a result of my 6-year work, and request the Center "to prescribe a medicine", in order to cure these maladies which I enumerate below. For my part, I should like to be entrusted with the supervision over this work.

Before we make any plans for work, it is necessary to ascertain those defects which we have to fight. Maladies from which the personnel of the navy suffers, may be divided: a/ into those which are spread everywhere, as a kind of "epidemic", and b/ into those which are peculiar either to certain individuals or some special groups.

The following are general maladies which are spread everywhere: a/ a blind foolish aspiration to high offices and riches; b/ party dissensions; c/ protection of one's own selfish interests; d/ a superficial work of only a "showy" character.

The following is a peculiar or special malady: to regard oneself as a clever and meritorious person and all others as fools.

Aspirations to lucrative posts and riches, protection of one's own selfish interests and work for form's sake only, all these defects are inherent in naval officers generally, all the more to the majority of them.

All kinds of party dissensions and various ideas which originate from them, are mostly utilized by officers who are natives of the Fukien province, in order to be able by means of them to keep a tight hand over the enlisted men.

As regards the aspiration "to regard oneself as a clever and meritorious person", this is a defect which is constantly to be met with among the officers who are engaged in work in the educational organs of the navy.

Looking at the prevailing conditions in the navy closely, one may observe that on board one and the same ship soldiers and sailors are not on speaking terms with one another, and soldiers and sailors of different ships look at one another with malice and envy. It may be also added that the attitude of officers towards the enlisted men does not

differ in anything from the attitude of crowned persons towards the common people, and that "mutual sympathy" is of course out of the question. Moreover, these enlisted men are sometimes regarded by their officers only as "casual fellow-travelers". There occurs sometimes that one or two more intelligent superior officers establish some kind of ties with the enlisted personnel, but in such a case they become the target for an endless gossip and sometimes even meet with failures in connection with their service. As a result, the upper and lower elements in the navy are separated from one another "as if with a partition" and it is impossible to establish between these two elements the least bond. Therefore one experiences the greatest difficulties, when one wants to proceed with the further development of our work.

As to the political education, one may still make in connection with this problem more or less consistent plans, because political convictions of those who by their activities belong to the educational circles, are comparatively modern as regards basic principles.

In pursuance of these plans, it is necessary, first of all, to make those comrades who have already joined the "Communistic Youth League" (Comsomol), to carry on an active struggle, and, besides, at the first opportunity, when the Center orders it, speedily to make these comrades join the "Comsomol" who have already entered the nuclei of the "New Seamen's League", of course after giving them a proper preparatory training. At present there are at least several tens of persons who could answer the above-mentioned purpose. The work in this direction must be considered as pressing.

It is also necessary to use all efforts, in order to enlarge these nuclei of the "New Seamen's League" which already exist, by drawing into them the more intelligent students, and gradually to convert them into an organization of the communistic youth. There are now two such nuclei, viz. in the Naval School at Chefoo and in the Shipbuilding School at Makiang. One of these days a new nucleus may be organized in the Kiangnan Dock and Engineering Works too. One must raise the spirit

of these comrades, in order to prepare them for active moves outside the School. As the term of their graduation is near, it is to be expected that, after completing within a year their studies and becoming junior officers, they will be able to bear the responsibility for the development of our work.

It would be easy for those comrades who belong now to the educational circles, to get into touch with the enlisted men on ships. If we convert these comrades into our vanguard, the whole thing may easily end in a complete success. It is only necessary, as a preliminary measure, to utilize these nuclei of the "New Seamen's League" properly, viz. by concentrating into them all good elements and them by working upon them in the desired sense. In a word, we must use these nuclei of the "New Seamen's League" as a "screen", in order to avoid persecution. The Center cannot fail to recognize that, temporarily at least, the " New Seamen's League" with its nuclei is a stage through which we must unavoidably pass.

The further development of the work in the naval organs is the most difficult thing. There may be two possibilities in this direction, viz. either to start the movement "from below", or to proceed to it by working upon the middle and upper strata. But under what surrounding conditions we shall find the enlisted men, should we start the movement from the lower strata? Over them there "reigns" a foolish and senseless policy of their superior officers, and beneath them there is antipathy which separates them from various provincial circles as with a "partition". Therefore it is very difficult to proceed to our work from this direction, i.e. from below. But we shall meet with the same difficulties should we try to start our work "from above", because in that case we shall be confronted with several inveterate habits, with the aspiration to preserve one's own position and with no desire to make any progress. Therefore every representative of the younger progressive generation who has the least aspiration towards a political development, can start the work just where he is placed now.

As regards organs of naval training in which due attention is already paid to the educational side, it is hardly necessary to require from them that they should be absolutely on our side, but only that they should work sincerely and zealously. There are now such men in the Naval Training Battalion at Chefoo, but there are none at Nanking. As to the agitation work which it is necessary to carry on intensely in the Naval Training Battalion at Chefoo, comrades of the Naval School at Chefoo must be entrusted with it.

Enlisted men on board the cruiser Haiyung always display a spirit of protest, and we must admit that it is possible to put our expectations in this phenomenon. We positively must make use of the last incident with this ship, in order to increase still more their power and resistance. We have, however, to bear constantly in mind the fact that they set a great value upon the population of the province and therefore, in order to carry on the agitation work on board this ship, it is absolutely necessary to find for that purpose natives of their own province, i. e. Fukien. Recently principles of a narrow patriotism were very much en vogue among the personnel of the headquarters of the navy, and I consider this phenomenon as very dangerous and worth thinking about. In my opinion during the period, when there are no military operations, it is necessary to carry on only a slow agitation work, and I consider that now our principal work must be in the educational organs, in order to create there sincere and steady elements. Special attention must be paid to the development of the nuclei of the "New Seamen's League" and the work must be started, first of all, in these nuclei.

G. Conditions prevailing in the Kwangtung Navy.

1. Fighting units fit for naval operations:

The cruiser Chungshan. Displacement: 780 tons. Speed: 13.5. Armament: 2 guns - caliber 4.7 and 3 - 3 pdrs.

The destroyer Feiying. Displacement: 850 tons. Speed: 32. Armament: 2 - 12 pdrs. and 3 - 3 pdrs.

The Transport Woofeng. Displacement: 200 tons. Speed: 13. Armament: 2 - 3 pdrs.

The cruiser Tzeyu ("Liberty"). Displacement and speed unknown. Armament: 2 - 3 pdrs.

The cruiser Kwangchin. Displacement: 600 tons. Speed: 12.5. Armament: 2 - 3 pdrs.

---

2. System of the Organization:

The Administrative Department of the Navy, besides one Chief and one Adviser, consists of the following five sections:

1/ the Section of Military Affairs with 6 sub-sections: a/ Sanitary, b/ mechanical, c/ general affairs, d/ military, e/ statistical and f/ military jurisprudence;

2/ the Section of Educational Affairs with 2 sub-sections: a/ instruction and b/ training;

3/ the Shipbuilding Section;

4/ the Commissariat Section with two sub-sections: a/ Supply and b/ accountability;

5/ the Budget Section.

---

3. Officials, their characteristics and Groupings.

The Chief of the Administrative Department P'an Wen-chih, a native of Kwangtung, graduated from the Naval School at Whampoa. He owes his present position to Gen. Chiang Kai-shih. It was chiefly through the activities of P'an Wen-chih that recently a conflict occured between the naval officers of different provinces, viz. Kiangsi and Kwangtung. All the same he is in the position to win over to his side a part of the en-

listed men of the navy, and it may also be admitted that under his administration the Kwangtung navy is in a more or less satisfactory condition. P'an Wen-chih is much addicted to opium smoking.

The Adviser of the Department Chieshieh (a romanization of the Russian name: Grey) does not work with a full sincerity for the benefit of the Chinese Navy and is quite a "foreign adviser". He is not free of the responsibility for the origin of the recent conflict.

The Chief of the Section of the Military Affairs Yuan Yang-hua, a native of Canton, graduated from the Naval School at Whampoa. His political convictions are comparatively good.

The Chief of the Section of the Educational Affairs Hsiao Kwang-yeh is a well educated man, "almost a learned man".

The Chief of the Shipbuilding Section: Jen Ching-ying (No personal characteristics given).

Some changes and reductions of the personnel are taking place just now in the Administrative Department of the Navy.

---

4. Conditions prevailing on each of the above mentioned Ships.

Commander of the cruiser Chungshan Wu Yü is a native of the Chekiang province and made his studies in Japan. He owes his present appointment to Gen. Chiang Kai-shih.

There is no "opening" through which it would be possible to approach the crew of this ship with a political propaganda, because both soldiers and sailors are extremely ferocious and cruel in character and absolutely refuse to receive any political training. They are for the most part natives of Kiangsi, and the spirit of "provincialism" is very strong in them. For many years they have been following the "path of counter-revolution". They took away opium, enriched themselves at the expense of the people, and there was hardly anything which they did not make use of, always for the purpose of "lining their own pockets".

They all gradually became rich men and with such men it is very difficult to talk about revolution. At present the Nationalist Government has to defray all the expenses in connection with the maintenance of this ship in silver dollars.

Commander of the destroyer Feiying Huang Chen is a Kiangsi man who graduated from the Naval School at Chefoo. He is very truthful in character, but lacks ability and has no influence whatsoever.

The political work does not progress successfully, although the commissary of the ship belongs to the Communist party. This ship is also within the sphere of influence of Kiangsi men.

The destroyer Feiying got damaged and is still out of order. Formerly its enlisted men were on the same level as regards pay, as those on board the cruiser Chungshan, but after the ship had become damaged, the pay was not given in a sufficient quantity and now the monthly amount does not exceed one half of what is due. The sailors, however, not only do not feel any grudge, but consider this change as quite natural and proper, because for the moment their ship is not so powerful as Chungshan. Therefore the majority of them use all their efforts to repair the ship as soon as possible in order to restore the former position.

Commander of the transport of Woofeng Li Kuang-yeh is a native of Kiangsu and graduated from the Naval School at Chefoo. He is a very intelligent man.

The political work on board this ship is on a proper footing, and judging by outward appearances, considerable results have been attained in this respect. So far, however, there is no real rapprochement with the enlisted men.

The financial condition of the crew is very good. As to the feeling of "provincialism", it cannot develop on board this ship, because its crew consists of natives of different provinces.

Commander of the cruiser Tzeyu ("Liberty") Hsieh Ch'ung-chien is a native of the Kiangsi province and graduated from the Naval School

at Chefoo. He is member of the "Young Military Men Association" and also is very close to us.

The cruiser Taeyu is a main stay of the members of the "Young Military Men Association", and the majority of the officers on board this ship are inclined to the left current. So far, however, the political work did not attain a sufficient degree of development.

Commander of the cruiser Kuangchin Chang Han is a native of the Kiangsu province and graduated from the Naval School at Chefoo. He is our political opponent.

Assistant Chief of the Naval School Chang Ch'ü-kuei is a native of Kiangsu. He owes this appointment to Gen. Chiang K'ai-shih. This school, however, is not yet functioning.

With the exception of one Ou-yang Ko who is a member of the "Society for the Study of Sunyatsenism", the whole Canton navy consists only of those who lead quite a stupid life, and, on account of their low political development, cannot even discuss such a subject as the "Society for the study of Sunyatsenism". They have only one aim, viz. to get an important post and to become rich, and they are absolutely devoid of principles. Every one fulfils perfunctorily only his allotted duties and does nothing more. Roughly they may be divided into two parties, i.e. the Kwangtung and the Kiangsi, which try to put an obstacle in the way of one another. These internal discords afford the Northern navy a possibility of gaining a victory over them.

As regards those workers of the Kwangtung navy who are in charge of educational matters, they belong for the most part to counter-revolutionary elements. The conflict which took place during the Linnan operations, occured as a result of the reactionary activities of these counter-revolutionaries.

EDUCATIONAL ORGANS OF THE CHINESE NAVY.

Extract from the "Report on the Chinese Navy" dated November 3rd 1926, No. 690.

(Translator's Note: This report was written in Chinese by a member of the Chinese Communist Party who had been entrusted by the Party Center with a mission of investigating conditions prevailing in the Chinese navy, in order to ascertain the possibilities of the further development of the work among the personnel of navy. The report is anonymous and there is no indication as to the personality of its author, except the fact that he is closely connected with the Chinese naval circles and has a 6-year experience in naval matters. The English translation is made from the Russian text which is a very indifferent rendering of the Chinese original).

Contents: Pages.

1. Naval School at Chefoo. 1
2. Naval School at Makiang, Foochow. 4
3. Kiangnan Naval Training School at Nanking. 5
4. Aviation School at Makiang, Foochow. 6
5. Naval School at Hulutao. "
6. Shipbuilding School at Makiang, Foochow. "
7. Submarine School at Makiang, Foochow. 7
8. Radio (Wireless) School at Nanking. 8
9. Technical School at Makiang, Foochow. 9
10. School for Draughtsmen at Makiang, Foochow. 10
11. Navy Medical College at Tientsin. "
12. Conclusion. "

1. Naval School at Chefoo.

This Naval School or College was established by Admiral Sah Chen-ping and, as regards the scope of its program, can be considered as the highest of the educational institutions of the Navy.

The internal structure of the school is as follows: one director, one assistant in charge of educational affairs, one assistant in charge of administrative affairs, two inspectors, one chief instructor, one instructor of special subjects, four senior instructors, four assistant senior instructors, four junior instructors, three drill instructors, three instructors of Chinese literature, 192 students and over 100 servants. Two squads of soldiers are attached to the school. Annual expenditure amounts to about $90,000.

At present the school presents a very dismal aspect. Of 192 students there remain now only 60. The instructor staff is also not complete: there are many vacancies. But the amount of expenditure, as well as the number of servants are the same. Rules concerning the enrollment of students from all the provinces and other regulations are not observed and not mentioned at all, and all matters are decided and put into effect by the director alone, without previously reporting them to the Ministry of Navy. The students are quite inert, because they experience the oppression on the part of the director of the school Lin Chi-yin who treats them in an arbitrary manner as if he were a provincial governor. The school is filled to a large extent with the dregs of society and, as such, can only contribute to the weakening of China.

The following peculiar features of this school may be regarded as its main defects:

1/ Reading of books and newspapers, by which knowledge is acquired and self-consciousness is awakened, is strictly forbidden in this school. Therefore its students are deprived of the opportunity of enlarging the circle of their knowledge.

2/ A despotic system prevails in this school in which the opinion is very often expressed that "although the state is a republic, there must be a monarchy in this school." This is a set rule and not only empty words. The director himself dreams too much of monarchy and asserts that nobody can differ with him in opinion, but that everybody must respect him, the director. Therefore everyone is oppressed in this school and nobody's opinion is ever asked.

3/ As a result of such a despotic system, students do not understand anything, do not look at what is going on around their school, are ignorant and not enlightened as regards their mind and only obey their director in a blind and passive way.

4/ All letters of students are subject to censorship.

5/ It is strictly forbidden to make a study of the present political situation in the country, and anyone who shows any interest in this respect, is held under a suspicion.

6/ Students are usually fed with what is left over from officers' and officials' meals.

In addition to these main defects, there are also many minor ones too numerous to be detailed here. In short, this school is totally devoid of any "spirit of life".

Students may be divided into two groups: old and new.

The old group is composed of 27 students who have been detached from the Shipbuilding School at Makiang, Foochow. They have completed a four year course of studies and are comparatively well educated. There is among them an organization called "New Seamen's League" which plays the role of a preparatory group for the "Communistic Youth League" or "Comsomol". Altogether there are eight Comsomols. One of them has already joined the Communist Party and those five or six who belong to the "New Seamen's League are studying party matters and sometimes are carrying on an extensive agitation work in which they easily attain successful results.

The new group which is composed of 34 students, was enrolled after Lin Chien-chang, leader of the Anfu clique in the navy, had assumed

the office. This Admiral contributed not a little to the abolishment of the old rule concerning the enrollment of students from all the provinces and of old regulations generally. There are among this new group several students who took up the agitation work very eagerly, and a certain development of this work in the future may be expected.

27 students who belong to the old group, are experiencing great difficulties on account of the severe school regime, and although their spirit for fight is strong enough, they dare not come out with a protest, in view of their numerical weakness. The new inspector of the school Lin Ch'en-fan who, being the younger brother of the director, occupies therefore a somewhat privileged position, covers by his authority all the unlawful acts which are committed by students of the new group, i.e. of the clique of Admiral Lin Chien-chang, but takes always drastic measures against our group, i.e. the old group. At his insistence, two students of our group were severely punished and one was expelled from the school, although neither of them had committed any offense, and moreover one student was accused of bolshevism in connection with a letter and summoned before the military authorities. In view of such an unbearable situation, an attempt was made to see the director of the school and to talk the matter over with him, but during this interview some misunderstanding occured and, as a result, soldiers belonging to the Precautionary Troops were called for quite unexpectedly and arrested students of the old group.

Such an act on the part of the director undermined definitively the revolutionary work in the school. Later part of the students were transferred to Fukien. Only four students of our group remained here to carry on the work.

Rear-admiral Lin Chi-yin, native of the Fukien province, director of the school, is quite an uneducated and very greedy man, addicted to opium smoking. As regards politics, he usually takes sides with the most powerful men and now dances attendance both on admirals Tu Hsi-kwei and Lin Chien-chang whose he is a relative. The shooting of Yang Chih-chung and the surrender of all the troops belonging to Marines were actually effected by him.

As regards our partisans, he only strives to split up their forces. (Note: Lin Chi-yin died and his post is still vacant).

His assistant in charge of educational affairs captain Ching Chung-ching, native of the Fukien province, is also not up to the standard and therefore directs the educational work in the school very poorly.

Former inspector Cheng Chang-heng was a clever man and maintained close relations with common people generally and particularly with students of our group. Last year he rendered much assistance to us in my work. He sent several reports to the Ministry of Navy recommending to permit students to read books and newspapers and to establish a library, but of course met with a flat refusal. As he was held under suspicion, he was replaced by Lin Ch'en-fan, the younger brother of the director. The new inspector, being quite an uneducated man himself, practically ruins by his actions the educational work and, unless he is dismissed from his present post, the prospects will be very dark indeed for the school.

---

2. Naval School at Makiang, Foochow.

The Naval School at Makiang (Foochow Naval College) which is lodged in the Mamoi Navy Arsenal at Foochow, is one of the best of its kind. Its internal organization is the same as that of the Naval School at Chefoo (see No. 1). Now it gives training for navigation of steam vessels only but formerly it was a school for training of officers for sailing ships.

There are over 30 students in this school and several tens of servants. Annual expenditure amounts to about $ 80,000.

This school calls forth nothing but pessimism, as it also has very many defects. Many restrictions are in force concerning the reading of books and newspapers by students. In the majority of cases all matters are settled out of personal sympathy. Students of this school share the same premises with the students of the Shipbuilding School (see No. 6) and of the Submarine School (see No. 7), but are not allowed to establish any relations

with the latter. It is also very difficult to create a club organization.

Students are mostly younger brothers or sons of senior naval officers. They are very gay in character, have no idea as to the common people and their frame of mind is that of rich bureaucrats. They are quite uneducated and very much addicted to opium smoking. They receive appointments as soon as they complete their studies and later concern themselves only with further promotion. There are, however, among them several students who possess a "living spirit". They belong to the "New Seamen's League" and also make a study of the party teaching.

The director of this school Rear-admiral Chang Ping-yüan, native of the Fukien province, is a very stupid and corrupt person, much inferior even to Lin Chi-yin as regards technical knowledge. He sleeps all day long and, under the pretext of obtaining funds for the school, "lines his own pocket". He belongs to the party of admiral Tu Hsi-kuei.

His assistant in charge of educational affairs Huang Ch'eng-hsü native of the Fukien province, received a good technical education in America, but being young as to age and somewhat timid in character, does very little real work. He belongs to the party of Admiral Lin Chien-chang and has been lately transferred to the post of Director of the Submarine School (see below No. 7).

---

3. Kiangnan Naval Training School at Nanking.

The Kiangnan Naval Training School at Nanking is the highest educational institution in our navy in which naval officers, particularly torpedo and gunnery officers, receive their supplementary technical training. The duration of the course is two years. The instructor staff is composed of those who have completed their studies in the Naval School at Chefoo. Among instructors there are two who, as regards their technical knowledge, are considered as the best specialists in artillery in China.

At present this school, on account of the lack of funds, is temporarily closed, and the Radio School (see No. 8) is lodged now in its premises.

---

4. Aviation School at Makiang, Foochow.

The Aviation School (Aerial College) is attached to the Aviation and Engineering Department of the navy at Makiang, Foochow. It possesses four hydroplanes which are adapted for training. Some time ago a certain Russian officer acted as instructor for this school. After his death two German aviators were engaged as instructors, but they have not as yet assumed their duties.

Students of this school are either officers or non-commissioned officers. There are eight students now and two of them possess a very clear political understanding. It is quite possible to exert influence upon them and to maintain regular relations with them in the future.

---

5. Naval School at Hulutao.

This school is, so to speak, a private school of Chang Tso-lin and therefore it is difficult enough to ascertain its internal conditions, but if the center deems it necessary, I will try to find some friends and to make a supplementary report later on.

---

6. Shipbuilding School at Makiang, Foochow.

There are over 50 students in this School. All subjects are taught in German. The teaching staff is composed of those who have completed their studies in this school. Its director Ch'en Tsao-fan received his education in England and his speciality is the building of submarines. His technical knowledge is quite good and he himself is a very trustworthy man. He belongs to the party of Admiral Tu Hsi-kuei and has been lately transferred to the post of Associate Director of the Kiangnan Dockyard. Annual expenditure of the school amounts to $ 60,000.

The following more serious defects of this school may be mentioned: Students are strictly forbidden to read newspapers. The reading of books i

restricted. The liberty of the students is also very restricted. They are confined in their premises and are deprived of all freedom. The teaching is done very poorly. Generally speaking, of all the naval schools this one is in the worst state of decay and presents a most dismal aspect.

If an effort is made, it will be possible to organize a nucleus of the "New Seamen's League", to get into touch with the youth at Makiang and to establisg a "Society of Followers". There are now in this school ten comrades who are the forefront nucleus of the whole navy at Makiang. A certain Ting Chia-kuan, a very able young man, is responsible for the work which is being done.

---

7. Submarine School at Makiang, Foochow.

The Submarine School at Makiang, Foochow, has been established by the late Minister of Navy Admiral Liu Kuan-hsiung. Its internal organization is the same as in the Naval School at Chefoo (see No.1). The first director of this school Vice-admiral Ch'en Chao-chiang paid the most serious attention to the educational training. It is well provided with school books of every kind and equipment, and furnishes many opportunities for a good education. However, it is called "Submarine School" only nominally, because actually no training is given in connection with the navigation of submarines, although the school is provided with the required machinery. Among other sections it possesses also an electrical section which has been organized quite recently. Sometimes this school is also called Shipbuilding School (cf. No. 2 and No. 6).

As to the defects of this school, they are practically the same as in other schools which have been already mentioned.

There are over 50 students in the Submarine School. The first group of them possesses some technical education and follows now a practical course in electricity. After the completion of their studies in the technical section, the students who belong to this group, will still remain in the shipbuilding yard, where they will continue their practice as

qualified workman or foreman and receive wages accordingly. Most of them are married and they are so accustomed to this life that it is very difficult to approach them with propaganda work. As to the newly enrolled students, they are mostly quite young and mentally undeveloped. Still, if an agitation work is carried on among them properly, it will be quite possible to attain certain results in this respect.

Both the director of this school and his assistant in charge of the educational affairs have received a good technical education abroad. (For personal characteristics of its Director Huang Ch'eng-hsi see above No. 2, p. 5).

---

8. Radio (Wireless) School at Nanking.

The Radio (Wireless) School at Nanking has been established by Admiral Lin Chien-chang and is located in the building which was formerly occupied by the Kiangnan Naval Training School for torpedo and artillery officers (see No3). The duration of the course is two years. There are over sixty students in this school.

The director of this school Rear-admiral Shen Chi-fan, is very much addicted to opium smoking and dreams only of riches and promotions. His education is insufficient for directing a school.

Students are licentious to the utmost degree. During lessons their conduct is not restricted by anything. Some of them are former students of the Technical School attached to the Administrative Department of the Navy at Makiang, Foochow. They all are very gay young men with whom it is difficult to speak about the revolution. Therefore the work must be started with the organization of a nucleus of the "New Seamen's League".

---

9. Technical School attached to the Administrative Department of the Navy at Makiang, Foochow.

This School is attached to the Administrative Department of the Navy at Makiang, Foochow, and bears the character of technical primary courses. The duration of the course is five years. Subjects pertaining to the general knowledge are taught in this school. Its internal organization is quite the same as in the Naval Schools at Makiang, or Chefoo. Only it is still more despotic with regard to students: even corporeal punishments are in force.

The following may be considered as the more serious defects of this school. All matters pertaining to the school are concentrated in the hands of the director who deals with the students quite arbitrarily without any discrimination as to right and wrong. The reading of books and news - papers is strictly forbidden. The difference between students and the teaching staff is practically the same as between slaves and slave owners. Therefore the general conditions of students are even more hard than in all other schools.

Students are well educated. They look themselves after school expenses, as well as after their own food. It is provided for in school regulations that students who stop paying their tuition fees, are not given any food.

The director of the school Ch'eng Te-hsien received his education in America. He is a young and unexperienced man, but makes a thorough study of educational questions. He belongs to the party of Admiral Lin Chien-chang. His assistant in charge of educational affairs Ho Kuang-hsin is a comparatively young man, very well educated and a good patriot.

Students of this school are also for the most part brothers and sons of officials. In so far as government circles of Fukien consider the navy as a private property of this province, they admit to the school mostly Fukien men. Thus the fortunes of the navy are entirely in the hands of the natives of Fukien. Therefore students, being anxious only about their own advancement, are very grateful to the school and have no time to

think about anything else. However, members who are working in the nucleus of the "New Seamen's League", report that in this school too there are members of the nuclei of this League. Comrade ..... who bears the full responsibility for the agitation work in this school, will make a detailed report some of these days.

---

10. School for Draughtsmen at Makiang, Foochow.

The School for Draughtsmen is attached to the Administrative Department of the Navy at Makiang, Foochow. There are several tens of draughtsmen-students in it. For the most part they consist of extremely dissolute elements and it would be very difficult to reform them. Now, however, in view of financial difficulties, they all have dispersed. Wang Tsu-hsi is the director of this school.

---

11. Navy Medical College at Tientsin.

The Naval Medical College at Tientsin was the only school of this kind. At present, however, it does not function any more on account of the shortage of funds.

---

12. Conclusion.

In short, of all the above-mentioned schools serious attention may be paid only to the following: a/ Naval Schools, b/ Submarine School and c/ Shipbuilding School.

According to my plans, it was decided to start the work in these schools, first of all, through organizing there nuclei of the "New Seamen's League" and then to convert them into the "Society of Followers", in order to improve the study of party teachings and to furnish thereby an opportunity for future "conquests". In this respect such a magazine as the "New Seaman" can exert a great influence. Ever since the Center came

to the assistance we a[illegible]lloting money for the publishing of this magazine, very many people did t[illegible] the same. As a result of the influence which this magazine was exerting [illegible], a considerable part of young students began to think "according to [illegible] ideas." With the appearance of the fourth issue, however, the Center stopped giving its material support, which circumstance called many interpellations from different places and even slanderous attacks on the part of the rival party. Local nuclei had already begun to carry on a regular correspondence, but the work in this direction was interrupted and there is no possibility now of developing our organization still further. If the Center had been able to continue the financial support and to allot $ 20 a month, we could have gone on with our work. At any rate, it would be much better than to carry on agitation with an "empty mouth".

G-2 Report

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
DEC 8 2657-D-28 1930
129
WAR DEPARTMENT

COMMUNISM

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. DEC 5 1930

In general, peace now reigns throughout China. Political parties and leaders have time to balance sheets and prescribe cures for apparent ills. This period may be short -- and China must make the best of it to eradicate banditry and communism, if indeed they are to be eliminated. At present 9/10 of Kiangsi, 1/5 of Hupeh, 1/3 of Hunan, 1/2 of Fukien, and 1/10 of Kwantung are in the hands of pseudo-communists. In parts of Kiangsi the communists have now been in control since the last of 1926. The so-called communist armies probably total 200,000 men. Money has filled Red coffers through the occupation of Changsha, Shasi and lesser towns.

On the other side of the picture, the Nanking government has ordered about 150,000 troops to communist infested areas to put down the Red disorder and has announced that in three to six months communism and banditry will be stamped out. The capable Ho Ying-chin has been placed in command of the forces for bandit and communist suppression. Nanking, which is prone to belittle ills and see the bright side of every picture, is optimistic over the outcome.

The episode at Changsha brought home to Nanking officialdom, as nothing else could, the dangers of the Red menace. This menace had been known to exist for a long period, but the exigencies of civil war and the struggle for existence, had dulled official cognizance. Now Nanking is keenly awake to the peril and may be expected to make efforts in some measure equal to the emergency.

It is not believed in this office that a great percentage of so-called communists are communists except in name. At the head of most of the groups one finds well-educated, radical young men who know what communism means, and in some cases try to carry out its precepts. But the rank and file know nothing of its principles. An effort is made to inculcate new recruits with some of the main rudimentary ideas, but more than this is not attempted. Communism is so far in China a misnomer. Perhaps the movement should be called an agrarian revolution. It is the attempt of the peasant to obtain more human living conditions. It is the outcry against systems of taxation and official aggrandizement in which the rights of the coolie have come to mean less than the rights of a human being.

It is reported that money is being sent from Moscow to further the movement, that the Reds under Chu, Mao and P'eng are in communication by wireless with the Third Internationale. This all may be true, but proof is lacking. All one can say is that Moscow per se is very sympathetic and would help if possible, and that the leaders of these so-called communistic bands are apparently true communists. But again, the movement is not based on emanations from Moscow but has its being in the conditions under which the coolie class is obliged to exist.

The above being true, it is difficult to see what the government armies can do against it. The Chinese soldier and the Chinese officer are drawn from the people. In the best disciplined armies of the world, the officer and men are of two separate social classes, and the men obey the officers' orders even though they are directed against the interests of their own class. This condition in China's armies does not exist. The gulf between the soldier's profession and the trade of banditry or communism is but a small fissure in an elastic medium -- it closes at the slightest provocation. What can an army of this sort do against such a movement? Occupy the important routes and towns, enlist the discordant

elements in its ranks -- yes; eradicate the movement -- no. In the first place, the return of troops to the disaffected areas will bring recruits to communism. In the second place, bandit headquarters are placed in such inaccessible positions that the ardor of the soldier who probably is a secret sympathizer is cooler long before contact is made. And again, there are at the present writing 17 foreign hostages in bandit or communist hands.

The 17 hostages represent British, Spanish, American, Norwegian, Italian, French and Swiss nationalities. It is believed that they are being held in such number to checkmate troops delegated for bandit and communist suppression. Since the two British women missionaries were butchered in Fukien, troops are loath to attack a band holding a foreign captive. They are held also to embarrass the Nanking government as well as to collect ransom.

Other indications of the attempt to embarrass the government are reported daily in the press and in consular reports. Practically every day a foreign ship is fired upon on the Yangtze. A few years ago such fire as was delivered came from rifles, but now field guns and trench mortars are employed as well. In view of the fact that gunboats receive their full quota of attention, and that practically all fire, whether on war vessels or merchant ships, is returned with interest, one is forced to believe that an attempt is being made to embarrass Nanking. It is true that there is the same hatred of the steam boat and progress in general among these bands that has always been evidenced towards innovations in China. It is true that there may be a hope of plunder after a well-directed shot. But in China, more than any place in the world, always look for the political motive. If the bandits can embarrass the government and bring it into strained relations with foreign governments, they are certain to be the winners. If the government does not succeed in putting them down and such strained relations are brought about, it will be because the government has not the strength to do so.

The bandit-communist situation has not brought the Nanking government to the major crisis as yet. But if the government is not successful in putting the threat down, then a major crisis may well eventuate. Communism may not and probably will not be China's final form of government, but it may well be one of the stages through which evolution leads China. There is a decided tendency to experiment in China. So much is new -- so little understood, that many things are adopted after trial and error. Returning students have said, "Well, monarchy failed, and democracy has failed; why not give Communism a chance?"

It was mentioned earlier that the government may despatch its troops to important areas and enlist the communist-bandits in the army. This expedient has been tried before, and where the number absorbed was not too large has apparently proved fairly effective. But in the case in hand, will not the dose be too large for the patient? It is announced that Chiang Kai-shek is going to recruit 14 new divisions. Are these divisions to be made up of bandits and communists? Some day disbandment must be effected -- and will troops made up of these classes, and troops who have been subject to the brutalizing effects of the last war, prove desirable citizens?

Chinese communism -- discontent, or whatever you call it -- is not a concrete object which may be fought, killed, or conquered by soldiers. It is an idea and may be conquered only by another idea. The idea which can defeat it is the idea of peace, plenty, safety, and a square deal for all. Were Nanking to send this idea into the field, properly backed by the necessary proof of its existence, it would be a complete victor

without a battle. But where in a country torn with political strife, ridden with medieval superstition and custom, enslaved by its own economic chaos, is this proof to come from?

PGT/edb

Distribution:

4 MID
1 File

Nelson E. Margetts
Lieutenant-Colonel, Field Artillery
Military Attache

G-2 Report

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
JAN 15
2657-J-28
130
WAR DEPARTMENT

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JAN 3 1931

COMMENT ON COMMUNISM IN HONAN

Although it is known that the A. C. of S., G-2 has access to Consular Reports from China, the following is quoted from L. No. 1085, The American Consulate General, Hankow, China, November 14, 1930. It is believed that this is the ablest exposition of the Communistic threat which has ever appeared from anyone who has had an intimate connection with the bandits. The writer, who asks that his name be withheld, is a member of the Catholic Mission, Loshan, Honan, and was captured by the bandits in June of this year.

Comment on Communism in Honan

By an Interested Observer

Nov. 2, 1930

The writer believes that the body of insurgents calling themselves communists who recently obtained control of the cities of Shangcheng, Kwangshan, Loshan, and Sihsien in the south-eastern section of the Honan province are what they claim to be - bona fide communists - and an integral part of the communist organization which has gained partial control of the provinces of Kiangsi, Hunan, Hupeh and Ahhwei. It is, moreover, the writer's belief that the communist movement in China is affiliated with the Communist party of the Soviet Republic and is being directed by secret agents from Soviet Russia.

It is, moreover, the writer's firm belief that it is a serious mistake on the part of all those concerned, not to discriminate between Communist insurgents and the border of bandits, active in various sections of China and to fail to attribute any political significance to the Communist movement in China. In order to form a correct estimate of the Communist movement in Honan (as also in the rest of China) it is necessary to recall certain historical facts throwing light on the origin of the Chinese Communist movement.

It is an undisputed fact that the Kuomintang or Nationalist party at the time of its successful campaign against the northern militarists in 1926 and 1927 was affiliated with the Communist party of Soviet Russia. There is little room for doubt in the minds of impartial observers that the success scored by the southern Kuomintang over the northern "warlords" was largely if not exclusively due to the assistance rendered by such capable political and military advisers (more correctly directors) as Michuel Borodin and General Galens. Up to the time of the successful conclusion of this campaign culminating in the capture of Chengchow and the withdrawal of the Mukden troops north of the Hoangho, there was no means of discriminating between the principles and ambitions of the Kuomintang and those of the Communist party. The speeches made by Eugene Chen, Wang Chung-wei, Tang Sheng-chih, Feng Yu-hsiang and by Chiang Kai-shih himself were outspokenly Communist in tone. It was at this time that the use of Communist slogans spread with lightning rapidity throughout the territory conquered by the Kuomintang.

At the time of the penetration of the Kuomintang's armies in southern Honan in 1927 the writer was stationed at Sinyangchow (a city situated on the Peking-Hankow Railroad near the southern boundary of Honan) and had an excellent opportunity of observing the tactics employed by the Communists in order to establish their position in China. The

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER 700152

Kuomintang armies on every step of their advance were accompanied by a large and well-trained force of Communist propagandists, composed mostly of Chinese young men and women who had enjoyed a college or university training. These young propagandists had been prepared for their work by an intensive course of training under Russian instructors.

The vanguard of this propagandist force travelled in a train (consisting of twelve or fifteen coaches) which had been especially equipped for their use. They carried carloads of Communist propaganda posters which betrayed signs of having been printed in Russia.

These propagandists proceeded to launch and to carry on their campaign according to a well-defined program;slogan-shouting parades, demonstrations, and meetings became the order of the day. In every town and hamlet the dangbu or political bureau with all its ramifications was established. Labor unions, student unions, merchant unions, farmers' unions, each with its special headquarters were established. Each of these bureaus became a base for the dissemination of Communist doctrines. Thus, within less than one year, the whole territory over which the influence of the Kuomintang extended, and that was practically the whole of China, became closely dotted with centers of Communist propaganda. Thus the doctrines of Marx, Lenin and Stalin became known throughout China, and Communist slogans such as "Down with the Imperialists", "Down with the Capitalists", "Down with the Bourgeoisie", "Down with the Mandarinate", "Down with Religion", "Down with the Foreign Dogs", "Down with Unequal Treaties", etc., were shouted ad nauseam throughout the length and breadth of the land.

Freedom from oppression, equality of treatment, the redistribution of wealth, the "liquidation" of all sorts of restraints and inhibitions were proclaimed as the benefits which the acceptance of Communism would bring to the masses of China's downtrodden population.

Whereas it must be admitted that with a large percentage of China's population (perhaps the majority) these doctrines of emancipation found but scanty favor, it is undeniable that among two great classes, the students and the soldiers, the doctrines of Communism were accepted and prized with a fervor such as is manifested by converts to any religious system.

The tenets of Communism obtained such a grip on the minds of these young "converts" that it caused them to revise their whole outlook on life. Overnight age-old traditions and modes of behavior were discarded by them. During that one year, 1927, ancient China became defunct and young China was born. The mother of young China is Communism.

After the completion of the Kuomintang's first "Northern Expedition" culminating in the temporary establishment of Chiang Kai-shih's political ascendancy over the whole of China, it was found expedient by the leaders of the Kuomintang to make an outward show of having repudiated the principles of Communism. It may be that this apostasy of Communism, on the part of China's political and military leaders,was sincere enough. Borodin, Galens and all Russian Communist advisers who had rendered such effective help to the Kuomintang in obtaining control of China were expelled in disgrace. The principles of Communism were disavowed and prohibited. In all provinces of China, numerous students and bobbed-haired girls were executed for refusing to apostatize from Communism.

Among the students and soldiers of China the new Communist creed had taken too deep roots to be eradicated by a ukase from political leaders who but a few days previously were the loudest in their acclaim of Communism and the millennium which its acceptance would bring to China.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER 700152

Even after repeated official manifestos prohibiting Communism had been issued, the members of the Dangbu throughout China continued to adhere to the principles of Communism, even though outwardly they made show of submitting to the wishes of the Government. It is a notorious fact that practically none of the Communist slogans were abandoned by China's officials, great and small, even after Communism had been officially disavowed.

With a knowledge of the above-recorded facts in mind it is easy to account for the rapid recrudescence of rabid Communism in many provinces of China during the period of the military campaign which has just come to a close in the northern part of Honan. The provinces which had formerly been a hotbed of Communism, Kiangsi, Hunan and Hupeh, were left without a sufficient garrison. Communist propagandists headed by Russian agitators were not slow in availing themselves of this opportunity of regaining the ground which had been lost. The tactics adopted by them this time were much more radical than those ever before employed in China. As in Russia, the Communist Red Army "Hung Kiun" was made to serve as the backbone of the whole movement. Strong, inaccessible positions in mountainous districts were chosen as the bases for operations.

Thus it was that the Communists who made their reentry into the Honan province at the end of the year 1928, established their first stronghold in the town of Suanhuatien, a large walled market town situated in the southern extremity of the Loshan district. This town is practically surrounded by mountains and could easily be held by a small band against a strong force of attackers. In Suanhuatien the Communists established their headquarters in the newly-constructed church of the Catholic Mission. The Christians of the place repeatedly reported to these missionaries that six Russians were working with the Communists. These men were frequently seen on the streets of Suanhuatien. They also preached the doctrines of Communism to the people. A few inadequate attempts were made to dislodge the Communists from their stronghold in Suanhuatien. Each time the military force sent for this purpose was decidedly worsted. A large percentage of the soldiers were captured and disarmed by the Communists and others went over to them. In the maantime the Communists were busy recruiting their adherents in the southern sections of the Loshan, Kwangshan and Shangcheng districts, bordering on Hupeh. In these efforts it seems that they were very successful. In the month of April they established a new stronghold in the large market town of Nanhsidsi in the district of Shangcheng. In this place (also surrounded by mountains) the two Jesuit missionaries, Fathers Anito and Hidalgo, have been held ever since the early part of May, 1930.

The Communists with these bases at Suanhuatien and Nanhsidsi are identical with those who repeatedly cut the railroad at Kwangshui and Linlin. They have little fear of the military as is proven by the fact that they attacked and broke their way into the walled cities of Kwangshan, Loshan and Sihsien, at a time when very large contingents of the government forces, recently returned from the front in northern Honan, occupied the neighboring cities of Sinyangchow, Kioshan and Chumatien, situated on the Kinhan Railroad.

There can be no doubt as to the fact that the insurgents who recently obtained control of the above mentioned cities in southeastern Honan, are real Red Russian-inspired Communists. Their arms and tactics are wholly different from those of the bandits (whose name is legion) active hitherto in the Honan province. These Communists preach and apply the doctrines of Marx and Lenin. They profess allegiance to Soviet Russia. Their emblem is the red flag. They profess friendship to the oppressed masses. They treat the farmers and workers with great consideration. They capture, despoil and kill the wealthy classes and officials. They are opposed to all religion. They divide the spoils of their raids on the rich with the poor.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER 700152

During their recent raid on the city of Loshan a force of Red soldiers in excess of 10,000 men were employed. They were well armed and well provided with ammunition. They succeeded in scaling the walls and in seizing some eight hundred guns thrown down by the defeated garrison. Immediately they set about tearing down the walls of the city. The poor people who were employed in this work were well paid. The women of the city were also well treated by the conquerors. They were set to work sewing uniforms for the soldiers, made from the cloth confiscated from the city shops. For this work the women were given rice and paid at the rate of fifty coppers a day. It is reported that the majority of the people in the Honan districts, occupied by the Communists, have welcomed the Reds as their deliverers from the intolerable burden of oppression which had been imposed upon them by military and civil authorities of late years, and by the bandits. The Reds are also reported to be implacable foes of the bandits. They summarily execute all bandits who fall into their hands.

Thus it appears that Communism has every prospect of making rapid progress in a northerly direction in the provinces of Honan and Anhwei. The ground has been well prepared for them by the military and civil authorities who have been bullying,oppressing and bleeding the people to death and leaving them helpless at the mercy of the bandit hordes (sometimes 25,000 strong) which have been laying waste the territory of Honan and Anhwei these late years.

Should the war begin over again between the northern and southern factions in China, there is no room for the least doubt but that the Communists will gain such ground and establish themselves so solidly that it will be impossible to dislodge them. Their forces of sincere and enthusiastic and well-indoctrinated adherents are growing by leaps and bounds. The Communist menace in China is no chimera.

PGT/edb

Distribution:

4 MID
1 File

Nelson E. Margetts
Lieutenant-Colonel, Field Artillery
Military Attache

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER 700152

G-2 Report

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
APR 2 1931
WAR DEPARTMENT

4-1 2657-J.281/131

NO OBJECTION TO PUBLICATION

CHINA (Population & Social Conditions)

Subject: Bolshevism in the Far East.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 24 1931

The following is a summary of an article which appeared in LE FIGARO of April 7th:

Among the numerous crises of which the world suffers today, that of the British Indies and the famine in China are without doubt the most serious of all since they carry in themselves the Bolshevist menace.

India or China, abandoned by Europe and America, and consequently exposed to disorder, would inevitably fall into the hands of the Soviets and the world would run the risk of becoming a prey to anarchy and ruin.

The last agreements arrived at between Lord Irwin, Viceroy of India, and Gandhi, may for a while restore some peace of mind. However the tragic news that during the past year over four million men have died of hunger in China has recently appeared in British newspapers and must not be overlooked.

The rest of the world is indifferent to this serious news and at present is occupied by other problems of less value and importance.

These hungry masses in China constitute a danger for the entire world because the Moscow propaganda gets each day more intense and misery pushes them toward Communism which promises to them happiness in this world.

This propaganda carried out by Moscow in an active manner among illiterate coolies is also practised on a larger scale and with greater care among the literary class, whose pride is well known. This class is told about European tyranny and absolutism, the slavery which foreigners prepare for them, and how Europe, Japan and America covet their fields, their mines and their gold. Thus Bolshevist influence becomes greater each day and Soviet funds are used for the general corruption of China, Indochina, India, etc.

It is all Asia which is becoming intoxicated by the Bolshevist influence. Through it 900 millions of human beings are being prepared against us and they may thus become an immediate danger for the civilized world. No other solution is offered for the moment than collective steps being taken by Europe, Japan and America in order to bring financial help to China and put an end to the famine there.

Such a step would open to these nations vast commercial

From: M.A. Paris Report #17,342-W April 9, 1931.

possibilities and would create an outlet for European and American production. The markets in China must be organized through financial help and immediate necessities sent there first, followed by manufactured products later.

Comments.

This article is of interest from the French viewpoint because of any effect that it may have on Indo-China. However again is brought out the often discussed question of concentrated action by the major powers against Bolshevism, and one frequently hears it said that stabilize or turn Russia white and you have the key to the economic crisis in the rest of the world.

For the Military Attache:

R. L. Walsh

R. L. WALSH
Major, A.C.
Asst. Military Attache.

RLW/ms.

From: M.A. Paris Report #17, 342-W April 9, 1931.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MILITARY DIV.
SEP 3 1931
2657-J-28
WAR DEPARTMENT

THE COMMUNIST MENACE IN CHINA

The Struggle Against a National Peril

by **YANG CHIEN**

This illuminating and frank article on the Communist menace in China, issued through the Kuo Min News Agency, is the result of a personal study made by the author in Kiangsi. Mr. Yang who is the Assistant Director of the National Research Institute and an orginal member of the Kuomintang, is eminently qualified to write on the Communist virus, having intensive knowledge of the Communist party with which he dealt during the trying period of party purgation in Shanghai. His article, in five sections, deals with the historical background and the growth of Communism in China; the political and military organisation and programme of the Chinese Communist Party; and the history of the several periods of anti-communist campaigns as conducted in Kiangsi, pointing out the reasons for their ineffectiveness and frequent reverses. While much progress has now been made in the present campaign, he calls attention in his conclusion to the important but difficult task of rehabilitation, which must follow the military operations.

THERE is now raging in Kiangsi a bitter and bloody struggle between 30 divisions of Government troops and the Communist armies. The struggle not only will decide the fate of the National Government, but represents the life and death struggle between the Chinese social and economic system with the Communist system introduced from Russia.

Yet in Shanghai one finds curiously little interest taken by the bulk of the populace, whose fate is being decided in the crucible of Kiangsi. For this apathy the populace is less to blame than the Government which has been lacking in candour. Official reports have been directed chiefly to allay the fears of the country, they have been concealing reverses and exaggerating petty successes. We have been fed with stories of the wonderful victories of Government troops, and have been told lurid tales of the remnants of the Communist being driven to extinction. Every time we were told that three months would see the end of the Communists; three times three months have passed and the Chairman of the National Government has been forced to lead personally an army of 30 divisions to deal with these frequently "decimated remnants."

Government *communiques* have also been confining their attention to the terroristic tactics of the Communists as if that were the end and not the means employed by the Communists; but the ideology, the technique, organization and programme of the Communists were ignored. Small wonder is it therefore that the Communist situation in Kiangsi has caught the people of the country unaware, although their very existence is being menaced.

The time has come to be frank and open with the people, so that the extent of the Red danger will be realized, however damaging this *expose* may be to individual reputations. We are presenting a dark and grim picture, but if we had brought the people to face the situation squarely and courageously, progress would have already been made.

I. Historical Background

The course of Chinese history has shown that at the end of every political period, such as the fall of a dynasty, the country is beset for years with widespread banditry. Thus during the Eastern Han Dynasty, there sprang Loh-lin and Chih-mei; at the end of the Tang Dynasty there was another great wave of banditry, costing the lives of millions of people; at the close of the Ming Dynasty, we find another serious incursion of banditry; the weakness of the Manchu Dynasty encouraged the Taiping outbreak and its successor, the Nien-fei Rebellion. It is almost safe to say that after each political upheaval there were decades of turmoil, the whole country ravaged by banditry. It is therefore but natural to find that with the collapse of the Manchu Dynasty and the inauguration of the Republic, a prolonged period of unrest has followed.

The present Communist outbreak which finds its culminating points in Kiangsi, therefore conforms to the usual rule. But the historical phenomenon which in the present case finds its expression in Communism is of a nature far more serious than the usual bandit outbreak, because this time the forces of anarchy are directed by the Third Internationale, which finds in China only one more episode in its programme of world revolution.

We are not concerned now whether it is the economic and social distress consequent on the

ing a new centre of political power. (2) Seizing political power by the proletariat, which is to lead the different classes of people in their common war against Imperialism. And (3) finally, establishment of the complete dictatorship of the proletariat. The leader of this faction is Chen Tu-siu, whom the Stalin faction derided as the leader of the 'Renunciation faction," for in calling a People's Convention the principle of "Class Struggle" is at least temporarily sacrified.

The Communist Party, under the control of the Stalin faction, divides the territory over which it now operates into different Soviet Areas, each ruled by a Special Committee. This Committee is under the direction and strict supervision of the Central Political Bureau situated in the Central Area (now in Kiangsi). Eight Special Area Committees have been organized for the following: Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi; South-western Kiangsi (in the Central Soviet Area); Northern Hupeh, Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei; North-Eastern Kiangsi; Fukien-Kwangtung-Kiangsi; Kwangsi-Yukiang; Border of Hupeh and Hunan. The Special Area Committees have under them Sub-Area Committees which control the *hsien* committee, which latter in turn control the town and the village committee.

For the direction of the Special Areas Committees, the following ten principles were enunciated:—(1) destroy Imperialism; (2) confiscate industries and banks of foreign capitalists; (3) unify China by way of recognition of the principle of Self-Determination of Nationalities (component races of the Chinese people); (4) overthrow the National Government; (5) establish Soviet (the council of worker, peasant and soldier) rule; (6) enforce the 8 hour law, increase wages, end unemployment, enforce social insurance, etc.; (7) confiscate all non-peasant land and redistribute farm lands among peasants; (8) improve the living conditions of the soldiers, find work and land for the people; (9) abolish all taxes levied by central and local governments and military authorities and enforce in their stead a graduated single tax on farm produce and other forms of income yielded by land; (10) support the Union of Soviet Russia with the proletarians of the world.

Of these 10 principles, the 9th principle calling for the abolition of all taxes is carried out in so far as the current taxes levied by the governments are substituted by their new taxes such as the graduated land tax, the local mutual welfare fee, etc. But the revenues accruing therefrom are insufficient to support the Soviet committee and the Red Army, so the deficit is met by such emerfency measures as "fines" (gentry, squires, rich peasants who are able to pay a "fine" of $80:—) and forced contributions in the form of obligatory surrender of grain (each person or household is allowed to retain only a fixed amount of grain after the harvest; the remaining amounts should be reported to the local Soviets, which may at any time call for them).

Besides the principle governing Soviet finance, the only principle that is being carried out is that of Agrarian Revolution. But this principle is of such sweeping importance that it deserves to be set forth in greater detail.

The Communist Party proclaimed in 1930 a set of general rules governing the conduct of Agrarian Revolution:—(1) Overthrow the political rule of gentry, squires and officials; disarm the counter-revoluntionary forces and arm the peasants to support the political power of the Soviet Council of the villages. (2) Confiscate all lands and estates owned by gentry, squires, and landlords and place them in the hands of the local Soviet Council for redistribution among peasants having no land or insufficient land. (3) Place all the estates owned by ancestral temples, religious temples and churches and other estates of a public nature such as reclaimed land, etc. in the hand of the Soviet Council for redistribution. (4) Reserve a certain area in every province for the Soviet Council to distribute among the soldiers of the peasant and worker's army as means for their support. (5) Declare all notes bearing high interest, pawn-shop tickets, etc., as null and void. (6) Burn or declare void all title deeds or leases. (7) Abolish all taxes levied by local government or military authorities and enforce in their place a graduated single tax. (8) Improve agricultural economy by (a) farm reconstruction, (b) improvement of irrigation, (c) prevention of floods and droughts, (d) emigration, (e) establishment of Farmers' Banks and Co-operative Societies extending credit on easy terms, (f) unification of currency and weights and measures, (g) efficient control of all waterways by the Soviet Government.

In practice the Communists in Kiangsi have undertaken the following measures: (1) All public land, temple and ancestral temple estates, and lands or estates owned by squires and landlords are unconditionally confiscated; the registration records of deeds and leases in the custody of local government are burned; landmarks forming boundaries are removed in order to wipe out all proof of ownership by the original owners. (2) The redistribution of lands is carried out by the local Soviet Council. (3) The redistribution of land is made with an able-bodied person as unit, regardless of sex. (4) Children below 16 and old and disabled persons are not entitled to land; but the family or household supporting them are entitled to additional land in accordance with their needs. (5) The amount of land to be allotted to a person or the additional land to be allotted to the family or household which have dependents is determined by the Soviet Council, but the additional land allotted to any family or household may not exceed 1/4 of the amount to which it is normally entitled (this limitation is aimed at limiting the means of existence of the dependents, who are not useful to the Red Army!). (6) When one area is overpopulated with the result that the land of the area is insufficient for distribution a portion of the population may be moved to neighbouring areas

and directs its officers. This is the Soviet scheme of making the army an integral part of the political organisation of the Party.

In addition to the regular army organisation, the Soviets have such auxiliary organisations as the "Red Militia," the "Children's Corps," the "Youth Vanguards" and two purely women's organisations.

All able-bodied persons, men and women of ages ranging from 18 to 45, are liable to be conscripted for service in the "Red Militia." The "Red Militia" is divided into "standing" and "territorial." The members of the "Standing Militia" enjoy the same treatment as soldiers. only they are not armed with rifles. The "territorials" support themselves, as they are not required to leave their abodes and are permitted to pursue their usual work while under military training.

The "Children's Corps" consists of children from 10 to 15 years old. They are primarily scouting parties and, in special circumstances, may also be called up to do reconnoitering work.

The "Youth Vanguards" are organised from young men and women of from 16 to 18 years old. True to their name, they form the vagnuards of the Communists forces, specializing in bayonet charges and terroristic tactics. They play the principal role in sacking towns and slaughtering the *bourgeoisie*.

Women are admitted to all Red military and political organisations on the same footing with men. There are no independent military organisations for women except the laundry corps, consisting of middle-aged women who do washing for the soldiers, and the "social welfare corps" consisting of young women, whose duty is to "entertain" the soldiers.

Owing to the shortage of ammunition and rifles, the Red forces are compelled to adopt guerilla tactics. Their manual on the subject enumerates the "Red Tactics" as follows: (A) lead the government forces to the Soviet area, or areas with thick forests and ragged hills and attack them from ambush; (B) mislead the government forces, then turn back and swoop upon them on their flank or rear; (C) when the government forces are concentrated, avoid them by falling apart; when the forces are weak, make concentrated attacks against them or surround them; (D) utilise the masses in disturbing the government forces (such as planting red flags on surrounding hills and making bugle calls from all directions) or employ the peasants (Red Militia) as advance guards to meet the government forces and pounce upon them when they are tired or their munition supplies are falling low; (E) permanent defences should not be attacked, severe battles are to be avoided; areas where the populace are not sovietised, fighting is to be avoided if possible; (F) undermine the morale of the government forces by sending propaganda peasants, workers and women to entice them.

IV. History of the Communist Campaign in Kiangsi

At one period the Communist Armies were ravaging Kiangsi, Hupeh and Hunan at the same time. However, after successive battles, they finally withdrew to Southern Kiangsi as their base, and there held off every effort of the Government troops to dislodge them. The advantages of Southern Kiangsi as a base are numerous. From there Communist troops could threaten or retreat into Hupeh, Hunan, Chekiang, Kwangtung and Kwangsi. The whole of Southern Kiangsi is mountainous, and practically inaccessible to large bodies of hostile troops, and on the other hand the Soviet-organized population gave their troops every conceivable assistance.

The rapidity of the growth of the Communist Army during the last 3 years has been phenomenal. As an example, in 1927, Fang Chi-min and Tsao Shih-ping left Nanchang for Yih-fang in South-eastern Kiangsi with only seven rifles between them. Fan Chi-min, the Commander of the 10th Red Army, has now 12,000 men under him with about 3,000 rifles. Chu Teh, when he was driven from Kiangsi in 1927, entered Hunan to join Mao Shih-tung with only about 200 to 300 rifles. He has become the Commander-in-Chief of the Red forces, with about 30,000 men and 15,000 rifles directly under his command.

What was a handful of bandits three years ago has now grown into a huge and formidable organization, requiring the mobilization of 30 divisions for its suppression. The disastrous mismanagement of incompetent officials who failed to 'nip the trouble in the bud' in time were only partially responsible; more fundamental reasons are to be sought in the inherent weakness of the social and economic conditions of the region and the preoccupation of the Government forces in the suppression of concerted rebellions elsewhere in the country. The Government was not permitted to make any serious preparation for the suppression of the Communists in Kiangsi until after the close of the Yen-Feng War.

The history of the Campaign against the Kiangsi Communists may be divided into 3 periods: (1) Lu Ti-ping Period, (2) Ho Ying-chin Period and (3) Present Period.

(1) Lu Ti-ping Period.—General Lu Ti-ping as the Chairman of the Kiangsi Provincial Government, had under him four divisions, the 18th, 50th, 12th and 13th divisions, which should have been sufficient to keep the Communist forces at bay. But owing to the recrudescence of civil war, two divisions, the 50th and 12th, were withdrawn to other fronts, leaving only the 18th and 13th to combat the rising tide of the Communist bandit hordes. Two divisions were clearly insufficient to cope with the situation; town after town fell into the hands of the Soviets and at the worst period the Government held only the sector extending from Nanchang to Kiukiang. The forces of the neighbouring provinces of Hupeh and Hunan were unable to give help as they had Communist bandits to deal with in their own provinces, and the best they could do was to hold their front against the invasion of the Kiangsi Communists into their territories. On the other hand, the movement of the Communist forces was so admirably concerted, they could defeat and

The Communist Menace in China

(Continued from Page 186)

ed, and vast sums of money must be poured in for rehabilitation of the devastated areas.

Far more important than all these, however, is the problem of the conditions that make for Communism. All things are but incidental, objectively necessary for the growth of Communism are the miserable economic conditions that drive famished and exploited humanity to despair. What is happening in Kiangsi may well happen to any province in China, and it is nothing short of a miracle that the famished and backward regions of the Northwest, which are contiguous to Soviet Russia, have not become infected with the virus of Communism. If that happens not alone the National Government and the Kuomintang, but the very integrity of the Chinese race will be threatened. For who can doubt but that beneath the patter of world brotherhood of the proletarian, the plotters of the Kremlin are scheming the installation of the "independent" Soviet Republic of China, an entity in the Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics just as independent as the "Independent" Buriat Mongol Republic?

Politicians who split hairs on political legalism, dreamers who seek to rule China by slogans, or are discontented with the present division of power and office, do they not realize that while they are weakening the life-blood of the Republic by their petty squabbles, they are making the way open for the virus of communism, which will destroy all alike in one fell swoop?

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
JAN 29 1932
2657-J-281
133
- 6990 -
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

RUSSIA (Combat).

Subject: A Resumé of the Communist Military Activities in China as Viewed from Moscow.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JAN 19 1932

The following is a resumé of the communist military activities in China during the past few years and of the situation in the autumn of 1931 based on information from allegedly reliable communist sources in Moscow.

The Red troops which remained after the defeat of the Canton Communists in 1927 by the Nationalist Armies formed the nucleus for the organization of the present Red Chinese Army. These troops were joined by one regiment of the Nationalist troops. This regiment was composed principally of communists and after the defeat of the Cantonese it withdrew to the Tzin-zan-Shan mountains. Later the remnants of the so called South Hunan peasant army, which was forced to withdraw to Tzin-zan-Shan by the pressure of the government troops after their occupation of the city Changshi, joined the Red forces also. These three elements were united by the beginning of 1928 and formed the first units of the present Chines Red Army under the control of the communists. These troops were organized as the 4th Corps, consisting of 3 divisions and 9 regiments. The National government attempted repeatedly to destroy this force, employing often as many as 6 divisions against it, but without success. In time other units were organized until at present there are 22 so called corps of Red troops which are more or less active in different parts of the country.

These so called Corps and other units are not uniformly organized nor of equal strength. Some of the so called Corps number as many as 8000 to 12000 men, but there are other units also calling themselves Corps which can muster but 1500 to 2000 bayonets. Recently the strengths of all units have been increasing due to an augmented flow of replacements. It is estimated that altogether, inclusive of the organizations of a semi-military nature, the communist troops in China number 300,000 armed men. These units (sometimes called corps and sometimes divisions) are very mobile. They avoid decisive engagements. When threatened by government troops they withdraw after having robbed the local rich inhabitants. Those of the local population who assist and participate in the robbery join the Red units and thus they are constantly augmenting their forces with volunteers. The armament, except that furnished by the Soviets, is principally that captured from the enemy. The Red Command considers a victory as a defeat if only a small amount of rifles and ammunition is captured. These units utilize their excellent knowledge of the terrain, their great mobility and their connections with the local population to continually harass and surround government troops and force their surrender. Most of these bands

have

FROM: MA WARSAW Report No. 1520 Date: Dec.29, 1931.

have machine guns and some of the best have a few pieces of artillery.

The Chinese Communist Party organizations exist in almost all of the units. Political sections and political Commissars exist in all units from the company up. In most cases the political commissars are Chines students trained in Moscow or by Moscow agents in China. Equality between the commanders and soldiers in material matters is practised. Each receives the equivalent of from 2 to 3 roubles monthly and their living. The problem of the education of officers and NCOs is solved by the organization of their own schools, training regiments etc.

The distribution of the 15 principal groups of Red Chines troops in the early autumn of 1931 was as follows:

1st region.

HUBEY - HONAN - ANHOY.

1st Corps - strength about 6000 men. Commander Hey-Chi-Chen. It was this force which attacked the Pekin-Hankow RR.

A new Corps, the 16th, has recently been organized in this area. No details concerning it are known.

2nd region.

Northwest HUBEY and northern SHENSI.

2nd Corps - 7500 men - Holung, a peasant, commander. Composed principally of peasants from western HUNAN.

6th Corps - 7500 men - Commander Kuan-Chi-Sun, a graduate of an advanced military school.

The 9th and 10th Corps have been organized recently. No details concerning them available.

3rd region.

North of NANCHANG.

8th Corps - 7000 men - Huang-Kin-Liao, a student, commander.

4th region.

West of CHANSHI in HUANAN.

The recently organized 13th Corps. - No details available.

5th region.

Southern KIANSI and western FUKIEN.

3rd Corps - 6800 men - GSAY-SHEN-CHAN, graduate of military school, commander.

4th Corps.

FROM: MA WARSAW Report No. 1520 Date: Dec.29, 1931.

5th region (continued)

4th Corps - 10,000 men . Chu-te - commander. He is an old army man with a German education. This is one of the principal armies. It has a strong administrative and political organization.

5th Corps - No details available.

6th region.

Nothern KWANTUNG.

11th Corps - 6000 men - Commander not known.

7th region.

Western KWANTUNG and eastern KWANSI.

12th Corps - 10,000 men plus. Tan-Tse-Chuy, a student, commander. Considered the most able Chinese Red commander due to his endeavors to introduce European military methods into his force.

14th Corps - 3000 men - Ho-Hun commander.

7th Corps - No data available.

Throughout China there is a special sort of Red Guard organization known as Insurrection units. They are formed principally from bandits. The direct mission of these organizations is to ruin the land owners, to divide the land, to protect communist and Soviet organs and in general all kinds of cooperation with communist organizations. Sometimes these organizations are later simply united with military units thus increasing the strength of the latter. It is said that in KIANSI province the Communist organizations often pay for food with notes of the "Workmen and Peasant Bank" which bear the picture of Carl Marx and Lenin.

In addition to the above, there is in China both a secret and non-secret "Red Militia". The non-secret organization exists in those areas where Soviet influence prevails. There exist also "self defense" units, a part of which are legal, but the majority of which are extra-legal and conspirative in nature.

The Comsomol in China is organizaed on the pattern of that organization in Russia, but it appears in China under the guise of "Circles of the Studying Youth" in which both open and secret work is carried on by Chinese communists.

Among the Chinese peasants committees are organized of the general type of the "Committees of the Poor" of Soviet fame. This is done either openly or secretly depending upon the local political situation. In some places all the power in the village is in the hands of such committees.

Comments.

FROM: MA WARSAW Report No. 1520 Date: Dec.29, 1931.

COMMENTS.

While the source of this information is considered as fairly reliable, it is for the most part too general in scope to be of great value. However, it is thought that it may be of interest to th Far Eastern Section since its origine is Moscow and it may furnish connecting links or verification of information from other sources.

When questioned as to definite proof and information of official Soviet direction of communist activities in China, all persons familiar with the situation, even those sympathetic to the Soviets, simply laugh and look at one as if he were an imbecile to doubt it for a moment. Therefore it is difficult to secure direct confirmation of such things.

The impression gained of the so called Red military forces is that they are but little more than large organized bands of bandits, but directed so as to accomplish the common mission of creating terror, unrest and misery in China so that she will eventually fall, like over ripe fruit, into the laps of the Communists - i.e . Soviet Russia. It seems to be the opinion in Moscow that the communist movement is making considerable headway in China proper and particularly in South China.

The Chinese names (persons and places) since they are given here phonetically from the Russian, may vary somewhat from those used by us.

Emer Yeager,
Major G.S.,
Military Attache.

2 enclosures.

1 sketch of China.
1 translation of names on sketch.

FROM: MA WARSAW Report No. 1520 Date: Dec.29,1931.

Asia Report.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

CHINA (Political) 4-1

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MILITARY INTEL. DIV.

SUBJECT: PRESENT TREND OF NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD COMMUNISM.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. OCT 11 1932 WAR DEPARTMENT

In the summer of 1932 the Militarists were promising to suppress the communists in three months. Later they said the solution was merely one of moving troops. In spite of these statements communism has continued to grow in China and today it is one of the biggest political problems facing the Nationalist Government.

Last June, T. V. Soong, Minister of Finance, submitted his resignation because he was unwilling to raise any more funds for military campaigns against the communists. At the time he raised the question as to whether or not communism could be suppressed by mere military action. Chiang Kai-shih at about the same time stated in conversation that the problem was only about three-tenths military and seven-tenths administration. More recently still he is reported to have said that the existing situation in Soviet controlled districts ought to be recognized and that no further attempt should be made to restore the old conditions. It is reported that the Ministry of the Interior shares this same view. This change of government front is indicative of the present trend of official thought and policy.

Originally the Communist problem of the Country was mostly one of administration and economics. Its crux was the distribution of the land. It is not maintained that if the land was equally divided the problems of the country would be solved. A few years ago the leaders thought that the problem of China was Militarism but to-day they see that the whole of the economic system of the villages of China is in danger of collapse. This would be a mortal wound to the nation. That the division of land is only one of the many problems of the restoration of village economics and there are many other problems such as improvement of agriculture, the provision of fertilizers, the encouragement of handicrafts, cheap transportation etc., is also fully realized by the thinking Chinese. But although the division of land is only one of the problems, it is the first that the leaders are preparing to tackle in those districts where the Soviet are already functioning because it has been the slogan that has drawn the peasants to the red banner as vultures flock to a dead carcass.

What the government means when they talk about recognizing present conditions is the recognition of the present distribution of the land in the districts and villages now administered in the so called Soviet areas in China. The details of the communist system is not generally known. It is only known with absolute certainty that one of the Communist principles is the destruction of the land-owning class. The land-owners of Kiangsi, Hupei and Anhwei know this to their cost. As a result of this when the Communists enter a village the important land-owners flee. The Communists burn the land-deeds and destroy the boundary marks, thus destroying all the bases of title to property. They then redistribute the land among the peasants but it is not generally known how they do this, under what warrants or landmarks the land is held anew, whether all the land is divided equally or whether a portion is held for the Soviet, or what services or responsibilities the new land-owners owe to the Soviet. In all probability the system is not entirely uniform but there is no doubt that the peasants in the Soviet controlled areas have benefitted economically. If the government should aim at restoring the old conditions, and should send back the old land-owners and restore to them their old holdings,

there would undoubtedly be reactions affecting great numbers of people in extensive areas of China that the present government is loath to face. The government realizes that there are only two alternatives before it. Either it must recognize the existing situation or restore the old situation. This is the problem confronting the political leaders of China to-day.

The majority of the leaders seem to be of the opinion that the present situation must be recognized. The evidences of the rights of property in the Soviet controlled areas have been obliterated and any attempt to re-establish them would provoke chaos in the village. Furthermore, in the past wars between the Soviets and the Nationalist Government the struggle has been represented in the Soviet propaganda as Class Warfare between the Workers and Peasants and Capitalists. This propaganda has been strengthened by the methods of attack and policies of the Nationalist Government. The troops have cooperated with the self styled local gentry, that is the land-owners. When they recovered an area the landowners followed in their wake and relied upon them to seek revenge and recover their land. The personal enemies of the land-owners were driven to become heroes among the Communists. Other people's land was claimed by the land-owners as part of their former holdings. Whites were turned into Reds. The peasants believe the Red Propaganda and become ready to support Communism till death. The first requisite in the fight against Communism is to destroy this faith of the peasants. A way must be found by the government to convince the peasants that the government is not fighting for the land-owners against the peasants. Many believe that the best way to do this would be to recognize the present distribution of land.

Many of the leaders of China are hoping that the Nationalist Government will not only recognize the existing conditions, as a first step, but that when putting this policy into effect it will use the simplest possible procedure. That they will send deputies to register land-holdings and that if the local people admit that a piece of land is actually being cultivated by Wang, they will register it in the name of Wang. If there is a local disagreement let the government decide and if a decision is impossible then register it carefully as the government's.

There are several districts which have merely been disturbed by Communism and in which no Soviet system functions. The land-owners have either fled or been killed but no actual land distribution has been made. It is thought that in these districts the Government must take the responsibility of redistribution and set up landmarks and land offices.

The politicians visualize the recognition of existing conditions not merely as a step in combating Communism, but as a preliminary to land reform in the entire country. It is one of the first principles of the Kuomintang that the cultivator should own his land. This is necessary for the livelihood of the people and for the establishment of peace. The Communist conception is really that of public owner-ship of the land. It does not conceive of the land as the private property of the cultivator. In the Soviet controlled districts of China the Communists have merely put into effect the principle of the Kuomintang.

It is held by some to be very dangerous to recognize existing conditions. It is argued that people in the Non-Soviet controlled

SUBJECT: PRESENT TREND OF NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD COMMUNISM.

districts would want to profit equally. This is a true danger but one which the leaders have come to believe cannot be avoided. Time and policy are involved. Are they to wait until Communism has spread into other provinces? Till all land-owners have been killed or driven away? Till there has been more bitter fighting at the cost of many lives and much money, between the Government troops and Communists? And all this to put into effect the original principle of the Kuomintang that to the cultivator belongs the land.

The political leaders believe that if they can bring back peace to their villages by an equal division of property rights even the old land-owners will be glad, because at present those who are not the victims of bandits are being ruined by the exactions of the Military and Government Taxation of all kinds. They realize full well how difficult it would be to effect an equal division of property rights but there are many precedents which they can study from other countries. It is felt that the Government should set up offices in the provinces still free from Communist control to study the land question with a view to putting into effect the principle that to the cultivator belongs the land, and that if the problem of the land is not solved, neither the Government nor the economic system of China can stand. Sooner or later some division of property rights must take place. The leaders believe that the thoughts contained herein are simply a reasoned revolutionary plan which is much better than the present attempt at reform through aimless unreasoning bloodshed.

It is still too early to predict whether or not Chinese leadership will be able to put these thoughts into action but it is believed that an attempt along these lines will be made to overcome Communism in China and that the results will be much greater than any results that can be expected from mere military campaigns.

W. S. Drysdale

W. S. Drysdale,
Lt. Col. Inf. (DOL),
Military Attache.

RHS

Distribution:
4 MID
1 Digest
1 File

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~
~~OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF~~
~~2750~~ ~~MILITARY INTEL. DIV.~~
SEP 27 1932
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

Morris 2657-D 2657-D-281
4-1 135

CHINA (Political-
Military)

Subject: The Communist Situation in China

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. SEP 26 1932

1. Principal Communist Infested Areas.

The tide of communism which in June threatened to engulf the rich Yangtze valley and menaced Hankow, Nanking and Canton, was stemmed by the heavy concentration of government troops in July and since then has been slowly receding. Under the gradual but steady pressure of the numerous surrounding divisions totalling over 400,000 men, the Red armies have been forced to abandon their gains and on every front retreat into mountain fastnesses where pursuit without preparation and thorough pacification of the reconquered areas would be dangerous, difficult and ineffective.

As seen by the accompanying map, the two principal areas now held by the so styled Soviet Government of China are the mountainous southeastern corner of Honan overlapping into west Anhwei and northeast Hupeh, and the wild, hilly southeast Kiangsi and west Fukien. There are three additional smaller areas, two in southern Hupeh and one in southwest Kiangsi and southeast Hunan.

2. Communist Forces.

The composition of Red armies in Hupeh and south Honan, which may be taken as approximately uniform throughout the communist forces, is believed to be as follows:

A Red army is composed of three divisions each of three regiments. A regiment is composed of one machine gun company and three battalions of three rifle companies each. The companies average about sixty-five men with a lesser number of rifles. The tried and proven communist soldiers carry 100 or more rounds of ammunition, but recruits are only trusted with two clips. All ranks are well trained in construction of earth works; discipline and training is good, but target practice is non-existent due to scarcity of ammunition.

The junction of Honan-Hupeh-Anhwei border is the sphere of operations of one of the largest single communist forces, the Fourth Red Army Group, consisting of two armies and two independent divisions numbering about 40,000 disciplined Reds with about 30,000 rifles, machine guns and some few trench mortars. In June this force took Luchow and threatened the Tientsin-Pukow Railway in Anhwei, by attacks towards Chengyangkwan and Pengpu; its operations towards the south menaced Anking and the Wuhan cities on the Yangtze, while to the west attacks were made on the Peiping-Hankow Railway which was cut several times, and where missionaries and railway personnel were kidnapped.

The 2nd Red Army Group consisting of the 7th, 8th and 9th Divisions operates in central and southwestern Hupeh. This Group including the 1st Training Division in northern Hunan is estimated at 40,000 Reds with about 25,000 rifles.

From M/A, China Report No.8368 August 30,1932

CHINA (Pol-Mil)

Subject: The Communist Situation in China

Parallel to the Hankow-Changsha Railway in the mountainous Hunan-Hupeh Kiangsi border is the 8th Red Army. Another Red force, the 16th Army, with headquarters at Yushan, operates along the Kiangsi-Anhwei border.

Of all the communist-bandit infested provinces Kiangsi is the worst sufferer. Southeastern Kiangsi is the territory of the 1st Army Group under the notorious Chu-Teh, consisting of the 3rd, 4th and 12th Armies, and some independent divisions, estimated at 40,000 with 25,000 rifles. In addition in the same region are the 5th and 6th Army Groups with about 60,000 men and 40,000 rifles. These two are the army groups which entered Fukien and captured Changchow. Another force, part of the 1st Army Group, holds western Kiangsi in the vicinity of Lienhwa. This force is estimated to total about 15,000 rifles.

3. Government Measures for Suppression of Communism.

a) Military Measures.

In July, having completed their preparations, the government forces began their drive against the Reds, holding the southeast Honan-Anhwei-Hupeh area. The 25th Route Army, the 3rd Army Corps, the 4th and 1st Divisions and the 40th Independent Brigade began operations westward from Anhwei, driving the communists into the mountains of western Anhwei, clearing practically all of the province and recapturing many cities including Hwokiu and Sanhochien. The movement was made in cooperation with offensive action from the west face of the Red area in Honan by the 15th and 20th Route Armies, the 1st Army Corps and the 2nd Division, and by an advance northeastward by the 9th and 22nd Route Armies and the 14th Army Corps. As a result the northeastern section of Hupeh has been practically cleared of communists and the Peiping-Hankow Railway in Honan is no longer menaced.

In central and western Hupeh the government troops consisting of the 10th and 13th Army Corps, interposed between the 2nd and 4th Red Army Groups, have been operating successfully against the 2nd Red Army Group, driving them southward and partially clearing the Han River. The plan was to force the Reds into the angle formed by the Han and the Yangtze Rivers, where the coup de grace would be administered by the Szechwan troops at Ichang and Shasi. The plan is working successfully, or rather too successfully, for driven by superior forces from the north the Red armies are intent on crossing the Yangtze and in severe encounters near Shasi have administered defeats on the Szechwanese troops. Operations against the 1st Communist Training Division of the 2nd Army Group by the 21st Army Corps and Szechwan troops have cleared most of the territory north of the Yangtze. No progress has been made south of the Yangtze on the Hupeh-Hunan border. The country is extremely difficult, and so far

CHINA (Pol-Mil)

Subject: The Communist Situation in China

as is known no troops have been assigned to the task of communist eradication in this area.

In south Kiangsi the 5th and 6th Red Army Groups which had retreated westward from Fukien under pressure of the 56th and 2nd Divisions and the 19th Route Army, invaded Kwangtung from Kiangsi. After a twenty-day campaign Kwangtung and Kwangsi troops acting in close cooperation inflicted severe defeats on the Red invaders, recovered Namyung and practically all of the invaded territory in Kwangtung. Pursuing their successes the Kwangtung troops which consist of the 1st and 2nd Army Corps, the 3rd and 44th Divisions and the 2nd Independent Brigade, advanced into Kiangsi and captured Sinfeng, while the 3rd Army Corps and the 2nd Division are blocking the Red advance southward into the East River region.

In Fukien the 19th Route Army has been advancing slowly, pacifying the occupied areas and restoring law and order. South Fukien has been cleared of communists and only the mountainous western border is still in Red hands.

The theatre of operations, due to the very nature of the foe, is everywhere mountainous and difficult, with few paths, poor communications and excellent cover from aerial observation and attack. These conditions make operations and supply of large bodies extremely difficult. The Red armies, mobile, lightly equipped and subsisting on the country, when driven from one place only dart into another. Their tactics are to avoid combat with comparatively well organized and well equipped government troops, but depend instead on surprise attacks on small or isolated detachments and on winning over the government forces, many of whom are in arrears in pay, by the offer of bribes and guaranteed payments of salaries. When surrounded or threatened by superior forces the communist troops can scatter at will and return to the simple guise of peasants, later to reassemble and attack where and when the opportunity offers.

b) Political and Other Measures.

Chiang Kai-shek fully realizes that military operations can only break up and disperse Red armies, which, by avoiding decisive action, escape the risk of extermination, and that military measures alone cannot entirely stamp out communistic activity. With the above in mind, many additional measures to combat the communistic menace have been promulgated by the Government. These measures show more thoroughness in the anti-communist preparations and include both prevention and cure.

In areas adjoining the communist infested regions the various "hsien" are to organize civil volunteer corps in the villages, five hundred men to the hsien, the various corps to cooperate among themselves and with the military in

CHINA (Pol-Mil)

Subject: The Communist Situation in China

local bandit and communist suppression. Hand in hand with military activity and organization of the local militia, political affairs committees have been organized for counter propaganda work; teaching the fallacies of the communist ideas and spreading the doctrines and principles of Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang.

Instructions have been issued for motor road building by the provincial governments to facilitate troop movements in areas adjacent to those held by communists. In addition, a Bandit Suppression Transportation Conference was held at Anking early in July and schemes were submitted for future railway and highway transportation development in recaptured areas, in the hope that economic development will obviate the possibility of new outbreaks in areas from which the bandits have been driven.

Political cooperation is sought in instructions to the provincial governments of communist infested provinces for care in selection of suitable men to fill the posts of district magistrates whose services are considered of utmost importance in suppression of communism. In addition, direct liaison is made with offices of the various district magistrates, which for the time being come under direct supervision of the Bandit Suppression Headquarters. These magistrates are charged with the responsibility of improving or changing the administration of their districts in accordance with plans drafted and approved by a special party and political bureau established to look after the administrative affairs of recovered communist affected areas.

On July 8th a measure promising rewards and punishments was promulgated by the government as a stimulus to troops engaged in the campaign. The rewards range from $30 to $5,000 Mex. for the capture of rifles, ammunition or personnel, depending on the value or importance of the capture, while capital punishment is to be meted out to those guilty of disobedience, negligence of duties, allying with Reds, trafficing in ammunition or supplies, disturbing public peace, molesting the population, deserting or absenting themselves without leave or fleeing before the enemy. That this measure actually has "teeth" can be seen from the trial of Brigadier General Wang Ch'en-yun of the 49th Division, who was charged with desertion of post of duty when the Kiangsi Reds attacked Lungyen, Fukien, in April. General Wang was tried, found guilty and executed on June 29, 1932.

General Chiang Kai-shek's instructions to his senior commanders forbid them to grant leaves of absence or to accept resignations and call for degrading, imprisonment or shooting for those who absent themselves from duty. Drastic measures areabeing taken against unauthorized retreats. A Reuter despatch of August 23rd from Hankow reports that a regimental commander, two battalion commanders and another commissioned

CHINA (Pol-Mil)

Subject: The Communist Situation in China

officer were executed for having retreated during anti-Red operations.

Other measures include prohibition of opium smoking by military and civil officials throughout the bandit affected areas under penalty of death. An embargo has been declared on shipment of rice, salt and other necessities to all areas under Red control and mail is to be censored and suppressed on the slightest suspicion, while in southeast Kiangsi branch post-offices have been ordered to suspend operations.

According to Hankow reports, planes are being used to scatter handbills from the air in the most modern propagandist manner, inviting the officers and men of the communist army to surrender and promising bonuses for the act and a price for the weapons. This was followed by a counter announcement by the communist armies offering to purchase rifles at $100 Mex., cartridges for 25¢, machine guns at $800 and a salary of $30 a month to those joining the Red ranks.

While some of the above measures are easier to promulgate than to enforce, nevertheless they show that the government realizes that a mass movement which has gained such momentum cannot be arrested and destroyed by force alone; that causes will have to be studied, and that the root as well as the branch of communism must be removed.

4. The Contributing Causes of Communism in China.

Communism is not indigenous to China; its principles are entirely foreign to the Chinese peasant who forms by far the vast bulk of the population. The Chinese is by nature thrifty and peace-loving, he holds to his land and his entire life is spent in the service of his family. His dead ancestors and unborn generations have a greater claim on him than abstract principles. He becomes a "communist", as he styles himself, or "bandit", as the government calls him, usually as a result of poverty, oppression and the incompetence of, and excessive taxation by, government officials. The hordes of undisciplined soldiers which many officials think it necessary to maintain have drained the public treasury with the result that soldiers, as well as officials, are commandeering private property, imposing confiscation taxes and otherwise exploiting the people.

Poverty ridden, exploited and oppressed, the peasant has but little to lose and, according to promises of the communist agents, much to gain. He listens to the promises of the old convert, survival of the Borodin regime, or some other strong and enterprising character whose lot was the same and who sought to escape it by rallying a few armed adventurers, joins the ranks and the growing band invades a district. Here their promises appeal, their

CHINA (Pol-Mil)

Subject: The Communist Situation in China

arms persuade, the worker and the shirker, the artisan and the ne'er-do-well are promised land, work, a full rice bowl and protection against exploitation by the grasping official and the usurious money lender. Arson, murder and expropriation aid in redeeming the promises at least at first, and carry conviction to the hesitant. The peasant, the worker and the bandit are absorbed in the armies willy nilly, the rich are killed or held for ransom, their land and properties confiscated and divided among the peasants and soldiers, though in return for the increased acreage the farmer gives up his crops in excess of the needs of his family to support the communist armies.

The above is a fair picture of the average Chinese militant communist whose understanding of the meaning of the word communism is vague and the knowledge of its doctrines is nil. He has neither the philosophy, program nor organization of the true communist, he can destroy but is not capable of creating, and were he to succeed in overthrowing the present social structure of China the result would be greater chaos and misery than even China has ever experienced before.

In the past the government policy of eradication has been a nearsighted one, and has played into the hands of the Reds. Large armies, poorly disciplined and unpaid, have been maintained into which many bandit forces have been incorporated. These armies, in the neighborhood of large cities, have become a fertile field for Red propaganda. The communists offer them full pay, ample rations, and an equal share of loot expropriated from the wealthy. Those who are not willing to "turn coat" and join the Red armies but who wish to cease fighting against them are promised a safe conduct with expenses to their home. Under these conditions a dangerous amount of defection of government troops has taken place until concentration of units and actual field work has restored discipline and control.

5. Conclusions.

Considering the tremendous troop concentration, the vast amount of effort, money and supplies spent, the present anti-communist campaign has shown but disappointing progress and has not accomplished the results expected. Although the areas under Red control have been materially reduced, large areas are still controlled by the Reds and many large cities are still menaced by communist bands. Government troops in many instances are content to hold the walls of the garrisoned cities, letting the surrounding country take care of itself. Government troops have been unable to achieve decisive results and the operations give every promise of dragging on indefinitely.

From the very nature of the problem, military action, even though supported by farseeing administrative preparations, can do but little to eradicate communism in China, which is rooted in poverty, age-long oppression and

CHINA (Pol-Mil)

Subject: The Communist Situation in China

grinding militarism. The present much advertised stupendous military campaign has impoverished the treasury, and the additional necessary taxation or borrowing will only enhance the tramendous burden of the people.

The solution lies in the development of communications, the reconstruction of agricultural districts, in the removal of restrictive and strangling taxation, in a reduction and reorganization of the vast and useless armies, and in the selection of capable and honest officials.

The problems involved are too difficult to solve to expect any immediate improvement, and while Chiang Kai-shek and his associates may be considered as making sincere and careful efforts to improve the situation, progress will of necessity be slow. In the meantime progress is retarded by the Japanese action in Manchuria. Funds badly needed for the anti-communist operations have been diverted, and what monies are available will be used for the more urgent demand of protecting China's sovereignty in the North.

W. S. Drysdale

W. S. Drysdale
Lieutenant-Colonel, Infantry
Military Attache

AG

Distribution:
4 MID
1 File

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
JUL 19 1933
WAR DEPARTMENT

4-1

APPENDIX

Translation from the Yung Pao, Tientsin, 17.10.1932

LAND ALLOTMENT ORDINANCE

The Land Allotment Ordinance for bandit suppression districts was promulgated by the General Headquarters, Hankow, on 12th October, 1932.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

ARTICLE I. Districts whose wasted land exceeds 60% of the total farming area will be demarcated as land allotment districts, and those with less than 60% as land allotment areas.

(a) Thinly populated districts whose fields have run to waste through devastation of the Red bandits.
(b) Land where the majority of the farmers have been compelled to evacuate and have been temporarily unable to return.
(c) Land where the boundary marks of fields have been mixed owing to bandits making a re-distribution, and where title deeds have been lost so that they cannot be restored to their original owners.
(d) Land which the bandits have exploited for themselves to the exclusion of the proper owners.

The demarcation of the above-mentioned Land Allotment Districts and Areas will be carried out according to orders.

ARTICLE II. Wasted land in Land Allotment Districts or Areas will be taken over on behalf of the public and re-allotted to soldiers in active service for farming according to their numbers. But, 50%, 40%, 30% of the total areas of farming land may be reserved according to local conditions for people who join Self-Defence Organizations of that particular District or Area.

ARTICLE III. The Magistrate of the Land Allotment District and Chief of the Land Allotment Area may be elected from among the Divisional and Brigade Commanders of the Bandit Suppression troops by General Headquarters of the Bandit Suppression Army in accordance with the regulations governing Suppression and Rehabilitation.

ARTICLE IV. The organization of the villages of the Land Allotment District:

Ten families making a "tithing" and the headman of the tithing is to be a platoon commander; ten tithings make a "pao" (a village) and the headman of the "pao" is to be a battalion or company commander; ten paos make a "Ch'u (a small district) and the headman of a Ch'u is to be a regimental or battalion commander. All of the headmen are under the jurisdiction of the Land Allotment District Magistrate, and they are linked together by military law and are supervised as to whether they are working hard and well behaved. The Magistrate also controls all the affairs of self-defence and self-control.

ARTICLE V. The magistrate of the Land Allotment District or the Headman of the Land Allotment Area will be concurrently under the direction and supervision of the Provincial Government and the Departments and Bureaux to which they belong.

ARTICLE VI. By alloting fields in accordance with the number of individuals every soldier at least can not be given less than four acres* and at most can not be given more than eight acres. This is to be decided according to the quality of the fields.

ARTICLE VII. Married soldiers are allotted fields on an equal footing with the unmarried ones; old and disabled soldiers are allotted one-half. The total amount of the land allotted to each family cannot exceed 30 acres.

Officers may be allotted land in addition to their salary in accordance with Articles VI and VII.

ARTICLE VIII. After land has been allotted unmarried men should take wives from the locality or from their birth place.

ARTICLE IX. Funds for the establishment of cottages, roads and waterways in land allotment villages, purchase of farming oxen, farming equipment, seeds and fertilizers and the supply of foodstuffs for the first year are to be supplied from funds held by Divisional and Brigade Headquarters. If these should prove insufficient, application will be submitted to General Headquarters for subsidiary allowance.

ARTICLE X. The Magistrate of the Land Allotment District or the Chiefs of the Land Allotment Areas shall levy 25% land taxes of the agricultural products on the newly cultivated fields from the third year and on the cultivated fields, which have no owners, from the second year.

ARTICLE XI. The Magistrates of Land Allotment Districts or Chiefs of Land Allotment Areas, should command and urge the Headmen of Tithings and Paos to measure the fields and to draw a sketch map after fields are allotted according to the number of individuals. A list for detailed registration of the names, addresses of those to whom fields are allotted and locations is to be submitted to the Provincial Governments pending investigation.

ARTICLE XII. When litigation takes place among the soldiers or between the soldiers and civilians, they are to be adjudged, first by Headmen of Tithings, then to be decided by Headmen of Paos and Ch'us; but final decisions shall be made by the Magistrates.

When above-mentioned litigation occurs in Land Allotment Areas, final decisions shall be made by the Chiefs of the Areas.

ARTICLE XIII. In managing the executive affairs of the District, the Magistrate may summon the Chiefs of Areas and Headmen of Paos to a conference. For carrying out orders of the Magistrate, developing agricultural establishments and improving farming, Headmen of Paos and Ch'us summon the

*Chinese acres or Mu are meant - 1/6 English acre.

the Headmen of Paos and Tithings to a conference. Rules of procedure at meetings of various classes are to be made out by the Magistrates.

Regulations for calling meetings of respective classes mentioned above are also applicable to Chiefs of Land Allotment Areas.

ARTICLE XIV. The Magistrates and Chiefs of Land Allotment Districts and Areas should establish various "co-operative stores" in the various Ch'us of Land Allotment Districts, villages and towns of Land Allotment Areas, in accordance with the Ordinance governing Co-operative Stores of agricultural villages, for the benefit of soldiers and civilians.

ARTICLE XV. The Magistrates and Chiefs of Land Districts and Areas should encourage the collaboration of agricultural and forestry specialists and those who have practical experience in agriculture and forestry as experts for direction.

ARTICLE XVI. For educational and recreational purposes the Magistrates and Chiefs of Land Allotment Districts and Areas should arrange to establish 'agricultural and forestry lecture rooms', Lecture Societies, Clubs for recreation in the various Ch'us and Paos.

ARTICLE XVII. Any points in the Ordinance which are not clear or need amendment will be submitted to General Headquarters for consideration by the Magistrate of the Land Allotment District or Chiefs of Land Allotment Areas.

ARTICLE XVIII. This Ordinance shall come into force on the date of promulgation.

- - - - - - -

G-2 Report

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Y-1

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
JUL 19
2657-J-28/137
1933
WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Mil-Pol)

Subject: Communist Suppression Campaign in Kiangsi

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUL 15 1933

The accompanying chart shows the estimated strength and distribution of Reds and the allocation of areas for the three principal Chinese Government armies in the Red-bandit suppression campaign. A series of conferences at Nanchang attended by the principal military commanders and presided over by General Chiang Kai-shek in person terminated on June 14th. During these conferences detailed plans were prepared for the suppression of the communist-bandits, the allocation of areas of responsibility, and for the reorganization and redistribution of troops. Upon the termination of these conferences the military commanders departed for their respective posts, whereupon a series of conferences known as magistrates' conferences, also presided over by Chiang Kai-shek, began on June 15th. At these magistrates' conferences detailed plans are being discussed for the political and economic rehabilitation of the areas that have been menaced by the communists and that the military leaders expect to recover.

It will be noted from the accompanying chart that three principal areas have been allocated as follows: The northwestern area to General Ho Chian, Chairman of Hunan Province; the southern area to General Chen Chi-tang, Chairman of the Southwestern Political Council; and the northern area to General Liu Chih, the present Chairman of Honan Province. General Chiang Kai-shek is personally taking command of this latter area during the temporary absence of General Liu who is at present in Honan.

The main Red concentration is in the south-central part of the province (marked "E" on accompanying chart). This concentration is considered the most dangerous Red force and strong Chinese forces are now engaged in preventing the northward movement of raiding parties from this area into the fertile valleys south of Nanchang. The total force in this single concentration probably does not exceed 36,000 armed men but the area controlled is a thickly wooded, mountainous region, practically devoid of any means of communication and through which troops proceed with the greatest difficulty and in constant danger of ambush. Two of the finest Central Government divisions which last December attempted to penetrate into this area from its western border suffered a severe defeat at the hands of the Reds. The two divisions were moving eastward in parallel columns only three to five miles apart. The Reds suddenly attacked in a locality where the troops of one column were out of support of the other and at a point where it took one day to cross the mountainous forest area from one of the division routes to the other.

The Chief of Staff at Nanchang explained that in these operations artillery, heavy machine guns and all means of transportation other than human carriers were valueless, and that a re-equipping and reorganization of the divisions that are participating in the next campaign was necessary.

From M/A, China Report No. 8602 June 22, 1933

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER 700452

CHINA (Mil-Pol)

Subject: Communist Suppression Campaign in Kiangsi

This reorganization and redistribution of troops is now being carried out and Chiang Kai-shek and his staff seem confident that within three or four months decisive results will be achieved.

General Chiang Kai-shek's staff hopes finally to be able to employ in these operations 20 divisions in the northern, 13 divisions in the northwestern, and 58 regiments in the southern area, a total force of about 450,000 men. Less than half of this number is at present available. Chen Chi-tang has accepted the command of the southern area only within the last few weeks and it is within the last ten days that his troops have been moving in compliance with the general plan.

The Chinese Government forces have during the last few months succeeded in breaking up the strong communist groups in the areas designated as A, B, C and D, and have occupied the principal villages where the Reds formerly maintained their control. The danger from these so called "Red-bandits" has been changed in degree only. Whereas formerly these marauders were able to defend themselves against a relatively large unit of the Central Government troops and even to attack such troops they now operate in small groups over greater areas and the danger to the peasants and the actual destruction of property may conceivably be greater than before. The Central Government troops are now engaged in preparing all the villages they occupy for defense and expect finally to operate from these villages to clear up adjacent sections.

During the above described operations the troops are being re-equipped, reorganized and redistributed, fortifications are being constructed, military and economic blockades are maintained against the Reds, the civilian population is being reorganized and the rural districts are being rehabilitated. For the reorganization of the civilian population and for the rehabilitation of the rural districts committees are being organized by the Chairman of the Province. These committees proceed to districts retaken and take charge in accordance with instructions issued by the Provincial Chairman. In the re-allotment of land it is believed that the procedure outlined in the accompanying "Land Allotment Ordinance" will be followed.

CONFIDENTIAL. Chiang Kai-shek's Chief of Staff at Nanchang informed the Military Attache confidentially that the operations against the central group to the south of Nanchang were to consist in occupying the main villages surrounding the heart of the Red concentration, then building an extensive trench system and elaborate defensive works around this limited area which they hope will finally result in a sort of siege of the Reds contained therein. That in the meantime operations for the reorganization of the civilian population and the rehabilitation of the rural districts freed from the Reds would continue. A military and economic boycott would be maintained against the surrounded area "F" and that operations would proceed against it at an appropriate time after the effects of the blockade were ascertainable.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER 700152

G-2 Report

CHINA (Mil-Pol)

Subject: Communist Suppression Campaign in Kiangsi

The above information was given to the Military Attache personally by General Chiang Kai-shek, in general charge of operations, by the Chairman of the Province of Kiangsi, by General Ho, Chiang Kai-shek's Chief of Staff at Nanchang, and by various other staff officers from the military headquarters. General Chiang as well as his staff seemed confident that General Chen Chi-tang will actually cooperate in this movement and that within four months they will be in virtual control of the entire province. The Military Attache while not so optimistic thinks that by the latter part of next October the danger from any attack by large groups of Reds will be greatly reduced; that the so called Reds will be dispersed over a greater area; that the danger to peaceful inhabitants from these marauders will continue until the political and economic situations show a marked improvement; that it will no doubt take several years for the improvement in the political situation and administration of the districts to bring about a really satisfactory condition in the province. Should General Chen Chi-tang actually cooperate as now seems probable there should be a decided improvement in the situation within three or four months.

W. S. Drysdale
W. S. Drysdale
Lieutenant-Colonel, Infantry
Military Attache

1 map attached

1 report appended

Distribution:
4 MID
1 File

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER 700152

G-2 Report

6-1

3 Enc 3700

FEB 28 1936 CHIEF OF STAFF MIL. INTEL. DIV. 2657-D-281 140 WAR DEPARTMENT

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Political Parties and Groups

Present Trend of the Chinese Communist Party.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. FEB 25 1936

The development of the Chinese Communist Party from its organization in 1920 until its severance from the Kuomintang in 1927 is described on pages 370 to 3703 inclusive of the China Political Digest. The object of this report is to record briefly the development since that year with emphasis on the Communist situation existing in China at the present time.

The year 1927 was a turning point in the history of the Chinese Communist Party which had reached the height of its ascendency in the early months of that year. Crippled by its formal divorcement from the Kuomintang in April, it was definitely outlawed after the decree of December 14th closing Russian Consulates throughout the country and severing diplomatic relations between China and the U.S.S.R. Since that time a state of open conflict has existed between the Communists and their former allies.

Formation of the Red Armies.

Borodin and the communist elements during the period of their ascendency had not failed to realize the potential advantages of spreading the Red doctrine among the government troops. Certain doubtful elements in numerous parts of the country, which it had been impossible to disband due to lack of funds, became completely sovietized and communist cells were organized in almost all of the revolutionary forces. The Army Group under Chang Fa-kuei (4th, 11th and 20th Armies) had done some of the best fighting of the campaign and Chang himself was a loyal commander, but without his knowledge Ho Lung, the commander of the 20th Army, Yeh Ting, a division commander in the 11th, and many subordinates had been converted to communism so that by April 1927 when Chiang Kai-shek's "moderate" government was established at Nanking, this Army Group had virtually become a communist stronghold.

At Nanchang on July 30th, three days after Borodin's departure for Russia, Ho Lung's army and Yeh Ting's division were joined by Chu Teh, then the Peace Preservation Commissioner at Nanchang in a successful revolt against the Nanking Government which had just declared itself against the Communist Party. Thus was brought into existence a communist force of about 15,000 men which served as the nucleus for the Red armies later organized, and Ho Lung and Chu Teh are still important figures in the present communist-bandit situation.

The Soviet Government of Hailofeng and the Coup d'Etat at Canton.

The Rebel forces controlled Nanchang for only a few days before they were driven to the south by a punitive force composed of the troops of Chang Fa-kuei and Chu Pei-teh. They retreated into Kwangtung and made an attack on Swatow with the

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Political Parties and Groups

Present Trend of the Chinese Communist Party.

hope of securing an outlet to the sea where they could receive aid from the Comintern. This move was unsuccessful but Soviet groups were formed at Lofeng and Haifeng (coastal towns about half way between Swatow and Canton), and with the support of the communist factions at Canton and the U.S.S.R. Consul in that city the first Chinese Soviet was formed and called the "Soviet Government of Hailofeng". An insurrection was prepared at Canton which broke out on December 11th and the Reds controlled the city for three days until it was re-occupied by government forces on December 13th. The Russian Consul was killed during the fighting and documents were found showing the part taken in the affair by the official agents of the Soviet Government. This precipitated the above mentioned decree of December 14th.

The Communists Go Underground.

Laws were passed outlawing all communistic activities. Their organizations in the industrial centers were suppressed or driven into hiding and the year 1928 was characterized by wholesale arrests and executions. The Hailofeng Soviet collapsed in April and the Red armies were dispersed into the various mountainous regions of South Central China, from which they were later to emerge in the form of agrarian revolts, organized bandits, famine sufferers, elements hostile to the Kuomintang, and malcontents of all descriptions. Unfortunately they were allowed a breathing spell of about two years, while the new Government was occupied with consolidating its position in the Yangtze Valley, reorganizing its armies after the march on Peiping in 1928, and quelling disturbances within the Kuomintang itself.

It was not until November 1930 that, at a meeting of the 4th Plenary Session of the Kuomintang, it was decided to dispatch forces against the Red army and suppress both communists and bandits completely. By this time the scattered Reds had been busy in those areas neglected by the Government, where the peasant population suffering from local misrule welcomed any form of government which promised some amelioration of their lot. There are no accurate figures as to how many people became supporters of the movement but the following government estimate of the rifle strength of the bandit strongholds at the beginning of the 1930 campaign is considered to be fairly accurate:

Honan - Anhwei border	9,000
Hunan - Hupeh border	10,000
Kiangsi Province	28,000
North Hupeh	7,000
Northeast Kwangtung	1,000
Western Chekiang	2,000
West and South Fukien	4,000
Hunan-Kiangsi border	3,000
Total -	64,000

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Political Parties and Groups

Present Trend of the Chinese Communist Party.

The Campaigns.

The first expedition into Kiangsi resulted in complete defeat of the government forces and had a moral effect on these forces from which they have never recovered. Effecting a strategic retreat from Kian (in Kiangsi Province), the Reds decoyed the 50th Nanking Division into the southern Kiangsi mountains where they completely lost their way. By similar methods, the 18th Division was tricked into entering Tungku to the southeast where they were defeated and disarmed by a rapid counter-attack under cover of darkness. Then, dressed in the uniforms of this Division and carrying its banners, the Reds sought out the 50th Division which, before it could be extricated, suffered a loss of about one half of its strength.

It would be of little value to describe in detail all the ensuing military operations in the South Central Provinces. In general they were alike. Great numbers of troops were employed to control the main arteries of communication and centers of supply, thus effecting an economic blockade of the Red areas, but the suppression troops showed little desire to go into the mountains and attack the enemy positions. This purely negative type of strategy is responsible for the endlessness of the communist-bandit problem in China. The Red tactics continued to be nothing more than a game of hide and seek. They avoided large bodies of troops but would vigorously attack and kill small groups and take their arms and ammunition. In areas where government troops were without pay or provisions, the Reds were busy with propaganda to create dissatisfaction in their ranks and cases are reported of complete divisions deserting to the enemy. The population of the affected areas experienced a reign of terror due either to the Red atrocities against the property classes and officials or to the necessity of supporting large numbers of worthless and undisciplined government troops.

In June 1931 the Generalissimo moved his own headquarters to Nanchang and an expeditionary force of 200,000 men under the Minister of War, Ho Ying-chin, was dispatched against the Reds in South Kiangsi. This campaign gave promise of success and many centers, including Juikin, the Soviet capital, were re-occupied, but the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in September caused troops and money to be diverted to other regions and these operations came to a standstill. For nearly two years nothing in the way of a real offensive was made and the Reds again had time to reorganize. They recaptured all the areas lost in 1931 and their numbers were augmented through a general rise of banditry.

In 1933 the net result of four years of suppression activity was that no progress whatsoever had been made and reports from many areas were "The more the suppression the more the banditry". Peasant uprisings had also begun to appear in

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Political Parties and Groups

Present Trend of the Chinese Communist Party.

the long neglected provinces of Szechwan and Shensi which were later to complicate the problem of communist suppression.

A truce was signed with Japan in May 1933, and Chiang was again able to return to the situation in South Central China. A fifty million dollar wheat loan, negotiated in America by T. V. Soong, also made it possible for the Government to put money into reconstruction of the devastated areas. Chiang moved back to Nanchang and began a comprehensive program which involved not only military operations but political and economic rehabilitation of the areas reclaimed, with emphasis upon improvement of communications.

This project was well received because it had something real to offer to the peasantry who were interested neither in the Marxist theory nor the San Min Chu I. It was favored by foreign interests who were becoming apprehensive about the situation, and was supported by public welfare societies and foreign missions. Military operations continued to be slow, and decisive engagements were not fought, but during 1934 the Red main forces under Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung were gradually crowded into the mountains of southern Kiangsi and their positions became more and more untenable. Kwangtung and Kwangsi troops drove out the small groups in those provinces and took effective border precautions to prevent their re-entry. The second largest group, probably 10,000 rifles, under Ho Lung and Hsiao Ke, remained in the mountains of northern Hunan, there they were also surrounded by large numbers of troops. The campaign was a success except that the Reds were not destroyed ("The operation was successful but the patient died".)

The Reds Move West:

The armed forces of the Reds in Kiangsi should have been annihilated, but Chinese troops do not fight that way. A route is always left for the enemy to retreat for fear of having a real fight, so in December the inevitable break through occurred. A small but apparently well organized force of Reds under Chu and Mao made a remarkable march across Hunan, Kweichow and northern Yunnan, made a feint toward Yunnanfu, turned suddenly north and by June 1935 had united in western Szechwan with other Reds under Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien which had also been moving west across northern Szechwan (later referred to.)

Much interesting material has been written about the famous march of the Chu-Mao column. In general, the defense offered by provincial troops was disgraceful and the pursuing Central Government troops simply followed in the wake of the Reds, always arriving just too late to prevent an attack but just in time to loot completely what the Reds had left. Main forces were rushed to save provincial capitals and large cities, while the Reds moved around such places and looted the unprotected villages.

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Political Parties and Groups

Present Trend of the Chinese Communist Party.

The accusation has been made that Chiang simply herded the bandits through Hunan, Kweichow and Szechwan as an excuse to follow with his own troops and thus establish himself in areas which previously were only nominally under Nanking control. Whatever the plan, such was the result. Provincial governments and armies which had collapsed in front of the Red invasion were reorganized under Central Government officials, and strategic motor roads were constructed into Hunan and Kweichow to facilitate the future control of those areas from Nanking. Chiang's power was extended but the gains made were at great expense to the country and certainly cannot justify his failure to score a decisive victory over the Red armies. In fact, these gains can only be temporary unless such a victory is soon forthcoming.

Before the Kiangsi Reds left that province, smaller groups, which originated in southern Honan and northern Hupeh, had also infiltrated west to the border of Shensi and Szechwan and in two years had grown in strength from about 3000 rifles to possibly 20,000. During 1935, the main portion of these Reds under Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien also retreated to western Szechwan, while a smaller group, about 3,000, under Hsu Hai-tung, infiltrated into northern Shensi.

The Ho Lung - Hsiao Ke Reds continued to infest the mountains of northern Hunan until December 1935, but with the fall of the Kiangsi Soviet it was inevitable that they should soon vacate this area. According to current reports, the customary break-through has now occurred and this group has crossed into Kweichow, possibly to join ultimately the Red forces in the West.

Several theories have been advanced to explain the general movement West by the Red armies during 1935. Some students of the question are convinced that they intended to reach Sinkiang or to establish an independent Soviet in the Northwest which would have communication with Sinkiang or Outer Mongolia and thus receive support from the Comintern. There is no evidence, however, of any encouragement to such a movement by Soviet Russia and it seems quite unlikely that these vandal hordes would be welcomed in Sinkiang, so there is room for doubt concerning such a theory.

A more plausible explanation is that the Reds have followed the line of least resistance which has naturally placed them in the most misgoverned and poverty stricken provinces in all China. The conditions in Szechwan, resulting from many years of civil war and exorbitant taxation by the warlords, indeed made this the most fertile field remaining in China for a peasant revolution and the rapid rise of Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien's Reds on the Szechwan-Shensi border had indicated what might easily have happened to this entire province.

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Political Parties and Groups

Present Trend of the Chinese Communist Party

The Current Situation.

The main theatre of operations has shifted to the areas of western Szechwan and northern Shensi. An officer of this office has recently visited these districts, so the situation there can be described somewhat in detail to indicate the real nature of these widely advertised campaigns.

Western Szechwan.

Of the original Kiangsi Reds only one group (possibly 5,000 rifles) remains in western Szechwan under the veteran Chu Teh (the remainder of this force under Mao Tse-tung and Peng Teh-huai broke through the government lines in the North, crossed the mountains of southern Kansu and in October succeeded in joining the peasant movement under Liu Tze-tan in northern Shensi). The largest group now operating in this area is that of Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien which the natives of north Szechwan report to be 80,000 people, 40,000 of whom are armed, although investigations from other angles indicates that about one half of these numbers is a fair estimate.

The following description of Hsu's forces during their march across north Szechwan is furnished first hand by a native tribesman of that district who saw the Red forces and on several occasions was used as an interpreter by Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien: The Reds are good at organization. Following the armed soldiers, which constitute about one half the total force, were a corps of carpenters and laborers to assist the troops and improve their comfort. The remainder of the force included boy and girl scouts, theatrical troupes, and men and women orators who preached the blessings of communism to the population. Large numbers of women and children were engaged in sewing and knitting for the troops. (A cache of thirteen sewing machines was discovered near Lifan, which had been abandoned and buried to avoid discovery.) Great importance is attached to propaganda as evidenced by thousands of printed and lithographed and carved inscriptions to be found in the area crossed by the Reds. Aside from the ruthless slaughter of certain classes, the conduct of the Reds toward the common people was better than that of the government troops. They were instructed in hygiene and no Red soldier was allowed to use opium under penalty of death. While in possession of a town, they were careful to pay for what they took although when forced to evacuate they took what they wanted and burnt the town.

They have their own money, consisting of silver coins and notes printed on cloth (see attached photos of communist money given the writer by the above mentioned tribesman. According to the inscription on the coins, they are made in "The Szechwan, Shensi Mint", although it is not known where they were actually minted). They have good rifles and machine

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Political Parties and Groups

Present Trend of the Chinese Communist Party.

guns, all of which have been captured or purchased from government troops, but are now suffering from a shortage of ammunition. They carry with them five or six radio sets, by means of which they are in touch with other Red areas and secret agents in various cities (this is confirmed from other sources). Provincial troops offered little or no resistance to the approaching Reds, and in some cases burnt the towns and fled before the Reds arrived. Lack of discipline among the pursuing troops of the Central Government was likewise evident. With an abundance of underbrush nearby, the soldiers preferred to destroy telephone poles, buildings, etc., for firewood and the common practice in pursuit of the Reds was to make the natives go ahead of the troops and attack the Red vanguards. The troops sustained almost no casualties because there was no serious fighting. When the Reds decided to evacuate a place, there was always plenty of time, and the soldiers could be expected to arrive a few hours after the evacuation.

In May 1935, just before the joining of the two Red forces which were converging on West Szechwan, Chiang Kai-shek transferred his temporary headquarters to Chengtu and announced that the end of the communist-bandits was in sight. An opportunity indeed existed at that time to drive the main forces of the enemy completely off the map. The amalgamation of the two Red armies was of no importance because the greatly superior numbers of government troops had also come within supporting distance of each other; to the west was the Plateau of Tibet over which a retreat was impossible due to lack of provisions and severe climate; the ranges to the northwest could be crossed via difficult mountain trails but already great numbers of Central Government troops were stationed in southern Kansu to prevent an invasion of that province. The result however was as usual. As soon as the fertile Chengtu plain was secure and outlying villages which could support troops had been occupied, all impetus to the campaign was lost. The Reds retired northwest into the mountains west of Sungpan where they remained unmolested for two months while the population was fed propaganda stories about their destitute condition, declaring that they would be exterminated by starvation before spring. Chiang Kai-shek busied himself with the political and military reorganization of Szechwan and in late October returned to Nanking. The National Government divisions from Kweichow, which had pursued the Kiangsi Reds to Szechwan, began to be withdrawn for use against the Hunan Reds, and the reorganized provincial armies were left to contain the Reds in the mountains. During September and October raids by small bodies of the Reds were made into Kansu and Sikang and the Mao Tse-tung group (about 5,000 rifles) succeeded in reaching the communist area in North Shensi, which convinced the government forces that a general break through to the North would be attempted. Suddenly, however, in October the Red main forces made a drive to the South along the Sikang border, re-occupied a large livable area and by early November were within 20 miles of Yachow on the west edge of the Chengtu plain.

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Political Parties and Groups

Present Trend of the Chinese Communist Party.

The present Red areas and the general distribution of suppression troops are shown on the attached map. While fierce engagements and big gains by government troops are being reported, from this area, the following is a brief description of what is actually happening.

Jealousy exists among the several Szechwan Tupans, all of whom have fought each other in the past, and none of them is willing to waste his strength against the Reds, so that passing the communists from one army to another has become a game. This was exactly what happened when the Reds made their recent raid to the south. According to persistent rumors in Szechwan, Liu Hsiang's 21st Army troops are blamed by the other commanders for failure to defend against Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien's march across the province. Therefore, the 45th Army under Teng Hsi-hou intentionally fell back and let the Reds through to attack Liu's troops, although in the end the 20th Army troops of Yang Sen were left to bear the brunt of the fighting. The National Divisions, which have been rushed back to the scene, also have their own "racket" which does not include attacking the communists. They intend to prevent the return of the Reds south into Yunnan or Kweichow and at the same time be on hand in case of danger to Chengtu resulting from rebellion or mutiny by the Szechwan troops.

The military strength of the Reds in Szechwan does not constitute any threat to the Nanking Government. There is no immediate danger to Chengtu because of the superior numbers of government troops who would fight to protect their provisions and comforts, and the Reds would not risk a serious engagement. There is a real danger, however, in the existing troop situation. While the provincial armies have been reorganized as National Government units, Chiang's control over the militarists is far from complete and according to reliable sources in Chengtu, many of the troops at the front have not been paid for several months. If the present situation is to continue indefinitely, there is a possibility that some of these unpaid armies will turn on Chengtu for loot and in the resulting conflict for control of the province, the communist force would be a very important factor. It is significant that the Red leaders, Chu Teh and Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien, are both natives of Szechwan and through possible alliances with other leaders might well become contenders for supremacy if civil strife should again break out in that province.

Northern Shensi.

This area, of little economic importance and with almost no communication, was for years entirely neglected by the Government. Present conditions there originated from a general agrarian revolt against increasingly unbearable

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Political Parties and Groups

Present Trend of the Chinese Communist Party.

oppression by local authorities. Red leaders, notably Liu Tze-tang, a graduate of the Whampoa Military Academy, were quick to take advantage of the situation and the farmers in search of some kind of government accepted what they had to offer. The people were better off than under the old regime, so they became believers in the new idea, and by the summer of 1935 practically all of North Shensi was an independent Soviet, although their rifle strength was negligible (about 2,000).

The situation has been complicated by the arrival of two outside fugitive groups, that of Hsu Hai-tung, which originated in South Honan and later roved in South Shensi for about two years, and a group of the old Kiangsi Reds (about 5,000) which broke through from Szechwan under Mao Tze-tung and Peng Te-huai. Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang states that the total Red strength is about 15,000 rifles, while there are 100,000 able bodied men in support of the movement.

A fair picture of the Shensi situation as viewed from the air is as follows:

There are no large concentrations of the Red forces. They simply live all over the country in very small villages and caves and, in spite of operations against them, are trying to raise their crops and make a living. The government forces are now in possession of all the towns worth looting, but in many cases the whole surrounding country is in bandit hands. The heavy fighting often reported exists mainly in the imagination of those in the government propaganda service. An example, from actual observation, is the town of Kanchwan (150 miles north of Sian) which is in the hands of the troops but supposed to be in a state of siege. Troops of the 67th Army Corps have occupied all towns as far north as Lochwan, where its headquarters is located. Advanced elements are in possession of Kanchwan and Fushih (Yehnan) but numerous small villages in between have been abandoned and the Reds have moved in. About 600 soldiers are in Kanchwan and their provisions have been exhausted so that Chang's personal plane is being used to drop provisions. The bandits have dug small trenches on the hills about 600 yards from the town and a few sentries (not more than 50) were observed maintaining the siege. The Marshal was advised by his foreign aviator to have the soldiers capture those close in trenches to avoid the danger to his plane of their rifle fire and the reply was "The soldiers could take the trenches but it would do no good because the Reds would take them back again". This illustrates the absurdity of the whole situation in northern Shensi, which is characterized by lack of coordination, and no organization of supply and communication. The troops show no taste for fighting or other hardships.

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Political Parties and Groups

Present Trend of the Chinese Communist Party.

The excuse offered for the lack of progress by the suppression force is the terrain difficulty which really does not exist. While the country is all mountainous, the mountains are not rugged and except for a range near the border of Kansu do not exceed 4,000 feet. They are of a smooth eroded type and the majority of the area is terraced and used for cultivation. It is true that the terrain is well suited to defense but with proper security, troops and supply carts could move anywhere. The whole situation is that the peasants will fight for their caves and crops and the soldiers do not fight.

The strategy of the high command is in general that used in Kiangsi. The complete Red area is being surrounded by great numbers of troops, and defense works with the object of eventually starving the enemy, and the problem of supporting these troops is rapidly becoming greater than the Red menace ever was.

Sianfu, which became the general suppression headquarters in the summer of 1935, is now in a state of temporary boom similar to that at Nanchang during the Kiangsi campaign, due to the amount of military activity behind the lines. The best property within the city is now valued at $1800 per mow as compared with less than $100 a few years ago.

The entire Northwest is being developed by the extension of the Lunghai Railway and it appears that Chiang is making use of the Red situation there to justify the existence of more than 200,000 troops, including those of Chang Hsueh-liang and Yu Hsueh-chung which have been thrown back in his lap from Manchuria and North China.

It has been suggested by the Japanese that Chiang Kai-shek might be using the Shensi situation to concentrate these troops where they could be used in case of hostilities in North China, but from observation of these troops and their present activities, it is believed that they would be of as much value if they were concentrated in Kwangtung.

Conclusion:

As a theory of government, communism has had little or no chance to succeed in China, which is still in a stage of agricultural life and family industry. Large scale manufacture and mass production have hardly begun to take root so that the industrial proletariat constitutes only the smallest percentage of the population. The majority of farmers possess either personally or through the family the land they cultivate. They have simple and clear notions about individual property, a love for the bit of land upon which they live and a strong

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Political Parties and Groups

Present Trend of the Chinese Communist Party.

conviction that they should not be deprived of it. A Chinese could only believe in one form of communism, i.e., a redistribution of wealth by which he could benefit.

The so-called Reds now operating in China, in open rebellion against the Government, can hardly be said to represent pure communism. Their leaders continue to be those men who became associated with the communist party during the period of its alliance with the Kuomintang and some of them no doubt have definite revolutionary ideas, but in general they should now be considered merely as "outs" or banished enemies of the Kuomintang militarists. During eight years of conflict, these leaders have proved themselves to be expert organizers and dangerously capable of leading a major revolution if a propitious occasion should present itself. The nucleus of the Red armes forces consists of former government troops, while their ranks have been swelled by bandits, attracted by prospects of plunder, peasants ruined by civil war, drought or flood, and by local farmers pressed into service against their will to replace casualties. These heterogeneous masses certainly have no strong convictions regarding any form of government.

It seems certain that these communist-bandits are not receiving any direction or support from the Third Internationale and that their methods are probably not approved by that body. While secret communist agencies still exist in the commercial centers of China as in all countries, the party is of no importance in national politics and in the words of a spokesman of the Nanking Government, "Since the resumption of friendly relations between the National Government and Soviet Russia in 1932, there has been no cause for complaint about Russian policy in regard to the internal affairs of China".

As enemies of Chiang Kai-shek, the Chinese communists have been defeated but they have done their part to drain the national treasury, demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the Nanking troops, and thus prevent the unification of the country under the Kuomintang. Even now, when China is faced with a crisis which should require the employment of her entire national defense forces against a foreign enemy, more than a half million soldiers are busy 800 miles from Nanking rounding up these scattered bands of Red bandits. Such conditions will not be tolerated forever.

It is believed that unless the present Government can show some sign of strength by a united front against Japan it will soon fall apart due to its own weakness. Furthermore, Japan is using the Red menace as an excuse for her present China program, which includes the prevention of Sovietism in the Far East, so it seems that whatever the fate of the Kuomintang, their old allies, the communists, will have played an important part.

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Political Parties and Groups

Present Trend of the Chinese Communist Party.

Source: Study in M/A Office and inspection of anti-communist activities in Shensi and Szechwan.

Joseph W. Stilwell

H S J

Joseph W. Stilwell
Colonel, Infantry
Military Attache

Encls: 2 Sketches
1 Exhibit

Distribution:
6 MID
1 Embassy
1 File

DEC 16 1936
OFFICE CHIEF OF WAR
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Political Parties and Groups

Recent Developments in the Communist Situation in China

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. DEC 16 1936

A detailed discussion of the history of the Communist movement in China, up to the end of January 1936, was given in our Number 9283 ("The Present Trend of the Chinese Communist Party"). The purpose of the present report is to sum up the movements of the principal Communist forces since January of this year and to comment briefly upon certain recent reported changes in the policy of the Chinese Communists.

Last January the forces of the principal Red leaders were located in general as follows:

(1) Ho Lung and Hsiao Ke in the vicinity of Yuanchow and Chihkiang on the Hunan-Kweichow border.

(2) Chu Teh and Hsü Hsiang-chien in the vicinity of Tienchuan, northwest of Yachow in West Szechwan.

(3) Hsü Hai-tung and Mao Tze-tung in northern Shensi.

During January and February the Ho Lung — Hsiao-Ke Reds moved across Kweichow, whether of their own volition with the government forces following, or pressed by the latter is immaterial. Our reports on the anti-Red campaign in China have frequently commented on the fact that government troops often claim to have driven the Reds out of areas which the latter have actually abandoned on their own initiative.

In February most of the Ho Lung—Hsiao Ke Reds crossed the Yangtze River from Kweichow into northwest Yunnan, while some moved into southern Szechwan. By April a considerable number were reported in occupation of an area about fifty miles northwest of Yunnanfu. Garrisons of provincial troops in many parts of Yunnan were so depleted because of the forces sent to combat these Reds that banditry and disorder broke out in several districts to such an extent that train service on the Yunnan-Annam Railway had to be suspended for a time.

In June, however, these Reds moved out of Yunnan into areas in western Szechwan and Sikong, where they joined with the forces of Hsü Hsiang-chien and Chu Teh.

The movements of Hsiao Ke, Ho Lung, and other Red leaders in far away Kweichow, Yunnan, Szechwan and Sikong were, however, of little concern to the Central Government during the early months of the present year. The activities of two other leaders, Mao Tze-tung and Hsü Hai-tung, caused far greater concern, principally because of the fact that for a time they threatened to aggravate the already strained relations of China and Japan.

From M/A, China Report No. 9490 November 20, 1936

G-2 Report

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Political Parties and Groups

Recent Developments in the Communist Situation in China

The forces of these two leaders, which as previously stated were concentrated in northern Shensi in January of 1936, in March crossed over the Yellow River into Shansi Province and penetrated the Fen River Valley. The reason for this movement was probably a shortage of food in Shensi. The total number of Reds moving into Shansi probably did not exceed 20,000, of whom half may have been armed with rifles.

The Reds of Mao Tze-tung and Hsü Hai-tung occupied few large towns in Shansi, but they threatened a number of important cities south of Taiyuan, and scattered groups even reached points within forty miles of the latter city.

The presence of Reds in Shansi brought forth strong hints from the Japanese that it might be necessary to send Japanese troops to protect the lives and property of their nationals in Taiyuan, as well as to combat possible further Communist advances into North China.

Recognizing the gravity of the situation precipitated by the Red invasion of "The Model Province," Chiang Kai-shek, Commander in Chief of the Chinese Government anti-Red forces, sent the 2nd, 25th and 95th Central Government Divisions into southern Shansi to fight the Communists. Two divisions of Shang Chen's 32nd Army and several Shansi divisions were also ordered to co-operate in the anti-Red campaign.

As the Reds in Shansi were greatly outnumbered and had no artillery and few automatic weapons, it would appear that had the Central Government troops so desired they could have annihilated the Communist forces without much difficulty. As it turned out, however, Chiang Kai-shek's soldiers apparently had little stomach for engaging the Reds in any decisive action, and the latter were allowed to do pretty much as they pleased in the Fen River Valley and the mountains of western Shansi. On their part, the Reds seemed to have had little animus against the Central Government forces, although they are reported to have carried some banners bearing anti-Yen Hsi-shan and anti-Japanese slogans.

Whether of their own volition or because they feared the large number of Government troops concentrated against them, the Reds did not remain long in Shansi. By the end of May, greatly to the relief of the Central Government, the majority of Mao Tze-tung's and Hsü Hai-tung's forces had re-crossed the Yellow River and were back in Shensi. The myrmidons of Chang Hsueh-liang on the west bank of this stream could have made the crossing a most difficult operation, but they had apparently been tipped off by Chiang Kai-shek not to oppose the Reds in departing from a province where their presence caused such embarrassment because of the situation vis-a-vis Japan.

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Political Parties and Groups

Recent Developments in the Communist Situation in China

Back in Shensi once more, Mao Tze-tung's and Hsü Hai-tung's Reds seemed not to find conditions to their liking, for by the latter part of July they were again reported on the move, this time toward Kansu, to which province they may have been attracted by excellent crop forecasts. Small groups from this body of Reds moved into southern Suiyuan where they still remain, as far as is known.

By the end of August, most of the Shensi Reds had been "driven" into Kansu and the southeast tip of Ninghsia, occupying an area lying in general north and east of Kuyuan. Some parts of this force probably still remain in Ninghsia.

Leaving Mao Tze-tung and Hsü Hai-tung for the present, we return to the Reds of Ho Lung and Hsiao Ke, which were stated above to have joined forces with Chu Te and Hsü Hsiang-chien in western Szechwan and Sikong during the latter part of June. By the end of July both of these groups of Reds were reported moving north toward Kansu, into which province they penetrated during August. Chu Te and Hsü Hsiang-chien laid siege to Minchow and Lintao, south of Lanchow, the provincial capital, while Hsiao Ke and Ho Lung operated in districts farther southwest. For a time it was feared that the Reds might even take Lanchow itself, although their policy has been consistently against the occupation of large cities.

From the vicinity of Minchow and Lintao, however, the Reds turned northeast and moved through Kansu to the area adjacent to the portion of the Lanchow-Sian motor road east of Tingsi. Here they joined with the forces of Hsü Hai-tung and Mao Tze-tung, thus effecting a union of most of the important Communist leaders in China. Government despatches from Shensi now announced with pride that the province had been "cleared" of Reds, but failed to mention that they had all moved of their own accord into Kansu where the prospects of good harvests offered a chance for better living conditions.

Since his appointment as Vice-Commander of Bandit Suppression Forces in western China, Chang Hsueh-liang, former warlord of Manchuria, has been directly responsible for combatting the Reds in Shensi and Kansu. Thus far, however, the Young Marshal and his old Northeastern Army forces have been a conspicuous failure.

Although Chang has issued many communiques reporting victories over the Reds, as a matter of fact his forces have actually fought them very little. The Northeastern troops, themselves homeless exiles in a strange and impoverished section of China, have apparently felt little hostility toward the Reds they are supposed to suppress, and considerable numbers are

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Political Peoples and Groups

Recent Developments in the Communist Situation in China

reported to have deserted to the ranks of the Communists. The entire body of Chang Hsueh-liang's troops is said to be honeycombed with Communist propaganda. Last August Chang's 109th Division surrendered, almost to a man, to the Reds, apparently without putting up any resistance. The Division Commander, General Niu Yuan-feng of the old Northeastern Army, was reported to have been killed by the Reds, but he may have been put out of the way by his own men.

Not only has Chang Hsueh-liang failed to eradicate the Communists, but rumors have been current for some time that he has been contemplating joining with the Reds and Soviet Russians in setting up an anti-Japanese autonomous regime in the provinces of Shensi, Kansu, Ninghsia, Chinghai, and Sinkiang. (See our No. 9482, par. 2.) These disquieting reports evidently caused Chiang Kai-shek to feel that his presence was needed in Shensi, for he flew to Sian on October 22nd. At the same time he ordered four Central Government Divisions into Kansu and Shensi to put some spirit into the anti-Red campaign.

The Central Government troops are reported to have driven the combined Red armies away from the Lanchow-Sian motor road to Tsingyuan on the east bank of the Yellow River. After occupying this town for a time, the main body of the Reds crossed the river and are now reported concentrated in the vicinity of Chingtai, about 110 miles north of Lanchow. Considerable numbers of Reds, however, are said to be still on the east side of the river.

According to an American newspaper man who recently spent four months with the Reds, their next move will probably be along the Yellow River toward Ninghsia, with Ninghsia City as their objective.

From the preceding account of the recent movements of the Reds, it would appear that the most of them have now been herded, or they have voluntarily moved, into the distant province of Kansu where they constitute less of a menace to the Central Government than they have for some time past. Reports have recently appeared, however, of scattered recrudescences of Red activity in Hunan, Kiangsi and Fukien. Thus it is not inconceivable that new anti-government groups, whether they be Communists or simply bandits, may arise in the former centers of Communist activity, and the endless cycle of attempts at Red suppression by the forces of the Central Government might begin anew in the very areas where they were first initiated several years ago.

The total strength of the Red armies in Kansu, after their long treks through various parts of China, is difficult to estimate. The number armed with rifles is believed not to exceed 25,000. Probably at least an equal number, although

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Political Peoples and Groups

Recent Developments in the Communist Situation in China

without modern weapons, consider themselves as part of the Red armies and follow in the van of the armed forces.

According to the foreigner mentioned above who recently spent four months in the Red capital which was then established at P aoan in western Shensi, the Chinese Communists on the 25th of last August issued a manifesto addressed to the Kuomintang Party, urging a union of all parties in China in a united front against Japan. This foreigner, who is rated an intelligent observer but whose reports are colored by a decided Communistic bias, further states that the Reds are no longer opposed to capitalism, but to imperialism. Their army, according to him, is now styled "The Chinese People's Anti-Japanese Vanguard Red Army," not as before "The Workers' and Peasants' Red Army."

Basing his statements on an extended interview with Mao Tze-tung, head of the Chinese Communists at the time he visited them, this foreign source reports that the Chinese Communists are willing to co-operate with the forces of the Central Government against Japan, and as evidence of their good faith, are willing to pledge themselves not to seek extensions of their territory or to promote class struggle during any conflict against the foreign aggressor.

Assuming that the Reds now really have a sincere desire to unite with the Chinese Central Government against Japan, they may find themselves maneuvered into a very dangerous situation in the event, considered unlikely by this office, that China ever makes real war with the Japanese.

Source: Study in M/A Office.

Joseph W. Stilwell
Colonel, Infantry
Military Attache

DDB

Distribution:
6 MID
1 Embassy
1 File

1 sketch attached

6-1

G-2 Report

3050
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL., INTEL. DIV.
FEB 20 1936
2657-J-281
WAR DEPARTMENT

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Political Unrest, Agitators, Radicalism, Revolutionary Movements.

Military Organization of the Communist-Bandit Forces in China

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. FEB 25 1936

The following is the official estimate of the military strength and composition of all the Communist-Bandit forces now operating in China, compiled as of December 6, 1935, by the Intelligence Department of the Military Affairs Commission. It is obvious that this data cannot be accurate in detail, but it indicates what the Chinese military believe to be the fighting strength of the Reds and viewed from all angles it appears to be the most reliable information available on this subject. The numbers of rifles listed are believed to give a fair estimate of the strengths of these forces, whereas those of automatic weapons and accompanying guns are probably exaggerated. At any rate the effectiveness of such weapons is not great because it is known that the Reds in all areas are suffering from an acute shortage of ammunition.

The group that was in the Hunan-Hupeh-Szechwan border district at the time this data was compiled is that which has recently moved west into Kweichow and is now threatening Kweiyang (see current Situation Reports). The miscellaneous groups in the mountains of Hunan, Hupeh, Anhwei, Kiangsi, Fukien and Chekiang, which are not mentioned in current reports on communist suppression, are small remnant bands composed of local inhabitants of those regions, which it has been difficult to identify and round up.

A. Szechwan - Sikang Border.

Chairman, Northwest Revolutionary Military Affairs Committee - Chang Kuo-t'ao.
Commander of Communist Northwest Army - Chu Teh.
Vice-Commander of " " " - Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien
Chief Political Adviser - Ch'en Ch'ang-hao.
Chief of Staff - Ni Chih-liang.

Troops commanded by Chu Teh:

Unit	Commander	Men	Rifles	A.Rs.	M.Gs.
5th Army	Ting Chen-tang	2,000	1,000	20	12
32nd "	Lo Peng-hui	1,200	700	20	10
	Total.....	3,200	1,700	40	22

Troops commanded by Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien:

4th Army	Wang Hung-chieh	4,500	3,600	80	36
9th "	Hsu Shih-yu	3,200	2,000	50	24
30th "	Ch'en Shih-tsai	4,500	3,600	80	36
33rd "	Wang Wei-chou	2,000	1,000	30	16
31st "	Yu Tien-ying	4,500	3,000	80	36
	Total.....	18,700	13,200	320	148

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Political Unrest, Agitators, Radicalism, Revolutionary Movements

Military Organization of the Communist-Bandit Forces in China

Total in Szechwan-Sikang border area:

21,900 men; 14,900 rifles; 360 A.R's; 170 M.G's.

B. Northern Shensi-Kansu Area.

The Shensi-Kansu Detachment: (This is a portion of the former Kiangsi Reds)

Political Chief - Mao Tse-tung
Military Commander - P'eng Te-huai
Vice-Commander - Lin Piao
Chief of Staff - Yeh Chien-ying
Strength - 5,200 men; 3,600 rifles; 100 A.R.'s; 40 M.G's; 12 mountain guns.

25th Army:
Commander - Hsu Hai-tung
Political Adviser - Wu Huan-kuang
Strength - 4,000 men; 2,000 rifles; 1,000 pistols; 80 A.R's; 30 M.G's; 2 trench mortars.

26th Army:
Commander - Liu Tze-tan
Political Adviser - Kao Kuang
Strength - 3,000 men; 2,000 rifles.

5 Independent Regiments (total strength about 4,000 men; 1,800 rifles).
15 small detachments (total about 2,000 men and 1,000 rifles).

Total in this area: About 18,200 men; 10,400 rifles; 1,000 Pistols; 180 A.R's; 70 M.G's; 12 Mountain Guns; 2 Trench Mortars.

C. Hunan-Hupeh-Szechwan Border.

Hunan-Hupeh-Szechwan-Kweichow Branch Military Council:

Ho Lung (Chairman)
Hsiao K'e
Jen Pi-shih
Chang Tze-i
Kuan Hsiang-ying

2nd Army:
Commander - Ho Lung
Strength - 12,000 men; 6,000 rifles; 2 mountain guns; 54 M.G's; 36 trench mortars.

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Political Unrest, Agitators, Radicalism, Revolutionary Movements

Military Organization of the Communist-Bandit Forces in China

6th Army:
Commander - Hsiao K'e
Strength - 8,000 men; 4,000 rifles; 36 M.G's; 24 trench mortars.

4 Independent Regiments:

Total strength - 2,000 men and 800 rifles.

Military Training Corps (selected N.C.O's):

Strength - 800 men; 800 rifles.

Total in this area: 22,800 men; 11,600 rifles; 54 M.G's; 60 Trench Mortars; 2 Mountain Guns.

D. Miscellaneous Groups:

Hunan-Hupeh-Anhwei Borders:

Commander - Kao Chun-t'ing
Strength - 1,000 men; 800 rifles or pistols; 40 A.R's.

Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi Borders:

Strength - 1,000 men; 600 rifles; 10 A.R's.

Kiangsi-Fukien-Chekiang Borders:

Strength - 1,800 men; 1,000 rifles; 15 A.R.'s; 5 M.G's; 600 pistols.

Source: Military Intelligence estimate provided by Chungking Provisional Headquarters of the Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission.

Joseph W. Stilwell

Joseph W. Stilwell
Colonel, Infantry
Military Attache

H S J

Distribution:
6 MID
1 Embassy
1 File

MAY 30 1946
MIL., INTEL. DIV.
WAR DEPARTMENT
2627-J-281

Speech made by General Chiang Kai-shek to Generals Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng at Sian on December 25th.

"This coup d'etat in Sian is an act which gravely affects both the continuity of Chinese history of 5,000 years and the life and death of the Chinese Republic, and constitutes a criterion by which the character of the Chinese nation may be judged. Since, today, you have shown due regard for the welfare of the nation, and have decided to send me back to Nanking, and no longer try to make any special demands, or force me to make any promise or give any orders, it marks a turning point in the life of the nation, and is also an indication of the high moral and cultural standard of the Chinese people.

"It is an ancient Chinese saying that a gentleman should correct his mistakes as soon as they are realized as such. The present outcome of the coup d'etat shows that you are both ready to correct your own mistakes, and that is creditable to you, as well as auguring a bright future for the Chinese race. Since you are now so convinced by my sincerity towards you that you have the courage to acknowledge your wrong-doing, you are entitled to remain as my suborindates. Furthermore, since you can be so readily converted, it will certainly be easier for your subordinates to follow suit.

"Formerly you have been deceived by reactionaries and believed that I did not treat people fairly and squarely and that I was not loyal to our revolutionary ideals. But now you have read my private diary for this whole year, the

public

public and private telegrams and documents, numbering some fifty thousand words, that have passed through my hands during the past two months, as well as my plans for the salvation of the nation and those relating to internal administration, foreign affairs, military affairs, finance, and education, numbering some 100,000 words, you must now know that there is not a single word which could condemn me of any self-interest or insincerity on my part.

"In fact, since I took military command and began to take charge of military training, there are two principles which I have always emphasized to my students and subordinates, namely: (1) that if I have any selfish motives or do anything against the welfare of the country and the people, then anybody may consider me a traitor, and may shoot me on that account; (2) if my words and deeds are in the least insincere, and I neglect principles and revolutionary ideals, my soldiers, may treat me as their enemy, and may also shoot me. From my diary and the other documents, you can see whether you can find one word which is to the detriment of the revolution. If you can find one such word, here I am, still in Sian, and you are at liberty to condemn and kill me. On my part, I am glad that I have always done what I have taught other people to do, namely, to be sincere and disinterested, and I can say in all confidence that I have done nothing I need to be ashamed of.

"The responsibility of this coup d'etat naturally rests with you two, but I consider myself also responsible for the causes which led up to the crisis. I have always worked for the country, and always believed that my sincerity and teaching would reach all my subordinates. Hence I have not paid any attention to my personal safety. I have taken no precautions on that account, and have therefore tempted the reactionaries

to take advantage of the situation. Everything has its remote causes. My own carelessness was the remote cause of this coup d'etat, and gave rise to this breakdown of discipline, causing the Central Government as well as the people much worry, and the nation much loss. On this account I feel I am to be blamed, and must apologize to the nation, the Party, and the people.

"A country must have law and discipline. You two are military officers in command of troops, and when such a coup d'etat has taken place, you should submit to the judgment of the Central Government. However, I recognize that you were deceived by the propaganda of reactionaries, and misjudged my good intentions to be bad ones. Fortunately, immediately after the coup, you realized that it was harmful to the country, and expressed your deep remorse to me. Now, you have further realized your own mistake in listening to reactionaries, and are now convinced that not only have I had no bad intentions towards you, but that I have always had every consideration for you.

"I have always told my subordinates that, when they make mistakes, their superiors must also be blamed for not having given them adequate training. As I am in supreme command of the army, your fault is also my fault, and I must ask for punishment by the Central authorities. At the same time I will explain to them that you sincerely regret what you have done. As you have rectified your mistake at an early stage, the crisis has not been prolonged, and I believe the Central authorities should be able to be lenient with you.

"Meanwhile you should tell your subordinates how you have been deceived by reactionaries, and how I have always had only the welfare of the nation at heart, so that they

will not be unduly disturbed over whatever decisions the Central Government may make.

"I have always impressed upon people the importance of ethical principles and integrity, to cultivate a sense of probity and of shame, to bear responsibility and to obey discipline. If a superior officer cannot make his subordinates observe these principles, he himself is partly to be blamed. Hence, in connection with this crisis, I am ready to bear responsibility as your superior officer. On your part, you should be ready to abide by whatever decision the Central Government may make, and your subordinates need not have any fear for themselves.

"We must always remember that the life of the nation is more important than anything also. We should not care for ourselves, although our personal integrity must be preserved in order that the nation may exist on a firm foundation. Our lives may be sacrificed, but the law and discipline of the nation must be upheld. Our bodies may be confined, but our spirit must be free. My own responsibility to the country and the Central Government will always be willingly borne as long as I live. That is why I have repeatedly refused to give any orders or sign anything you wanted me to give or sign while under duress. It is because I consider life or death a small matter compared with the upholding of moral principles.

"My words and deeds are not only to be left to posterity but I want you to understand them so that you will also value moral principles more than anything else. I have said more than once that if I should make any promise to you or sign anything at your request while at Sian, it would amount to the destruction of the nation, as I represent the integrity of the entire nation. If I should try to avoid danger and

submit to any duress exercised by my subordinates, my own integrity would be destroyed, and with it the integrity of the nation which I represent. No matter whether it be an individual or a nation, the loss of integrity is tantamount to death itself. For the upholding of those moral principles which I have repeatedly emphasized to the people, I am ready to undergo any sacrifice. If I do not carry out my own teachings, my subordinates as well as the people of the country will not know what to follow, and the nation will be as good as destroyed.

"From this coup you should learn a definite lesson: that integrity is more important than anything else, and that national interests should precede personal ones. If you commit mistakes, do not hesitate to admit them and make corrections. You should bear responsibility for what you have done, and should make these things plain to your subordinates.

"Dr. Sun Yat-sen used to instruct us that we must first rebuild the moral fibre of the nation before we could effect a national revival. Honesty, righteousness and love of peace are important moral characteristics of our country. For more than ten years I have devoted myself to uniting the nation politically and spiritually for national salvation, and honesty and righteousness are of particular importance. I have always tried to carry out my own words. Anything that is beneficial to the country and the people I will do with total disregard of my personal interests. Recommendations of this nature have always been accepted, and put into practice.

"The policy of the Central Government for the last few years have been to achieve peace in and unification of the country, and to increase the strength of the nation. Nothing

should

should be done to impair this strength. During the present crisis, as you engineered the coup, you are responsible for bringing about warfare in the country. But as you have expressed your remorse, I shall recommend the Central Government to settle the matter in a way that will not be prejudicial to the interest of the nation.

"In short, you now know the situation of our country as well as my determination to save it. I always give first thought to the life and death of the nation, as well as the success or failure of the Revolution, and do not pay any attention to personal favors or drudges. Questions of personal danger or loss are of no interest to me. Besides, I have had the benefit of receiving personal instructions from Dr. Sun concerning broadmindedness, benevolence and sincerity, and am not vindictive with regard to things that have passed. As you felt remorse very early, it shows that you know that the welfare of the nation is above everything else. That being the case, you ought to obey unreservedly the orders of the Central Government, and carry out whatever decisions it may make. This is the way to save the nation from the dangers it is facing, and this is the way to turn a national calamity into a national blessing."

No. 308.

Nanking, January 12, 1937.

Subject: The Sian Revolt. Detention of General-Issimo Chiang Kai-shek by General Chang Hsueh-liang.

MAY 20 1937
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL., INTEL. DIV.
DEPARTMENT

2 Pbneg
2627-146
281

Good. Save.
Complete account of revolt
DAO

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to make the following report upon the revolt of General Chang Hsueh-liang at Sian, and his attempt to force the Government to accept a revision of the policies by seizing and holding Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, President of the Executive Yuan.

Information of the seizure of the person of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek by General Chang Hsueh-liang came to the Embassy at Nanking at about 9.30 a.m. on the morning of December 13th through a Reuter press release carrying a statement issued by the Central Executive

utive Committee as the result of a meeting the night before. A telephone call to Vice Minister Hsu Mo of the Foreign Office brought confirmation. This was followed on December 13th by the following announcement issued by the Publicity Department of the Foreign Office on December 13th:

> "On December 12, 1936, Chang Hsueh-liang, a former member of the Military Affairs Commission, who had been entrusted by the National Government with the task of suppressing communistic banditry in the Northwest and maintaining peace and order in that region, suddenly started a revolt at Sian, detained in that city Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission and President of the Executive Yuan, and a number of high Government officials, and declared his unlawful intentions in circular telegrams.
>
> "The National Government, by a mandate issued on the same day, deprived Chang Hsueh-liang of all his official posts and ordered the Military Affairs Commission to punish him severely and take over direct command of all the military units under his control. In the temporary absence of the Generalissimo, Dr. H. H. Kung, Minister of Finance and Vice Chairman of the Executive Yuan, has been appointed Acting President of the Executive Yuan, while General Ho Ying-chin, Minister of War and a member of the Standing Committee of the Military Affairs Commission, has been ordered to take charge of the command and movements of all troops.
>
> "The National Government has the situation well in hand and has issued orders to the various Provincial and Municipal authorities to take stringent measures for the maintenance of peace and order in the country."

The Government acted very quickly to meet the emergency thus caused by the apprehension of the actual head of the State. Dr. H. H. Kung, Vice President of the Executive Yuan and concurrently Minister of Finance, was at once appointed Acting President of the Executive Yuan during the absence of its President, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and immediate steps were taken to organize and despatch a punitive military expedition to surround Sian-fu, the scene of the revolt, and to suppress the rebel-

lion.

lion.

The action of General Chang Hsueh-liang in staging a revolt in Sian and taking into custody the person of the President of the Executive Yuan and his staff came as a distinct shock to the country. Chinese as well as foreigners wondered what would be the effect upon the stability of the Government and the peace of the country. The people generally were taking a good deal of natural pride in new-found evidences of national unity, and in the successes which had attended the efforts of national troops in defending the country against the invasion of Suiyuan by Mongols and Chinese bandits armed and trained by Japanese officers and ronin.

Perhaps it was for this reason that Chiang Kai-shek's person and name became, in the minds of Chinese at home and abroad, a symbol of that unity which the country had so long lacked and striven so hard to attain; while General Chang Hsueh-liang became at once in the popular mind a symbol of the tendency to disunion and domestic chaos which had shamed them before themselves and the world. While the rescue of the person of the Generalissimo took on the aspects of a holy aim appealing to the emotions of young and old, it was observable that there was a growing determination in Government circles to save the Government at whatever cost, even at the cost of the life of the Generalissimo and his fellow prisoners.

It was soon learned that the Generalissimo had not been killed. Telegrams were received by the Government from Chang Hsueh-liang at Sian assuring the Government that the Generalissimo would not be harmed. But there

was great uncertainty as to whether Chang Hsueh-liang would be able to protect the Generalissimo from the unruly soldiers of Yang Hu-cheng, who was rumored to be the real force behind Chang Hsueh-liang.

Little or no news of actual conditions in Sian was available.

The exact reasons for General Chang Hsueh-liang's mad act were difficult for an outsider to learn. It was known that he had sent out a circular telegram calling for support and setting forth certain reasons for his act, and advocating a certain program, but the text of this document was suppressed and difficult to obtain. What is believed to be an authentic copy of the text of this telegram was sent to the Department by the Embassy in its telegram No. 627 of December 20, 5 p.m., from Peiping. The document is interesting as setting forth the psychological background of Chang Hsueh-liang's action. Only time will tell how sincere were the motives behind it.

The telegram was addressed to all of the high organs of the Government and to the various provincial Governments. It refers to the violation of China's sovereignty through the loss of Manchuria, the Shanghai Truce, the Tangku Truce, and the so-called Ho-Umetsu agreement. Attention is called to "changes in the international situation, nations intriguing between one another and using our nation and people as a sacrifice", an obvious reference to the German-Japanese agreement against communism, and the similar ? agreement between Italy and Japan. It then accuses the diplomatic agencies of the Government of seeking to compromise the Government's differences

with

with Japan when it should be encouraging the civil and military leaders of the country to start a war of national defense. It complains of the detention of leaders of the National Salvation Association at Shanghai, and accuses the Generalissimo of being surrounded by bad characters and as therefore having forfeited the support of the masses. It states that Chang Hsueh-liang and others have pleaded with Chiang Kai-shek with tears in their eyes, but to no effect, and that after Chinag's supporters had fired upon student demonstrators he and his colleagues could no longer sit still but had given to Chiang Kai-shek his last advice and had taken him under their protection.

Chang Hsueh-liang announced the program of the military and civilians of the Northwest as follows:

1. Reorganize the Nanking Government and admit all parties to share the joint responsibility for saving the nation.

2. Stop all kinds of civil wars.

3. The immediate release of the political leaders arrested in Shanghai.

4. The release of all political prisoners throughout the country.

5. The repeal of all laws and restrictions upon the patriotic movement.

6. The protection of the civil rights of the people: free speech, free press, right of assembly, and political freedom.

7. The immediate putting into effect of the last will and testament of Sun Yat-sen, calling for an alliance between China and all countries that believe in its freedom and independence.

8. The immediate convocation of a National Salvation Conference.

The first item of this list is a bid for the support of the communistic element in the country which was believed to be strong in the schools. But it has been demonstrated by this incident that the strength of this group has been over-estimated, for the students of the country - even at Sian - do not appear to have responded to the call from Sian.

Item two is of course popular among all classes, but Chang's method of putting it forward destroyed its appeal. He at once symbolized in the minds of everyone the very thing they wanted to put away, civil revolt.

Item three is an appeal to the anti-Japanese sentiment of the country, represented by the National Salvation Association against which the Japanese have been making constant protests to the Chinese Government. The arrested persons were held responsible for anti-Japanese agitation in Shanghai.

Items five and six are similarly an appeal to the anti-Japanese sentiment, which has been driven underground by the Government in its endeavor to meet Japanese protests and accusations that the Government has been encouraging anti-Japanese feeling in the schools and through the Kuomintang.

Item seven is addressed to that section of public thought which has advocated closer relations with Soviet Russia in opposing the common enemy, Japan.

This document did not receive much publicity. It is believed that this was due to suppression by the Central authorities, as well as to the shock which Chang

Hsueh-

Hsueh-liang's attack upon and detention of the Generalissimo gave the country, just at the moment when it was beginning to thrill over the success that was crowning the efforts of its forces in Suiyuan in opposing the Mongols and bandits who, trained, armed and led by Japanese, were making an attack upon Suiyuan.

The Government's official attitude toward Chang Hsueh-liang and his supporters in Sian was from the first characterized by firmness and determination. Troops began to move northward the night of December 13th, and a concentration of forces at Tungkwan was quickly accomplished.

From accounts which have since come to Nanking, it would appear that at the beginning General Chang Hsueh-liang felt quite confident of the rectitude of his action and expected that the Central Government would at once send delegates to Sian to discuss matters with him. When this did not happen he began to worry, and apparently it came to him as a shock that his act was on all sides condemned as the act of a traitor rather than the hero he felt himself to be.

The situation was dramatized for the world on Monday, the 14th of December, when Mr. W. H. Donald, the Australian friend and adviser of both the Generalissimo and of General Chang Hsueh-liang, flew to Sian to be with the Generalissimo, thus establishing the first private contact with the rebels in Sian.

The Government continued to press forward with its military preparations, and it appears that Chang Hsueh-liang's confidence in his cause began to waver. Finally he persuaded General Chiang Ting-wen, the officer that

the

the Generalissimo had appointed to supersede him in command of the campaign against the communist bandits, to go to Nanking with a letter from the Generalissimo to General Ho Ying-chin, the Minister of War and Commander of the punitive force which the Government was sending for the relief of Sian.

The following translation of this letter indicates that, written as it was in the presence of General Chang Hsueh-liang, it was intended by the Generalissimo as an ultimatum to Chang Hsueh-liang that he must be released by Saturday the 19th, or punitive measures would continue:

> "Informed of the bombing of Sian by squadrons yesterday, I am writing to request you to order the immediate cessation of air raids. As far as I can tell from the present circumstances, I may be able to return to Nanking before the end of this week, and therefore hostilities should not break out and bombing should be discontinued until Saturday. (Signed) Chung Cheng."

There was some evidence of a division of opinion among leaders in the Government as to the best means of dealing with the situation at Sian. All wanted to extract the Generalissimo safely, but those near the family, especially Mrs. Chiang Kai-shek, were anxious to have some one go to Sian. Mrs. Chiang wanted to go herself, but for a time was persuaded to remain at Nanking. H. H. Kung, the Generalissimo's brother-in-law, offered to go, but the Government flatly refused to allow him to leave Nanking, as he was now the acting head of the Government. It was finally agreed that T. V. Soong should go in a private capacity, and on December 19th he went by plane to Sian arriving there on the 20th. T.V. Soong returned to Nanking on the 21st and went again to Sian on December 22nd, this time accompanied

by

by Mrs. Chiang Kai-shek.

Thus the situation stood, the Government steadfastly refusing to make terms with General Chang Hsueh-liang, with negotiations proceeding privately for his release, until the evening of Christmas Day, when, as suddenly and as dramatically as it had begun, the crisis ended with the Government's announcement of the safe arrival of the Generalissimo at Loyang at 5.55 p.m. that evening, accompanied by Mrs. Chiang and escorted by General Chang Hsueh-liang, who was accompanied by T. V. Soong.

The whole extraordinary party arrived in Nanking by air from Loyang at a little after noon on the day after Christmas. The capital and the nation gave themselves up to a season of rejoicing in which the originator of the trouble, General Chang Hsueh-liang, was almost completely forgotten. Mr. Price, an American missionary residing at Nanking, tells me that he was in a small village some miles from the city of Nanking on Christmas night when the news of the Generalissimo's release was received over the radio. He said that the response was immediate and spontaneous, the villagers obtaining what firecrackers they could find to make the celebration noisy. Apparently similar spontaneous celebrations occurred wherever the radio reached, illustrating the effectiveness with which the Government had dramatized the situation to the people by radio. There can be no doubt that this incident brought out most dramatically the deep interest which has been developed in the Government, its strength and its unity,- for the

issues

issues involved from first to last were purely domestic, such as would have found little interest and certainly no united feeling among the people ten years ago.

On December 26th the Government issued three documents:

1. The text of a speech made by the Generalissimo at Sian to General Chang Hsueh-liang and General Yang Hu-cheng on December 25th.

2. The text of a letter addressed to the Generalissimo on December 26th by General Chang Hsueh-liang.

3. The text of a statement made by General Chiang Kai-shek on December 26th.

The speech of the Generalissimo made at Sian is a remarkable document. Before discussing it I should state that I was at the Union Church, which is conducted in the interest of the local foreign community (mostly missionaries) on December 27th, when after the sermon Colonel Huang, the Y.M.C.A. Secretary who has been personal secretary to Mrs. Chiang Kai-shek and very active in the New Life Movement and in the Officers' Moral Endeavor Association, was introduced to the congregation and proceeded, in faultless English and without hesitation, to thank the congregation on behalf of the Generalissimo for its prayers for his safety. He then said that after the Generalissimo's arrest the first thing that he asked for was his Bible, and that he, Colonel Huang, had been instrumental in getting this for him, the Generalissimo's guards having asked him whether the Bible was a fit book for the Generalissimo to read. Colonel Huang said he could personally vouch for the fact that the Generalissimo had derived great comfort from his reading of the

Bible

Bible, and that this was further evidenced by the Christian forbearance which characterized the Generalissimo's speech at Sian.

The speech is a notable one and will probably become sanctified among Chinese state papers. The Educational Department of Kiangsu on January 6 issued an order that this speech should be included in reading assignments for all Middle Schools in the province. Chiang opened his address by designating Chang Hsueh-liang's action in unconditionally freeing him as marking a "turning point in the life of the nation" and as indicating "the high moral and cultural standard of the Chinese people."

General Chiang praises Chang Hsueh-liang for being ready to admit and correct his mistakes as a gentleman should, and says that for this reason he has the right to remain as his subordinate. He expresses the conviction that Chang Hsueh-liang's subordinates will the more easily be brought to admit and correct their attitude because of the courage of their superior officer.

The Generalissimo refers to his private diary and to various Government documents which had fallen into Chang Hsueh-liang's hands and been read by him, and expresses the conviction that he did not find in "those documents" a single word which might condemn him of "self interest or insincerity".

> "In fact, since I took military command and began to take charge of military training, there are two principles which I have always emphasized to my students and subordinates, namely: (1) that if I have any selfish motives or do anything against the welfare of the country and the people, then anybody may consider me a traitor and may shoot me on that account; (2) if my words and deeds are in the least insincere, and I neglect principles and revolutionary ideals, my soldiers may treat me as their enemy, and may also shoot me.

me. From my diary and the other documents, you can see whether you can find one word which is to the detriment of the Revolution. If you can find one such word, here I am, still in Sian, and you are at liberty to condemn and kill me."

I quote the concluding paragraphs of this speech in full because of the significance of the thoughts and words used:

"The responsibility of this coup d'etat naturally rests with you two (Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng), but I consider myself also responsible for the causes which led up to the crisis. I have always worked for the country, and always believed that my sincerity and teaching would reach all my subordinates. Hence I have not paid any attention to my personal safety. I have taken no precautions on that account, and have therefore tempted the reactionaries to take advantage of the situation. Everything has its remote causes. My own carelessness was the remote cause of this coup d'etat, and gave rise to this breakdown of discipline, causing the Central Government as well as the people much worry, and the nation much loss. On this account I feel I am to be blamed, and must apologize to the nation, the Party, and the people.

"A country must have law and discipline. You two are military officers in command of troops, and when such a coup d'etat has taken place you should submit to the judgment of the Central Government. However, I recognize that you were deceived by the propaganda of reactionaries, and misjudged my good intentions to be bad ones. Fortunately, immediately after the coup, you realized that it was harmful to the country, and expressed your deep remorse to me. Now, you have further realized your own mistake in listening to reactionaries, and are now convinced that not only have I had no bad intentions towards you, but that I have always had every consideration for you.

"I have always told my subordinates that, when they make mistakes, their superiors must also be blamed for not having given them adequate training. As I am in supreme command of the army, your fault is also my fault, and I must ask for punishment by the Central authorities. At the same time I will explain to them that you sincerely regret what you have done. As you have rectified your mistake at an early stage, the crisis has not been prolonged, and I believe the Central authorities should be able to be lenient with you.

"Meanwhile you should tell your subordinates how you have been deceived by reactionaries, and

how

how I have always had only the welfare of the nation at heart, so that they will not be unduly disturbed over whatever decisions the Central Government may make.

"I have always impressed upon people the importance of ethical principles and integrity, to cultivate a sense of probity and of shame, to bear responsibility and to obey discipline. If a superior officer cannot make his subordinates observe these principles, he himself is partly to be blamed. Hence, in connection with this crisis, I am ready to bear responsibility as your superior officer. On your part, you should be ready to abide by whatever decision the Central Government may make, and your subordinates need not have any fear for themselves.

"We must always remember that the life of the nation is more important than anything else. We should not care for ourselves; although our personal integrity must be preserved in order that the nation may exist on a firm foundation. Our lives may be sacrificed, but the law and discipline of the nation must be upheld. Our bodies may be confined, but our spirit must be free. My own responsibility to the country and the Central Government will always be willingly borne as long as I live. That is why I have repeatedly refused to give any orders or sign anything you wanted me to give or sign while under duress. It is because I consider life or death a small matter compared with the upholding of moral principles.

"My words and deeds are not only to be left to posterity, but I want you to understand them so that you will also value moral principles more than anything else. I have said more than once that if I should make any promise to you or sign anything at your request while at Sian, it would amount to the destruction of the nation, as I represent the integrity of the entire nation. If I should try to avoid danger and submit to any duress exercised by my subordinates, my own integrity would be destroyed, and with it the integrity of the nation which I represent. No matter whether it be an individual or a nation, the loss of integrity is tantamount to death itself. For the upholding of those moral principles which I have repeatedly emphasized to the people, I am ready to undergo any sacrifice. If I do not carry out my own teachings, my subordinates as well as the people of the country will not know what to follow, and the nation will be as good as destroyed.

"From this coup you should learn a definite lesson: that integrity is more important than anything else, and that national interests should precede personal ones. If you commit mistakes, do not hesitate to admit them and make corrections. You should bear responsibility for what you have done, and should make these things plain to your subordinates.

"Dr.

"Dr. Sun Yat-sen used to instruct us that we must first rebuild the moral fiber of the nation before we could effect a national revival. Honesty, righteousness and love of peace are important moral characteristics of our country. For more than ten years I have devoted myself to uniting the nation politically and spiritually for national salvation, and honesty and righteousness are of particular importance. I have always tried to carry out my own words. Anything that is beneficial to the country and the people I will do with total disregard of my personal interests. Recommendations of this nature have always been accepted, and put into practice.

"The policy of the Central Government for the last few years has been to achieve peace in and unification of the country, and to increase the strength of the nation. Nothing should be done to impair this strength. During the present crisis, as you engineered the coup, you are responsible for bringing about warfare in the country. But as you have expressed your remorse, I shall recommend the Central Government to settle the matter in a way that will not be prejudicial to the interest of the nation.

"In short, you now know the situation of our country as well as my determination to save it. I always give first thought to the life and death of the nation, as well as the success or failure of the Revolution, and do not pay any attention to personal favors or grudges. Questions of personal danger or loss are of no interest to me. Besides, I have had the benefit of receiving personal instructions from Dr. Sun concerning broadmindedness, benevolence and sincerity, and am not vindictive with regard to things that have passed. As you felt remorse very early, it shows that you know that the welfare of the nation is above everything else. That being the case, you ought to obey unreservedly the orders of the Central Government, and carry out whatever decisions it may make. This is the way to save the nation from the dangers it is facing, and this is the way to turn a national calamity into a national blessing."

Upon his arrival in Nanking on December 26th General Chiang Kai-shek issued the following statement to the press, assuming personal responsibility for the whole incident and expressing his thanks to the Government and people of China for the way they had cooperated throughout the crisis:

"I feel somewhat tired because of the shaking in the airplane to-day. My views on the Sian affair may be found in my talk, published to-day,

which

which I made to Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-chengin Sian.

"At present, everything must await decisions of the Central authorities. Through poor leadership, I, as Commander-in-Chief of the nation's armed forces, must hold myself responsible for the incident which has made my heart ache.

"Fortunately, due to the proper handling of the situation by the Central authorities and the dutifulness of the military and political leaders, the nation has remained stable throughout the crisis. This has made me feel very grateful.

"I am also thankful for the sympathies expressed by our people both in and outside China and the friendly concern of officials and individuals in foreign countries during my weeks in Sian."

On this same day there was given to the press a letter addressed to General Chiang Kai-shek by General Chang Hsueh-liang in which the latter confesses his crime and asks for appropriate punishment:

"To the Generalissimo: By nature I am crude and precipitate, and I have now committed the great crime of violating law and discipline as well as disrespecting you. Shamefacedly I have followed you to Nanking, wishing to surrender myself with utter sincerity for reprimand and punishment.

"Please punish me according to my crime in order to uphold discipline and to warn against repetitions in the future. Whatever is beneficial to our country I shall never decline, even if it means death. I beg you to forget your personal feelings about me and let nothing hold you back from giving me the punishment I deserve."

General Chiang Kai-shek submitted his resignation to the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee in the following words which were given to the public on December 29th:

"During my recent trip to the Northwest, the Sian incident unexpectedly broke out on December 12. My imprisonment had caused grave concern of the Central Government, as well as that of the nation. The revolters not only had violated the discipline of the state but had also shocked the world.

"Thanks

"Thanks to the emergency measures taken by the Central Government, the dignity of the state was upheld and the crisis was soon averted. But in spite of this, the discipline of the state and the leadership of the highest military authority had been prejudiced while the troops and civilians in Shensi had suffered unnecessary losses.

"Since I am leading the military forces of the country, I should set a good example for my fellow servicemen. But it was apparent that my word failed to command the obedience of my followers. Otherwise, the mutiny would not have broken out which nearly resulted in a collapse of the foundation of the state. To come to think about it, I should not shake myself of the charge of incompetence.

"I believe that the state should uphold its discipline. Only then could there be commendation and punishment. And only then could one's responsibility be established.

"Since I was ignorant of such a mutiny brewing and had failed to check it at its outbreak, which resulted in my subordinates taking such a rash step, I had not lived up to the sacred charge thrust upon me. Therefore, there is the more reason why I should not stave off the responsibility.

"I sincerely hope that the Central Executive Committee will censure me for my negligence of duties.

"During recent years, both my health and my mind have failed me. I have committed many errors in discharging my duties. I should not have shouldered such a heavy load of responsibilities in the first place. After the Sian incident, I am the more conscience-stricken and it is no longer fit for me to continue in office.

"I, therefore, respectfully request the Central Executive Committee to accept my resignation from my post as President of the Executive Yuan and from my concurrent post as Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission. I further request the Central Executive Committee to immediately appoint some other competent man to take over my duties so that I may retire from active service and to await disciplinary punishment.

"In that case, the discipline of the state will be upheld while my conscience may feel more at ease. This I respectfully submit."

This was promptly rejected by the Committee on December 29th:

"Comrade

"Comrade Chiang, because of his heavy political and military duties, hardly has time to rest. Only recently he went to Shensi twice with the view of lecturing to the troops and to unify the morale of the army there by employing the magnanimous and courageous spirit of Tsungli (Dr. Sun Yat-sen).

"Even in the recent Sian incident, which was grave in scope, Comrade Chiang had, during his imprisonment, succeeded in moving the rebel leaders and making them repent for their misdeeds through his personal integrity and great personality.

"As far as the Sian incident was concerned, Comrade Chiang should not be held responsible. Consequently, his resignation should be rejected and his request for disciplinary punishment should be ignored."

This was followed by a second submittal of his resignation by the Generalissimo and its rejection, the Generalissimo being granted a month's leave to recuperate from the ill effects of his experiences at Sian, among which it is understood he suffered a sprained back while escaping from his quarters when they were attacked.

The Central Political Committee of the Government on December 29th empowered the Military Affairs Commission to take disciplinary measures against Chang Hsueh-liang, acting upon a petition from the Generalissimo, which the Military Affairs Commission referred to the Central Executive Committee seeking instructions as to measures to be taken against Chang Hsueh-liang, "who has come to the capital in person to await the punishment of the Central Government."

General Chiang Kai-shek was reported to have recommended that Chang Hsueh-liang be given "a lenient punishment so as to encourage him to improve himself" in a petition to the Central Executive Committee. The Generalissimo was reported to have expressed the opinion that Chang Hsueh-liang, as Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the

Bandit-

Bandit-Suppression Forces in the Northwest, should be held responsible for the outbreak at Sian which was under his military jurisdiction, but that, since he had come to the capital to await the punishment of the Central Government and had also addressed a personal letter to the Generalissimo admitting his guilt and asking his superior to mete out the kind of punishment he deserved, he was prepared to accept Chang Hsueh-liang's repentance. General Chiang enclosed with his petition the letter which he had received from Chang Hsueh-liang.

The special military tribunal presided over by General Li Lieh-chun which was set up to try Chang Hsueh-liang met on December 31st and sentenced him to ten years imprisonment. He was also deprived of all civil rights for five years. The decision of this tribunal was followed by the filing of a petition from General Chiang Kai-shek as President of the Executive Yuan, asking that Chang Hsueh-liang be pardoned in a special amnesty in view of his remorse. It was generally believed in Nanking that on New Year's Day Chang Hsueh-liang would receive a complete pardon, and that he would be allowed to return to his troops at Sian. It is probable that this might have been the outcome had it not been for the fact that there was a delay in the proceedings during which time it is believed that those members of the Government in favor of more severe action had an opportunity to influence the Government, among them Mr. Chang Chi and Mr. Li Wen-fan. When on January 4th the State Council announced its decision upon the Generalissimo's petition for pardon, every one was surprised to

learn

learn that it had granted a "special pardon" to Chang Hsueh-liang and that nothing was said about restoration of his previous posts or civil rights. On the contrary, the Government ordered the Military Commission to keep Chang Hsueh-liang under strict surveillance, and it is understood that that is the condition under which Chang Hsueh-liang is now being kept at Nanking.

Thus officially ends a crisis unique in modern Chinese history. It is generally believed that the Government has emerged from it strengthened by its experience, chastened by its realization that unity is not easily accomplished, heartened by the popular support which came to it from all sides.

Respectfully yours,

NELSON TRUSLER JOHNSON.

In quintuplicate to the Department.

Copy to Peiping.

800

NTJ.KA

Enclosures:

1. Text of speech made by General Chiang Kai-shek at Sian on December 25th.

2. Statement made by General Chiang Kai-shek to newspaper representatives on December 26th.

G-2 Report

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and NSD ltr of
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By ... NARS Date 3-25-74

RESTRICTED

JUL 27 1937
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
3700
WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Political Parties and Groups

The Chinese Communists and The Sian Revolt.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUL 27 1937
2657-D-281/142

In our last general report on the status of the Communists in China (No. 9490), the dismal failure of the anti-Red campaign conducted by Chang Hsueh-liang and his favorable attitude toward the Red policy was commented upon. This report was dated November 20, 1936, at which time Chiang Kai-shek was fully cognizant of Chang Hsueh-liang's sentiments toward the Red forces which he was under orders to fight. Hence Chiang's visit to Sian on October 22, 1936, at which time he is reported to have made it clear to Chang Hsueh-liang that further temporizing with the Communists was not to be tolerated and that he must put some heart into the anti-Red campaign. Shortly after this, Chiang Kai-shek ordered four Central Government divisions into Kansu and Shensi to co-operate with Chang Hsueh-liang's forces in fighting the Reds.

A brief account of the background of Chang Hsueh-liang's bias in favor of the Reds may not be out of place here. He had taken up his headquarters in Wuhan as Commander of Bandit Suppression in Honan, Hupeh, and Anhwei, in April 1934, and took part in the great campaign against the Communists in Kiangsi in 1934. Some believe that even at this time, Chang had little heart in fighting the Communists, but if such was the case it was not generally known.

Chang Hsueh-liang apparently began to have serious doubts as to the wisdom of the anti-Red campaign, or to put it another way, began to waver in his loyalty to the Central Government and Chiang Kai-shek, in 1935. He is said to have stated while in Hankow that he would much rather fight Japan than continue with bandit suppression.

In October of 1935, Chang was ordered to take his Army to the northwest to fight the Red forces who had recently arrived in that area after their long trek from Kiangsi. Chang obeyed the orders, moved his forces to Shensi, attacked the Reds and received a crushing blow when his 109th and part of his 101st Divisions went over to the enemy. This was his last serious attempt to carry on a campaign against the Reds. Persons close to him state that by the end of 1935 he was convinced that the Reds could not be destroyed by an open attack and so reported to Nanking. His Northeastern Army remained in occupation of Shensi, Ninghsia, and Kansu, but offensive operations against the Reds dwindled month by month until a practical truce existed between the Communists and the Tungpei Army.

Very probably at this time Chang Hsueh-liang began to suspect that his force had been transferred to the Northwest in order to reduce its effectiveness as a possible menace to Nanking. His men were scattered over a wide area,

RESTRICTED

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Political Parties and Groups

The Chinese Communists and the Sian Revolt.

a part of his army under Wan Fu-lin, one of his trusted subordinates, remained at Paoting, and his artillery had been taken away from him. It is reported that after November, 1935, he received no replacements in personnel or equipment and that pay for his troops was not regularly forthcoming.

With the affairs of the Tungpei Army in this condition, it is not surprising that Chang was in a mood to be easily swayed by Red propaganda. At this time he is said to have first met Chou En-lai, Vice-Chairman of the Red Military Affairs Commission, a clever, well-educated man who could be expected to exercise great influence over a weak character like Chang Hsueh-liang. Chang is also said to have been greatly influenced in favor of the Red cause by one Kao Fu-yuan, a regimental commander who had been captured by the Reds and later released, thoroughly indoctrinated with Red ideals.

Just about this time an important change in Red policy gave Chang Hsueh-liang an opportunity of allying himself with them with less risk of incurring the odium which such an act might have brought on him several years before. Early in 1936 the Red Army invaded Shansi, at which time it was noted that their former anti-Kuomintang slogans had been abandoned in favor of slogans of national defense. Even before this, as early as December, 1935, Communist manifestoes had concentrated entirely on the question of national resistance, in other words were strictly anti-Japanese in character. On August 1, 1936, the "United Front Policy" was officially announced by Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Chinese Soviet Republic. According to this announcement, the two cardinal points in the Red program were cessation of civil war and the uniting of the country in active resistance to Japanese aggression.

Supporters of the Red cause naturally believe that this change of policy on the part of the Reds was due solely to an unselfish desire to save China from Japanese aggression, even at the sacrifice of their communistic ideals. More sceptical persons are inclined to believe that the Reds were seeking an opportunity to effect some kind of a compromise with the Central Government without too much loss of face. The Reds had walked some 20,000 li since they left Kiangsi, harassed, more or less, en route by Central Government and other troops, and now found themselves in a part of China where pickings were very poor. Hence they might be expected to be anxious to find some means of effecting a rapprochement with Nanking, especially if such an action would result in the calling off of the Central Government troops and the handing out of some money from the Central Government coffers.

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Political Parties and Groups

The Chinese Communists and the Sian Revolt.

By declaring themselves willing to join with Nanking in an anti-Japanese campaign, the Reds appeared magnaminous, self-sacrificing, and intensely patriotic. If their actions were not dictated by such high motives, they were nevertheless a clever move to wring concessions out of Nanking, and even the most rabid communist and advocate of revolutionary doctrine could scarcely blame the Reds for a willingness to effect a compromise with the Central Government in the face of the Japanese crisis.

But whatever were the motives behind the Red change of policy, it was sufficient to win Chang Hsueh-liang even more enthusiastically to their cause. By the fall of 1936 there was a perfect working understanding between the Northeast Army and the Reds. Chang Hsueh-liang was an enthusiastic advocate of the proposed Red anti-Japanese campaign, and began to take an active part in organizing the work of national salvation along the lines of a united front of all parties. Sian became a center of anti-Japanese propaganda, and the Tungpei Army was frantically anti-Japanese. Chang Hsueh-liang established a special school near Sian in which to train officers in political activities. Part of the old Northeast University (Tungpei) was transferred from Peiping to Sian and became a center of student patriotic activity.

It was in the face of a situation such as this that Chiang Kai-shek flew to Sian late in October to try to put some teeth into the anti-Red campaign. He had good reason to be disturbed over the situation in Shensi. Shao Li-tze, the Provincial Chairman, was loyal to the Kuomintang, but had no troops. The Pacification Commissioner, Yang Hu-cheng, had 40,000 troops, but he was very close to Chang Hsueh-liang, and the latter had already declared a truce with the Reds. On meeting Chiang Kai-shek, Chang Hsueh-liang is generally believed to have argued for war with Japan, but the latter insisted that the Communists must first be liquidated and it was the task of the Tungpei Army to do it. Just at this time, the Japanese-backed attempt against Suiyuan had begun and the whole country was in a glow about the stiffening of policy against Japan.

If Chang made any appeals to Chiang for a cessation of the anti-Red campaign, they had no effect upon the latter, who was determined to stamp out the Communists.

Those who consider the realities of the situation at that time cannot be too hard on Chiang for his desire to keep up the anti-communist campaign and avoid war with Japan. Chiang knew well enough that war with Japan would probably mean the end of him and his followers. But as long as the necessity, real or otherwise, of suppressing the Communists as a prelude to fighting Japan could be kept in the public view, the popular cry for war with Japan could be temporarily stalled off.

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Political Parties and Groups

The Chinese Communists and the Sian Revolt.

As heretofore noted, in October of 1936, knowing that Chang Hsueh-liang's forces would not fight the Reds, Chiang had sent the First Army under Hu Chung-nan into Kansu. Hu advanced into territory held by the Reds in the northern part of the province and encountered the enemy around the middle of November. Exact details of the campaign are not known, but the Central Government forces, if not actually defeated, certainly won no great victories. On November 27th, Chang Hsueh-liang is said to have wired Chiang Kai-shek pleading to be allowed to send troops into Suiyuan. Chang was invited to Loyang, where the Generalissimo met him and refused to comply with his request, but promised to go to Sian to interview the Tungpei commanders. Chiang arrived in Sian on December 4th, where he was welcomed by a large banner inscribed with the slogan, "Support Chiang Kai-shek, the Revolutionary Leader!" This banner remained up all during the revolt and was in place to welcome the troops of the Central Government when they entered the city on February 8th. Chiang Kai-shek stayed at Huachingshih, near Lingtung, twelve miles east of Sianfu. He was accompanied only by his personal bodyguard and about twenty picked troops.

Details of the argument between Chang and Chiang concerning the necessity of pressing the anti-Red campaign need not be given here, but the Generalissimo remained adamant in his determination to continue operations in the Northwest. It became known that Chang Hsueh-liang was to be replaced by a Chiang Kai-shek man, Chiang Ting-wen, and the renewal of the drive against the Chinese Soviets was set for December 12th. The situation was aggravated by a student demonstration on December 9th, in which the demonstrators were fired on by troops and three were wounded.

On the night of December 11th, Chang Hsueh-liang, Yang Hu-cheng, and some of the senior commanders of the Tungpei Army decided to arrest the Generalissimo. The arrest took place early the next morning. His staff was captured in the Sian Guesthouse, a foreign style hotel, where they had been quartered. Chiang's bodyguard put up some resistance and a number were killed. During the fighting, the Generalissimo made an unceremonious flight out the back door, not waiting even to put on his shoes. During his flight he fell and severely injured his back. He was later taken crouching in a hole on the mountain back of his quarters, in a pitiable condition from cold and injuries.

A full account of the events of the next fortnight during which Chiang was a prisoner in Sian would be beyond the scope of this study, but the main developments have already been fully reported. The Nanking Government promptly launched a punitive expedition against the Sian rebels, a move which

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Political Parties and Groups

The Chinese Communists and the Sian Revolt.

suggested to many that certain persons, among whom Ho Ying-chin was most commonly mentioned, were not much concerned if the attempt to rescue Chiang might result in his death.

Soon after the detention of Chiang Kai-shek, which was euphemistically referred to in Sian as "advice by military force," Chang Hsueh-liang issued a manifesto to the nation, announcing his act and stating an eight-point program which the Sian faction desired carried out. The points are recapitulated below:

(1) Reorganization of the Nanking Government and admission of all parties and cliques to shoulder the responsibility of national salvation.
(2) Cessation of civil warfare.
(3) Immediate release of the leaders of patriotic bodies arrested in Shanghai.
(4) Release of all political offenders throughout the country.
(5) Safeguarding the freedom of the people in holding meetings and organizing associations.
(6) Emancipation of the patriotic movement of the masses.
(7) Faithful observance of the last will of Dr. Sun Yat-sen.
(8) Immediate convocation of a National Salvation Conference.

After the arrest, there were several meetings between Chang and the Generalissimo. H. H. Donald, adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, Madame Chiang, and her brother T. V. Soong, all visited Sian, and are said to have conferred with the Northwest leaders. Chiang's story is that Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng finally came to see the error of their ways and repented. Chang insisted on going to Nanking to show his sincerity and take his punishment. In any event, Chiang was released on December 25th.

The account given in Sian soon after the Generalissimo's release by representatives of the Northwest faction concerning the prelude to that event is very much different from the story told by Chiang Kai-shek on his return to Nanking. It was claimed in Sian that during his detention Chiang came to see the justice of the views of the Northeast Army and those allied with it, and that he agreed to carry out Chang's eight-point program on his return to Nanking. On his return to Nanking, so said the supporters of the Sian rebels, Chiang came under the influence of pro-Japanese "traitors," repudiated the promises made previous to his release, and ordered his troops, who had begun to withdraw from positions threatening Sian, to take up preparations again for an offensive against the Northwest coalition.

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Political Parties and Groups

The Chinese Communists and the Sian Revolt

Whether or not Chiang ever promised any concessions to the Sian faction will probably never be known. But if his own diary is to be believed, he never made any recession from his stand that the Reds must be stamped out, and his last act before leaving Sian was to read a severe homily to Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng on the enormity of their offense in having detained him.

There is still some confusion as to the exact part played by the Communists in the Sian affair. Contrary to the general belief at the time, it is probable that they had nothing at all to do with the arrest of Chiang Kai-shek. There was certainly a good understanding between the Tungpei Army and the Reds in the Northwest, but the initiative in the events of December 12th is believed to have come from Chang Hsueh-liang himself, influenced by a group of Tungpei Army radicals. It is generally believed that there were no Communists present at the meeting which planned the coup, and Soviet headquarters in Paoan, Shensi, did not hear of the affair until several days after it occurred.

It was to be expected, however, that as soon as they learned of the situation, the Reds would be eager to turn it to their advantage. Immediately after the arrest, Chang Hsueh-liang sent for communist representatives to come to Sian. Chou En-lai, Vice-Chairman of the Red Military Affairs Commission, and Yeh Chien-ying, Chief of Staff of the East Front Red Army, were sent to Sian to represent the Reds. In spite of the reports appearing in the press at the time that Sian was full of Red emissaries, it is believed that these two and a few others were the only Reds actually in the city during the period of the revolt. Chou En-lai took the principal part, and acted as chief spokesman and negotiator for the Communists. In this connection it is interesting to note that Chou was at one time an instructor in the Whampoa Military Academy under Chiang Kai-shek.

Now that the hysteria attending the arrest of Chiang Kai-shek and the events following has subsided, it seems generally agreed that the influence of the Communists was turned in the direction of releasing the Generalissimo and making a peaceful settlement. It would have been entirely possible for the Reds to have seized Tungkwan at this time and established a separatist government in opposition to Nanking, in the hope of support from other parts of China. There were probably extreme leftists in Sian who favored such a course, but the Reds with their long political experience seem to have realized that such an action would have been a direct challenge for the civil war which they were supposed to be trying to avoid. Thus with a unique opportunity of embarrassing the Central Government,

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Political Parties and Groups

The Chinese Communists and
The Sian Revolt.

the Reds seem to have preferred a policy of conciliation, probably in the belief that in the long run such a policy would react to their benefit. In any event the Reds kept their heads in the crisis and even the missionaries in Sian admit that they behaved very well.

The question naturally arises as to whether the Russian Soviets had anything to do with the Sian revolt. As far as can be determined, Red Russia had nothing to do with it at any time. Soviet diplomatic representatives in China were most emphatic in declaring that neither the Soviet Government nor any party or faction in Russia had any connection with the affair. The Soviet press in general condemned Chang Hsueh-liang's arrest of the Generalissimo as a great mistake. It is very probable that the Soviet Government felt that a civil war between the Sian coalition and the Central Government would have played directly into the hands of Japan and made the Soviet position in the Far East more difficult.

Whether by so doing he was repudiating promises made prior to his release or not, as soon as Chiang got back to Nanking he lost no time in ordering a large concentration of Central Government troops at Tungkwan; and with the threat of a superior force ready to attack as an ace in the hole, began negotiations to settle the Sian affair. It was inevitable that the coalition of the Northeast Army, Yang Hu-cheng, and Reds controlling Sian should begin at this juncture to show lines of cleavage. The general line-up seems to have been with the Reds on the right, favoring a settlement which, though it might appear unfavorable, would still preserve peace; in the center Yang Hu-cheng, who was not averse to fighting for the best terms possible; and on the left the younger Tungpei officers and many of the Tungpei soldiers, angered at the continued detention of Chang Hsueh-liang and burning with a desire, from a safe distance, to fight the Japanese even if they had to fight Chiang Kai-shek's forces to get at them.

In such an atmosphere, negotiations for a settlement were carried out, with the usual accompaniment of rumors concerning terms flying thick and fast and a tremendous expenditure of gasoline in ferrying the representatives of both sides back and forth in the most luxurious airplanes available. In the midst of the negotiations, in spite of assurances from both sides that everything would come out peacefully in the end, foreign nationals in Sian, mostly British and American missionaries, were evacuated by truck and bus on January 18th.

By the 2nd of February it became apparent that some kind of terms had been agreed upon and that the forces of the Central Government were about to enter Sian. This was a signal for a final flare-up on the part of some hot heads in the

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Political Parties and Groups

The Chinese Communists and the Sian Revolt

Tungpei Army. Some of the younger leaders felt that they were being sold out by their superiors, particular resentment being directed against Wang Yi-che, commanding the 67th Army. Headed by Sun Ming-chiu, commanding the Tungpei Special Service Regiment, there was a brief mutiny, in which Wang was shot and killed. The mutineers were also after Ho Chu-kuo, former commander of Chang Hsueh-liang's Cavalry Army, who was condemned for having taken a rather ambiguous stand during the revolt. Ho was saved by Yang Hu-cheng, but the latter made no attempt to interfere with the rebels. He may have actually encouraged them with the idea of later getting the credit for having saved a bad situation.

The mutiny was of brief duration and was soon brought under control by wider heads among the Tungpei forces, among whom Yu Hsueh-chung, Chairman of Kansu and Commanding General of the 51st Army, who had arrived in Sian a few days before from Lanchow, seems to have played the principal role in calming the situation. The mutineers were allowed to escape.

The mutiny of February 2nd had little effect upon the final settlement of the Sian affair, which was already practically concluded. On February 4th, Yang Hu-cheng, Yu Hsueh-chung, and Ho Chu-kuo published a peace manifesto embodying the following points:

(1) Chang Hsueh-liang was to regain his rights before the Third Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang;

(2) The Northeast forces were to withdraw from Sian according to the plan agreed upon by Nanking, but the Central Government was to recognize the Sian affair as a patriotic, not a rebellious movement;

(3) The mass movement and the national salvation organizations were to be protected and supported by the Central Government.

From the day of the arrest of the Generalissimo to the publishing of this manifesto was fifty-five days, hence the Sian affair may later be known as the fifty-five days' revolt.

The terms on which the Sian affair were actually settled are not known. In his official report to the Military Affairs Commission on February 8th, Ho Ying-chin, Secretary of War, states that Yang Hu-cheng finally agreed to the terms of the Central Government on the 24th of January, but Ho did not say what the terms were. All he released for publication was that he had agreed to the appointing of a joint commission

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Political Parties and Groups

The Chinese Communists and the Sian Revolt

to supervise the withdrawal of the Tungpei, Yang Hu-cheng, and Red forces from Sian; that the Central Government would furnish pay and rations for one month as "withdrawal expenses;" that small units of the Tungpei Army would be allowed to remain along the Sian-Lanchow motor road; and that units of Yang Hu-cheng's forces would be permitted to remain in Sian.

Proponents of the Sian rebels, however, state that the following were the terms of the settlement:

(1) The Tungpei troops to withdraw to Kansu with headquarters at Pinchow and later to be transferred to Lanchow.

(2) One regiment of Tungpei troops to remain in Sian.

(3) Yang Hu-cheng's forces (the 17th Route Army) to withdraw north of the Wei River, but two brigades to remain in Sian.

(4) The Red armies to return to their own region in North Shensi, but to be supported by Nanking and later taken into the National Army.

(5) Ku Chu-tung, Commissioner of the Provisional Headquarters of the Military Affairs Commission in Sian, in other words Chiang Kai-shek's direct representative, to move into Sian with no more than an adequate body-guard.

(6) The troops of the Central Government to garrison the Lunghai Railway, but not Sian or the Lanchow motor road.

(7) Yang Hu-cheng to retain his post as Pacification Commissioner of Shensi.

In this connection, it should be stated that at no time during the Sian affair did Red troops enter Sian. Considerable numbers, however, did come into Suiyuan, about thirty miles north of Sian, and Red forces were also reported among the forces holding the "front line" astride the Lunghai Railway at Weinan.

It is not believed that any terms so favorable to the Sian side were ever agreed to by the Central Government, but in any event no such were ever carried out. The Tungpei forces, except a few cavalry troops still in Sian, have been transferred to posts in Anhwei; the Reds have gone back to North Shensi; and Yang Hu-cheng's troops have withdrawn north of the Wei River. Yang Hu-cheng has been allowed to resign as Pacification Commissioner of Shensi, but has been ordered to take a trip at the Central Government's expense to inspect conditions abroad. He is due to leave in a few days, after a round of entertainments in his honor in Shanghai, presumably as a reward for having revolted against his Commander-in-Chief.

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Political Parties and Groups

The Chinese Communists and the Sian Revolt.

Full civil rights were restored to Chang Hsueh-liang on February 17th, but he still remains at Kikou, near Fenghua, Chekiang, and if he is not under arrest, he gives very much the appearance of being in that situation. Yu Hsueh-chung, who was a stabilizing factor in the whole situation with his influence apparently in favor of the Central Government, has been made Pacification Commissioner of Kansu with his headquarters at Hwaian. Ho Chu-kuo, who also stood more or less by Nanking, has been made Vice-Commissioner of the Provisional Headquarters of the Military Affairs Commission in Sian.

It is the general impression that the Reds got some money from the Central Government at the time of the Sian settlement, but how much, if any, is not known. Also it is not known whether they received anything else either in the way of promises or more definite concessions.

Spokesmen for the Sian side say that at the time of his release Chiang Kai-shek promised to bring Chang's eight-point program before the Third Plenary Session which opened in Nanking on February 15, 1937. During the session Chiang stated that he had told Chang he would present the proposals but would accompany them with a recommendation that they not be adopted. The proposals were accordingly rejected by the Session amidst tumults of applause for the Generalissimo. There are some who say that the Session later adopted a proposal by the Kwangsi delegation embodying most of the points brought up by Chang Hsueh-liang, but this has never been definitely confirmed.

The Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Communist Party made the following proposals to the Third Plenary Session:

(1) The cessation of all civil wars and the concentration of national strength to cope with external aggression.
(2) Freedom of speech and the release of political prisoners.
(3) The summoning of a National Salvation Conference to be attended by delegates from all parties, factions, public bodies, and armies.
(4) The acceleration of preparations for positive armed resistance against Japan.
(5) The improvement of the people's living conditions.

In return for the above, if they were accepted, the Reds were willing:

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Political Parties and Groups

The Chinese Communists and the Sian Revolt

(1) To suspend all armed activities throughout the country aiming at the overthrow of the National Government.

(2) To change the title of "The Soviet Government of China," to "The Special Area Government of the Republic of China," and to change the name "Red Army" to "The Chinese National Revolutionary Army," to be placed under the direction of the Military Affairs Commission.

(3) To further the realization of real democracy through the enforcement of popular suffrage in the area under the jurisdiction of the Special Area Government.

(4) To suspend the policy of land confiscation but resolutely carry out the national anti-Japanese policy.

To these proposals the Third Plenary Session made no response except to demand the "surrender" of the Reds on the following terms:

(1) Abolition of the Red Army and its incorporation into the national armed forces under unified command.

(2) Unification of government power in the hands of the Central Government and the dissolution of the so-called "Chinese Soviet Republic," and other organizations detrimental to governmental unity.

(3) Absolute cessation of communistic propaganda which is diametrically opposed to the Three People's Principles.

(4) Stoppage of the class struggle which splits society into antagonistic classes and invites mutual destruction.

The Session called attention to many alleged past misdeeds of the Reds such as fighting against the Central Government at a time when the latter was fighting Japan. It was also declared that while the communist scourge must be eliminated root and branch, the Kuomintang, in its great-hearted desire to harbor no grudges, was willing to accept the surrender of the Reds on the terms outlined above.

It is of course apparent that the terms of "surrender" as outlined by the Session coincide almost exactly with what the Reds had already offered to do if their own proposals were adopted. Since the conclusion of the Third Plenary Session, there have been some negotiations between the Reds and Nanking, but no announcements have been made concerning the results of these negotiations, if any. Chang Chung, member of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, recently returned to Nanking from a visit to North Shensi, but had nothing to say

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Political Parties and Groups

The Chinese Communists and the Sian Revolt.

to the press concerning the results of his visit. In spite of many rumors, it is generally believed that no basic settlement has been reached, but the little news which has leaked out indicates that the parleys may have resulted in a decision to continue the military truce which has prevailed since the settlement of the Sian affair, to cease attempts at an economic blockade of the Reds, and to attempt a search for a formula under which the Red Army and the Soviet areas can be incorporated into the national state. The Communists are said to still be demanding a reorganization of the Central Government on a democratic basis with all parties and armies, including the Reds, represented; and the adoption of a policy of resistance to Japan. On this basis the Reds are reported to be willing to "cooperate," as they say, or "surrender" as the Kuomintang puts it.

In any event, the Reds seem to have gained a decided advantage since the cessation of the military campaign against them last fall. While no truce has ever actually been made with them by the Central Government, they are at least free for the time being from harassment by the forces of the Central Government or other armies, they are allowed to do as they please in the area controlled from their capital in Yenan, northern Shensi, and the general impression is that their poverty has been relieved to a certain extent by money subsidies from Nanking.

Whether the Red situation will be allowed to remain in the present status quo remains to be seen. It is probable that Chiang Kai-shek would be perfectly willing to do so, but the existence of the Red-controlled districts, even in far distant Shensi, is a thorn in the side of Japan, and the Japanese are in a position, should they so desire, to exert strong pressure on Chiang to resume the anti-Red campaign.

The Red army forces are at present concentrated principally in the area Lochwan-Yenan in Shensi. There are still scattered Red forces in Kansu, but no definite reports concerning their strength and location have been received for some time.

Joseph W. Stilwell,

Joseph W. Stilwell
Colonel, Infantry
Military Attache

DDB

Distribution:
6 MID
1 Embassy
1 File

G-2 Report

RESTRICTED 6.1

2060

FEB 26 1937
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
WAR DEPARTMENT

2657-J-281
143

CHINA (Population & Social Con.)

Subject: Socialism, Radicalism, Communism

Chinese Communist Organization

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. FEB 25 1937

The following data and estimates on the Chinese Communist Army were furnished by Mr. Edgar Snow, correspondent of The London Daily Herald, who last year spent several months with the Reds and had free access to and many conversations with their high command. His information is considered very reliable.

THE CHINESE RED ARMY

(Official title now is Chung-kuo Jen-min Chun Kang-jih Hsien-fang Hung Chun: Chinese People's Anti-Japanese Vanguard Red Army.)

Organization

Commander-in-Chief - Chu Teh.
Chief of Staff - Chang Kuo-tao

Members of the Revolutionary Military Committee:

Chairman	Chu Teh
First vice-chairman	Chang Kuo-tao
Second " "	Chou En-lai
Third " "	Wang Chia-hsien

Other members:
Mao Tse-tung, Peng Teh-huai, Hsu Hsiang-chien, Hsu Hai-tung, Lin Piao, Ho Lung, Hsiao Keh, Lo P'ing-hui, Tso Chuan, Yeh Chien-ying, Ho Wei, etc.

The main forces of the regular Red Army have been reorganized, and are now grouped under a triple command, as the First, Second, and Fourth Front Armies:

I. The First Front Army:
Consists of two army corps, one artillery division, one Mohammedan training division, one independent Red division, three independent armies (more properly detachments), and two special regiments.

II. The Second Front Army:
Consists of three armies (so-called).

III. The Fourth Front Army:
Consists of five armies (so-called), and one Independent Cavalry Division.

A fourth command is called the Yo Chi Tui (Partisan Brigades) and consists of about 35 partisan groups, not fully armed, operating in northeastern Shensi, central Shensi and on the Shen-Kan border.

From M/A, China Report No. 9504 January 14, 1937

CHINA (Population &
Social Con.)

Subject: Socialism, Radicalism, Communism

Chinese Communist Organization

Following is a detailed statement of organization in the main forces operating in Shensi, Kansu and Ninghsia:

I. The First Front Army:
Commander-in-Chief, Peng Teh-huai
Chief of Staff, Nieh Ho-t'ing
Political Commissar, Peng Teh-huai
Chairman, Political Dept., Yang Shan-kun

A. The First Army Corps:
Commander, Lin Piao (at present in North Shensi, as president of the Red Army Academy--Hung Chun Ta Hsueh)
Acting Commander, Tso Chuan
Political Commissar, Nieh Jung-chen
Chairman, Political (Training) Dept., Chu Jui
Director, Agit-Prop. Dept., Liu Hsiao
Director, Public Health Dept., Dr. Tu Lo yuan (?)

(1) First Division -
Commander, Cheng Ken
Commissar, Yang Yun
Chairman, Political Dept., Lo Yuan-fu

Total no. troops - 3,000

(2) Second Division
Commander, Chin Kuan (now vice-president Red Army Academy)
Acting Commander, Yang Teh-chih
Political Commissar, Hsiao Hua
Chairman, Political Dept., Teng Hua

Total no. troops - 3,500

(3) Fourth Division
Commander, Li T'ien-yo
Political Commissar, Huang Ke-chen
Chief Political Dept., Hsu T'ung

Total no. troops - 2,500

(4) Fifth Cavalry Division
Commander, K'ang T'ien-ming
Political Commissar, Kao Chin-shuan

Total no. horses - 1,500

(5) Staff Regiment (mounted)
Commander, Chen ? ?
Political Commissar, Ch'ou Ch'uang-chen

Total of four companies, about 500

CHINA (Population &
Social Con.)

Subject: Socialism, Radicalism, Communism

Chinese Communist Organization

B. The Fifteenth Army Corps
Commander, Hsu Hai-tung
Political Commissar, Cheng Tze-hua
Chairman, Political Dept., Wang Shou-tao
Director, Agit-Prop. Dept., Huang Chen
Director, Public Health Dept., Chien Tsung-chien

(1) Seventy-Third Division
Commander, Chen Ching-hsu
Political Commissar, Hsiang Ju-ch'in
Chairman, Political Dept., Wang Chi-tsun

Total no. troops - 3,000

(2) Seventy-Fifth Division
Commander, Chang Shao-tung
Political Commissar, Chen Man-yuan
Political Dept., Chiung Wei

Total no. troops - 2,500

(3) Seventy-Eighth Division
Commander, Han Hsing-tsu
Political Commissar, Tsui T'ien-ming
Political Dept., T'ang Fu-jen

Total no. troops - 2,500

(4) ? ? Cavalry Regiment
Commander, Teng Chin-pao
Political Commissar, Sha Yun-t'ing

Total no. horses - 600

(5) Staff Regiment (Mounted)
Commander, Liu Pen-yi
Political Commissar, ? ?

Total no. horses, about 200

C. Artillery Division
Commander, Chu Jui
Political Commissar, ? ?

(1) Siege Gun Company
(2) Mountain Cannon Battalion
(3) Pei Chi P'ao (Trench Mortar) Regiment

Total no. men about 1,400

CHINA (Population &
Social Con.)

Subject: Socialism, Radicalism, Communism

Chinese Communist Organization

D. Mohammedan Training Division

(1) 15th Army Corps Moh. Training Regiment
(2) 1st Army Corps Mohammedan Training Regt.

About 800 each regiment, total, 1,600

*E. Independent Red Division
Commander, Yao Chieh
Political Commissar, Li Ling

Two regiments, about 1,500

*F. Twenty-Ninth Independent Army
Commander, Hsi Sung
Commissar, Kan Wei-han
Political Dept., Liu Shui-hui

One division; one regiment - about 2,000

*G. Thirtieth Independent Red Army
Commander, Yen Hung-yen
Commissar, Tsai Tsu-fan
Political Dept., Tu P'ing

One division
One regiment
One attack platoon
One independent company
One special company

Total no. troops, about 2,500

*H. Twenty-fifth (?) Independent Army
Commander, Ho Ching-pao
Commissar, Ma Hsin-kai

Independent Regiment
Commander, Wu Tai-feng
Commissar, T'ang Kai-lin

Independent Regiment
Commander, Yi Kuei
Commissar, Mo Shen-chung

Total, about 1,500

*I. First Special Regiment
Commander, Huang Tsun-p'u
Commissar, " " "

About 800

CHINA (Population &
Social Con.)

Subject: Socialism, Radicalism, Communism

Chinese Communist Organization

*J. Third Special Regiment
Commander, Kuo Ch'ing-hai
Commissar, same

About 400

Estimated total 30,500

II. Second Front Army
Commander-in-Chief, Ho Lung
Political Commissar, Jen Pi-shih
Chairman, Political Dept., Kuan Shan-ying
Agit-Prop. Dept., Wang ? ?

A. Second Army
Commander, Ho Lung
Political Commissar, Jen Pi-shih

B. Sixth Army
Commander, Hsiao Keh
Political Commissar, Wang Chen

C. Thirty-Second Army
Commander, Lo P'ing-hui
Political Commissar, Ho Ch'ang-kung

Estimated by Red Army Political
Department to total. 40,000

III. Fourth Front Army
Commander-in-chief, Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien
Political Commissar, Chang Kuo-tao
Political Dept., Chairman, Chen Ch'ang-hao
Agit-Prop. Dept., Fu Tsung

A. Fifty Army
Commander, Teng Chen-t'ang
Commissar, Huang Tsao
Political Dept. (unknown)

B. Ninth Army
Commander, Ho Wei
Commissar, Ho Wei
Political Dept., Sun Hsi

C. Fourth Army
Commander
Commissar

D. Thirtieth Army
Commander, Chen ? ?
Commissar, Li Hsien-nien

CHINA (Population &
Social Con.)

Subject: Socialism, Radicalism, Communism

Chinese Communist Organization

(Note: There appear to be two units called the "Thirtieth Army" -- the one in North Shensi apparently being distinguished from the other as the Thirtieth "Independent Red" army.)

E. Thirty-First Army
Commander, Yu T'ien-shou
Commissar, unknown.

F. Fourth Cavalry Division
Commander, Li Tsun-yi
Commissar, unknown

Strength, estimated by Red Army Political Department - total. 50,000

Note 1: The writer did not visit either the Second or Fourth Front Armies, which were in south and west Kansu, and northern Szechuan, at the time he travelled in Soviet regions. The figures given for the First Front Army are, however, fairly exact, as the writer inspected these units himself. Figures on the Second and Fourth Front Armies must be accepted with some reserve, however, as it has been impossible to check on them, except through numerous conversations, questioning of various people who had recently come from those armies, etc. Even the Political Department of the Red Army at Pao An was not able to state these figures with exactitude.

The estimates furnished by the Red Army Political Department are, it is interesting to note, only a fraction of what is claimed as the strength of the Red Army by the Chinese Communist Party's delegate at Moscow, Wang Ming. At the 7th Comintern Congress, Wang asserted that the Red Army now exceeds 500,000 men, not including partisans.

Note 2: The units checked thus (*) above, while under the general command of Peng Teh-huai, of the First Front Army, for strategic purposes, are in practice a separate command, known as the East Front Army, and operate mostly along the Great Wall in Shensi and Ninghsia, and garrison certain Red districts in northeastern Shensi. Chou En-lai is commander of the East Front Army (which also supervises the partisan brigades), and Yeh Chien-ying is chief-of-staff. Both Chou and Yeh were former Whampoa cadets.

Since the consolidation of the Second and Fourth Front armies with the First Front Army, some further reorganization has no doubt taken place. Chu Teh is said to have gone with part of his staff to Pao An, north Shensi, while Peng

CHINA (Population &
Social Con.)

Subject: Socialism, Radicalism, Communism

Chinese Communist Organization

Teh-huai has been given field command of the three Front Armies. There has doubtless also been considerable expansion of the Red Army, as a result of new enlistments and defeated Kuomintang troops. The Reds have destroyed five brigades of Hu Tsung-nan's First Army since November, two decisive battles taking place on November 17 and 21, in Kansu, and others late in December.

- - - - -

Joseph W. Stilwell,

Joseph W. Stilwell
Colonel, Infantry
Military Attache

Distribution:
6 MID
1 File

AMERICAN EMBASSY
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHÉ
CHUNGKING, CHINA.

2 Incl.
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
2657-I-281
149
WAR DEPARTMENT

1-1
CONFIDENTIAL

2657-9

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. FEB 5 1941

December 31, 1940

Subject: Notes on Relations between the National Government and the Chinese Communists.

To: The A.C. of S., G-2, War Department, Washington, D.C.

1. There is forwarded herewith, as Enclosure Number 1, a translation of a telegram sent on October 19, 1940, on behalf of the National Government, by Chief of the General Staff Ho Ying-chin and Vice-Chief of the General Staff Pai Chung-hsi to the Communist military leaders Generals Chu Teh, Peng Te-huai, and Yeh Ting. This document is of historical importance as it sets forth in detail the position of the National Government vis-a-vis the Communists at the time it was sent, and has accordingly been the basis of negotations between the two parties since that time. Sent as enclosures to the telegram are the Central (National) Government's proposals of July 16, 1940, for the settlement of outstanding issues between the two parties (See Paragraph 3. of the telegram of October 19th) and the proposals of Chow En-lai, on behalf of the Communists, for the adjustment of questions concerning guerilla forces and the areas in which they operate (see page 6 of Enclosure No. 1 to this letter.).

2. Chow En-lai was relieved on September 9,1940, from his position as Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Political Training of the Military Affairs Commission and appointed "Assistant Member in Charge of the Field Party and Political Committee" of the Military Affairs Commission. Actually this position means little and Chow, who is formally addressed as "Vice-Commissioner," but usually as "Mr.," performs few, if any, duties except as a liaison officer between the Communists and the National Government.

3. The telegram from Generals Ho and Pai of October 19, 1940, was replied to by Generals Chu Teh and Peng Te-huai in a long telegram dated November 9, 1940, but not received in Chungking until November 15, 1940. A translation of this telegraom, which was also signed by General Yeh Ting, Commanding the New Fourth Army, and General Hsiang Ying, Vice-Commander of the New Fourth Army, was forwarded in a letter from this office dated December 2, 1940, subject "Notes on Relations between the National Government and the Chinese Communists." This letter incorrectly gave the despatching date of the telegram from the Communist leaders as November 5, 1940.

4. Paragraphs 5 to 10, inclusive, of the enclosed telegram of October 19th set forth the National Government side of the clashes which occurred between the National Government and provincial troops and Communist forces in Shantung and Kiangsu in July, August, and October of 1934. A brief account of the Communist side of these clashes was forwarded in the letter, referred to above, from this office dated December 2, 1940. A more detailed report of the Communist version of these clashes has been obtained and will be forwarded, with analysis and comments, at a later date.

5. It is impossible to decide at this distance and from the reports now available as to which side was to blame for the clashes in Shantung and Kiangsu. The National Government account, however, appears straightforward and circumstantial. The fact that the report of General Yu Hsueh-chung (see Par. 6 of the telegram of October 19th) seems to blame the Communists for the attack on Lutsun, Shantung, is worthy of note as General Yu has a reputation for integrity and no hostility be-

File

tween him and the Communists has been reported by the latter. That the fighting in Kiangsu in October must have been heavy is indicated in Paragraph 9 of the telegram of October 19th, and it would appear that the National Government forces took some severe punishment. It is probable that both sides were more or less to blame for the clashes, but all the essential facts involved will probably never be known. Because the relations of the National Government and the Communists may have an important effect upon the future history of East Asia, however, the undersigned considers it worth while to gather such data as he can concerning these clashes.

6. Paragraph 13 of the telegram of October 19th directs that all Communist forces, both the 18th Group Army and the New Fourth Army, move to designated areas north of the Yellow River "within one month after the receipt of orders." Orders were subsequently issued that all units of the 18th Group Army then south of the Yellow River should move to the north thereof by the end of December, while all the New Fourth Army, including forces both north and south of the Yangtze, should move to the North of the Yellow River by the end of January, 1941.

7. On December 7th General Yeh Ting, Commanding the New Fourth Army, telegraphed General Ho Ying-chin setting forth in detail the difficulties with which he was faced in moving north and making the following requests:

(1) Payment of allowances from the National Government for the support of his army for October (already partially paid) and November, and payment in advance of this allowance for December.

(2) Payment of Yuan$100,000 for pensions for killed and solatiums for wounded and disabled.

(3) Payment of Yuan$300,000 for the manufacture of winter uniforms.

(4) One million rounds each of rifle and machine gun ammunition.

(5) Cooperation of National Government and provincial troops in his move north.

(6) Increase of allowances from the National Government to Yuan$250,000 per month, to be paid directly by Commissariat Headquarters in Chungking. (Previous method of payment not known, possibly through War Zone Hq. DDB).

8. It is reported from Communist sources that after receiving this telegram, the National Government made certain grants of money and ammunition, but in what amounts, if any, is not known. The complete text of the telegram referred to is enclosed. (See Page 6 of Enclosure No. 1 to this letter.

9. According to General Ho Ying-chin, the transfer of Communist forces from the south of the Yangtze to the north thereof was begun in December but has not been completed and as yet the Communists have not begun to move toward the north of the Yellow River. Communist sources point out that General Yeh Ting, Commanding the New Fourth Army, did not refuse to move his troops north of the Yellow River, as a perusal of his telegram of December 7th will show, but that he is desirous of entering into further negotiations with the National Government concerning his move, particularly with regard to money for expenses and partial compensation for moving to an area where living con-

ditions are very hard. As far as is known the forces of the 18th Group Army still south of the Yellow River have as yet made no move to proceed toward the areas to which they have been assigned north of that river. The undersigned expects that all of the 18th Group and New Fourth Armies will eventually move north of the Yellow River after some negotiations and the payment of some money by the National Government, provided, of course, that there is no unforseen change in the present situation in China.

10. The grievances of the National Government against the Communists are clearly and succinctly summed up in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the telegram of October 19th. The stand of the National Government appears reasonable, especially in the way in which it points out the difficulties which the military leaders of the government face in handling the Communists as a part of the forces supposedly under their command.

11. Paragraph 2 of Enclosure No. 1 to the telegram of October 19th (see Page 3 of Enclosure No. 1 to this letter) is worthy of note as it gives the final decision of the Government on the question of the political organization of and the hsiens to be included in "The North Shensi Administrative Area," which is the new name for "The Border Area," as the Communist-controlled area of Shensi, Kansu, and Ninghsia was formerly known. The list of hsien given to the Communists as given in the telegram agrees with that contained in a letter from this office dated November 9th, 1940, subject, "Hsien Controlled by the Chinese Communists in Northwest China." In this letter Kiahsien was incorrectly listed as "Tuanhsien," due to a mistake in reading the Chinese character. A sketch showing the hsien in the North Shensi Administrative Area is forwarded, with Chinese characters, as Enclosure Number 2 to this letter.

12. Sub-paragraph (4) of Paragraph 3 of Enclosure Number 1 to the telegram of October 19th (see page 5 of Enclosure Number 1 to this letter) delineates the areas to which the National Government has ordered all Communist forces not already there to move and to confine their activities henceforth. Almost every hsien city and many of the smaller cities and villages in these areas are in the hands of the Japanese. In addition, Hopei and Shantung have suffered heavily from famine during the past two years, hence the country to which the Communists are ordered is no paradise. As noted before in reports from this office, certain observers of a pessimistic turn of mind interpret the anxiety of the National Government to get the Communists north of the Yellow River as springing from a desire to have them in a part of China which is very likely to be conceded, openly or in effect, to Japan if and when peace is made. Whether this be true or not, it is evident that if the Communists ever carry out completely the moves which have been ordered, they will find themselves in a position where they can do little to harm the National Government. Whether they can do it much good in the way of fighting the Japanese in this area remains to be seen, but apparently the National Government is willing to run the risk that they may not be able to accomplish a great deal.

13. Chow En-lai's proposals for the settlement of the guerilla question are interesting. They are evidently prompted by a desire on the part of the communists to do as much as they can for the local population who have been organized to carry on guerilla warfare in areas which the Communists will probably evacuate. Chow's proposals are very general in nature and are, in effect, that all guerilla units, wherever they may be, should be recognized in status quo and receive pay and be allowed to continue their operations. As the acceptance of these proposals would have given the guerillas considerable standing and

largely tied the hands of the National Government in controlling them, it is not surprising that the latter rejected them almost in toto (see Paragraph 14 to the telegram of October 19th on Page 3 of Enclosure No. 1 to this letter).

14. The longer the relations of the National Government and the Communists are studied, the more clearly the position of both sides can be appreciated. The Communists find themselves in a situation in which they are supposed to fight the Japanese but are distrusted by the National Government and given as little as possible with which to maintain themselves and resist the enemy. The National Government, on the other hand, finds itself faced with the problem of handling forces which in some cases refuse to obey orders and often act on their own initiative. This affects unity of command and coordination of war effort and is naturally annoying to a Government trying to carry on a life and death struggle against aggression. The Communists, moreoever, carry on extensive work in the way of organizing the civil population for the purpose, so they claim, of resisting the Japanese. The National Government, however, looks upon this organization of the people with suspicion as a possible attempt to sow seeds of disloyalty toward the present Chinese governmental set-up. There is much to be said on both sides.

15. The documents forwarded in this letter were published in pamphlet form by the Communists, but were never released to the public by the National Government. The willingness of the Communists to publish them is somewhat surprising, as not all the matter contained therein is exactly to their credit. Other documents published at the same time as these include the following:

Proposals of the Chinese Communist Party for the Settlement of Differences between the Two Parties. (June, 1940).

First Reply of the Chinese Kuomintang Party to the above Proposals. (July 2, 1940).

Reply of the Chinese Communist Party to the Proposals of the Kuomintang. (This was in reply to the proposals from the National Government of July 16, 1940, forwarded herewith as Enclosure Number 1 to the telegram of October 19, 1940.

The documents listed above will be forwarded, with comments, at a later date.

16. The documents concerning relations between the National Government and the Communists have of necessity been forwarded by this office in somewhat piece-meal form. It is intended to incorporate all material available into one study to be forwarded in the near future.

David D. Barrett
David D. Barrett,
Lieut. Col., Ordnance Dep't.,
Assistant M/A.

Enclosures: No. 1, Text of telegram from Ho Ying-chin to Communist leaders, dated October 19, 1940.
Text of telegram from C.G. New Fourth Army, to National Government dated December 7, 1940.
No. 2, Map of North Shensi Administrative Area.

Copy to M.A., American Embassy, Peiping.

Encl 1
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
1-13 1941
2657-I-281
149
WAR DEPARTMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

TEXT OF TELEGRAM FROM GENERALS HO YING-CHIN AND PAI CHUNG-HSI TO GENERALS CHU TEH, PENG TEH-HUAI, AND YEH TING. DATE: OCTOBER 19, 1940.

To General Yeh Chien-ying, Chief of Staff of the 18th Army Corps:

For immediate transmission to Commander-in-Chief Chu Yu-chai (Chu Teh), Vice-Commander-in-Chief Peng Teh-huai, and Commander of the New Fourth Army Yeh Hsie-yi (Yeh Ting).

(Note: Paragraphs in the original telegram were not numbered. Numbers have been inserted to facilitate reference to particular sections. DDB).

1. The existence or extinction of the race depends on the success or failure of armed resistance, and the result of armed resistance depends on the strictness of military discipline. The 18th Army Corps and the New Fourth Army were at the beginning of resistance able to abide by instructions and were not without merit as they resisted aggression and were properly organized.

2. Unexpectedly disputes took place prior to the extermination of the enemy. Conflicts were reported brewing from time to time. Chang Ying-wu's Hopei militia were cruelly disposed of and the Hopei provincial government of Lu Chung-lin was also dispered. The revolting units (of Yen Hsi-shan's Army) in Shansi were permitted to escape and Shih Yu-shan was evicted. Not only did the 18th Group Army and the New Fourth Army act without restraint, but they also looked upon friendly (National Government) troops as enemies, thus diminishing the power of armed resistance against the Japanese.

3. The authorities of the Central Government have been lenient and have stuck to their determination to carry out their present difficult and dangerous task. They therefore instructed us, Ho Ying-chin and Pai Chung-hsi, to consult with Vice-Commissioner Chou En-lai and Chief of Staff Yeh Chien-ying concerning methods of dealing with the situation. Several conferences were held with the result that on July 16, 1940, a generaous and concrete proposal was made. This proposal was approved and given to Vice-Commissioner Chow En-lai, who flew to Shensi on July 24th to hold discussions with Generals Chu and Peng and to act in pursuance thereof. Moreover, on July 28th, I, Ho Ying-chin, issued a telegraphic order to various units directing them to avoid clashing with the 18th Group Army and the New Fourth Army.

See back →

4. When Vice-Commissioner Chow En-lai returned to Chungking he did not indicate, however, whether the proposal agreed to would be acted upon accordingly, but proposed three methods for the adjustment of guerilla areas and guerilla units, thus making it still more difficult for the Central authorities to act in the matter.

5. Very recently, on August 11th, a unit of the 18th Group Army under Hsu Hsiang-chien launched attacks from several directions on Lutsun, seat of the Shantung Provincial Government. Provincial Chairman Shen Hung-lieh, having been instructed to avoid clashes, therefore withdrew his troops. Hsu captured Lutsun on August 14th and continued to advance. The Shantung Provincial Government and the troops under its jurisdiction suffered heavy losses. The Generalissimo's headquarters strictly ordered Hsu's units to withdraw, and also ordered General Yu Hsueh-chung, Commanding the Kiangsu-Shantung War Zone, to submit a report.

6. In a telegram dated September 5th, General Yu Hsueh-chung reported that Hsu Hsiang-chien's troops attacked and occupied Lutsun on the 14th; that his headquarters repeatedly telegraphed

Enclosure #1.

Hsu to cease attacking and to withdraw from Lutsun; that while Hsu immediately replied that he was willing to act according to instructions, he actually failed to do so; that when the enemy (the Japanese) in the Poshan-Hsintai (northeast and southwest, respectively, of Taian, on the Tientsin-Pukow RR) area attacked Lutsun, Hsu's forces retreated therefrom without engaging the enemy so that Lutsun was taken by the Japanese on August 18th. General Yu also reported that the enemy withdrew from Lutsun on the 22nd and Hsu's forces again entered the town, but evacuated it on the 23rd.

7. In addition, in northern Kiangsu, units of the New Fourth Army under Chen Yi and Kuan Wen-wei arbitrarily left their defence areas south of the Yangtze in July, crossed the river and attacked troops under the command of Chen Mou-lien, a subordinate of General Han Teh-chin, Chairman of the Kiangsu Provincial Government. They attacked and took Kuchi and Chiangpa (20 kms southwest, and 30 kms, west, respectively, of Jukao) in Jukao Hsien (Jukao is north of the Yangtze, 210 kms. northwest of Shanghai). They also captured Hwangchiao (25 kms. northeast of Taihsing) in Taihsing Hsien (60 kms. southwest of Jukao); and Chiangyen (25 kms. east of Taihsien) and Chutang (32 kms. east of Taihsien) in Taihsien (65 kms. west of Jukao).

8. They established tax barriers in all these places, confiscated the people's ammunition, and later formed an Administrative Committee in violation of the Central Government's administrative system. The Generalissimo's Headquarters issued strict orders to stop such acts, but they harshly declined to obey.

9. Again, on October 4th, the New Fourth Army began severe attacks on the provincial troops of General Han Te-hin, Chairman of Kiangsu, in north Kiangsu. The commander of the 16th Regiment of General Han's 6th Independent Brigade was killed. (Regimental Commander also named Han). On October 5th they attacked the 89th Army and took several thousand prisoners, inclding Sun Chi-jen, Commanding the 33rd Division, 89th Army; Brigadier General Miao Jui-ti, and some subordinate officers. On the night of October 5th they continued their attacks, causing Army Commander Li Shou-wei, Brigadier General Weng, Regimental Commander Chin, and other officers to fall into the water. The fate of these officers is still unknown. Numerous other officials, assistants, and soldiers were killed.

10. The troops of General Han Te-chin have been gradually withdrawn to the vicinity of Tungtai (52 kms. northwest of Jukao), but the New Fourth Army has continued its attacks. Meanwhile, Peng Ming-chih's unit of the 18th Army Corps (18th Group Army) began to attack southward on the 6th of October. Since North Kiangsu and Shantung Province are not war areas of the 18th Group Army and the New Fourth Army, they have operated outside of their proper areas. They have retreated without engaging the enemy and have attacked friendly troops. They have procrastinated, and even failed to obey, in carrying out the terms of a proposal delivered to them after it had been agreed upon, and they have often performed illegal acts. These actions only disappoint their military comrades and play into the hands of the enemy bandits.

11. The repeated occurence of unfortunate incidents and the loose talk about "many men and little money" were due to the following:

(1) The failure of the 18th Group Army and the New Fourth Army to stay within the limits of their war areas and their capricious actions.
(2) Violations of recuiting limits and free augmentation of their troops.
(3) Violations of orders of the Central Government and destruction of the Central Government administration.
(4) Attempts to incorporate friendly (Central Govt. or provincial troops) troops into their own forces, or to destroy them, instead of fighting the enemy.

12. The four points noted above constitute the foundation of the so-called clashes, and are also the facts concerning the illegal acts of the 18th Group Army and the New Fourth Army. Unless such actions are remedied, these forces cannot be considered as revolutionary units of the National Revolutionary Army.

13. Apart from the north Kiangsu incident, concerning which the Generalissimo has issued a seprate order which it is hoped you will strictly obey, we have been officially instructed to send you a copy of the proposal which was discussed and was approved by the Central Government authorities. (See Para. 3, above). The various units of the 18th Group Army and the New Fourth Army are all required to move into the war areas provided for in Category 3 of the Central Government's approved proposal within one month after the receipt of this telegram, and also to abide strictly by all other provisions of this category, meanwhile patiently awaiting the instructions of the Central Government concerning the enforcement of other categories of the approved proposal.

14. As to the three proposals made by Vice-Commissioner Chou En-lai concerning the adjustment of guerilla areas and guerilla units, the first and third proposals cannot be approved. After the 18th Group and New Fourth Armies have arrived in ther prescribed areas, consideration will be given to taking action concerning the third porposal. Your reply is requested.

Ho Ying-Chin, Chief of General Staff
Pai Chung-hsi, Vice-Chief of General Staff.

October 19, 1940.

Enclosures:
Copy of the Central Government's proposal dated July 16, 1940.
Copy of Chow En-lai's three proposals concerning the adjustment of guerilla areas and guerilla units.

ENCLOSURE NUMBER ONE

1. Relating to the question of Party: Final decision of the Central Government made in accordance with the provisions of Article 226 of the "General Principles Governing Armed Resistance and National Reconstruction."

2. Relating to the question of the "Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region": The final decision of the Central Government is as follows:

Area: In Shensi,- Suiteh, ~~Michih~~ Mitse, Wupu, Kiahsien, Chingchien, Yenan, Yenchang, Yenchuan, Paoan, Anting, Ansi, Kanchuan, and Fuhsien; and a portion each of the two hsien of Tingpien and Chingpien (not including Tingpien city, but including Chingpien city).
In Kansu: Hoshui and Huanhsien, and a portion of Chingyang (including Chingyang city).
This is a total of eighteen hsien (Tingpien, Ching-

pien, and Chingyang not completely under Communist control).

NAME: Name has been changed to "North Shensi Administrative Area," and its administrative organization called "North Shensi Administrative Area Headquarters."

Subordinate Jurisdiction: The North Shensi Administrative Area Headquarters shall be temporarily subordinate to the Executive Yuan, but shall be placed under the guidance of the Shensi Provincial Government. The various hsien in the Area shall be under the direct jurisdiction of Area Headquarters. No other intermediate organizations will be established.

Organization: The Headquarters shall have a director. Detailed information concerning the organization shall be determined by orders of the Central Government. The administrative structure for the hsien and lower organs shall be uniformly subject to no change.

Official Instructions: All official instructions in the Area shall be uniformly in accordance with Government laws and ordinances now in force.

Personnel: The Director of the Area and hsien magistrates will be appointed by the Government upon recommendation of the 18th Group Army.

Stationing of Troops: Units of the 18th Group Army stationed in Shensi, Kansu, and Ninghsia shall all be withdrawn inside the Administrative Area.

Remarks: No other areas shall follow the example of this Area. Public officials and supplies passing through the Area shall not be subject to interference. No arbitrary issuing of banknotes shall be permitted within the Area. An attitude of hostility shall not be assumed aginst persons in the Area who in the past have not been on cordial terms with the 18th Group Army. An office of the Military Affairs Commission shall be re-established in Suiteh and Central Government troops stationed there.

3. Relating to the question of the war area of the 18th Group and New Fourth Armies, the final decision of the Central Government is as follows:

(1) The Hopei-Chahar War Zone is abolished. The two provinces of Hopei and Chahar and that part of Shantung north of the Yellow River shall be incorporated into the Second War Zone. Yen Hsi-shan is to remain as Commander-in-Chief and Wei Li-huang and Chu Teh are to continue as Vice-Commanders of the Second War Zone. (That part of Shantung north of the Yellow River shall be called in abbreviation "North Shantung" and includes the following 26 (sic) Hsien: Litsing, Putai, Pinhsien, Chanhwa, Wuti, Loling, Hweimin, Tehping, Shangho, Linghsien, Linyi, Tsiyang, Techow, Pingyuan, Yucheng, Tsiho, Enhsien, Wucheng, Siatsing, Lintsing, Kaotang, Tsingping, Poping, Jenping, Liaocheng, Kiuhsien, Kwantao, Tangyi, Kouhsien, Hwahsien, Chaocheng, Yangku, Showchang, Fannsien, Kwanhsien, and Chengpohsien. The Yellow River shall be the southern boundary.)

The boundary of the Second War Zone is as shown on the appended map (not enclosed). This boundary, however, is of a temporary and not permanent nature; nor is it of a political nature. The War orders of the Military Affairs Commission are subject to no restrictions.

(2) Concerning the command of operations, the War Zone Commander-in-Chief shall act under orders of the Military Affairs Commission. The various Vice-Commanders shall abide absolutely by the orders of the Commander-in-Chief in conducting operations. They must not interfere with political and party affairs in the War Zone or arbitrarily issue banknotes.

(3) In order to facilitate military operations, Vice-Commander Wei Li-huang shall be responsible for Southeast Shansi; Vice-Commander Chu Teh shall be responsible for Hopei and Chahar and a portion each of north Shantung and north Shansi; and the Commander-in-Chief (Yen Hsi-shan) shall be directly responsible for southwest Shansi.

Commander-in-Chief Yen Hsi-shan shall present a coordinated proposal to the Military Affairs Commission concerning the detailed demarcation of war areas in Shansi Province.

(4) The entire 18th Group Army and the New Fourth Army shall be transferred to the area for which Vice-Commander Chu Teh is responsible (Hopei and Chahar, north Shantung, and north Shansi). The New Fourth Army shall be included in the military operations schedule of the 18th Group Army and shall be subject to the command of Vice-Commander Chu Teh.

(5) All units of the 18th Army Corps (18th Group Army) and the New Fourth Army shall within one month of the receipt of orders arrive in the area prescribed in the above articles.

(6) After they are transferred to the area prescribed in the preceding articles, the 18th Group Army and the New Fourth Army must not establish at the places where they were originally stationed (their present stations) any garrison headquarters, offices, information centers, or similar organs.

(7) After they are transferred to the area prescribed above, the 18th Group and New Fourth Armies must not station detachments in the areas which they have vacated under changed names or store arms and ammunition there. They especially must not, under the pretext of protecting the people by utilizing their strength against Japan, secretly and actively arm in their original areas. This is enjoined in order to avoid giving rise to local disturbances.

(8) Unless so instructed by the Military Affairs Commission, the 18th Group and New Fourth Armies must not arbitrarily proceed beyond the area prescribed above. Unless otherwise provided for in orders of the Military Affairs Commission, there must not be any units whatsoever in other War Zones or places in the name of the 18th Group or New Fourth Armies.

(9) The Chairmen of the Hopei and Chahar Provincial Governments shall be select4d and appointed by the Central Government. Vice-Commander Chu Teh may recommend three to five members of the Provincial Governments. The headquarters of the Hopei and Chahar Provincial Governments are temporarily located in the vicinity of Taming and Yuhsien in order to facilitate the performance of duties.

4. Relating to the question of the organization of the 18th Group and New Fourth Armies, the final decision of the Central Government is as follows:

(1) The 18th Group Army shall consist of three armies with six divisions, three recruiting regiments, and three additional recruiting regiments. No detachments are allowed. (The division organization is the adjusted division system of two brigades of two regiments each.)

(2) The New Fourth Army shall be composed of two divisions. (Division organization, two brigades of two regiments each).

(3) The 18th Group and New Fourth Armies shall abide by the following:

Absolutely obey orders.

All columns, detachments, and other guerilla units shall be abolished within a time limit. After armies are organized, no further appointments shall be made under any name and no additional troops shall be independently organized.

The Military Affairs Commission may send officers at any time to conduct a count and inspection.

Personnel management shall be effected according to military laws and regulations. Expenditures, temporarily taking an army as a unit, shall be obtained directly from the Commissariat.

Pay of soldiers shall be as provided in the Commissariat regulations of the Central Government. The Military Affairs Commission may send officers at any time to conduct a count and inspection.

ENCLOSURE NUMBER TWO

(Proposals of Chow En-lai concerning methods of adjustment of guerilla areas and guerilla units).

(1) Expansion of the Second War Zone to include the whole of Shantung Province and a part of Suiyuan.

(2) Payment of military pay to the 18th Group Army, New Fourth Army, and guerilla units in various places according to their full strength.

(3) The various guerilla units are to remain in the various war zones which are delimited as their areas of combat and separately engage the enemy.

TEXT OF TELEGRAM FROM GENERAL YEH TING, COMMANDING NEW FOURTH ARMY, TO CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF HO YING CHIN AND VICE-CHIEF PAI CHUNG HSI (TRANSMITTED THROUGH GENERAL YEH CHIEN YING, CHIEF OF STAFF OF EIGHTEENTH GROUP ARMY.

Referring to your telegram of the 19th of October, Commander-in-Chief Chu Teh and Vice-Commander Peng Teh-huai replied on the 9th of November, reporting in detail their difficulties and anxieties. Prompt preparations are being made separately for the northward transfer of the regular units. I have personally visited the Headquarters of the War Zone Commander-in-Chief at Shangjao to request full instructions.

There are, however, matters which should be taken care of before the transfer is begun. These are as follows:

(1) Expense money for the month of October has not been paid in full; of the November expenses, not a cent has been paid; while December expenses are due very soon. Before moving it is necessary to liquidate accumulated local debts, and pay in arrears to my soldiers must be partially paid. As the treasury of my Army is now empty, I cannot but await the payment of funds under these circumstances.

(2) It is now late in the winter but winter uniforms have not been prepared. In my last petition, I reported that the amount needed for winter uniforms was well over $400,000 (local currency). Only $100,000 has been received. This is quite a discrepancy.

Since cotton piece-goods are more expensive north of the Yangtze than south of the river, and since labor costs are higher in the former than in the latter area, the soldiers will, unless uniforms are speedily prepared, have to suffer cold and hunger after crossing the river. Therefore I must await the receipt of the amount, as estimated, for the preparation of winter uniforms.

(3) My Army has been fighting south of the Yangtze for three years. The wounded, disabled, and killed have been sacrificed for the nation. Now that my Army is to be transferred to a distant place, these unfortunates are unable to accompany us, and I cannot very well neglect them. Only if the wounded and sick are taken care of according to precedent will they feel easy. During three years of warfare, no pensions have been paid covering the men of my Army killed and wounded. I respectfully request that $100,000 be paid in full at one time for this purpose. I have no recourse but to wait for the granting of pension funds.

(4) Not a single round of ammunition has been received by my Army since March of this year, except 50,000 rounds received during the campaign against the Japanese mopping-up operations in September near Kinghsien (Anhui). Now each soldier has only ten rounds of ammunition for each rifle. Once my soldiers start on the journey, they must travel behind the enemy lines. The enemy and the puppets have blockaded the Yangtze on a large scale and it is not easy to cross. A bitter fight is thus expected and without sufficient ammunition, this fighting will be difficult. It is therefore requested that my Army be supplied with one million rounds each of rifle and machine-gun ammunition. Thus I cannot but wait for the supplying of ammunition.

(5) Units of my Army in South Anhui must make a long journey as they must first move to south Kiangsu before crossing the river. Preparations for rationing and quartering and for transporting supplies must be dependent upon the assistance of the local authorities and garrison troops met enroute. If the local authorities render no assistance and if the garrison troops met enroute prepare to take hostile action, the passage of large numbers of my troops will be impossible. The assistance of local authorities and the permission for passage by garrison troops are therefore necessary.

(6) The itinerary of my Army's northward crossing has not been fixed. Furthermore, commodity prices are rising. The original amount of the appropriation for expenditures is far from sufficient. It is requested that hereafter such appropriation be paid directly by the Commissariat in Chungking and that the appropriation be increased to the amount to which my Army is entitled, that is, $250,000. I cannot but await your instructions on this point.

The above are the absolutely minimum requisites for the removal of my Army. Yesterday, I received telegraphic instructions from the War Zone Commander-in-Chief, General Ku Chu-tung, directing my Army to start within a time limit. He pressed me urgently, but has made no reply to my detailed report concerning my difficulties when I called to request instructions at Shangjao and my repeated telegraphic requests since my return.

Even if the Army starts on the journey by following a dangerous route, those who go have but a single garment each and are barefooted, and those who remain are pitifully disabled. Ammunition is insufficient and on the way there are thousands of enemy fortresses and numerous friendly units (Central Government and provincial troops). The route, moreover, is bisected by the Yangtze. It will be impracticable, if not impossible, to carry out my instructions even if I exhaust every effort under such conditions. My officers are worried and my soldiers hesitant. I do not know what to do. I report the above frankly and earnestly await your instructions.

Yeh Ting (Commanding New Fourth Army)
Hsiang Ying (Vice-Commander, New Fourth Army)

December 7, 1940.

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL., INTEL. DIV.
JAN 8 1941
1-1 2659-2-281
147
WAR DEPARTMENT

AMERICAN EMBASSY
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE
CHUNGKING, CHINA.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL., INTEL. DIV.
JAN 10 1941
1-1 2657-2-281
CONFIDENTIAL 147
WAR DEPARTMENT

Chungking,
December 2, 1940.

Subject: Notes on Relations between the National Government and the Chinese Communists.

To: The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, Washington, D.C.

Forwarded herewith is a copy of a telegram sent by the Chinese Communist military leaders Chu Teh and Peng Te-huai to Generals Ho Ying-chin and Pai Chung-hsi, respectively Chief of Staff and Deputy Chief of Staff of the Chinese Army. The telegram is also signed by the Commanding General and Vice-commander of the New Fourth Army, now stationed in Kiangsu and Anhui on both sides of the Yangtze River.

This telegram, a very long one, is partly in answer to two telegrams recently sent by General Ho Ying-chin directing the New Fourth Army to move from its present location to areas north of the Yellow River in Hopei and Shansi. The first of these two telegrams from Ho Ying-chin was sent about October 19th, 1940, the second around November 5, 1940. The second telegram directed that the move of the New Fourth Army be completed by the end of November, 1940.

The telegram from the Communist leaders not only sets forth in detail their reaction to the orders for the New Fourth Army to move north, but also explains at length the Communist position toward a number of issues affecting relations between them and the National Government, and makes several important requests. The essential points in the telegram are summarized below:

(1) The Chinese Communists are loyal to the National Government of China. Recent clashes with National Government forces in Shantung and Kiangsu are regretted. An impartial investigation of these clashes would be welcomed.

(2) The New Fourth Army does not wish to leave its present garrison area to move north of the Yellow River. The areas to which they have been ordered cannot support the troops and civil population now living there, let alone any additional forces. The New Fourth Army fears their families and homes will be attacked by Japanese and hostile Chinese troops if the Communist troops leave them behind unguarded.

(3) The leaders of the New Fourth Army will try to persuade their troops now south of the Yangtze River to move north thereof. After the war is over, all Communist troops can be concentrated in one area, but now is not an opportune time to do so.

(4) If the New Fourth Army moves north, it will

File
JAV

lose the enthusiastic support of the people which is ncessary for the ultimate victory. Strife between the Communists and the National Government weakens the national power of resistance.

(5) The Communist forces now number over 500,000 including the local populations which have been organized for guerrila warfare. At present the Communists are receiving pay for the support of only 45,000 men. An increase in the funds for the support of the Communist forces is requested.

(6) The Communist forces have received no munitions or medical supplies for over a year. Adequate supplies are requested.

(7) Early settlement is urged of the question of the control of the twenty hsien originally included in the "Border Region" of Shensi, Kansu, and Ninghsia. The blockade of the "Border Region" by National Government troops should be lifted.

(8) Final victory is in sight if China is not split into factions. Japanese plans to stir up the forces of the National Government to fight the Communists should be frustrated.

~~Since the telegram referred to above was sent, no reports have been received for~~

As far as is known, the National Government has not yet answered the telegram referred to above. Chou En-lai, Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Political Training of the Military Affairs Commission and political representative of the Chinese Communists in Chungking, told the undersigned on November 27th that the National Government was moving forces, particularly in eastern Anhui, into position to attack the New Fourth Army in its present location, and he feared that if these moves were not halted, a serious crisis might result. He further stated that Government forces had been disposed north of the Yellow River so that if the Communists moved into the area assigned them they would be exposed to attacks on both flanks, which attacks he feared would be made.

No reports have been received of recent clashes between the Communists and the National Government or provincial forces. Communist sources state that their troops are quietly waiting, hoping that the National Government will halt its menacing troop moves and that matters outstanding between the two factions, particularly the question of the move north of the New Fourth Army, can be settled amicably by negotiation.

Reports from high official circles, which may be taken as generally representating conservative pro-Kuomintang opinion, state that the the New Fourth Army in Anhui and Kiangsu has been organizing the people ostensibly for resistance against the Japanese but actually to oppose the control of the National Government. It is also claimed in these quarters

that attacks by the New Fourth Army on the Japanese rear in Kiangsu and Anhui have not been as effective as the Communists claim, and that National Government troops could operate much more effectively in these areas if the Chinese Red forces were out of the way. Consequently, so state these reports, the National Government is anxious to remove the New Fourth Army to an area where its political activities will not endanger the Chinese Government and where its military inefficiency will not interfere with the plans of the Chinese high command.

The desire of the National Government to get the Communist forces out of the Yangtze River Valley has given an opportunity to some observers who are constantly scanning the horizon for signs of weakening of Chinese resistance to opine that the leaders of free China may be envisaging the possibility of having to make peace with the Japanese or the Nanking puppets, and are consequently anxious to get the Communists where their probable opposition to peace moves would make little difference. The undersigned does not subscribe to this viewpoint.

The following gives the Communist side of some the clashes which have occurred between National Government and provincial troops and those of the 18th ~~Rmtkxff~~ Group (former Eighth Route) and New Fourth Armies.

In Shantung trouble between National Government forces and provincial troops and the Communists has been due principally to hostility toward the latter on the part of Miao Chen-liu, Commanding the 57th Army (formerly under Yu Hsueh-chung, now commanding the Shantung-Kiangsu War Zone), and Shen Hung-lieh, Governor of the unoccupied part of Shantung. The Communists claim that Miao Chen-liu has carried out traitorous negotiations with the Japanese and has even attempted to sell out to them, which facts were reported to the National Government, but no attention was paid to the reports. Shen Hung-lieh, so the Communists state, is an arch-reactionary who does not stoop to collusion with the Japanese against the Communists.

In the middle of August, 1940, when the Fourth Brigade (called by the Communists a "Chih Tui") of the 18th Group Army was engaging the Japanese near Lutsun, 30 Kilometers east of Taian, Shantung, a force of 4,000 Shantung provincial troops and Marines, at the instigation of the Shen Hung-lieh, attacked the Communists. The latter fought back, and using Lutsun as a base, broke up the hostile attack. At the suggestion of Yu Hsueh-chung, who was asked to mediate in the affair, the 18th Group Army evacuated Lutsun, which promptly fell back into Japanese hands. Shen Hung-lieh claimed that the 18th Group Army forces attacked first, but the Communists maintain that the people of Shantung are witnesses to the contrary.

Relations between Kiangsu provincial troops and forces of the New Fourth Army stationed in Anhui and Kiangsu deterio-

ated during the spring of 1940, and beginning in March there were minor clashes in which the Communists claimed their forces in the Hofei-Chuhsien area of Anhui were attacked. The New Fourth Army eventually withdrew from Chuhsien.

In August, after some negotiation concerning the garrison areas of Kiangsu provincial troops and Communist forces in Kiangsu, it was agreed that the former would remain north of a line running through Haian and Chutang, towns north of the Yangtze river about 175 kilometers northeast of Nanking, while the Communists were to stay south of this line. The Communists claim that on September 4, 1940, Kiangsu provincial troops crossed this line and attacked them. The Communists then withdrew to an area east of Huangchiao, about twenty five kilometers south of Haian, where they were again attacked and there was heavy fighting on September 5th in which both sides suffered considerable casualties.

On October 5th, Kiangsu provincial forces again attacked Huangchiao, forcing the Communists back toward the Yangtze River. Part of the 18th Group Army came down from the Hsuchow area to "mediate" (as the Communists put it) in the fighting, which lasted for some days. Communist reports on the circumstances and ultimate result of the fighting are vague, but state that casualties on both sides were heavy. All that is known of the clash from National Government sources is that the fighting was eventually stopped and the affair temporarily patched up.

The above notes are believed to be of interest as bearing on a phase of the present war in China about which it is difficult to obtain information from official sources. Most of the information in this report, except that obtained from Chou En-lai and official sources, was obtained from a foreign source with a distinct pro-Communist bias, but whose reports have been found reliable in the past.

The undersigned still holds to the opinion, often expressed in previous reports, that the Communists are not strong enough to embarrass the National Government seriously even if they so desired. He believes that relations between the two factions will continue, as in the past, to be marked by clashes, followed by temporary settlements, and then further clashes.

There is no doubt that if the National Government ever emerges victorious from the present conflict, a determined effort will be made to wipe out the Communists for good and all, but unless the influence of some hot heads and super-conservatives in the National Government becomes very strong, the undersigned does not expect the latter to engage in a decisive struggle with the Communists in the near future. To engage in a real fight with the Communists now would appear a disastrous move, because it would play so strongly into the hand of Japan.

David D. Barrett

David D. Barrett, Lieut. Col., Ord. Dep't., Ass't MA.

1 Enclosure

AMERICAN EMBASSY, OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL., INTEL. DIV.
WAR DEPARTMENT
APR 11 1940

Chungking, China,
March 11, 1940

Subject: Some Notes on Relations between the National Government and the Chinese Communists.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 10 1940

To: The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, Washington, D.C.

1. The information contained in this report was obtained from what is considered a reliable source having close relations with the Communists. It is believed to be of interest as having to do with the background of the present relations between the National Government and the Communists.

2. After the kidnapping of Chiang Kai-shek by Chang Hsueh-liang in 1937, commonly referred to as the "Sian Incident," and before the outbreak of the war with Japan, an agreement was concluded between Chiang and the Communists whereby twenty three hsien in Shensi, Kansu, and Ninghsia which had been all or partially occupied by the Communists on the completion of the "Long March," were officially recognized as territory under Communist Control. These hsien were designated as the "Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Area." The agreement was officially concluded between the Executive Yuan and the Communists, but as far as is known, it was never published.

3. The twenty three hsien to be controlled by the Communists were designated as follows: In Shensi, Chunhua, Hsunyi, Fuhsien, Kanchuan, Yenan, Yenchang, Yenchuan, Ansai, Paoan, Anting, Suiteh, Wupu, Mitse, Tuanhsien, Chingpien, Chingchien, and Tingpien; in Kansu, Chengning, Ninghsien, Hoshui, Chingyang, and Huanhsien; in Ninghsia, Yenchih. Note: At the time of the clashes between troops of the National Government and those of the Communists in Kansu in December, 1939, reports were received which indicated that the Communists considered Chenyuan as one of the hsien allotted them by the agreement referred to above. On the latest list of the hsien obtained from Communist sources, however, Chenyuan is not included. Efforts are being made to clear this point, ~~on~~ concerning which there seems to be doubt, even in Communist circles.

Copies to SD ONI Com.

4. According to the Communists, during the time when the capital of China was located in Hankow, a map was published with the approval of the Executive Yuan which showed the hsien listed above as included in the Border Area. The undersigned has not been able to obtain a copy of this map.

5. Between 1937 and 1939, Central Government forces gradually occupied Chingyang, Hohsien, Chengning, and Huanhsien in Kansu; and Hsunyi in Shensi. Although this action was

File JAV

probably not specifically ordered by Chiang Kai-shek, the Communists claim that nothing was done to restrain the troops, nor were the hsien ever returned to Communist control. This alleged encroachment resulted, in the summer of 1939, in an open clash between National Government and Communist forces in the Chengning (Kansu)-Hsunyi (Shensi) area. According to Mr. Edgar Snow, the fighting lasted about two weeks and several hundred casualties were suffered by each side. Mr. Snow reports that as a result of the fighting, which lasted for about two weeks, ~~with the heaviest fighting on~~ the Communists finally evacuated the districts mentioned.

6. In the five hsien which have been occupied by the forces of the National Government, these forces have gradually assumed the attitude that the Communists never had any rights therein. Actually there are still many Communists residing in the areas and Communist headquarters are maintained there.

7. The Communists admit that in some other hsien outside of the five referred to above, they have never been in complete control. In some of these hsien in addition to Communist troops there are stationed Peace Preservation Troops which are under provincial, not Communist, control. In some hsien there are two magistrates, one appointed by the Communists, the other by the Provincial Government. In some hsien the provincial authorities have never fully recognized the rights of the Communists as granted under the agreement referred to in Paragraph 2, above. With regard to all of these conditions, the National Government has always maintained a more or less passive attitude, refraining ~~from interfering~~ as much as possible from interfering in the administration of the areas concerned.

8. At the time of the creation of the "Border Area" in 1937, the National Government wished to designate Ting Wei-fen, a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, as Chairman of the area. The Communists refused to accept Ting and pressed for the designation of Lin Chu-han as Chairman. The National Government has never appointed Han as Chairman, but he has discharged the functions of the office since 1937 in his capacity as Vice-Chairman.

9. The Communists state that they now feel it was a mistake on their part not to have accepted Ting Wei-fen as Chairman of the Border Area, as his appointment would have given them a better status under the National Government, and they think it probable that Ting would very likely have only nominally discharged the duties of his office, leaving Lin Chu-han to act the real administrative head of the Area.

10. As far as the recent friction in Shansi between Yen Hsi-shan's "Old" and "New" Armies, the Communists favor the latter because they say it has fought hard against the Japanese and made a good showing, while the "Old" Army made a wretched showing at the time the Japanese first invaded Shansi. Otherwise they claim to be neutral in the dispute between the two

factions.

11. At the end of December, 1939, the National Government, so Communist sources report, decided to reduce the number of hsien in the Border Area to nine, as follows: Yenan, Paoan, Ansai, Yencheng, Kanchuan, and Chingpien in Shensi, and Chingyang, Hoshui, and Hwanhsien in Kansu. Later the National Government decided that the Communists should be allowed to control fourteen hsien. The Communists say they will never consent to give up a single hsien of the eighteen which are now controlled, all or in part, by them. This matter has been under negotiation for some weeks and has not yet been settled.

12. The Communists profess to be at a loss to understand why the National Government should be so anxious about regaining control of a few hsien in China's great northwest, when there is so much of China which must be won back from the Japanese.

David D. Barrett.
David D. Barrett,
Major, Infantry (DOL),
Assistant Military Attache.

Enclosure: Map showing the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Area.

Propaspia Communists not were allegedly open to claim the Japanese

Rm 394
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
2657-0-29
1925
WAR DEPARTMENT

June 13, 1925.

AMERICAN PUBLICITY IN CHINA

I. GENERAL SITUATION PRESENTED:

1. The formulation of an American policy, in China, today involves a proper approach to, and a thorough understanding of two very definite problems which have grown out of recent events there.

2. The first problem is that of anti-foreign sentiment. This sentiment has existed for many years but since May 30th, beginning with the riots in Shanghai, it has assumed very serious proportions. With the exception of Fukien Province, however, there appears to have been a marked desire on the part of the Chinese to except Americans from this anti-foreign feeling. The reasons for this will not be discussed in this Study; but the fact may be accepted. Hence it may be seen that the first important objective of American policy should be the maintenance of this feeling of friendliness on the part of China towards America as a whole and towards her nationals living in China in particular.

3. And the second problem is that of America's attitude towards a conference, or conferences, between the Great Powers and China which is soon to be called for the purpose of allaying this anti-foreign sentiment. At present three such conferences are imminent, one for the settlement of the Shanghai riots, one for the adjustment of China's tariff (provided for by the Chinese Customs Treaty signed at the Washington Conference), and one to inquire into the present practice of extra-territorial jurisdiction with a view to assisting the Chinese Government towards effecting reforms which would warrant the Powers in eventually relinquishing their respective extra-territorial privileges (also provided for under the Washington Conference in Resolution IV). America took the lead in calling the Washington Conference, and she is now again taking the lead. Already American representatives have been appointed to sit on the Shanghai Riots and Customs conferences and Mr. Kellogg is now attempting to obtain from the other foreign powers an expression of their willingness to participate in the conference dealing with extra-territoriality.

4. Two very favorable reactions have been produced by America's willingness to discuss these various questions. One has been the intensification of feelings of friendliness for America among the Chinese and the other has been the producing of a sense of assurance among the Chinese people that the Powers are willing to be reasonable about the question of their differences and disposed frankly to discuss matters. Hence it may be seen that the second important objective of American policy should be the maintenance of this feeling on the part of China that she is being fairly and sympathetically dealt with by the foreign powers.

5. But the accomplishment of these two much-to-be-desired ends -

a) The maintenance of a continued pro-American sentiment in China, and

b) The maintenance of a continued feeling on the part of the Chinese of being fairly dealt with by the foreign powers

presents two very definite obstacles. In the first place the Chinese people are at present being subjected to a flood of anti-foreign propaganda - partly Bolshevist and partly student-natfonalist in origin, which is wholly and violently anti-foreign in purport., And in the second place, there is a very real danger in the near future that the insistence on the part of the foreign powers for a deliberate rather than an immediate relinquishment of extra-territorial rights may appear to the Chinese as a breach of promise or as an indication of bad faith. Unfortunately, both the American and Chinese press has rather tended to intimate that America in particular is disposed to an immediate relinquishment. This is far from the case. And when the Chinese realize it, a blind, unreasoned anti-American sentiment is quite probable.

II. NEED FOR AMERICAN PUBLICITY:

6. How can this be avoided? How can the deleterious effects both of anti-foreign propaganda and of a misunderstanding of America's Chinese policy be neutralized, if not corrected? The answer may be found in dispatch #3182, dated June 3, 1925, from the American Consul General at Shanghai which is quoted in part as follows:-

7. "I have the honor to transmit a front page editorial appearing in the China Press (American) of today, under the heading: "Why Not Meet This Propaganda?" which contains a suggestion which appeals to me very strongly." (See Exhibit "A" attached, for copy of this editorial.)

8. "There was perhaps never a time in Shanghai, and rarely elsewhere, when there was circulated such a large volume of printed propaganda such as pamphlets, leaflets and posters. Much of this is purely Bolshevistic." (The Soviet Government for the last year has carried out a deliberate campaign in China for the purpose of putting itself in the position of the most favored nation by denouncing the so-called capitalistic, imperialistic nations and arousing violent Chinese sentiment against them. The recent anti-foreign outbreaks there have been directly traced to Soviet origin. In Shanghai alone $60,000 was used for purposes of inciting the natives against all foreigners except the Russians.) "This propaganda, which is distributed in Shanghai chiefly but in other parts of China as well is having a very deleterious effect."

9. "The concluding suggestion of the editorial (Why Not Meet This Propaganda?) makes" says the American Consul, "a very strong appeal and is considered a practical proposition. The editor states that practically all the countries conducted publicity campaigns in China during the Great War and that -

> "Since the close of the war they have left the field to the Bolsheviks. It would seem that the time has come for meeting the poison which has been spread without hindrance and designed purely for the purpose of driving foreigners from the land."

"Propaganda urging the recognition of good forms of government would assist materially to combat the poison that is being circulated by the Bolshevists. a) It would help to lead the citizens of China in a recognized, safe course of political development. b) It would also be a righteous campaign because it would save much human sacrifice in the future. In transmitting the editorial it is urged that propaganda (or publicity if it is preferred to call it such) of the character suggested above, to counteract that of the Bolsheviks, be organized and effectually conducted throughout China as a means to safety, sanity and righteousness."

10. These suggestions by the American Consul General, Shanghai, are based upon the necessity for combatting the deleterious effects of Bolshevist propaganda of an anti-foreign nature in China. When it is realized that the Chinese as well, are flooding the country with anti-foreign propaganda equally venomous, the need for a counter propaganda, or publicity, becomes even more urgent. (See Exhibit "B" for Chinese examples of anti-foreign propaganda.)

11. This added reason for publicity was recognized by the Intelligence Officer with the British Forces in North China, when in a report of May 23,1925 he wrote: "The foreigner who wishes to remain in China is faced with a very different problem to the gunboat policy which maintained his predecessors by the application of force to a Central Government, which, if weak vis-a-vis the Western Powers, was at any rate strong enough to enforce its authority within its own boundaries.....Now-a-days all this is changed. Every province is a law unto itself.....Even supposing that all the powers were unanimous on a certain course of action, the magnitude of the task.....is stupendous, and the result would probably only be transitory.

12. "A cheaper and more effective way of combatting this danger undoubtedly lies in the power of propaganda. If the Mass Education movement (now on foot in China) is not to be the instrument for the expulsion of the foreigner for the benefit of the Bolshevists and returned students, the literature served out to the lower classes must give them a true perspective of the foreigner's place in the scheme of things.....no time should be

lost in flooding the country with suitable (i.e. pro-foreign) literature, and in encouraging the Christian Schools to spread propaganda, if we are not to be faced with a situation infinitely more dangerous than the Boxer rising."

III. METHODS TO BE EMPLOYED:

13. Having explained the pressing need for American publicity in China, the next step is a discussion of the methods to be employed, and immediately one is faced with the obstacle of lack of funds. Under the present administration's economy program, a publicity fund for China will be a most difficult thing to obtain. It would devolve upon those determined to see the idea effected to convince the proper authorities of the wisdom of the old "stitch in time" proverb. Publicity funds for China should be regarded as national insurance for the protection of American lives and property, for the maintenance of China's good will and the consequent economic and commercial advantages accruing to American trade in China which during 1924 amounted to $272,100,000, and as a preventive against the growth of a feeling so violently anti-foreign as to result in wholesale killings and the necessity for dispatching of an American Expeditionary Force. In this latter event, the expenditure would be well into the millions, and the likelihood of its necessity is not so remote that it should not be given the very gravest consideration.

14. Appropriations for American publicity in China must be secured. They can be, if the actual present need is strongly and pursuasively explained. A campaign, as suggested in Exhibit "C" of this Study should be inaugurated at the earliest possible date.

15. But if every effort to obtain funds proves unsuccessful, then it is urgently recommended that at least the suggestions in Exhibit "D" be effected. Too much stress cannot be put, however, upon the fact that "D" is really only a small part of "C" and cannot hope to prove ~~as remotely~~ even very advantageous to American interests and aims.

IV. COOPERATION BETWEEN GOVERNMENTS:

16. The question as to whether or not there should be any cooperation between the United States and other governments in any publicity campaign in China is one for the State Department to decide.

17. Indeed, the entire question of whether or not American publicity should be attempted, and either alone, or in concert with other powers, is a matter to be decided by the Department of State.

18. The sole purpose of this Memorandum is to inform the proper

authorities in the War Department of existing facts in the present situation in China, and forcibly to point out the need for American publicity in order that they may urge upon the State Department the absolute necessity for action. For it would be the State Department which, logically, would supply the funds for the campaign and take the lead in its direction. The War Department would merely cooperate.

19. It may be of interest to note that the present American Minister in China, Mr. J. V. A. Macmurray, on several occasions prior to leaving for his new post expressed himself as determined in every way possible to maintain the present good will and confidence of the Chinese people by a frank and careful explanation of American motives and policies there. This he hoped to do, through his large acquaintanceship among Chinese officialdom which of course would be greatly facilitated by his present position. In a sense, it is understood that he hoped to carry on a one-man word of mouth American publicity campaign which would have in view the very objects outlined in this Study. It is believed, consequently, that any broader application of this policy would receive his whole-hearted support.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS:

20. It is urgently recommended that this Study receive the War Department's most careful consideration with a view -

a) To supporting the suggested plan for American publicity in China as outlined in Exhibit "C".

b) To utilizing every possible means of urging upon the State Department the strong necessity for inaugurating the plan proposed in Exhibit "C" at the earliest possible date.

c) To acquescing, in the last resort, to the plans outlined in Exhibit "D".

d) In the event of the adoption of either plan, to cooperating with the Department of State to the fullest degree.

PRIVATE & CONFIDENTIAL

MIL. INTEL.
2657-J
WAR DEPARTMENT

MINUTES OF A CONFERENCE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF OUTPORTS CONVENED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEFENCE LEAGUE ON 6th and 7th MAY, 1926.

NOTED
J. H. REEVES
A. C. OF S., G-2.

The meeting, which was held at 17 The Bund, was called to order at 2:30 p.m. by Mr. L. M. ff. Beytagh (Chairman of the League) who spoke as follows:

Gentlemen, I propose that this conference should be very informal and, with your kind permission, I shall talk to you sitting down instead of standing up.

I shall read out the names of those who are present, but first I want to assure you that no publicity whatever will be given to anything that is said at this meeting, to those who are present or what is done.

(The names of those present were then read from the list of signatures obtained before the meeting was called to order, and appropriate comments were made regarding each name.)

Now when I say that a gentleman represents Tientsin or Nanking or any other outport, I do not mean that he officially represents that port. We understand that you gentlemen have come to Shanghai from your various outports to learn what we are doing here and something of the objects and aims of The Constitutional Defence League. We hope that when you go back to your ports you will take immediate steps to establish centres or cells in those ports to work in accord with The Constitutional Defence League and carry on the same educational and propaganda work. I hope that is quite clear and satisfactory to you, gentlemen.

Mr. L. however, comes more or less as a delegate from Peking as he represents a group of people there who have organized themselves and are apparently preparing to work along lines similar to The Constitutional Defence League and we also consider him as representing Tientsin.

Now, gentlemen, the object of this conference is to put you in possession of facts regarding the things we have done and what we propose to do in the future; and for the benefit of those who have not attended any of our previous meetings, I shall make a short statement of what has already been accomplished. I assure you I shall make this statement as brief as possible as I think the most important business to come before the conference is a report to be made by Mr. Carl Crow, the chairman of our Propaganda Sub-Committee. All the work we are doing is important but by far the most vital of all is the propaganda work. We are not a beligerent association but are organized merely to educate all classes of society as far as we can afford to do so, and this must be done principally by propaganda. Hence I rely very much more on what Mr. Crow has to tell you than on what I have to tell you myself.

Propaganda as carried on in China hitherto has been for the great part national propaganda or propaganda of individual firms or groups carried on for a short period of time and then dropped. The result was that propaganda of various forms has been going on in China and doing much more harm than good — in this way, that our enemies, the Communists were able to seize on the disparity of views expressed by the different nationals and use them to their own advantage. What we are endeavoring to do is to unite all nationalities in a consistent fight against Communism, and operate over an extended period of time on as large a scale as possible.

Officials of most nationalities are prohibited from carrying on propaganda in the Far East by reason of treaties which provide that they shall not carry on such propaganda. We all know that whilst other nations have fulfilled the terms of those treaties, Russia has conducted a very extensive system of propaganda in China, which most governments are precluded by treaty terms from combating officially. A number of merchants and professional men consequently got together and decided that they would form an international association for the purpose of eradicating Bolshevism from China. We founded ourselves in November at a preliminary meeting and it was not until some months later that we were able to do any effective work. That we have so far succeeded beyond our expectations is proved by this fact: Prior to our organization no person or corporate body made any attempt what-

soever to do anything to offset Bolshevism in China. I do not think anyone can quote a single attempt beyond the limited schemes which I have already mentioned but which were fostered principally by single nationalities in their own behalf and were not purely anti-communistic. But, since the inauguration of this League and as a result of the presence of leading Chinese Officials at our meetings, there has been something like a national outbreak against Bolshevism, and four Chinese organizations exist locally which have taken up the fight against Bolshevism. In my opinion the Chinese lacked leadership to start the fight against Bolshevism; they did not have the initiative or the courage themselves but when they found the foreigners were behind them it gave them the courage to organize themselves. I do not say they would not have opposed Bolshevism if we had not formed The Constitutional Defence League, but I do say that we have greatly hastened their work and I believe that Communism is very rapidly on the decline today, for which I think we can take a large share of the credit. In one of my original speeches in Shanghai I said that although there was excellent stuff in the Chinese, they needed organization and leadership. They have now got that leadership and are doing exceedingly well in the fight against Bolshevism.

I shall not read out the names of the original Provisional Committee, but there were 5 American, 3 Belgian, 5 British, 2 Chinese, 2 Dutch, 2 Finnish, 3 French, 2 Italian, 2 Japanese, 1 Norwegian, 3 Portuguese, 3 Swedish, and 1 Swiss member.

We had three months' heavy organization to carry on before we actually got down to any work. I propose to tell you the names of the members of the various committees that have been formed and a little about the work of each committee.

(The names of the members of the General Committee were here read with comments. Each nationality is permited two representatives under the constitution—at present America, Belgium, Britain, China, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, Portugal and Switzerland are represented).

Now we come down to what I call the battering ram of our League, that is the Propaganda Sub-Committee of which Mr. Carl Crow is chairman. Mr. Carl Crow permits me to say that he was in charge of American propaganda work during the War. As a result of this experience Mr. Carl Crow had all the data necessary for carrying on a propaganda organization. Had it not been for this it would have cost us quite a year's loss of time and incalculable expenditure of League funds to get properly organized. Mr. Crow's system is very elaborate and very complete. It is such that we are able to distribute any literature we want in any district we like in a very short period of time. It really means this, that we have been able to seize on a complete system of propaganda used during the Great War. This has simplified our work immensely. We have sent out seven thousand letters in the form of a questionnaire into the Interior, to Missionaries, and had it not been for Mr. Crow's system of addresses we should have been unable to do this.

(The gratitude of the League to Mr. Crow for the wonderful work he has done, was here expressed by Mr. Beytagh.)

The other members of the Propaganda Committee are 2 Americans, 1 Belgian, 6 Britains, 2 Finns, 2 Frenchmen, 2 Japanese, 2 Portuguese and 1 Swiss, assisted by an international staff of editors, translators and organisers—

We have a Labour Sub-Committee of people who are in close touch with labour, consisting of 2 Americans, 3 Britains, 2 Chinese and 1 Japanese.

These are all men who are in actual contact with labour and are able to advise us what to do, and what not to do, in connection with labour propaganda and other necessary work amongst labourers.

We have a Publications Sub-Committee composed of men of the highest qualifications. We have an Intelligence Department of which I can disclose no details whatever, but I will ask you to take my word that this department is working in complete accord with the authorities in Shanghai at the present moment in a manner which we really never anticipated. They supply us with important information and we supply them with information which is equally valuable to both sides, and I do not think that since Shanghai started there has been an organization that has done such efficient work along these lines. I am not allowed to disclose names but let me ask you to accept my definite assurance that it was largely due to our combined action that nothing took place on the first of May and we hope that nothing will take place on the 30th of May.

Before I finish let me repeat to you this, that our work is entirely education and propaganda; the other work that we have undertaken we are doing merely with a view to furthering that programme. I shall leave Mr. Crow to describe the educational and propaganda work that we have done and are going to do, but I want to give you one or two truths about Russian propaganda. We know that millions of children are leaving the schools and universities of Russia every year steeped in Communism. We know that in America, Britain and

other countries children are leaving school with no idea whatsoever as to what Communism is. The result is there will be an enormous increase of students of Communism in Russia who will be bound to overcome our people in time unless we provide against it. I do not want to see my children overcome by Communism in twenty-five years time but unless we steadily persevere against it we shall not be able to prevent it.

The Communists themselves see that, and I have just received a report today, an important secret report, nobody else has seen this report except Mr. R. N. Swann, our Secretary; that they are concentrating on the production of youthful Communists in vast numbers in China; they are forming Communistic leagues among the children throughout China. They know that the great masses of China will not readily accept Communism now, but if the children of China are educated in their way they will become the Communists of the future. They are looking ahead twenty-five years and it seems to me imperative that we should do the same thing.

I omitted to mention another important committee, the Russian Advisory Committee, composed of prominent Russian gentlemen, some of whom are present in this room today. They are all "White" Russians and are actuated by patriotism and a sense of fear of what has gone on in Russia. They have agreed to keep us in close touch with Russian affairs in Shanghai and abroad, and to advise us regarding our Russian translations, and as to the best means of distributing our propaganda amongst Russians the world over.

I must assure you that although there is nobody present from Hongkong, a most important letter which I have here today indicates to me their strong sympathy with our work, and we can be quite assured of the strongest possible support from that quarter. I regret I have to be so secretive but I am sure you will quite appreciate my reasons for being so. A certain gentlemen will arrive from Hongkong at the end of this month and information will be given him similar to that which is given here today. We hope that any of you who can will be present at that time and we also hope to have representatives from other ports not represented here to-day.

I shall ask Mr. Carl Crow to tell you about the work of the Propaganda Committee. I shall then ask Mr. Bruce to give you an outline as to how we finance our work in Shanghai, which of course you do not have to follow unless you wish, but it is quite a complete system which may be of use to you.

I may tell you, you will be in receipt of regular information from us in the form of a monthly bulletin we are issuing called "The Constitutionalist", which will keep you in touch with what we are doing here.

Now, gentlemen, I will call on Mr. Carl Crow to address you.

Mr. CARL CROW (Chairman of the Propaganda Committee): I think the best method for me to follow in giving you an idea of the propaganda work which has been done and which is planned is for me to read to you a memo, which covers a statement of our aims and policies, and comment on it as I proceed. At the beginning of our work we decided to avoid lengthy discussions as much as possible by drawing up a statement of policy which would be followed, with the understanding, of course, that it was by no means final and would be changed from time to time as necessity arose. That statement of policy was adopted by the Propaganda Committee, then by the General Committee and it constitutes a kind of guide for all our work.

(1) The work of propaganda naturally divides itself into two heads *(a)* editing and *(b)* publication. The duty of the Editors is to select ideas, arguments, etc., which will support our programme. The object of the Publishers is to reach the greatest possible number of people with those ideas at the least possible expense.

EDITING:—The Board of Editors should have access to all material published here and in other countries on the subjects in which we are interested,. From this the Board would make selections for reprinting, or translation, or from the materials at hand prepare copy for handbills, newspapers, advertisements, booklets, posters, etc. Agents in New York and London and possibly elsewhere should be engaged to purchase and forward to us all books on the subject, clippings from newspapers, magazine articles, etc. There are established agencies which do this kind of work. The Board might establish special correspondents in certain places.

Mr. Beytagh has already told you of the constitution of the Board of Editors. The newspaper clippings are coming forward by every mail, sent by agents in New York and London who see to it that we get all important American and British comments on Communism. We are planning to employ a special correspondent in Moscow who will give us special information. I may say that members of our various Committees have a great many valuable personal correspondents in Europe and in America.

The work of reviewing all this material and of preparing publications for China would be too great for any committee of volunteers and a capable man should be employed to do this work, assisted by clerks and translators, as may be necessary.

The paid Editor should have no discretionary powers and should merely suggest to the Board of Editors such publications as he might think suitable.

That work is being done. We receive now all the important Moscow papers and in fact Russian papers from all over the world, and translations are made from them.

It is highly important that the Board of Editors be informed at all times of enemy propaganda and it is suggested that this intelligence service be maintained independent of the editior and translators mentioned above. There is no loss of efficiency in separating these different activities since they are all centred in the Editorial Board and the more widely different functions and activities are separated, the more difficult will it be for the enemy to learn of our plans and so be prepared to combat them.

That is being done very successfully indeed.

PUBLICATION: Before going into detailed suggestions as to the way in which the material prepared by the Board of Editors may be disseminated, it is suggested that it is highly desirable to avoid creating the impression that a great deal of money is being spent, or that attention be drawn to the organization which is doing this work. If the propaganda can be made to appear to be spontaneous and coming from many different sources, so much the better. For that reason existing organizations and the usual and established media of publicity should be used as far as possible.

NEWSPAPERS: There are about thirty daily newspapers in China published in European languages, perhaps twelve Japanese dailies and about 500 to 600 dailies in the Chinese language. There are also several hundred weekly and monthly publications, (Accurate data on all of these publications, their circulation, political affiliations, etc., is at our disposal.) With a few exceptions, the Chinese language publications are all political organs, subsidized by some political party or some individual politician. They thrive in political centres. For example, there are about forty dailies in Peking, which is more than in Shanghai.

The circulation of the leading Chinese papers of Shanghai runs to about 80,000. One paper in Tientsin has a circulation of 20,000 and there are others in Hankow, Hongkong, Canton, etc., with circulations of more then 5,000. The circulation figures give no indication of the actual number of readers, since the Chinese newspaper is usually read by a number of families or shops. With all their faults, Chinese newspapers afford the cheapest and most effective way of reaching the class of Chinese which we want to reach.

We have so far done very little work with the Chinese newspapers. That is something which takes quite a lot of managing and we simply have not reached it yet.

Chinese editors are very provincial and suspicious. They are not interested in foreign affairs and it would be exceedingly difficult to get them to print as news or editorial matter any of our material if we offered it to them directly. However, there are a number of news agencies supplying news to the Chinese press and it may be possible to use these occasionally, or to make definite arrangements with one of them.

Paid advertising space in the Chinese papers is ridiculously cheap and this may be used from time to time.

POSTERS: The poster is the method of reaching the man in the street, the labourer, mill employee, shop assistant, etc. Since a very small percentage of the men of this class can either read or write, it is essential that the poster be pictorial in form. Through agencies which exist it is possible to secure distribution and display of posters at any place in China, at a reasonable cost.

We now have in the hands of the printers the first poster which is designed to appeal to workmen in the mills. This is only one of a series which we have in hand and which we hope to have printed shortly. We have what you might call a psychological laboratory for testing these posters. Before any large quantity of them is printed, we will post a few in certain mills in Shanghai where we have exceptional opportunity to observe the effects on the workers. If this is favourable, larger quantities will be issued and they will be available for use in all parts of China.

BOOKS AND BOOKLETS: The printed book enjoys a prestige in China which the newspaper has not yet earned and, in my belief, sways public opinion far more than the newspaper. My suggestion would be that the Editorial Board publish a series of books and booklets, designed to reach different classes. These books should be published by arrangements with different Chinese publishers and bear the imprint of these publishers. The arrangement is very simple, "If you will publish this book at such and such a price, I will purchase so many of them". We will then advertise these publications by using paid space in the

Chinese papers. The advertising will appear as regular commercial advertising, but both by text and illustration will set forth the ideas we wish to propagate, so that they will accomplish something more than actual sale of the books.

In addition to the distribution of books in this way they should be sent to individual Chinese, but as far as possible appear to come from individuals with whom the Chinese is acquainted, rather than from an organization. A practical method of doing this on a wholesale scale has been worked out.

The first publication is a translation of Sarolea's book "Impressions of Soviet Russia." This has been mailed to 5,000 schools. The second printing of 30,000 will be mailed to:

Editors (Chinese)	300
Business houses (Chinese)	2,000
Chinese Pastors, Protestant Churches	2,500
" " Catholic Churches	3,500
Chinese civil officials	1,500
" military officials	1,000
" police	1,000
Chambers of Commerce in all towns	2,000
Hospital doctors	500
Missionaries	12,000

This bears the imprint of the Constitutional Press, which you might say is a dummy publishing house which we have organized to bring out some of our publications. This is in line with our policy to keep the C. D. L. in the back ground and out of the limelight in all propaganda work. It is improbable that any publications except our official organ, "The Constitutionalist", will ever bear our name.

We have also in hand a proposed reprint of "Impressions of New Russia", a book by a Chinese student who visited Russia. The book was published in the first instance by the Chinese Cotton Mill Owners' Association. We also have in mind the printing of translations of certain of Mr. Rodney Gilbert's articles on Communism.

MISSIONARIES: The seven thousand missionaries in China are doubtless in closer touch with Chinese than any other class of foreigners and could be of invaluable aid to us. I am sure that a great number of them are in sympathy with our aims and that they would give us their most enthusiastic support if approached in a tactful manner. This cannot be done through the missionary organizations but each missionary must be approached as an individual. I have on several occasions mailed to missionaries (of all nationalities) questionnaires on such subjects as the progress of road building in China and have always received the most helpful replies. For example I recently mailed 750 letters and received about 500 replies.

My suggestion would be that a letter be sent to the missionary list stating quite frankly that an international committee of business and professional men, alarmed at reports of enemy activity, wish to find out how far this activity extends. A carefully prepared questionnaire should be enclosed and the replies will indicate which ones can be depended on for further help.

These can be utilized in *(a)* the compilation of mailing lists of Chinese, *(b)* the distribution of literature, (c) the dissemination of propaganda by word of mouth and *(d)* reporting on enemy activity.

I think you have a copy of this letter to missionaries and also a copy of the questionnaire. We had hoped to have this letter in the mail before this but it has been held up by the printers. We shall have it out shortly, however. In our letter there is a self-addressed envelope and I anticipate that we shall get 3,000 replies. That, by the way, is the method of establishing personal contact with many thousands of Chinese. We will ask the missionaries (and others as well) to supply us with names and addresses of prominent Chinese with whom they are acquainted, and when literature is sent to these Chinese it will appear to be coming from the foreigner with whom they are friendly and will therefore have a much greater effect than if it comes from an organization of which they have never heard.

The letter is going out now in English, and we have 1,500 in the French language which will be mailed to the French missionaries. The letter has also been put into Italian for the Italian missionaries and other languages may be used.

EDUCATING OURSELVES: Very few of us know anything about the plans and activities of the enemy. Among the means of educating ourselves I would suggest the selection, by the Board of Editors, of a list of suitable books on the subject, and that efforts be made to place these books in various club, school, municipal and other public libraries, on boats, etc. We will present the books if necessary. Foreign booksellers may be encouraged to display and advertise these books.

Books should be sent free to sympathetic missionaries, so as to provide them with material for word of mouth propaganda.

I may say that since we have started this work it has been impossible to carry this plan out and purchase these books on Communism from the local booksellers, for as often as they get them in they sell them out.

ESSAY CONTESTS: A series of prizes totalling $1,700 is to be offered to students of Chinese schools of different grades for the best essays on the subject of Communism. The greatest possible number of students will be interested. The contest will be extensively advertised in the Chinese papers. This will not only arouse interest in the subject, but the entries will provide a most valuable mailing list and a nucleus for the establishment of nests of propaganda in different schools.

This essay contest is already under way. It has been advertised in leading Chinese newspapers and I don't think I am too optimistic when I say that 2,000 contestants will enter. The contest is open to any student in China regardless of sex or the rank of the school. We have been granted an appropriation of $2,500 for this work. Now to show you another way in which we are disguising the work which we do, the contest is ostensibly being promoted and financed by the Franco-Chinois Educational Association, an organization with which the vice-chairman of the Propanda Committee is connected.

RADIO: There are only about 3,000 radio sets in China, of which less than half are said to be in Chinese ownership. Broadcasting over the radio will be useful, but should be classed as one of the minor means of propaganda.

HANDBILLS: The Chinese Post Office provides a very effective way of distributing handbills and circulars, charging 10 cents per 100 for their delivery, unaddressed, by mail carriers. In this way it is possible to cover any community or any section very effectively at small cost. Distribution of handbills in any other way is wasteful and ineffective, since there is no way of checking up on the coolies employed to do the work.

That is only one of the schemes that we have in mind to cover any part of the country that we want to cover.

MOVING PICTURES: If it is possible to secure a film which sets forth our ideas, we could undoubtedly use it to great advantage. As there are about 100 moving picture theatres in China, we may be safe in assuming that there are several hundred thousand Chinese who are regular patrons of the moving picture theatres. Agents in New York or London might be asked to look out for a picture of that kind, or one might be adapted. It might be possible to produce one locally, but that would be both risky and expensive.

MR. BEYTAGH: I may interrupt Mr. Carl Crow to say that arrangements are being made for a film locally which may be ready shortly.

MR. CROW: We have a very active Moving Picture Sub-Committee which is looking after these matters.

ESTABLISHING NEWSPAPERS: In my opinion, the establishing of newspapers for the purpose of carrying on propaganda is a waste of money. It is on all fours for a merchant with a few tons of merchandise to buy a ship to ship it in, rather than use the facilities of a shipping company. The establishement of a newspaper is a very expensive enterprise, and no matter how much may be spent on it, the circulation it will gain is always problematical. There are hundreds of existing publications which we may use in one way or another.

I might say that in spite of this, we have under way a plan for the publication of a newspaper or to subsidize the publication of a newspaper which will reach the Chinese seamen. A sub-committee is investigating the practicability of the scheme.

OFFICIAL ORGAN: In order to keep members of the League in touch with its activities, a small monthly, "The Contitutionalist", will be published. The first issue is to appear in the English, French, Russian and possibly other languages.

I had hoped to have copies of that paper for you to-day but it will not be completed until to morrow. The first issue of "The Constitutionalist" contains a verbatim report of the English-speaking mass meeting held on March 12th and also a copy of the constitution of The Constitutional Defence League. A copy of "The Constitutionalist" is going out in the letters to missionaries. In addition to that, we are mailing copies to all foreigners in China and to all newspapers published in the English language in America, Britain and the Colonies.

The French edition contains a verbatim report of the French mass meeting which was held at the same time as the English mass meeting. It is now in the hands of the printers and 6,000 copies will be printed. A sub-committee is taking care of the distribution of this edition.

I have here in manuscript the copy for the Russian edition, which consists of an edited translation of the English edition. Our Russian Advisory Committee is now considering the distribution of this edition and will give us their recommendations.

I think that is about all we have done and all that at the moment we are definitely planning to do. We have quite a number of sub-committees who are hard at work on special undertakings, such as the essay committee, labour committee, etc. The Labour Sub-Committee is working on the problem of propaganda among the labourers.

We are in close touch with the local anti-Communist organizations which have been formed by the Chinese, and will doubtless be able to help them to a wider distribution of their material than they are able to get now.

There is one point which I would like to impress on outport delegates and that is the importance and necessity of coordinating all propaganda work. It is a work in which it is very easy to make dangerous mistakes and I am afraid mistakes of this kind would be made if the individual organizations in the outports undertook to issue propaganda on their own initiative.

I think we put every possible safeguard against such mistakes. Nothing is done on the authority of any one man or any one small group of men. There will be no publication considered by this committee until it has been passed by the Editorial Board,

After it has passed the test of the Editorial Board, the Propaganda Committee as a whole will consider the suitability of its publication and, if they approve, will ask the General Committee for authority to publish and for an appropriation. There is no room for hasty judgment in this method of procedure, which places so many safeguards against mistakes.

Now we want to add still further safeguards by asking each outport to be represented on this committee. That will mean that every proposed piece of literature will be circulated among the outports as well and we will have the benefit of your opinions.

I think that is all I have to say.

MR. BEYTAGH: I feel that we may very well indeed compliment Mr. Carl Crow on his excellent report and the efforts which he has given to this work, which I may assure you he is doing quite voluntarily. Just to show you that his propaganda work is having a vital effect, I had a report yesterday from the Canton Gazettee in connection with the Labour Conference down there, in which they enumerate a number of imperialist organizations, and the first on the list is The Constitutional Defence League. That is the result of what has already been done by us: they call it a life and death struggle.

Now, gentlemen, I will ask Mr. M. W. Bruce to tell you what we are doing in the matter of finance.

MR. M. W. BRUCE (Chairman of the Finance Committee): You will realize that large funds will be required to carry out the programme of work explained to you by Mr. Beytagh and Mr. Carl Crow. So much so, that it is necessary to invite the sympathy and co-operation of all firms and individuals. We got into touch with the general public by holding mass meetings in different languages viz: French, Japanese and English, followed by a special invitation to the principals of the local firms of all nationalities to attend a semi-private gathering, where much information was imparted that could not be given out in public. The result of this was that quite a number of firms agreed to give all the moral and financial support they could and commenced to send in funds to the various Banks, with a promise to subscribe more at a later date. Such funds are termed "Endowment or Capital Funds".

In addition to the foregoing, a special letter was drafted for those who represent home firms on this side and could not subscribe without consent from their principals. Considerable support is anticipated, from all countries as a result of this letter.

Monthly subscriptions or regular income. It expected that most individuals will give all possible support, and for this purpose we have adopted what we describe as a card collecting system. A number of people have stated that they are unwilling to subscribe until they know more details of Bolshevism and the work of the League. To remove this difficulty and to satisfy ourselves that such an excuse shall have no reason to prevail, we are drawing up a letter on similar lines to that prepared for home firms, which will be addressed to every individual in Shanghai and all outports. Along with this letter is attached a slip which can be returned with a signed promise to subscribe. Such promises will be attended to by what are termed card leaders.

The Finance Committee appoints the card leaders say (50).

Each card leader is to be responsible for 10/20 card men, (or women) or enough persons to control this number of cards.

Each card man is responsible for a minimum of one card representing $10 per month. The idea of making each card represent $10.00 is for easy working. A card can contain 10 names subscribing $1.00 per month, or 5 at $2.00, or, say, one at $5.00, one at $3.00, and one at $2.00, or even one at $10.00 per month. Anyone subscribing $20.00 would have their names on two complete cards.

Each card man returns $10.00 per month, per card, which may be handed to the secretary of the League by card leaders or paid direct into the League's account with the various Banks. The Secretary keeps a card index, consisting of a copy of all collecting cards. Any name taken from or added to any card is reported by each card man to his card leader, and the latter combines all alterations in one report sent to the Secretary each month.

Prior to reporting to the Secretary, all monies are either lodged in one of the Banks under the "Constitutional Defence League" Account and the receipted counterfoil handed to the Secretary or alternatively the actual cash collected is handed to the Secretary, together with the card leader's report of alterations.

Centralization of funds. I suggest that all outport collections should be forwarded periodically to The Shanghai "Constitutional Defence League" head office for reasons explained by Mr. Carl Crow.

MR. BEYTAGH: I think we may thank Mr. Bruce and the Finance Committee for the excellent scheme they have worked out. Some very fine work has been done in that connection.

I might elaborate a little on what Mr. Bruce has said. It is quite true that small ports like Swatow and Kiukiang could not put up sufficient money to carry on propaganda of their own but it happens to be a fact that it is in those particular ports that heavy propaganda is necessary. Hence it should be possible for those ports to draw on a bigger fund than they can put up themselves. We would like all the outports to turn their collections in to the central fund, but that is a matter for discussion among the outports themselves and we would like the outports to consider very carefully the suggestion put forward by us. You will then enjoy the benefits of the central fund, and naturally the greatest sympathy would be given to any suggestion made by outports for expenditure from this central fund. I may inform you in this connection that we have considerable expectations of very substantial sums from overseas. Whether they will materialize or not we do not know, but the prospects seem very good and naturally these particular funds would be expended not only in Shanghai but also in the outports. I hope you will put that to your ports when you get back.

That covers our agenda for to-day. I do not propose to keep you any longer unless you have some urgent questions which you wish to ask me now. As I have told you, the meeting tomorrow is to be given over to questions, and I hope you will consider the whole matter tonight and have a number of questions to ask tomorrow.

May I bring forward one point, if you are sending any confidential information to Shanghai, at any time do not send it by post as we know that our mails have been tampered with. Send it by courier.

MR. L. (Peking): In passing through Tientsin on my way to Shanghai, I learned that there were several groups doing some work of this description of a national character. In just what way would it be possible for those groups to affiliate with The Constitutional Defence League, or will they in any way jeopardize the work of this league if they carry on such work by themselves?

MR. BEYTAGH: We expect to get into touch with all of these organizations and hope to be able to convince them that individual or national efforts, or efforts ever a limited period of time, will do more harm than good. We hope eventually to persuade them that an international organization such as The Constitutional Defence League is the only effective means of combating Communism.

There being no further questions, let me assure you we have 12 different nationalities represented on our committees, their names I have given you. This is the first time in Shanghai that we have had a committee of so many different nationals working so cordially, frankly and happily together on any one particular subject We have had not one single moment of friction.

The meeting terminated at 4 p.m.

MEETING HELD ON MAY 7th WAS CALLED TO ORDER AT 2.30 P.M.

MR. L. M. ff BEYTAGH (Chairman of The Constitutional Defence League): I will not take very much of your time this afternoon. As you know, the afternoon is to be devoted to questions, but prior to starting the questions, I would like to say one or two things supplementing what I said yesterday afternoon. What I would like to emphasize and what I would like these outports gentlemen to emphasize is that the operations of The Constitutional Defence League are in no way directed against Russia as a sovereign power. I omitted to mention that yesterday, but as Russia is a power recognized by most of the other powers, with very few exceptions, we might be prohibited by our consuls from carrying on any propaganda directed against the government of that country. What we are aiming at is Communism as a whole irrespective of the country concerned, and as it finds its greatest expression in Bolshevism, we are automatically against Soviet Russia. It is not against Russia as a national entity but we are opposed to Communism of every nationality. I would like to have that clearly laid down.

Another point I would like to make very clear is regarding funds and subscriptions. You will be asked in your outports by large firms, small firms, wealthy individuals and comparatively poor individuals, "How much do you think we ought to put up?" Now that question has been asked me hundreds of times in Shanghai and each time I have said, "I do not know". It depends on the amount of interests the individuals or corporations concerned have in China and the amount which present business conditions permit them to subscribe. The minimum subscription is one dollar a month. That allows everybody to come in. When they put up one dollar and get their names on the cards they automatically become members of the League. Now I know of several instances of people who are alleged to be very wealthy who are really up to their eyes in debt, and they are putting up a dollar a month. There are others who are putting up a hundred dollars a month, others who are ten thousand dollars. I know of one firm thatme who have promised to put up from five to putting up fifty taels a month. I know of so has been authorized to spend fifty thousand taels if they are satisfied as to the effectiveness of our work. There are many different interests in China but the British and the Japanese interests are of course greater than the interests of other smaller nations, and they would naturally be expected to give more than the other nationalities. I think you will find it the best policy to leave it entirely to the contributor to say what he can or can not do. You can assure him that his name or the amount he subscribes will not be divulged to anybody. Even I personally have no knowledge of what any one contributes unless he tells me himself. I believe, gentlemen, that this is now quite clear to you.

The question has been put to me whether branch offices located in the outports should be approached by the outports branches for subscriptions. There are certain very large commercial institutions in China, some of whom have headquarters in Hongkong, some have headquarters in London, some in New York and some in Tokyo. In most cases those headquarters have to be referred to before any contribution can be made to the League, and as these headquarters will already have been asked by us for their support, we shall not expect you to solicit contributions from the branches in the outports. Therefore the contributions which you may receive or amounts you collect will come chiefly from individuals or individual members of these branch firms. There are, however, certain firms who have headquarters in the outports and from these you may solicit funds.

Now, gentlemen, having said that much I will throw myself open to any questions you may like to ask. Before we start the questions—in addition to that letter to home offices which is in circulation—we have letters to individuals which I think you should take a copy of, together with a copy of the promissory note. You need not follow this system if you do not want to, but it is a suggestion.

MR. L. (Peking): Are they being circulated in the outports?

MR. R. N. SWANN (Secretary): They are being circulated to everybody. Supposing subscriptions are promised from Hankow or any other port, we shall arrange for your committees in the outports to get these subcriptions in.

MR. R. (Nanking): Will it be possible to submit a balance sheet as I anticpate that the people who contribute to The Constitutional Defence League and the people whom I approach for subscriptions will want to be shown just what is being done with their money.

MR. L. (Peking): They will be wondering what is happening to the money that is subscribed by any particuler outport and I would like to know if we will be in a position to tell them.

MR. BEYTAGH: Gentlemen, the question has been brought forward by gentlemen from Peking and Nanking whether it will be possible for the outports to know what is being done with the funds subscribed to the League. I can assure you that no cheques can be signed

other than by myself or the Vice-Chairman, and the Secretary. We shall at the end of this year have an audit made by one or two auditors of different nationalities. Next year I hope that we shall have a more frequent audit. At the present moment our auditors are Messrs. Thomson & Co., whom we all know by name I think. I do not believe it would be advisable to send statements of accounts through the mail as our mail is not free from tampering by interested parties and we do not want it to become known how much money we have or how it is being spent. I think some arrangements can be made whereby someone from the outports can come and see our books and take away a statement of the audited accounts for the year. Possibly some outstanding person from your outports might be authorized to come along and see the audited accounts and let you know.

When we get along a little further, we are going to ask 3, 4, or 5 gentlemen of different nationalities, who are not otherwise active in connection with the League, to be a Supervisory Committee. They will be men of the highest standing in the community and at all times they can suddenly challenge our books and audit them themselves or get some one outside to audit them. That committee will do no other work whatsover, in connection with the League and at any time they may make whatever investigation they consider necessary. If we have a Supervisory Committee of the highest trusted men of the city that ought to be sufficient to satisfy anyone.

You may tell your friends in the outports that this year we have no budget; that we do not know how we stand financially, but having got through the remaining eight months of the year, we shall frame a definite budget on usual parliamentary lines which we shall expect you to criticize freely. In that budget your requirements will be considered fairly and individually. This year, of course, it is quite impossible to have a budget.

MR. R. (Nanking): How do you propose to carry on propaganda among labourers, in addition to pamphlets?

MR. BEYTAGH: I believe that question can best be answered by Mr. Crow and I shall call on him to give you any further details.

MR. CROW: I am afraid I can not give you a very satisfactory or definite answer because that is a question we are working on now without being able to make up our minds; we have a Labour Sub-Committee consisting of Dr. John Darroch, S. Sadachi (Indian Cotton Importers' Assoc.), R. B. Mauchan (of the Kiangnan Dock), E. Elliott (of the Oriental Cotton Mill), S. C. Clarke (of the Y. M. C. A.) and two prominent Chinese Industrialists as well as a Chinese Advisory Committee. They have had several meetings, but about all I can say is that we think we are making some progress. We have first to visualize just what the problem is. Among the various things which have been suggested and discussed is the formation of clubs around the mills. These clubs would be formed by someone who would have the confidence of the workers and to whom they could go with their grievances and complaints.

Another suggestion is dispensaries, another is cinema shows and lectures, and so on. I can not say that any one of these things will be just what we shall do, but we are putting a great deal of time and study to the problem.

MR. BEYTAGH: I think Mr. R. has asked a very important question.

MR. CROW: A suggestion came to me this morning from a lady who has had a great deal of experience in work of this kind, that a committee be formed to visit the mills in China and find out any conditions which the mill operatives may have cause to complain about.

MR. BEYTAGH: Naturally, gentlemen, we propose that you in the outports should send us any suggestions that you may have, as to how we could best carry on the work in your ports, as what would be useful in Shanghai might not be beneficial in Canton or elsewhere.

MR. R: Supposing in an outport there is a branch running. There is unrest, something is stirring there, can you send an inspector up to investigate and report.

MR. BEYTAGH: That might be advisable but I do not think it would be possible, for you could not send a Shanghai man to look into trouble in another province; for one thing there is the difference in dialect.

MR. SWANN: The 7,000 letters which are at present being circulated up-country will undoubtedly bring a lot of information and if even 10% of the people reply and consent to give the necessary assistance there is no doubt that headquarters in Shanghai will be informed very regularly of anything that may be expected to happen. Headquarters can then communicate with the branch stating that certain information has been received and suggestions made and ask for their approval or alternative recommendations.

MR. R: Will you have one or two trained men who can investigate conditions?

MR. CROW: We hope so. With the essay contests which we have started one of the principal ideas is that they will get us in touch with thousands of students who are sympathetically inclined toward us, or who can be made sympathetic, and to choose many helpers from their numbers.

MR. BEYTAGH: Of course, gentlemen, this thing can not be done in a day or two, for quite apart from what we have heard to-day and yesterday, we have numerous other details to consider.

MR. CROW: We might give the outport Representatives a copy of our circular memorandum on labour.

MR. SWANN: On the subject of trained agents, certain authorities have offered to put at our disposal all the trained investigators or trained students we require. They have told us that if we want to use our own people, trained by ourselves, they suggest that we should be guided by their opinion as to whether they are trustworthy or not. We are able to draw on quite a number of assistants of this kind.

MR. BEYTAGH: We regret we can not mention who we mean by "certain authorities" but we are bound down by our word of honour.

MR. R.: Should it not be one of our principal aims to be more friendly with the Chinese.

MR. BEYTAGH: That is being achieved to a very great extent. We have been lucky enough to have very prominent Chinese Officials at several of our committee meetings. We regard this as a very important step in what we have in mind of cooperating with the Chinese.

MR. R.: I think we must have contact with the Chinese.

MR. BEYTAGH: Mr. Swann reminds me that one of the main proposals which I put forward some months ago is for the appointment of a Chinese President of the League. We have two names already proposed for this position, but hearing of Marshal Sun Chuan Fang's interest, I have not approached the two men we have in mind. It is far better to have a man approved by him.

I do not expect the honorary president of the League will have time to take a very active part, but as long as we can say to the other powers that we have a Chinese president, and active Chinese members of the Committees, that will set the seal of approval on our work.

MR. L.: You have more or less covered the question I was going to ask, but have you any Chinese associated with you at the present time on the Committee?

MR. BEYTAGH: Yes, we have Mr. F. whom you all know is one of China's leading merchants, Mr. C. a well known Industrialist and Mr. C. who is a graduate of London University and a well known merchant, but until we get in close contact with Marshal Sun we do not want to do anything definite regarding the Honorary President.

MR. L.: Is the attitude of the Chinese what we might call satisfactory?

MR. BEYTAGH: Yes, decidedly so, but it is quite possible that many of them will join the Chinese Anti-Bolshevik organizations. There are four of these organizations but before doing anything very definite with them, most careful inquiries must be made. As far as we can see only one of them is really reliable. I might elaborate that a little further and say that investigations are being made by certain authorities and when we are satisfied as to their bona fides, we shall certainly work with them. We have got to be sure of our ground first.

I may tell you that Chinese Anti-Communists in Hongkong are very much more active than the Chinese in Shanghai. They have no organization there but we are placing them in charge of our secretary in Hongkong.

MR. L.: Do I understand that they have already formed a branch of the League in Honkong?

MR. BEYTAGH: I would like to read you selections from a letter from a very prominent person in Hongkong:

(Read extracts of letter which cannot be published.)

I may say that we have done nothing so far toward procuring a man to tour China but we do want to procure someone. We shall perhaps do it in conjunction with Hongkong.

(Further extracts from letter)

That, I think, will show you that their idea is to form a branch of the League in Hongkong. I believe we may feel assured of a very considerable backing from that quarter.

Now although you may not have prepared any further questions today, let me tell you that we are entirely at your service and I am sure when you meet your own people, they will ask you a lot of questions which you are not prepared to answer, so please call upon us.

MR. R.: Are these letters and the "Constitutionalist" going to be circulated to everybody in the Hong List?

MR. BEYTAGH: Thirty thousand copies are being printed, which will be sent to every foreigner in the Hong List, to seven thousand missionaries and also to every important newspaper in the United States, Europe, etc., etc.

MR. R.: Will they also go to the Chinese?

MR. SWANN: That is being considered at present. We may issue a Chinese edition which will be edited in the same way that the Russian edition is edited. The Russian edition is being prepared to meet their particular requirements. For instance most refugee Russians know a good deal about Bolshevism without being told of it by the League. We intended to print a Japanese edition straight away but the Japanese members of the Committee said that if we would go ahead with the English edition they would then edit it in their own way and print an edition which would appeal to their nationals. The French edition is at present on the press and six thousand copies will be sent out.

MR. BEYTAGH: You can still find dozens of people who say "What is The Constitutional Defence League? We have never heard of it." By circulating this first edition of "The Constitutionalist" very freely, we hope gradually to create an interest in it and bring people to realize that this is a genuine effort.

MR. L.: What are to be the relations of the branches in the outports with headquarters?

MR. BEYTAGH: That has never been decided but we have down on the agenda for the next committee meeting the formation of an Outports Sub-Committee. This has not been formed yet as we were awaiting the result of this conferance. It is not our desire to impose upon outports any terms or conditions which might not be acceptable to them. By mutual consultation as to what would suit you and what would suit headquarters, we hope to arrive at the best arrangements. The general outline of work should be decided on in Shanghai but we do not want to domineer over anybody.

MR. R.: I think it should be controlled from Shanghai as we will be relying on you for funds to a very great extent.

MR. BEYTAGH: All the outports will get a full report of yesterday's meeting and to-day's meeting at the earliest posible date.

If you have anybody in Shanghai whom you would like to act on the Outports Sub-Committee, I would be very glad if you would give me their names later on.

MR. R.: I think it would be a very good thing if you would appoint that sub-committee as soon as possible.

MR. BEYTAGH: We propose to do so after we have finished this conference.

MR. CROW: I might add that we send out to every member of the Propaganda and Educational Committee the different suggestions, ideas, etc., which are submitted, in order to get their opinions before the regular meetings. There should be someone in each outport to whom identical letters can go so that we can have the benefit of their opinions as well.

In addition, every publication will be circulated to the outports and they will be asked how many copies they can use. If any outport decides they can use so many thousand copies of "The Constitutionalist" or any other publication, we will naturally expect to supply them.

MR. R.: Would not "The Constitutionalist" automatically go to each member?

MR. SWANN: The first edition is being posted to every one in the Hong List both Shanghai and outports. After the first edition it will be circulated to members but anyone requiring copies will receive them.

MR. LUNT: Will the Propaganda Committee do anything before linking up with the outports?

MR. BEYTAGH: We hope that suggestions will come from you. We do not want to force propaganda on you. Certain matter which we use here might not be appropriate in the outports. All requirements will receive individual consideration.

MR. SWANN: With regard to the Essay Contest, I think the outports can assist in making this contest popular. There is no reason why they should not draw the attention of students and others to the contest.

MR. R.: What have you done to call this to the attention of the public? Supposing I should go to the Nanking University, how could I bring up the subject of this contest without showing that I had a personal interest in it and special information?

MR. BEYTAGH: You must never let it be known that this Essay Contest is being conducted for propaganda purposes and it must not be made to appear to be connected with the C. D. L.

MR. A. (Canton): May I ask if you have included the Canton Christian College in the Schools circulated?

MR. CROW: The announcement is being sent to 5000 colleges and the Canton Christian College is included in the list.

MR. R.: What language would you use in the Chinese press?

MR. CROW: As I understand it the language to be used would depend on the publication. In other words the language we would use in newspapers would not necessarily be the same as that used on posters which would be published in an appeal to laborers.

MR. BEYTAGH: We were discussing that the other night and Dr. M. said there are only two written languages in China and universally understood. (Wen li 理文 and Kuo Nyue 語國).

MR. CROW: We have on the Propaganda Committee Dr. M., Dr. D. and Dr. MacC. They are the leading experts on the Chinese language and Chinese Psychology, so I think we are not likely to make any grievious mistakes.

MR. R.: I can forsee that with corporations it might be easy to sustain interest in the League, but there is the probability or possibility that the interest of individuals may dwindle after the first few months. I persume the bulk of the continuous funds are expected from individuals. What would happen in a case like that?

MR. BEYTAGH: What we propose to do in that case—and as you say the interest may dwindle—at the end of the present year we hope to be able to make a report in public of as much real interest as possible and if we can do so I think that our contributions will continue to come in. If we can show good results we shall have very little difficulty in carrying on. I think it will depend entirely on what sort of report we can make at the end of the year.

MR. R.: I do not mean that they will doubt what we are doing but in the outports where they are not so closely in touch. If you had a membership card combined with some sort of pledge, you might be more certain of getting regular funds.

MR. BEYTAGH: We did have a form of a pledge but decided to alter the wording to an agreement to pay.

MR. R.: You mentioned about Mr. Jones or yourself trying to get around the outports.

MR. BEYTAGH: Mr. Jones and I have been talking about it. I have been to Hongkong already—Nanking only takes a week end and I will try to get there in the near future—I place myself at your service as soon as you like—and I will see if I can get Mr. Jones to go elsewhere.

Mr. J. R. Jones and myself or somebody else will endeavour to go round and talk in all the outports but again it is a matter for some consideration after you have reported to your various ports.

We propose, gentlemen, that as our Hongkong friend is coming up at the end of May, to hold another conference along similar lines, which you gentlemen do not need to attend if you do not wish to. In the meantime we will make a full report of this Conference.

Just as a matter of interest before you leave, you will be interested to see what has been adopted finally as the seal of the League.

Gentlemen, I am afraid I shall have to ask you now, if you have no further questions, to terminate this conference as there is a reception at the Union Club to Marshal Sun at 4:30 and I have to be there.

I ask you to accept my personal and sincere thanks—and I would like to express to you the most cordial thanks of the whole of the General Committee and the sub-committees of the League for the time the trouble and thought you have given to this matter. All we hope is that you will sympathize with us and will join with us eventually.

(The meeting terminated at 4:00 p.m.)

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
4-1 1925 2657-D-288 JUL 16 '07
WAR DEPARTMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT ATTITUDE OF CHINA TOWARD THE JAPANESE AND OTHER FOREIGNERS.

From England 19.

No. R-17813 Date July 3, 1925., 19

Replying to No. Date , 19

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. JUL 15 1925

The following is a report of a conversation which took place between Mr. Yoshida, Counsellor of the Japanese Embassy in London, and an English contact of mine who is in confidential relation with many high members of the Government.

The conversation is absolutely authentic and may be of interest in view of the fact that Mr. Yoshida was formerly stationed at the Japanese Embassy at Peking, and has an intimate knowledge of Chinese affairs. Further interest may accrue from the fact that he will very shortly become Charge d'Affaires ad interim at the Japanese Embassy in London, which post he will occupy until a new Ambassador arrives.

Although the remarks made are those of an individual, yet because of his position they deserve consideration.

A copy of the conversation has been furnished to this Embassy.

"NOTE:- The word "foreign" throughout this conversation denotes Japan as well as the other Powers where China is concerned."

* * * * * * *

"Mr. Yoshida stated that in his opinion all the present trouble in China is due, of course, to Bolshevik influence, but most of all to the foreigner's jealousy of each other and the way in which they have all consistently belittled each other to the Chinese, particularly belittling Japan.

"He was of the opinion that action must be taken or very grave events would follow, if not now, shortly, and he stated that the obvious persons to take action on behalf of all the Powers were the Japanese, who, however, have been so slighted by the other Powers that they will wait to be asked before they do anything.

"He openly boasted that Japan had the best Intelligence Service in China, particularly in the Yang-tse Valley and Peking, and that he himself, when sitting in his room in the Japanese Legation, could get more real information as to what was happening in the country than all the diplomats who propped up the Peking bar.

Binding Margin

"Japan had backed the Anfu leaders in face of all the other Powers and their protests, because at the time when those leaders were refugees, they, the Japanese, knew perfectly well that they were going to be the ultimate winners in China's civil strife, and he inferred that Japan would make it its business to see that it was the winner. Similarly, Japan had now given shelter to what remained of the Imperial family and its power because they look forward to the time when with Japan's support they will come in to their own again.

"He regarded the overwhelming and never concealed jealousy of America for Japan as very largely responsible for the present impasse between the Powers, and he instanced a thing that happened in 1919-1920 as the first real eye opener Japan had from this angle. Apparently Japan had been buying Baldwin locomotives for their Shantung Railway line, and in those years they suddenly started building a few in Japan instead of as before placing all their orders in America; but news of this order having reached America he was himself brought to book in no uncertain manner by the American Legation in Peking for controvening the open door policy, and he said quite gravely that it was with great difficulty that the Japanese Government was restrained at that time from making more than an ordinary demonstration against America on the matter in question.

"On the subject of the Lin Cheng train outrage which took place about two years ago, Mr. Yoshida said, with a meaning smile, that it was very lucky for the Chinese that there were no Japanese in the train at the time, and hinted that they, the Japanese Legation, knew of this outrage, or rather the planning of it, beforehand, and not being ready to take action in China had made it their business to see that no Japanese travelled on that day.

"His reading of the words anti-foreign in all Chinese demonstrations at the moment was that it was anti-christian and anti-European and only anti-Japanese, as it were, by accident. Considering that at the beginning of this conversation he premised very strongly that the word foreign in the eyes of China always included Japan, his final definition of anti-foreign is, to say the least of it, inconsistent."

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
INTELL. DIV.
JUL 27 1925
WAR DEPARTMENT

4-1 2657-J 286

SUBJECT The Present situation in China.

From M/A Peking

No. 5481 Date June 22, 1925, 19

Replying to No. Date, 19

5800-Political Issues and Problems.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. JUL 24 1925

The present critical state of affairs in China has been brought about about by certain factors and a specific incident.

FACTORS:

The factors primarily responsible are, I believe, (a) the slowly and steadily rising sense of national consciousness; (b) an increase of the dislike of foreigners in general, and of hatred for foreigners of certain nations in particular; (c) a desire to secure the abregation of the so-called "unequal treaties", and the cancellation of all foreign concessions; (d) a desire to resume the full exercise of sovereignty. It is quite possible to express all of this in the one statement that there is a steadily rising sense of national consciousness, but it is thought well to explain specific objectives.

There is another factor of primary importance and of vast but uncertain effect that must be added. This is a sense of outraged pride, and is particularly manifest among the returned students and their disciples, and to a measurable extent among those who are receiving or have received Western educations in China. For years, indeed since the arrival of the first missionaries, the Chinese in China have received no intimation from their teachers that there exists toward them any feeling that as a people, nation or civilization they are inferior. Undoubtedly this, so far as the missionaries are concerned, is natural, as though unquestionably and probably sub-consciously they felt it, the very nature of their occupations among their pupils and converts made it beyond the bounds of reason that it would be mentioned.

The earlier students that were sent to foreign countries to be educated in western ways were similarly kept in ignorance of this profound fact.

Preeminent among Chinese characteristics is their conceit. Convinced of the superiority of their own ways, their attitude toward the foreigner and his ways has been that of easy tolerance and indifference so long as they did not interfere with Chinese ways and customs. When this did occur, their resentment was promptly and vigorously expressed, and was summarily crushed by Western might. That this did not convey to them the full measure of its implication was due to a belief that might only had settled the issue, and for the moment, and that inevitably Chinese superiority in time would make itself felt and all lost ground be regained.

CONFIDENTIAL
JUL 31 1925
NOTED - DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
~~NOTED - DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF~~

Binding Margin.

With the increase of the number of students in Western lands there came about an awakening as to the true situation. The latter day students included many of active and inquiring minds, who were not satisfied to confine their contacts to scholastic environs, nor their studies to a narrow curriculum. They spent years in the practice of the liberal professions and in business in all parts of the world. Many of them gained high place. To all of them their gradually came the conviction that the Chinese were regarded as an inferior people.

It is not necessary to discuss this, nor to cite the examples that every day life in the West afforded the keen-eyed Chinese in arriving at this disconcerting conclusion. It is equally unnecessary and quite futile to deny the fact that on the part of the mass of white people such a feeling exists. We are concerned only with the problem that has resulted from the fact.

Once convinced of the regard in which their people were held, the reaction has been to make of the returned student and the student of Western education in China, an apostle of a new attitude toward the foreigner, one end of the scale of which may be described as intolerance and dislike and the other as active and vigorous hate. There are among this body many of both extremes. Of the whole body it may be said that there is a common feeling of deeply hurt pride.

As Chinese students are held by their countrymen in particular esteem and enjoy a status peculiar to themselves; as they are highly articulate, and in a country not generally well organized, are themselves well organized; as with nothing to lose, they are burning with a sense of outrage, injustice and mortification, it will be recognized that this factor and its exponents is seriously to be considered.

Factors of secondary importance that have brought about the present state of affairs are (a) the internal disorganization of the country; (b) the weakness of the present Government; (c) the Militarists; and (d) the rivalries within China of Foreign countires.

A Consideration of the Factors of the Situation

Primary Factors. (a) National Consciousness. Much in recent years has beenwritten of the rising sense of national consciousness. Those who have seen and reported upon it are competent to judge. I am sure that it is an actual fact. It expresses itself in attempts at organization of the people; at more general education; in protests against abuses in administration; in attempted reforms. In spite of the aid that vastly improved means of communication has been to the movement, its accomplishments have as yet been pitifully small. But it needs no vision to see into what it may grow in this vast country.

(b) Dislike and hatred of Foreigners. If a foreigner cares to live in China and conform to Chinese ways, I am sure that he would be more unmolested than would the stranger sojourning in any other country in the world. To such a one the Chinese are absolutely indifferent. But foreigners are either unable or unwilling to do this. The result has been to set them apart, objects of dislike and suspicion. In this category may be found the Americans. It is absurd to say of them that the Chinese love them. They simply dislike them less than they do those of all except a few other countries that have been too weak to practice aggrandizement in China. I think that the Chinese do us the justice to know that we have always had the strength to participate in the various struggles that have occured in the past over Chinese territory. Also that they remember with gratitude the forbearing attitude of our troops during the Boxer Troubles. They dislike us, none the less.

CONFIDENTIAL

In another category are found the foreigners who are nationals of countries that have forcibly seized Chinese territory or exploited them and their resources. Chief among these are the Japanese and the British. It is idle to blink this fact, and if in normal times only patience will elicit the depth of the hatred the Chinese bear them, it becomes appallingly apparent on such occasions as the present. The Russians formerly shared this odium. For the moment it is in abeyance, the Chinese viewing them in critical distrust, and even using them freely for certain ends. But if the Russians build too much on an obliteration of the memories of the past, and do not talk with the utmost circumspection, they are doomed to a rude awakening.

There is no profit in Japanese, British or other foreigner pointing to benefits that they have brought to the Chinese. The British in particular have done a vast amount of good in China. But the Chinese will not willingly admit that any good has flowed to their country from Britain and deny indignantly any obligation.

(c) A Desire to Secure the Abrogation of "Unequal Treaties" and the Cancellation of Foreign Concessions. Foremost among the first are those that apply to the principle of extraterritoriality and those that prevent the Chinese from adjusting their own import and export duties. Foreign concessions are to them a perpetual provocation, even though they make a frequent use of them as refuges in times of domestic trouble.

(d) A Desire to Resume the Full Exercise of Sovereignty. Not only in so far as is implied in the foregoing desires, but in all matters, the Chinese have a natural desire to exercise full sovereignty. It is true that they are ignorant of the corresponding sovereign obligations, and that their lack of the one comes from their inability or unwillingness to discharge the other. The fact of the desire remains a potent present factor.

Secondary Factors. (a) The Internal Disorganization of the Country. If it were not for the fact that it has existed for such a length of time, this should be given a place as a primary factor. As a matter of fact the question is bound to occur if the present state is so vastly different from that that has always existed in China. Never more than loosely bound together, it has staggered along from dynasty to dynasty, each succeeding house being ushered in by a brief period of comparatively strong central rule which steadily deteriorated to a condition much, in a governmental sense, like the present, when it in turn yielded to another. A strong central government would not have permitted the occurrence of the incident that has precipitated the crisis. On the other hand, the elements that brought about the incident could not have been formed. It is certain that such a government would now be able to stop further manifestations, and thus a disorganized government becomes a secondary factor in the present state of affairs.

(b) Weakness of the Present Government. The present Provisional Government is the creature of and wholly dependent for its existence upon two great militarists: Chang Tso-lin and Feng Yu-hsiang. It is not a popular government, nor a strong one. It is probable that if either of the two who support it were to gain exclusive power, the present personnel of the government would be immediately thrown out of office. It was not popular with the people. Its head, Tuan Chi-jui, was the leader of the pro-Japanese Anfu Party that amid the execrations of all China was driven from office by Wu Pei-fu. It has now been forced by the Student Movement and Feng Yu-hsiang into an attitude toward the situation in which it is suddenly finding itself intoxicatingly powerful and popular. How far this will lead it into poses or demands from which it may not with dignity recede, is cause for anxious thought.

CONFIDENTIAL

(c) The Militarists. Most prominent at this time are Chang Tso-lin and Feng Yu-hsiang. It is believed that their situation as to each other is accurately stated in Report No. 5419, and that this had not been altered up to the time of the Shanghai incident. This incident has completely changed the plans of the former, as later stated, and has made the latter loom ever larger on the horizon of events.

(d) Rivalries within China of Foreign Countries. The countries referred to are Japan and Russia, and their attitude I also believe correctly represented, up to the time of the Shanghai incident, in Report 5419.

The Incident

The specific incident that has brought on the present critical state of affairs was the firing on a mob of rioters in the streets of Shanghai by the Municipal Police on the afternoon of May 30th. A considerable number, perhaps the majority, of the rioters were students. Some of them were killed and more wounded. Full reports of this have been made elsewhere.

Following this incident there have occurred many disturbances throughout China; parades and demonstrations in practically every city and town of any size, and considerable riots in Hankow, Kiukiang, Chekiang and Nanking. Bad as some of these have been they have never emerged from the insignificance in which they stand in relation to the main incident. It has a profound psychological importance that makes it the center of all interest and negotiation, and from which may flow all the results that are possible and that are giving every one so much concern.

Everyone of the factors that has been named except the Japanese has been occupied in magnifying this incident.

Led and made articulate by the Students Associations and Unions all over China, actuated by the motives above mentioned, the Chinese have denounced the shooting as unjustifiable, brutal and in pursuance of "imperialistic policies"; have demanded the immediate and condign punishment of the Police; the cancellation of the Shanghai Municipality and abrogation of all concessions and unequal treaties; the dismissal of the Japanese and British Consuls-General in Shanghai; the recall of the Japanese and British Ministers; apologies and indemnities from their Governments. Posters and inflammatory documents spread from one end of the country to the other depict and describe the shooting as a brutal wholesale murder, with red handed killers gloating in their work; call upon the people for vengeance; shriek for the blood of Japanese and British; demand a war upon Britain. Boycotts have been proclaimed against the Japanese and British, and a general strike is called for the 23rd of June, and for the first time this is extended to include Americans.

Seizing the opportunity presented, Feng Yu-hsiang addressed a statement to Chang Tso-lin in which he invited him to join in denouncing the shooting, in expressing sympathy for the victims, in standing by the Government in demanding redress. It was the first popular thing that Feng has done, and finding instant response among the people, amounted to a challenge to Chang. He had either to join, or appear before the people as if not the defender of the foreigner, at least not the defender of the Chinese, and making the best of a situation that for the moment caused a halt in his plans, Chang joined. Other and lesser militarists have joined in the movement, only two standing out for the suppression of riots and disorder, Chao Heng-ti and Hsiao Yao-nan.

CONFIDENTIAL

The whole country is in a violent state of agitation and turmoil. Nevertheless, there have been by no means the disorders that might have been anticipated and as yet the situation is not out of hand. All depends on how quickly the Shanghai incident may be composed.

Efforts to this end have been made. On the night of the 17th, however, those negotiations proceeding in Shanghai between commissioners from the Central Government and the Diplomatic Body were broken off, the former returning to Peking. A conciliatory statement as to this has been issued by the Diplomatic Body, and it is hoped that there will follow no violent reaction.

If it becomes possible to settle the Shanghai incident on terms acceptable alike to the Foreign Governments and to China, the whole matter will blow over. I am however certain that it will not be possible to arrive at such a settlement without concessions having been made by the foreign governments. This incident has only brought closer the inevitable day of settling. For long we have been in an untenable position. It would be infinitely better for us to voluntarily relinquish such a position, and gain the credit that would follow such an action, than to continue to hold on until we are forced out.

Concessions that the Chinese may insist upon.

A temporary concession to their feelings in the immediate trial of the Police Inspector, Everson, who ordered the police to fire on the mob. This is a procedure that I think should have been followed at once. It is true that I think that there is little doubt but that he would be acquitted of a charge of manslaughter, the obvious one that should be brought against him. It is also true that there are noisy Chinese elements that would denounce the proceedings as a prearranged affair, designed to whitewash the Police. But I think that the more sober elements would be satisfied with the result, and would support the side of law and order. They would, too, have the feeling that the foreigners had taken a serious view of the shooting, and a dignified and proper course in bringing the officer to trial. Their present feeling is that the foreigners protest that the shooting was justified, but are not willing to submit it of a test in court; that had the victims been white, this course would have been insisted upon by all the other whites; that it therefore follows that they do not regard the shooting of some Chinese as a matter of any great importance. Of course, as a part of the proceedings, and while awaiting the result, Everson to be suspended from duty. This also I think a reasonable course to follow.

Permanent concessions that they would desire are hard to define, as there much loose talk, and little actual crystallization. But it seems reasonable to think that they will want a share in the administration of the Shanghai Municipality; exclusive administration of the Mixed Court in at least all civil cases; an immediate meeting of persons authorized on behalf of their Government and foreign governments interested, to arrange for the rewriting of treaties that now extend special privileges to foreigners.

There is to my mind no question as to the justice of their desire for the first. They are taxed; they should have a voice in the administration of affairs. The second should not be difficult to grant. The Shanghai Mixed Court is a legal fiction. It has served a useful purpose. It deserves a separate study, for which there is no room here. The final concession involves all China. Every thoughtful person has seen the time coming when it would have to be faced. It would have been better to have abandoned the untenable position in which these treaties have, through the passage of time, placed us, than to await the day when we are forced to rewrite them. But there is still time left to make a graceful and generous gesture, and I think that it should be made. It is true that our own country has gone a long way in its efforts to accomplish such an end. That the interests of other foreign countries have for some time rendered our efforts of no

CONFIDENTIAL

value is most unfortunate. The Chinese do not credit us so much with the good intent, as extend to all the Powers participant in the Washington Conference the odium of hypocrisy. Americans are not excepted from this.

If in order to bring about a prompt settlement of the Shanghai incident we are not willing to make some such concessions as the foregoing, and if, as I think probable, the Chinese will not settle the incident without the concessions, the problem, immediate in its nature, is as to the course that the Chinese will follow in efforts to force a settlement satisfactory to themselves.

Possible Course of the Chinese.

There is much wild talk of war. While I consider this improbable, it is not wholly impossible. Many of the fiery radicals are clamoring for immediate war with Great Britain. Feng Yu-hsiang has been uttering threats and making promises as to war. The Chinese feel that they would have the sympathetic support, and possibly physical aid, from the Soviets. They are convinced that we would not fight them. They believe that France would not do so, nor Italy, for reasons sufficient in each case. They do not seem to contemplate as probable that, if they were to go to war with Great Britain, Japan would be involved. There may be some good reason for this.

Another course that they could take would be to accept under protest the proffered terms of settlement of the foreigners, and commence an intense national campaign designed to bring about peacefully the concessions that they are set upon. This seems a wholly reasonable course to follow, and in keeping with the Chinese nature. The reason that I have little hope of its being followed is that it has in the past been unproductive of results. The Chinese are distrustful alike of the sincere desire of all foreign nations to yield anything to reason, and of their own leaders. The Militarists, the Tuchuns, are hated, despised and distrusted. There is reason to believe that these leaders are themselves to be attacked, and that a considerable social revolution of internal affairs is imminent.

The most probable course that I think the Chinese will take involves the use of the deadliest weapons that they have at their command, with which to force their terms on the foreigners. These are the strike and the boycott. A universal strike against the foreigner in China will almost at once make his life there impossible. A boycott will ruin his business. There is no room for argument here. Hope that they will not be invoked lies in the fact that if they are, many Chinese will be thrown out of employment, and many others ruined.

Strikes already are in operation in Canton and Shanghai. In the former place it is extended to Americans, as well as Japanese and British. There is a continuing campaign for a universal strike and boycott. It is idle to think that if carried out, all foreigners would not be involved.

Possibility of Violence to Foreigners.

This must constantly exist until the Shanghai incident is settled and ~~foreign~~ forgotten and all the incitement to violence has died away. It is astonishing that with the virulence of the anti-foreign campaign there has been so little to report of assaults.

Pending a settlement of the issue the best that can be done is to avoid by all means possible clashes between rioters and foreigners. To this end moderation of conduct is necessary, and the Chinese Government has been asked to afford the protection of its own troops to foreigners, rather than placing reliance upon foreign armed forces. This is not always possible of accomplishment, and the danger constantly exists that rioters and foreign soldiers will come into collision. No matter under what provocation the latter may have to act, if bloodshed follows, the matter is certain of misrepresentation by the Chinese, and ~~xx~~ a disastrous explosion may follow.

CONFIDENTIAL

If worse comes to worse, the Chinese get fully out of hand, and a general anti-foreign campaign ensue, the only apparent course open is to evacuate all interior points. It is doubtful if more could be held of China than is commanded by the guns of war-vessels. Action to be taken in such an eventuality is not within the scope of this report.

The Attitude of the Soviets.

There is for the present, and probably always will be, some doubt as to the extent of Soviet participation in initiating the Shanghai incident. But I think that there can be no doubt but that they are fomenting the agitation that has resulted, and that they are using it for their own ends in China. It has seriously embarrassed Chang Tso-lin in his plans in Northern China, and has brought prominently forward their own man, Feng-Yu-hsiang. Other reports have been rendered on this point.

The Attitude of the Japanese..

This has afforded much matter for speculation. Surface indications are that the Shanghai riots grew out of the strikes in Japanese cotton mills in Tsingtao and Shanghai. There is much reason to believe that the strikes themselves were originally fomented by the Soviets. The first reaction against the Shanghai incident was directed as much against the Japanese as the British. But almost at once there was apparent an effort on the part of the Japanese to divert all blame from themselves to the British. In many cases and places they have succeeded. They are acting with the greatest care, and avoiding any appearance of offense to the Chinese. I think the explanation lies in the belief the Japanese have that they are about to lose all the gains that they have made in the past few laborious years in regaining the confidence and friendship of the Chinese. I feel certain that I correctly reported their attitude in Report 5419. That when the Shanghai incident broke they found that Chang had been maneuvered by Feng into a position where he had to support the Government or be universally execrated by the Chinese. That they believe that the present hope of maintaining the status quo in China lies in Chang. That they realize that Chang cannot, for reason just stated, oppose Feng and the Government alone, and that for them to support him would be to make of themselves at once the target of unparalleled hatred from the Chinese. Consequently they are seeking to avoid all appearance of offense, and biding their time. They have much to gain by such a course. Any damage to British business will be a help to them. If this movement develops into a national one, from which a new government is to emerge, they would like to be the friend of the latter. Should it by any chance become a pan-Asiatic movement, they want to lead it. If they can so maneuver affairs as to make considerable foreign support available to Chang, including at least the British and French, they would be very glad, and would add their own support if it were absolutely necessary.

The Attitude of the British.

I think that this has undergone a considerable change from the date of the incident, when their first reaction was one of great indignation and apparently a determination to remain unmoved by threats. They seem now to be alarmed as to the extent of the strikes and boycott, and to seriously question whether it might not be advisable to make extensive concessions. There is no doubt of the anxiety with which they await our own attitude. There are many rumors current to the effect that France and Japan have agreed to give aid to Chang. I do not credit them, though there have been curious exchanges that make them not too improbable.

They

CONFIDENTIAL

The Attitude of the Militarists.

Feng for the moment has the center of the stage. From his utterances it would appear that nothing short of war against the hated British would satisfy him. I think it certain that he is only playing to the grandstands, and hoping to divert from himself the hatred that the Chinese have for the militarists in general.

Chang I believe to be thoroughly opposed to the whole present movement. He nationalistic in every thing and way that is not inconsistent with his personal ambition. To the furtherance of the latter he will accept the aid of any country or person. Circumstances have forced him to accept Japanese aid, and to repel the Soviets. If he thought that he could get the help of the Powers to the extent necessary to crush both Feng and the present movement, he would accept it, and trust to events later to make it possible for him to gratify Chinese desires. It seems probable to me that he foresaw something of the present state of affairs when in last November he almost tearfully besought the moral support, at least, of the Powers, in a campaign against Feng.

Sun Chuan-fang in Chekiang is fishing in troubled waters. Probably the greatest "slippery-head" of them all, he may be relied upon to do anything that will profit himself.

Chao Heng-ti in Honan and Hsiao Yao-nan in Hupeh have adopted ~~strongly~~ strongly repressive measures towards the rioters and students. Their continued power is uncertain unless they change their attitudes.

Wu Pei-fu is remaining non-committal. There have been many absurd reports of his having come to an understanding with Feng. Of all the militarists he has the greatest prestige, and his eventual attitude may mean much. He has sent aid to the strikers, and conveyed an appearance of sympathy to the movement in general.

In the south the Kwo Ming Tang leaders are frankly anti-foreign to the hilt.

Conclusion.

I am not unduly depressed over the situation, nor encouraged by the fact that the past few days have seen no particular acts of violence. I believe the movement to be wide-spread and determined. It may subside; it may be that after all the whole matter will be settled with no change in the status of foreigner and Chinese. But if it does, it will be because for the moment it was not possible for it to acquire sufficient momentum. For the present there is great and imminent danger of a catastrophe that will dwarf the Boxer Uprising. If this danger is passed, only folly will keep the Powers from providing against its recurrence.

DISTRIBUTION:

4 MID
1 CGUSAFC
1 Tokyo
1 Manila
1 Legation
1 File.

CONFIDENTIAL

41 2657-2286
2
1925 AUG 15 31
WAR DEPARTMENT

SUBJECT Analysis of the present situation in China, by George E. Sokolsky.

From M/A Peking

No. 5505 Date July 15, 1925., 19

Replying to No. Date, 19

5020

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. AUG 17 1925

1. The following article was republished in "The Far Eastern Times" of July 15. It is forwarded as confirmatory in large measure of views held by this office and expressed in previous reports. Sokolsky is an American, Jew, Journalist, born 1893 at Utica, New York, Graduate of De Witt Clinton School and Columbia University. He is correspondent for Japanese Advertiser, Trans-Pacific, and North China Daily News. On a recent trip to Shanghai I was told that he would probably shortly take over the editing of George Bronson Rea's Far Eastern Review. It is understood that he and Rea are to go into business together. Rea is leaving for the States shortly on vacation. Rea's affiliations with the Japanese are well known.

It is interesting to note that Sokolsky's prophecy as to the attitude of the Kwomintang toward the Special Tariff Conference is already coming true.

Distribution:

4 MID
1 CGUSAFC
1 File

(Continued on page 2)

Binding Margin.

The Far Eastern Times : July 13 ,1925.

Chinese Agents On Plan In China

[illegible] by Mr. George E. Sokolsky.

[illegible] Shanghai, July 4.—The question of Russian complicity in the anti-foreign movement in China is generally misunderstood. At the outset of the trouble, the public mentioned that there were many Russians in Shanghai. They learned that the Soviet Government had something to do with the strike and it was even supposed that the Russian Consulate had directed the strike and its place of the Russian Consulate in Shanghai at which it was decided to pull the strike, all of which is true and indisputable nonsense, the work of White Russians in the employ of the police and on the intelligence services of various nations. Realizing that all foreigners in Shanghai were suspicious of the Russians, the "Whites" continued to play their confusing concoranties, miserable little pedlar's game.

Chinese Act as Agents.

Soviet complicity in the anti-foreign movement is of altogether a different character. The agents of the Soviet are not Russians but Chinese. In the whole city of Shanghai there is not one Russian of even secondary importance. The Soviet representatives speak no Chinese, have no contact with Chinese political leaders and generally keep far from Chinese affairs. They are not even adequately informed of the policy of their country or of its political activities in China. The reason for this is as follows: All Russian activity in China is concentrated in the Left Wing of the Kwomin Tang, which has recently been nicknamed, the "Red" Kwomin Tang. Soviet Russia does not need Russians to do her work in China, when at her disposal is the best organised political group in the country.

The contact between Dr. Sun and Soviet Russia commenced some time in 1923. When the Doctor was [illegible] President of the Soviet of Chinese [illegible] and [illegible] receiving a cable to that effect, the cable was [illegible] sent via Dairen [illegible] written was with Dr. Sun [illegible] the Russian [illegible] there translated [illegible].

This point of contact [illegible] have led to some misunderstanding. The Soviet [illegible] mission came to Canton [illegible] representative to Shanghai [illegible] to study the political situation in China, particularly in Canton and to maintain the contact. The most successful of these [illegible] a Mr. Borodin, who is now at Canton and who dominates the Central Executive of the Kwomin Tang.

Old Methods Used

It was Borodin who worked out a method whereby [illegible] methods, which the Russians had were successful in Russia, Persia and Turkey, could [illegible] China. The main burden of the Soviet argument has been that the failure of China in achieving internal unity and international equality with the Powers is that the Chinese adhere to old methods in warfare and in international relations. The effect political group which would adopt new methods would be able to master the country and would ultimately make it impossible for the foreign powers to maintain their present attitude toward China. Russia called attention to the possibility of a Sino-Russian arrangement which would destroy Japan and humiliate Great Britain. The United States, fearing Japan more than any other nation on earth, according to the Soviet point of view, and seeking to make money out of the war, would be neutral, [illegible]

Karakhan's Transfer To Moscow

A wireless message from Berlin confirms the report, exclusively published in The Far Eastern Times July 8 that Ambassador Karakhan is to be transferred from Peking to Moscow. The message states that he will take up an important position in the Soviet Foreign Office. The position referred to is that of Commissar of Foreign Affairs, an office now held by M. Chicherin who is reported to be indisposed and about to take curative waters in Germany.

[illegible] and schools were [illegible] to refill the ranks of the [illegible] opposed to Great Britain, Japan and the United States. France was omitted, however, [illegible] members of the Kwomin Tang were involved in the gold franc settlement.

It will be remembered that [illegible] Soviet Russia then adopted a [illegible] policy in China, the principle of [illegible] a condition whereunto all treaty Powers would be placed upon an equality with benefit. It is important even if the much pro-Russian advocate to suggest that the policy was motivated by any [illegible] for China. It was rather the result of jealousy and of a desire to humiliate Great Britain, Japan and the United States. Mr. Karakhan's attacks on Dr. Bourman and his "foolpidgin" policy in Peking was part of this campaign of humiliation, a campaign which completely failed in its essential purpose of changing the international position of the treaty Powers in China.

Japan Gained Friends

The attitude of the treaty Powers as evidenced by the Washington Conference and the general trend of events was such that they were constantly gaining in the friendly attitude of the Chinese people toward them. Japan's change of policy, particularly, had that effect and it is safe to say that had not the unfortunate incident of May 30 occurred, Japan's position in China would have constantly improved until her political and

[illegible] Kwomin Tang members in parliament, almost three hundred are followers of Feng Sheo-yi whose opposition to the Left Wing has been continuous and consistent.

In their desperation this group joined forces with Feng Yu-hsiang who naturally turned to Russia as an ally because Chang Tso-lin is supposed to be working with Japan. Feng Yu-hsiang does very little as a matter of principle, being [illegible] considerations. He now finds himself pushed into Mongolia which is [illegible] a buffer state between Soviet Russia and China and [illegible] have a friendly ally in the rear.

Utilizing the military assistance provided by Soviet Russia and the popular agitational assistance provided by the Left Wing of the Kwomin Tang, he has felt all along that he was a match for Chang Tso-lin. Furthermore he expected that when the time was ripe for him to seize Peking, members of the Kwomin Tang would take such actions throughout China as to make it possible for them to seize local governments which would recognize his authority.

Two Events Interfere

This, then, was the programme worked out by Soviet Russia. Two events, however, interfered with that programme. One was the settlement of the Gold Franc Issue which made the Special Tariff Conference a certainty and

[illegible] Two-lin's decision [illegible] two reasons clearly [illegible] intention of [illegible] and holding it as [illegible] down Feng Yu-hsiang [illegible] of influence to a point [illegible] The Tientsin [illegible] Tientsin and [illegible] Feng Yu-hsiang [illegible] Russia is that [illegible] between Russia and [illegible] only [illegible] Mongolia. From the [illegible] of international [illegible] means that in the event of a war between Japan and Russia, Japan would be in a position [illegible] to move large forces not only into Siberia by way of [illegible] but into Siberia by way of Mongolia. Against the [illegible] in the Tsoman [illegible] Russia's protests, reviving [illegible] claim to her sphere of influence in spite of the [illegible] that all Powers had [illegible] spheres of influence [illegible] had recognized [illegible] the Chinese government [illegible] build her own railroads [illegible] she saw fit. Russia's [illegible] with regard to this question [illegible] regarded as an [illegible] Chang Tso-lin who has [illegible] contracts for the steel for [illegible] these lines and who is proceeding with them as rapidly as possible.

Chang Uses Force

In the general distribution of political power after the last Chihli Fengtien war, Chang Tso-lin was enabled to extend his power from Manchuria down to the Yangtze by way of the Peking-Hankow Railroad to Hunan and by the Tientsin-Pukow line

[illegible] May 30 that the events of that [illegible] the organization which [illegible] control of the strike had been prepared by the Left Wing of the Kuomin Tang for the purpose of creating disturbances [illegible] which Tang Yi-shang [illegible] make an attempt to [illegible] the Chinese government and to establish a Soviet form of government in preparation for a Russian attack on Chang Tso-lin which would have led to a Russian-Japanese War, as Japan's vital interests in Manchuria and Korea would be endangered. From this standpoint, the events of May 30 may be regarded a blessing in that it will be difficult if not impossible for the Left Wing of the Kuomin Tang to revive their organization which has been killed by the failure of the present strike and which completely exposes a plan to bring about another great war on the soil of China.

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

WAR DEPARTMENT

1925 2657-2-286 8

SUBJECT The Present Situation in China.

From M/A, China

No. 5539 Date August 7, 1925., 19

Replying to No. Date, 19

RECEIVED 4/2 WDL SEP 11 1925

3600 - Political Issues and Problems.

The period since the breaking off of negotiations between the delegation sent to Shanghai by the diplomatic corps to investigate the incident of May 30th, and that sent from Peking to Shanghai by the Provisional Government for the same purpose, has been one of no accomplishment visible to the public in the way of a settlement either of the Shanghai incident itself or of the larger questions which have grown out of it.

On the return to Peking of the diplomatic delegates, June 18th, a meeting of the diplomatic body, acting upon information supplied by the delegation and obtained from other sources, notified the Waichiapu that it was ready to open negotiations concerning the Shanghai incident and decided upon a course of action which it felt would help to meet the situation and indicate the foreign viewpoint as to responsibility for the shooting of May 30th.

The conclusions expressing this course of action were telegraphed July 1st through the consular body at Shanghai to the Municipal Council. Promulgation of them was entrusted to the consuls general at Shanghai who were at the same time informed that they would be simultaneously published in Peking. The receipt of these conclusions in Shanghai created consternation and immediate opposition was made by the British Consul General, Barton, to their being published or taking effect. A temporary postponement of publication was made to July 6th. In the meantime Barton expressed his opposition in telegrams sent directly to the British Foreign Office. His protest received sufficient support from his home government to cause it to decline to participate in the enforcement of the diplomatic body's decision. As this broke the solidarity of the powers it automatically suspended any enforcement of the decisions.

The dissensions which have followed among the representatives of the foreign powers in Peking, and the actual contest between the British Charge d'Affaires and the British Consul General, have resulted in the noted period of non-accomplishment.

In the meantime, there have been a succession of leaks which have resulted in the essence of the diplomatic body's decision as to Shanghai becoming more or less public. That portion of the decision to which Barton particularly took exception is comprised in the findings of the diplomatic body: (a) for the occurrences of May 30th, the Chairman of the Municipal Council was not devoid of blame; (b) the Chief of the Municipal Police, McEuen, had been so negligent of precautions as to indicate his unfitness for his position and should be replaced; and (c) the Police Inspector, Everson, who ordered the police to fire, while taking the only possible course, was criticised for lack of judgment in refusing re-enforcements offered him prior to the occasion for opening fire.

Binding Margin

The view of Barton, which I am sure was shared by practically all of the Shanghai British community and a considerable portion of the rest of the foreign community, was that the decision of the diplomatic body had been based upon recommendations made to it by its delegation; that this delegation was not properly constituted for the purpose of conducting a legal inquiry into the affair; that its investigations were ex parte; that its sessions had been private; that it had not the power to administer oaths; that it had not summoned all available witnesses; that in consequence officers of the Municipal Council had been condemned by an incompetent agency and without a fair hearing in their own defense. The Shanghai Municipal Council, on being informed officially of the decision of the diplomatic body, and for the reasons just stated, declined to carry out the decision, announcing its primary responsibility for its officers to the ratepayers of its municipality.

In the negotiations which have followed, the French Minister resigned from a committee of three of which he was a member, which had been designated to negotiate with the Waichiapu as to the Shanghai incident; thereby apparently indicating another breach in the solidarity of interested foreign nations and giving rise to much uneasy speculation. He has subsequently announced his position is that as a difference of opinion had arisen between the diplomatic body and the Shanghai Municipal Council as to their relative authority in the settlement of the incident, and since the Ministers could not enforce their decisions, there was no point in their conducting negotiations. Hence his resignation was to his mind entirely logical. Also, that his government has no intention whatever of disassociating itself from other foreign powers in the settlement of the current and other situations that may arise between them and the Chinese. In his assertions to this effect he has used rather violent and undiplomatic language indicating a considerable pique that the British in particular should have alleged the French were not participating fully in the problem.

There is considerable evidence to the effect that leadership in the solution of the present difficulties both in Shanghai and the country at large, will be assumed by the United States, Great Britain and Japan. If this is correct, the leadership will have to be conducted with the greatest delicacy and tact that the sensibilities of the other foreign nations may not be wounded.

Speaking only of the Shanghai incident, it is apparent that a plan is taking form to conduct a legal inquiry into all the circumstances connected with the shooting of May 30th. This legal inquiry to be conducted by jurists, American, British and Japanese, who have been stationed at other places than Shanghai and who have had no connection with that municipality. The American Legation is very insistent that a Chinese jurist be included in the membership of the commission to make the legal inquiry.

There is no question of the wisdom of this course; however, it should have been taken immediately after May 30th. As the Chinese have been informed through the leaks above noted of the decision reached by the diplomatic body as to responsibility for the Shanghai incident, their view of the present intention to conduct a legal inquiry is as follows: They were pleased with the dismissal of McEuen, the rebuke of the Chairman of the Council and the blame that attached to Everson, as indicating a belief on the part of foreigners of a considerable degree of foreign culpability and particularly of British culpability. They correctly interpret the failure to put this decision

into effect as due to the opposition of the British; they feel that the British in expressing a willingness now to participate in a legal inquiry, do so in the belief that the findings of such a committee will support the Municipal Council and its officers and exonerate them from all blame; they are perfectly aware that the diplomatic delegation was not judicial in nature, but to give force to their objection to the new proposed legal inquiry refer to it as having been such an inquiry, and ask why, when as the result of it certain decisions had been reached those decisions were set aside and a new legal inquiry proposed?

It is my opinion that the diplomatic body, in sending the delegation to Shanghai, acted in the belief that it would be a gesture designed to show the Chinese Government that the foreign powers were determined to conduct on the spot an impartial investigation by personnel not of Shanghai, and that this was a wise move. Also that in arriving at its decision, the diplomatic body acted only partly upon observations made by the diplomatic delegation and mainly upon information furnished it from a variety of official and unofficial sources in Shanghai. I think the decision it reached was wise and should have been unswervingly followed. I think failure to follow it has put the foreign powers in a bad tactical position. However, I think that with patience the difficulties may be surmounted and a legal inquiry be had. But if such an inquiry exonerates from blame McEuen, the Chairman of the Council, and Everson, then I think the objections of the Chinese will be very well founded and it would have been better that no inquiry should ever have been had.

Reports indicate that McEuen, whatever his record of service, which has been long and honorable, was on this occasion grossly negligent in his absence from his immediate duties and his failure to provide for exigencies that the commonest prudence could have foreseen; that Fessenden, Chairman of the Council, though not equally as negligent, was nevertheless so to a culpable extent; and that Everson, had he accepted the re-enforcements offered him prior to the shooting might easily have been in such a strong position as to preclude the necessity for actual firing.

All this should have and could have been determined had Everson immediately been placed on trial for manslaughter, a course which it seems to me common sense should have dictated.

26517-8286

The general condition throughout China has changed in certain aspects from that existent at the time of Report #5481. Physical disturbances have been absent for some time, but this I attribute to a Chinese feeling that psychologically a situation has been created which demands and will have attention by the powers; that foreign sympathy for the Chinese point of view has been evoked in many quarters; that further acts of violence cannot add to but may alienate some of this sympathy; that their wisest course of action is to steadily insist upon a settlement of the matters at hand with no accompaniment of untoward incident.

The Chinese have set their hearts upon the abrogation of the unequal treaties, the cancellation of the rights of extra-territoriality and upon tariff autonomy. How much of these desires they will be able to realize is problematical, but it is apparent that further delay in discussing them is impossible.

The Chinese believe that if they regain their sovereign rights they will by virtue of such regaining be a proud, independent and successful member of the family of sovereign nations of the world. Even though all that they ask is granted them, the injury to foreign trade, the difficulties of foreign life in China, the losses of foreign capital, which will result, will not be comparable to the tremendous disappointment the Chinese are going to suffer when they find themselves still in chaos. A simile used by me to Rodney Gilbert sometime ago and made the subject of a cartoon in the North China Herald, is sufficiently apt to be repeated. It is that in their present efforts the Chinese may be likened to a carter who fixes a Packard name=plate to his Peking cart in the belief that thereby his cart becomes an automobile. The Chinese people, bitterly resentful of foreign condescension and control, have been made by their leaders to believe that plastering on their government the insignia of a sovereign state will make it one. When they find that it is the same old Peking cart their disappointment will be as great as their resentment toward their leaders.

There is a profound psychological fact concerning the Chinese which must never be lost sight of in dealing with them, and that is that appearances are infinitely more important to them than any other quality of any other kind concerning physical or political edifices. Thus, in Peking, one sees miles of walls that have every appearance of enduring masonry. A heavy rainfall discloses the fact that they are precarious erections of rubble, held together with the slight cohesive power of mud and washed over with a coating of thin painted cement. Those who take a contrary view and point out that the Great Wall has endured and will endure for centuries, neglect the fact that they who built it were driven to their task by relentless masters. There are no such masters of physical or political construction in China today.

Chang Tso-lin.

Failing to obtain the support of foreign powers other than the Japanese in his efforts to secure control of Northern China, and Japan declining alone to assist him, Chang Tso-lin's position has become increasingly precarious. It is difficult to determine with any accuracy the extent of combinations formed against him. However, that some combination has been effected and that its object is the expulsion from within the Wall of Fengtien troops, is I think correct. Chang has returned to Mukden where he recently held a conference at which it was decided to send no more Fengtien troops south of the Wall. I feel certain that this conference decided also that in the case of attack they would immediately evacuate the area about Shanghai, Kiangsu, Shantung and the larger part of Chihli. Today the Fengtien representatives in the Provisional Senate meeting in Peking have been pre-emptorily recalled. There is every indication of Chang's relinquishment of his plans as outlined in Report #5419.

Feng Yu-hsiang.

The 3rd National Army, under Sun Yueh, has successfully completed its campaign in Shensi and Sun Yueh himself will probably be named the tuchun of that province. Feng Yu-hsiang is more than holding his own and there is good reason to believe that through the mediation of Yueh Wei-chun a temporary working agreement has been reached between him and Wu Pei-fu.

If this agreement includes, as it is said to, Hsiao Yao-nan and Chao Heng-ti with Sun Chuan-feng in Chekiang, and Ni Tao-lang in Anhwei, we may expect a complete change in the complexion of affairs

within a very short time. Probably the most important point of such a combination is the certainty that it will result in the return to power of Wu Pei-fu. It is reliably reported that this combination has as one of its articles the immediate release from confinement of Tsao Kun.

Feng has lately made bold overtures to the Japanese, in which he calls upon them to join the Chinese in opposition to the policies of the white races. He is probably influenced in this by the Soviets, and by a desire to weaken Chang Tso-lin's connection with Japan in favor of himself.

In the south, Tang Chi-yao of Yunnan has been driven back to his province after the failure of his campaign through Kwangsi. In Canton there are surface indications that there is a rising resentment on the part of merchants and the better situated of the laboring classes against the communistic tendencies of the present government. Sun Fo, son of Sun Yat Sen, is now in Peking for conference with Tuan Chi-jui. Whether this conference has been brought about from a desire for rapprochement between the Canton Government and the Provisional Government, to dictate terms to the Provisional Government; or for the purpose of presenting the Canton view, and proposals for the settlement of the Shameen incident, remains to be seen.

Russia.

There are continued reports of the steady arrival in Mongolia and Kalgan of munitions for the forces of Feng Yu-hsiang and the Mongolian Army. Other reports are to the effect that $4,000,000 has been advanced by the Russians to finance the campaign of the National Army into Shansi and Shensi. Conferences have been held in Kalgan between representatives of the Soviets from Canton and in Mongolia.

I believe that the Soviets are intent upon two objects; the first and least important of which is the incitement of the Chinese to revolt and violence for the purpose of establishing independent governments affiliated with the U.S.S.R. or an independent government of all China similarly affiliated.

The second and more important object is to bring about such complete friendship and accord with the Chinese people as to insure Chinese support to Russia in the latter's inevitable conflict with Japan over Manchuria.

For the past three years Russia has been conducting an imperialist policy in Mongolia and Manchuria. I think that her activities further south are tentative and that no great success is expected from efforts to sovietize China. Russia has been longer in contact with the Chinese and more closely resembles them in mental processes than any other white nation. It seems to me probable that from her intimate knowledge of the Chinese she must recognize the practical impossibility of converting them to her own communistic ideals. Nor is it apparent that any great benefit could flow to her from such conversion. It is true that she desires that those rights and exemptions of her nationals in China which she has relinquished may be taken from those countries that still by treaties maintain them, and it is true that she views with complacency any trouble of any sort for the "imperialistic" powers in their relations with China.

But more important than anything else is her desire to regain all ground in Manchuria lost in 1904 and 1905. For the campaign which she must wage to this end, she is desperately anxious to secure China as an ally, and lines of supply both of re-enforcements and munitions other than the single track trans-Siberian railway which was so weak an element in her war against Japan.

Japan.

I see no reason to alter my opinion expressed in Reports #5419 and 5481, as to the Japanese attitude during the past few months. Having been out-maneuvered south of the Wall and so far unable to secure support other than her own for Chang Tso-lin, they are now anxious that he return to Manchuria with his forces. They must consolidate their position in Manchuria and take all possible advantage of what measure of control they are able to exercise over Chang. Should Wu Pei-fu emerge as the leader of new forces, they will be faced with a repetition of the issues that confronted them in the fall of 1924. It seems to me that they have failed markedly in their attempts to crush Feng and his Soviet supporters and have narrowly escaped losing all the ground that by studied effort they had regained in Chinese esteem and friendship. They seem now desirous of sharing with Great Britain and the United States leadership in negotiations designed to settle the Shanghai incident and to give effect to the provisions of the Washington Conference in so far as they affect China.

No particular reaction appears as a result of Feng's overtures for joint Chinese and Japanese action as opposed to the white powers. Knowing Feng's Soviet affiliations, and having Chang in Manchuria who is opposed to the Soviets, the reason for this is plain.

Another explanation of Feng's overtures may easily be the failure to disassociate Japan from Great Britain in the strikes and boycotts. The attitude of the average Chinese is one of uncompromising dislike of the Japanese, and this has caused the failure of the attempt to isolate Great Britain. Feng quite conceivably may have thought his overtures would evoke a more sympathetic attitude toward Japan by the people at large.

Conclusions as to the General Situation.

I think that at the moment affairs in China that concern the status of its foreign relations are in a state of suspense - of delicate equipoise. But a slight impulse is needed to send it in one of two directions: Toward a resumption of relations as they existed prior to May 30th; or, toward a more violent assertion of demands for treaty revision, etc.

Time is the greatest ally for those who hope that the former course may be followed. The Chinese have no great capacity of sympathy for the sufferings of others. Nor are they homogeneous. Their sense of a common nationality is as yet embryonic. Hence the death of a few of their numbers and the wounding of others in points so separated as Shanghai, and Hankow, of itself means nothing to them.

Life is a constant struggle, and want is always at hand. Hence they are not easily to be kept upon a strike that deprives them of wages, in the interest of what is to them largely theory. Similarly merchants are loath to perpetuate a boycott that costs them money as well as the objects of it.

If the Chinese were capable of the self sacrifice that sustained interest in national affairs requires before it will produce reforms, they would not now be in the position that they are.

To get results from the Chinese it seems to be necessary to excite them to an hysteria by the most violent speeches and demonstrations. Then they are capable of anything.

Therefore it seems safe to say that every day that passes without an incident of provocative nature is that much advance made on the road to former relations.

The radical element fully appreciate this. They know, too, that in encouraging clashes they run the risk of alienating some of the foreign sympathy that may be of value to them. They are thus between the horns of a dilemma. Every day it becomes plainer that the Shanghai incident precipitated a crisis that had not been planned until the fall at the earliest.

Signs are not lacking that the more radical are striving desperately to keep the fires of resentment burning. The most outrageous falsehoods and misrepresentations are printed daily in Chinese papers. Student Associations are again endeavoring to fulminate. One sign of this is the strike of the servants of the British Legation, elsewhere referred to. I think it probable that the crisis has been safely passed, and that we are to enter upon a period of negotiation. There would be no doubt of this in my mind if there were some way in which appeal could be made to the ready sense of humor of the Chinese.

Conclusions as to the Prospects of Civil War.

Always existent, these are for the moment somewhat less bright. I think that had Chang not withdrawn to Mukden, war would have broken out about Shanghai between his forces and those of Sun Chuan-fang, and that this would have precipitated a more general conflict. The possibility of war between Chang and Feng is somewhat less than the prospect of war between Chang and the forces comprised in the combination of the nine provinces, elsewhere reported.

Distribution:

4 MID
1 CGUSAFC
1 Tokyo
1 Manila
1 Legation
1 File

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
OCT 20 1925
4-1 2657-9-286
3600 4
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CHINA (Political)

2657-9-286

Subject: Present Situation in China.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D., OCT 15 1925

Since the rendition of the last report on this subject, #5539, August 7, 1925, there has been an appreciable slackening of the tension which at that time characterized the relations between China and the "imperialistic" powers. There has been justification for the belief expressed in the quoted report that that was a time of suspense and equipoise. Since then the tide of anti-foreign feeling has slowly receded. I do not believe that it again will reach the level of the days prior to May 30, 1925 until many concessions have been granted the Chinese and many re-adjustments made in the existing relations between foreigners and Chinese.

The subsidence of the anti-foreign feeling is not, I believe, to be understood as a weakening of resolution on the part of the Chinese to obtain these concessions and re-adjustments. On the contrary, I believe that the feeling among the leaders of the nationalistic movement in China is that they have given the foreigners a demonstration of their power. With this demonstration and the psychological condition which it produced they are satisfied to await events. They are convinced that the foreigner now knows their power. They believe that they can recreate if necessary the demonstrations which evidenced that power. They feel that further demonstrations with consequent reactions might prejudice their cause at home with their own people, who would suffer from continued strikes, boycotts, and riots, and abroad with those foreign sympathizers that they have gained.

The strike in the British Legation wore itself out without incident. In Hankow negotiations between the Chinese and British came to a full period with exorbitant demands by the former for recompense with implications thereby conveyed. In Kiukiang and Nanking conditions again approach normal. In Shanghai the state of emergency has been declared terminated, the Japanese mill strike is over, the British mill owners are offering to settle with the strikers on practically identical terms as those upon which the Japanese strike was settled, the crews of Japanese coastwise vessels have returned to work as have most of the crews of British vessels, and coastwise and river shipping approximates 75% of normal. In Canton the situation is more obscure but most not be confused with that of other places in China. It is that of a distinct and unique seizure of the Canton government by the communistic element of the Kwomanting party, engineered and backed by the Soviets.

The British Attitude.

Although the present situation must be considered as one affecting all China in its relations with foreigners, the attitude of the Chinese and foreigners toward each other in Shanghai receives a great amount of importance from the fact that not only was Shanghai the scene of the incident which precipitated the crisis through which Chinese and foreign relations are now passing, but because it is as

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Present Situation in China. (cont'd)

well the largest and richest foreign settlement in China. Contacts there result in reactions which if unfortunate are more provocative than they would be in any other place. Its long and turbulent history marks it as a most prolific cause of misunderstanding and trouble between the Chinese and foreigners. Accordingly it affords a valuable index of the feeling marking both the inception and subsidence of the recurrent crises.

From May 30th until recently the British attitude in Shanghai has been one of a determination to restore and perpetuate conditions as existent prior thereto. This determination at times has seemed stupid and at other times has verged upon the truculent.

As an example of the former it is to be recalled that on July 6th the Municipal Council dominated by British influence cut off from all but "essential industries" electric power from the municipal plant. The reason given for this action was that there had been a strike among the employees of the plant which placed upon Europeans the burden of continued operation and that this burden was too great for any other purpose than the production of power absolutely essential to life in the settlement. The actual reason was that Chinese mills using the power were thereby unable to continue in their employ a vast number of people stated by some at 100,000, a considerable portion of whose earnings was devoted to the financing of the strikers from the Japanese and British mills; that the product of the Chinese mills was flooding the market and would seriously undermine the business of the Japanese and British mills. The step was taken without prior notice to the American Admiral in command of American landing forces at Shanghai and who was second in command of all foreign landing forces. It was a gesture of defiance and an aggressive act which might have been fraught with most unfortunate circumstances in that it released from employment a horde of coolies ripe for mischief. That these consequences did not follow must be attributed as well to the restraint of the Chinese as to the influence exercised by Chinese armed forces and foreign landing forces.

Pressed for a statement as to the number of strikers from the municipal plant it developed that these were 3,000 out-door technical workers.

Conducting their own negotiations the Japanese mill owners settled their strike with their employees and requested power for their mills that work might be resumed. It is regrettable that there was not unanimity among foreigners in treating with the striking element; nevertheless, the success of the Japanese was a distinct achievement, and restoration of working conditions which would have promptly absorbed 50,000 workers would have markedly relieved the situation. The British remained obdurate however, and until September 8th refused to turn on the power, although the Chinese Commissioner of Foreign Affairs guaranteed that if they would do so he would have the 3,000 strikers returned to the plant on exactly the same conditions that existed prior to the strike.

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Present Situation in China. (cont'd)

There is no doubt that the Japanese, in conducting to a successful conclusion their negotiations with the strikers, gained a distinct advantage over the British. In the subterfuge of crediting their workmen with five days' pay at the end of the first day, they carried out the demands of the Chinese that $100,000 be paid the strikers.

An example of their determination which verged upon the truculent is found in the case of McEuen, heretofore reported. It would appear from the attitude the British have adopted that the dismissal of McEuen or the acceptance of his resignation has assumed such importance in Great Britain as to suggest the possibility of a parliamentary crisis. Nothing more clearly indicates British attitude in Shanghai than their reference to McEuen, a British subject in the employee of the Shanghai Municipality an international entity, as a "British officer". The British are adamant that the only action to be taken in his case is that immediately prior to the judicial inquiry for which they are planning he is to be "suspended without prejudice". Unfortunately there is far too much reason to believe that the judicial inquiry will find him neither criminally negligent nor culpable. I am afraid that if this actually does eventuate the effect will be most unfortunate. On the other hand, there is no question in my mind but that had the conclusions of the diplomatic body been carried out and McEuen dismissed, the effect would have been most beneficial, the ends of justice would have been served and no wrong done McEuen.

There are signs, however, of a marked change in the British attitude in Shanghai. On August 31st at a joint meeting of members of the British Chamber of Commerce and the Shanghai branch of the Chinese Association, resolutions as follows were adopted:

> "That this meeting publicly declares itself in favour of prompt action in order to give effect to the decision of the Washington Conference and the adoption by the representatives of the various Governments concerned of a point of view sympathetic towards the suggestions which China may make with regard to the application of those decisions.
>
> "The meeting also gives public expression of its support of the principles of direct Chinese representation on the Municipal Council in the International Settlement and the rendition of the Mixed Court and hopes that the negotiations which are now proceeding in Peking on these questions will be brought at an early date to an issue satisfactory to all parties. That it tender the Chinese community in Shanghai an expression of its earnest hope of the acceptance of this resolution as evidence that the misconceptions, among which is the belief that British merchants are unsympathetic towards China's national aspirations, are without foundation. Also that the Chinese Chamber of Commerce use its influence to dispel them and to co-operate with the British merchants in bringing the present unhappy situation to an end".

These resolutions indicate such a reversal of policy and attitude as to be both ludicrous and pathetic. Throughout the rest of China there has been evident a clever British propaganda designed to alleviate the situation and sooth China's sensibilities. I think the

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Present Situation in China. (cont'd)

British are coming to a tardy recognition of the fact that they cannot restore the status existent prior to May 30th and that their efforts to do so will meet with no sympathy from America and Japan.

The British attitude toward Canton has apparently been immediately productive of results. Defying the embargo of the Canton Government, a British ship visited Canton from Hongkong with no untoward results.

The Japanese Attitude.

The Japanese have acted with consummate skill, turning a crisis precipitated by a riot in one of their own mills into a position where they are reaping marked benefit. Their trade has increased materially at the expense of the British, while the steadily conciliatory attitude they have adopted has gone far not only to allay Chinese irritation but to win them Chinese friendship. I think that we may be reasonably sure the Japanese will not only in no way participate in any policy even faintly reactionary but will do all in their power to help China realize her aspirations for tariff autonomy and the re-writing of the unilateral treaties. More, if the opportunity presents itself through Great Britain having too deeply committed herself to any reactionary policy, I think we may anticipate Japan's assuming the leadership of foreign powers seeking to befriend China or even announcing an independent policy of disinterested friendship, and in this attitude justice to Japan must recognize she is acting upon the best mainspring of any country's foreign policy "enlightened self interest".

Russian Attitude.

It is too early yet to say, but it would appear at the moment that in acting upon the advice of its Soviet advisors, the Canton Government has gone too far and that there is an increasing resentment against them. This has elsewhere been reported. It still remains to be seen if by threats and terror the Canton Soviet government will be able to maintain itself. There is every reason to expect an open breach and fighting between the communists and the anti-communists at any moment. I think Canton has been definitely isolated from the rest of China and will have to work out its own salvation, and that this isolation, proclaimed impossible heretofore by many competent observers, has been brought about by the firm attitude of the British. In the north there is no apparent change in Soviet plans except as may be implied in the departure from Peking of Karakhan, elsewhere reported.

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Present Situation in China (cont'd)

Conclusions as to General Political Situation.

I think that it is most unlikely that for the present there will be any further rioting or other physical demonstrations of anti-foreign feeling. Unless there is a war to upset their plans I believe the Chinese are prepared to go into the approaching Tariff Conference with a fair degree of confidence of attaining considerable concessions, and at least an attentive hearing to their demands. There is, of course, difference of opinion between the members of the Chinese delegation to the Conference. Probably this difference is best expressed by saying that some are inclined to moderation in demands and others to an extremity that is little short of chauvinism. Yet it is reasonably to be expected that there will be a substantial unanimity of action presented by both groups. On the part of the foreign powers there is evident a desire to meet Chinese wishes so far as may be possible. The situation presented is one full of possibilities.

In considering what these possibilities may be it would seem wise to give some thought to the reconstruction of the premises upon which I conceive Chinese foreign relations heretofore to have been based. Roughly stated, these are freedom on the part of foreigners to carry on trade in China under conditions of life and law comparable to those existing in Europe and America. From these have grown open ports, concessions, and the exercise of the right of extra-territoriality. From further and more intimate relations have grown foreign supervision of the national customs service, the Salt Gabelle, and of the tariffs levied by the Chinese Government.

While it was obviously possible for a nation, or nations, more advanced in the art of modern warfare than the Chinese to establish by force such relations with the Chinese as to make these conditions of trade and existence possible, it is equally clear that they could not have been maintained had the Chinese possessed the ability to profit from this lesson of force. Japan presents a perfect demonstration of this. Quite as backward as the Chinese in modern warfare, of approximately only a tenth of China's population, and not forcibly opened to foreign trade until ten years after the treaty that opened the first ports in China, she nevertheless so firmly faced the issue of regaining her sovereignty that forty years thereafter she had defeated China, and ten years later, staking her whole existence on the issue, conquered the might of Russia and threw back the Russian advance on Manchuria. Thereafter she has rated as one of the great powers. This sudden emergence to equality with the greatest nations of the world of an isolated and island empire that fifty years prior had been in a state of medieval feudalism was due to such a grim determination, singleness of purpose and intensity of effort and sacrifice as to be almost convulsive. The reward was equal to the labor expended. Contrasted with her present splendid position must be the realization that had she not made the stupendous and successful effort that she did, her relations with the western powers would still be comparable to those of China today.

It is extremely doubtful if China is capable of the united and self-sacrificing effort that would produce the same result for herself. If she is not there appears at first glance no reason to suppose that her foreign relations may not be continued as they have been heretofore, the same means to that end being used that originally brought them about.

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Present Situation in China (cont'd)

It is also clear that those relations have been of an extremely profitable nature to nationals of the foreign powers, and so indirectly to the powers themselves. Huge business enterprises have been built up that represent the investment of billions of dollars. The foreign investment in Shanghai alone is placed at $3,000,000,000.00 gold. In addition to these enterprises are many activities of a speculative and trading nature that require no considerable investment of capital in permanent plants. It is difficult to forecast the effect on these of an alteration of existing arrangements and relations. Thus there must be envisaged an opposition to change as powerful as the capital, investments and prospective profits of what in lieu of a better name may be called the foreign vested interests in China.

When there is added to the foregoing reasons for a desire on the part of foreign powers to perpetuate existing relations with China, and the statement of the apparent ability to force on China such a perpetuation, the further statement that there is reasonable doubt on the part of the foreign powers of China's ability to conduct its own affairs in a satisfactory manner and grave fears that she is unable to safeguard the life and property of foreigners in China if present restrictions and exemptions are removed, I think the whole case is presented for those elements that oppose any change whatever, and which elements will be animated in the approaching Conference by that spirit of opposition to change. It is not without great merit, and is entitled to the gravest consideration. Yet it is open to the charge that it presents both a selfish and shortsighted premise upon which to base Chinese foreign relations, and it is certain that the relations based upon it have been productive of misunderstandings that on occasions have produced catastrophies and if continued bid fair to produce others.

It is selfish in that though profit from these relations has accrued to the foreigners, and this profit has been the reason for their establishment and maintenance, only a minimum of profit has accured to the Chinese, and that wholly incidental to the profit taking of the foreigner. More, the establishment of certain extremely profitable enterprises of foreigners has been at the expense of the Chinese. For example, the foreign owned and operated coastwise and river shipping has driven thousands of junks out of an age-old business. It is idle in this connection to point to the fact that the foreign steamers have reduced costs and time schedules. Only superior force expressed in treaties makes possible their continued operation. Such meagre comfort as they may the Chinese gain from considering economy and celerity of delivery.

It is shortsighted in that though there is now an apparent ability by force to perpetuate conditions initiated in 1842, the times have changed. A more liberal feeling has swept the world, a part of which is a desire to deal fairly with weak as well as strong. There is no longer the solidarity of foreign interests that came from a common hunger to gain advantages in defenseless China and that recognized in a united front opposed to a Chinese protest the best hope of individual gains. There are now to be taken into account certain countries, formerly aligned with the great powers, that for their own reason are now desirous of acting independently - the Soviets, to further their dream of a world revolution, possibly the Japanese as leaders of an united Asiatic movement.

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Present Situation in China (cont'd)

If the premises upon which the foreign relations of China are based were rewritten to meet these charges that the present ones are shortsighted and selfish, the first suggestion seems a preamble that as the foreigner is a guest in China; as he has come to China to trade for his own profit; the burden rests upon him to prove that Chinese conditions as to life and law are inapplicable to him. If he is successful in proving this, he might by study arrive as such safeguards as are necessary but falling short of the practice of the principle of extra-territoriality. It is in this spirit indeed that I think the whole question of extra-territoriality should be approached.

To meet the charge of selfishness in the present relations, I would suggest that these tests be applied to foreign enterprises in China: Will they be of profit alike to the Chinese and the foreigner? Will they be beneficial to China? Will they be conducted at the expense of China and the Chinese?

If the first and second, or either, may not be answered in the affirmative, or if the third cannot be answered in the negative, then they should not be supported by force. This may seem too idealistic. Its cogency perhaps may be best shown by a comparative statement. If the United States were so weak that another nation were able by force to obtain the right to navigate its rivers and coasts with merchant vessels presenting advantages over the American ships, and these were protected in this traffic by their own warships, the condition to Americans would be intolerable, and would be endured only so long as weakness made resistance hopeless. Throughout that period there would be unceasing trouble and the foreign ships would take their profit only in spite of the Americans and to the accompaniment of an increasing hatred. It may be said that Americans would meet the competition and hence the comparison is not apt. It is made for the purpose of showing that existing relations with the Chinese breed hatred and distrust that can lead to only one conclusion, and for that reason it is apt.

To meet the charge of shortsightedness, it would seem wise wherever possible for the delegation of each foreign power to consider every several question presented for decision as if it were a matter at issue between China and its own country alone, entirely omitting the use of the pressure that combined action would produce. Inevitably certain problems would be presented that would be insoluble under such an arrangement. Others from their very nature would require from their initiation joint consideration. Yet the effect desired would be produced, in large measure at least, if all appearance of ultimatums from combined strength were avoided, and thereby thunder would be stolen alike from the Russians and the Japanese. I am not sufficient of a diplomat to work this out or even to be sure that it is workable, but this is I think certain, that one of the greatest of Chinese grievances results from their feeling that though they might be able to cope with foreign powers individually, they are helpless before them in combination and, further, that this feeling is being played upon at present by the Russians, who are offering to free them from the "imperialistic yoke"; and again, that I think it more than probable that if the foreign powers once sufficiently commit themselves to a reactionary policy, Japan will seize the opportunity to declare herself the leader of a more liberal policy, or even the sole friend of China.

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Present Situation in China (cont'd)

If the premises upon which China's relations with the Washington Conference Powers were rewritten along the lines indicated and for the reasons stated, the possibilities presented by the approaching Tariff Conference, and its conceivably widened scope, would be full of hope for the future.

Distribution:

4 MID
1 CGUSAFC
1 File
1 Manila
1 Tokyo
1 Legation

JUNE TWENTY-THIRD

THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
FOR THE
INVESTIGATION OF THE SHAKEE MASSACRE
JUNE 23 1925
CANTON CHINA

VIII-I-2-b

My dear Colonel Borrell,

Attached just received from China and of possible interest.

Goldhandwy

N.Y. June 26

FOREWARD

Two months after the Shakee Massacre, I went to Shanghai, Nanking, Kukiang and Hankow to investigate the sad incidences in these places. The incidences varied a great deal in degree of horror, but the liberate action of killing of the Chinese by the imperialists was the same everywhere. Shanghai being the first case, but the case in Canton was the worst among them.

The investigation for the Shanghai incidence has been held many times, but the opinions among the judges and representatives from the different nations varied in many ways. So far no result has come out from them. That shows very clearly that those who were responsible for the shooting did not want to admit the wrongs done to the Chinese people.

Now the incidence in Canton has also not yet been settled, but the people have been and are standing firmly against the British Colony of Hong Kong and Shameen. The strike is still on. This shows the united front of the people in Canton and they will never give up unless the wrongs done to them have to be righted.

Mr. Y. L. Lee, Secretary of the Commission, has reported that the first edition of this pamphlet "June Twenty-Third" six thousand copies, have been sent out to all countries over the world and the demands for them are increasing everyday. A second edition is very necessary. On behalf of the Commission I whish to take this opportunity to appeal to the readers again for their humane consideration.

T. C. KAM
Vice-Chairman of the Commission

不有犧牲者
誰識虎狼暴
猙獰死枕藉
尚復言人道

胡漢民題

THE COMMISSION

HON.	CHAN YUNG	(陳　融)	CHAIRMAN
MR.	T. C. KAM	(金曾澄)	VICE-CHAIRMAN
MR.	CHAN FOO MUK	(陳孚木)	CHINESE SECRETARY
MR.	Y. L. LEE	(李應林)	ENGLISH SECRETARY
MR.	KO KOON TIN	(高冠天)	
MR.	LAAM SUN TONG	(藍駿堂)	
MR.	CHOW TIN PONG	(鄒殿邦)	
MR.	WONG TSO PUI	(黃祖培)	
MR.	LEUNG LONG TSAU	(梁闌秋)	
MR.	TSUI SHAU PUN	(蔡壽朋)	
MAJOR	CHU TONG	(朱　棠)	
MISS	SHAM TSZ FONG	(沈芷芳)	
MR.	LI YUI YI	(李悅義)	
DR.	SIN KAI CHI	(冼家齊)	
MR.	CHAN SUM	(陳　森)	
MR.	SHAM SUNG	(沈　崧)	
MR.	CHUNG HOK LING	(鍾鶴齡)	
MR.	PEI YIN CHI	(皮言智)	
MR.	FUNG HUNG CHO	(馮雄磋)	

THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION FOR THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SHAKEE MASSACRE, JUNE 23, 1925, CANTON, CHINA.

On the afternoon of June 23, 1925, a mass meeting took place at the East Parade Ground to protest against the unnecessary killing of Chinese students by British policemen in Shanghai. After the mass meeting, the crowd marched through the streets to distribute hand bills, a usual feature of parades in Canton. The parade, comprising first labourers, then farmers and merchants, then students-boys and girls-and lastly cadets and soldiers, marched from the East Parade Ground along the Bund to Shakee, which is separated by a wide canal from the island of Shameen, the Anglo-French Concession in Canton. As soon as three quarters of the entire parade and the first part of the student demonstrators had passed the West Bridge of the British Concession, the Britishers on Shameen opened fire, killing 52 and wounding 117 Chinese students, labourers, merchants and cadets.

Immediately after this unfortunate incident, the Governor of Kwangtung, Mr. Wu Han Min, called a meeting of representatives of some fifty or more important organizations for the purpose of forming a commission on investigation. Those elected to serve in this Commission were Mr. Chan Yung of the Kwangtung Supreme Court, Mr. Ko Koon Tin of the Canton Christian College, Mr. Laam San Tong of the Canton Students' Union, Mr. Chow Tin Pong of the General Chamber of Commerce, Mr. Wong Tso Pui of the Kuomintang School Principals' Association, Mr. Lee Ying Lam of the Canton Y. M. C A. Mr. Leung Long Tsau of the Charitable Institutions, Major Chu Tong of the Whampoa Academy, Miss Sham Tsz Fong of the Women's Equal Rights Federation, Mr. Tsui Shau Pun of the City Chamber of Commerce, Mr. Li Yui Yi of the Kwangtung University, Mr. Sin Kai Chi of the Kung Yee Medical College, Mr. Chan Fu Muk of the Journalists' Union, Mr. Chan Sam of the General Labourers' Guild, Mr. Kam Tseng Ching of the Kwangtung Educational Association, Mr. Sham Sung the Chief Inspector in charge of the Ninth Police Station, Mr. Chung Hok Ling of the Pun Yui Red Cross Society, Mr. Pei Yin Chi of the Young Soldiers' Association and Mr. Fung Hung Cho of the Hong Kong Students' Union. After this Commission had been organized, its members were sent out to investigate matters concerning this sad incident. Opportunities were given to the general public for the making of reports and several meetings were held. At one of these meetings the American Consul, the German Consul and the Russian Consul were invited to sit with the Commission to hear reports.

From the evidence given by the reports of many eye-witnesses the Commission wishes to state the conclusions that follow. Evidence and testimony gathered by the Commission for its report from the different eye-witnesses are also published in full elsewhere in this pamphlet.

Shakee is the road opposite Shameen, the Anglo-French Concession in Canton. It parallels Shameen and is separated from it by a wide canal. The only entrances to Shameen are two bridges, the East Bridge (French) and the West Bridge (British). Before the parade, Shameen was well fortified with sand-bags and barbed wire entanglements, and protected by British and French sailors and other volunteers. All these preparations were probably



This map shows the positions of the demonstrators in Shakee and its relation to Shameen

due to the Shameen authorities having had no Communication with Canton city for two days before the parade. During these two days all sorts of rumors were rife within Shameen and the authorities there were so nervous that they had almost reached a state of panic. During the parade the iron gates at the bridges were closed and barricaded. Before the firing took place, the students and faculty members of the Canton Christian College had just passed the West Bridge, followed by boy and girl students of the Sacred Heart College, the Women's Normal School and other schools. The Whampoa cadets were still further behind. They were a few hundred feet from the West Bridge, where the firing started.

It ought to be clear that Shakee is not within the concession but is in strictly Chinese territory. The Chinese therefore had a perfect right to march down this street. Armed cadets and soldiers were in the parade, it is true but this has been the custom in demonstrations in the last few years in Canton.



This map indicates positions of those who were killed and those who were heavily wounded and died afterwords, Each "X" represents one person.

While the demonstrators were at the mass meeting earlier in the afternoon, they were strongly urged by Governor Wu Han Min and Dr. C. C. Wu, Secretary of Foreign Affairs and other speakers to keep order in passing through Shakee. Policemen were sent out to preserve order along Shakee. The demonstrators did keep perfect order in marching along the Bund and Shakee, but as soon as the last part of the student section approached the West Bridge, signals were suddenly observed for preparation for shooting near the Victoria Hotel, at the southern end of the West Bridge just within Shameen. Rifles and machine guns were seen pointing at the demonstrators. Some students were frightened and wanted to run away but the parade leaders quieted them. Then according to the reports of the eye-witnesses of the Canton Christian College



" The demonstrators did keep perfect order in marching along the Bund and Shakee."

students and Mr. Shum Sung the chief Inspector in Charge of the ninth police station, who were at that time at the West Bridge, a man was seen on the first floor of the Victoria Hotel who started to shoot at the demonstrators with a revolver. Then rifles and machine guns followed. Scores of men, women and children in the procession and among the spectators were killed or wounded. Thereupon firing from both sides started and continued for about half an hour.

It may be observed that not only were most of the demonstrators unarmed, but that there were also crowds of onlookers on the side walks. Moreover demonstrators were marching in closed columns in good order. Shakee was in no way fortified, but was exposed to shooting from any angle from Shameen. On the other hand, Shameen had been well fortified before hand, all sailors and volunteers were well protected behind sand bags, the iron gates at both bridges were closed and guarded with eight or more machine guns, most of the dead and wounded were unarmed and the casualties, were 52 dead and 117 wounded on the Chinese side.

The parade entering Shakee road

Mr. L. C. Au, Teacher of Canton Christian College

Many of those who were wounded and killed were very far from the armed cadets; for example, the teacher and student of the Canton Christian College, who were killed after they had gone far beyond the West Bridge. If the shooting had first started from the Chinese side, then unarmed students and others would have had opportunity to escape from the place of danger very easily. Furthermore many of the wounds were in the left side of the bodies. If the attack from Shameen had not been sudden the wounded would have escaped or at least the wounds would have been in the back instead of in the left side.

The demonstrators were separated from Shameen by a wide canal. The two strong iron gates at the entrances were closed and barricaded. Shameen was naturally well protected, even without sand bags, barbed wires, machine guns, cannon and gunboats. The British and French sailors were protected behind sand bags. No attempt at all was made on the part of the demonstrators to touch the gates. Under what necessity therefore were the Shameen authorities in employing machine guns in killing unarmed demonstrators by the score?

The brain was shot away.

An examination of the wounds, which we made. revealed their terrible character. From evidence shown in the report of Dr. Y. Y. Kwok, Physician of the whampoa Academy to the Commission, it appears that the Shameen authorities employed dumdum or soft-nosed bullets, illegal under international law even in war.

So far, the reports show that there were 52 killed and 117 wounded. There may be some others, concerning whom we have no report. Those whom we know to have suffered casualties are described in full in the appendixes B. and C.



"An examination of the wounds, which we made, revealed their terrible character"

From our investigations and the evidence given by the various reports to the Commission. We, as members of the Commission, feel that the Shameen authorities have to be held responsible for this Shakee Massacre. With no prejudice whatsoever, we submit this report to the world for just and humane consideration.

The Commission for the Investigation of the
Shakee Massacre, June 23, 1925.

Chungpang.
T. C. Kam
Y. L. Lee
Chan Fu Moo
Choi Shou Pang
Chu tang
Sham Sung
Lee Yuet Yee
Chow Tin Pong
Fungtung-cho.
Shen Ze Fong.
Laam Leen Fong
H. L. Chang
Pee Yin Chi
T. P. Hwang
Dr. Shin Ga. Chai
Koontin T. Ko
Liong Long Chou

Kong Naam, a seaman, with his mouth, face, nose and lips shot away. Teeth completely destroyed.



Please notice the wounds shown in these two photos.

Hui Iu Cheung, student of the Canton Christian College

APPENDIX A.

Evidence and Testimony Gathered by the Commission for its Report.

I. By the teachers and students of the Canton Christian College.

Ng Pak Shing's report: "Over one hundred students of our college took part in the demonstration. Following us, there were students from Kwan Wei Girls' School, Sacred Heart College, Girls' Normal School, Canton Normal School, Chap Sun School, and the 2nd Higher Primary School."

Yeung Wa Yat and Chui Yee Ping report: "When we had passed the West Bridge, shooting suddenly started from somewhere near Watson's store followed by volleys of machine gun fire from Shameen. The masses made haste to run; we were carried off our feet by the crowd. A man behind us was killed on the spot by a flying bullet."

Tsao Yeo's report: "When we had just passed the West Bridge, shooting was heard from near Watson's store. The street was crowded and I could not pass. A bullet scratched my face before it entered the head of a person in front of me who fell dead. I ran into a narrow alley soon afterwards."

Li Yun Lung's report: "I was at the head of our column. When we had passed the West Bridge, shooting was heard and I ran to hide myself behind a brick pillar of a store in an alley. Near me stood Hsu Shek Lau, Hui Iu Cheung and an unarmed soldier. Then suddenly a bullet entered the pillar. The next bullet struck down Hui Iu Cheung. A man dressed in white running past me was also shot down. The unarmed soldier succumbed to the next bullet About ten minutes afterwards, I was able to run to the other end of the alley, where it was safer. Here I saw at least 7 or 8 persons lying dead on the ground."

Wu Kai Shing's report: "When I had gone about 50 feet beyond the West Bridge shooting was heard from Shameen. The people were not much disturbed at first, but after hearing the third shot, all scattered in disorder, I ran into an alley opposite the West Bridge. Just as I reached the entrance of the alley, a bullet passed over my head and struck down a man near me."

Hsu Shek Lau's report: "When shooting was heard, I ran and hid myself behind a pillar in front of a store. I saw my school-mate Hui Iu Cheung and an unarmed soldier, whose duty it was to preserve order there before me. The soldier, gave one cry and fell dead. When I turned my head I saw that Hui Iu Cheung also had fallen, when the shooting became more intense I ran at once into an alley."

Li Shiet Hwa's report: "When we had passed the West Bridge a shot was heard, and I am sure it came from Shameen—sure, because at that time I was not much frightened. Shortly afterward more shooting was heard, and I ran to the sidewalk to try to get behind a pillar, but all the pillars of the buildings were occupied. Continuous machine gun fire was heard. I had to run from pillar to pillar for several hundred yards before I reached the entrance of a small alley, where a man had already fallen. Many people crowded here eager to get inside. Some boy scouts were crushed beneath their feet; I do not remember how I got in; but even after I got in I heard the shooting for a long time."

"Those killed were: Professor Au Li Chow and a student named Hui Iu Cheung who were shot down beyond the West Bridge.

Those severely wounded were: Tsao Yew Tang. Shiu Pun. Ho Han etc.

Those slightly wounded are too numerous to mention."

2. Report by Wong Tso Pui, Representative of the Kuomintang School Principals' Association:

"I joined the parade with the boys and girls and walked as they did a little ahead of the whampao Cadets. When we arrived at Shakee Road. I saw many Chinese policemen standing erect with white flags in their hands along our side of the canal to preserve order among the demonstrators. There were many citizen spectators there. The cadets marched four abreast in closed columns. When we reached the West Bridge a shot was heard from a building facing the West Bridge, on Shameen. At this time the cadets had not arrived at the West Bridge. I was standing near Choy Lan Alley into which I ran at once and the crowd after me. Volleys were being discharged very heavily toward this alley, a man fell near me. Twenty minutes later when the shooting was not so heavy as before, I ran to another smaller street. On my way, I saw the ground stained with blood everywhere and the sight was horrible."

3. Report by Sham Sung, the chief Inspector of the 9th Police Station Canton City:

"When the labourers and students were about to turn off from Shakee Road to an alley, the armed foreigners of Shameen, who were looking at the parade, suddenly ran behind their fortification of sand-bags. As soon as the cadets arrived near Tew Yuen Alley off Shakee Road, a long-headed and short-haired foreigner in civilian dress began to shoot from the first floor of the Victoria Hotel at the demonstrators on Shakee Road. Soon after volleys of machine gun fire came from the British Police Station on Shameen. Another machine gun was operating near a foreign building on the left side of the road near Watson's Store. These shots were directed towards the direction of Yuen Hung Store on Shakee Road. I was then standing near the West Bridge and

therefore saw everything very clearly. As I was in a very dangerous position, I dropped down to the ground and rolled toward Shakee. A man stumbled over me and died on my back. My uniform was consequently covered with blood. Shortly afterward, some foreigners removed their machine guns to Watson's Store facing the West Bridge and sent a volley at us. Cannon from foreign gunboats were heard from the river. Everyone scattered for safety."

4. Report by Major Chu Tong of the Whampoa Military Academy.

"When the cadets of our academy reached Shakee Road, we saw machine guns and armed foreign soldiers in and near a building in Shameen. Near the East Bridge a foreigner was looking at the demonstrators through field glasses. When we came near the West Bridge, many foreigners were standing on the ground between the buildings. Soon afterward, the clanging of a bell was heard, like a fire alarm, the foreign onlookers quickly disappeared and shooting began from Shameen. Firing of machine guns followed. All aimed at the demonstrators. As our aim was only to hold a parade, not to fight, we tried our best to prevent shooting from our side. We could find no shelter as the street was so crowded. Orders were quickly given to our cadets to fall flat to the ground. But the crowd in front of us was in great disorder. Volley after volley was fired from Shameen, a great many of our cadets and students of other schools together with citizens and onlookers were killed on the spot. Detailed report of casualties will be presented later."

5. Report by Miss Soo Tai Hwa and Miss Whang Yuen Yung, Proctors of the Provincial Girls' Normal School:

"The parade was arranged in the following order: (i) laborers (2) peasants (3) merchants, (4) students (5) cadets. Our school belonged to the 9th group. On our way from the Bund to Shakee, special inspectors consisting of military men, police, students, etc, were appointed to preserve order among the demonstrators. These persons had white flags in their bands, hearing the characters: "Keep Order." etc., When we passed the East Bridge, we saw some foreigners looking at us through field glasses. On the left side of a store and by the stone coping of the canal there were piles of sand-bags from behind which many foreign soldiers were peeping at the demonstrators. The same preparations were also seen on the left side of the East Bridge. When we proceeded toward the West Bridge, some foreigners with field glasses walking along the other side of the canal, stopped near Watson's Store where some 20 foreigners were looking at the demonstrators. Suddenly shooting was heard; and machine gun fire followed. The crowd pushed us into an alley beyond the entrance of the West Bridge. As the volleys were heavy, we made the students bend low and enter the alley. Some students however were wounded. The roar of cannon was also heard. Detailed condition of the dead and wounded will be reported later."

6. Report by Chen Hwei Tsang, student of Canton Law College:

"Our school having only a small number of students, did not form a special group, but joined the group of another school. We walked a little ahead of the Canton Christian College group. Behind the Canton Christian College group were small groups of primary school boys and girls, followed by cadets from Whampao Academy. When we had just passed the West Bridge, we heard the sound of shooting from a building in Shameen. It was soon followed by volleys from machine guns. The crowd was thrown into great disorder. The policemen that were standing along Shakee Road to preserve order were now helpless. Many of them fell into the water. My hat was struck by a bullet, and my head felt shaky. I bent down on the ground and crawled into the alley near Yuen Hung Store. My foot was slightly hurt. When I reached the interior of the alley, I still heard volleys."

7. Report by Chen Sam of the general Labourers' guild:

"When the students of the Canton Christian College and the cadets of the Whampao Academy came near Ki Chang Company, the foreigners began to shoot at us from a hotel in Shameen, killing several persons on the spot. Many others fell into the water. As the throng was making a great noise another volley from Shameen was fired with the result that many more were killed. Students of the Canton Christian College suffered a great deal. Two girl students were also wounded. As the foreigners were protected by sand-bags and as there was no protection on Shakee, the number of killed and wounded was therefore very large. Thirteen workers belonging to our guild were severely wounded. They are now in Kung Yee and Canton Hospitals. Their condition will be reported later.

"Tang Han Hing and Fan Chang Yuen of Chap Yen Union and Whang Tang of Bor Tzoy Union also gave the same report."

Many other reports from the Director of the Canton Shamshui Railway. students of the Kwangtung University etc., etc., are quite similar to those we have given above, therefore omitted.

8. Report by Dr. Chau Koon Ming, Physician.

"After the Shakee Massacre, a woman called Fung An-yeung sze, Ah Yui by name, came to my office for treatment (She lives in Lung Kee Grocery, Second Ma-loo, West Bund). She said, "I was watching the parade near Tsoi Laan Street, Shakee. Before the firing occured, I saw foreign soldiers on Shameen near the West Bridge aiming their guns as if attempting to fire. The demonstrators were afraid and ran away, but they were immediately called to reassemble by their parade leaders. Thus the order of the procession was resumed. Then the firing at Watson's Pharmacy started. As I fled, I was thrown down and trampled on. I recall clearly that a whistle from the foreign troops immediately

preceeded the first firing, and that thereafter every whistle signal there followed firing either of rifles or of machine guns.' "

"Another patient by name of Chau Yuk Ting came to me for treatment because of a wound on his knee caused by a collision which occurred in front of a garage opposite the East Bridge. He said that the first shot in the French concession was discharged by a foreign soldier who stood under the veranda of the gray building near the East Bridge which is the residence of a doctor of the Franco-Cantonaise Pharmacy. Mr. Chau lives in No. 33, Yan Tsai Street and may be consulted again."

9. Report by Chan Kwok San, student of the Chop Shun School.

"We four brothers, Kwok Kei, Kwok Keung, Kwok San and Kwok Fung, took part in the parade that day. Shortly before we arrived at the West Bridge, we heard the firing. The students of the Canton Christian College marching in front of us immediately dispersed. The procession was in great disorder. Some scattered and fled, and some fell to the ground to take refuge. Turning around I found that my brothers had disappeared so with a few of my schoolmates I hid myself behind the corner of a house. I saw that the gate of Shameen was tightly shut, and I saw suddenly several foreign soldiers with firearms attempting to open the gate to come out. But seeing the cadets arriving, they stopped. I watched for a chance to dash into the inner streets and returned home."

10. Correspondence.

June 24th 1925

The Editor, Canton Gazette,

Dear Sir:

As an eye-witness I wish to say a few words in your columns concerning the bloody affair of yesterday afternoon at Shakee opposite from Shameen. The writer was taking pictures of the parade as the procession was passing by Shameen. After taking a few pictures I stood on a spot about twenty feet away from the East Bridge watching the parade go by. The procession was marching peacefully and orderly ahead toward the west, shouting occassionally, "Down With Imperialism." As the parade was coming toward the end a sudden shower of machine gun bullets shot right into the crowd from the direction of the French Police Station.

This threw the crowd into a panic, and a general rush was made for safety into the narrow side streets and alleys. I, myself rushed across the Bund and found myself in a food restaurant. There were about 150 others crowded into this small place; some crawling under tables, some hid themselves in the corners and others got behind stoves and ice boxes. There was no back door nor window to escape, and for nearly an hour we remained there while machine gun bullets

went whistling by the front door. In the attack I saw many that were shot down and scores of women and children were crushed to death on the rush for safety.

The shooting of yesterday was absolutely uncalled for. The murderous attack from across Shameen upon the peaceful demonstration of students and workers indicates nothing more than a well planned wholesale slaughter of our citizens, for:

1. There was no shot fired either by the paraders nor by the people watching the parade, prior to the shooting from Shameen.

2. Our people were absolutely unprepared for any sudden trouble with the Shameen people by the simple fact that tens of thousands of our people gathered on both sides of the Bund to see the parade go by.

3. The parade itself consisted mostly of young school children and middle school students.

The Shameen authorities had planned for this massacre ahead for:

1. The writer had seen the Shameen authorities had been building fortifications in strategic places along the Shameen water front for days since the 18th with sand bags.

2. As far as the writer could ascertain there were four machine guns at the West Bridge and a like number at the French Police Headquarter. The four machine guns at the West Bridge were manned by British gunners and were placed as follows; two of them on the second floor behind sand bags on Watson's Building and the other two at the opposite building on the second floor also behind sand bags.

We who raised our voices to heaven for justice against the wholesale murder of our peaceful citizens throughout China have also been met with a shower of bullets from the British and French machine guns.

We who tried to arouse our people to stand for justice and humanity have met our deaths mercilessly from the hands of imperialistic and militaristic powers.

We cannot and have not the right to raise our voices against injustices and wrongs done to us, except to be butchered at will by the British and French soldiers.

It is without question that the responsibility for the massacre of the demonstrators on Tuesday, June 23rd rests entirely upon the Shameen authorities.

It is with horror that such crimes should be committed a gainst a peaceful and helpless people, by such enlightened and powerful nations of the world.

The writer has written these lines as testimony from an eye-witness, and who narrowly escaped from death, with the sole purpose of calling upon the civilized world to bring justice due and to remove wrongs done to our helpless and defenseless nation and further to prevent any such merciless atrocities upon any helpless people in any part of the world henceforth.

In the name of Christiandom, let us not only, "Make the world safe for democracy," but let us also MAKE THE POWERFUL NATIONS OF THE WORLD SAFE FOR DEFENSELESS PEOPLES.

Yours for China and for Humanity,

(Signed) Kam Lum Chu,
Educational-secretary,
Canton Y. M. C. A.

II. Letter of Rev. K. H. Chiu to Mr. Y. L. Lee (member of the Commission)

Mr. Y. L. Lee, Secretary
Y. M. C. A.
Canton.
My dear Mr. Lee:

On June 23rd. about ten minutes of three, I went from Pok Tsai Bridge to the Bund. When I reached Sai Hor How the Patriotic Parade of Canton citizens had just reached there. The demonstrators carried banners and inscriptions representing the various schools and organizations and were full of enthusiasm. As they marched along, the spectators applauded them. I stood there and watched them for a short while and then went ahead following the boy and girl students.

I noticed that the demonstrators were full of enthusiasm, shouting now and then, "Back with the Customs", "Back with Shameen" and singing their school songs, but they were peaceful throughout, They did not show the slighest intention of committing any act of violence or disorder.

After standing a few minutes near the East Bridge, I took a small boat to go across the river, because I had to attend a meeting at Fong Tsuen. Looking back from the boat, I saw that there were trenches in Shameen filled with sailors and soldiers as though they were ready for a big attack. The fortification back of Pohoomull's Store was the clearest to be seen.

It was at about 3:10, when I had not been in the boat more than seven minutes that I heard rifle shots and cannon fire. The foreign gun boats off Shameen also participated in the attack.

During the shooting the air was thundering with rifle shots, machine guns and cannon fire.

After the shooting was over, I went to the scene where the shooting had occured and also to see the wounded at the hospitals. At these places I saw some whose heads had been blown open, others whose intestines and stomachs had

been shot through. The sights were so cruel and inhuman that one could hardly describe the pain and agonies they must have suffered. I was so struck that I found it difficult to keep from crying.

I noticed there were about 40 or more dead bodies along Shakee Road and many that were wounded. Of these the large number were school children, while the others consisted of merchants, labourers, boy scouts, teachers and cadets.

Seeing that my good old friend Mr. Au Lai Chow was among the dead, I was especially sorrowful. He was a member of my church and a faculty member of the Canton Christian College.

Oh, how cruel and unjust. God will surely punish these murderers who have so mercilessly shed this peaceful and innocent blood.

What I have said above, is what I personally saw ; and therefore as a Christian I wish to be a witness of the above facts. I hope this may be of use in bringing justice to our helpless people.

Yours most sincerely,
(Signed) K. H. Chiu
Executive-Secretary
The Church of Christ in China
Kwongtung Divisional Council.

12. Report by Chau Chaak Chi, student of the Sacred Heart College.

"I was in the 82nd team of the procession that day. When we reached Shakee, I saw piles of sand-bags lining the East Bridge and at the entrances of the streets in Shameen. I saw foreign soldiers moving behind the sand bags (I saw their heads only). They held their rifles on the top of the sand-bags and aimed at the procession. The preparations seemed to be even more severe near the West Bridge. There were sand-bags in front of the Victoria Hotel and other buildings and verandas. Several foreigners in ordinary clothes stood in front of the Hotel. There was one person in that group in white clothes and yellow trousers with a fierce look who pulled out his revolver and attempted to shoot at us but was at once suppressed by his companions. That sight caused many of the procession to dispel, and thus the parade was in great disorder. Immediately afterwards, some demonstrators shouted that nothing had happened to be afraid of, so the procession recovered fairly good order. After that, I saw several foreigners running into the Victoia Hotel, and the man in white coat and yellow trousers fired one shot at our procession, and then I heard two more from the east side of Shameen. The crowd was very much terrified and fled for life. One of my fellow schoolmates was shot and fell. Some of my schoolmates and I ran to the colonnade along the sidewalk and took refuge behind the pillars. When the firing paused, I dashed into a small lane. There I saw a boy scout lying on the ground wounded.

My schoolmates and I tried to save him by "Artificial respiration," but because of his serious wounds the attempt was ineffectual. These are the occurrences that I saw."

13. Report by the 106 members of the Boatmen's Union.

"On June 23, we were at the boats stopping at Shakee Sun Chung. We went ashore to watch the parade. We saw the sand bags piled up in Shameen as if a great battle were to take place. There were also barbed wire entanglements on both sides of the bridge gate. The procession kept very good order. Altho the foreign soldiers were making a fuss about the demonstrators, yet the latter proceeded in an ordinary manner, taking no heed of them. But suddenly the foreign soldiers commenced firing at the procession which resulted in the killing and wounding of many people. These are the occurrences that we witnessed with our own eyes."

14. Report of the Canton Procurator's Bureau on the Shakee Massacre.

"On June 23rd, the 14th year of the Republic, all classes in Canton held a patriotic demonstration in protest against the Shanghai Massacre of Chinese Students by the British police.

"The Procurator General especially appointed Mr. Jahm Wing Sung an officer with a number of police to keep order along the line of the parade.

"Suddenly at about 3 P. M., it was heard that shooting had occured between the East and West Bridges. Upon enquiry, Officer Jahm and police quickly returned and reported that when the demonstrators reached Shakee Road, a fire alarm was sounded in Shameen; the armed foreigners who stood watching the parade thereupon immediately got behind piles of sand bags and suddenly shooting was heard from the Shameen Municipal Council Building, Watson's store and nearby buildings. Simultaneously, cannons were fired from the foreign gun boats.

"The order of the parade was as follows, laborers, peasants, merchants, boy and girl students from various schools of the city, cadets and soldiers.

"When shooting first began the students from the Canton Christian College had just passed the West Bridge. Following the Canton Christian College students were students from the following schools, Kwan Wai Girls' School, Secred Heart College, Girls' Normal, Canton Normal, Chop Suen, the Second Higher Primary, and cadets from Whampoa Academy. All the demonstrators were marching four abreast. Spectators who were watching the parade along Shakee Road numbered more than 10,000. Both the demonstrators and spectators were orderly and peaceful throughout the demonstration There was no act of violence to be seen anywhere.

"Because no previous preparation had been made for protection, the unexpected

shooting killed and wounded a large number of men, women and children.

"The officer from the Procurator's office said,' When the shooting occured, we were in great danger and sought for shelter near the West Bridge. We had to wait until there was less firing before we could safely get back through the narrow side streets to report what we had seen'.

"The Procurator General immediately went with the Head Prosecutor, Man Chang, and assistant prosecutors Chen Sui Sun, Leung Shak Yuen, Lee Man Wai, and training prosecutors Chu Yui Joe and Lee Sui Pui, and also the court clerks Au Kam, Pun Nai Tung, Yui Kung Ning, Pang Jock, Leung Kai, Hung Foo and coroners and court officers to investigate, inspect and to collect evidence.

"The result of the Procurator General's investigation is as follows.

The responsibility for this unfortunate affair.

"1. Proof for the responsibility of the Shakee Massacre.

"The Procurator General went in person to investigate the nature of the shooting and found that the merchants, the peasants, labourers, both spectators and demonstrators and the business men doing business along Shakee Road all of them gave the same identical story as that reported by the officers from the Procurators office.

"The forgoing facts and the condition of the wounded and the position of the dead lying along Shakee Road point to be fact that Shameen was entirely responsible for the shooting for the five following reasons:

"1. The order of the parade was as follows:- Ahead of the armed cadets were the girl students and children from various schools. Assuming that the demonstrators opened fire firse, naturally the girls and children from the schools would have had an opportunity to escape from the place of danger. But on the otherhand, Shameen had taken undue precautions in making extensive preparations for safety, consisting of dugouts protected by piles of sand bags and trenches at strategical places. When the signal was sounded by the fire alarm, immediately rifles and machine guns opened fire from all directions is Shameen at the peaceable paraders and spectators.

"Because the Shameen authorities had prepared for trouble and were attacking us from well fortified places, while we had neither expected nor prepared for trouble, they therefore must be held responsible for the shooting.

"2. The distance between the students of the Canton Christian College and the Whampoa Cadets was several hundred feet. The Canton Christian College students had just passed the West Bridge, when shooting began and among the first that were shot down were Mr. Au Lai Chau a teacher of that College and

Hui Iu Cheung a student there. This goes to show that firing was first started by the Shameen Authorities.

"3. The armed cadets who were marching four abreast and in closed colums when they reached Shakee Road did not disperse for firing positions, this shows that they had no intention to do violence nor were they prepared to attack Shameen.

"4. On account of the great multitude gathered along the road side to watch the procession, we would not have been so foolish as to fire upon Shameen thereby endangering the lives of tens of thousands of men, women and children on the open road.

"5. In examining the wounded and dead we found that most of the bullets had entered the bodies on the left side or on the back. This conclusively proves that the shooting was from Shameen.

"II. What the Procurator General saw on Shakee Road after the shooting.

"The place where the shooting occured is located in the western part of the city which faces Shameen, the foreign concession. Most of the shooting happened to be in the vicinity of the West Bridge which was protected by British soldiers and sailors. There were two bodies on Shakee Road to the west of the West Bridge. These bodies were that of Mr. Au Lai Chow and Hui Iu Cheung, teacher and student of Canton Christian College respectively.

"At the entrance to Shakee Road there were over ten bodies scattered along the road. These were the cadets.

"Between the East and West Bridges along Shakee Road there were scores of bodies, of all classes—peasants, workers, students, merchants and spectators.

"The bodies of cadets and civilians were taken to Whampoa Academy and to the 9th district police station respectively for coroner's examination.

"The wounded were taken to the following hospitals for immediate care; Kwong Wah, Canton Hospital, Doumer and the old Kung Yee.

"The Procurator General with Prosecutor Chan and assistants, went to 9th district police station to examine the bodies of those that were killed. Among the sixteen that were killed one was Au Lai Chow of Canton Christian College and another was Cai Lai Dack. Five of the sixteen could not be identified.

"It was already daylight after the examination of the bodies was over."

"Early on the morning of the 24th the Chief Prosecutor Man Chone, and assistants Dang Shek Yuen, Lai Man Wai, and clerks King Pau Jock, Leung Koi, Hung Foo and also coroners and court officers went to Whampoa Academy and various hospitals to examine the bodies.

"At the Academy the bodies were kept in an old house, nubmer 14. Among

the fifteen bodies there, one was that of Chung Yoke Kwong. At Kwong Wah Hospital, there was one dead, named Kwong Lai Shee, and among the eighteen wounded was one named Hui Cheung Kin at Canton Hospital, there were six dead one named Hui Yui Cheung. Two of the six that were dead were unable to be identified. Among the twenty-three that were wounded, one named Chau Jeun.

"At Doumer, there was one wounded named Kam Jock.

"At the old Kung Yee Hospital there was one dead named Wong Ching Hing, and among the six wounded one named Lee Kong Nam.

"The total number of wounded and dead up to that time numbered eighty-nine persons and the nature of their wounds were filled out in separate record forms. These were submitted to the Governor's Office at 9 P. M. of the 24th."

Examination of the Dead and wounded.

See the tables on Appendixes B and C.

15. Correspondence

"Mr. Y. L. Lee (member of the Commission)

Y. M. C. A.

Dead Mr. Lee:

"In response to your request, on behalf of the Commission, for information concerning people injured in the Shameen-Shakee affair of June 23rd that have been brought to the Canton Hospital, I submit the following report:

"Thirty-three persons, some severely and some slightly wounded were brought here for treatment. Of these two have since died. Six were able to return home after receiving operative or other treatment. Five were dead when they were brought here. The total number of casualties seen by us was therefore thirty-eight. Three of these had been trampled upon by the crowd.

"The entrance wounds were for the most part either in the front or side of the body. Most of the missiles had perforated and left the body. The few missiles recovered were bullets or portions thereof, the bullets fracturing and comminuting the bone and the bone having the same effect upon the bullet. Some of the wounds were obviously caused by ricochet and spent bullets. The missiles which caused several larger wounds was not determined.

"The wounds were as follows: One through the upper chest and neck of the humerus. One fracture of the head of the humerus. Fracture of the femur, comminuted, severe hemorrhage. Most of the posteior part of the sole of the foot torn off. Bullet entered left side of neck, and was located in the base of the left lung. Elbow joint shattered, Wounts of calf of both legs, with bnllet fragments presents. Leg wound with bullet still present. Orbit lac-

erated. Lacerated wound of skull and brain. Gutter wound of forehead. Lacerated wound of both legs, soft tissues. Wound of leg with bruises elsewhere. Bullet perforated left auricle. Slight wounds of the face and neck. Wound of face. Three cases with bruises.

"Ambulatory cases: Bulletin chest wall, evidently ricochet. Bullet fragment in scalp. Slight wounds of hand and finger, said to be caused by glass. Three cases of concussion.

"Dead when brought to Hospital: Transverse wound of abdomen. Comminuted fracture of neck of femus, hemorrhage; two cases. Large wound of skull and brain. Trampled to death.

"All cases with fractures or retained bullets were Xrayed. Photographs taken of cases that died in Hospital for identificaton.

"Ascertainable occupations: Military 14, merchants 3, peddlers 3, letter carriers 2, students 5, tailor 1, boatmen 1.

Faithfully yours,
(signed) J. O. Thomson
Chairman Hospital Staff & Surgeon."

16. Resolutions of American Staff Present at Canton Christian College.

"Whereas, on the afternoon of June 23, 1925, a Chinese patriotic parade mar ching along the Bund and Shakee, Canton, was fired upon by Shameen troops, and

Whareas, the parade was proceeding in an orderly manner and was composed largely students and workmen, unarmed and defenseless and

Whereas, in consequence of the shooting, many were killed and wounded, including members of our staff and students body.

BE IT THEREFORE FREELY AND VALUNTARILY RESOLVED,

That we, American members of the staff of Canton Christian College, express our horror and regret that such an outrage should have occurred, and

That we are of the opinion that the blame and responsibility for the merciless and unjustified assault rests those who directed the firing from Shameen, and

That we express to our Chinese colleagues, students and friends our deep-felt sympathy and our support, and

That since we feel that the world has been inadequately informed of the Chinese viewpoint, we are determined to co-operate with the Chinese in the presentation of their case, and

That we make our position known directly to the American Government and to the American people, with the hope that America will do all in her power to assist China in securing just treatment and in realizing her aims to free herself from foreign imperialism.

Unanimously adopted by the Seventeen American Staff Members at Canton Christian College,

June 24, 1925."

17. Canton Christians and the Shakee Massacre

Canton, June 30th, 1925.

"TO OUR MISSIONARY FRIENDS IN CHINA:

In view of the conflicting reports concerning the disastrous affair in Canton on June 23rd, we wish to acquaint you with the following facts which have come to our best knowledge.

As a mark of protest against the reckless killing of many unarmed and defenseless Chinese students by the Foreign police in the International Settlement of Shanghai on May 30th, a patriotic parade was held in the city of Canton on June 23rd. The parade was composed of workmen, peasants, merchants, students and cadets, all of whom were unarmed, except the cadets carrying rifles which is quite customary and perfectly legitimate when marching in their own territory.

When the parade was passing along the Shakee Road, right opposite Shameen, the British and French Concession in Canton, in peaceful order to turn into the western part of the city; machine guns from Shameen, and shells from the Foreign gunboats near Shameen, suddenly fired upon the paraders as well as the spectators among whom there were many women and children. This threw the parade into a great panic and confusion. Among the paraders, the Canton Christian College staff and students were the first ones who were fired at from Shameen. The cadets with no intention to make an offensive attack and prevented by the great throng of the unarmed people from retreating immediately into the streets behind, knelt down and returned fire for a short while. So far as we can ascertain, on the Chinese side over forty, including one professor and one student of the Canton Christian College, were killed and over a hundred were wounded.

The British and French Consuls in Canton are claiming that they were justified in their taking such drastic action because they are complaining that the paraders had first fired upon Shameen. The Chinese paraders and spectators, however, have testified by thousands as eye-witnesses that the Shameen troops had actually started the trouble as described above.

We are led to believe by the presence of the following facts that the Chinese could not have first fired upon Shameen and that the blame and responsibility for the assault rests upon the Shameen authorities.

1. The parade consisted largely of workmen and students carrying only banners and paper flags all of whom were unarmed and unprepared to do or meet any violence.

2. Not expecting any trouble, tens of thousands of peaceful Chinese citizens came out to the streest to watch the parade. Shakee Road itself where the disaster took place was crowded with spectators.

3. Shameen, a small island by itself, was well protected on one side by Foreign gunboats and on the other side by a canal over a hundred feet wide. The Concession is connected with the city only by two bridges which were protected by iron gates. These gates were masked by steel plates of over four feet in height. There were machine guns well protected with sand bags at favourable positions guarding each of the entrances into the Concession.

4. Sand bags were placed at strategic points along the whole water front of Shameen, while on the Chinese side there was not even a single sand bag to be found.

5. In view of the recent unfortunate incidents in Shangani and in Hankow, the Chinese authorities in Canton had given strict orders to the paraders and to the public to be peaceful and orderly and to refrain absolutely from any use of force before the procession began.

Furthermore, even if we should grant that the cadets carrying rifles had started to fire first as the Shameen authorities say, was it justifiable for the Shameen authorities for the purpose of self-defence, to direct their machine guns and fire upon the students who were unarmed and defenseless? We have therefore, come to the conclusion that such merciless assault was absolutely uncalled for and against the principles which Christ and His Church always stood for. To have Amritsar massacre in India all humanity condemns.

Being aware of the fact that the world has been inadequately informed of the Chinese viewpoint and the presentation of their case in such affairs we feel that it is our duty to make known these facts to our missionary friends in China, and through them to the Christian people all over the world.

May we also appeal to you as heralds of the Gospel of love and justice for humanity that you make your stand known to the Chinese people and to express yourselves in the practical application as well as in the abstract preaching of the Christian message,

Yours most sincerely,
On behalf of
THE CHINESE CHRISTIAN UNION
FOR NATIONAL SALVATION

Chan Chap Ng	Fong Lew Chun
Cheung Man Hoi	S. Job Fong
S. F. Chien	Kong Chi Wing
T. H. Chow	Kwan Seung Wo
K. H. Chiu	Y. C. Kwan

S. T. Law
T. C. Lau
Y. L. Lee
Leung Kwan Mak
S. C. Leung
Y. S. Tom
Tong Bing Wing
Wong Yau Kam
Kam Lum Chu

(Chan Chap Ng, Professor of Canton Christian College, Cheung Man Hoi, Editor of the True Light Monthly, S F Chien, A well Known lawyer, T H Chow, Pastor, K H Chiu, Executive Secretary of the Church of Christian China, Kwangtung Divisional Conncil, Fong Lew Chun, Pastor, S Job Fong, Manager of the Chung Mei Drug Store, Kong Chi Wing, Preacher, Kwan Seung Wo, Dean of the Hackett Medical College, Y C Kwan. Principal of the Union Middle School, S T Law, Principal of the True Light Seminary, T C Lau, Dentist, Y L Lee, Principal of the Y. M. C. A. Middle School, Leung Kwan Mak, Teacher of the Graves' Theological Seminary, S C Leung, General Secretary of the Canton Y M C A, Y S Tom, Teacher of the Union Theological College, Tong Bing Wing, Principal of the Pui To School, Wong Yau Kam, Educator, Kam Lum Chu, Secretary of the Y M C A.)

18. Correspondence

To the Editor, Canton Gazette.

Dear Sir,

We should like to infrom you that German Merchants residing in Tungshan are eager to express their sincere symyathy with the unfortunate victims of the Shameen terrible incidents, which happened yesterday in connection with the procession of Cantonese peasants, workers and merchants students and soldiers. After receiving several reports of the merciless killing and wounding of hundreds of Chinese citizens, we communicated with many of our compatriots, and are able to state that we did not meet any one of German nationality, who would not have expressed his heartiest sympathy with his Chinese friends regards the Shameen horror. Steps have been taken to approach the GermanConsul-General in this matter to explain to the Chinese Government and guilds the view rather all Germant are taking in this unprecedented using of arms against demonstrators. We would consider it a great favour if you wound express our point of view, not only in the Canton Gazette but likewise pass it on to the local Chinese newspapers for publictaion.

Enclosing our cards.
We beg to remain, dear Sir,
Yours vary truly,
GERMAN MERCHANTS.

Canton, Tungshan, June 24.

When the Massacre Was Over

A peaceful worker

" About ten minutes afterwards, I was able to run to the other end of the alley; where it was safer, I saw at least 7 or 8 persons killed on the ground. "

" Under what necessity therefore should the Shameen authorities in employing machine guns in killing the unarmed demonstrators by the score ? "



Killing by score

APPENDIX B

LIST OF THE 52 KILLED IN THE SHAKEE MASSACRE

Name	Age	Occupation	Address	Condition of the wounds	Notes
Au Lai Chau	48	Professor	Canton Christian College	Bullet pierced through the ribs.	Corpes laid in the 9th Police Station, post-mortem examination
Ngai Taai Tak	20†	Student of the Commercial Sch.	No. 50, Ngau Hong	Shot in the Abdominal wall and left and right thighs.	-do-
Lei King Men	13	Boy scout	No. 9, Hing Lung New St.	Died of over pressure upon the neck, chest, and right and left thighs.	-do-
Yung Kwok Choh	15	Merchant	Cheung Sing tailor, Yung Kwong Street.	Bullet pierced through the right glenoid cavity, the pharynx, and the larynx; the oesophagus severed.	-do-
Unidentified	40†	inc.	inc.	Shot in temporal region	-do-
Leung Sik Huen	25	Merchant	inc.	Shot in the front lower part of the left ear.	-do-
Ip Hing	20†	Merchant	inc.	Bullet pierced through the cranium, the brain protruding.	-do-
Lam Moon	18	Apprentice	Yuet Woh Cheung, Tai Wan New St. Shaam Foo Tsin.	Shot in the left hip bone and sacrum.	-do-
Lo Ngau	28	Merchant	inc.	Shot in the right side of the flank, and bullet pierced through the left gluteal region, Both knees were bruised.	-do-
Chan Iu Lam	10†	Merchant	inc.	Shot through the right glenoid cavity, both eyes, the mouth and the nose; upper and lower teeth shot away.	-do-
Tsang Lam	40†	Merchant	No. 51, To Chung Bridge.	Shot in the right side of the chest wall.	-do-
Unidentified	30†	inc.	inc.	Shot in the back part of the head, the brain protruding.	-do-

Name	Age	Occupation	Address	Condition of the wounds	Notes
Yan Yuen Fong	20†	inc.	Wah On Drug Store Shap Shaam Hong	Bullet pierced through both sides of the ribs, posterior.	-do-
Ma Ngo	inc.	inc.	inc.	incomplete	The corpse was laid in the 9th Police Station and was carried away and coffined before examination.
Chung Yuk Kwong	20†	Recurit cadet	Military Academy	Bullet pierced through the fore-head from behind.	Corpse laid in Paat Kei Wui Koon.
Cheung Tak Shing	10†		-do-	Shot in the thorax and through the left scapula.	-do-
Chiu Yee Tsuen	20†	Recruit cadet	-do-	Shot in the left side of the trunk and through the right ribs, posterior.	-do-
Wan Kok Shai	20†	do-	-do-	One bullet wound in the lower part of the left mammary gland, another penetrated from the left side of the posterior ribs through the abdomen; intestines extruded.	-do-
Cheng Fung Leung	20†	-do-	-do-	Shot in the right hip bone and through the right ribs; ribs fractured	-do-
Koon Kuen Shan	30†		-do-	Shot in the right side of the chest from anterior	-do-
Tsui Chi Yuen	20†	-do-	-do-	Shot in the right side of the gluteal region through the lower part of the abdomen; intestines extruded.	-do-
Man Hei Toi	20†	Cadet corporal	-do-	Shot through the thorax.	-do-
Fung Wing Tak	20†	Recruit cadet	-do-	Shot through the throat and cranium.	-do-
Tsui Fuk Wing	20†	-do-	-do-	Shot in the right glenoid cavity through the throat.	-do-

Name	Age	Occupation	Address	Condition of the wounds	Notes
Ting Ping Man	20†	-do-	-do-	Shot on the right side of the forehead and bullet pierced through the right acromion process.	-do-
Lo Lam Chaak	20†	-do-	-do-	Shot in the right knee, the patella fractured; another shot on the right posterior ribs which penetrated through the breast bone.	-do-
Yee To Ming	20†	Cadet Corporal	-do-	Shot in the right glenoid cavity and bullet perforated the left hip bone.	-do-
Kwok Kwong Saw	20†	Recruit cadet	-do-	Shot in the upper part of the left ear.	-do-
Tsui Yau Kwong	20†	-do-	-do-	Shot on the right hip bone.	-do-
Kwong Lei Sze (woman)	40†	inc.	inc.	Shot on the left side of the calf and the gastrocnemiust muscle the fibula fracured.	Corpes laid in Kwong Wah Hospital, post mortem-examination conducted there.
Hui Iu Cheung	20†	Student of the C. C. C.	Canton Christian College	Shot in the bladder and through the inner upper side of the right thigh.	Corpse laid in Canton Hospital, postmortem-examination conducted there.
Tsim Him Chan	20†	Recruit cadet	Out-post guarter of the Military Academy.	Shot through the thorax another wound in the center of the back through the right ribs.	-do-
Unidentified	30†	inc.	inc.	Shot on the right part of the breast and bullet pierced through the right glenoid cavity.	-do-
Lo Shui Cheung	21	Cadet	Training corps	Shot in the upper part of the right mammary gland exit through on the lower part of the back, in the mid line.	-do-
Wong Po Ting	34	Laborer	Tungkei Shipping Co, No 16, Mung Shing Lee Honan.	Shot on the right side of the trunk and through the outer part of the left side;	-do-

Name	Age	Occupation	Address	Condition of the wounds	Notes
Siu Ping Nam	24	Corporal in the Militia	inc.	Shot in the front part of the right elbow and through its inner part; another shot in the right thigh and through the left gluteal reqion.	-do-
Wong Ching Ting	20†	Cadet	Military Academy	Shot in the center of the back and through the middle part of the abdomen.	Corpse laid in Kung Yee Hospital, postmortem examination conducted there.
Leung Chung	24	Laborer	Yee Hing Lung, Foo Hing St.	Incomplete	The corpse was laid in Kung Yee Hospital and postmortem - examination conducted there. It has already been carried away to be closed in coffin.
Tseung Chi Tong	20†	Soldier of toe Party Army	Military Academy	Shot in the front part of the right scapula, the hedd of the humerus was fractured and viens severed.	-do-
Tsang Shek Tsuen	20†	Major in the Party Army	-do-	Shot in the thorax and right scapula.	-do-
Lau Tsue Luk	20†	Recruit cadet	-do-	Shot on both tibiae, bones mashed into pieces, viens severed.	-do-
Kwong Huen	inc.	Merchant	inc.	Shot in right femur, fractured.	Died immediately after arriving at Canton Hospital
Yuen On	63	Laborer	Woh Shing Taai, Ahan Tin Tei	Bullet entered the right thigh and came out from the vagina. Wound 1 1/2 in.	Postmortem-examination conducted at Kwong Wah Hospital, photo taken for record.
Hah Tsuen	21	Laborer	Woh Cheung, No. 21, Tsoi Laan Wang Street	Shot on the right side of the flank. The wound was about 3 inches deep and 3 inches in diameter forming the shape of a bow.	-do-

Name	Age	Occupation	Address	Condition of the wounds	Notes
Tang Fui	inc.	Merchant	Shun Foo Tailor, Shai Hing St. Shakee	Several shots on the lower part of the body.	Died on June 28th in Canton Hospital. Reported by Tang Ngai Foo of the Cantral Bank.
Chue Tso Wing	inc.	Recruit cadet	Military Academy	inc.	Died in Kwong Wah Hospital, Reported by Chue Tong of the Military Academy.
Cheung Yan Yung	inc.	Soldier of the Party Army	-do-	Incomplete	Incomplete
Wu Chung Shing	inc.	-do-	-do-	Inc.	Inc.
Chan Kong	inc.	-do-	-do-	Inc.	Inc.
Lei Chi	20†	Laborer	No. 8 Tung Hing St.	Inc.	Inc.
Leung Kui	20†	Peddler	No. 17, Tso Kei	The back part of skull and brain was shot away.	Inc.
Wan Yuk Him	18	Student of the Taat Man School	No. 9, Fung Loi East St.	Shot in the spinal-cord.	inc.

(*A number of the cadets, who were killed or wounded, were unarmed. They had been sent to Shakee beforehand to preserve order.*)

APPENDIX C

LIST OF THE 117 WOUNDED IN THE SHAKEE MASSACRE

Name	Age	Occupation	Address	Condition of the wounds	Notes
Chan Chun	22	Recruit cadet	Tung Shan	Bullet penetrated through neck into left lung.	Examination conducted in Canton Hospital, X rayed.
Suen Ka Foo	20†	Recruit cadet	-do-	Shot on both thighs, the wound on the left thigh is about 2 in. wide and 1 in. long, that on the right is about 1 1/2 in. wide and 8/10 in long.	Examined in Canton Hospital.
Lo Kuen	30†	Peddler	inc.	Scapula fractured by bullet.	Examined in Canton Hospital, X rayed.
Yam Yue Kong	18	Merchant	Tseung Shau Li	Shot on both thighs.	Examined in Canton Hospital.
Sit Hung	59	Postman	inc.	Chest bruised	Examined in Canton Hospital.
Chan Chau Woh	31	Peddler	inc.	Face and neck wounded by bullet fragments.	Examined in Canton Hospital, X ray photo taken.
Yau Ting Kwong	28	Soldier of the Militia	inc.	Shot in the right shoulder; upper part of the scapula fractured.	Examined in Canton Hospital, X ray photo taken.
Lam Shang	25	Marine service	inc.	Injured by Collision.	inc.
Ng San	20†	inc.	inc.	Shot in right foot, bones fractured, and tissues destroyed.	Examination conducted in Canton Hospital, X ray photo taken.
Wah Hok Sui	23	Cadet	Military Academy	Shot in left ear.	Examined in Canton Hospital.
Ng Tin Tak	30†	inc.	inc.	Brain wounded by bullet.	-do-
Paang Wan Yuen	28	Cadet	Military Academy	Shot on the right side of forehead.	-do-

Name	Age	Occupation	Address	Condition of the wounds	Notes
Wong Yin	18	Recruit Cadet	inc.	Neck and right leg both wounded by bullet.	-do-
Leung Tso	30†	Merchant	inc.	Eye-ball (left), face nose, and lachrymal bone all wounded by bullet.	-do-
Wong Ting Ng	28	Cadet	Military Academy	Shot in right patella and right wrist	-do-
Cheng Muk Shang	27	Oil worker	inc.	Right calf and both arms wounded by bullet.	-do-
Wong Fong	26	Postman	inc.	Breast injured by over-pressure and also wounded by bullet.	-do-
Lai Ka Ying	15	Student	Municipal 2nd Higher Primary School	Head and abdomen injured.	-do-
Maan Kung To	17	Recruit Cadet	inc.	Shot in right arm, right humerus fractured.	Examined with X ray in Canton Hospital.
Lam Kwok Kung	15	Student	Municipal 1st High Primary School.	Brain shock and cranium injured.	Examined in Canton Hospital.
Yeung Ting Naam	16	Cadet	Military Academy	Forehead and eye wounded by bullet.	-do-
Ng Shang Chiu	10†	Student	inc.	Face and nose wounded by bullet.	-do-
Kong Naam	37	Seaman	No. 7, Yuen Hong. Yan Tsai St.	Mouth, face, nose, and lips wounded by bullet. Teeth completely distroyed.	Examined in Kung Ye Hospital, and Photographed.
Chue Sheung Shing	40†	Soldier of the Party Army	inc.	Gluteal region wounded by bullet.	Examined in Knng Ye Hospital.
Lau Paak Lung	20†	Recruit Cadet	inc.	Scapula. shoulder and back all wounded by bullet.	-do-
Hui Kwok Leung	36	Soldier of the Party Army	inc.	Scapula, shoulder and back all wounded by bullet.	Examined in Kung Ye Hospital, a photo taken.
Hoh Sik	inc.	Shameen worker	inc	Cranial bones fractured brain concussion	Examined in Kung Ye Hospital.

Name	Age	Occupation	Address	Condition of the wounds	Notes
Lei Shing	17	Shameen worker	inc.	Chest, abdemen, and scapula wounded by bullet.	-do-
Lam Chaak	17	Laborer	Tseung Woh King Fa Tsik Kai,	Right ribs injured by overpressure, left glenoid cavity bruised through collision.	Examined in Doumer Hospital.
Hui Chung Kin	inc.	Student of Kwong Wah Medical School	inc.	Both calves burned by boiling water. Left palm swollen.	Examined in Kwong Wah Hospital.
Lam Chung	inc.	Cadet	inc.	Front part of right foot wounded by bullet; Size of wound: 1/3 in wide, 1/8 in. long.	-do-
Cheung Yuen Wah	inc	Student of the Women's Normal School	inc.	Hand injured by collision.	-do-
Loo Yuk Pui	inc.	Student of the Municipal First Lower Primary School	inc.	Fingers wounded by bullet.	-do-
Pung Chiu	inc.	Laborer	Wui Shing Shoe Factory.	Upper part of left foot contused.	-do-
Cham Chan	inc.	Laborer	Wui Shing Shoe Factory.	Both knees bruised in collision.	-do-
Lei Leung	inc.	Laborer	inc.	Right side of the head, right calf, and face-bone all wounded by bullet.	-do-
Lau Shing Yue	inc.	inc.	Po Hong Wui Koon Sheung Kau.	Shot in right face, the wound extended to the interior of the mouth.	-do-
Leung Hei	inc.	inc.	Hei Kei, Tsik Kam Hong, No. 1, Hing Lun Lei Shai-Kwan	Head and chest all wounded by bullet.	-do-
Lau Tsam Yin	inc.	inc.	inc.	Left elbow wounded by bullet.	-do-
Tang Sui Pan	20†	Student	Canton Christian College	Bullet pierced through the left arm 1/2 in. below the elbow.	-do-

Name	Age	Occupation	Address	Condition of the wounds	Notes
Fung Kwok Chan	inc.	Peddler	inc.	Unconscious. Concussion of brain due to a fall.	-do-
Cheng Shui	inc.	Policeman	9th Police Station	Skin over right scapula wounded by bullet.	-do-
Chau Waai	22	Laborer	Yeung Mo Labor Union, Tsing Ping Bridge.	Shot in left calf.	Examined in Kwong Wah Hospital, Photo taken.
Wong Shui	22	Cadet	Military Academy	Right upper-arm and scapula wounded and bones fractured; the left part of the femur (right) also wounded by bullet.	Examined in New Kung Yee Hospital, X rayed.
Hon Kai Hon	23	Cadet	Military Academy	Left knee wounded by bullet.	Examined in New Kung Yee Hospital.
Lau Chan Tung	22	Cadet	-do-	Head wounded by bullet	-do-
Tseung Tit Shang	23	Recruit Cadet	-do-	Left leg and right ankle, left arm and right leg were each wounded by a separate bullet.	-do-
To Tso Hong	18	-do-	-do-	Right part of the chest wounded by bullet.	-do-
Wu Chan Tseung	21	-do-	-do-	Shot in upper part of the right shoulder.	-do-
Chue Yue Lam	20†	-do-	-do-	Chest wounded by bullet.	-do-
Ching Fuk	inc.	Worker	Yeung Mo Tsik Kung Union, Sui Hong, Tsing Ping Bridge	Both knees and left gluteal region bruised in collision.	Examined in Kwong Wah Hospital.
Chan Yat Cheung	30†	Soldier	First Regiment of the Training Corps	Left wrist bruised by bullet.	Examined in the Sanitation Company of the First Regiment of the Training Corps.
Yue Tak Pin	28	-do-	-do-	Left thigh wounded by bullet.	-do-
Lau Tak Shing	32	-do-	-do-	Left thigh wounded by bullet.	-do-

Name	Age	Occupation	Address	Condition of the wounds	Notes
Wong Chun Tong	20†	-do-	-do-	Left axilla wounded by bullet.	-do-
Lau Kwai Ting	40†	-do-	-do-	Left axilla wounded by bullet.	-do-
Cheung Tsz Liu	33	-do-	-do-	Right Knee wounded by bullet.	-do-
Luk Wing Pin	30†	-do-	-do-	Right foot wounded by bullet.	-do-
Cheung Hong Suen	22	-do-	-do-	Right thigh wounded by bullet.	-do-
Yan Kwok Wing	26	-do-	-do-	Right axilla wounded by bullet.	-do-
Cheung Yik Nang	31	-do-	-do-	Right foot and ankle wounded by bullet.	-do-
Tse Pau Hei	23	-do-	-do-	Right foot wounded by bullet.	-do-
Tsuk Lam	38	-do-	-do-	Right part of the breast and right foot wounded by bullet.	-do-
Chan Wan Kang	27	-do-	Second Regiment of the Training Corp, Parade Grouud.	Right arm wounded by bullet.	-do-
Ngok Tak Shau	22	-do-	-do-	Left palm wounded by bullet.	-do-
Ting Ngok Lam	23	-do-	-do-	Right ankle wounded by bullet.	-do-
Chan Tin Fat	33	-do-	-do-	Bullet pierced through the palm of hand.	-do-
Lau Chau Shing	21	-do-	-do-	Head wounded by bullet.	-do-
Chan Chau Foon	44	Fortuneteller	Yeung Lam Chue, Fong Chuen.	The mouth and head wounded.	Examined in Fong Pin Hospital.
Leung Laan	40†	Laborer	Kwong Hang Cheung, Tung Ting Fong.	Right arm wounded by bullet.	-do-
Wong Chan Sze (woman)	70†	inc.	Hoh San Chue, Wah Lam Tze School.	Left knee wounded by a fall.	-do-

Name	Age	Occupation	Address	Condition of the wounds	Notes
Hoh Chue Hoi	44	Peddler	No. 17, Woh Cheung Lee	Right foot and right arm wounded by bullet.	-do-
Tsui Kong	47	Merchant	Ning Shau Tsaan, Yan Yee Kee, Tseung Laan St.	Shot in the right thigh and through the left thigh; the back of both feet wounded.	-do-
Tse Ka Sheung	17	Student	Surveying Technical School.	The back, the chest and the hands all wounded by fall.	Examined in Ng Hoi Tsz Hospital.
So Haak Ming	15	-do-	Kwongtung University	One foot hurt by a fall.	Examined in Pun Man Shang Chan Hospital.
Lei Chue Chuk	21	-do-	-do-	Chest hurt by a fall.	inc.
Tsang Hin Sheh	26	-do-	inc.	One hand hurt by a fall.	inc.
Ah Shau	inc.	Laborer	Builders' Labor Union	Chest hurt by a fall.	inc.
Wai Pik Fai	22	Student	Chap Shun School	inc.	inc.
Kuk Lai Kwong	inc.	Recruit Cadet	Military Academy	Left elbow seriously wounded.	Reported by Chue Tong of the Military Academy.
Tseung Haak Cheung	inc.	-do-	-do-	inc.	-do-
Wong Kei Man	inc.	-do-	-do-	inc.	-do-
Chue Shuen Pung	inc.	-do-	-do-	inc.	-do-
Chan Chau Sau	inc.	-do-	-do-	Head wounded	-do-
Tseung Tsok Kwan	inc.	-do-	-do-	inc.	-do-
Tung Ching Wing	inc.	-do-	-do-	Right arm wounded	-do-
Man Shing Shang	inc.	Ass. Cadet Corporal.	-do-	inc.	-do-
Wong Kam Hei	inc.	Soldier of the Party Army.	-do-	inc.	-do-
Chiu Kam Ting	inc.	-do-	-do-	inc.	-do-
Chan Woh Sheung	inc.	-do-	-do-	inc.	-do-

Name	Age	Occupation	Address	Condition of the wounds	Notes
Yung Sin Kai	inc.	-do-	-do-	inc.	-do-
Loo Hung Shing	inc.	-do-	-do-	inc.	-do-
Wong Kat Lin	inc.	-do-	-do-	inc.	-do-
Chan Foo Wing	inc.	-do-	-do-	inc.	-do-
Cheung Yee Lun	inc.	-do-	-do-	inc.	-do-
Tsun Waan Wan	inc.	Laborer	inc.	One thigh bruised.	Examined in Kwong Wah Hospital, Reported by Sham Tsz Fong and Sin Ka Tsai.
Siu Chung	28	Student of The Kung Yee Medical School.	inc.	Head wounded by overpressure.	Examined in New Kung Yee Hospital, Reported by Sham Tsz Fong and Sin Ka Tsai.
Tiu Tsoi Kau	25	-do-	inc.	One foot bruised.	-do-
Wong Maany Yee	21	-do-	inc.	Shoulder bruised.	-do-
Ip Kwok Chue	28	-do-	inc.	Breast and Shoulder bruised by collision.	-do-
Wong Yuen Ying	22	-do-	inc.	The chest and one foot chafed.	-do-
Wong Hon Ying	20†	-do-	inc.	One thigh chafed, the abdomen and chest wounded by overpressure.	–do–
Kong Seung Ping	25	Laborer	inc.	One foot bruised.	–do–
San Yat Tak	20†	Soldier	inc.	The left corner of the left eye wounded by bulled.	Examined in Canton Hospital, Reported by Sham Tsz Fong and Sin Ka Tsai.
Ma Yuet Fong	22	Student of the Kung Yee Medical School.	inc.	Chest bruised and knee-joint chafed.	Examined in New Kung Yee Hospital, Reported by Sham Tsz Fong and Sin Ka Tsai.

Name	Age	Occupation	Address	Condition of the wounds	Notes
Sz-to Ng	13	Student	24th Lower Primary School Kau Yiu Fong	Fore-head wounded by bullet.	inc.
Sz-to Kung	13	-do-	-do-	One foot wounded by collision.	inc.
Hoh Kam To	14	-do-	-do-	One arm wounded by bullet.	inc.
Tsin San Hon	14	-do-	-do-	One arm wounded by bullet.	inc.
Cheung Chiu Naam	inc.	inc.	Kwongtung University	Crushed	inc.
Pat Lui	inc.	inc.	-do-	Hurt by a fall.	inc.
Cheung Nung	inc.	inc.	-do-	One hand injured.	inc.
Chau Ping Pui	inc.	inc.	-do-	Chest and thighs bruised	inc.
Cheng Yin Mei	inc.	inc.	-do-	One hand injured.	inc.
Yeung Chan Hong	inc.	inc.	-do-	Crushed	inc.
Koo King Poon	34	Recruit cadet	inc.	Shot through one side of the skull.	inc.
Look Sz Taai	67	inc.	inc.	Compound fracture of humerus, with hem-orrhage	inc.

G-2 Report

4-1 1925 2657-9-299 3020

NOV 11

WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Soviet Plots Against the Life of Chang Tso-lin.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. NOV 9 - 1925

1. It has been learned from a very reliable source that the Sovier courier arrested at Pogranichnaya on September 24th with explosives and bombs in his possession (see Report #5637) was en route to Mukden with his companions for the purpose of assassinating Chang Tso-lin.

2055-622 (18)

2. From the same source it was learned that there are at present in Mukden five red Russians who are there for no other purpose than Chang Tso-lin's assassination whenever an opportunity presents itself. It is the Soviet belief that if Chang Tso-lin were eliminated the Japanese would put in Cheng Hsueh-liang, Chang Tso-lin's son, in his place and that in such case Li Ching-lin and Chang Tsung-chang would declare their independence of the Manchurian party, probably joining the Kuomintang.

Distribution:

4 MID
1 CGUSAFC
1 File

From: M/A, China Report #5654 October 8, 1925.

4-1

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
6090
1926
2657-9-302
JAN 29
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Martial Law Regulations.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. JAN 19 1926

Martial Law having recently been declared in many parts of China, the following regulations for the Province of Shantung are furnished as typical of those generally enforced:

1. Wherever Martial Law is in force jurisdiction over all local matters which may in any way be connected with military affairs will pass to the Commissioner for Martial Law, who will exercise control over all the local administrative and judicial authorities.

2. Throughout the area under Martial Law all Civil and Criminal Causes connected in any way with military affairs will be tried by Court Martial.

3. No appeal will be allowed from any judgment given by the Court Martial.

4. In the area under Martial Law the Commissioner for Martial Law is invested with the following papers:

(a) To subject all letters and telegrams passing through the Post Office and telegraph office to inspection by the censor.
(b) To suppress any meetings, societies, lectures or theatrical performances, together with all newspapers, posters, and other publications, which may at any time be considered to be of a dangerous nature.
(c) To inspect and - where necessary - to confiscate or purchase all privately owned arms, ammunition, military weapons, explosives, or materials of any dangerous description.
(d) To close the thoroughfare in the vicinity of any place where military stores are manufactured or stored.
(e) To examine all passengers on arrival or departure by land or water, and to detain any of a suspicious character.
(f) To examine all merchants and travellers visiting the area and deport them as occasion may demand.
(g) To examine all persons carrying goods in or out through the city gates, and to detain any of a suspicious character.
(h) To fix at his discretion a time limit for the opening and closing of the city gates.
(i) To subject to severe scrutiny any person found on the street during the time that they should be clear of traffic.
(j) At any time of the night to inspect as occasion may demand any residence, building, or vessel in harbour.

5. No claim for compensation in respect of losses sustained during time of crisis will be allowed.

6. Martial Law will be abolished directly the conditions necessitating its institution have come to an end. When that time has come it will be announced by special proclamation.

7. This order will come into force on the date on which it is exhibited.

Distribution:
4 MID
1 CGUSAFC
1 File

From: M/A, China Report #5692 December 1, 1925

CONFIDENTIAL
Copy No. 1

16

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. D.V.

1926 2657-J-306 FEB 4

WAR DEPARTMENT

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE ASST. CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
HONOLULU, T. H.,

Refer to:

December 8, 1925.

SUBJECT : Report.

TO : A. C. of S., G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C.

1. Inclosed herewith is a report voluntarily submitted to this office by a Korean, whose name is Young M. Park.

2. Mr. Park is a Korean who has been identified with the so-called Korean Independence Movement for some years. He was educated at the University of Nebraska and first came to Hawaii in 1917. He left the territory in 1919 on the U.S.A.T. THOMAS, bound for the Orient. The past six years he has spent in Siberia and China. He returned to Honolulu in July of this year, as a steerage passenger on the PRESIDENT LINCOLN. Mr. Park, according to his own statement, has from time to time been in touch with various military intelligence agencies in the United States Army under the status of a volunteer contact.

3. It is believed that the report itself, although of little value insofar as its treatment of international politics is concerned, nevertheless, is interesting and fairly accurate with reference to such details as directly effect Korea and the Koreans.

4. The report is furnished for your information.

Robt. G. Kirkwood
Robt. G. Kirkwood,
Major, General Staff,
A. C. of S., G - 2.

1 Incl.
(report)

Confidential

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
1926 2657-9-306 FEB 4
WAR DEPARTMENT

Report # I.

Another World Conflict Under Preparation in Chinese Territory By Japanese and Russians

By Young W. Park

Victory Day, 1925 (Nov. 11, 1925 OSK)
Honolulu

Young W. Park
Honolulu
Address

Phone 68556
P. O. Box 1514
1685 C Lusitania St

Parking address and name
1. c/o Military Attaché's office, Am. Legation
2. c/o Rodney Gilbert
North China Daily News
3. P. O. Box 133

S. R. Hahn

ANOTHER WORLD CONFLICT

UNDER PREPARATION

IN CHINESE TERRITORY

BY JAPANESE AND RUSSIANS

After the Great European War the world enjoyed peace for a period of seven years. The average people to-day generally believe that there would be nothing like such a tragical scene befallen again in the near future upon the human society. But it is a non-sensical belief and a hope in vain. The huge columns of suspicious clouds now rising here and there in the north-eastern skies of Asia may overcast, sooner or later, every corner of the world. That may be a rainstorm or snowstorm, we can't predict.

"The world has gained nothing by the Great War," said Lord Balfour to H. Bernstein. "The world is still dislocated. I do not agree with those who say that as soon as this generation that has witnessed and endured the horrors and sufferings of the war is gone, the next generation will be quite ready to start a new war all over again. I am not naive enough to believe the Great War was the last one."

In addition to the above remarks, Romin Roland, a French novelist and one of the world's leading pacifists, predicts the coming of a war that would destroy civilization. He said:

"I believe that the Great War has taught the governments nothing, and unless a miracle occurs, which we cannot expect, we are marching with great strides toward a new war that will surpass in duration and intensity to that of 1914--18.

"It is no longer a question of a duel between France and Germany, which henceforth passes to the back ground. It will be a question of an enormous struggle, between the European and Asiatic races. The Asiatic races will go with Russia and the European races will undoubtedly go with the United States."

Cutting in short, the next war ahead of us may be really a world conflict with all races involving in it. It shall be led by Japan and Russia combined as an ally against the United States and Great Britian. China has not determined which side she will take, but she may, eventually, be compelled to go with her closer neighbors by the influence of "red" movements among the students and laboring class and by the pro-Japanese and pro-Russian militarists. As for the Koreans--even though they have no government, no diplomatic organ --they will take some step with Uncle Sam, not only because of their old friendship, but also because of their own salvation.

We know that in the European War the main factor that brought out the great conflict was the old problem of the Balkan States. But in the future war the medium of two fighting parties will be, no doubt, China. In case China goes with Russia and Japan, every thing in the Orient established and maintained by the Americans and British shall be instantly at stake. Therefore the Russian and Japanese policy toward China and the general tendency of Chinese movements should be carefully studied by the powers concerned.

In this short report it is, of course, impossible to make out a detailed statement about all the things of the Far East, but the following paragraphs may be a summary of general aspects, especially of the Russian and Japanese activities in China and the Chinese conditions at present.

I. RUSSIAN POLICY TOWARD CHINA.

1. Russia's Old Ambition.

It is evident that Russia to-day has renewed her age-old policy under the new regime of the so-called Soviet Republic. Russia's ambition to gain a footing in East Asia and an outlet to the Pacific has been deeply impressed in the hearts of her people even before the Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689 or, at latest, the treaty of Aigun, 1858. Following the first treaty Russia was definitely out for Chinese Territory. In the past two and a half centuries she has blown hot and cold on China. But whether the breath has been hot or cold, her object has been the same--Russian aggrandizment at the expanse of China.

2. Same Policy With Different Methods.

Now Russia under a new form of government is trying to "come back" in Manchuria after she has already siezed Mongolia in her hand. The only different methods used by the Russians for the same old policy is (1) that they are to-day wearing red cloth and flying the red flag with the emblem of sickle and hammer; (2) that they are conciliating China and playing upon China's natural prejudice against the westerners instead of against the Japanese as they did after the Sino-Japanese war; (3) that they are employing the dirty trick of wholesale bribery not only, as they did before, to the high officials of China, but also to the student bodies and laboring classes. It is too early to determine what the final result is to be, but there cannot be much questioning the fact that China will be partly, if not entirely, "redized," because the majority of Chinese officials, students, and working men are now sincerely conceived that Russian friendship toward China is based upon pure altruism; that the sending of enormous

funds for supporting the strike movement is pure friendship; and that the crying for abolition of unequal treaties is the true principle of equality.

3. Trotsky's And Kopp's Utterances.

"The course of Russian politics is wending its way eastwards," said Victor L. Kopp, Soviet Ambassador to Japan, in a speech welcoming the Soviet Airmen in Tokyo, last September, "Russia's eyes," he added," are turned toward Asia." And in Moscow Comrade Trotsky said the same word in a recent interview printed in the European press. Of course, that Russia's eyes are turned eastwards is nothing new. This has been an open secret for months past, but the statement has not been so definitely stated as has now been done by the two red leaders. Both Kopp and Trotsky can rightly be regarded as voicing the intentions of the Moscow government and there is not a least doubt that Russia will play the old game with China.

4. What Russians Are Doing In China To-day.

With the phrase of the worldwide revolutionary movement, the fundamental aim of the Bolsheviks is to make every nation disordered, disturbed, and unrest. Thus the Russian red leaders in China acting under orders from Comrade Karakhan, the Soviet Ambassador to Peking, are doing everything in their power to keep China in a state of turmoil under the guise of helping her throw off the yoke of imperialistic powers and are advocating at every possible turn, the abolition of the so-called unequal treaties. The recent strikes and student demonstrations in China were also engineered by the Russian Communists and are still being kept alive by the fund from Russia.

The latest stunt backed by the Soviet was the calling of a Red Congress of Chinese students, workers, and peasants on August 1st this year. In connection with this movement, the Rosta, an official Soviet news agency, which has transmitted circulars to various student organizations declared that "the Conference to be called on August First must settle the questions of the present events in China and centralize all the actions of China against the foreign imperialists, especially against America, Great Britian and Japan. To carry out the objects aimed at, " continued the circular," the students, workers, and peasants must elect a central executive committee which should assume the leadership of the present national movement and must take a leading part in the negotiations pending between the foreign powers."

5. Boasting Of "Victory" Achieved By Bolsheviks In China.

Following the Shanghai incident this year, the newspapers in Russia were proudly boasting of the "victory" achieved by the

Bolshevists' forces in China. "The banner of revolution has been planted over the Pacific Ocean and the world remarked that ice had begun to move on the Neva." The author of this exultant and proud declaration is Karl Radek, who is internationally famous as a Bolshevik propagandist in foreign countries, and he makes it in the Moscow Pravda, an official organ of the communist international.

"Events that took place at Shanghai are," Radek continues, "a presage of events that are going to take place in China, in India, in Egypt, in Java and elsewhere, plus the rising of natives in the colonial and Dependent countries'--such is the definition Comrade Lenin gave to the world revolution. Now this formular is being carried out more and more with flesh and blood. Soon will come the time when Calcuta, Madras, Shanghai and Canton will begin to exchange revolutionary greetings. And then these centers will send their greetings to the proletariat of Paris, London, New York, and Tokyo."

6. "Red Army "Ready To Sieze Manchuria.

The program of Russian activities in China is being carried on not only with money power nor merely with propaganda. It is backed with strong military forces concentrated at several strategic points across the border. To the external point of view it seems nothing more than an army for the protection of Russia's frontier, but its suspicious movements were already discovered by all foreigners.

The East China Railway, which was built by Russians and was for a few years managed by the International Technical Board, is again controlled by the Russians to-day, although it is in name under the Chinese government. Russia regards this railway exactly as her life just the same as the Japanese regard the Southern Manchuria line. The city of Harbin, wherein the headquarters of the same railway is located, is also regarded by the Russians as their back door as well as the headquarters of military forces, of political plotters, and of Communistic propagandists. Harbin has been frequently called the enigma of the Orient. Today it is even more of an enigma, a political enigma as well as a social enigma.

With the present facilities of the railway and the favorable position of Harbin, the Russians are ready to sieze Manchuria any moment at will. It is believed that the total number of "Red" troops at strategic points like Vladivostok, Nickolsk--Ussuriski, Possiet Bay, Haborovsk, Blagoveschensk, and Chita easily number 200,000 picked fighters. If a signal is given by an order from Harbin, these troops may be moved into Manchuria in less than two days. No one is prepared to say when such an advance might be made.

Gen. Niechieff, who commands the Russian white Legion in Chang Tso Lin's army, said he thought it would be six months; others gave a more conservative view of a year and a half to two years.

7. Who Is Responsible To Save Civilization From Bolshevism?

The Bolshevism or Russia's desguised imperialism means, in short, the destruction of civilization of the world. It is not only a menace to one or two nations, but is a common danger to all races. Who is, then, responsible to-day to save the world from this "Red Peril?"

In the last century when Russia seeks for an outlet to the Pacific, it was Great Britian that prevented the greedy ambition of the Tsar. The next one was Japan, in 1914, that checked the advance of the Cassack worriors in Manchuria. But at present there is no one but Uncle Sam who can save the nations from this critical conditions.

II JAPANESE ACTIVTIES IN CHINA.

1. Japan's Foreign Policy

After the abragation of Anglo-Japanese Alliance Japan was, for some time at the crossroads as regards her foreign policy. She was at a loss whether to continue harness with the United States and Great Britian or to reorientate in a new direction. But at last she changed her course thinking that a change would promote the future of Island Empire.

What has caused Japan to seek new friends and to make away ~~with~~ with the old? Two of the main causes are that she feels that Great Britian is bent on promoting an understanding with the United States above all things, and the second is that she interprets the new U. S. immigration law as a wanton slap to her national dignity. So bitterly felt by the new act of the American Congress, Japan this year observed July First as a memorial day of nabional humiliation.

2. Seeking Alliance With Russia.

Now Japan is marching in ~~a~~ same step with Russia. The conclusion of her treaty with Soviet Republic early this year was the

first indication of the Island Empire seeking a change. The recent visit of the Russian airmen to Japan is also some thing more than an ordinary trip. "The flight of the Soviet airmen from Europe to Japan," said the Russian Ambassador to Tokyo in an address, "was an indication of the trend of politics to-day; the flight might be linkened to the message which Russia was bringing to the Asiatic peoples."

In the Far East it is widely rumored that a secret pact has already been signed between Russia and Japan. The main point of the new pact is believed to be an offensive and defensive measure against the United States and Great Britian. No matter what it is --secret or open--an alliance between these two issolated nations is an indispensible matter. Some one believes the alleged Russo-Japanese pact is merely a rumor because there are some proofs that the two governments are not in so friendly terms; the biggest of them is the Russisn objection to the Japanese plan of railway construction in Manchuria and the other is the Japanese denial to Russian proposition asking Tokyo to permit 70 Russian Commercial Commissioners to reside in Japan as a body of diplomats. But the foreigners in China are all convinced that such an "unfriendliness" between Russia and Japan is nothing but a trick to cover the secret pact which is now surely in existence.

3. Conciliation Policy Toward China.

While Japan seeks an alliance with Russia, she is trying, at the same time, to concilate China to be under her own influence. Recently the Japanese attitude toward China is very different from the time when they proposed the "famous" 21 Demands to the Peking Goverhment. Imitating the good example of America, the Boxer indemnity has been voluntarily returned to China. It is also reported that Japan has declared to recognize the complete autonomy of China's customs and to advocate the abolition of extraterritoriality in China. Whether such expression is a true one or false one, anybody can imagine what it means.

However China to-day is no longer foolish enough to trust Japan as her faithful friend--even not as a confidencial neighbor. The sinful action and mischievous doings ever committed by the Japs were deeply impressed in every heart of the Chinese. There is no one but a few notorious pro-Japs to be fallen in the artificial net of Japanese vile devices.

4. Pan-Asianism And Japanese "Monroe Doctrine."

Adding to the conciliation policy, Japan plays another trick in China. The supreme aim of this trick is more or less similar to that of the Russians--that is, in brief, to keep China in dis-

turbance, in disorder and in turmoil.

The so-called Pan-Asiatic Society composed of different nationalities in Asia was organized in Japan. Its motto is "Asia for Asians." "Hands off from Asia" is another phrase against the western powers. It is, therefore, called by the foreigners the "Japanese Monroe Doctrine."

Beside that there are a number of organized bodies in China created and supported by the Japanese. The biggest of these are (1) The Black Dragon Society for social revolution, (2) The White Wolf Society for a movement to establish a Moslem Empire in West China, and (3) The Red Spear Legion for restoring monarchial system of government. Generally speaking, the object of these societies is widely different from this to the other. But one point that every one agrees in each other is to promote the anti-foreign movement against all foreigners other than Japanese.

Another body of Chinese employed by the Japanese is Hunghutze or Red Mustache Bandits in Manchuria. Whenever Japan desires to secure any special interest that may not be obtainable through the diplomatic methods, the bandits are secretly called to practice some lawlessness against the lives and property of the Japanese residents. On the plea of such crime committed by the bandits Japan takes immediately a drastic action for her greedy ambition. The patroling of Japanese troops in east Manchuria and the establishment of Japanese police in Chientao district (in Kirin Province) are the result of using bandits. There are now many Japanese "ronins" or vagabonds in Manchuria as the heads of Hunghutze. Arms and amnunitions are entirely supplied by the Japanese army headquarters on Sino-Korean border.

5. Backing Chang Tso Lin At Any Cost.

The greatest success of Japanese understanding in China is that they made Chang Tso Lin, the military governor of Manchuria, formally a notorious bandit leader of Hunghutze, completely subjected under their power. Chang Tso Lin is actually a vassal king to Japan instead of being a Chinese official. He doesn't obey any order from Peking, even rather respects that of Tokyo.

Japan supports Chang morally and materially. If Chang feels the lack of funds Japan pays it in advance; if Chang wants arms and amnunitions, Japan supplies them without limitation. Chang Tso Lin pays, in turn, a heavy price to Japan. The privileges such as railway construction, industrial projects, and agricultural enterprices what the Japanese are maintaining in Manchuria were all secured by such means.

In 1922 and 1924 when Chang Tso Lin invaded North China, he was instigated and backed by the Japanese too. Arms and amnunitions were sent from Korea and the officers and non-commissioned officers of the

artillery regiments were all the Japanese under Chinese uniforms. Such officers and men captured by Wu Pei Fu were, therefore, instantly and intentionally shot without any investigation at the presence of foreign newspaper men as well as the Japanese reporters. To this merciless action Japan could say nothing at all either offically or unoffically.

"If Marshall Chang fails to keep his position in Mukden," exclaimed Yoshizawa, the Japanese minister to Peking, to one of his friends, "our own forces should be put in the field." This utterance created an unusual shock to the Chihli leaders and it made them dare not to try a drive to the outside of sanhaikwan.

6. Encrochment Policy With Territorial Ambition.

Japan's encrochment to Manchuria--as is that of Russia--is not a new ambition. Since the Sino-Japanese war of 1894 Manchuria has never been forgotten even a day or two. "Korea first, Manchuria next" was a phrase always uttered by the Japanese political leaders since a half century ago.

What would Japan gain by the encrochment or siezure of Manchuria?

First of all, a country about twice as large as Germany and potentially nearly four times as productive. John W. Stephens, the noted American engineer and economist who supervised the transportation of the Allied Forces in Siberia during the Great War, stated that the valley of the Sungari would one day be more productive than the great valley of the Volga and under intensive cultivation could raise more than one-fifth of the world's supply of food.

There are also more than 30,000 square miles of virgin forest; rich coal, iron and zinc deposits as well as gold mines said to be richer than Alaska. The steppes of Eastern Mongolia and North-Western Manchuria are said to contain about one fifth of the total number of sheep in the world, approximately 25,000,000 heads, and about 10,000,000 of cattle.

Now Korea has been completely controlled; then the next to the Japanese eyes is Manchuria. The so-called open door policy proclaimed by the United States is nothing to them. America has never paid any attention to the Manchurian affairs. In fact, Manchuria is to-day practically under the free hands of the Dual Powers--Japanese in the southern part and Russia in the northern part.

On account of the U. S. new immigration law, the encrochment policy of Japan has been rapidly progressing since earlier part of this year. Lately the Japanese Constitutionalists or Kenseikai adapted a new policy, as their party issue, to the effect that about 20,000,000 Koreans--that is the whole population of Korea--shall be

driven out of Manchuria and 10,000,000 Japanese shall be emmigrated from the island to the peninsular. They declared this is the way to resolve the problems of the Japanese increasing population and food, What would be the future of the Koreans, then.

7. Military Preparation To Meet Any Emergency In Manchuria.

As Japan has conceived such territorial ambition since long ago, the armed forces backing to the encrochment policy have already been fully prepared on the Manchurian border. At any movement, when a signal is given, the Japanese forces can sieze Manchuria by land and sea.

The strongest of all is an army corps stationed at Narami, the extreme north of Korea conjoining with Chinese and Russian borders. This army corps is consisted of all branches of land fighters, including anti-air forces. The only defect to Narami past till this year was the lack of transportation facilities to East Manchuria. But this defect has been entirely removed in July this year by the completion of a big bridge over the Tumen River and by the through traffic of a newly built railway from Narami to Tienpaosan, a silver mine operating by Japanese in Yenki district of Kirin.

Tienpoasan railway is a short line which will be a branch of Kirin--Hainyung (north end of Korea) Railway which is also to be constructed by the Japanese. By this trunk line reaching the capital of Kirin, thence connecting with Kirin-Changchun Railway and with a branch line to connect Chinese Eastern Railway at Hailiu, Japan is to extend both arms northward to embrace Manchuria--Kirin-Hainyung line being the right arm, Southern Manchuria the left one.

Along the Southern Manchuria line there are also strong forces of Japanese troops under the name of railway guards. In Porthsmouth Treaty the Japanese railway guard should not be more than 15 men in a distance of every 1000 meters. But at present the entire strength of railway guards is more than a division with divisional headquarters in Port Arthur and brigade headquarters at Liaoyang and Kungchuling. Those discharged soldiers after the term of compolsory service are ordered to stay in Manchuria as colonial settlers. They are financed with government funds--300 yen in cash and 20 mu (6mu to an acre) of land for every settler. At the time of necessity they shall be called to the color any moment at the designated point.

The main body of Japanese troops to be used in Manchuria is, however, in Korea. With the headquarters at Seoul the 19th Division is directly connected with Tokyo and it will be the centre column marching to Manchuria by the Seoul--euiji and Antung-Mukden Railways.

The advanced post of this column is right on the southern bank of the Yalu, having a position to take Antung and Mukden any time at will.

8. Busy To Fortify Naval Base In Korea.

In speaking of some impregnable naval bases of the world, every one knows only Pearl Harbor, Port Arthur, etc. But the best one--best of all the mentioned--which is secretly kept by Japan is still unknown to the world.

This finest naval base Japan fortifies to-day is called Chinhaimen or Chinhai Bay at the southern end of Korea. Backed with high mountains on the north, armed with rocky ranges on both sides and with a big island on the front it has an inlet and an outlet together. The size of the bay can put, without difficulty, all the warships of the world now under the naval service. It is a historical naval stronghold that has proved itself the value of its position. In 1592 when the Japanese invaded Korea, the whole strength of their naval forces was destroyed at this bay by the ever famous Korean admiral, Lee Soonsin, who is credited by the naval history as the first inventor of submarine boats.

Since the annexation of Korea in 1910, Japan was, and is, busy with the fortification of Chinhaimen. She never pays less attention to it than to her home bases, Yokosuka, Sasepo, Kure, etc. As the work of fortification is an absolutely secret matter, the Koreans formerly made residence in that harbor were all driven out and no one could be admitted unless a special permission from the naval authorities.

The writer of this report has tried several times in order to secure some valuable information about the fortification. But it has been failed every time on account of short of funds. It is, however, still in the hope that the secret of the Japs may be discovered on some future day by the concerted efforts of the Korean revolutionists.

III CHINESE CONDITIONS AT PRESENT

1. A Republic Without Constitution

In discussing the general conditions of China, no one can raise any objection to the point that China to-day is in the state of chaos. However it is not because she is a country without stable

government or proper officials, but because she has no fundamental laws of the state that we call constitution.

Existing as a Republic for a period of 14 years China has been ruled without constitution. But it is not the fact that she has never tried to make any law of that sort. The so-called provisional constitutions had been drafted and proclaimed several times by the temporary rulers who were in power for a time. The first constitution or Sun Yatsen's law was destroyed by Yuan Shihkai; Yuan Shihkai's by Tuan Chijui; Tuan Chjiui's by Li Yuanhung; and Li Yuanhung's by Tsao Kun. The constitution adopted and proclaimed by Parliament on Oct. 10th 1923 was called the permanent constitution of China. But it was again annihilated in Oct., 1923 by the so-called Christian General, Feng Yuhsiang, together with Chang Tsolin and Tuan Chjui.

2. Country Divided By Individual Militarists.

Since the downfall of Manchu dynasty China has been divided into numerous pieces, every province being independent from the other. The Peking government is merely a nominal head of the Republic. In fact no one in the provinces respects it as the central authority. Thus an order from Peking government does not reach the outside of the city gate. It is, however, called the national government because it has been formally recognized by the foreign powers.

The sphere of influence and interest divided by the individual military leaders at present is, in brief, as following:

(1) Manchuria or the Three Eastern Provinces, namely Fengtien, Kirin and Heilungchiang, and four of the inner provinces of North China, Chihli, Santung, Anhuei and Jeho, controlled by Chang Tsolin.

(2) Inner Mongolia or two Special Districts, Charhar and Suiyuan, and the province of Kansu controlled by Feng Yuhsiang.

(3) Honan under Yue Wiechun.
(4) Senshi under Sun Yue.
(5) Sanshi under Yen Hsisan.
(6) Hupei under Hsiao Yaonan.
(7) Hunan under Chao Hengli.
(8) Chekiang and Kiangsu under Sun Chuanfang.
(9) Kianghsi under Fang Penjen.
(10) Yunan under Tang Chi~~ao~~ yao.
(11) Kwangtung, Kwanghsi, Szechuan, Kweichow and Fukien under a group of individuals still struggling for supremacy.
(12) Sinkiang, Chinghai and Chuanpien left to local leaders because these provinces are too far from the political centre and nobody wants them.

Each of these militarists is practically the king of his own province. Some of them are often in a hostile state while others keep strict neutrality from both parties. Like an international combination or grouping against certain powers, there are also each group of provinces formed as an alliance for offensive and defensive purposes.

Chang Tsolin is, however, not only separated from those provinces, but also practically independent of China. In September last year, Karakhan, then the Soviet Plenipotentiary Representative in the Far East, in a separate treaty between Russia and Manchuria, recognized Chang Tsolin as the supreme ruler of Manchuria. The treaty reads:

"Art. 10. The Soviet Government of Russia shall recognize the sovereign rights of the Three Eastern Provinces."

3. China's Modern "Frankensteins."

At the present time China has many "Frankensteins" in her political and social phases. Frankenstein is a work used by Mary W. Shelley in entitling one of her novels in 1818. It means, according to the novel, that an artificial creature or monster created by a man, committed many atrocious crimes inflecting the most dreadful retribution to his maker. In consequence the name, Frankenstein, has become a synonym for one destroyed by his own work.

Among the many Frankensteins in China there are two most dangerous ones, one completed and the other in making. The completed one is the vast military establishment comprising nearly two million men which can niether be disbanded nor controlled and which is threatening the every existence of the ~~making~~ country, is the labor movement, organized primarily for use as a political weapon against "imperialism" but which is likely not only to destroy foreign industry, but China as well and in addition to this, the students who were largely responsible for the creation of the movement.

Country. The other Frankenstein now in making,

In other lands, especially in the United States and Great Britian, the labor movement was started to unionize all industries and then to improve the conditions of the workers so that they may be the valuable members of the society. But in China they are making the mistake of stirring up a Frankenstein with the anti-foreign, anti-government and anti-civilization feelings which in all probablity they will be unable to control in the future.

4. National University A Resort Of Agitators.

The recent disturbance in China is somewhat similar to the Boxer

uprising of 1900 in its nature and character. The only different point from the preceding one is that the movement this time has been started by the students and teachers instead of, as it was before, old conservative class in the country.

The National University of Peking is a resort of such agitators including the students as well as the teachers. Proferrors Chiang Menglin; Yui Jichang, and Li Sauchang are the most prominent figures in Bolshevik faith. Directly connected with Karakhan, the Soviet Ambassador ; Kwonintang, the followers of late Dr. Sun Yetsen; and most of the college professors and students in the country, they have started a nationwide movement since 1923 to preach the Bolshevism. They have always an enormous fund on hand because Karakhan doesn't mind how much they spend in the propaganda and actual movements.

Owing to the activities of those "learned men" China goes too fast toward the bottom of destruction. Most of those agitators are not truly men of principle or doctrine. Since a few years the radical students and labor leaders have read a few books dealing with economic subjects and have swallowed a lot of propanganda thought ~~there~~ by the Bolsheviks and by social uplifters from the West. Arming themselves with a few phrases from the westerners, the meaning of which few of them understand, they started out to overturn the world and create a new day for China internally and internationally through the labor movement. The illiterated laborers not understanding what it is all about, but deeply interested in anything which promises money and ~~sustance~~ sustenance without the accompanying labor to which they have been accustomed, blindly follow the leaders in activities which are likely to create all kinds of complications for China. Many Chinese think that if tariff autonomy could be obtained, that immediately economic condition in China would be raised to the standard of the west, and China, through the mere forces of numbers, could conquer the Universe.

5. Hatred Of Westerners Instigated By Leading Militarists.

Among the leading characters of the Chinese political stage almost every one of them is responsible for the fate of China to-day. It seems, however, unnecessary, and impossible, to make a detailed statement about all the individuals including the minor ones. Therefore the names to be mentioned herein are only those who are in a large measure responsible for destruction of China.

On the top of the list of the destructive leaders of China there are three leading figures above all. These are, first, Dr. Sun Yatsen who is praisingly called by his followers "Lenin of China," second,

Chang Tsolin, formerly a bandit leader and now a noted pro-Japanese war lord, and thirdly, Feng Yuhsiang, who is commonly called by the westerners the Christian General. But in this writing Sun Yatsen and Chang Tsolin are both omitted because they are so notorious that every one may know them, perhaps better than the writer.

As for the "Christian General" the foreigners have often misunderstood him and therefore no sufficient heed had been paid to the man and his action, because he became a Christian outwardly. But contrary to such confidence of the foreigners he is a common enemy to the foreigners as well as to his own countrymen. He is not a Christian in his behavior nor is a man of faithfulness in every respect. He has distinguished himself more for his ruthless than for his intellect or learning.

Cutting in short, Feng's career is not a very praiseworthy one. He has been just as currupt as many another Chinese general. When he ejected President Li Yuunhung he betrayed a friend and benefactor; when he imprisoned President Tsao Kun he murdered many innocent persons; when he expelled the abdicated Manchu Emperor he robbed the priceless treasure from the palace; and when he deserted his superior Commander, Marshal Wu Peifu, and traitorously entered Peking, he sold himself to the Japanese and Russian money contributed to Chang Tsolin for buying his (Feng) rebellious action against Peking government.

If we turn the pages of history further back, we can find that Feng, during the Boxer outbreak, was one of the leaders who, to the cry of "Exterminate the Foreign Devils," surrounded the enclosure in which a number of missionaries that fled for refuge and were brutally massacred. To-day Feng's cry is "Exterminate the British." It won't be long, if he can have his way and Britishers are killed, before the old war cry of "Exterminate the Foreigners" will again be on the lips of a passion-awayed and bloodthirsty mob. Even now, while others are seeking a dignified, just and peaceful end to the trouble between China and the foreign powers, Feng is banging his war drum nearly every day.

6. Christian General Backed With Anti-Christian Russian Bolsheviks

Since last spring evidence has been daily growing that the "Christian General", Feng Yuhsuang, and his satelletes are in close relation with Russia. Bolsheviks attempt to penetrate into Chinese politics is thereby completely fulfilled. It was, however, Chang Tsolin who drove Yuhsiang to the Russian side by siezure of Feng's arms, which were bought from foreign agents and shipped to Tientsin. Being in a position without sufficient arms Feng was quickly determined to extend his welcome hand to the Russians

who were ever ready to grasp it.

Recently an enormous amount of arms and munitions were sent to Kalgan, one of Feng's strongholds, by the Soviet. It was reported by some authoritative sources that on certain days more than 20 truck-loads of arms reached Kalgan in succession.

Russia does not want any price for those military supplies. She is rather willing to pour them into China. But Russia is getting her payment in another manner, for Moscow, at present, is not interested in this evil traffic for commercial gain. Russia's aim today are political and the payment she wants is also political.

7. Feng Seeks Sino-Japanese Entente.

Feng Yuhsiang was once violently anti-Japanese. As a matter of fact, when the recent troubles in China broke out, he was still anti-Japanese. But Feng has undergone a new conversion; he has experienced a fresh change of heart.

At a dinner given by him to Japanese newspaper men in China last July, he issued a war cry for the yellow races to unite and eject the westerners. The room in which the dinner was given was decorated with scrolls, one of which reads: "My army seeks the liberation of China from the theiving foreigners;" while another declared that "China is losing millions of Yuan (dollars) annually owing to the ruthless exploitation of her riches by foreigners."

His speech was to the effect that the Chinese and Japanese are descended from the same stock and that they should band together against other nations:

"I intend to send 10,000 students to study in Japan and I want Japan and Germany to send me experts to advise me and my people. It is alsolutely necessary that a Sino-Japanese entente should be formed and I intend to exert all my strength towards theis end."

About a month after that speech a representative has been despatched to Japan for the purpose of "clearing up misunderstandings," visiting high officials, leading business men and political leaders. Another mission has been sent last October with a secret document and nobody can tell what it is. But it is generally believed that this mission is the first step toward the Sino-Japanese military pact.

8. China's Diplomatic Tendency Doubtful

Now China is sitting on the fence in so far as her foreign policy in the future is concerned. Of course, that she will continue cordial relation with western powers for some time to come is a safe

conclusion. But how long this will continue depends on how the cards are staked.

Judging from the present tendency and future conditions China will stick to Japan and Russia as a new triple entente against the dual powers of the west, namely the United States and Great Britian. Anti-British agitation has already shown the general attitude of the Chinese this year. The next news from the Far East in the near future shall be anti-American.

Observe the general sentiment of the Americans in China by reading the following paragraph in a letter written by a prominent American journalist, Rodney Gilbert, to one of his friends in Honolulu:

"With regard to the present anti-British movement in China, I hope that the Americans are not thinking that they are exempted because the Chinese like American better than they do England. The movement is anti-foreign, founded entirely upon China's realization of her inferiority and her incapacity, and if it happens to be anti-British now, rather than anti-American, it is only because it suits Karakhan's policy to make it anti-British. The Soviet policy is to wreck England and America by ruining their foreign markets and since England is in difficulties at home and is more dependent upon Asiatic markets than America, it seems to Moscow that England is the easiest target. With England ruined and out of the way, America will come next and will then be an equally easy mark. If the Chinese were not such fools they would understand that Russia's sole purpose in China is to throw the country into complete chaos. China's friendship means nothing to Russia, and is worth nothing, but China's complete collapse means such heavy loss to all the western powers, particularly England and the United States, that the ruin of China is worth Moscow's best efforts."

9. Future Hope Of China Rests on Wu Peifu

Although the political ship of China is running hour by hour toward the rocks of destruction, yet there is an able pilot who may, if he is in a proper position, save her from whole wreck. This is the man who overturned the pro-Japanese government of Tuan Chijui in 1920, who drove back the Manchuria invasion in 1922, and who recently declared to exterminate the Bolshevik movement in China. The name of this distinguished man is Wu Peifu, generally known as "Scholastic General" in the Chinese army.

He is, first of all, a well ~~learned~~ educated man in Chinese classics, if not in European or American. Unlike those currupt officials of to-day's China, he is a man of stern integrity. While in a position as the Sunyuesze or super-military-Governor of Chihli, Santung and Honan, and almost as a dictator to Peking government for the past five years, he has never fattened his pocket with any sort of money--

government fund or bribery--that every Chinese official does to-day. He is now as poor as he was before while Chang Tsolin, Feng Yuhsiang and all other Chinese military governors are listed as multiple millionaires.

Somebody in China, particularly the satellites of Chang Tsolin and Feng Yuhsiang, called Wu as pro-American. It is not because he is actually backed by the United States as much as Chang and Feng by the Japanese and Russians, but because his attitude toward America is very friendly and cordial while it is very cold and better to the Russ and Japs. If he was actually supported by America or Great Britian even after the Chihli-Fengtien war last year, China ~~won't~~ (wouldn't) be such a pandamonium to-day.

Recently it is reported on the newspapers that Wu Peifu is rising up again with the Yangtze Valley leaders under his command. It is, then, an opportunity to Wu Peifu himself and a fresh hope to the Chinese national life. Something would happen, in the nearest future showing a definite sign whether China is to be ruled by the pro-Japanese and Pro-Russian or by the pro-American."

10. <u>What America Ought To Do To China,</u>

The political and social disturbance in China is not merely a question affecting the destines of the Chinese people. It will be, atleast, a leading factor determining the vicissitudes of all races. Destruction of China means the ruin of the world's market in the Far East and it means, therefore, the ruin of the world's commerce.

As it has already been discussed in the beginning paragraphs of this report, the next world conflict shall be brought to pass by the Chinese question accompanied with a formation of two distinct camps--that is, Russia--Japan on one side and America--England on the other. ~~For this reason~~ As for the reason why it does not need any futher discussion. In short, if the United States realizes the danger of Russian Bolskevism to the world civilization and the menace of Japanese aggression to the world peace, she must extend her helping hand to China to-day without a bit of hestitation. Otherwise the time will not wait man, and the opportunity will not wait man's action.

Victory Day, 1925
Honolulu

James McTook

MIL. INTEL. DIV.
4-1 1926 2657-D-309
3800
WAR DEPARTMENT
2657-D-7

G-2 Report

CHINA (Political)

Subject: International Train.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D., FEB 11 1926

1. On those occasions of warfare when normal railway communication between Peking, Tientsin and Shanhaikwan has been interrupted, it has been the practice of the foreign powers still party to the Protocol of 1901 to insist as their right upon the running between these points of trains for the exclusive use of nationals of those powers, and under the protection of soldiers of such of them as maintain garrisons in China. These trains have come to be known as international. The powers base their right to run these trains upon the quoted Protocol (see pages 282-3, Vol. I, MacMurray's Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China").

2. Except for the delays due to temporary damage to the railroad or congestion of troop trains, no particular difficulty heretofore has been experienced in running these international trains. During the recent fighting about Tientsin, however, such extraordinary difficulties were encountered both between Peking and Tientsin, and Tientsin and Shanhaikwan, that they became a matter of grave concern to the chiefs of mission in Peking, and the commandants of foreign garrisons in Tientsin. Though for the present the matter has been settled through the cessation of hostilities, I believe it is one that should receive immediate and careful thought for reasons which will appear.

3. An interruption of normal rail communication occurring immediately after the outbreak of the recent hostilities, an international train was despatched from Tientsin at 10:00 a.m., December 9, 1925, for Peking. There was some delay due to damage to the roadbed and after twice having been held up and searched by troops of Feng Yu-hsiang, the train finally reached Peking at 3:55 a.m., December 10th. This train left Peking for Tientsin at 8:10 a.m., December 10th, and after delays incident to the great number of troop trains on the tracks "arrived at Yangtsun, about 15 miles from Tientsin, at 6:20 p.m., December 10th and remained here until 7:00 a.m., December 11th, when the train proceeded to a point about five miles south of Yangtsun, where it was fired upon by Li Ching-lin's forces. Shrapnel and high explosive shells were being used, but no direct hits were made on the allied train. Shrapnel burst directly over the engine, breaking one window pane. The train stopped and after a few minutes - the shelling continuing - the train returned to a point out of range of Li's artillery. Three armored trains were just in rear of the allied train which prevented further retiring.

"At 10:05 a.m., a patrol, consisting of Lieut. Brann, U. S. Army, and two men from each contingent, was sent forward under a French flag to get in contact, if possible, with Li Ching-lin's forces, to arrange for the safe passage of the allied train through his lines. This patrol was, at a point south and through Feng's line, fired upon by a machine gun and rifles. The patrol returned to the train at 1:30 with no casualties.

"At 2:45 p.m., in compliance with instructions contained in a radio from the U. S. Army Forces in Tientsin, efforts were made to go forward, using a light engine, to meet an allied train reported to be departing from Tientsin East at 2:00 p.m. The engine reached a point south about six miles, when it was fired upon by Li's forces, using artillery, shrapnel and rifle fire, necessitating the return of the train to the detached coaches.

From M/A, China Report No. 5733 January 8, 1926.

CHINA (Political)

Subject: International Train - cont'd.

"The allied train remained out of range of Li's artillery during the night of December 11th.... While waiting here for instructions to proceed to Tientsin or to return to Peking, one of Li Ching-lin's aeroplanes dropped a high explosive bomb near the Yangtsun bridge in the center of the town and within 150 yards of the allied train.... At 12:30 p.m., December 12th, the allied train left for Peking and arrived there at 6:00 p.m., where the train commander was directed to remain until further instructions were issued." (From report of Warrant Officer W. J. Johnson, U. S. Army.)

The following is quoted from statement by Captain J. D. Cope, U. S. Army, Train Commander:

"When the international train was coming to Peking the Feng Yu-hsiang armored train was passed at Chang-Chuang. On the return trip the armored trains (three) were encountered at Yangtsun where they were in the train yards and remained there. There was considerable rolling stock of all descriptions in the yard, troop trains, etc. During the night the international train also remained in the yard and traffic was so adjusted during this time that the international train could get out on the main line at daylight December 11th. In this adjustment of traffic the armored trains were shifted to the north on the main line to permit the international train to get clear.

"The movement of the armored trains to the north out of the yard appeared logical and necessary to make room for the necessary shifting of traffic in the yards, and while it did bring them onto the main line and directly in rear of the international train, they made no attempt to follow it, and at the time the international train was fired upon the armored trains of Feng Yu-hsiang's forces were at least three miles behind (to the north of) it.

"It is possible that observation posts with powerful glasses could observe the relative positions of these trains from the position of the Li Ching-lin lines."

4. Thereafter, until December 25th, no train service of any kind available to foreigners existed between Peking and Tientsin. Such mail as was received during this period came by couriers who took devious routes consuming from three to four days on the journey. Efforts to reach Tientsin by motor car were unsuccessful throughout the same period.

5. An international train was run with fair regularity between Tientsin and Shanhaikwan up to December 22nd. On this date a train from Tientsin was stopped by being fired on at 1:30 p.m. at Hsin Ho, by troops of Feng Yu-hsiang. After being halted the officer commanding the Chinese troops insisted, in spite of protests, on inspecting the train. Having accomplished this he ordered the immediate return of the train to Tientsin. The officer in command of the train asked for time to get into radio communication with his superiors at Tientsin. Not only was this reasonable request refused, but the threat was added that the train would be immediately attacked if it did not at once retire. Chinese troops and artillery were placed in position to give this threat effect. The train thereupon withdrew.

CHINA (Political)

Subject: International Train - cont'd.

6. Subsequent to the failure to get a train through to Tientsin from Peking, negotiations were entered into between the foreign commandants in Tientsin and Li Ching-lin, and the Senior Commandant of Legation Guards in Peking and Feng Yu-hsiang. These negotiations resulted in certain agreements to govern the operation of an international train between Peking and Tientsin as follows:

1. Tientsin to notify Li Ching-lin and Peking to notify Marshal Feng when train is to run, giving probable time it will want to pass lines.

2. On arriving at battle line commanding officer of the train to notify Chinese commander that no hostile train should follow his train.

3. When moving up to pass lines, to stop if followed within four miles by hostile train and back up.

4. Assure Marshal Feng that no Li troops will be carried.

5. Assure Marshal Feng that if he desires, no Chinese, except railway, legation, consular or commandant's employees, will be carried.

6. Will keep Marshal Feng informed of location of train so that he may know that opponent is not using foreign flags as ruse de guerre.

7. Assure Marshal Feng that if any one dares use foreign flags to protect his trains serious complications would arise.

8. Based on the above assurances Marshal Feng will issue an order to his commanders at the front to allow the international train to pass whenever it shows up and in so far as track may have been disturbed, the military transport will assist in its repair. (Note: In case of Li Ching-lin, wording is appropriately changed.)

Feng also insisted on the following which was agreed to:

1. The National Army will not be responsible for damages inflicted not under its control.

2. In case the international train should be forced to turn back again on account of attacks by the Chihli forces, it shall return to Peking and under no circumstances should it remain within the firing line of our troops as to obstruct our military actions, or any other place along the railway line.

3. At no place during the passage should the train stop except for good and legitimate reasons and no passengers shall be allowed to alight and make observations.

Under these agreements a train was scheduled to leave Peking at 6:00 a.m., December 23rd, but on notice being received that 2200 metres of track had been torn up near Yangtsun it did not depart. After the defeat of Li Ching-lin on December 23rd, repairs were made and service was resumed on December 25th, on which day an international left for Tientsin.

CHINA (Political)

Subject: International Train - cont'd.

7. Energetic protests were made by the Diplomatic Body over the stopping of the train at Hsin Ho, and the attendant incidents. Feng Yu-hsiang gave orders that the train was to be allowed to proceed to Shanhaikwan but as these orders were issued after his victory only surmises may be made as to the course of events had fighting continued, or had he been defeated. In his reply to the protests of the Diplomatic Body, Feng Yu-hsiang confined himself to a statement that the war now was over, and implied that no more trouble need be anticipated.

8. It should be noted that in both these cases the international train was easily identifiable as such as it carried on the pilot of the engine the massed flags of the powers concerned and was guarded by foreign soldiers.

9. The situation thus presented was that a treaty right of the foreign powers was denied them by force of arms, and that in attempting to exercise this right their nationals were fired upon and subjected to immediate risk of life and limb. While it is important to note that there was no expression of anti-foreign feeling in connection with the Tientsin-Peking incident, that does not alter the gravity of the situation. It is not so apparent that there was no anti-foreign feeling in the Tientsin Hsin-Ho case. This train was under command of a Japanese officer and an explanation of the extremely rough demeanor of the Chinese officer on this occasion may lie in the intense hostility which the troops of Feng Yu-hsiang felt for the Japanese.

10. The problem presented for consideration was whether the situation of complete interruption of railroad and motor car communication between Peking and the sea was to be acquiesced in by the foreign powers, or if the forces at their disposal, designed under the Protocol for the maintenance of this communication, were to be used to secure it. It is possible that the agreements entered into and Feng Yu-hsiang's orders, noted in paragraph 6, would have served to clear up the situation. Doubts may be felt as to this, in view of the destroyed track and the truculent attitude of junior officers. Fortunately, the matter was settled by Feng's victory. However, under present conditions the situation may and in all probability will recur in the near future, and a solution other than fortuitous should be ready for application. Either that, or such a course should be taken as will preclude a repetition of the situation.

11. Prior to a discussion of these matters, it would be well to note three other points. One is that following the outbreak of hostilities Peking was stripped bare of rolling stock, so that no train could be despatched until one had arrived from Tientsin. Another is that even such travel as was possible was accompanied by danger to the lives of passengers and subject to frequent halts and inspections by Chinese troops. The third is that without thereby diminishing the right of the powers to run the international train, an explanation for the Chinese opposition to it may be found in the fact that in the case of the Peking-Tientsin incident the train was followed by armored trains of the enemy attacking Li, causing him to suspect a ruse de guerre, and in the Hsin Ho incident the Chinese suspected that the train's commanding officer might convey information of them to their enemies. These but seem to emphasize the view that unless neutralized, it is impossible to operate international trains over these railways.

12. It would seem that the first point for consideration is whether or not the right to maintain open communication between Peking and the sea is to be retained. This right was secured, as noted, in the Protocol of 1901. Its reason is found in the siege of the foreign legations in Peking in 1900, and the great difficulty encountered by foreign troops in marching to their relief from Tientsin. If there is still occasion to fear for the safety of foreigners in Peking from such attacks or rioting beyond the ability of Chinese troops or their willingness to handle, the right should be retained. If, however, it is felt that foreigners in Peking are not in such danger, or that Chinese troops may be depended upon to protect their lives and property, then the right should be relinquished as speedily as possible.

13. If the right is relinquished there is at once a solution of the problem of the operation of international trains.

14. If the right is to be maintained it is apparent that the present arrangements and available troops are inadequate.

The reasons for this may be partially found in the fact that Chinese troops are better armed and trained and in larger disciplined numbers than was the case until comparatively recently; in the fact that there is a growing anti-foreign feeling among the Chinese which seeks expression whenever possible in invasion and denial of treaty rights; and in the fact that there is not only no longer a solidarity of foreign powers, but as well there is one power, at least, anxious to bring about trouble between China and the treaty powers.

To continue the effort to maintain this right with the present arrangements and available troops is not only to continue to lose prestige through impotence, but also to risk encounters the results of which might easily be deplorable.

15. There is a possibility that an alteration of arrangements might be effective. Thus it might be possible, through agreement with the Chinese government, to bring about the neutralization of the railway between the indicated points. In normal times there are so many reasons why this would be acceptable to the Chinese that it should be possible of arrangement. At this time, however, I do not believe the acquiescence of the Chinese government could be secured. Even if it were, troops attacking the government would not respect it, and experience has shown that the Chinese government would not respect any rights of any countries except under threat of force. If the foreign troops at present available are not sufficient to keep communications open between Peking and the sea, they obviously would not be to maintain the neutralization of those communications.

16. Another arrangement might be a prior agreement among the treaty powers that immediately on the outbreak of hostilities that threaten to close these communications, the treaty powers should declare that, experience justifying them, they insisted that these communications be made neutral, using force for the purpose. This is the course followed by the Japanese in the case of the South Manchurian Railway.

To carry out such an agreement there would have to be complete harmony between the treaty powers, great promptness of action and a single objective. As on more than one occasion there have been grounds for suspecting active sympathy toward one or another of contending factions by certain of the treaty powers, it is recognized that efficient action under such an agreement would be difficult of accomplishment.

17. That more troops would be necessary to the successful carrying out of such a plan is obvious. These might be secured from two sources: China, or the powers themselves.

Experience has shown that Chinese troops trained and led by foreigners are efficient and dependable. It might be possible, though at this time I doubt it, to enlist a corps of Chinese railroad guards for this express purpose. It seems to me that the plan would have a greater prospect of success were the corps raised to maintain the integrity of all Chinese railways, with the distinct understanding that sufficient of it, in conjunction with available foreign troops, would be used when necessary to neutralize any special section. There would be no use in considering such a corps unless it were trained and led by foreign officers to include all commissioned grades and its pay were guaranteed by the treaty powers. A large portion, if not all, of this expense to be borne by the railroads which could easily afford the outlay if free of the constant drains they now suffer from the militarists. Such portion of the expense as the treaty powers would have to bear would be far less than the cost of the reinforcements to their present garrisons, and as this cost would be prorated among all the treaty powers, it would be more equitable than the present arrangement in which only those which maintain garrisons are under expense.

If Chinese troops were not used, reinforcements would have to come from the treaty powers. The possibility of this is not a matter for discussion here.

18. As to the total number of troops that would be required, a comparison of those available with those used by the Japanese on the South Manchurian Railway should in a measure be illuminative.

The total distance Peking-Tientsin-Shanhaikwan is almost exactly 260 miles. Foreign troops available are as follows:

United States	1345
British	911
French	1545
Japanese	791
Italian	510
	5102

Of the foregoing each country maintains in Peking legation guards. These have a definite mission and it is improbable that they could be detached from it. Their numbers are as follows:

United States	456
British	175
French	231
Japanese	127
Italian	160
	1149

There are thus left available only 3953, or approximately 15 per mile. The equipment naturally is not uniform and the lack of a common language would be a disadvantage. Moreover the question of command and joint action, however well intentioned the personnel, would be a matter of constant friction, jealousy and delicate adjustment. In times of emergency there is not only not time for these but they become as well a positive detriment to efficient action.

On the South Manchurian Railway the distance Antung-Mukden-Changchun is 461 miles. The Japanese troops available are 4 battalions of railroad guards, 1 regiment of cavalry and 1 division, a total strength calculated at 12,400 or roughly, 26 per mile. But it is not to be assumed that this number, or an increase of 11 per mile over the present strength, would be sufficient for the section Peking-Tientsin-Shanhaikwan. The Japanese have the advantage of a completely Japanese force actuated by a single motive. Moreover, the distance from Antung to Mukden is only 171 miles and it is known that in the area Mukden-Changchun there are available sufficient Japanese reservists to protect that section if necessary. Also, the Japanese force may be added to from Japan in a matter of a few hours.

19. A point for consideration in connection with the foreign forces available is whether or not the points which now limit open communications between Peking and the sea - Peking and Shanhaikwan - might not well be changed to Peking and Tientsin, thus shortening the system to 86 miles. If this were done the force now available would be nearly 50 per mile. The reasons which in 1901 determined Shanhaikwan as the sea port no longer are so cogent. Tientsin may be regarded as an ice free port except on rare occasions, and on these, if necessary, the frequent traversing of the river by boats for this purpose should be able to keep a channel open. Taku Bar does not present difficulties which may not be easily met, and certainly not such as to justify any considerable expense for the maintenance of land communication to it from Tientsin.

20. In exercising forbearance and refraining from the use of force in running the trains during the recent crisis the foreign powers undoubtedly used good judgment. With an undamaged track it is possible that with a resolute show of force the trains might have been allowed through. On the other hand, had it been necessary to fire on the Chinese in reply to their fire the killing or wounding of Chinese or foreigners might have easily precipitated a situation of vast possibilities. It is moreover an open question if the Chinese would have been overawed by the foreign force, which was small in numbers and without artillery, while the Chinese numbered many thousands with all modern weapons. Also, a few rails removed or a bridge blown up, both in front and behind the train, would have brought it to an inglorious and possibly disastrous halt.

If forcible action had been used and a crisis precipitated, it must be recognized that in the burst of anti-foreign feeling which very possibly would have followed, the total of foreign forces available, some 5,000 men, would have been inadequate to cope with the situation.

21. My opinion and recommendations are as follows:

1. Although the probability of danger to foreigners in Peking is remote, I think it still exists and that Chinese troops are not to be depended upon for their protection in the event of a popular movement against them. While the foreign garrisons in Peking are sufficient to protect the Legation Quarter, within which all foreigners might be assembled, against mob violence, they are insufficient to defend it against a siege for a greater length of time than a week. In this conclusion I take into account the modern equipment and training of Chinese soldiers. The right of maintaining open communications between Peking and the sea should be retained.

2. The sea port of these communications should be changed from Shanhaikwan to Tientsin.

3. The railroad from Peking to Tientsin including a zone on either side five miles wide, a total of ten miles, on the outbreak of hostilities north of the Yangtze River should be declared neutral, no Chinese troops being permitted to enter or travel on it except after being disarmed and in such numbers as the powers may decide. In the absence of such hostilities Chinese troops may use this zone under the same conditions as other passengers.

4. That immediate steps be taken by the treaty powers to ensure such neutrality.

5. That to the present equipment of the foreign garrisons there be added six aeroplanes equipped as bombers and with machine guns.

6. That on the completion of the above arrangements, all foreign garrisons be withdrawn from points on the Peking and Mukden Railway between Tientsin and Shanhaikwan.

22. I recognize that if these recommendations were carried out there would be implication of weakness on the part of the foreign powers. But it should be noted that the powers maintain the right of open communications between Peking and the sea changing only the point interpreted as the sea, and any loss of prestige which might result from relinquishment of a portion of the railroad communications to the point theretofore interpreted as the sea would not be comparable to the loss already suffered and possibly still to be suffered in an inability to maintain the present line.

23. There appear three alternatives to my recommended action. One is to maintain the present line, neutralized throughout. Because of the number of troops that would be necessary and for other reasons stated, I do not recommend this. Another is to relinquish the right, withdrawing all troops at other points than Peking to Tientsin, and using the latter as an outpost and covering point for any expedition that might be sent to China. This would contemplate Peking as dependent upon its present resources and self-sustaining in the event of an emergency until it could be relieved. For reasons stated I do not recommend this. The third is to depend wholly upon the Chinese for the preservation of law and order and the protection of the property and lives of foreigners and withdraw all foreign garrisons from China. I do not believe the time is ripe for this and do not recommend it.

Distribution:
4 MID
1 CGUSAFC
1 Manila
1 Tokyo
1 File
1 Legation

G-2 Report

(7) 4-1

1926 3600 2657-D-3 29

WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Political)

Subject: The Taku Incident.

2657-D-30 (3) RECEIVED G/2 W.D. APR 23 1926 (4)

1. This incident, reported in Reports #5772 and 5790, rapidly developed into one of intense importance. The course of events has been fully reported by cablegram by the Legation to the State Department. It is considered sufficient in this report only briefly to record these events.

2. The Chinese authorities, having taken no satisfactory steps in response to the communication sent them by the powers (see par. 5, Report No. 5790), the American, British, Italian and Japanese ministers, representing countries having naval forces at Tientsin, directed their naval commanders to serve notice on the commanding officers of the Chinese belligerent forces as follows:

(1) All hostilities in the channel from Taku to Tientsin must be discontinued.
(2) All mines or other obstructions must be removed.
(3) All navigation signals must be restored and not further molested.
(4) All combatant vessels must remain outside Taku and refrain from interference with foreign shipping.
(5) All searches of foreign vessels except by Customs authorities must be discontinued.

3. Were satisfactory assurances on these points not received the five powers named were to take such measures as they might find necessary for the purpose of removing or suppressing any obstruction to the free and safe navigation of the channel between Tientsin and the sea. The five ministers above mentioned nevertheless considered it desirable that the naval forces should not, unless in case of absolute necessity, resort to gun fire until further advised. These instructions were given in order to maintain general treaty rights of international commerce and the particular right of free access from the capitol to the sea as provided in the Protocol of 1901.

4. The above notice to the commanding officers of the belligerent forces was served on them at 4:00 p.m. on the 15th of March and the period for compliance set at noon on the 17th.

5. On March 13th, the already serious situation had been complicated by the fact that despite prior arrangements between the Japanese Consul General at Tientsin and the Chinese military authorities in command of the fort at Taku for the entry of two Japanese destroyers, the latter were fired upon while passing the fort. They returned the fire and thereafter repaired outside the Bar. Four Japanese on the destroyers were wounded, of whom three were officers, one being the commander of the destroyer flotilla which had arrived off Taku from Port Arthur. The Japanese have demanded an apology for this, reserving the right to make other demands. Generally speaking, their attitude has been patient and forbearing.

6. Another incident of March 13th furnished a certain justification for the operations of the Fengtien flotilla in blockading the approach to the channel at Taku and in boarding and searching inbound vessles. On that date the Soviet steamer "Oleg" appeared off the bar. She had been there during the previous week but owing to her draft had been unable to enter. On this occasion, though her load had been lightened so that

DISTRIBUTION
MID.....4
Legation.....
M/A Tokyo.....
C.G. Tientsin.....1
G-2 Manila.....
File.....1
.....

From M/A, China Report No. 5812 March 24, 1926

entry was possible, before she could do so she was boarded by marines from the Fengtien flotilla, who on search found concealed under an alleged cargo of seaweed munitions destined for the 1st National Army at Tientsin to the value of $2,500,000. She has been detained by the blockading force.

7. Anticipating the conclusion of this report it may be said that Chang Tso-lin expressed an indifference as to the cessation, through the intervention of the powers, of the activities of the fleet off Taku, as with the capture of the "Oleg" its principal mission had been accomplished.

8. Shortly prior to the expiration of the period of the ultimatum, satisfactory assurances were received from the commanding officers of the Fengtien flotilla and the land forces of the National Army at Taku that the demands of the powers would be acceded to except for certain minor changes as to paragraph five. These changes, subsequently agreed to by the powers, contemplate the searching by the Customs authorities assisted by Chinese police of Chinese passengers and personnel on vessels entering and leaving Tientsin. On March 17th the following reply was received from the Wai Chiao Pu to the note from the foreign powers referred to in par. 5, Report No. 5790.

"Acknowledging the receipt of Your Excellency's Note of the 16th of this month together with the communication which the naval commandants of the several Powers in Tientsin have transmitted to both the Chinese belligerent parties in Taku, we have the honour to inform Your Excellency that we have immediately forwarded these documents to the competent military authorities.

"In conformity with the stipulations of the Protocol of 1901 the free communication between Peking and the sea must remain unobstructed, a principle which the Chinese Government has always respected.

"Unfortunately there have been recently movements of troops as a result of warfare in the neighbourhood of Taku which were the cause that foreign vessels have been subjected to certain restraint in their navigation.

"The Chinese Government having received on several occasions communications thereanent from the Diplomatic Representatives of the foreign Powers is doing everything that lies within its power to remove these obstacles and to restore free communication between Peking and the sea.

"We are convinced that the Diplomatic Representatives are aware of this fact. However, the interested Ministers not wishing to await with some patience the solution of this question have given instructions to their naval commandants to transmit the above mentioned communication fixing a time limit for the answer.

"Upon examination of the contents of this communication it appears that the naval commandants of the different Powers in Tientsin have thereby assumed an attitude which the Chinese Government considers to be beyond the scope of the Protocol of 1901. It cannot recognize this as an equitable means.

"The competent military authorities have been authorized to take the proper measures with regard to the different clauses of the said communication, and at the same time we are writing to Your Excellency with the request to communicate with these Ministers who have naval forces in Tientsin to the end that they from their side immediately authorize their naval Commandants in Tientsin to enter into relations with the local military authorities in order to find together the proper ways and means for the maintenance of the communication with the sea.

"It is essential that no recourse should be had to extreme (too hasty) methods, especially in view of the friendly relations which exist between China and the foreign Powers."

9. The incident thus has been satisfactorily closed and may be considered as a distinct achievement by the treaty powers in the maintenance of their treaty rights. It is probably impossible to overestimate the importance from many standpoints of this incident. It will be discussed under the following aspects.

10. Solidarity of Treaty Powers. There is reason to believe that the Chinese have grown to doubt united action in support of their rights by the powers party to the existing treaties, and to count upon this in their continued encroachment upon these rights. Though behind the scenes there were certain divergencies as to methods in the contemplated action, the effect produced by the ultimatum of the powers has been one of accord and harmony and no doubt will be of salutary effect upon the Chinese. Discussing these divergencies, it may be said that the pronouncement of Mr. Stanley Baldwin that fire action would not be used by the British except to defend lives, was undoubtedly disconcerting to certain of the associated powers. Similarly, the expression of unofficial American opinion as to the wisdom of the ultimatum may have tended to encourage the Chinese. It is possible that the Japanese were somewhat reluctant to participate. These, however, may be discounted in the general effect of harmonious action that was produced.

11. Maintenance of the Right of Free Communication. As heretofore reported, when communication between the capitol and the sea has of recent months been interrupted by land operations, the powers, recognizing their impotence to restore and maintain communication have saved their faces by accepting the interruption as incident to civil war unaccompanied by any anti-foreign demonstration. This has been fully reported upon in Report #5733. But a continuation of this face-saving acquiescence in a situation which actually was a violation of a treaty right was likely in the end to have the effect, by force of precedent, of vitiating if not cancelling that right. Hence the value of this incident in affording an opportunity to apply a superior force to reestablish communication and reaffirm the treaty rights. It is for this reason that the reply of the Wai Chiao Pu above quoted reaffirming the Protocol of 1901 is such a distinct achievement for the foreign powers.

12. I think in general it may be said that the face-saving device above referred to is recognized by all foreign powers concerned as full of danger and to have been resorted to only reluctantly and from motives of expediency. The Protocol of 1901 contains no qualifying statement that free communication between the capitol and the sea is to be maintained only in the presence of an anti-foreign demonstration. An analogy of this treaty right reasonably might be this: As association having constructed a tenement building which had been destroyed by a fire with resultant loss of life of inhabitants through the absence of a fire escape had rebuilt the tenement with a fire escape. Regulations of the tenement prescribed that this fire escape should be kept free at all times from obstructions. Inhabitants in the tenement, neglectful of the wise precaution, obstruct the fire escape by using its landing stages as storage spaces, maintaing the absence of fire as a justification for their action. But it would be a criminally negligent administration of the tenement that did not, if it had the power, cause an observance of the regulation that the fire escape be unobstructed, recognizing that should a fire occur it would then to be late to remove the bars to the means of escape.

The situation in China today is such that an anti-foreign demonstration may occur at any moment. The present relations between foreigners and Chinese constitute an unstable mixture which of itself or by the introduction of some other agent may at any moment break down. And this

disintegration may take the form of an anti-foreign explosion. Hence whenever in the course of the rear guard action that the powers are now fighting it is possible for them by firmness and united action to re-establish and secure the recognition of their right to free access from Peking to the sea, the opportunity should not be missed.

13. The Divergence of Opinion Among Members of the Foreign Communities in China as to the Action Taken. It is probable that very few people, official or unofficial, have realized the gulf that has opened, widened and deepened between the opinions of members of the foreign communities in China as to what the policies of their governments should be in dealing with the increasing number of cases of violation of treaty rights that now mark foreign relations in China. As heretofore reported and referring particularly to the American community in China, it may be said that its opinions may be roughly divided into those of two groups: the missionaries and the business elements. Generally speaking the business elements support the policy of the government where the latter is intent upon the maintenance of treaty rights. On the other hand the missionaires deprecate every effort made by the government to maintain those rights where the effort invokes or threatens the use of force. Referring specifically to the missionaries, it may be said that on publication of the powers' letter of protest to the Wai Chiao Pu (par. 5, Report No. 5790) a delegation of missionaries in Peking called upon the American Minister to protest against this action. Subsequently similar protests have been learned of from missionary groups at other points in China. There is reason to believe that though they gave no local publication to their views, some if not all of these groups cabled them to the United States for publication in the American press, and that representation has been made to the State Department of the unwisdom of the course followed by the American Minister in associating himself in the combined action of the powers, with the recommendation that he be recalled. The reaction between business men and missionaires has been violent and local recrimination bitter and acrimonious to a degree (see Letter No. 5804). The entirely successful conclusion of the incident should furnish a complete answer to those elements that have attacked the Minister and his policy. I am, however, doubtful if this will be the case and consider that the harm that the missionaries have done and will continue to do by attacking the course taken, even after it has been decided and entered upon, to be profound and far-reaching. Recognizing the fact that there may come a time in our relations with China when we either shall have to relinquish all our rights or maintain them by force, and that the possibility exists that in such a juncture or at a time of anti-foreign demonstrations prompt and decisive action may have to be taken in order th avoid disaster, the necessity is apparent of a substantial unanimity of opinion at home in support of the government. This incident has not only shown that there is no such unanimity among Americans in China, but has indicated the extreme probability that a considerable section of public opinion in the United States may be won to what in lack of a better characterization, may be called the missionary point of view.

14. There is no sense in assailing this point of view in such bitter terms as that used by Mr. Rodnay Gilbert (see Letter No.5813), though in justice to him it should be said that he is only expressing the views of many other Americans. As Americans, the missionaries are quite within their rights in seeing their Minister and discussing with him matters of policy in China. It is quite a different thing that the latter, as the representative of his government, having decided upon a course of action, should be attacked by them for taking that course. I question whether it ever will be possible to reconcile the divergent views of these groups. But the increasing seriousness of the possibilities of these divergencies justifies a study of their occasion.

15. The government of the United States is committed to a course in China sufficiently explicit to require no exposition. Wholly subsidiary to this course and incidental to the maintenance of certain treaty rights, it, in common and associated with certain other powers, maintains forces in and adjacent to China. Either these forces are to be used in joint action with the associated powers, when such use is the only way by which a right is to be maintained, or they stultify themselves. Insofar as the government does use these forces for these purposes, it meets with the support of the business interests, and almost invariably with the opposition of the missionaries.

16. As a class the missionaries are idealistic and credulous. Devoting their lives to service in and for China, they become ardent champions of the Chinese in whom their ready sympathies find qualities not so apparent to others, and not so actual as hoped for. The charm of the Chinese is undeniable. Probably no other people in the world bring to social relations such infinite courtesy, tact, consideration and politeness. Their mental abilities are no less engaging. They delight in argument, and in endless discussions on abstractions have the keen pleasure that other people have in some favorite sport. So as debaters they have great skill, and can present either side of any case with astonishing wit, keenness and resource. It is thus that the missionaries see and hear them, and the result upon the missionary mind is one little short of hypnosis. I think that the most serious charge that can be brought against them is that, fired with a zeal that would carry them gladly to martyrdom, generally speaking of limited horizons and narrow education, with a devotion to the Chinese that has blinded them to any sense of obligation to their own country, they have lost all sense of proportion; and clinging with fanatic devotion to an ideal of service that grows each day more pathetically hopeless, they have become unreliable witnesses to testify on Chinese affairs.

17. They see in the ultimatum of the foreign powers a forcible intervention in Chinese affairs, and a gratuitous insult to the Chinese and nothing else. No thought occurs to them, or if it occurs is rejected, of American rights invaded by forces that after all are subversive of all the best that they hope for and think they see in China; of legitimate American business interests jeopardized and ruined; of American lives imperilled. Like other ardent converts to a cause, in protest against what they see as wrongs to China, they exceed all but the most radical Chinese. They are unconscious of the use the latter make of them and indifferent or ignorant of the fact that conservative Chinese welcome such an incident as the Taku ultimatum as a check to the vicious militarism now ruining China. It is their good fortune that their absorption in service keeps them from the heartbreaking knowledge, plain enough to others, of the slight and evanescent effect their missionary efforts have on the Chinese. To the latter the multitude of creeds and rituals, the clamors and differences of sects, in many cases the lack of dignity and balance, presented by the missionaries has repelled rather than attracted, and such slight success as they have met with has resulted in converts who will evolve and are evolving a christianity adapted to the Chinese mind and foreign to its prototype. Though I believe the foregoing a fact, I find it an infinitely melancholy one when thought is given to the effort that has been expended by men essentially honest, sincere and painstaking in a service devoted to the betterment of their fellow men.

18. I have gone into this matter at such length because I think this is a time for sober and careful thought, for an absence of prejudice and bitterness, and for a laborious consideration of all the factors that make up the problem of our relations with China. No man can understand and appriase the reports on foreign relations that come from China that does not understand the missionaries, and an accurate understanding of them must be one composed in sympathy and patience.

19. The Reply of the Wai Chiao Pu. I think the dignity and restraint of this communication worthy of careful thought. There have been intimations that only after heated debate was any reply prepared to the note of the powers. Many members of the Cabinet advocated either counter-proposals or an ignoring of the note.

20. The Possibility of Any Other Course Than the One Taken. It is on this point that opinion has sharply divided. I cannot see that it was possible for any other course to be adopted than the energetic protest and threat of further action that followed the mining of the channel, the firing on foreign vessels, removal of aids to navigation, and unauthorized boarding and searching. If these violations of treaty rights were to be submitted to, then the hour had struck for the departure of the foreigner from China or his entry into an entirely new relationship with China as a price of his continued residence there. It is by no means certain that war would have followed had the terms of the ultimatum not been complied with. Yet certainly the risk of war existed, and this risk had to be undertaken. It is illuminating in this connection to realize the number of conservative Chinese who approve the course taken by the powers.

21. What Would have Followed a Failure of the Chinese to Accede to the Demands of the Powers. Committed to a definite course, it would have been folly for the powers to have failed to carry out their threat had the Chinese been stubborn. It would have been a simple enough matter to disperse the Fengtien flotilla, or to cause it to withdraw. The Taku fort presented greater difficulties. None but light draft vessels could get close enough to bombard it with direct fire. These would have been in a difficult position for maneuvers, and themselves open to fire from shore batteries. However, it may be assumed that no great difficulty would have been encountered in reducing any resistance of the fort, nor in removing the mines stated to have been planted. Yet prior to dismissing this point it is to be noted that the naval commanders in discussing their plans evidently foresaw sufficient difficulty to cause them to contemplate the necessity of using some of the land forces of the allied garrisons. A telegram to this effect to the Legations received an answer indicating the extreme inadvisability of such a course, and disapproving it unless as a last resort to the successful consummation of their mission. The reason for this of course is obvious. General Connor expressed an opinion that, considering the length of the river from Tientsin to Taku, and the fact that both banks would have to be patrolled, the land forces were not in sufficient number to be effective.

22. Assuming, however, that force had been resorted to and the channel opened, it is reasonable to suppose that there would have followed a patrolling of the river, and the arrival at Tientsin of such allied vessels as could navigate the shallow channel and negotiate the abrupt turns. If war had not followed this action, the demonstration would have been successful and sufficient for the maintenance of treaty rights in that particular area. But there would have been a considerable reaction throughout China that would have expressed itself in much the same manner as followed the Shanghai incident of last May when there were riots and shootings in Canton, Hankow, Kiukiang and Nanking. Thus we should have found that we had obtained observance of a right at a particular point in a limited area at the price of riots in many others, all anti-foreign and all highly provocative. It is not to be thought that these possibilities were not carefully considered. What makes this incident so important, among other things, is that they were considered and that nevertheless it was recognized no other course was open than the one taken. Not only did the course of events force the issue upon the foreign powers, but unless there is a decided change, the crisis will recur. In such recurrence the foreign powers face a situation in which they may be forced to take action, which through insufficiency of numbers cannot be conclusive.

4-1

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. D.V.

AMERICAN LEGATION
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE
PEKING, CHINA.

1926 2657-9-309 APR 24

March 17, 1926.

WAR DEPARTMENT

#5804

Subject: The Taku Incident.

To: The A. C. of S., G-2.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D./ APR 23 1926

1. The great divergence of opinion among foreigners in China as to the course being taken by the foreign powers in connection with the Taku incident is indicated by the enclosed editorials.

2. The "Peking and Tientsin Times" is British and published in Tientsin. Mr. Woodhead, the Editor, is an ardent proponent of the maintenance of treaty rights. There have been occasions to believe that he has been used by the British Legation to give informal expression to its views.

3. The "Peking Leader" is American and edited by Mr. Grover Clark. Mr. Clark is inclined to carry his friendship for the Chinese beyond a reasonable point. However, in this he is expressing the views of a considerable number of American missionaries.

4. The editorials are significant of a serious condition that exists, which is that the diametrically opposite views of the present state of affairs in China held by missionaries and certain others on the one hand, and generally by American government officials and business men on the other, result in confusion and doubt at home among those who rely for their opinion on reports from China. I think the seriousness of this condition emphasized when it is realized that not only is the first group highly articulate and possessed of a meretriciously sentimental value, but also their views, opinions and recommendations are given wide currency.

5. It is not unreasonable to suppose that a result of this condition may well be that should an occasion, even an emergency, arise requiring prompt and decisive action, an ill-informed or misinformed American public opinion may halt such action.

J. H. Barnard,
Lieut. Colonel, F. A.,
Military Attache.

2 encls.
elh

1 sheet sent F E Commerce for return

CHIEF OF STAFF
INTEL
26 S7-9-309
APR 24
From the
WAR DEPARTMENT
THE PEKING
LEADER

Leader

[illegible] important [illegible] to take [illegible] account the [illegible] than [illegible] the [illegible] of any [illegible] that may be involved. The [illegible] points therefore should be kept in mind by everyone concerned.

[illegible] the small war now in progress in north China, the Kuomintang, as a necessary means of self-preservation, had to take steps to prevent the Fengtien warships and transports from entering the river at Taku and thus getting into a position to attack Tientsin.

2) Reasonably promptly after these steps were taken, arrangements were made whereby ships engaged in ordinary peaceful trade were enabled to enter the Tientsin port, with only a relatively small amount of inconvenience in the way of giving identification and other evidence that aid was not being furnished to the Fengtien attackers.

3) Since ships engaged in peaceful trade have been and are passing in and out of Tientsin under these arrangements, it can no longer be claimed that passage to the sea is closed, even though there was about a day when ships were held up and even though the need for defence against Fengtien attack leads the Kuominchun to continue to keep a watchful eye on ships that seek to enter the harbor.

4) If the Kuomintang take steps to force the Kuominchun to withdraw even the present precautions as to ships entering Tientsin without at the same time acting to remove the cause of these precautions—i.e. to remove the threat of Fengtien attack on Tientsin—they will be definitely taking sides in the present conflict in China.

5) The purpose of including in the Boxer Protocol a provision that communications with the sea should be kept open was to prevent the recurrence of such a situation as developed in 1900, when the foreigners in Peking were bottled up by definite anti-foreign military activities. There is in the present situation no indication that any such attack on foreigners is planned. If the Chinese Government or any formidable part of the Chinese people were definitely planning to use armed forced against the foreigners in Peking, the question of using foreign armed force to insure free communications with the sea might perhaps legitimately be raised—and in such circumstances the question would be raised whether there were a Boxer Protocol or not. In the absence of any such anti-foreign military plans, however, it is quite out of keeping with any real understanding of the situation in China or any real desire to see Sino-foreign relations on a friendly basis seriously to talk about forcible foreign intervention just because for a few days—or even for a few weeks—foreigners living in Peking or Tientsin, along with the Chinese in the same places, are put to some inconvenience in getting mails and in trading or moving from place to place. The existence of the provision in the Boxer Protocol might perhaps be construed as justifying foreign armed action to keep communications open with the sea if foreign lives were definitely in danger of armed Chinese attack. Any use of foreign armed force in the situation as it actually exists would be a twisting of the letter of the Boxer Protocol out of all connection with its spirit and with the purpose intended.

6) It should be borne in mind by the Chinese that it is of vital importance to China that both the Kuominchun and the Fengtien authorities use every possible means to avoid misunderstandings or positive actions which will complicate the situation at Tientsin. And it is particularly the duty of the Kuominchun authorities, as long as precautionary measures are kept in force, to see to it that the men actually in command at Taku are furnished with all the necessary information about ships that may be about to enter Tientsin, and that in this and every other way the precautions taken should cause the least possible interference with or inconvenience to peaceful shipping. This has not always been done hitherto. It is, correspondingly, the duty of the Fengtien authorities to do their part in clearing up the situation by removing the warships and transports from the neighborhood of Tientsin.

Note: The Diplomatic Corps' latest note has come in since the above was written, but the Editor sees no reason for changing the views expressed because of that note.

4
Y-1
2657-9-309
4
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CHINA (Economic)

Subject: Chinese Interference with Shipping between Tientsin and Tangku.

(See Report #5772) 2657-9-309(3) + letter

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. APR 13 1926

1. In connection with the development of the present war, Li Ching-lin dispatched an expedition from Tsingtao consisting of the naval transport Hwaichia and two merchant transports with about 5,000 troops, as well as the war vessels Haichi, Haishen, Chuyu and the Yung Shiang. A further force of about 5,000 is reported to have left Tsingtao on March 1st for same point by way of Weihsien and Chefoo due to insufficient transport by sea.

2. Two cruisers and three transports of the above number arrived at Taku Bar on March 4th, and on March 7th began disembarking troops at Peitang, eight miles north of Tangku, where they cut the railway. The disembarkation was covered by fire from cruisers on the South forts at Tangku. Heavy firing took place in this area on March 9th and the National Army refused to allow shipping in or out of the river day or night, and informed the Taku pilots that ten mines were being laid across the channel. It is also reliably reported that all bar range and signal lights have been extinguished.

3. As the Peking-Hankow Railway is out of operation and rail travel beyond Tientsin cut off, this action has resulted in completely cutting off Peking and Tientsin from other than telegraphic communication with the outside world.

4. Although actually no greater violation of the provisions of the Protocol of 1901 as to communication between the capital and the sea than has occurred in the immediate past when rail communication between Peking and Tientsin was closed and an international train denied passage, this action in closing the Hai Ho presents better opportunities for the action of the foreign powers, without their being thereby subjected to the charge of favoring one side or the other of the civil war. Thus foreign vessels have been boarded and searched; others have been fired upon; aids to navigation have been removed or rendered inoperative; and finally, ten mines are said to have been laid across a 500-ft. channel. The fact that they are reported as controlled gives no assurance to foreign shipping.

5. But a more compelling reason for the action of foreign powers is to be found in the fact that while the interruption of rail communication has found them numerically too weak to assert and maintain their treaty right, interruption of water communication finds them with a naval force immediately available that vastly preponderates that of the Chinese. Accordingly on the 10th a meeting was had of the twelve interested powers and as a result a communication was addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs demanding immediate removal of the mines and other obstructions to shipping in the river or else the powers might "collaborate for the protection of foreign shipping and for the maintenance of free access to the port of Tientsin. Similar representation has been made to the commanding officers of the opposing forces responsible for the situation. There are at present no results from this action by the Diplomatic Body.

From M/A, China Report No. 5790 March 11, 1926.

CHINA (Economic)

Subject: Chinese Interference with Shipping between Tientsin and Tangku.

6. A naval demonstration will probably ensue if the demands of the powers are not met. It is to be expected that this will bring about the desired result, and possibly with no unfavorable reaction. On the other hand it is quite possible that the National Army forces will refuse to remove the mines unless the powers require the Fengtien ships and forces to withdraw. Possibilities of trouble certainly exist in this direction. Another occasion for anxiety is to be found in the possibility of a refusal by the Chinese to take any measures to remedy the situation. In such case it would not seem reasonable for foreign naval vessels to take action against the Chinese war ships, which of course have neither laid the mines nor interfered with aids to navigation. They might take action against the forts from which the National Army has been operating, but these are only of mud with easily removed materiel. It is not apparent that they could do much else. Only light draft ships of inconsiderable length can get to Tientsin (destroyers cannot negotiate the short turns) and once there it would seem that activities would be confined to a demonstration of such naval strength as could be assembled.

7. If actually planted, the use of these mines marks a further advance in Chinese warfare and a degree of forethought in the preparation for the defense of Tientsin that is unexpected.

8. The fact that the Japanese and the British, the powers most affected, met the situation by overtures through their consuls in Tientsin and that these overtures were designed to bring about permission for their ships to pass through the scene of fighting and the mine field, rather than the complete action contemplated by the later Diplomatic Body note, is worthy of note. It seems to me they may have suspected that the powers are being maneuvered into a position where they will have to protest.

J. B. Brownell

Distribution:
4 MID
1 CGUSAFC
1 File

OFFICE OF ...
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
1928 2657-D-31
CS

Peking, November 3, 1925.

No. 239

Who's Who China

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose, for the Department's information, a memorandum prepared by the Chinese Secretary reviewing the present situation of the Peking Government and containing information relative to Chinese who, at the present time, hold important military and political positions.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

J. V. A. MacMURRAY.

Enclosure:

1. Memorandum October 29, 1925.

Copy to Tokyo.

MB/MBL

OFFICE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY
2657-9-312
WAR DEPARTMENT

MEMORANDUM.

(WSP) Peking, October 29,1925.

SUBJECT: Present Prospects of the Peking Government.

Owing to the convening of the Customs Conference the Peking Government has come into a position of greater prominence than it has latterly enjoyed. The present moment appears to be one of impending change. How widespread the coming war will be, and even whether a war is actually going to take place, must be considered still in doubt. Consequently the statements made in this Memorandum are tentative. They are the result of a consideration of circumstances as they exist at the moment of writing.

The Provisional Government came into existence in November, 1924. Tuan, the Chief Executive, was installed in office by Chang Tso-lin and Feng Yu-hsiang. In the Provinces the Tuan regime has never acquired much prestige; of actual power it has never acquired any. The Government at Canton has never recognized the Tuan Government as the Government of China, although the Peking Government does appoint officials in certain districts of the eastern part of Kwangtung Province. Yunnan Province likewise has never recognized the Peking Government. In fact the present Governor of Yunnan, General T'ang Chi-yao, has never received any appointment to his post since

he

he seized it by military force two or more years ago. Appointments to military and civil governorships have been made by Tuan either under instructions from Chang Tso-lin or Feng Yu-hsiang, or simply to confirm political and military ascendency gained in any particular Province through unauthorized warfare by the appointee. Examples are -

Liu Hsiang, appointed Military Governor of Szechuan on May 16, 1925, after he had forcibly ejected General Yang Sen appointed by ex-President Ts'ao Kun.

General Sun Yao, appointed on August 29, 1925, by Tuan, Military Governor of Shensi after he had ejected Liu Chen-hua appointed by ex-President Ts'ao Kun.

General Yang Yu-t'ing, appointed Military Governor of Kiangsu on August 29, 1925, at the behest of Chang Tso-lin whose Chief of Staff Yang was. Yang's predecessor, Lu Yung-hsiang, was a member of Tuan's party, the Anfu Party, and had seized possession of Kiangsu Province through the use of troops belonging to Chang Tso-lin and some of his own. Tuan was naturally unwilling to depose his own nominee in favor of Chang Tso-lin's, but was powerless to oppose the command from Mukden. Yang's eviction from Nanking about October 16th by Sun Ch'uan-fang, the Chihli Party Governor of the neighboring Province of Chekiang, was the beginning of the present war, if it may yet be called such.

Yuch

Yuah Wei-shun appointed Military Governor of Honan on April 24, 1925. This appointment was partly at the behest of Feng Yu-hsiang and partly a recognition of the fact that Yuah was the foremost military figure in the Province. He has never secured complete control of the troops in the Province. It is said that there are still some thirty thousand (30,000) Chihli Party troops who would accompany Wu P'ei-fu on an expedition against Chang Tso-lin if Wu should go through Honan Province for the purpose and that whether Yuah joins in this expedition or not he will be very glad to have these independent troops leave Honan Province for some other graazing ground, the Province being quite unable to support the number of troops located therein. It is said there are about two hundred and fifty thousand (250,000) troops in this Province although not all of them are armed.

Chang Tsung-ch'ang appointed Military Governor of Shantung on April 24, 1925. This man is known by the Chinese as an out and out bandit and is a picturesque figure. To give him the post Tuan was obliged to remove a man of his own Party, General Cheng Shih-ch'i.

Li Ching-lin, appointed Military Governor of Chihli on January 17, 1925. This man was one of Chang Tso-lin's victorious Generals in the campaign of 1924, and installed himself in office with subsequent ratification by Tuan. The man he displaced, Wang Ch'eng-pin, although originally a member of the Chihli Party had capitulated to Feng Yu-hsiang and the latter would have liked to keep him in place but was obliged to yield to Chang Tso-lin.

Hsiao

1. Hsiao Yao-nan, Military Governor of Hupeh, is a hold-over from before Tuan's time. He has been enabled to retain his office by several factors, e.g. he would not leave unless he were forcibly expelled and as he has a considerable military force of his own this would not be easy.

2. Tuan has never wished to obliterate completely the power of the Chihli Party, since it is a useful offset to the power of the present great rivals, Chang Tso-lin and Feng Yu-hsiang. Hsiao has now come out definitely in support of Wu P'ei-fu in the latter's effort to throw Chang Tso-lin back outside the Wall. Hsiao's future probably depends upon the success of Wu P'ei-fu's venture and the ultimate decision, still in doubt, as to the part Feng Yu-hsiang and his immediate henchmen, Yueh in Honan and Sun Yao in Shensi, take in the struggle.

Fang Pen-jen, appointed Military Governor in Kiangsi on December 12, 1924, after he had expelled by force Ts'ai Ch'eng-hsun. Both belong to the Chihli Party. Fang has thrown in his lot with the Wu P'ei-fu venture and has already sent troops to Anhui Province and has ejected Chiang Teng-hsian appointed Military Governor of the Province by Tuan under orders from Chang Tso-lin on August 29, 1925. This Province is Tuan's own Province and he has made a futile effort to keep it for himself. Before Chiang's appointment he had appointed Cheng Shih-ch'i, a member of his own Party (the Anfu Party), and

he

he wished to appoint Wu Ping-hsiang, a man of his own Party who is now Civil Governor, also Military Governor, but had to yield the Province to Chang Tso-lin.

Feng Yü-hsiang, appointed Military Governor of Kansu on August 29, 1925, replacing Lu Hung-t'ao, who had long held the Province because no powerful political leader had wanted it sufficiently to effect its conquest. To this day the extreme western Province of Hsin-chiang has not become the spoils of politics for the same reason, although it is said that the Soviet forces are active there, with a view to creating an independent state, presumably in friendly alliance with Feng. Feng has not yet proceeded to his new Province and it seems doubtful whether he will be able to govern it effectively when he does, as the Mohammedan element is very strong.

Chang Tso-lin at the timehe installed Tuan in power as the Chief Executive of the Provisional Government was without appointment or recognition from the Central Government as being in control of Manchuria. After he had installed Tuan the latter naturally gave him an appointment, i.e. as Director-General of Northeastern Frontier Colonization, with control of the military forces in Manchuria. This was done on January 7, 1925.

Coming to the Peking Cabinet itself we find substantially the same persons in office as were originally appointed by Tuan in November, 1924. The Anfu Party which, as has been said, is Tuan's own Party, holds the following

important

important portfolios: Interior, Finance and War. Chang Tso-lin has his men in Agriculture and Communications. The Kuomintang has the rather unimportant portfolios of Navy and of Justice.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs is a professional diplomat without party affiliations who was appointed on February 21, 1925, after Tuan had waited vainly for Tung Shao-yi to accept the post.

The Minister of Education is a member of the Yen-Chia-Hsi Party, which is an aggregation of men of considerable influence who are now out of power and it was thought that his appointment would be pleasing to T'ang Chi-yao, the Military Governor of Yunnan, and thus help to bring him into cordial relations with the Peking Government.

It is reported on apparently good authority that in the negotiations now going on between Chang Tso-lin and Feng Yu-hsiang to determine whether they shall or shall not fight Feng demands that the following Cabinet positions be filled by his own appointees, they now being held by appointees of Tuan or Chang Tso-lin: Communications, Agriculture and Commerce, Finance. He is willing, however, to take Foreign Affairs instead of Finance, in which case he would appoint C.T. Wang.

Hitherto Feng Yu-hsiang has been contented to fill the offices outside of the Cabinet controlling revenue. For instance, after he had ousted ex-President Ts'ao Kun on October 23, 1924, he immediately appointed his own lieutenants to such posts as Governor of Peking, Head of the Peking Octroi, Director of the Peking-Suiyuan Railway, and Director of the Peking-Hankow Railway.

It

It is believed that this bare account of the situation will show the nature of the Government of China, which now demands restitution to it of the sovereign powers filched from it by the Treaties. With almost negligible exceptions none of the men who have been named in this Memorandum are popular leaders in the sense that they command loyalty or would be retained in office if the people could eject them. The possible exceptions are Wu P'ei-fu, Feng Yu-hsiang and C. T. Wang, the latter being one of China's Plenipotentiary Delegates in the Conference. The following is probably a correct appraisal of the popular estimate of these three men:

> Wu P'ei-fu is honest, patriotic, but unpractical; Feng is patriotic but ambitious and a harsh tax gatherer; C. T. Wang is courageous, patriotic but an opportunist and has at times been known as subservient to Chang Tso-lin. He enjoys, perhaps, a higher reputation among the nationalistic youth of China than he does in his own Party, the Kuomintang.

If the average Chinese with any knowledge of foreign relations were to be asked whether he was satisfied with the present National and Provincial Governments of China he would undoubtedly say "No". He would probably say that after China had rid herself of foreign oppression she will turn her attention to the wrongs she is suffering internally and will clear out the gang of militarists and politicians that now exploit the country. The latter are skilful in using the present nationalist waive of

emotion

emotion for their own benefit. Opposition to the foreign Powers is easier and safer for the average Chinese than opposition to his own rulers. His feelings are probably mixed. Perhaps unthinkingly he feels that he is the victim of oppression but he sees no reason why foreigners resident in China should be exempt from that oppression. He does not wish greater power given to the militarists but he resents the position of apparent superiority occupied by foreigners.

The Foreign Powers give their attention to facts, the Chinese to theories. In such matters as China's tariff autonomy and the abolition of extraterritoriality the proper course for Foreign Powers to pursue seems to be to remove a stigma of inferiority under which the Chinese people believe themselves to lie racially and at the same time to conserve as far as possible the actual conditions necessary for the protection of foreign commerce, the payment of obligations due to foreigners and the maintenance of conditions under which foreigners can safely reside in China.

WRP/GL

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
2657-9-37
2650
Foreign Relations
WAR DEPARTMENT

4-1

G-2 Report

CONFIDENTIAL

CHINA (Political)

Subject: The Chinese Legal System;
The Chinese Government and
The Commission on Extraterritoriality.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. JUL 15 1926

1. This report is written after interviews with American representatives on the Extraterritoriality Commission. It indicates certain general conclusions that more or less definitely have been reached and I think may be taken as a fairly accurate forecast of the final recommendations and decisions of the Commission. It is requested that until the final report of the Commission is made public the contents of this report be treated as entirely confidential.

2. The Chinese Legal System - The Chinese Government. A condition precedent to the enactment of laws and the administration of justice is a stable government. Before proceeding to a discussion of the legal system the following remarks about the Chinese government are pertinent.

3. The Chinese Republic has been in existence about 14 years, during which time there have been 8 presidents or chief executives. The average term of office for each president, excluding the four months' interregnum during which there was an attempt to restore the Manchu Dynasty, is about 16 months.

4. The First - or Provisional Constitution adopted on March 11, 1912, indicates that the founders of the new government had in contemplation a republic with a constitution outlining the form of government and prescribing the rights and duties of the people. A parliament was to be duly elected by the people which, among other powers, was charged with the enactment and rescission of laws. There was to be a judiciary to administer justice free from all outside interference. A president, vice president, and a cabinet were to carry on the administrative departments of the government.

5. Since the Provisional Constitution there have been two other constitutions, the so-called Yuan Shih Kai Constitutional Pact, promulgated on May 1, 1914, and the Permanent Constitution promulgated on October 10, 1923.

6. There is now no constitution in China. The so-called Tsao Kun Constitution of 1923 has been declared not valid because, as one distinguished Chinese jurist has said, "So goes the popular notion, a divorced wife cannot give birth to a legitimate child".

7. Since the establishment of the Republic there have been 41 cabinets with an average term of four months and five days each. During the same period there have been 24 Ministers of Justice with an average term of seven months and three days. During the same period there have been 9 parliaments, or so-called Representative Bodies, in session but none of them has ever enacted any laws other than preliminary organization and election laws.

8. These frequent changes in government were not made in an orderly way pursuant to a constitutional provision. For the most part they have been the result of civil wars between opposing military cliques who during their respective periods of ascendency have exercised absolute control

CHINA (Political)

Subject: The Chinese Legal System;
The Chinese Government and
The Commission on Extraterriteriality.

in the areas dominated by them. These civil wars began shortly after the death of Yuan Shih Kai in June, 1916, and have been continuing with ever increasing frequency and seriousness up to the present day.

9. At this date (April 23, 1926) there is no Central Government for China and the capital city is now occupied by the military forces of Chang Tso-lin and Wu Pei-fu. The last Chief Executive, Tuan Chi-jui, fled to the Japanese concession in Tientsin on April 19th. Two of his predecessors, Li Yuan-hung and Hsu Hsi-chang, went in a similar manner, while his immediate predecessor, Tsao Kun, was arrested and confined in Peking from December, 1924, to April, 1926. These flights of the Chief Executives also have been accompanied by wholesale flights of prominent government officials, either to the Legation Quarter in Peking or to foreign settlements and concessions in Tientsin and Shanghai. Every governmental function of China is absolutely dominated and controlled by the militarists. The appointment of every official including the judges of the courts is made at the dictation of the dominant war Lord.

10. In addition to the control of parts of China by warring military leaders who nominally recognize the Central Government at Peking, there has existed in Canton since 1917 the so-called Independent Government which now styles itself the Chinese Nationalist Government and which disclaims any relation to the government of Peking as an integral part of the Chinese Republic. This government controls the provinces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi and has affiliations with the leaders in a number of other provinces. This Canton Government has notified the members of the Commission on Extraterriteriality that they would not be welcome at Canton or at any other place under its control, nor would they be received officially.

11. As a result of the continuing civil wars, the financial situation in China is desperate. The military have assumed charge of the collection of all sources of revenue except the Maritime Customs and except the salt revenues in certain small areas. Therefore, the resources of China are being continuously drained for useless wars; the normal expenses of the government, including the salaries of civil and judicial officers, remain unpaid; and the government's secured and unsecured debts mount higher and higher each day.

12. Substantially all of the railroads in China have been seized by the military and are now controlled and operated by them. The revenues of the railways are appropriated by the military to the exclusion of the payments not only of interest upon railway bonds but also to the payment of the railway employees who are operating the railroads.

13. <u>The Commission on Extraterriteriality</u>. Since the first meeting of the Extraterritorial Commission on January 12, 1926, and for some time prior thereto, there have been continuous wars in Northern China and sporadic struggles in other parts of China. For four weeks continuously there was no train service between Peking and Tientsin. An attempt was made to wreck the train on which the American and Netherlands Commissioners, together with their families, were traveling from Shanghai to Peking en route to the meeting of the Commission.

CHINA (Political)

Subject: The Chinese Legal System;
The Chinese Government and
The Commission on Extraterritoriality.

14. The Commission on Extraterritoriality was scheduled to meet in Peking on December 18, 1925. At that time there was no train service between Tientsin and Peking so that it was impossible for several of the commissioners of the foreign powers to travel from Tientsin to Peking, thereby necessitating the postponement of the first meeting of the C ommission to January 12, 1926. This interruption was caused by the war then being waged between the forces of Li Ching-lin and those of the National Army on the right of way of the railroad connecting Tientsin with Peking.

15. The members of the Commission had expressed a desire to travel to other parts of China to investigate the administration of justice. Because of military activities the Chinese government has been unable to furnish railroad transportation to the members of the Commission desiring to visit Kalgan, Paotingfu, Taiyuanfu and other points.

16. Respecting conditions in China, the following are undeniable facts:

1) The total absence of any Central Government.

2) Complete and arbitrary control of every department of governmental activity by the militarists who are constantly warring among themselves.

3) The absence of laws enacted by constituted authority subject to repeal only by that authority. China assumes to be a republic yet there is no Constitution in China. She has no laws which were passed or authorized as the provisional constitution of 1912 provided.

4) The absence of competent trained judges free from all outside influence, political or military. No provision for the payment of judges.

5) Chaotic conditions financially, with all revenues confiscated by militarists. No regard for financial obligations.

17. With these undeniable facts the demand of the Chinese for the immediate abolition by the Powers having extraterritorial treaties of their rights under those treaties is little short of absurd.

18. The Powers may be willing:

1) To make applicable to their nationals in China and cause to be administered by their several consuls, such of the Chinese codes and laws as have been approved by the Extraterritorial Commission, and which laws, speaking generally, are well prepared.

2) That prisoners be confined in model prisons such as the prison in Peking.

3) That the extraterritorial powers refuse protection to persons of Chinese race who by reason of birth or naturalization are citizens or subjects of such powers, and who return to China to live, unless such persons, after a short residence in China, have obtained a denaturalization certificate in accordance with the Chinese laws of nationality.

4) To abandon the practice of granting asylum to political or other Chinese offenders, in foreign concessions or settlements.

CHINA (Political)

Subject: The Chinese Legal System;
The Chinese Government and
The Commission on Extraterritoriality.

5) To abandon all extraterritorial practices which have no basis in treaty.

6) To permit any person so desiring to waive his extraterritorial rights, civil and criminal, and submit himself to the Chinese courts.

19. The Powers may recommend:

That during the period the aforesaid conditions obtain, Chinese undertake to remove the defects enumerated under the head of "undeniable facts" (paragraph 16).

That China, during the period of the conditions aforesaid, undertake to establish a system of special sections of district courts.

That China agree to extend the special system of courts to all foreigners in China.

That China secure, at an early date, the services of foreign counsellors to train Chinese judges.

That China establish a National Law School for the purpose of training judges for judicial service.

20. It is possible that a statement may be made that when China has put into effect the recommendations last aforesaid, then the Powers having extraterritorial treaties will surrender them.

Distribution:
4 MID
1 CGUSAFC
1 File
1 Japan

American Embassy
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE,
TOKYO, JAPAN.

3-1

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

2657-9-313

WAR DEPARTMENT

No.2334. July 10, 1926.

Subject: Outer Mongolia.

To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D.C.

RECEIVED G, 2 W.D. JUL 28 1926

1. There is enclosed herewith, as being of possible interest, to the A.C.of S., G-2, a translation of an article on Mongolia emanating from the Japanese Foreign Office and published in the "International Review."

c/c to MA/Peking.

C. Burnett
Lieut. Colonel, Cavalry,
Military Attache.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
2 1
1926 2657-9-345
JUL 29
WAR DEPARTMENT

Outer Mongolia.

Tokyo, Kokusai Jiho(Int'l Review)
Published by the Japanese Foreign
Office, June 25, 1926.

Internal Conditions in Mongolia.

No definite lines can be drawn to mark the boundaries of Mongolia. Some say that Mongolia comprises all the districts where the Mongolians reside. If so, Mongolia may be said to comprise three Southwestern Districts of China, namely, Hsinchiang, Chinghai and Kansu, as well as Russian Siberia and Outer and Inner Mongolia. But such a definition is absurd. In the present article, matters relatingto Outer and Inner Mongolia and Hulunpeir, lying between the Great Wall of China and Siberia, are dealt with, because the Mongolians are mostly residing in those regions. In Kobde and Tannuulianhai Districts, which constitute part of the socalled Outer Mongdia, not only Mongolians but other tribes are residing at the present time. From the view point of geography, history, economy and civilisation, it is deemed proper to treat the above two districts in conjunction with Outer Mongdia and not to separate Outer Mongolia from the two districts. Though Hulunpeir is geographically connected with Outer Mongolia and may thus be treated in the same light as Kobde and Tannuulianhai, yet Hulunpeir constitutes part of the Amur Province (China) in so far as the local administration is concerned. It is, therefore, just as proper to regard Hulunpeir as a "special Mongolian district" outside the sphere of Outer and Inner Mongolia. The word "Mongolia" in the present article means Inner and Outer Mongolia (including Kobde and Tannuulianhai) as well as the Hulunpeir district. Mongolia has a population of some 2,000,000 souls, of which 1,400,000 are in Inner Mongolia and 600,000 in Outer Mongolia.

Self-Government System in Mongolia.

In Mongolia there is a sort of self-Government system which has been in practice since the days of the old Chinese Imperial regime. "Banner" ( ) constitutes one of the units of political organization in Mongolia and is a territory belonging to "chasak", namely, Noblemen of Mongolia. "Chasak" enjoys an automomy to a certain extent in the abive territory. Many "banners" form a union ( ) which has its own ruler. The ruler may convene regular conferences of "chasak" under his jrusidiction in order to discuss and settle important affairs between "unions" and "banners." He is also authorized to exerdise his functions so as to maintain relations with the Central Government of China and the latter's local officers.

In Inner Mongolia there are six unions and 49 banners, while Outer Mongolia has four unions and 86 banners. The systems of unions

and banners are also in force in Kobde, Tannuulianhai and Hulunpeir. In Inner and Outer Mongolia these systems are being executed in a most typical manner.

Inner Mongolia.
Chinese

In the days of the old Imperial Dynasty, the Mongolians were granted an autonomy as above stated, and the Manchu (people of Manchuria) were prohibited frommentering into Mongolia for agricultural enterprises, thereby protecting the Mongolians against the influx of aliens. Later, howevern the Manchu emigrated to Mongolia, especially Inner Mongolia, in large numbers, disregarding the above prohibition measure. In the latter days of the Chinese Imperial regime, the Peking Government remained passive as to emigration of the Manchu to Mongolia and in some cases the emigration was encouraged. As a result of the emigration in large numbers of the Manchu in these districts of Inner Mongolia, which lie with close proximity of China Proper and Manchuria, the system of Central, State and Provincial administration was inaugurated in the above districts of Inner Mongolia just as is the case with the administration in China Proper. At the present time those districts in Inner Mongolia which lie within close proximity to Manchuria, are included inthe three Eastern Provinces, while other districts are attached to three special regions of Jeho, Chahar and Suiyan. There are indicationsx that in recent years the autonomy of the Mongolians in the above districts has become a matter of more formality.

The Establishment of a People's Revolutionary Government in Outer Mongolia.

The Old Chinese Imperial Dysnasty had its ci vil administrators stationed at Kulun, Uliasutai, and Kobdo in Outer Mongolia for the purpose of administering the four "unions" of XXXXXX Chechehan, Tuhsiehtuham, Chasaketuhan and Saiyinneyenham in Outer Mongolia Proper as well as Kobdo and Tannuukianhai. The administration was so indulgent that they did not interfere with the local autonomy of the Mongolians. Towards the close of the Chinese Imperial regime, statesmen of China, influenced by the current ideas of expanding the national power and encouraging productive enterprises at the time, had taken a policy so as to encourage the emigration of the Manchu to Mongolia with the object of checking the expansion of Russias influence from Siberia to Outer Mongolia. Further, the Chinese statesmen sent to Kulun an influential Chinese named San-To to adopt a policy of interference. This has enraged the Mongolians so much that noblemen and lama priests of Outer Mongolia with the Living Buddha as centers of operation, have started an anti-Chinese movement. Availing themselves of the Chinese revolution of October, 1911, the Mongolians, with the backingof Russia, precipitated a coup d'etat on November 30, 1911, when Mongolia declared its independence with the Living Buddha as center of new administration. Uliasutai followed suit and declared its independence in December, 1911, and Kobdo in August, 1912.

As a result of negotiations held between Russia, China and Mongolia at Kiakhta from September, 1914 to June, 1915, the socalled Kiakhta Treaty was signed between Russia, China and Mongolia. The Treaty stipulates, among other things, that Outer Mongolia is practically a part of China's territory, that China has a suzerainty over Outer Mongolia, and that Outer Mongolia enjoys an autonomy and may conclude international treaties with other countries regarding commerce and industry. By virtue of the Treaty, China has despatched her executive officials to Kulun and other important places in Outer Mongolia. The Russian Revolution of 1917 has afforded China an excellent opportunity to recover her influence in Outer Mongolia to a great extent. In November, 1919, the autonomy of Outer Mongolia was annulled by order of the Peking Government. In December, 1919, the Peking Government sent Mr. Hsu Shu-tseng to Kulun as an Inspector-General of Northwestern China to adopt a high handed policy. As a result of the Anhui-Chihli war of July, 1920, in North China, Hsu Shu-tseng lost his official position. However, the Chinese influence in Outer Mangolia was maintained by Mr, Chen Yi for some time. The Living Buddha and his followers, with the backing of General Wengel and other remnants of the White Army, expelled the local Chinese administrative officials from Outer Mongolia and declared their independence for the second time. The Wangel Army then drove the Chinese authorities from Uliasutai and Kobdo. Having cleared away all the Chinese elements in Outer Mongolia, the Wengel Army soon assumed a tyrannical attitude towards the Mongolians in general. The young Mongolians in Outer Mongolia, who were displeased with the Wengel Army, assembled in the Baikal region where they, with the backing of the Soviet Government, organized a political party called the Mongolian Nationalists. In the name of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Government, the Mongolian Nationalists assumed a hostile attitude toward the Kulun Government which was then under the sway of the Wengel Army. On July 6, 1921, the Mongolian Nationalists, with the backing of the Red Army, entered Kulun and established a Mongolian People's Revolutionary Government with M. Bode (leader of the Nationalists) as the Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Political Conditions in Outer Mongolia under the new Government.

M. Bode, leader of the Nationalists, and the Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs, is a native of Shappi, a district under the jurisdiction of the Living Buddha's Administrative Office and was later sent to Russia for the prosecution of his studies in appreciation of his services in giving Russians in Kulun the lessons in Mongolian literature. After his return home from Russia, Bode entered the Russian Consulate at Kulun as an assistant official.

M. Danzan, Minister of Finance, was a printer belonging to the Department of Foreign Affairs at the People's Government, and is a leading memberof the Nationalists.

M.Suhebatoul (?), Minister of War,was in the service of the Mongolian Army and later joined the Nationalists.

Other Ministers of State are all commoners, but the offices of Vice-ministers are given to noblemen. Though the Living Buddha is regarded as the center of the Mongolian Administration, yet he has nothing to do with administrative affairs, his principal function being to discharge his duties as the leadee of religious matters.

The Revolutionary Government of Outer Mongolia has a Provisional National Assembly as a legislative organ and a Cabinet comprising five Departments of State, namely, the Army, Justice, Foreign Affairs, Homes Affairs and Finance, as administrative organs. Besides there is an independent administrative body called the Mongolian Nationalists Central Commission which exercises its authority independently of the Government offices. The administration is being conducted in accordance with the popular wish, and in various districts the authority and power of noblemen are transferred to the people through the medium of automomy in local elections. The Revolutionary Government is doing all in its power to enhance the knowledge of the Mongolians by inaugurating schools, newspaper offices and other branchesof science. In the Springof 1922, a number of the Mongolians were arrested at Kulun charged with intrigue against the Revolutionary Government and several of them were executed. The Revolutionary Government, influenced by the Soviet Administration, has gone so far as to adopt a radical policy in its administration and the result was that an anti-govennment movement was started by noblemen andother classes who have often asked the Peking Government and Marshal Chang Tso-lin of Mukden to,help them in their movement against the Revolutionary Government. The Peking Government was, however, too busy in adjusting its internal affairs to go to the rescue of the anti-Revolutionary Government elements in Outer Mongolia.

Since the Summer of 1922 the Revolutionary Government has changed its attitude and adopted a moderate policy in its administration. In the autumn of 1922, Bode resigned office as the Premier and was succeeded by Chahanchia Futokto (?), a priest of high rank in Outer Mongolia. In this connection, M. Bukkevitch (?), Russian Advisor to the Mongolian Goverhment, was recalled home in accordance with a request of the Mongolian Government andhis office was later taken up by M. Ribalsky (?) from Moscow. With the progress of the times, the foundations of the Revolutionary Government became strong and the friendly relations between Mongolia and Russia enhanced.

The Conclusion of a Russo-China Treaty.

On May 31, 1924, a Fundamental Russo-Chinese Treaty was signed at Peking. Article 5 of the Treaty provides that Russia shall recognize that Outer Mongolia is one of the regions comprising China and

and that Russia shall respect China's suzerainty in Outer Mongolia. It is further provided that the matter relating to the withdrawal of Russian red army from Outer Mongolia shall be discussed at a Russo-Chinese conference which shall be held within a month after the signing of the present Fundamental Treaty in order to settle minor points pending between the two countries and that Russia shall withdraw her red army as soon as an agreement regarding the withdrawal is concluded.

No such conference as is stipulated in Article 5 has yet been held between Russia and China. During the Russo-Chinese parleys at Peking for the conclusion of the above fundamental Treaty, M. Danzan (a leading member of the Mongolian Nationalists) proceeded to Peking and asked for permission to participate at the parleys, but this request was rejected. While in Peking Danzan declared that so long as China is under the control of militarists who are advocates of Militarism, Outer Mongdia would not entertain any idea of establishing close relations with China, that China has no right to exercise her authority in Outer Mongolia, and that Outer Mongolia would not allow China to implant the latter's influence. This reveals that Outer Mongolia is decidedly antagonistic to China.

On May 20, 1924, the Living Buddha died at Kuluh. He was born in Tibet in 1870 and when he was five years old he was made the Living Buddha, the Eighth, at Kulun. On November 30, 1911, when Mongolia declared its independence, the Living Buddha was elevated to the position of a King. Upon the conclusion of the Russo-Chinese Mongolia Treaty in June, 1915, Outer Mongolia was placed under China's suzerainty, and in November, 1919, the autonomy of Outer Mongolia was cancelled. In February, 1921, Outer Mongolia declared its independence again with the Living Buddha as center of the new administration. Even after the establishment of the People's Revolutionary Government in June, 1921, the Living Buddha remained in office as the King. With the death of the Living Buddha as stated above, a Constitution of Outer Mongolia, which was approved by the National Assembly in the Autumn of 1921 was promulgated, declaring that Outer Mongolia is a Republic and would be governed by popular wish, the office of Living Buddha being abolished.

National Assembly and Constitution of Outer Mongolia.

After the death of the Living Buddha, Chelintorchi (Minister of Foreign Affairs) was appointed Prime Minister. The new National Assembly held its first sitting at Kulun in the Autumn of 1924. It is composed of the Communists, 47 in number; the Trader's Union of the Communists, 14 in number; the Revolutionists, 4 in number; and the independents, 13 in number.

~~Soviet Russia's Republican Administration, Outer Mongolia has adopted~~

Under the Republican Administration, Outer Mongolia has adopted Soviet Russia's systems in every respect. The following are the principal points provided for in the Mongolian Constitution:

No ~~All~~ individuals shall own lands, underground resources, forests, lakes, rivers, and other natural resources.

All international treaties and foreign loans which were effected between Outer Mongolia and other countries before the Revolution of 1921, shall be declared null and void.

A National Revolutionary Army shall be organized for the purpose of conducting the administration at the hands of the masses, and all young men shall receive military education.

Religions and churches shall be separated from the State, and no restriction whatever shall be placed on individuals as to their religious faith.

The Mongolians shall enjoy a perfect liberty of speech and holding public meetings.

The State shall give the poor people all possible help and facilities.

No fee shall be charged for the education of sons and daughters of the poor as well as the general public.

All classes of Mongolians shall enjoy equal rights under the Republican Administration, no matter whether they are of different religions, races, or sexes.

The title of princes, noblemen and lords shall be abolished.

In foreign policy, the Mongolian Republic shall concentrate its energy upon the upsetting of Capitalism and the propagation of Communism, and for the realization of this object the Republic shall cooperate with small nations which are always suffering from tyranical policies of great nations and with all Revolutionists the world over.

The Mongolian Government reserves, according to the development of international conditions, the chance of a possibility for establishing friendly relations with other countries which stand for Capitalism.

Foreign Policy of Outer Mongolia.

At the second session of the National Assembly held in November, 1925, at which 90 representatives including five women were present, a resolution was passed to the effect that all possible measures shall be taken to further strengthen the bonds of friendship with Soviet Russia, that attention shall be paid for the establishment of friendly relations with other countries, especially small nations

which are always suffering from oppressive policies of great nations , and that for the establishmentof relations with Capitalistic States, due precaution shall be taken so as not to expose Mongolia to national danger. It was further resolved to,encourage the education of the people, to appoint efficient officers and officials, to develop industries and to break down all abuses and corrupt practices in financial administration.

4-1

G-2 Report

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. D.V.
2190
1927
2657-J-316
JUN 30
WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Population & Social Conditions)

Subject: Brutality of Bandits.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. JUN 29 1927

1. Chinese bandits, in their actions, provide an illuminating index to the callousness toward suffering and indifferent brutality that characterize the whole people when they are not dominated by positive restraint, calculated self-interest, or the fear of consequence. This generalization is used advisedly, as at the present time the bandits of China, by their numbers, distribution and origin offer a fairly close cross-section of the entire population.

2. It is not to be understood that all Chinese bandits are fiendishly cruel at all times. Where they hold captives of monetary importance they usually treat them as well as possible under the circumstances of their hard and roving existence. Where they are permanently occupying a given area they generally refrain from giving undue offense to the local population, with a view to obtaining their tolerance and in some cases their support. But where these restraining factors are withdrawn the conduct of Chinese bandits is cold blooded and destructive almost beyond belief.

3. The indiscriminate murder of captives from whom no ransom can be expected is a matter of common occurrence. The wanton slaughter of animals that cannot keep up with the gang is also a frequent event which, while not so horrifying, is less understandable unless their extraordinary callousness is considered. Houses and villages are burned wantonly, sometimes a house being set alight to provide warmth for the bandits resting on the other side of the street. Individuals are killed, singly and in groups, apparently for no other purpose than to provide amusement. An example is reported from Honan where villagers, whose homes were occupied by bandits, were bound together, drenched with kerosene and set alight, each group of four or five being left free to run around in agony for the sport of their captors. The treatment of women who fall into their hands is brutal in the extreme. Not stopping at offering them the most outrageous personal abuse, it is quite common for bandits to kill women after slaking their own passions, and this killing is sometimes done in the most cruel and indescribable fashions.

John Magruder
John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache.

TJB

Distribution:
4 MID
1 Tientsin
1 File

From: M/A, China Report No. 7045 May 23, 1927

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
1926 2657-J-31 AUG 11
2730
WAR DEPARTMENT

4-1

G-2 Report

CHINA (Population & Social Conditions)

Subject: Banditry in China.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. AUG 11 1926

1. There is a somewhat widespread impression among foreigners, fostered by the Chinese, that banditry in China is the occasional occupation of a limited number of lawless people, and as such is of no greater significance than the activities of similar persons in other countries. This is not correct; on the contrary it is a highly organized industry which has existed since time immemorial. It includes in its ranks many former officers and soldiers and many bandits from time to time join the different armies. On occasion this transfer is effected by whole units, companies, battalions or regiments of bandits being incorporated into the army or vice-versa.

2. Recruits are easily obtained from younger sons whose inheritance in land is insufficient for their support; from disbanded soldiers, deserters, outlaws, and captives. Arms and ammunition are secured by purchase or from deserters from the army. Some bandit organizations are extremely well equipped, but generally their equipment is inferior.

3. It is impossible to arrive at any accurate estimate of the number of bandits in China, but it is safe to say that counting active and inactive bands, there are at least 200,000 of them, all armed.

4. They are known by different names in different parts of the country, the commonest being TUFEI (robber) and HUNG HU TZU. The latter is the common name for the Manchurian bandits and means "Red Beards". The antiquity of the occupation is indicated by the fact that in the age old plays produced in Chinese theatres, a bandit is always indicated and represented by a man with a red beard.

5. Banditry has been too long organized and systematized to offer large rewards. Generally the bandits maintain their existence by robbing travellers, holding captives for ransom and raids on remote villages and farms. In many regions their income is derived from a form of insurance, the country and village people paying a regular sum in return for which they are not only unmolested by the local bandits, but the latter as well protect them from other bands. The amount so paid is a matter of delicate adjustment, the bandits knowing to a penny just how far they may exert this blackmail before the people will resent it forcibly, while the latter maintain a loose form of militia, generally known as TUAN, which takes the field in resistance to exorbitant bandit demands. It was such a force that attacked the bandits who had captured Captain Betts.

6. Organized bands maintain agents in all the larger cities and in some cases the actual leaders are permanent city residents, maintaining a dignified position as merchants or the like. These exercise complete authority over the bandits, though as a rule they are known personally to only two or three of the highest officers in the field organization.

7. Between these leaders in the city and the local government officials there frequently is an understanding by which the bandits, in return for the payment of a percentage of their earnings and an agreement

From M/A, China Report No. 5899 July 7, 1926

CHINA (Population & Social Conditions)

Subject: Banditry in China.

to keep them within bounds and to leave certain persons unmolested, are given protection, or ample warning of attempts to suppress them. In other cases these city dwelling leaders are as unknown in their true occupation to the government officials as they are to their neighbors and the rank and file of the bandits.

8. The profession of banditry has developed its own language customs, secret pass words and procedure.

9. Bandits have played an important part in many of China's wars, both foreign and domestic. The Japanese made use of them as partisan bands in their war against Russia. There is reason to believe that now in Manchuria many bands that harass the Russians along the Chinese Eastern Railway are armed, equipped by and in constant communication with Japanese agents. In civil warfare army commanders frequently enter into alliance with bandit chiefs, or on occasion with those leaders of irregular troops who maintain an anti-bandit organization.

10. Justice to the old profession of banditry compels the statement that so far as the Chinese people are concerned there is little to choose between the average bandit and the average Chinese soldier. Both live off the people though they produce nothing and the requisitions of the latter are as searching and all embracing as the levies of the former. Bandits treat their native prisoners with great barbarity, unhesitatingly killing those too weak to keep up on the march, and not infrequently leaving the dead body of a ransomed prisoner for his family or friends to find. On the other hand the soldiers have a fearful reputation for violence and cruelty.

11. The following notes by Captain T. J. Betts, C.A.C., language officer, give a clear idea of bandit organization, command, methods, etc. It may be taken as accurately descriptive of bandit bands in general, with slight modifications suitable to different localities and climates.

NOTES ON A BAND OF EASTERN YUNNANESE BANDITS

The following notes are the result of an enforced stay of ten hours with a band of Yunnanese bandits near Lai T'ou P'o, Yunnan, on May 17, 1926. I believe this band to be a typical one, although the details of its organization are probably not duplicated in their entirety among other bands.

Strength: Approximately 170.

Armament: 70 men armed with edged weapons only. Approximately 12 modern military rifles and carbines in the band. The rest of the bandits carried converted muzzle loaders, cal. .60, Mauser single shot low velocity breech loaders, cal. .45, and Mauser tubular magazine, bolt action, low velocity repeating rifles, cal. .45 in about equal numbers. (All calibers approximate.)
Ammunition was low - about 40 rounds per man.
I observed 4 pistols and revolvers.
No machine guns or automatic rifles.

CHINA (Population & Social Conditions)

Subject: Banditry in China.

Organization: A battalion of two companies of three platoons, of three squads, of approximately eight men each (this agrees with present basic Chinese military organization, which, however, has 3 companies per battalion and 12-14 men per squad).

The officers consisted of Commander, Chief of Staff, Executive, Battalion Commander, Company Commanders, Platoon Leaders and Squad Leaders.

Personnel: The bulk of the bandits were young, active Chinese, distinguished only by physical fitness, absence of occupational scars or muscular development and a slightly dissipated appearance. Youth was their predominant trait. With the exception of the Chief, Executive and Chief of Staff, I do not believe one was over 23. There were numerous boys under 16 in the ranks. All the officers and a large proportion of the men had had military experience. I saw only five or six men who appeared to be habitual criminals.

The Chief, Executive and Chief of Staff were all men in their thirties, and formed a sort of council for directing the band, though in the last analysis the word of the Chief was absolute. The Chief, I was afterwards informed, had been at one time a colonel in the Chinese Army.

Discipline: Discipline was purely a personal matter. The Chief was the only individual who was obeyed immediately and unquestioningly. The rest of the officers when issuing orders did so in a good natured manner and were obeyed slackly.

Outposts apparently were keen and alert.

Battle discipline seemed very good.

Tactics: I observed these bandits in the following operations: ambush, occupation of a village, tactical march, posting of outpost and rearguard action. In all cases their dispositions were good, rapid and consonant with the recognized principles of minor tactics. The outpost work was particularly good: word was brought of enemy approach ten minutes before the first shot was fired. While marching the band tended to straggle, and no effort was made to preserve military formation within the main body.

Miscellaneous: The only animals present were three ponies, used to carry packs and to serve as mounts for the senior officers.

There were no women with the band.

The supply problem was non-existent. The men wore all the clothes they had, and looted new garments when needed. Food was requisitioned a meal at a time from the most convenient village, and cooked and eaten on the spot. No reserve rations were carried.

The bandits said they had a base, but I am not convinced of this. They may have had some loot cached in one village, under guard pending disposition, but I doubt if their "base" amounted to anything more.

The bandits were practically 100% opium smokers.

P. W. Barnett

Distribution:
4 MID
1 CGUSAFC
1 File

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
JUL 12
WAR DEPARTMENT

4-1

2657-D-317

G-2 Report

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Proposed French Policy.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. JUL 12 1927

1. On or about May 1st the French Minister, after long deliberation, urgently requested his Government to authorize him to act in accord with the British in all matters relating to the situation caused by the Nanking affair. As I understand, the request was in effect to give the French Minister authorization to cooperate with Britain generally in facing the menace caused by the Soviet influences present in China. The recommendation was made in forceful language, the main considerations being:

a) The bad effect upon the Annamites which would result from propaganda among them tending to show that France's lack of positive action in connection with the Nanking affair was due to her military weakness.

b) The advisability of cooperating with the British in the Far East in order to improve their relations in Europe.

2. My informant stated that it was believed if Britain and France were bold in their policy, Japan probably would join them, whereas at present Japan, outwardly at least, is following America in her policy of inaction. He also mentioned the growth of sentiment in Britain and France to eliminate their post-war antagonisms in Europe and to cooperate in the interest of European peace.

3. Since the foregoing information was furnished, the same source has intimated that Paris did not accept Count de Martel's suggestion with enthusiasm. He also stated that it was most difficult to cooperate with Britain at a time when "Great Britain has no government". He expressed great disgust for Mr. Chamberlain's speech of May 9th, in which the latter announced Britain's decision to exact no sanctions for the Nanking affair, coming as it did just at the time when Count de Martel was urging Paris to act strongly with Britain. The French Minister is a forceful and persistent personality and it seems clear that he urges a more positive policy in China while the Quai d'Orsay inclines toward moderation and deference to an understanding which is suspected to exist between France and Japan.

John Magruder,
John Magruder
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

Distribution:
4 MID
1 Tientsin
1 File
1 Japan

From M/A, China Report No.7043 May 18, 1927

NOTED
J. H. REEVES
A. C. OF S., G-2.
4-1 1927 2657-9-317
2820 2
FEB 8
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

SECRET

China (Political)

Subject: French Policies in China.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. FEB 8 1927

1. A French official who is very active in matters military, diplomatic and commercial, and who works very intimately with the French Minister, told me recently that the French policy in China is simple and clear. It is stated to be as follows:

(a) To protect the frontiers between Indo-China and China, preventing disorders and radicalism in China from spreading into the French colony.

(b) To increase French trade in such articles as France is best prepared to compete. Trade comparable with Britain, the United States and Japan is not hoped for, but France is eager to improve the market for her luxuries, airplanes, motor cars and certain small machinery.

(c) To maintain a liberal attitude toward China's nationalistic aspirations, but proceed deliberately in giving up rights now claimed by treaty. My informant said their policy is not to publish to the world (as did England) their readiness to give up their privileges but to make it known privately to Chinese officials of all factions that they recognize the changed conditions and in due course these privileges must disappear, but by regular processes rather than abruptly. He said, for instance, that they would retain their concession in Shanghai as long as possible and when they had to give it up, "tant pis". Even then they would follow the customs of China and try to exact quid pro quo's.

(d) To combat Bolshevism by every possible means. He plainly showed that the French are favorable to the North as against the South, principally because of the Soviet direction of the nationalist movement.

2. I gather that while publicly the French protest neutrality, privately they do not hesitate to offer aid and comfort to Chang Tso-lin. Negotiations and adjustments are made locally with all factions, and Anglo-Saxon ideas of neutrality and hesitancy about entering into local intrigues are never permitted to handicap French officials in their negotiations. In brief, the French play the game in China as the Chinese play it. They avoid pin-pricking diplomacy, but if violence is shown to French citizens they are not averse to a use of force as, for instance, in Canton last year. Once having used force, they avoid the unfavorable consequences by very intimate negotiations to hush publicity. In this instance, France escaped the condemnation heaped on Britain by employing the dependence of Canton on Saigon rice.

3. The French are very bitter against the British Memorandum. They consider it exceedingly stupid diplomacy. Whereas the British grandly publish to the world their hope of gaining benefits by independent action, if necessary, the French, it seems, are ever watchful for benefits accruing from independent action - but why publish it?

4. It will be observed that French and Japanese diplomacy are very similar.

John Magruder
Major S.S.

DISTRIBUTION
4-1
Tokyo
Mountain
Manila

From M/A, China Report #6019 January 6, 1927

4-1

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

1926F 2657-9-317
2850

WAR DEPARTMENT

Report

CHINA (Political)

Subject: International Relations, French.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. SEP 2 1926

1. The motives which actuate foreign powers in their relations with China; the reasons for their active or passive attitude of sympathy with the parties to the issues which now divide the country are generally clear to the observer. Thus for a considerable time French policy was affected deeply by the negotiations connected with the Gold Franc case, which negotiations incidentally had a profound effect upon China's relations with other powers, notably in the matter of the Washington Conference Agreements. It should be noted that a settlement of this case on terms acceptable to the French was consummated by them with a Chinese government supported by Chang Tso-lin and other leaders then as now identified with the anti-radical movement, and in spite of violent opposition from the radicals. That other considerations than those made public at the time induced the anti-radicals to make the settlement is morally certain, though naturally what these were is unknown. Possibly among them, in addition to money payments, were assurances as to exclusive supply of certain war materials, credits, etc.

2. Not only do a lively sense of favors conferred and obligations incurred operate to perpetuate French sympathy with and support of Chinese anti-radicals, but transcending them in cogency is the further fact that the French always are keenly apprehensive of the extension from Kwangtung into Yunnan and Indo-China of the spirit of revolt, communism and anti-foreignism. The following report was submitted by Captain T. J. Betts, C.A.C., language officer, after his return from a visit to Yunnanfu. It is of particular interest in detailing the reasons for the policy of the French in their relations with Yunnan, and for their opposition to anti-radicalism throughout China in general.

3. <u>French Policy in Southwest China.</u> French policy in southwest China is at present shaped with the idea of conserving such benefits as remain to her with the passing into abeyance of the Great Powers' "Spheres of Influence Policy", of maintaining her traditional position as the protector of Roman Catholic missionary effort, and of retaining control and ensuring the profitable operation of the Yunnan railway. It is thus basically not a forward policy, but rather one of conservation.

4. <u>Conservation of Certain Elements of the French "Sphere of Influence".</u> In the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first of the twentieth, during the so-called "Battle for Concessions", the French in common with certain other Great Powers staked out for themselves a sphere of influence in China, reserved for their exclusive exploitation and perhaps for eventual annexation. The French enclave was the great block of land stretching from the Tonkin frontier north to the boundaries of Shensi and Kansu. While geographically homogeneous, the territory was not an economic unit and even under the most favorable circumstances could hardly have been consolidated under French influence. Eastern Szechuan faces east and trades with and through Shanghai. The scanty trade of Kweichow runs along its rivers, either to the Yangtze or to the West River and, eventually, to Canton. Western Yunnan and the Tibetan marches are linked up commercially with Burma. There still remained, however, the veritable kingdom of Central Yunnan and southwestern Szechuan that was oriented toward Indo-China on the south.

5. Upon the demarcation of their sphere the French showed considerable activity. Negatively, they discouraged exploitation by other nations, notably the British project for a railway from Burmah through Talifu and Yunnan with the Yangtze as an ultimate destination. Positively, they

CHINA (Political)

Subject: International Relations, French.

accomplished the tremendous feat of constructing the Yunnan railway from Hokow to Yunnanfu. In the northern portion of the sphere they put in a great deal of work in charting the Upper Yangtze and its tributaries, and in improving their navigation. Consulates were established at Yunnanfu, Chungking and Chengtu, with staffs quite disproportionate to the existing volume of French trade. The French did not commit themselves, however, to any grandiose schemes for industrial, agricultural or mineral exploitation, leaving all these matters in the hands of private enterprise, and perhaps deferring action until after the thorough completion of their work in Indo-China.

6. With the abandonment of open adherence to the policy of spheres of influence, and inevitably even without its abandonment, the economically heterogeneous portions of the French enclave fell away. That the French do not regard these territories as totally lost is indicated, however, by their continuance of their large consulates in Szechuan and by their maintenance of a comparatively large naval force (3 gunboats) on the Upper Yangtze. Inasmuch as they had no large fixed investments at stake in these regions, it has been easy for them to preserve a correct but noncommittal attitude.

7. The same laissez-faire methods in the vast territory that economically faces Tonkin has assured French dominance in this area. Here again no great exploitation projects have been attempted although they have been reported as anxious to secure mineral rights. The trade of this region naturally gravitates down the railroad to Tonkin, and the bulk of the export trade almost automatically passes into French hands at least once. Imports into this area also must go through Indo-China, and by means of a tariff barrier predominance of imports of French origin is assured. The Indo-Chinese tariff is in the hands of the governor of that colony, who has arbitrary power to alter its provisions concerning goods of foreign origin. At present all goods of French origin entering Indo-China come in free, while most foreign products are taxed 45%. For transit through Indo-China, 20% of the full duty or 9% net is charged. The customs formalities are vexatious, and there exist certain special regulations that hamper foreign trade. For example, no canned goods are permitted to enter Indo-China either as destination or in transit unless the name of the country of origin is embossed (not printed) on the individual can. Inasmuch as competition with French products would involve a certain change in the tariff rates, non-French manufacturers are loth to go to the expense of making special preparations for competition in a market that can be closed to them at any time. Aside from the tariff provisions already mentioned, the French do not discriminate in any way against non-French trade in this region, so that non-competing products, such as oil and flour, enjoy a ready market, regardless of the country of origin.

8. <u>Missions.</u> As elsewhere in China, the French governmental agencies charge themselves with the protection and encouragement of Roman Catholic missions. In this region, moreover, the great majority of the Catholic missionaries are French. The task has been an easy one, as the natives, while difficult to convert, are very tolerant, and anti-Christian outbreaks or agitation are rare. The situation is further eased by the fact that the Catholic missions do not place emphasis on higher education, and hence have not become involved in the few cases of student agitation that have occurred in Yunnan, nor in the turmoil stirred up by students in Szechuan.

CHINA (Political)

Subject: International Relations, French.

9. In this area the French Government has shown its interest in missionary activities by attaching army surgeons to the hospitals in Yunnanfu, Chungking and Chengtu, where they give their services without expense to the missions.

10. The Yunnan Railway. This railway represents France's largest stake in China. Constructed at an initial cost of 350,000,000 gold francs, and with additions and improvements totalling 100,000,000 gold francs more, it is a physical asset and an asset of empire that is not to be lightly disturbed. Its present status, from the French point of view, is a happy one. The line runs through country that seldom is involved in the civil wars that affect Yunnan, and to date the authorities have exerted themselves to protect it from bandit activities. Under the agreement by which its construction was authorized it is stipulated that the line may be acquired by the Chinese Government in 24 years (i.e. 1927), on payment of construction costs, amortization costs and all other expenses. This obviously is impossible at the present time. Return of the railroad also is stipulated when its earnings have covered the expenses above enumerated. This contingency is clearly remote, as interest on investment alone must be in the neighborhood of G$5,000,000 a year. The railway management is very chary about releasing information as to earnings, and will only go so far as to admit that the excess of operating revenue over operating costs is satisfactory. In 1922 the road reported a gross operating revenue of $2,658,661 which savors of an under-statement. There can be no doubt that the French would be quick to resent any interference with the railroad by governmental or other agencies, and that they would seek to evade any efforts on the part of the Chinese to gain control of the enterprise, but to date there have been no efforts in either direction.

11. Policy Toward Nationalistic or Anti-Foreign Agitation. The French are extremely sensitive to nationalistic or anti-foreign movements in Yunnan, primarily because of the nearness of Tonkin, where they have become greatly alarmed at even rudimentary nationalistic agitation. Here again their task has been simple, as the administration of Yunnan has been basically conservative since the establishment of the Chinese Republic, and the present Governor has held office continuously with the exception of one year since 1916. They therefore seek to remain on good terms with the Provincial administration and do everything in their power to hold up its hands. They have recently supplied the Governor with four machine guns, and in April, 1926, had agreed to furnish him 7,000 rifles, nominally for the armament of railway guards. The railway guards actually number some 1,200 men.

12. The French policy of conservation is thus seen to be the logical one at the present juncture. The present is no time to embark on exploitation schemes anywhere in China. Their economic dominance of southwest China is administered from Indo-China and cannot be called to account. Their control over the Yunnan railroad is undisputed. Their relations with the Yunnanese Government are satisfactory. Their obvious policy is one of laissez-faire, and the cultivation of friendly relations with the conservative rulers of Yunnan.

J. H. Barnard,
Lieut. Colonel, F. A.,
Military Attache.

Distribution: 4 MID
1 CGUSAFC
1 Japan
1 Manila
1 Legation
1 N/A
1 File

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
M.I. INTEL. DIV.
JAN 10 1934
WAR DEPARTMENT

4-1 2657-9-319 6 - 3890 -

G-2 Report

For Official Use Only.

RUSSIA (Political).

Subject: Soviets in Mongolia.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JAN 9 1934

The "KURJER WARSZAWSKI", December 6, 1933, carried a dispatch (ATE) from Riga to the following effect: "Information is received from Moscow that the news of the organization of a new state of Western Mongolia is causing great dissatisfaction in local government circles.

Although the Soviet Government has not yet announced its official attitude in this matter, it is maintained in political circles of Moscow that the new Mongolian Government in Dolonor will be an obedient tool in the hands of Japanese military authorities."

The same paper, December 16, 1933, carried a dispatch (Orient) from Berlin, saying : "Information is received from Mukden that the Government of Inner Mongolia has addressed a proclamation to the population of Outer Mongolia (Soviet) suggesting the union of both regions into one state of "Great Mongolia". "

The following is a translation from the Russian of a specially prepared report on the subject. Owing to the great distance from the scene of operations, more specific data are not now available. The report, however, should bring contributions of this office, under even number, up to date.

T r a n s l a t i o n.

Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan.

Mongolia, bordering on Russia to the West and North, on Manchuria to the East and on China to the South, is divided into two parts : Inner Mongolia, which is now under the influence of Japan, and Outer Mongolia which, up to the present, has been under the influence of the Bolsheviks.

Inner Mongolia.

After having acquired control over Manchuria, the Japanese directed their attention toward Inner Mongolia, where they endeavored to gain the support of the local Mongolian Princes. Japan organized meetings with the Mongolian Princes and prominent Mongolian politicians. Partially by bribes, partially by extensive promises, the

Japanese

FROM: MA WARSAW Report No. 1236 (2136) Date: Dec.27, 1933.

Japanese succeeded in winning the politicians and, as a result, Inner Mongolia broke relations with China, proclaimed Dolonnor to be the Capital of their independent state and requested - quite recently - the protectorate of Japan.

Outer Mongolia.

Outer Mongolia stretches from West to East for 2600 kilometers. To the North it borders on the USSR - the Oyrotskaya "autonomous" Soviet Republic, the Buriato-Mongolian Republic and other regions of Eastern Siberia.

Character of the Country.

Inner Mongolia up to the recent events consisted of a series of small appanage principalities. This country is very sparsely populated. The total population of this part of Mongolia reaches about 900,000, of which 800,000 are Mongolians, 50,000 Chinese and approximately 40,000 Russians.

Mongolian Lamas.

There are in the country 82,000 Lamas (priests) who used to have a great influence up to recently.

Outer Mongolia and Russia.

When Outer Mongolia became part of Russia in 1909, there was no interference with the inner life of the country. In 1915, under an agreement made in Kiakhta, Russia recognised the autonomy of Mongolia.

Outer Mongolia and the Bolsheviks.

At one time the Japanese had control in Outer Mongolia; they supported the Chinese, and also the Russian troops of Ataman Semenoff, who were friendly. Later Outer Mongolia returned to the influence of the Bolsheviks who, up to 1924, did not interfere with the independence of the country but gave it the opportunity to govern itself.

National Mongolian Republic.

In 1924, the Bolsheviks organized in Outer Mongolia the so called National Mongolian Republic, in which they acted as if they were at home.

National Revolutionary Party.

The National Revolutionary Party in Outer Mongolia, assisted by the Bolsheviks, succeeded in freeing the country

of all

of all foreign control - chiefly Chinese and supporting Japanese. At the present time this party, diluted by local communists, counts approximately 35,000 members.

Organization of the State.

The organization of this National Mongolian Republic is based on the Soviet model. The mission of the Government is "combat with the "feudal" princes and the capitalistic elements (owners of herds)." There is a REVVOENSOVIET (Revolutionary War Council), planning establishments, and a five year plan. There is also a G.P.U. which is called "Interior State Guard".

The election law is similar to that of the Soviets. The former princes are deprived of election rights, and so are the Lamas who live in monasteries.

Supreme Authority in the Country and Interior Administration.

The supreme authority of the country is the Great National Huran or Congress of Deputies (77 members), who are elected in accordance with a system approved by the Bolsheviks. Actually the power is in the hands of the "Small Hural" (Small Huran) composed of 15 members. The Government consists of a Premier and Ministers.

The National Revolutionary Red Army.

Special attention is given by the Bolsheviks to the National Revolutionary Red Army, which furnishes very good cavalry material that may be of great assistance to the Bolsheviks in their military operations in the Far East. The Bolsheviks take good care of this army and see that it does not lack anything. The army has already a considerable number of cadres of trained cavalry, and even of infantry. In the Capital, URGA, there is a cadet school and a military school which furnish local officers. The most able of these officers are being sent to Moscow for further specialization.

Insurrection in the Country.

The Mongolian Lamas had not lost their influence on the population, This refers especially to those who did not live in monasteries, but in villages with their families. The Lamas, as well as other who formerly held the power, and the bourgeoisie, had every reason not to be satisfied with the regime. Japanese money did much to bring about serious fermentation which developed into an insurrection in which a part of the army participated. Many Soviet agents became victims and the Bolsheviks sent in a punitive expedition of selected GPU troops.

Concealed Events.

The Bolsheviks are endeavoring to conceal what is going on in Mongolia because of the importance of that country in the

event

event of a conflict with Japan.

Chinese Turkestan.

Chinese Turkestan or Sinizian is a buffer country between England (India), Soviet Russia and China. There was in the country a Chinese Governor and local garrisons of the "central" Chinese authorities.

Insurgents.

This year, in spring, so called "Mahomedan" insurgents, supported and guided by Bolsheviks, commenced to oppress the Chinese local authorities. The Chinese authorities were supported by "White" Russian troops of General Dutov and General Annenkov wha had come to Turkestan from Soviet Russia.

Troops of General Maa.

The the Bolsheviks, to assist the insurgents, moved from Soviet Russia the troops of General Maa who had found shelter in Soviet Russia and who were well armed and had four mountain batteries composed of Schneider guns, 1909 model.

Success of the Insurgents.

As a result, the Chinese garrisons were compelled to leave the country. At the same time, the "White" Russian troops dispersed. The Capital of Turkestan, Kashgar, which for a long time, remained in the hands of the "Whites" was taken by the Mahomedan insurgents.

Proclamation of Independence of Chinese Turkestan.

In November, the Mahomedan insurgents organized an independent Government and announced their full separation from China.

Bolshevik Agents.

According to the last information received from Chinese Turkestan, the so called independent Mahomedan Government in Kashgar has actually no power at all and is composed of persons who are inspired by communistic cirlces.

Plans of Bolsheviks concerning Chinese Turkestan.

The occupation of Manchuria by the Japanese cut off the principal channels for the extension of communism to China. The Bolsheviks then organized automobile and air traffic through Mongolia from Urga to Kalgan. The establishment of Chinese influence in Inner Mongolia, and also the prospective

occupation

occupation by the Japanese of Kalgan where all lines of the Bolsheviks from Mongolia to China converge, puts before the Bolsheviks the task of finding new ways of maintaining contact with China. The only way that they can avail themselves of now, is via Chinese Turkestan.

* * *

Albert Gilmor,
Lt.Colonel, C.A.C.,
Military Attache.

FROM: MA WARSAW Report No. 1236 Date: Dec. 27, 1933.

FOR OFFICIAL USE
ONLY

3030

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

APR 28 1933

WAR DEPARTMENT

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 25 1933

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Mongolia

There are, in effect, three Mongolias - Outer Mongolia, Inner Mongolia, and Manchurian Mongolia.

The area of Outer Mongolia is something like a million square miles. Manchuria contains about 260,000 square miles. The Mongol population of Outer Mongolia is perhaps a million and of Manchuria between a million and a million and a half. In addition, there are something under a million Mongols in Inner Mongolia, and about half a million in Jehol. This gives an approximate total of three and a half to four millions of Mongols.

China has recently attempted to make more secure her control over parts of Inner Mongolia by creating the provinces of Jehol, Chahar, Suiyuan and Ningsia out of territory formerly known as Inner Mongolia. Inner Mongolia is recognized as one of the appanages of China, but actually it is administered by its own princes. They have been strong enough up to the present to avoid Chinese colonization, but they are not likely to try to break away from China unless rash efforts are made to increase Chinese control, or unless they are tempted by offers of an alliance with Manchoukuo guaranteeing them some degree of genuine autonomy.

Outer Mongolia. The position here is obscure - more obscure than it need be because international recognition of the actual state of affairs would require acknowledgment of a prodigious improvement in the standing of Soviet Russia, which the nations most affected would only admit under pressure and with distaste. The historical claim of the Mongols themselves, for which a strong case could be stated, is that they do not "belong" to China and never did.

When the Manchu Empire fell the Mongols attempted to assert their right to autonomy. In Outer Mongolia, with Russian support, they succeeded to a certain degree, but Inner Mongolia was too near to China and too far from an independent supply of arms.

In 1919 when it appeared that the power of Russia was broken forever, the Chinese made an attempt to conquer Outer Mongolia. The expedition, at first successful, treated the Mongols with such brutality that any voluntary union between Outer Mongolia and the Chinese Republic is now most unlikely. The Chinese invaders were finally slaughtered and scattered by a very small force of Mongols and Tibetans led by anti-Bolshevik Russians.

A government of Outer Mongolia was then established under the highest ecclesiastical authority in the nation - the Living Buddha of Urga. But real power was in the hands of the Russian soldier-refugees under the sadistic Baron Ungern-Sternberg, who even exceeded the Chinese in extortion and massacre. When the "Mad Baron" was at last defeated and killed by Red Russians, the Bolshevik intervention came as a deliverance. Soviet Russia did not need to conquer Outer Mongolia; it

had only to organize a people who were already well disposed in its favor. And when the Living Buddha died in 1924, it was only necessary to confirm the reorganization of the country on Soviet lines begun in 1921. That revolution did not appear to the Mongols as a Russian conquest. A genuine pro-Russian, pro-Soviet party had by then been built up, and though Russians were concerned in the political reorganization, most of the executive work was in Mongol hands and has remained there.

The invariable testimony of competent observers is that Russian control by force does not exist. There are no Russian troops in the country, and even the Russian officers there are instructors, not commanders. Russian civil officers, apart from technical experts, doctors, veterinarians, etc., are also very few and on the whole are popular. In other words, the government of Outer Mongolia may be under the influence and inspiration of Russia but it cannot fairly be called a disguised Russian government. It is based on the genuine conversion to Russian ideas of an important minority among the Mongols.

There exists a large element in Outer Mongolia which is bitterly hostile to the present government. Several thousand Mongols within the last year have found it so intolerable that they have abandoned all their possessions and fled, at the risk of being shot at sight. Nevertheless the government, and the patrols which try to shoot them when they cross the border, are Mongols who do not need prompting or orders from Russian officers.

The truth appears to be that the strength of the Outer Mongolian government is founded neither on Russian terrorism nor on any special diabolical Russian ingenuity in misleading a semi-barbaric people. The younger and more energetic men among the Mongols themselves are in control, and they have found no help or sympathy except in Russia and no model for modernization except the Russian.

The younger Mongols have modelled themselves on the Soviets as naturally as Chinese republicanism has modelled itself on America and Europe, but basically the new Mongolia is no more communistic in feeling and instinct than China is republican. Basically it is nationalistic with a tincture of crude demonracy, and success of the new government would have been impossible without the rank failure of the old order to rise to the national emergency and to adapt itself to the new conditions of power in the modern world.

Progressive Mongols are convinced that all religion, most of all their own, is a curse, and therefore "progress", "modernization" and the whole movement toward the material development which we ourselves call "civilization" are inseparably associated with the attack on the established religion, the social and political position of its high dignitaries and the vested interests of its great monasteries.

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Mongolia

Inner Mongolia. Inner Mongolia is the stronghold of all that has been destroyed in Outer Mongolia, - the old tradition, the power of the princes, the sanctity of religion. Chinese colonization has forced this conservative Mongolia back into a desperate last stand. Until recent years there was really more land than the Mongols needed, except perhaps in bad years, but this margin has now been devoured. The land was taken over by negotiation through the princes and great religious foundations who, not being strong enough to resist, made the best of a bad business, taking cash compensation or annual subsidies. This process has been pushed to the limit. There is no more spare land. The Mongols must either resist or resign themselves to abandoning the old Mongol way of life, turn to living like the Chinese, and eventually be lost among the Chinese.

It was therefore inevitable that a Young Mongol party should appear and grow rapidly in influence. The Young Mongols are devoted to the ideal of saving the remnant of the Mongols as a nation, or at least as a territorial, linguistic and racial group. They stand for education, "modernization", "progress" and adaptation to the standards of the outside world. In order to succeed, they are willing to make drastic changes. They are, of necessity, anti-aristocratic, anti-Chinese and anti-religious - at least to the extent of wishing to dislodge the lamas from their positions of privilege.

Because it has proved impossible either to halt Chinese colonization or compromise with it, the Young Mongols waver between ideas of union with Outer Mongolia and ideas of treating with Manchoukuo and Japan for support in a movement toward autonomy.

The establishment of a quasi-independent Manchoukuo, with the last of the Manchu Emperors as Chief Executive, offers a rallying point for the princes. The difficulty among the princes of Inner Mongolia is to find one who can be accepted there as ruler by all the others. They are all so nearly equal in status and lineage that there is no obvious leader by right of birth. Allegiance to, or alliance under, a Manchu Emperor would solve the problem. There is no doubt that princes and church would rally to a Manchu Emperor if they were convinced he had come to stay and could give them real support.

The most real cleavage among the Mongols themselves is between Outer Mongolia and Inner Mongolia, - between the young men, the modernizers, the believers in "progress" and "civilization", on the one side, and the monarchists, the princes, the church, the conservatives, those who distrust change and new ways, on the other. Politics and religion apart, there is among all Mongols a feeling of blood-brotherhood that is very strong. Race and language are almost sacred to them. Under all differences of allegiance there is a powerful feeling that all Mongolia ought to be united. It is only over the method of achieving unity that they quarrel. In this appeal for unity Outer Mongolia, with its tradition of being the ancient home of the Mongol race and Mongol glory, dominates Inner Mongolia.

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Mongolia

Source: Owen Lattimore, a foremost authority on the Mongols.

COMMENTS: Heartily endorsed by the Military Attache. A reasonably accurate knowledge of Mongolian affairs is indispensable in arriving at a proper estimate of changes likely to take place in North Central Asia as a result of the Japanese Manchoukuo movement.

Any material now in the digest that indicates that Mongolia as at present formed is not an autonomous state should be removed. The digest at present over emphasizes the degree of control exercised by the U.S.S.R. over both the political and military activities of the state. The U.S.S.R. no doubt would expect and get military support from Mongolia either against Japan or China should the occasion require such support, but the decision would be made by the Mongolian government. The point is that the Mongolian government would be able to make its own decision, a decision which under present conditions would no doubt be favorable to Russia. Within the next ten years the decision made by the same officials might be favorable to Japan.

W. S. Drysdale

W. S. Drysdale
Lieutenant-Colonel, Infantry
Military Attache

Distribution:
4 MID
1 File

8

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
MAY 18 1932
X-1 2657-9-319
4
WAR DEPARTMENT

FOR OFFICIAL USE
ONLY

G-2 Report 6910

RUSSIA (Combat)

Subject: Nation's Plans for War.
FEARS FOR LOSS OF MONGOLIA.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 12 1932

One of Soviet Russia's fears is that Japan will attempt to re-establish the old Mongolian Empire by uniting Outer Mongolia and Inner Mongolia into a single state under Japanese protection. At the present time Outer Mongolia belongs to the Soviet Union in nearly everything but name. If Japan were to combine it with Inner Mongolia to establish a new state under her own protection, as she established the state of Manchoukuo, the Soviet Government would lose its influence in this considerable territory.

* * *

G. E. Arneman
GEORGE E. ARNEMAN,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

Copy to M.A., Warsaw.

From: M.A., Riga, Latvia Report No. 7937 Date: April 25, 1932.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
JAN 22 - 6990 -
2657-9-319
3
WAR DEPARTMENT

RUSSIA (Combat).

Subject: Outer Mongolia a Soviet Military Base.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JAN 22 1932

The following is a translation from Russian of a report on the activities of the Soviets in Outer Mongolia furnished by a source believed to be reliable :

After the death of the last ruler of Mongolia the Bolsheviks established in Mongolia the Soviet system of governing with certain amendments, taking into consideration the local social and religious customs. After the conclusion of the military agreement with Mongolia in 1926, and the complete sovietization of the country, the Bolsheviks began to draw Mongolia systematically into the civil struggle of China, by organizing in Mongolia and sending out from there to China special military units to assist the Red Chinese troops. Thus Mongolia up to the recent events in Manchuria was a military base for the Bolsheviks from which Moscow supported with arms and men those Chinese generals who were willing to help her in the fight against the Nankin Government. After the Japanese commenced their operations, a part of the arms and replacements of men were coming to General Ma from Mongolia. In the future Mongolia may serve for Moscow as one of the bases from which a possible armed conflict with the Japanese may develop.

The Mongolian Government is politically and materially wholly dependent upon Moscow. Not only the political but also the whole military system of the country are organized by Moscow and subject to her control. In December 1929 Moscow sent to Urga the well known Bolshevik politician Borodin, who previously had completed a great work in Canton. He received full dictatorial powers for the final organization of military affairs in Mongolia and for the consolidation of the new political system. Being a skilful and careful politician, and familiar with the local conditions, Borodin has increased Moscow's influence in Mongolia considerably.

Since the latter part of 1929 and especially after Borodin's arrival in Urga, Moscow began to organize systematically the military affairs of Mongolia. In December 1929 the first large transports of airplanes, tanks, armored cars, trucks and approximately 2200 so called military volunteers arrived in Urga. These volunteers were recruited mainly from the representatives of Mongolian tribes living in Russia who in the USSR had gone through military training and the "political alphabet" and were then sent to Urga to reinforce the Mongolian army, into which they were infiltrated in the character of medium and high commanding personnel.

At the beginning

FROM: MA WARSAW Report No. 1529 Date: Jan.5, 1932.

At the beginning of November 1931 the head of the Mongolian government visited Moscow. The result of this visit was the conclusion of a very close military alliance between Mongolia and Moscow under which Moscow takes over the whole organization, supply and direction of military affairs in Mongolia. In the event of war by the USSR with a third power, all military formations in Mongolia, organized by the Bolsheviks, will become a part of the Red Army.

At the beginning of November 1931 very responsible military leaders were sent to Mongolia from Moscow, for the purpose of the reorganization of the Mongolian army and in order to work out on the ground war plans with consideration of all local peculiarities in the event of a possible conflict with Japan.

For the reinforcement of the Mongolian army there were sent recently to Mongolia in two transports 120 light artillery guns, 1200 machine guns, 10 airplane escadrillas, 20 tanks and 30 armored automobiles. A group of military specialists has also been left at the disposal of the Mongolian army. Further transports of military equipment to Mongolia are contemplated, for Moscow looks upon Mongolia as upon one of the possible theaters of military action in the event of war with Japan.

***

COMMENTS:

There are several things which tend to confirm this. During December there appeared in the Polish press a news item to the effect that the Soviets had signed a military treaty with Mongolia. This was not denied by the Soviets in so far as I know. Then I was informed by an independent reliable source that the Soviets had sent 100 military instructors to Mongolia. And finally in discussing this matter with Walter Duranty, he stated that practically speaking Mongolia was a part of Soviet Russia in so far as political and military affairs went. He said that to all intents and purposes the Mongolian army is and has been for several years a part of the Soviet army.

In addition an article in the Paris "Le Journal" of December 19th entitled "The Secret Action of the Soviets in the Manchurian Conflict" with the by line Saint-Brice, seems to bear out the report. This article quotes Karakhan as saying before the Polit-bureau that the Japanese operations in Manchuria had violated the "modus vivendi" existing between Soviet Russia and Japan concerning Manchuria. In this agreement the Japanese had promised not to come nearer to the Eastern Chinese Railway than 25 kilometers and not to cross the 116th meridien which separates Manchuria from Mongolia. Karakhan had said that this secret agreement was a heritage from the Czarist government, which is a rather weak argument. (See report # 1500 Index 6900, subject:"The Manchurian Situation as viewed from Moscow", this office, dated Dec.8,1931).

According to

FROM: MA WARSAW Report No. 1529 Date: Jan.5, 1932.

According to this article Voroshylov took a trenchant attitude before the Politbureau. He decried the intervention of the commissariat of foreign affairs in the question of General Blucher having furnished General Ma arms and munitions. He also growled that the Soviets had lost a wonderful opportunity to establish a well organized government from the military view point in the province of Hei-Lou-Kiang which would have been entirely under Soviet influence, adding that General Ma had always been a friend of the Soviets, as evidenced by his shooting of the White Russian General Kalmykoff. He said that now General Maawas powerless and the Soviets had lost all of northern Manchuria.

Karakhan had replied that the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs was well aware of the situation but it had been necessary above all else to avoid a conflict with Japan. He thought it would be much easier to attract the Japanese to the south towards Chin-Chow which would conserve the good relations with Japan and at the same time be certain to develop friction between the Japanese and American imperialism. They could then take advantage of that condition to reestablish their position on the Chinese Eastern Railway.

According to this article the Politbureau then adopted resolutions to support the following policies by the Commissariat of Foreign affairs :-

1. To propose to the Mongolian Government that it take the necessary measures to put its army in a good state in case of a new conflict in northern Manchuria. With this in mind the Commissariat of War is charged to send to Ulan-Bator 100 instructors chosen only from Mongolians living in Russia, 90 pieces of light artillery, 1000 machine guns and 10 equadrilles of aviation.

2. To charge the Soviet Ambassador at Tokio to negotiate with the Japanese the retirement of the Japanese troops from the Russian zone.

3. To charge the Soviet Consul General at Harbin and General Blucher to establish relations with General Ma Tchang Tchan, counselling him to follow the same policies as Tchong-Tso-Lin, ie to yield to the force of the Japanese and at the same time with the aid of Russia prepare a well organized army to give the Japanese a decisive blow at the proper time.

4. To force General Ma towards an alliance, held absolutely secret, with the Mongolian Government at Ulan-Bator but in any case not to ally with him directly in order to avoid at all costs in case of revolutions an armed conflict with Japan.

5. To charge the Russian Consul at Harbin to distribute one million roubles among the Mongolian princes with the end in view of establishing accord between them and the Government at Ulan Bator.

It is possible that the Paris Military Attache has reported the above article. The reliability of this newspaper

and

and of the author of the article is not known, but since it coincided so closely with the first report, it was decided to quote it.

Emer Yeager,
Major G.S.,
Miliyary Attache

FROM: MA WARSAW Report No. 1529 Date: Jan.5, 1932

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
JAN 8 1932
2657-S-319
2

G-2 Report.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

4-1
-6900-

WAR DEPARTMENT

RUSSIA (Combat)

Subject: Reported Soviet-Mongolian Military Agreement.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JAN 2 1932

The semi-official Gazeta Polska of November 24th carried a despatch to the effect that a military convention has been signed between the Soviets and Mongolia. According to this dispatch this new agreement strengthens that of 1926 and the Mongolian Army in case of war between Russia and a third party will become part of the Soviet Army.

I asked a prominent American newspaper man from Moscow about this and he confirmed it. It relates to what is known generally as "Outer Mongolia" and is shown on Soviet maps as the Mongolian Republic. According to him this republic is to all intents and purposes a part of the U.S.S.R. and that except theoretically its independence is pure fiction. The Japanese Military Attache also maintains that this is really a part of the U.S.S.R.

' ' ' '

Comments.

The latter has been evident for some time from the way references to this area are made in the Soviet press. It is spoken of usually as if it were an intregal part of the Union. Only when consciously speaking or writing for foreign consumption do the Soviets treat this as a separate nation.

The increasing influence of the Soviets in this area might have a considerable bearing on the initiation of the recent Japanese action in Manchuria. At least this point should not be forgotten in considering that question. The Japanese Military Attache here was quite emphatic when he discussed the Soviet influence in this area with me several months ago, long before the current Japanese action in Manchuria.

Emer Yeager,
Major, G.S.
Military Attache.

From: M.A.Warsaw, Report No 1507, Date: Dec.15,1931.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
DEC 6
2657-J-319
6900
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CONFIDENTIAL

RUSSIA (Combat)

Subject: Military Alliances and Ententes.
SOVIET RUSSIA AND MONGOLIA.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. DEC 2 1926

Special conversations are going on between the Revvoensoviet and BOYAN CHULGAN, the Mongolian representative in Russia, regarding the situation created by the withdrawal of the National Army from Kalgan, and the consequent threat to Mongolia. NIKIFOROV, the Soviet Plenipotentiary Representative in Mongolia, who was recalled to Moscow, is participating in these, and has been empowered by the Mongolian Government to make the following arrangements:

a To settle the question of immediate military assistance by the SSSR to Mongolia. The Mongolian representative at Moscow has also been instructed to take up this matter both with the Narkomindel and the Revvoensoviet.

b To arrange for the despatch to Mongolie of such articles as are necessary in view of the fact that she has suffered from military operations in the Kalgan area, and is now deprived of the possibility of obtaining imports from abroad.

c To obtain funds to organize defensive measures and to stabilize her economic and financial situation.

Negotiations are still continuing, and the following results have so far been obtained:

a PETIN, the Commander of the Siberian Military District, is to get in touch with the Commander of the Mongolian National Army, and to place at his disposal 76-mm field guns and ammunition for eight 4-gun batteries, of which three will be formed with mountain guns of a light type.

Further, as a demonstration to impress CHANG-TSO-LIN, Red forces will be concentrated during the autumn manoeuvres in the areas:

(1) Verkhne-Udinsk - Chita - Srietensk
(2) Vladivostok and the frontier.

Similar instructions will also be sent to AVKSENTIEVICH, the Commander of the Middle Asia Military District.

Should the allied Chinese generals violate Mongolian territory, the SSSR will take all possible measures to defend Mongolia, and further, should necessity arise, the SSSR will receive all Mongolian citizens, Government institutions, and property, which have to be evacuated, and look after them.

b Steps will be taken to provide Mongolia with the necessary supplies, and the larger trade organizations such as the GOSTORG with all its branches, the VTS (All-Russian Textile Syndicate), the Centrosoyuz, and the Leather Syndicate, will form a combined body to develop import and export trade with Mongolia, and by this means all the necessary materials will be quickly available.

No definite decision has been reached regarding financial aid, as the Narkomfin is discussing three alternative proposals with the S.T.O., namely:

From: M. A. Riga Report No. 5546 Date: October 29, 1926.

(1) A loan
(2) Granting of large sums on credit
(3) Increasing the SSSR capital in the Mongolian State Bank, or giving the Bank a guarantee for a certain sum.

The idea is to obtain a firm hold over Mongolian finance.

To improve communications with Mongolia, the Dobroflot opened a new air line Novosibirsk-Verkhneudinsk-Urga on August 1, with a service of 3 times weekly, maintained by three Junkers machines. It is proposed to increase later the number of these machines to 6.

Source: Reliable.

* * *

for
THEVOR W. SWETT,
Captain, General Staff,
Military Attaché.
L. R. Horth

COPIES TO:
M.I.D.....4
File.....1
M.A.Peking...1

From: M. A. Riga Report No. 5546 Date: October 29, 1926.

San Francisco (GH) 9-29-23-5M
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV
2-1 1926 2657-9-320
DEC 28
WAR DEPARTMENT

In reply refer to:

HEADQUARTERS, 30TH INFANTRY
OFFICE OF THE REGIMENTAL COMMANDER

Presidio of San Francisco, Calif.

December 21, 1926.

Subject: Special report on Chinese activities, and of Socieites concerned with Chinese matters in San Francisco.

To: The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff, Washington, D. C.

Acknowledged.

RECORD SECTION
M.I.D.
1926 DEC 28 PM 4 09
RECEIVED

1. As of possible interest, there is forwarded herewith a summary of a talk recently given by Dr Ng Poon Chew, Editor of the Chinese Daily in San Francisco, before the members of the China Society.

2. The China Society of San Francisco is composed of a hundred odd men and women of San Francisco who listen to some particular phase of the Chinese situation from selected speakers once per month. The Society does not appear to occupy a very large place in the life of the Community. Very few men or women of any social or political prominence ever attend the meetings of the society. The membership seems to be composed of those who have at one time or another visited China.

3. There are two other bodies in San Francisco, however, that are attended by men and women of high social and political standing, which concern themselves frequently with the Chinese situation.

The International Relations Committee of the Commonwealth Club, for men exclusively, is now engaged in making a special study of many phases of the Chinese situation. This Committee is conservative in its outlook. It will make a report to the Club as a whole, and throughthis medium there will be placed before some 1500, odd, men of this city a sound view of the situation. This Club offers the best medium for reaching the leaders of the business and political world of San Francisco.

The World Affairs Forum, a rcent organization, is open to both men and women. It is a growing Club and is highly intellectual. The Forum is studying the Chinese situation.

4. The Committee for Fair Play to China listens largely to radical views on the situation, and contributes, if anything, only the continuous agitation of the Chinese viewpoint on such matters as Extraterritoriality, Tariff, Concessions etc etc.

Hayes A. Kroner,
Major, 30th Infantry.

Enc 1
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTELL.
1-1 2657-9-320
DEC 28 1926
WAR DEPARTMENT

San Francisco, California.
December 21, 1926.

Summary of a talk given by Dr. Ng Poon Chew of San Francisco,

before the CHINA SOCIETY of San Francisco,

on the 20th December, 1926,

Subject:

"Recent Developments in China and their Significance".

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Biographical,-

Dr Ng Poon Chew is a Chinese resident of America, who was born in Canton some 60 years ago. He was well educated in the Chinese classics and History before his arrival in the United States. He has built up a very strong Chinese Newspaper, the CHUNG SAI YAT PO, Chinese Daily and today is the Editor and Managing Director. He is well learned in Western Literature, French, German and English; he speaks English fluently. Dr Chew appears to be an intense admirer of America, and refers with pride to the fact that his son was a Lieutenant of Artillery in the American Army in France. Dr Chew is prominent in Masonic circles, is a well know and muchly respected Chinese gentleman.

But Dr Chew is best known for the powerful influence that he wields among his Chinese compatriots in the Bay District around San Francisco, and in fact, among Chinese of the West Coast of America. His opinions are forcibly and continuously expressed in his newspaper, which is published in the Chinese written language. He is considered the leader in an internationally-political sense among the Chinese. More,-Dr Chew is known as the Americanized Chinese Champion of Chinese rights in China and in America. He is capable of maintaining stableness of thought among the Chinese community, and is just as capable of guiding that community into radical and unpeaceful ways.

Dr Chew is very vigorous for a man of his age. However, he is ably assisted by a Chinese staff on his newspaper which would carry on his policies should Dr Chew become incapacitated. He isan affable little man, of very pleasant manners who talks incessantly to those whom he likes. He is a delightful speaker, witty and versatile. He easily influences a certain type of Western mind, that knows little of the subject and prefers "hero-worship". He is particularly effective in his influence on the minds of the majority of Western Women, who appear to become highly agitated,and adoring toward the speaker and China. Dr Chew, himself, appears to be subject to certain Western influences, although not easily moved except by flattery. He is a man of considerable means, and resides in the city of Oakland. His business in in San Francisco.

Chew's talk:

Dr Chew prefaced his remarks by a brief sketch of the earlier Chinese schooling methods, and traced his own advent into American life, speaking at some length on his own admiration of things AMERICAN and on the need that China has for continuous and vigorous American Friendship.

Dr Chew's talk followed, generally, along the following lines,-

1. Revolutions in China
2. The Cantonese Successes
3. The Cantonese Government
4. The Kuomintang Principle
5. Importance of the Nationalist Movement
6. Criticism of Western Nations
7. Moral, Social and Industrial changes in China
8. Forecast of the Future
9. Intenseness of feeling of the Chinese.

1. Revolutions in China.

Dr Chew, in a hurried survey of Chinese history, said that Revolutions in China are the successful rebellions that have purified and revivified the Chinese people in their known history of 5000 years. The present day turmoil is but the continuation of the revolution of 1911, and may be described as the 28th of the MAJOR cycles of Chinese life and history. It is an historical fact that after each revolution, the Chinese have fought among themselves for from 15 to 100 years before Peace came to the people, but that a stable government always resulted, and that no critic of the Chinese people is acting fairly if he is impatient with the apparent slowness of the Chinese in evolving a stable government after the events of the last 25 years. A very appropriate Chinese proverb says"After great peace comes Turmoil; after turmoil comes Peace". In the history of no people is that saying so true as in that of the Chinese. Thepresent revolution is a repetition of history.

2. The Cantonese Successes.

Dr Chew was defiant of the historical record that no great leader had come out of the South of China to effect a change in government. He said that the successes of the Cantonese government cannot be said to be the successes of any one great leader, but that the Success already met by the Cantonese Government was gained and is still further assured by the awakening of the Kuangtung people. He mentioned the economical and political changes that had taken place in Canton. The walls of old Canton have been razed; an 150 foot boulevard had been made where the old walls once stood; over 25 miles of 80 foot roadways have been cut through the old city and that many more miles of paved raod are being arranged for; over 1900 miles of surfaced road have been built in Kuangtung; that motor cars are coming into great use and that airplanes

ing used to transport mails etc. (Dr Chew was here carried away by his enthusiasm and pictured a China with multitudes of motor busses operating between various cities, widespread use of airplanes and a nationwide scheme of road building.) Politically, Dr Chew said, the Cantonese had shown the world that the Chinese people were capable of self government.

3. The Contonese Government.

Dr Chew described it briefly as composed of 7 departments(mentioning the usual ones, omitting the Navy) with each department run bya Commission which was headed by a Commissioner; with the 7 departments recognizing the selected Commissioner as the Head of the Government. As the system becomes more widely recognized, selection will give place to popular choice, so that the Cantonese government is working for a purely representative government. The Government now is very sensitive of the feelings of the people, and no Commissioner may remain in power who becomes unpopular with the people. The Commission form of Government was not suggested to the Cantonese by the Russian Bolshevist, but was patterned after the Soviet system. China expected to adopt finally an improved form of that system.

4. The Kuomintang(Nationalist) Principle.

Dr Chew said that the Cantonese movement or the underlying Principle of the Kuomintang, Nationalist, party was radical, red and communistic.

He qualified this statement as follows;- radical, because the method for obtaining self government, a government free from Foreign domination and influence, is purely in opposition to the militaristic methods used by leaders from the North of China; red , because the spirit of the Party is intensely Chinese, China for the Chinese, and is personally and-nationally opposed to any foreign interference; communistic , because the idea to be developed is the maintenance of institutions for the few by the many and vica versa.

Dr Chew was very firm in his announcement that the Chinese are distinctly antiforeign in that there was a firm belief that the Foreign Powers had coerced China by force in the Past, and that the only way to impress the Foreign Powers with China's determination to regain her entire sovereignty was to exhibit emphatic opposition to the continuation of Foreign Privileges.

Dr Chew said that the Kuomintang idea gripped the heart of the Chinese.

5. Importance of the Nationalist Movement.

Dr Chew stated that the present effort of the Kuomintang to gain political and military victory over all other groups in China is the crystalization of all revolutionary sentiment in the minds of the Chinese people. There is no other group or party in China that has for its moving spirit the welfare of the Chinese people. All other groups, such as those controlled by Chang Tso-lin, Chang Tsung-chang, Sun Chuan-fang and Wu Pei-fu

and other Northern militarists, are entirely for selfish purposes. De Chew said that these leaders will, in the course of time, as well as their successors who follow the same course, ~~will~~ all disappear in the onward progress of the Nationalist movement. The Kuomintang means to unify the whole of China, not excluding Manchuria. That party means to set up a government patterned after the Soviet system of government, with a large measure of provincial autonomy.

Dr Chew said that the present Nationalist movement is the most important phase of all Chinese history. Its great importance lies in the fact that the aims and plans of the movement are in direct opposition to the Foreign Powers. It has found its importance in the realization of the Chinese that they have been impotent before the foreigner for many tens of years, and that the only road to national salvation lay in opposing the foreigner, and in showing the latter that the Chinese will refuse further interference in their domestic schemes. Dr Chew said that all Chinese are rapidly becoming to think exactly along these lines.

6. Criticism of Western Nations.

Dr Chew explained that the Chinese give credit to the Western Nations for having brought them to a realization of their, the Chinese, position of military inferiorty to the West. The Chinese acknowledge that the West has contributed much in the way of the educational and industrial awakening of the Chinese. There is, however, a deep rooted hatred of the methods used by the Western Nations in their demonstration of their superior strength over the Chinese. Dr Chew was more pronounced in his criticism of the European Nations than he was of the United States. He said that the Chinese cannot refrain from grouping the United States with the Foreign Powers, generally, but they realize that the United States have been the lest selfish of any of the Western Powers in their relations with the Chinese. China needs the friendship of the United States, and cares more for her friendship than that of any other Western Power.

7. Moral, Social and Industrial changes in China.

Dr Chew spoke of the great change in the family life of the Chinese whereby members of both sexes now intermingled in public. The marriage customs are being rapidly affected, so that more and more Chinese choose their own marriage mates(and he said, parenthetically, that there will be an increase in the number of divorces as well). The moral side of the Chinese has also felt the effect of the foreigner, and ~~that~~ a looser standard of morals was rapidly taking hold of the people. The industrial changes in China are the most noticeable, however. As China turns to the factory system of the West, the labor questions become more annoying. Agriculture is losing a large percentage of its labor, which is being attracted to the factories. Dr Chew said that this change indicates the probable nature of the competition that the West can expect from China in the near future.

8. Forecast of the Future.

Dr Chew said that the Nationalist campaign was now directed solely against the domestic enemies of the party; that success must be reached by the Kuomintang efforts because that party was fighting the battles of the people of China and that the Chinese wholeheartedly supported the principles of that party.

After the success of the party at home, it would next turn its attention to the Foreign Powers. Complete success at Home was not necessary before demands would be made on the Foreign Powers that they alter the unequal treaties that now exist between China and some of the Foreign Powers.

Dr Chew painted rather a gloomy picture of the future.

He said that the peace of the Pacific depended upon the stability and strength of the Chinese Nation. The Chinese people can and will, in their own time, establish just the kind of government that they want. The Chinese must be allowed to do that without any interference from the outside world. If the Nations of the West continue to insist on their preferential status vis a vis the Chinese, and if the West insists on interfering with the internal administration of the Chinese government, then the Chinese will become openly hostile to the Foreign Powers and will in time force them to accede to the Chinese position.

Dr Chew appealed to his American audience with the far-reaching question,- "If Foreign Powers were interfering with America's internal affairs, and demanded special privileges for themselves, would you not rise up and fight them?" It is the same with the Chinese, and it is the Kuomintang that is leading the people into the forceful opposition to the Foreign Powers that still maintain their preferential positions.

Dr Chew said that the Foreign nations must cancel their unequal treaties with China, they must give up their territorial concessions, they must give up the management of the Customs and Posts, they must give up the participation they have in the coastal and river trade of China. If the Foreign Powers do not change as above outlined, then the Chinese will make them do it.

History has not recorded the perpetual supremacy of the European. The military prowess of the West cannot always be supreme. The secret of the West that enabled the foreigner to "lord it" over the Chinese is now known, and there is a firm belief in the Chinese heart that they can eventually meet and master the Western peoples. Dr Chew said that many Chinese believe in the rising power of the Dark skinned races, the coming supremacy of the colored man. And if this day arrives, where China can assert herself, there will be wars without end about the Pacific.(A distinct feeling of gloom and overhanging catastrophe hung over Dr Chew's listeners at this juncture).

Dr Chew said, however, there is one bright hope and that is that the Powers of the West will see the justice of China's demands, and will meet China's position on all matters. Extraterritoriality will be shortly surrendered if Peace is to come instead of War. The Chinese have the greatest hope that the United States will continue a policy of unselfish friendship toward

the Chinese; that the United States will lead other Western Nations to adopt the concialiatory attitude toward the Chinese ambition. If this is done Peace will come, and there will be cooperation among the races.

Dr Chew again mentioned the long history of the Chinese people and said that time is hardly a question with the Chinese. Tomorrow might mean 10, 50 or 100 years to China. But "tomorrow" will find a strong, united and independent China, a China ready to fight any and all Nations for the independence of the colored people.

9. Intenseness of feeling of the Chinese.

Dr Chew spoke of the change from the passive temperament to that of one which demanded action, in the soul of the Chinese people. The education offered by the West, the industrial influence of the West was merely incidental to the progress and awakening of the Chinese. The Chinese, today, are experiencing an intenseness of feeling, that their position vis a vis the rest of the world must be altered at once. The sharp realization of the socalled inferior position of the Chinese is responsible for that intensity of feeling. There is a national demand that something be done. The Kuomintang is the natural leader in this new feeling, and the Kuomintang will continue to fight all domestic enemies, and foreign - if need be - to insure that the Chinese are treated as equals, in their own country and in all countries of the world, of any and all peoples.

Dr Chew paid his respects, in passing, to the tourists who visit China. The tourists have actually had the temerity to protest against the razing of old city walls on the grounds that China should preserve these walls as vast monuments to posterity. China, new China, cares nothing for the preservation of those monuments which everywhere indicate her former state of inferiority to the Western Nations. Walls and Palaces which stand in the way of modern roads and streets and industry must and will be done away with.

- -

Note: Dr Chew spoke to some 100 people, 90% of whom were women. The latter crowded about him with praiseworthy remarks. Most of the men are in business of importing commodities from China, and seemed the least enthusiastic over Dr Chew's remarks. No newspaper publicity was given to this talk of Dr Chw's, except that it was prominently touched upon in Dr Chew's own Chinese paper.

4-1 1 Enc

G-2 Report

1921 2657-9-32/5

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Policies of Nationalist Government.

1. Herewith is the full text of an interview given by Chang Kai-shek to the Editor of the Hankow Herald, at Nanchang, on November 19th. It is a most startling announcement of the Kuomintang program, or of Chang Kai-shek's personal conception of the program. It boldly states that the Nationalist Government will disregard all its international obligations and for the first time proclaims internationalism as an aim of the Nationalist Government. The sentiments expressed about christian missionaries gives a good intimation of the purposes of the interview, namely, favorable publicity before a large and influential class of foreigners. It is interesting to note that any taunt is flung at foreign officialdom by Chinese leaders today, but it is comforting to observe that the susceptibilities of the great American public are still being lulled by a gentle consideration of the missionary.

2. The most casual reading of the interview will show that the ideas expressed are purely Russian. It doubtless is true that Soviet representatives were present when the interview was given. Certainly there is nothing Chinese in any of the replies. No Chinese heart ever burned with sympathy for Filipinos nor for any other people under imperialist yoke; no Chinese ever fought for principles which did not provide him with actual or hoped for benefits. The interview is interesting as an expression of Russia's aspirations for a Chinese government which Moscow hopes to put in power.

John Magruder
John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache.

Distribution:
4 MID
1 CGUSAFC
1 File

RECEIVED
JAN 3 1927
G 2 W. D.

From M/ a, China. Report #5997 December 2, 1926

Peking & Tientsin Times, November 29, 1926.

Enrich
X-1 52657-8-32

KUOMINTANG'S STRATEGIC GENERAL SPEAKS.

FULL TEXT OF CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S STATEMENT.

A COMMITTEE FORM OF GOVERNMENT.

ALL FOREIGN SUPERVISION TO BE ABOLISHED.

READY FOR CONFERENCE TO DRAFT NEW TREATIES.

By Bruno Schwartz.

The revolution which is now in progress by the Nationalist Forces in China will not be completed until all existing treaties with foreign powers will have been abrogated and all Foreign Concessions returned to the Chinese Government, was a declaration made to me in a personal interview with the Commander-In-Chief of the Nationalist Army at his military headquarters at Nanchang, Kiangsi, on Friday afternoon, November 19th.

According to General Chiang Kai-shek, the conquering of Wu Pei-fu, Chang Tso-lin, Sun Chuan-fang and other northern militarists, is but a step of the immediate programme of the Northern Expedition. Hand in hand with it goes the determination to remove all supervision from Chinese administrative affairs, such as the Customs, Postal Service, Salt Gabella, to secure the return of all Foreign Concessions in the country and to declare any and all treaties with foreign power which were made with previous governments in China null and void. There will be no question of considering and revising exising treaties when the military revolution in China has been successfully completed, declared General Chiang, as all such treaties will summarily be refused recognition by the Naionalist Government.

Plan For A Committee Form Of Government.

What are your plans with regard to the form of government China will have after the revolution is completed, I asked General Chiang.

The new government will be based entirely upon the policy laid down by "The Three Peoples Principles" by D. Sun Yat-sen, he replied. It will be a Committee form of government along the same lines as exists in Russia today.

Capital At Wuchang.

Where will the Capital of the country be, was the next question.

The new capital will be at Wuchang, was his reply. The date for the removal of the bureaux of the government from Canton to Wuchang has not yet been definitely set, but it will be in the near future. General Chiang stated that he himself would come to Wuchang within two weeks, and that it is very likely once the government removes to Wuchang, that city will remain the permanent Capital of China.

Recognition Welcome, But Not Essential.

What are your intentions with regard to seeking recognition from the Foreign Powers, I next asked General Chiang.

Those who are sympathetic with us will extend us recognition without making demands for privileges in return for extending us recognition, he replied. Such friendly nations, he stated, will relinquish all their special privileges and concessions without question, and will recognize us as a friendly Power. Those who still desire to maintain their special privileges and their Concessions, and those who are not willing to co-operate with us by denouncing all existing treaties with China as unequal and making new treaties upon a basis of entire equality, will be considered by us as unfriendly, and we do not care whether they recognize us or not. Existing treaties will come to an end, however, in the immediate future, recognition or no recognition. We want to be friendly with all other nations of the world, but we are out to stamp down Imperialism, the General stated, and no unequal treaties will ever be adhered to by us for the sake of securing recognition from Powers with Imperialistic ideas.

With regard [illegible] negotiations with the [illegible] Chiang Kai-shek [illegible] Nationalist Government [illegible] and willing as [illegible] enter into conference [illegible] presentatives of the [illegible] ers in China, but [illegible] declaring that such [illegible] have to be made on [illegible] equality, entirely [illegible] privileges as have been [illegible] in the past—that [illegible] ity and similar [illegible] ment would be omitted [illegible] new treaties entirely.

Thinks Laws Will Be [illegible] All.

What about your courts of [illegible] I asked General Chiang [illegible] common knowledge to [illegible] and foreigners alike. I said [illegible] what the present courts [illegible] is something far from just [illegible] that China has no civil or [illegible] al codes which are worthy [illegible] name, and that so-called [illegible] in accordance with local [illegible] each individual village in [illegible] that almost all judges in [illegible] live on what they can get [illegible] their jobs (which are [illegible] short lived) and not on [illegible] salaries (which are usually [illegible] paid); that foreigners in the [illegible] try would be far from willing [illegible] submit to the ruling of [illegible] adequate system, and that [illegible] governments would [illegible] unwilling to make them [illegible] it as it would be [illegible]

We are prepared for that, [illegible] General Chiang in reply. [illegible] have our civil and criminal [illegible] drawn up which we are sure [illegible] be satisfactory to all. As the [illegible] volution progresses, these will [illegible] instituted, and they will not [illegible] guarantee the foreigner in China [illegible] justice in accordance with [illegible] laws, but will guarantee the Chinese people justice from the foreigner, which is more important. The beating of Chinese with impunity by foreigners, and [illegible] security of the latter in so [illegible] will be a thing of the past. [illegible] eigners who beat Chinese in [illegible] will be punished in [illegible] with our laws, declared the [illegible] tionalist chief, and such [illegible] not be looked upon with [illegible]

Abrogation Of Sino-Belgian Treaty Accord With Nationalist Policy.

What do you think of Dr. Wellington Koo's action in abrogating the Sino-Belgian Treaty, I asked General Chiang.

[illegible] Belgium which contains special privileges, he said further, and no status quo will be maintained. If Belgium wishes to enter into a new treaty, this government is willing to enter into one with her, but upon an entirely new basis. We will execute no treaties such as were signed by former governments, nor will we continue to adhere to any treaties or agreements which were made with other nations by any government in China previous to that of the Nationalist Forces. Nor will we at any time recognise any treaties made now, unless they are over the signature of the Nationalist Government.

Extrality And Foreign Concessions Must Go At Once.

What about Extraterritoriality and the Foreign Concessions, was the next question.

If Extraterritoriality continues to exist in China, and if foreign Powers continue to exercise special privileges in this country in the form of administering and owning Concessions here under their own laws and outside of the jurisdiction of the Chinese Government then the present revolution shall not be complete until these are entirely abolished, stated General Chiang. It is just as great a part of the Revolutionary movement to abolish Extraterritoriality and Foreign Concessions as it is to stamp out the northern militarists, he said further, and this Revolution will not come to an end until that has been done.

No Period Of Years Or Gradual Abolition.

Don't you think it would be more satisfactory to all concerned if the relinquishing of special privileges in China were accomplished gradually, I asked, and that it could be done with mutual satisfaction over a period of years as the Chinese government machinery developed standard of recognized efficiency.

This is not an evolutionary movement, replied Gen. Chiang. It is revolutionary. There will be no period of years, not one, or two, or three years. We small have equality and any treaties which do not give us that equality with other nations of the world shall cease to exist as far as we are concerned. There will be no probationary period of waiting from the time the revolution has become a success insofar as our military movement is concerned. There will be no years to wait for the abolition of extraterritoriality and the handing back to China of the Concessions. This will be done at once, and foreigners who wish to remain in China are cordially welcome to stay here and be governed by our laws. Nations who wish to trade with us may do so in accordance with our laws. But no one can stay in China, and no one can trade in China, and still be subject to his own laws alone without reference to the laws of the Chinese government. The idea of waiting for the abolition of these special and unequal privileges over any period of time does not meet with sympathy on our part, and we shall not submit to any such delay under any circumstances.

Is Friendly Toward Americans, But Government Is Imperialistic.

What is your attitude towards the United States, and Americans in China, I asked.

I like America and Americans, he replied, and we are glad to have nationals of your country living and trading in China.

Do you think the form of Government in the United States of America would be suitable to future China, I further inquired.

No, he said, your government in spite of its name as a democratic form of government, tends to be imperialist in nature. Our government, as I have said before, will be founded on "The Three Peoples Principles". The fact that you tell me that America is ruled by the people and is therefore a democracy does not make it so. A proper democracy does not hold possessions outside of its own territorial limits, and refuse to the people of those possessions the right to freedom and the right to govern themselves. In so doing we cannot consider America a government which respects the rights of the people, and thus it is Imperialist in nature.

Do you refer to the Philippine Islands, I asked.

Exactly so, he replied. The United States has no right to maintain its hold upon those islands outside of its territory. They are a separate people and are entitled to the right to govern themselves.

Have you ever been to the Philippines, I asked him.

No, he admitted, he had never visited the Philippines, but he knew their history and what their people wanted.

I asked General Chiang whether if they were granted independence, under present world conditions, did he not think it would be necessary for the Philippines to maintain an army and a navy of [illegible] the Islands were [illegible] continuous civil [illegible] immediate [illegible] by the mutual [illegible] races. I told him [illegible] ed the Philippines [illegible] led over almost every [illegible] far flung islands and [illegible] one race in one island [illegible] content to be ruled [illegible] any other island. [illegible] many races in these [illegible] together to form a [illegible] since the hatreds of the [illegible] against one another were [illegible]

This General Chiang dismissed as being exaggerated, and [illegible] that it had no bearing [illegible] on the right of the Philippine Islands to autonomy. The [illegible] of such statements, thought [illegible] General, was an expression of [illegible] perialist trend of mind.

Missionaries Will Continue To Be Welcome In China.

What do you think of Christianity and Missionaries in China, [illegible] questioned. Will the National Government continue to encourage Missionary activities in China, or will they be banned.

I have no quarrel with Christianity, said General Chiang, and Missionaries will always be welcome as heretofore. The elimination of missions from China is no part of our programme, and they may function in this country without interference as always.

Foreigners May Extend Industrial Enterprises.

Will the exploitation of China's natural resources be permitted by foreign companies, I asked, and will foreign industrial enterprises and factories be permitted, or is it the intention of the National Government to favour the promotion of native owned industries.

We will not solicit foreign capital for China, replied General Chiang Kai-shek. It will always be welcome here. If foreign concerns wish to continue their factories in this country, or to open any other form of industrial enterprise, it will be given our hearty support in exactly the same manner as any Chinese enterprise. But it will only be permitted provided it is profitable to the Chinese people who work in these industries. The welfare of the workers comes first in our scheme of things, equally with the welfare of the enterprise itself.

[illegible]

General Chiang,

As your armies gradually cover more territory it is probably necessary for you to take into your ranks many of your former enemy troops, I suggested. Is it not very likely that with the continual addition of such troops your former enemies will out-number your own southern forces in your own ranks, and that eventually your forces will split and you will have a counter revolution on your hands?

There is no such possibility, he replied. In the first place, we do not take over our former enemy troops. Many generals in China are now sending delegates to us asking us to take their forces into our army, but we shall refuse to do so. We defeat and disarm our enemies, and after that is accomplished, such individual soldiers who care to join our army make application to do so. We examine them, and if we think they are the right sort of material we take them in. We do not take all, nor many of them, by any means. Then they are given a course of education in the "Three Peoples Principles" of Dr. Sun Yat Sen. They are thus made one of us, and then distributed among our own forces, individually, and not in groups. Thus they learn our motives and principles, and make any idea of split in our ranks or counter revolution entirely out of the range of possibility.

Most of these former enemy troops who join our forces are used in the building of roads, added General Chiang, and not in actual warfare.

Does Not Fear That Ignorant Labour Will Impede The Revolution.

By giving the labouring masses as much power as your Government is allowing them at present, and stirring them up by means of propaganda which is so ultra-revolutionary in nature, is it not possible that your labour will eventually attain so much control over your movement that it will dominate you completely and possibly impede your movement when it opposes your own plans?

This is also extremely unlikely, he said. We have no fear of our labouring classes. We work with them, and teach them and train them. Our system is for the people, not over the people, and if we continue to lead them right and train them right, there will be no fear of opposition.

[illegible]

What will become of General Liu Yu-chun, who was captured in Wuchang, I then asked.

He will not be tried by a military court, answered General Chiang, but by a tribunal of the people. He has held the city and the people of Wuchang shall be his judge.

Co-operation Between Nationalists And Feng Yu-hsiang.

Is it true that General Feng Yu-hsiang has joined hands with the Nationalist movement, and has agreed to co-operate with you in an offensive against Peking?

That is true, he replied, General Feng Yu-hsiang has become a member of our party, and he and his troops are assisting us now. They will join us in our offensive against Peking in the very near future.

Northern Generals Seek Entry Into Nationalist Forces.

I then asked whether it was true that Generals Wei Y-san, Tien Wei-chien and Chin Yun-ao had sent delegates to Hankow in an endeavour to negotiate terms of peace with the Nationalist Forces.

Not exactly, smiled General Chiang. They have sent delegates to ask us to take them and their armies into our forces.

Will you do that?

We have not decided on any such move, replied the General.

More Railways Are Of Utmost Importance.

What are you going to do about improving communications in China, if anything, I asked.

That is a question I am glad you have asked, replied General Chiang. Railways in China have been too long neglected. It will be our first and most important work to build railway systems which will link up the various provinces of our country. And the first step in this connection will be the improving of our present railway from Hankow south, and the completion of this line all the way from Hankow to Canton.

Will this connect with the Peking-Hankow Line?

Decidedly. We shall build a bridge across the Yangtze River which will carry our trains from the extreme north to the extreme south of China. This railway and this bridge, are first on the programme on the plans for construction and reconstruction of our communications systems.

[illegible]

Will your revolution [illegible] plete, I asked, when the [illegible] ists in China have [illegible] when the Concessions are [illegible] to Chinese jurisdiction [illegible] extraterritoriality shall [illegible] abolished in China. In [illegible] words, is it the object of [illegible] volution to carry out its [illegible] within the boundaries of [illegible] or is it moulded on the [illegible] of Soviet Russia, to extend [illegible] propaganda into other countries? Is this revolution in China the beginning of a world movement on your part, or will you be satisfied if you have removed "Imperialism" and "Militarism" from China?

This revolution is not the end but merely the beginning, [illegible] the startling reply of General Chiang Kai-shek. There are other nations in the world to-day [illegible] are burdened under the yoke of "Imperialism". It is true that this revolution is now taking place in China, but there are other countries where it must take place as well. Such revolutions for freedom of other oppressed peoples, will have to come after China is but one country. There are many more in which "Imperialism" must be crushed before the world will be at peace.

Continued in type - next page.

THE PERSONALITY OF GENERAL CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

Despite the plentiful reports which Reuters and a number of Japanese news agencies have graciously circulated for the benefit of Marshals Sun Chuan-fang and Wu Pei-fu, to the effect that General Chiang Kai-shek is as "dead as a doornail" -- that the latter has at odd times been "wounded", been "seriously wounded", has been "mortally wounded" and has finally "died of wounds", it is a fact all these tales are merely propaganda originating at the headquarters of the various northern warlords, absolutely without foundation.

For one who is dead, General Chiang Kai-shek seemed extremely healthy and in good spirits when I met him last Friday afternoon in Nanchangchang. He has not been wounded, has not yet died, and the afternoon I saw him had just returned from addressing a mass meeting in one of the public squares.

He wears no uniform, and dresses simply in the same manner as the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen, without decoration and without insignia. He is very easy to interview, without affectation, and talks directly to the point without evasion no matter how startling his statements must be, as will be seen from the forgoing replies he has given to my questions.

He is very young for the position he holds, but thirty-eight years of age, a native of Chekiang Province. He has received his military education at Paoting Military Academy and in Japan, and is attended at Nanchang by a great number of Russian military advisers who are almost constantly with him.

He has a great amount of personal bravery, as he attends public meetings and travels through the streets with practically no bodyguard beyond a soldier or two. The statements which he has made in this first and exclusive interview, to the Hankow Herald, should give the Powers an idea of the purpose of the present Nationalist Revolution.-- Hankow Herald.

4-1 1927 2657-D-321 3010 WAR DEPART

G-2 Report

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Kuomintang (Nationalist) Government.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAR 15 1927

1. Herewith is a diagram showing the organization of the Left Wing of the Kuomintang Party from which has developed the so-called Nationalist Government, the mouthpiece of the Nationalist movement in China. The organization is shown only in skeleton form since much of the personnel is not definitely known. It should be noted that the power fell into the hands of the Left Wing of the Party as a result of a coup d'etat by Chiang Kai-shek in the spring of 1926. At this time he controlled the Central Executive Committee and was a virtual dictator. Most of the active members of the Right Wing fled to Shanghai. In the Central Executive Committee resides all the power of the organization and, since there has been no Kuomintang Congress since 1924, it now does not even hold a mandate from the Kuomintang Party.

2. An examination of the diagram is informing in view of Eugene Chen's absurd claim that his government is the government of China, and his entirely misleading intimations that his government is in any sense representative of the people of China. The Kuomintang has always been a political group which had an influence out of all proportion to its military strength. It is the only political group with a policy and which, in the Western sense, approaches to a political party. It may also be said to voice the aspirations of the majority of modern, thinking Chinese. However, Kuomintang has always been dominated by a relatively small group of leaders and, with a few exceptions, by a group as selfish and as materialistic as the average of Northern militarists. To say Kuomintang represents or holds any sort of mandate from the people is of course wholly misleading. Kuomintang has always consisted of shrewd politicians, political visionaries, a few honest patriots, and men generally too impractical to hold armies together. Their hatred of the Northern militarists is natural since the latter have always blocked Kuomintang schemes. It would be questionable to assert that in the past, ignorance, greed, and lack of constructive vision of Northern militarists has been more damaging to China than the brilliantly conceived schemes of the Kuomintang for creating situations from which material benefits flowed to members of Kuomintang.

3. However this may be, it should be noted that Eugene Chen's government is a creature of the Central Executive Committee, which at present is a radical-dominated creature of the Left Wing of Kuomintang, which latter Wing came into power through a military coup d'etat of Chiang Kai-shek. Wholly aside from the Russian features superimposed on the organization, it would be difficult indeed to trace any connection between the Nationalist Government and the Chinese people, even though it does voice Chinese aspirations.

4. The system of paralleling all military units with political commissars is, of course, purely Russian and is proving distasteful to the older Chinese military commanders. The system temporarily, however, gives tremendous power to Borodin and Galen who dominate the Central Executive Committee. The allotment of Russian money and war material is in Borodin's hands; the Communist Party and the agitational agencies of the Political Bureau also are directed by him. These two

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Kuomintang (Nationalist) Government.

levers, combined with the political commissar system, place Borodin in a position of influence greater than any individual Chinese member of the Central Executive Committee. A fight between the military leaders and the radical politicians dominated by the Russians seems inevitable, and will probably be the cause of very important developments in the South.

John Magruder

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

Distribution:
4 MID
1 Legation
1 Tientsin
1 MID

Kuomintang Party

Left Wing

Other parties and groups of various shades of radicalism.

Communist Party: Small at present. Has one or two members in C.E.C. All subscribe to Kuomintang principles.

Central Executive Committee

This is the supreme council consisting of about 35 members elected by the Congress of the Kuomintang held in Canton in 1924. It is now self perpetuating. Borodin and Galen are advisors to this whole committee, but particularly to the political and military bureaus respectively. A standing committee of 9 members is the influential group.

Right Wing

Nationalist Government elected by C.E.C. from its members

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Eugene Chen
" " Finance, T.V. Soong
" " Communications Sun Fo

Kuominchun Allied Forces

Military	Political
Feng Yu-hsiang, C. in C. Meng Chih-chung, C. of S. 10 Army Corps Commanders	Li Shih-tsung This bureau parallels military units and has branches as low as regiments acting as political teachers and checking agents. (Commissars)

Hunan-Hupei Armies

Military	Political
Tang Sheng-chih Closely associated with Chiang Kai-shih although hardly a subordinate.	

Chiang Kai-shih's Forces

Military	Political
Chiang Kai-shih	Chen Ming-shu

WAR DEPARTMENT
MAR 9 1927
265-J-32/5
4-1

G-2 Report

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Kuomintang (Nationalist) Government.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 16 1927

1. The accompanying clipping supplements Report No. 6063 and is a very comprehensive explanation of the Kuomintang organization, giving the composition of the various committees. I got Mr. Schwartz, Editor of the Hankow Herald, to prepare this from data which he obtained from the Nationalist Government.

2. This paper also explains some of the political significance of the meetings of the Central Executive Committee during the first weeks in March, during which certain committees were reorganized and the extremists at Hankow clearly demonstrated their control. It will be seen what an "interlocking directorate" affair the C.E.C. really is.

3. Hsu Chien, Teng Yen-Ta, Sun Fo are Communists and several other members of the Standing Committee are extremists. There is no doubt whatsoever that Borodin dominates them.

John Magruder
John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

Distribution:
4 MID
1 File

From M/A, China Report No.7004 April 1, 1927



tionalist Government and the Government Ministries.

In the above are seen five Ministries, although only four have actually been elected. At the present time there is no Ministry of Labor, but since it has been announced by the Government that a Minister of Labor will shortly be appointed, this Ministry has been included.

Until last Friday, General Chiang Kai-shek had been Chairman of the three most important Committees under the Central Executive Committee. He was Chairman of the Political Council, Chairman of the Standing Committee and Chairman of the Military Council. At last Friday's session of the Central Executive Committee, the position of "Chairman" of all Committees of the Kuomintang and of the Nationalist Government was abolished, and in its place was instituted a system of "Board of Chairmen". The purpose of this move was to curtail the power of any single individual of any Committee, and to diffuse

The Standing Committee of the Central Executive Council of the Kuomintang is composed of the following nine members:— Wong Ching-wei, Tan Yen-kai, Chiang Kai-shek, Koo Meng-yu, Sun Fo, Tan Ping-shan, Chen Kung-po, Hsu Chien and Wu Yu-chang.

This Committee shall, during the interval between the General Meetings of the C. E. C. (three months), exercise supreme authority as regards party affairs and political and military matters. Except in the case of Party affairs which shall be dealt with directly by the Standing Committee, shall be turned over to the Nationalist Government for execution.

Ministers Of C. E. C.

The following Ministers of the Central Executive Committee were elected:— Wong Ching-wei, Minister of Organization Affairs, Koo Meng-yu, Minister of Propaganda, Teng Yen-ta, Minister for Farmers' Affairs. Chen Kung-po, Minister

General Meeting of the C. E. C. This Commission consists of ten military men and six members of the Central Executive Committee, who are:— Gen. Yen Yen-hsi, Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang, Gen. Tang Sen-chi, Gen. Chen Chien, Gen. Li

Chen Chien, Mr. Teng Yen-ta and Dr. Hsu Chien.

It is to be noted that practically all the military men elected to serve on the Commission are Army Corps Commanders of the Nationalist Forces.

Committee Of Nationalist Government

This Committee consists of 28 members, appointed by the General Meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang. During the interval between the General Meetings, however, the Standing Committee exercises the authority of making such appointments, but they must be approved by the next General Meeting. The present Committee of the Nationalist Government consists of:— Wong Ching-wei, Gen. Tan Yen-kai, Yu Yu-yin, Gen. Chen Chien, Sun Fo, Gen. Li Chung-ren, Wang Shao-hsiung, Soong Tse-wen, Gen. Chu Pei-teh, Gen. Li Chi-sun, Gen. Tang Sen-chi, Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang, Chen Yu-ren, Koo Meng-yu, Tang Ping-shan, Kung

[illegible] Ministers for the K. C.

The following Ministers of the Central Executive Committee were elected:— Wang Ching-wei, Minister of Organization Affairs, Koo Meng-yu, Minister of Propaganda, Tang Yen-ta, Minister for Farmers' Affairs, Chen Kung-po, Minister for Labor Affairs, Chen Chi-hwen, Minister for Merchants' Affairs, Sun Fo, Minister for Young Men's Affairs, Mrs. Liao Chung-kai, Minister for Women's Affairs, Peng Chieh-ming, Minister for Overseas' Affairs.

Commission On Political Affairs

The Commission on Political Affairs is composed of fifteen members, consisting of the entire body of the members of the Standing Committee and six additional members and/or deputies of the Central Executive Committee, elected to serve in the Commission by the General Meeting of the Central Executive Committee. These six members are :— Soong Tse-wen, Chen Yu-ren, Tang Yen-ta, Liao Tse-han, Wang Fah-chan, Mrs. Sun Yat-sen.

The Board of Chairmen for the Commission on Political Affairs is composed of :— Wang Ching-wei, Tsai Yen-kai, Sun Fo, Koo Meng-yu, Wu Chien, Soong Tse-wen and Tan Ping-chan.

Commission On Military Affairs

A Commission on Military Affairs has been created by the present [illegible] Commission [illegible] Chiang-wei, Gen. [illegible] Yu-jen, Gen. Chen [illegible] Fo, Gen. Li Chung-jen, Wang Shao-hsiung, Soong Tse-wen, Gen. Chu Pei-teh, Gen. Li Chi-sum, Gen. Tang [illegible], Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang, Chen [illegible], Koo Meng-yu, Tang [illegible] Kang, Yang Sun [illegible] Wen-hwei, Gen. Ho Yung-chien, Gen. Ho Yu-fan, Peng Chieh-min, Ching Han-i, Mrs. Sun Yat-sen, Wang Fah-chan, Wu Yu-hang and Gen. Chen Tien-yuan.

The Standing Committee of the Nationalist Government [illegible] Wang Ching-wei, [illegible] Fo, Han Chien and Soong Tse-wen.

Five Bills Passed

At the third session of the General Meeting of the C.E.C., five important bills were brought up by the Bill-Drafting Committee and were passed. One of them concerns the constitution of the forces of the Revolution, while another is on the necessity of organizing the more [illegible] Government, namely the Ministry of Labor, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Industry and Ministry of Sanitation. Two of the bills deal with Kuomintang affairs in Inner and Outer Mongolia.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
JUN 8 1927
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Reports

2657-D-321
3010

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Kuomintang (Nationalist) Government.

2657-D-321 (3)
RECEIVED G/2 W.D. JUN 2 1927

1. Reference Report No. 7004, following is a list showing the Communists, marked "C", and others. Those marked "N" are Kuomintang Nationalists and vary in degree of radicalism; those marked "E.N." are extreme Nationalists, tending toward communism. All members of the Government either are left or center wing of Kuomintang, all right wing members having been forced into the protection of foreign concessions.

Standing Committee of the Central Executive Council of Kuomintang.

Wang Ching-wei	C
T'an Yen-kai	N
Chiang Chieh-shih	E.N.
Ku Meng-yü	C
Sun Fo	C
T'an P'ing-shan	C
Ch'en Kung-po	C
Hsü Ch'ien	C
Wu Yu-chang	E.N.

Ministers of Central Executive Committee.

Wang Ching-wei	- Minister of Organization Affairs	C
Ku Meng Yü	- Minister of Propaganda	C
Teng Yen-ta	- Minister for Farmers' Affairs	C
Ch'en Kung-po	- Minister for Labor Affairs	C
Ch'en Ch'i-kuan	- Minister for Merchants' Affairs	E.N.
Sun Fo	- Minister for Young Men's Affairs	C
Mrs. Liao Chun-k'ai	- Ministress for Women's Affairs	C
P'ang Chieh-ming	Minister for Overseas Affairs	N

Commission on Political Affairs.

Composed of all members of Standing Committee and

Sung Tse-wen (T.V. Soong)	E.N.
Ch'en Yu-jen (Eugene Chen)	E.N.
Teng Yen-ta	C
Lin Tsu-han	C
Wang Fah-ch'in	E.N.
Mrs. Sun Yat-sen	E.N.

Board of Chairmen for the Commission on Political Affairs.

Wang Ching-wei	C
T'an Yen-kai	N
Sun Fo	C
Ku Meng Yü	C
Hsü Ch'ien	C
Sung Tse-wen	E.N.
T'an P'ing-shan	C

From M/A, China Report No. 7008 April 5, 1927

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Kuomintang (Nationalist) Government.

Commission on Military Affairs.

T'an Yen-kai	N
Feng Yu-hsiang	N
T'ang Sheng-chih	E.N.
Ch'eng Ch'ien	N
Li Tsung-jen	N
Ho Ying-chun	N
Li Chi-chen	N
Chu P'ei-te	N
Chang Fah-k'uei	E.N.
Chiang Chieh-shih	E.N.

(The above are all militarists)

Wang Ching-wei	C
Sun Fo	C
Ku Meng-yü	C
Teng Yen-ta	C former militarist
Hsü Ch'ien	C
Sung Tse-wen (T. V. Soong)	E.N.

Board of Chairmen.

Wang Ching-wei	C
T'an Yen-kai	N
Chiang Chieh-shih	E.N.
T'ang Sheng-chih	E.N.
Ch'eng Ch'ien	N
Teng Yen-ta	C
Hsü Ch'ien	C

Committee of National Government.

Wang Ching-wei	C
Li Chi-chen	N
T'an Yen-kai	N
T'ang Shengh-chih	E.N.
Yü Yu-jen	N
Feng Yu-hsiang	N
Ch'eng Ch'ien	N
Ch'en Yu-jen	E.N.
Sun Fo	C
Ku Meng-yu	C
Li Tsung-jen	N
T'an P'ing-shan	C
Wang Shao-hsiung	?
K'ung Keng	?
Sung Tse-wen	E.N.
Yang Shu-chuang	?
Chu P'ei-te	N
Pai Wen-wei	N
Niu Yung-chien	?
Ho Ying-chun	N
P'ang Chieh-ming	N
Ching Han I	?
Mrs. Sun Yat-sen	E.N.
Wang Fah-ch'in	E.N.
Wu Yu-chang	E.N.
Ch'en T'iao-yuan	N

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Kuomintang (Nationalist) Government.

Standing Committee of Nationalist Government.

Wang Ching-wei	C
T'an Yen-kai	N
Sun Fo	C
Hsü Ch'ien	C
Sung Tse-wen (T.V. Soong).	E.N.

Ministry of Nationalist Government.

1. Foreign Affairs	- Ch'en Yu-jen.	E.N.
2. Justice	- Hsü Ch'ien	C
3. Finance	- Sung Tse-wen.	E.N.
4. Communications	- Sun Fo.	C
5. Labor	?	

John Magruder
John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

Distribution:
4 MID
1 Legation
1 Tientsin
1 File

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
AUG 1927
2657-D-321
MIO
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Kuomintang (Nationalist) Government at Nanking.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. AUG 9 1927

1. The following official notification issued by Mr. Quo Tai-chi, Chiang Kai-shek's appointee as Commissioner of Foreign Affairs at Shanghai, announced the birth of the third government in China claiming recognition from the Powers:

"In accordance with the resolution passed by the Political Council of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang of China, the Nationalist Government has made Nanking the Capital, and has started to function on April 18".

2. The "legality" of the Nanking Government is neither greater nor less than that of the Peking or Nanking governments. It came into being as a result of Chiang Kai-shek's growing resentment at the restrictions placed upon his powers by the Russian and Chinese Communist dominated Central Executive Committee at Hankow. Hankow knows what the Directory learned during Napoleon's Italian campaigns - that "A peoples army is invincible, but it is dangerous unless its officers are genuinely devoted to the government". Conscious of his military strength and more deeply imbued with feudalism than with the genuine revolutionary spirit, Chiang Kai-shek gathered about him all those factions of the Kuomintang Party who were out of favor with the extremist Hankow clique due either to political or personal differences. Having commanded the armies which permitted Kuomintang influence to expand, and having secured the revenues of Kiangsu he began to suppress Communists and labor agitators, and the break with Hankow was widened.

3. A series of conferences in Shanghai following Wang Ching-wei's arrival from exile on April 3, 1927, indicated how the ground lay. A varied group of Kuomintang leaders attended the conference, among whom were Wang Ching-wei, T. V. Soong, Hu Han-ming, Tsai Yuan-pei, Wu Tzu-hui, and Li Shih-tsen. C. C. Wu closely followed the meetings but the ill-feeling caused by his expulsion from Canton had yet to be healed. It was the will of the moderates, who were in the majority at these meetings, to break with the Hankow radicals, repair to Nanking and call a Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang Party on April 15, 1927, and to reconstitute a governing body purged of extremists and communists.

4. In spite of the failure to secure a quorum for the meeting it was held nevertheless. Chiang Kai-shek felt himself strong enough to over-ride technicalities, and the formation of the government was announced as of April 18th. Meanwhile Wang Ching-wei had gone to Hankow, T. V. Soong remained in Shanghai and the reconciliation between C. C. Wu and Chiang Kai-shek was being laboriously patched up.

5. It has not been possible to obtain a complete list of members of the Kuomintang Party who attended the Nanking meetings, nor can any specific information be obtained as to the complete personnel of the present Nanking Government. Whether or not the committee form of government introduced by Soviet Russia into the Kuomintang Party and employed at Hankow has been retained by Chiang Kai-shek is not known. The truth is inescapable that Nanking is a dictatorship established by Chiang Kai-shek

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Kuomintang (Nationalist) Government at Nanking.

with the concurrence and assistance of certain moderates acceptable to the dictator. The organization of the government is understood by neither Chinese nor foreigners. Like all typical Chinese institutions there is no clear-cut organization and none is to be expected to emerge from the confusion of the present Nanking regime.

6. The following personnel only is known to be active in the government:

Chiang Kai-shek - Title unknown but actually military dictator.
C. C. Wu - Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Chien Yung-ming - Assistant Minister of Finance.

No designations can be assigned to the following, but these may be expected to hold key positions:

Wu Chih-hui	Yeh Ch'u-tsang
Ch'en Ming-shu	Kan Nai-kuang
T'sai Yuan-p'u	Li Chun-p'ei
Li Shih-tseng	Liu T'ing
Ch'en Kou-fu	Hu Han-min
	Tai T'ien-ch'eng

7. In assuming office as Minister of Foreign Affairs, C. C. Wu announced the policy of his government in moderate language. In brief, he stated that force would not be used in redressing outstanding inequalities and differences between the Powers and China; that at a suitable time he would propose the abrogation of unequal treaties; that meanwhile life and property of foreigners in China would be afforded such protection as is recognized in international law.

John Magruder
John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

Distribution:
4 MID
1 Tientsin
1 File

MIL. INTEL. DIV.
NOV 14 1928
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

3100 Functions of Governing Body

CHINA(Political)

Subject: "The Organic Law of the National Government of the Republic of China."

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. NOV 13 1928

1. The Organic Law of the National Government of the Republic of China having been formally adopted by the Central Political Council was referred to the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang on October 3rd. The latter body ratified the document and promulgated it at ten o'clock p.m. the same day. The complete document as reported by Reuters is attached hereto in the form of clippings.

2. In adopting the Organic Law, the Central Executive Committee further resolved as follows:

"In order that the Kuomintang shall carry out the Three People's Principles in accordance with Dr. Sun Yat-sen's 'Fundamentals of National Reconstruction' and to train the people in the exercising of their political power during the period of political tutelage until the inauguration of a period of constitutionalism when a Democratic Government shall have been realised, the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee decided on the following fundamental principles.

1. During the period of political tutelage the Nationalist Congress of Kuomintang delegates shall represent the National Convention in guiding the people and exercising political sovereignty.

2. At the adjournment (of the Annual Session) of the Nationalist Congress of Kuomintang delegates the political power shall be vested in the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang and exercised by the Committee.

3. The people shall be gradually trained to exercise their four political rights, namely election, recall, initiative and referendum.

4. The five political powers of the Government, namely, Execution, Legislation, Judiciary, Examination and Supervision shall be vested in the Government Council of the Nationalist Government which shall have complete authority to exercise them so as to build the foundation for Government by popular election during the period of constitutionalism.

5. The Central Executive Committee and the Central Political Council shall direct and supervise the Government Council in the execution of important national affairs.

6. The revision and interpretation of the law governing the Reorganization of the Nationalist Government shall be decided and carried out by the Central Executive Committee and the Central Political Council."

John Magruder
John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

Distribution:
4 MID
1 Tientsin
1 File

From M/A, China Report No. 7338 October 9, 1928

Encl 1
DEPT. OF STATE
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
6S7-D-321
DEPARTMENT

[illegible]

[illegible] the people.

Accordingly the [illegible] in fulfilling [illegible] direction and [illegible] the Nationalist [illegible] developing upon it by [illegible] its history [illegible] and promulgates this law governing the organization of the Nationalist government.

The Organization Law

[illegible] National government [illegible] of the [illegible] and shall have supreme command of the land, naval and air forces, and shall have the power to declare war, negotiate peace, conclude treaties and shall exercise the power of granting amnesties, pardons and reprieves and the restitution of civic rights.

"The National government shall be composed of five *yuan*, executive, legislative, judicial, examination and control. There shall be a president and from 12 to 16 state councillors of the National government from which the presidents and vice-presidents of the five *yuan* shall be appointed.

President Heads Gov't.

"The president of the National government shall represent the government in receiving foreign diplomats and in officiating over and participating in state functions. The president shall concurrently be the commander-in-chief of the land, naval and air forces. If the president is unable to discharge his duties through any cause whatsoever the president of the executive *yuan* shall act.

[illegible] shall [illegible] through [illegible] which the [illegible] National [illegible] the chairman [illegible] which cannot be [illegible] between two or [illegible] shall be referred to the council for decision. All laws promulgated and all [illegible] issued by virtue of a decision of the state council shall be signed by the president of the National government and shall be countersigned by the presidents of the five *yuan* and of the five-*yuan* [illegible] according to law, issue orders.

Executive Yuan

"The executive *yuan* shall be the highest executive organ of the National government and shall have a president and vice-president, the latter substituting in the absence of the president. The executive *yuan* shall establish ministries to which will be entrusted various executive duties and may appoint commissions for specified executive matters. The ministries shall each have a minister, a political vice-minister and an administrative vice-minister and the various commissions shall each have a chairman and vice-chairman. All of whom shall be appointed and removed by the National government at the instance of the president of the executive *yuan*. The ministers and chairman may when necessary attend meetings of the state council and the legislative *yuan*, and the executive *yuan* may introduce in the legislative *yuan* bills on matters within its competence. The meetings of the executive *yuan* shall be attended by the president, vice-president, ministers and chairmen of commissions thereof and shall decide legislative bills which may be introduced into the legislative *yuan*.

[illegible] to the [illegible] and also [illegible] ment of disagreement [illegible] fields above third class [illegible] and also all matters which cannot be settled between various ministries and commissions of the executive *yuan* and all matters which [illegible] ing to law or in the opinion of the president [illegible] ed at such [illegible] various ministries [illegible] missions of the [illegible] may, according [illegible] orders. The [illegible] the executive *yuan* [illegible] various [illegible] missions shall be [illegible] by law.

"The legislative *yuan* shall be the highest legislative organ of the National government and shall have power to decide upon legislation, budgets, amnesties, declarations of war, peace negotiations and treaties and other conclusion of important international matters. It shall have a president, vice-president [illegible] composed of from [illegible] to be appointed by the National government at the instance of the president of the said *yuan*. Members' term of office shall be two years. Members shall not concurrently be non-political or administrative officials of various organs of central or local governments.

"All resolutions passed by the legislative *yuan* shall be decided upon and promulgated by the state council. The organization of the legislative *yuan* shall be determined by law.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

6-1 12657-9.321
1928 3190 10
NOV 30
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Personnel of New National Government.

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. NOV 27 1928

1. Following is a list of appointees in the National Government complete to date, so far as known:

Government Council (16 Members)

President - Gen. Chiang Kai-shek
Members - Gen. Tan Yen-kai
Gen. Hu Han-min
Mr. Chang Chi
Mr. Tai Chi-tao
Dr. Wang Chung-hui
Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang
Mr. Sun Fo
Mr. Chen Ku-fu
Gen. Chang Hsueh-liang
Gen. Ho Ying-ching
Gen. Li Tsung-jen
Admiral Yang Shu-chuang
Gen. Yen Hsi-shan
Gen. Li Chi-shen
Mr. Lin Shen

Chief Secretary of the Government:
Mr. Koo Ying-feng

Administrative Yuan - (Executive Council)

Director - Gen. Tan Yen-kai
Vice Director - Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang

Minister of:
Foreign Affairs - Dr. C. T. Wang
Finance - Mr. T. V. Soong
Military Affairs - Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang
Agriculture & Mining - Mr. Yi Pei-chi
Labor and Industry - Mr. H. H. Kung
Education - Dr. Chiang Meng-ling
Railways - Mr. Sun Fo
Home Affairs - Gen. Yen Hsi-shan
Communications - Mr. Wang Po-chun
Health - Mr. Hsueh Tu-pi

Legislative Yuan

Director - Gen. Hu Han-min
Vice Director - Mr. Lin Shen

Judicial Yuan

Director - Dr. Wang Chung-hui
Vice Director - Mr. Chang Chi

From M/A, China Report No. 7356 October 24, 1928

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Personnel of the New National Government.

Examination Yuan

Director - Mr. Tai Chi-tao
Vice Director - Mr. Sun Fo

Supervisory (Control) Yuan

Director - Mr. Tsai Yuan-pei
Vice Director - Mr. Chen Ku-fu

2. The following appointments have been made but no offices in the government, as defined in the organic law, seem to be provided for them. It is believed that they are offices, perhaps temporary, especially provided for the incumbents who are important enough to have high titles and yet, as a matter of face, cannot accept positions under the Ministry of Military Affairs:

Chief Military Adviser (Chief of Staff)
Gen. Li Chai-sum (Li Chi-shen)

Chairman of Military Council
Gen. Li Tsung-jen

Director of Military Training
Gen. Ho Ying-chin

John Magruder,
John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

Distribution:
4 MID
1 Tientsin
1 File

ORGANIC LAW

OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

of the

REPUBLIC OF CHINA

4-1
Enel
2657-D-321
13

ORGANIC LAW

OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

of the

REPUBLIC OF CHINA

4-1
Encl
2657-D-321
13

DR. SUN YAT-SEN'S WILL

For forty years I have devoted myself to the cause of the people's revolution with but one end in view, the elevation of China to a position of freedom and equality among the nations. My experiences during these forty years have firmly convinced me that to attain this goal we must bring about a thorough awakening of our own people and ally ourselves with those peoples of the world who treat us on the basis of equality so that they may co-operate with us in our struggles.

The work of the Revolution is not yet accomplished. Let all our comrades follow my "Plans for National Reconstruction," "Fundamentals of National Reconstruction," "Three Principles of the People," and the "Manifesto" issued by the First National Convention of our Party, and strive on earnestly for the consummation of the end we have in view. Moreover, our recent declarations in favour of the convocation of a National Convention and the abolition of unequal treaties should be carried into effect with the least possible delay. This is my heartfelt charge to you.

SUN WEN

Written on February 20, 1925.

ORGANIC LAW

OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

OF

THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

(TRANSLATION)

(Promulgated at Nanking on October 4th, 1928)

The Kuomintang of China, in order to establish the Republic of China on the basis of the Three Principles of the People and the Constitution of Five Powers, which form the underlying principle of the Revolution, having conquered all opposition by military force and having now brought the Revolution from the military stage to the educative stage, deem it necessary to construct a framework for the Constitution of Five Powers with a view to developing the ability of the people to exercise political power, so that constitutional government may soon come into existence and political power be restored to the people; and, further, in virtue of the responsibilities hitherto entrusted to the Party for the guidance and supervision of the Government, do hereby ordain and promulgate the following Organic Law of the National Government:

CHAPTER I.

THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

Article 1.—The National Government shall exercise all the governing powers of the Republic of China.

Article 2.—The National Government shall have the supreme command of the land, naval, and air forces.

Article 3.—The National Goverment shall have the power to declare war, to negotiate peace, and to conclude treaties.

Article 4.—The National Government shall exercise the power of granting amnesties, pardons, reprieves, and restitution of civic rights.

Article 5.—The National Government shall be composed of the following five *Yuan:* the Executive *Yuan,* the Legislative *Yuan,* the Judicial *Yuan,* the Examination *Yuan,* and the Control *Yuan.*

Article 6.—There shall be a President and from twelve to sixteen State Councillors of the National Government.

Article 7.—The Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the Five *Yuan* shall be appointed from among the State Councillors of the National Government.

Article 8.—The President of the National Government shall represent the National Government in receiving foreign diplomatic representatives and in officiating or participating in State functions.

Article 9.—The President of the National Government shall concurrently be the Commander-in-Chief of the land, naval, and air forces of the Republic of China.

Article 10.—In case the President of the National Government is unable to discharge his duties from any cause whatsoever, the President of the Executive *Yuan* shall act in his place.

Article 11.—The National Government shall conduct national affairs through the State Council.

The State Council shall be composed of the State Councillors of the National Government, and the President of the National Government shall be the Chairman of the State Council.

Article 12.—All matters which cannot be settled between two or more of the *Yuan* shall be referred to the State Council for decision.

Article 13.—All laws promulgated and all mandates issued by virtue of a decision of the State Council shall be signed by the President of the National Government and countersigned by the Presidents of the Five *Yuan*.

Article 14.—Each of the Five *Yuan* may, according to law, issue orders.

CHAPTER II.

THE EXECUTIVE *YUAN*

Article 15,—The Executive *Yuan* shall be the highest executive organ of the National Government.

Article 16,—The Executive *Yuan* shall have a President and a Vice-President.

In case the President is unable to discharge his duties from any cause whatsoever, the Vice-President shall act in his place.

Article 17,—The Executive *Yuan* shall establish Ministries to which shall be entrusted the various executive duties.

The Executive *Yuan* may appoint Commissions to take charge of specified executive matters.

Article 18,—The Ministries of the Executive *Yuan* shall each have a Minister, a Political Vice-Minister, and an Administrative Vice-Minister, and the various Commissions shall each have a Chairman and a Vice-Chairman, all of whom shall be appointed or removed by the National Government at the instance of the President of the said *Yuan*.

Article 19.—The Ministers, and the Chairmen of the various Commissions, of the Executive *Yuan* may, when necessary, attend the meetings of the State Council and of the Legislative *Yuan*.

Article 20.—The Executive *Yuan* may introduce in the Legislative *Yuan* bills on matters within its own competence.

Article 21.—Meetings of the Executive *Yuan* shall be attended by the President, the Vice-President, the Ministers of the various Ministries, and the Chairmen of the various Commissions, and presided over by the President of the said *Yuan*.

Article 22.—The following matters shall be decided at the meetings of the Executive *Yuan*:

(1) Bills on legislative matters to be introduced in the Legislative *Yuan*.

(2) Budgets to be submitted to the Legislative *Yuan*.

(3) Amnesties to be submitted to the Legislative *Yuan*.

(4) Declaration of war, negotiation for peace, conclusion of treaties, and other important international matters to be submitted to the Legislative *Yuan*.

(5) The appointment or dismissal of administrative officials of or above the rank of *Chien-Jen* (Third Class).

(6) All matters which cannot be settled between the various Ministries and Commissions of the Executive *Yuan*.

(7) All matters which, according to law or in the opinion of the President of the *Yuan*, should be decided at the meetings of the said *Yuan*.

Article 23.—The various Ministries and Commissions of the Executive *Yuan* may, according to law, issue orders.

Article 24.—The organization of the Executive *Yuan* and of the various Ministries and Commissions shall be determined by law.

CHAPTER III.

THE LEGISLATIVE *YUAN*

Article 25.—The Legislative *Yuan* shall be the highest legislative organ of the National Government.

The Legislative *Yuan* shall have the power to decide upon the following:—legislation, budgets, amnesties, declaration of war, negotiation for peace, conclusion of treaties, and other important international affairs.

Article 26.—The Legislative *Yuan* shall have a President and a Vice-President.

In case the President is unable to discharge his duties from any cause whatsoever, the Vice-President shall act in his place.

Article 27.—The Legislative *Yuan* shall be composed of from forty-nine to ninety-nine members, who shall be appointed by the National Government at the instance of the President of the said *Yuan*.

Article 28.—The term of office of the members of the Legislative *Yuan* shall be two years.

Article 29.—The Members of the Legislative *Yuan* shall not concurrently be non-political administrative officials of the various organs of the central or local governments.

Article 30.—The President of the Legislative *Yuan* shall preside at all meetings of the Legislative *Yuan*.

Article 31.—All resolutions passed by the Legislative *Yuan* shall be decided upon and promulgated by the State Council.

Article 32.—The organization of the Legislative *Yuan* shall be determined by law.

CHAPTER IV.

THE JUDICIAL *YUAN*

Article 33.—The Judicial *Yuan* shall be the highest judicial organ of the National Government and shall take charge of judicial trials, judicial administration, disciplinary punishment of officials, and trial of administrative cases.

The granting of pardons and reprieves and the restitution of civic rights shall be submitted by the President of the Judicial *Yuan* to the National Government for approval and action.

Article 34,—The Judicial *Yuan* shall have a President and a Vice-President.

In case the President is unable to discharge his duties from any cause whatsoever, the Vice-President shall act in his place.

Article 35.—The Judicial *Yuan* may introduce in the Legislative *Yuan* bills on matters within its own competence.

Article 36.—The organization of the Judicial *Yuan* shall be determined by law.

CHAPTER V.

THE EXAMINATION *YUAN*

Article 37,—The Examination *Yuan* shall be the highest examination organ of the National Government and shall take charge of examinations and determine the qualifications for public service. All public functionaries shall be appointed only after having, according to law, passed an examination and their qualifications for public service having been determined by the Examination *Yuan*.

Article 38,—The Examination *Yuan* shall have a President and a Vice-President.

In case the President is unable to discharge his duties from any cause whatsoever, the Vice-President shall act in his place.

Article 39.—The Examination *Yuan* may introduce in the Legislative *Yuan* bills on matters within its own competence.

Article 40.—The organization of the Examination *Yuan* shall be determined by law.

CHAPTER VI.

THE CONTROL *YUAN*

Article 41.—The Control *Yuan* shall be the highest supervisory organ of the National Government and shall, according to law, exercise the following powers:

(1) Impeachment.
(2) Auditing.

Article 42.—The Control *Yuan* shall have a President and a Vice-President.

In case the President is unable to discharge his duties from any cause whatsoever, the Vice-President shall act in his place.

Article 43.—The Control *Yuan* shall be composed of from nineteen to twenty-nine members, who shall be appointed by the National Government at the instance of the President of the said *Yuan*.

The security of tenure of office of the members of the Control *Yuan* shall be determined by law.

Article 44.—All meetings of the Control *Yuan* shall be attended by members of the Control *Yuan* and presided over by the President of the said *Yuan*.

Article 45.—The members of the Control *Yuan* shall not concurrently hold any office in any of the organs of the central or local governments.

Article 46.—The Control *Yuan* shall have the power to introduce in the Legislative *Yuan* bills on matters within its own competence.

Article 47.—The organization of the Control *Yuan* shall be determined by law.

CHAPTER VII.

ADDITIONAL ARTICLE

Article 48.—The present Law shall come into force on the day of its promulgation.

MEMBERS OF CENTRAL POLITICAL COUNCIL

Messrs. Wang Shao-min, — Tan Yen-kai, — Gen. Chiang Kai-shek, — Hu Han-min, — Kan Nai-kuan, — Chen Kung-po, — Shao Lih-ts, — Dr. Wu Chao-chu, — Sun Fo, — Chu Pe-teh, — Chang Jen-jih, — Ting Wei-fên, — Wang Fah-chin, — Wu Ching-heng, — Chen Yeu-jen, — Mrs. Liao Chung-kai, — Koo Meng-yu, — Soong Ts-vung, — Gen. Li Chi-sen, — Chen Kuo-fu, — Gen. Li Lih-chun, — Tai Chuan-yen, — Pe Vung-wei, — Gen. Li Chung-jen, — Mrs. Sun Yat-sen, — Siao Fu-chen, — Dr. Tsai Yuan-pei, — Li Yoh-ying, — Teng Chê-ju, — Gen. Ho Ying-ching, — Gen. Pai Tsung-hsi, — Chen Ko-yu, — Chen Min-Chu, — Ho Yao-tsu, — Yeh Tsao-chang, — Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang, — Koo Ying-fen, — Gen. Yen Hsi-shan, — Yu Yiu-jen, — Yi Pei-chi, — Admiral Yang Shu-chwang, — Huang Fu, — Kung Hsiang-hsi, — Wang Peh-chun, — Hsueh Tuh-pi, — Dr. Wang Cheng-ting, — En-Kuh-Pah-Tuo, — King Heng-yi, — Liu Shou-chung, — Pai Yun-ti, — Chow Chi-kong, — Liu Ya-ts, — Huang Shih, — Wang Loh-pin, — Chen Chia-yeu, — Chu Tsi-tsing, — Ting Chao-wu, — Chen Pih-chun, — Chen Shu-jen, — Chu Min-yi, — Miao Bin, — Dr. Wang Chung-hui and Huang Shao-hsiung.

MEMBERS OF CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Messrs. Wang Shao-min, — Tan Yen-kai, — Hu Han-min, — General Chiang Kai-shek, — Mrs. Sun Yat-sen, — Chen Kung-po, — En-Kuh Pah-Tuo, — Yu Yiu-jen, — Chu Pe-teh, — Koo Meng-yu, — King Heng-yi, — Soong Ts-vung, — Pe Vung-wei, — Mrs. Liao Chung-kai, — Wu Chao-chu, — Ting Wei-fên, — Tai Chuan-yen, — Gen. Li Chi-sen, — Kan Nei-kuan, — Chen Yeu-jen, — Gen. Li Lih-chun, — Wang Fah-chin, — Liu Shou-chuug, — Siao Fu-chen, — Sun Fo, — Pai Yun-ti, — Chow Chi-kong, — Huang Shih, — Wang Loh-pin, — Chen Chia-yeu, — Chu Tsi-tsing, — Ting Chao-wu, — Gen. Ho Ying-ching, — Chen Shu-jen, — Chu Min-yi, and Miao Bin.

CANDIDATES FOR THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Messrs. Wu Tih-chen—and Chen Shao-yiu.

MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE

Messrs. Wu Ching-hing,—Chang Jen-jih,—Tsai Yuan-pei,—Koo Ying-fen,—Dr. Wang Chung-hui,—Li Yo-ying,—Liu Ya-ts,—Shao Lih-ts,—Chen Kuo-fu,—Chen Pih-chun,—Teng Che-ju, and Huang Shao-hsiung.

CANDIDATES FOR THE CENTRAL SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE

Gen. Li Chung-jen,—Messrs. Kuo Chun-tao,—Li Foh-lin, and Pan Yun-chao.

MEMBERS OF STATE COUNCIL

Gen. Chiang Kai-shek (president),—Messrs. Tan Yen-kai,—Hu Han-min,—Dr. Tsai Yuan-pei,—Tai Chuan-yen,—Dr. Wang Chung-hui,—Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang,—Sun Fo,—Chen Kuo-fu,—Gen. Ho Ying-ching,—Gen. Li Chung-jen,—Admiral Yang Shu-chwang,—Gen. Yen Hsi-shan,—Gen. Lin Chi-sen,—Lin Sen and Gen. Chang Hseuh-liang.

EXECUTIVE YUAN

Mr. Tan Yen-kai (President),—Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang (Vice-president)

LEGISLATIVE YUAN

Mr. Hu Han-min (President), — Mr. Lin Sen (Vice-president)

JUDICIAL YUAN

Dr. Wang Chung-hui (president), — Mr. Chang Chi (Vice-president)

CENTROL YUAN

Dr. Tsai Yuan-pei (President), — Mr. Chen Kuo-fu (Vice-president)

EXAMINATION YUAN

Mr. Tai Chuan-yen (President), — Mr. Sun Fo (Vice-president)

MILITARY ADVISORY COUNCIL

Gen. Li Chung-jen (President)

STAFF DEPARTMENT

Gen. Li Chi-sen (Chief-of-Staff)

TRAINING AND SUPERVISORY DEPARTMENT

Gen. Ho Ying-ching (Director)

MINISTRIES OF EXECUTIVE YUAN

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR: Gen. Yen Hsi-shan (Minister), — Chao Tai-wen (vice-minister)

MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS: Dr. Wang Cheng-ting (Minister), — Messrs. Chu Shao-hsin and Tong Yueh-liang (vice ministers)

MINISTRY OF MILITARY ADMINISTRATION: Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang (Minister),—Mr. Chang Chun and Mr. Loh Chun-lin (vice ministers)

MINISTRY OF FINANCE: Mr. Soong Ts-vung (minister),—Messrs. Chang Shou-yung and Li Tiao-sen (vice ministers)

MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATION: Mr. Wang Peh-chun (Minister),—Messrs Li Chung-kun and Wei Yi-feh (vice ministers)

MINISTRY OF RAILWAYS: Mr. Sun Fo (Minister),—Messrs. Lien Shen-hai and Wang Cheng (vice ministers)

MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY, COMMERCE AND LABOR: Dr. Kung Hsiang-hsi (Minister),—Messrs. Cheng Hung-nien and Moh Hsian-yeu (vice ministers)

MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND MINING: Mr. Yi Pei-chi (Minister),—Mr. Tsen Yang-fu (vice Minister)

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION: Dr. Chiang Mon-lin (Minister),—Messrs. Ma Hseu-luen and Wu Tsen-chun (vice ministers)

MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH: Mr. Hsueh Tuh-pi (Minister),—Messrs. Hu Yueh-wei and Liu Shui-heng (vice ministers)

THE ORGANIZATION OF KUOMINTANG AND



THAT OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT



Main Magazine
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
29 2653-J-32/8

CHINA TOMORROW

Vol. I | Peiping, December 20, 1928 | No. 2

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE ORGANIC LAW

By E. S. Corwin

An Analysis of the "Strong Policy" of Japan

By Wu Jui Kao

The Relation of the Kuomintang to the Common People

By Samuel S. Sung

The Chinese Peasant Movement

By Cato Young

The Problem of Unemployment in China

By Frank Yen

TWENTY CENTS A COPY | TWO DOLLARS A YEAR

CHINA TOMORROW, the periodical of New China, is dedicated to the masses, whose welfare should be the foremost concern of any democracy.

Contents

	Page
Editorial Paragraphs	15
Some Observations on the Organic Law—By E. S. Corwin	17
An Analysis of the "Strong Policy" of Japan—By Wu Jui Kao	21
The Relation of the Kuomintang to the Common People—By Samuel S. Sung	23
The Chinese Peasant Movement—By Cato Young	24
The Problem of Unemployment in China—By Frank Yen	27
The Past Month in China	30
The Book End	31

EDITORIAL BOARD

Editors

Yen Ching Yueh, Bien Sha King,

Samnel S. Sung, Fang Fu-An

Business Editors

Fang Fu An, Chia Hsi Yen

Published on the 20th of every month at Peiping, China. Contributions in harmony with the purpose of the magazine are welcomed.

SUBSCRIPTION RATES: Single copies 20 cents; $2 per year; Foreign U. S. $1.50. Orders, subscriptions and all correspondence should be sent to CHINA TOMORROW, P. O. Box No. 8, Peiping, China.

China Tomorrow has at hand a store of excellent material which the editors are eager to print; however, the cost of printing and further matarials is such that the outlay per copy is almost equal to the sales price; thus we are compelled to regulate the size of the magazine in proportion to the increase of our circulation and subscription list. If you are interested in the aims and ideals of CHINA TOMORROW, **Subscribe Today**. *We can guarantee you interesting and worth-while reading on current affairs in China.*

CHINA TODAY

Volume I Peiping, December 20, 1928.

EDITORIALS

THE BREAK in the negotiations between Japan and China for a settlement of the Tsinan affair has been received with mixed feelings. While it is obviously desirable to reach some sort of a working agreement with Japan in order to facilitate the work of reconstruction and to alleviate the danger of international conflict, yet there are many who fear that the only agreement to which Japan would assent would necessitate a virtual surrender of China's self-respect and national honor. China looks upon the Tsinan disaster as a deliberate attack on the part of Japan upon her soldiers and civilians, an unprovoked invasion of her territory for sinster purposes. She demands the evacuation of Tsinan as a proof of the sincerity of the Japanese government before any negotiations be entered into. Such an evacuation would be construed in both countries as an admission that the blame rested primarily on Japan. However we can be certain that the Japanese government, will never thus publicly confess its error in sending the troops. The whole question of national honor is involved, and the Japanese will not be the first to admit the fallibility of their government. Even though there must be thousands of responsible Japanese who feel privately that the sending of troops was a serious error, the very fact that they feel it makes the admission doubly difficult. After all is not this matter of "face" and "national honor" at the root of most of our international misunderstandings, and is it not rather ridiculous? What practical difference does it make to either country whether the troops are sent home before or after the negotiations have been completed? It is natural that politicians should be unduly exercised about these matters, because it is unfortunately just such issues that determine the stability of their political power, but it is important for us to realize that it is the economic relations which are all-important whereas national honor is likely to be an empty shell. Might it not contribute greatly to better international relations if China would go more than half way towards meeting Japan on the ticklish matter of the Tsinan issue, and reserve the right to stand firm on those issues which will vitally affect the future of the nation, such as tariff autonomy and the maintenance of the sovereignty over Manchuria? The time has come for politicians to face realities, and for the public to judge them by the degree which they have emancipated themselves from mere political expediency.

ANTI-JAPANESE [illegible]

PROPAGANDA FOR THE JAP[illegible] BOYCOTT has been flooding [illegible] Tsinan trouble more than [illegible] If one were to believe newspaper [illegible] really feel that something had [illegible] But most of the energy spent on [illegible] been that of talk. Sentimental [illegible] place at intervals, under the [illegible] patriotic zealots, but what [illegible] other than public disturbance? [illegible] almost as prevalent as ever in the [illegible] The merchants who form an all-[illegible] such a campaign are unmoved by the [illegible] to do their part in checking trade with [illegible] for the most part, customers, who could do much [illegible] control the attitude of these merchants, by refusing to purchase Japanese goods or even to trade in [illegible] where these are on sale, are as [illegible] cooperative as the merchants. What the [illegible] needs is a nation-wide well worked out plan of action. A national drive designed to inspire [illegible] purchaser alike with the zeal for uniting against a common foe for the good of China will be more successful and far-reaching than a program of compulsion. Merchants should be compensated for their losses for in such a situation where the betterment of the country is at stake, it is only fair that the [illegible] could be borne by the entire country.

THE OPIUM SCANDAL

ALMOST simultaneously with the reported launching of an extensive anti-opium campaign by the Nationalist Government comes the news of a national scandal of the first importance growing out of the apparent attempt of the Shanghai director of Public Safety to enforce the law against certain influential military men. At the present writing the above official has been removed from office and the case is reported to be under investigation by the highest officials of the Nanking government, while the mayor of Shanghai is said to have resigned in protest against the interference of Nanking. This is not the first time that a military leader has been discovered to be engaged in the opium traffic. At the end of July a large amount of opium said to have belonged to General Chen Tiao Yuan, Chairman of the Hwa Provincial Government, was discovered by

[illegible]

[illegible] Some opinion has been [illegible] implicated. It [illegible] show its strength [illegible] the decision [illegible] in general [illegible] particular must be taken out of [illegible] case has [illegible] for political stuff, it is high [illegible] demand that all those involved [illegible] high be their position [illegible] of Chinese [illegible] who utilize positions [illegible] their own interests. The [illegible] opportunity to deal a [illegible] to both of these evils.

EXTRATERRITORIALITY

[illegible] Treaty of amity and commerce [illegible] between Belgium and Luxemburg [illegible] China which was signed [illegible] November 22, together with the five [illegible] the same day was of great importance [illegible] is a definite land mark on the path of [illegible] The Union of Belgium and [illegible] extraterritoriality and the [illegible] China permits the Belgian and Luxemburg [illegible] to enjoy the rights to live, to trade [illegible] property in any part of the territory [illegible] to the rights enjoyed by the Chinese [illegible] We are glad to see this long [illegible] becoming a reality. It is certainly wise [illegible] governments to establish their relations [illegible] of absolute equality, which is after [illegible] better protection than consular jurisdiction. This is no doubt one of the greatest achievements of the National Government. We want to assure the governments of Belgium and Luxemburg that this is a noble deed and it will have its reward. And we earnestly hope that the other nations will emulate the example set by these two nations.

THRIFT.

IN KEEPING with the resolution of the National government, which urges that the people of China observe economy in funerals, weddings and birthday parties, the Y.M.C.A. of Peiping has recently held a three day thrift campaign. An important feature of their program included street talks given daily in different parts of the city for the purpose of acquainting the people with this stand on the part of the government, and reminding them of the not infrequently tragic results of such utterly useless extravagance. Unfortunately the people of China, are hypersensitive to public opinion when it comes to limiting expenses of a wedding or a parent's funeral.

[illegible] frequently [illegible] of [illegible], prominent and otherwise, are reduced to a state of poverty because of the tremendous extravagance of the funeral they feel necessary to show honor to the deceased head of the family. What we need is an absolutely new change of thought in this matter. Surely it is preferable to shower the loved one with affection while he is living than after he has passed beyond the power to appreciate our efforts. And taking it the other way, what kind of affection is a father showing for the family he leaves behind him, when he commits them to financial need as a result of the expensive funeral held over his remains? Is our conservatism so ingrown that we allow public opinion to thus drive us to destitution? With poverty all around us and want crying in all directions in China, surely we must see that when living people are dying of hunger, holding a long and extravagant funeral which achieves no other good than that of fattening the already full pockets of the undertaker and priests, is nothing short of playing traitor to our families, our fellow citizens and the very basic idea of constructive and cooperative government.

IN A RECENT protest demonstration of some one hundred Students of Peiping University, the President's office was broken into, furniture smashed and office papers and documents scattered upon the floor while later the students held the premises of the school against the police. In view of the extent of the damage done, it has been rumored that there is some political significance behind this apparently meaningless action said to have been engendered purely by resentment at the change of the name from "Peking National University" to the less dignified "Peiping University". This university is recognised throughout China as the leader of the student movement and any action by it as such, will make a profound impression for good or ill, on the students of the entire nation. For its prestige will cause it to be taken as an example of student action in China. For this reason, if the dignity of the institution is to be the main issue, surely the students' action at a time of disagreement with authorities should be ever consistent with that dignity. If student leaders who are critical of the ideas of their elders, would lend weight to their arguments, let them set an example by mature and reasonable action in keeping with the reputation of the instution which they represent. For the mere word "National" is not vital to the dignity of the college, nor has it been the name by which the university has been designated which has won for it an outstanding place in educational institutions of China. It is by its products, the achievements and character of its graduates that a college gains or loses prestige and each student has some responsibility in this direction, if he is interested in winning for his Alma Mater an enviable reputation, let him see that his own actions are in keeping with these aspirations.

CHINA TOMORROW feels keenly the loss of one of its editors, Mr. Wu Jui Kao, who passed away, on November 24. Mr Wu was a brilliant student of social conditions who graduated last year from Shanghai College with highest honors. Although he was only 26 years of age, his mental attainments had won him the respect of all who knew him. The article herein included, "An Analysis of the Strong Policy of Japan" was written a few days before his death.

Some Observations on [illegible]

By Edward [illegible]

A [illegible] IRONICAL query is frequently heard in [illegible] the United States, "What's the Constitution [illegible] between friends?" The expression is said originally to have been extorted from the notorious "Boss" Tweed, by the surprising and inopportune scruple of a follower. Three hundred years earlier Sir John Selden had recorded in his *Table Talk* a similar quip: "What are twenty Acts of Parliament amongst friends?"

The new Organic Law of China, which was promulgated on October 3rd by the Central Political Council, is decidedly "a constitution among friends," but among friends who don't repose any too great amount of confidence in one another's intentions. It owes its outstanding features to these two facts.

To speak more precisely, the Organic Law establishes in power, or rather it regularizes the control of a revolutionary autocracy, but an autocracy with a difference; it is collegiate in form—and also in essence, since no one man has as yet emerged as the real directing force of the government—and it is qualified by a pledge to prepare the way by education for a truly democratic régime.

The real power back of the Organic Law is, of course, the leadership of the Kuomintang, together with certain military elements which have become more or less assimilated to it, and are at any rate indispensable to it. This leadership consists of a group of definite nameable persons and appears in three guises, or disguises: first, for party purposes it is the Central Executive Committee of the party, the body which to date has determined the personnel and principal officers of the new system; secondly, for constituent purposes it is the Central Political Council, the body which promulgated the Organic Law; thirdly, it is also the Government State Council, which is created by the Organic Law and under it has final power of decision on all governmental programmes and policies. *The immediate purpose of the Organic Law is to hold together the leadership thus organised as the essential condition of its retaining the governing power over China.*

The character of the Organic Law as the instrument of a revolutionary autocracy appears at the very outset in the fact that it invokes in its Preamble no more ultimate or wide-spread popular authority than the Kuomintang itself. There is no reference to "We the People", a striking omission to the student of modern democratic constitutions. There are also other notable omissions, as, for instance, of any stipulation regarding the length of official terms; of any provisions touching the existing institutions of local government; of any attempt to define even as to its larger essentials the relationship between the Executive and the Legislative Departments (Yuan). These [illegible] [illegible] remain for determination by [illegible] Houses at their discretion and [illegible] or convenience.

Still another feature of the [illegible] stamps it with a revolutionary [illegible] acter is the part which it [illegible] Not only does this cover virtually [illegible] government (Chap. II), but [illegible] at the outset of the powers of the [illegible] (Chap. I) places the chief executive [illegible] executive powers of War and [illegible] only in the executive power [illegible] legislative power, contrary to [illegible] in constitutional drafting, but [illegible] has been the first to be organized. [illegible] functioning government of China [illegible] other Yuan still remain for the [illegible] projects.

But as I also remarked, one [illegible] Organic Law is *to keep the [illegible] political power together*. This [illegible] elaborate procedures which are [illegible] tion, treaty making, and the [illegible] ordinarily be introduced into the [illegible] from the Executive Yuan. It must [illegible] the former. But even after that [illegible] be promulgated as law until it has been [illegible] the State Council and has been signed by [illegible] ent of the National Government and counter[illegible] the Presidents of the five Yuan. Such a [illegible] is clearly indicative of recognition by the [illegible] the Organic Law that the cooperation of [illegible] antagonistic interests was to be secured only by furnishing them with every possible assurance [illegible] disadvantageous surprise and with every [illegible] opportunity to check one another. Thus while the Organic Law exhibits a concentration of [illegible] power in the hands of a small group, it exhibits [illegible] even greater clarity the essential nature of this [illegible] as *an equilibrium more or less precarious [illegible] diverse interests.* What Montesquieu remarked of the English Constitution in the eighteenth century applies with two-fold force to the Organic Law—before any part of the mechanism can move all the parts must move together. That is to say, in order to work at all the Organic Law requires that a single unified group be in control of all its parts.

Although projected primarily as a *treaty*, the Organic Law is also meant to serve as a *Constitution* and to embody elements of a permanent constitution for China.

Its first feature from this point of view is the incorporation of the classic principle of the separation of powers into Legislative, Executive, and Judicial, to which are added two other of

[illegible] Yuan; (2) Budgets to be submitted to [illegible] Yuan; (3) Amnesties to be submitted [illegible] Legislative Yuan; (4) Declaration of war..... [illegible] of treaties, and other important interna- [illegible] matters to be submitted to the Legislative [illegible] Yuan; as under the Cabinet system, the ex- [illegible] is to have a legislative initiative, while, [illegible], all important matters are ultimately [illegible] legislative form. Essential questions, [illegible] remain unanswered: whether members [illegible] Yuan may hold seats in the legisla- [illegible]; whether in case of disagreement between [illegible] and Legislative Yuan, the former will [illegible] to resign, or may, in the alternative, [illegible] the latter; whether there is to be "ministeri- [illegible]" under the leadership of the President [illegible] National Government; whether the members of [illegible] Legislative Yuan may introduce legislative pro- [illegible] of their own; to what extent the Legislative [illegible] may amend measures coming from the Execu- [illegible] Yuan—an especially important question in rela- [illegible] to the budget. Until such questions have been [illegible] by formal legislation or by a settled [illegible] of practice the final classification of the [illegible] Government according to the conventional [illegible] is impossible.

In point of fact, such questions are to-day large- [illegible] academic because of the initial character of the [illegible] Yuan, which is that of a mere appointive [illegible]. Article 27 of the Organic Law reads: "The [illegible] Yuan shall be composed of from forty- [illegible] to ninety-nine members, who shall be appointed [illegible] the National Government at the instance of the President of the said Yuan." The revolutionary and autocratic genesis of the Organic Law could scarcely appear more strikingly. But eventually, it is fair to assume, the Legislative Yuan is planned to become a truly popular organ. It is therefore, worth while to discuss it briefly as a feature of permanent constitutional arrangement in China. From this point of view its salient characteristics are its unicameral make-up and its comparatively small size, both of which are of decided interest to the political scientist.

Whether a legislature should have a second chamber depends in the first instance on whether more than one principle of representation is advantageously available in the state under consideration. In Great Britain the House of Lords and the House of Commons are based on two radically different principles each of which long represented a vital principle of social organisation in that country. The House of Representatives and the Senate of the United States are also representative of different but vital interests. Here in China it would seem that one house might be made representative of population and the other of localities—specifically, the provinces. Such an arrangement would perform the great service of allaying, if not altogether avoiding, the suspicion that one section of the country was utilising the central government to exploit other sections.

On the other hand, even if this comes about, it is to be hoped that neither house of the reconstructed Yuan will be enlarged beyond what is absolutely necessary to give effect to the principle on which it is based. The function of a legislature is the articulation of public opinion, the criticism of measures of government, and debate leading to decision. Legislative bodies of the size of the American House of Representatives are notoriously ineffective in the last named rôle, with the result that the real work of legislation is devolved upon committees. In contrast with the ineffectiveness of large legislative bodies in discussion leading to decision stands the ordinary corporation directorate. While debate in the American Congress rarely persuades anybody it is a notable fact that the decisions of company directors in the United States are in the overwhelming number of cases unanimous. And still more convincing evidence of the value of discussion in small groups, even where sharply opposed interests are represented, is afforded by the proceedings of conciliation boards for the settlement of disputes between labour and capital. Statistics show that these arrive very commonly at unanimous or nearly unanimous verdicts. The further illustration of the same point by the common law jury needs only passing mention.

Chapter IV of the Organic Act provides for the Judicial Yuan. In its original form the chapter made no mention of "courts", and although this omission has since been supplied the chapter still remains fragmentary.

But in another respect chapter IV is more revealing. It shows that China has definitely adopted the Continental system of administrative courts in preference to the Anglo American system of Rule of Law. The point is the better worth noting since it is likely to have the effect of making the study of Continental administrative law an important feature of political science and legal curricula in China.

In chapter V establishing the Examination Yuan China capitalises her own institutional history in noteworthy fashion. The importance of the old examination system in stabilising government by drawing the talent of society to its service has rarely received due appreciation from commentators on Chinese institutions. In this respect it served much

the same purpose as has the British peerage, which by absorbing talent from the ranks long kept popular discontent from developing a dangerous leadership; while in another respect it was reminiscent rather of the Catholic Church of the Middle Ages, since the ranks and privileges conferred by it were not hereditary. The system was thus at once conservative and democratic, realising with unique success Napoleon's demand for "an open career to talents."

To be sure, civil service examinations are employed in other governments, but only for subordinate offices. China has always used them even for the highest offices, and apparently means to continue doing so. This exaltation of the examination principle, one immediate purpose of which perhaps is to enforce tests of party regularity, is indeed a contribution of more than passing significance, for the tendency of government the world over to-day is to become bureaucratic and professional, and this tendency is bound to increase with the extension and growing complexity of governmental functions.

We come next to the Control Yuan (Chap. IV) the business of which will be to supervise the working of the other organs of government, and which is vested with the power of impeachment over the members of the other Yuan. Here again China is endeavouring to capitalise her own institutional history, so that it is with some reluctance that I confess my doubts as to the workability of this feature of the Organic Law. The problem being dealt with by this part of the Organic Law is a difficult one for two reasons, the first of which is conveyed by the old query, *"Quis custodiet ipsos custodes"* ("Who then will stand guard over the guardians themselves")? The second consists in the difficulty of, at one and the same time, having the advantages and avoiding the dangers of discretionary authority. The problem of creating a due responsibility on the part of discretionary officers has never yet been satisfactorily solved in any constitution. The Cabinet system establishes political responsibility, it is true; but this is not a responsibility to standards, it is only responsibility to the expediency of a party. In the United States, three forms of responsibility will be found, all imperfect in their functioning; first, responsibility to the ordinary law, which is capable of reaching actual violations of the law, and sometimes does; secondly, impeachment, a legislative function, and one which has generally been found unworkable—in Jefferson's words, "a mere scarecrow"; thirdly, political responsibility, that is, accountability to the voters on election day, which is usually *nil*, otherwise the Republican party would hardly have been returned to power at the election just held. As one satirist acutely remarked in the recent campaign: "The Republican party is a forward looking party because it does not *care* to look backward."

That, therefore, the [illegible] Organic Law did not put [illegible] devices is hardly strange. [illegible] have contrived any better? A [illegible] by to be a man of parts, and [illegible] likely to be content with [illegible] sinecure; he [illegible] want to [illegible] important. He will, in other [illegible] American slang—be very apt to [illegible] some Mattie." There is a Chinese [illegible] the effect that "If you trust a man [illegible] him; if you distrust him do not trust [illegible] censorate, however, is a sort of [illegible] the rest of the government. No doubt [illegible] depart at times from the paths of official [illegible] When they do so they should be [illegible] under the ordinary law; that is to say, [illegible] is hardly required, if its only function is to [illegible] the ordinary machinery of the law. On the [illegible] hand, if the censorate goes beyond this it will [illegible] constantly intruding upon the necessary [illegible] judgment of other departments, which would [illegible] mischievous for two reasons. It would [illegible] official timidity in other departments, and it [illegible] often set ignorance in judgment over [illegible] since no censorate can ordinarily make itself [illegible] of all the data underlying the decisions of [illegible] officers and departments, or if it could, then [illegible] unusual talent should be better employed than [illegible] faultfinding. Nor can the censorate fail to offer [illegible] handle to malignants in search of an opportunity [illegible] embarrass the party in power, or such departments [illegible] and officers as provoke their special malice.

The argument for the Control Yuan [illegible] rests, as was suggested, upon the necessity there [illegible] been for a similar organ under the Empire; and it [illegible] true that the story of this institution has illustrious [illegible] pages. But this is just because the imperial censor [illegible] acted under such a weighty responsibility, he literally took his life in his hands. There is no evidence that the Control Yuan would be similarly curbed.

I might add that the censorship idea was originally utilised in two of the states of the United State, Pennsylvania and Vermont. It has long since disappeared from both these governments, principally because it was found that the censors divided on party and personal lines. Their verdicts were discredited with a large part of the population before they were uttered. The Audit feature of Chapter VI is, of course, thoroughly sound so far as it goes, for it still awaits development by appropriate legislation.

The Organic Law is only a skeleton of government, as indeed a constitution should be. Even so, there are points at which it might well be elaborated at an early date; I suggest two. So vast a country as

[illegible] for its effective government [illegible] institutions, or else [illegible] a [illegible] of the centre on will always [illegible] Should not there [illegible] a sort of federalism, one [illegible] no doubt, but still involving the [illegible] as much authority shall be relegated to [illegible] as possible? Along with this facts—the [illegible] of China—goes moreover the sure prospect [illegible] the political education of the people will proceed [illegible] in different parts. By the expedient [illegible] the delegation of functions of government to the provinces could be made to march with the development of the political capacity of the various provincial populations. Nor would there be [illegible] advantages that might be anticipated from [illegible] federalism, or even perhaps its greatest [illegible] It would create a multiplicity of vital units of [illegible] which would be both schools for political [illegible] and laboratories for political experimentation. It would check the overdevelopment of a [illegible] bureaucracy; and by the same token it would [illegible] many of the processes and activities of government under direct public scrutiny in the local units. The argument against too much government is often [illegible] Sir Frederick Pollock has pointed out, an argument against too much *central* government.

Not less important is the omission from the Organic Law of a Bill of Rights. It affords no recognition whatever that the individual has rights against the government, an idea which lies at the very roots of the democratic theory of state. It should never be forgotten that democracy is only a device looking towards self-government. It rests on the fundamental notion that the ultimate source of all just power is the human individual, from which it necessarily follows that the right of even a democratic government to control the individual has limits. But not only is a Bill of Rights an attempt to recognise this wholesome principle of the autonomy of the individual, and the inherent limits of authority; it also has value for the reinforcement of government itself in its rightful authority because it constitutes an assurance at the outset against governmental excesses. If the citizen is assured that the government will pay for any property which it takes from him for public improvements, his attitude towards such projects will be far different than if the government has a free hand to sieze property without making compensation; and the citizen who is assured of the availability of *habeas corpus* will be far less apt to set up as a censor of the just severity of the laws.

To re-iterate, the predominant characteristic of the Organic Law is that it establishes a politico-military autocracy in power. This autocracy is qualified by the moral obligation of those who wield it to undertake the political education of the masses so that the latter shall be enabled in time to assume ultimate control. What the present system aims at, in other terms, is the arrest in mid-course of a revolution with a view to continuing it under guidance and direction. That is a difficult task, but not an impossible one. The framers of the Constitution of the United States accomplished it, and Bismarck accomplished it in Germany. The founders of the French Constitutional Monarchy of 1789 failed in their similar effort, as did also the founders of the Russian Republic of 1917. The first duty incumbent upon the present rulers of China is indicated by these facts. It is that of making their power viable by enlarging the foundation on which it rests. The pyramid of political authority in China today stands on its apex, and obviously it must be eased to a broader and less precarious basis as speedily as possible. Two things at least are necessary: first, the sincere co-operation of the existing elements of party leadership as against the endeavour on the part of this or that element, or this or that individual, to play a lone hand; secondly, the extension of the party membership as swiftly as possible to all assimilable and important elements of the nation, and the rapid absorption of the available political talent of the nation. *To the latter measure there is, in fact, only one alternative, the indefinite continuance of militarism.* Nor is this to question the soundness of the One Party idea when properly applied. Any government based on revolution must exclude from power those who do not accept the basic principles of the triumphant cause. Yet such test principles should be *basic*; and within the precincts which they mark out discussion and diversity should be welcomed. Within the One Party, and in no wise challenging its distinctive principles, should arise "parties" in the moderated and modulated sense of Western democratic practice. Their existence is the indispensable condition of political liberty, for unless there is an alternative party to which he may turn, what security has a lone critic of the powers that be? To repeat, *the co-existence of strong contending groups within the agreed premises of the existing political structure is the condition sine qua non of political liberty, and in the last analysis of individual liberty.*

Returning to the Organic Law—After all is said and done, its most notable aspect is its endeavor to establish an *institution* in power instead of an *individual*. This effort has necessitated recourse to an intricate and cumbersome course of proceedure at essential points, yet one not substantially more elaborate than that of certain other constitutions, for example, that of the United States. What has kept such constitutions workable instruments of government is "party politics" as the West knows them. Abstractly there is no reason for thinking that the Organic Law is not an entirely feasible vehicle of party government. Whether, on the other hand, the Organic Law might be expected to endure for any great length of time as the instrument of a multiple-headed autocracy is a different question, regarding which I should hesitate to venture prediction. As George Eliot sensibly said, "of all forms of human error prophecy is surely the most gratuitous."

Edward S. Corwin

Dec. 11, 1928

An Analysis of the "Strong Policy"

By Wu Jui Kang

SINCE the appearance of Tanaka on the political stage of Japan the so-called "Strong Policy" toward China has added fuel to the already heated relations between China and Japan. On several occasions it might have caused war, but each time this has been avoided. It is the hope that Japan will sooner or later come to see her own mistake." Contrary to China's expectation, Tanaka still holds on to his "Strong Policy". It is difficult to say how long China will be able to bear this oppression. But inasmuch as no outbreak has yet taken place there is still hope of solving the problems through careful study and mutual understanding. It is with this purpose in mind that the present article is written.

The so-called strong policy is not at all a new thing. As a matter of fact it has been Japan's policy since 1895, varying in degree of cause from one time to another. Even Japanese students of modern history would perhaps admit, if they do not allow patriotism to color their spectacles, that Japan's policy toward China has been characterized by territorial expansion, economic exploitation and political control. The annexation of Liuchow, Formosa and Korea are well known historical events. Their yet uncompleted attempts in Manchuria, and Mongolia furnish self-sufficient evidence. But modern means of transportation and communication have drawn nations so closely together that aggression of this sort has becomes much more difficult than a century ago. Japan is not slow in seeing this change. Gradually she is turning her attention from this crude type of imperialistic policy to a better one, that is, economic exploitation. Her experience with Russia right after the Sino-Japanese war, awakened her to the necessity of this change, although subsequent facts seem to show that she was not quite convinced until the conclusion of the world war.

The Nishihara Loan is a famous example of economic exploitation. Under the circumstances prevailing at that time, the Japanese bankers must have realized that the Anfu clique was making concessions against the will of the people, that the said clique would not be able to pay, and that the only result would be nothing but default. But for one purpose or another, the Japanese bankers were willing to play for higher stakes. It seems that default was the very thing they wanted.

But in a war-torn nation such as China has been during the past 16 years economic exploitation would mean very little unless there existed some amount of political control. Japan made brave attempts along this line when she advanced the twenty-one demands. Of course the naval and military pact was for the same purpose. Here [illegible] with the sphere of influence.

Jealousy, we know, is very [illegible] of serious trouble, and the other [illegible] just as jealous as Japan of their [illegible] avoid the pending conflicts Japan [illegible] ments especially to this effect. One [illegible] Japanese alliance and the other [illegible] agreement. They rationalized such [illegible] the so-called "paramount interest". This [illegible] terest is one of Japan's pretexts for [illegible] the so-called specials rights in Manchuria [illegible] Mongolia. From this brief account [illegible] Tanaka's strong policy has its historical [illegible] and any attempt to change it means a [illegible] effort to overthrow Japan's traditional [illegible] policy.

As students of history we should [illegible] like ordinary patriots and argue in [illegible] of ethical reasons of right or wrong. We [illegible] understand others. We wish to go into [illegible] Certainly Japanese have their reasons for [illegible] this policy.

The unbroken line of the Imperial [illegible] from the legendary begining to the present [illegible] to the Japanese a matter of pride above everything else. People of democratic leanings may [illegible] superstitions respect for their king, as [illegible] millions during the coronation. But a [illegible] would lead us to understand that they are [illegible] supersititious than ordinary believers in any [illegible]

This mixed pride in their unique imperial [illegible] their mysterious origin, as well as their great [illegible] since the Meiji Era has added greatly to their sense of national importance and greatness. Let us take military success for example. Since Japan [illegible] her ship into the sea of world intercourse, she [illegible] successfully passed through the Sino-Japanese war (1894-95), the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5) and the Great War (1914-8). It is no wonder that they are now proud of their "Great Nippon". What is there in China that they need to be afraid of? When the news of the Chinese demand for the punishment of General Fukuda reached Japan military leaders there immediately petitioned their government and raged over the question of their national honor. Indeed we should not overestimate the importance of the Japanese love of vanity; but the fact remains that the so-called Strong Policy is the legitimate child of this very attitude.

Far more important than this motive is the stress of the economic situation. We know that in 1840 there were only 30 million people in Japan, but during the last 50 years she has more than doubled her peopulation and is now increasing at the rate of 700,000

[illegible] Japan's past [illegible] year to year. Her [illegible] industrialization. But [illegible] do not allow her to do this. The sur- [illegible] Bureau of Japan in 1911 [illegible] of coal in Japan at about 8 million [illegible] it will last only 50 years. Her [illegible] is even more evident. Inspite of all [illegible] more, the zenith of production has al- [illegible] reached. Petroleum is another important [illegible] but according to a Japanese survey the [illegible] last more than 100 years at the [illegible] Furthermore, raw material is so [illegible] Looking around the map of the world, we [illegible] no market where Japanese goods can go in an [illegible] amount except to China. From either the [illegible] of raw material or that of foreign markets China will be of tremendous importance to Japan [illegible] near future. That is why Japan regards [illegible] in China as a life and death matter. The economic motive then, as we now see it, is [illegible] of the "Strong Policy". Unless we can [illegible] out this kernel, the Strong Policy will grow, [illegible] and spread more seeds of trouble.

The [illegible] outline of Tanaka's program is [illegible] than the writer's hypothesis. He hopes [illegible] that the whole thing is not true. But [illegible] as it is, it is not all together groundless. It is a result of careful study of Tanaka's diplomatic [illegible]. For the honor of Japan and her statesmen as [illegible] people we hope that the responsible authorities [illegible] Japan will try and try to disprove our supposi- [illegible] their diplomatic dealings with China in the [illegible] of time.

For the sake of concreteness let us take some [illegible] cases. The whole affair of the Tsinan incident seems to show Tanakas' program as follows:

1. In the name of protection of Japanese, lives and property Tanaka expected to check the advancing nationalist army and to wait for another internal conflict within the Kouming tang andthen to bring about a compromise between North and South, the result of which would mean the dominance of the old regime in the North and thus the protection of Japanese interests.

2. Had no internal trouble broken out among the nationalists, Japanese intervention would still have meant the offering of a great opportunity to Northern militarists for consolidation, thus prolonging the war and weakening the nationalists and preserving Japan's interests in the North-East.

3. In case the nationalist had made any mistake, however small it might have been, Tanaka would have liked his men to take the opportunity of creating a serious case out of it and even if necessary initiating trouble. This last step, amounting to a direct conflict with Nationalists, should be taken only when the above two steps had failed to bear the anticipated results.

The ground upon which we build our supposition may be briefly summarized in the form of two questions:

1. If Tanaka's sole purpose was the protection of Japanese in Tsinan why not move them to a safer place which would have been much cheaper than sending two soldiers to protect each person?

2. Being experienced in war, how could Japan fail to see the possibility of conflict in such an important region? If Tanaka really wanted peace even a man with an exceptionally low mentality would be wise enough to see the danger and try to avoid it. We do not doubt that Tanaka is an intelligent leader. Then what was his purpose in sending soldiers?

Japanese activities in Manchuria, the death of Chang Tso Ling, the recent drive of railroad negotiation all reveal Tanaka's program as outlined above. So far the Japanese authorities have failed to give consistant and positive evidence, to establish their disinterestedness in the case of Chang's murder.

From the above analysis of Tanaka's plans we may work them out in the following program:

1. Maintain old privileges whether legal or not.

2. Keep a strictly cool attitude while waiting for favorable opportunities as long as there is no necessity of entering negotiations in a hurry.

3. If the trend of development is against Japan either create new problems so that there will be a pretext for strong action or get the cooperation of other imperialistic nations in presenting a united front. The salt gabelle case is a good illustration.

4. If all these proved to be futile and other nations tend to cooperate with China an open parley with the general policy of "lose nothing without gaining something" should be had. This we should remember is the last step, and will be taken only when Japan can do nothing else. The trips of Yada to Nanking followed by Arita, Nishida and Saito do not show that Tanaka is changing his policy. It is diplomatic isolation. And it is the fear of being taken advantage by other nations at expense of Japanese interests in China that forces Tanaka, unwilling as he really is, to enter negotiations with Nanking. But his strong policy is unchanged.

[illegible] which Tanaka builds his whole program of Strong Policy in their favor. They know very well that if Chinese risk themselves and insist on what they think to be right, the Japanese government is strong enough to force its way.

This is the apparent program of the Strong Policy. We call it an apparent program because we do not [illegible] to believe [illegible] Satyaki [illegible] had determined to defend [illegible] Chosen and Mongolia. On the [illegible] Minister of Foreign Affairs [illegible] should be cut off he would [illegible]

Indeed the conflict has already [illegible] No "Modus Vivendi" seems to be possible.

The Relation of the Kuomintang to the Common P[illegible]

By Samuel S. Sung

THE GOVERNMENT is a means by which social and economic policies which will benefit the common people can be carried out. In the highly complex society of today, it is impossible for any one person to have first hand knowledge of all that takes place in our vast social system, and the average person knows only a small fraction of what is happening from day to day; so a party which can represent the great mass of the people is greatly needed to transact the business of government. After all a party is nothing other than a method of focusing attention and releasing the energies of the people in a desired direction. The conservatives, socialists, liberals and communists are engaged in a bitter fight in all the countries of the world to gain control of the existing political machinery. Each group appeals on the merits of its program for the support of the indifferent masses.

The situation in China is not exceptional. There have been many different parties throughout the successive dynasties, but party control of the government has become an actual fact only with the assumption of the reins of state by the Kuomintang. The policies of the nation both domestic and international are, in theory at least, determined by and elaborated from the principles of Dr Sun Yat sen. In the proclamation of November 26th, the Nationalist Government set forth the necessity of law and order and financial adjustment as the two primary needs of the moment, and the next three most pressing problems were declared to be those of political reform, economic reconstruction, and educational regeneration. Inasmuch as these call for the active cooperation of the people, an attempt is being made by the government through intensive propaganda to enroll the support of the hitherto indifferent masses. The chief issue at stake remains, however, whether or not the Kuomintang will be able to exercise its function of national leadership in such a way as to benefit these people whose aid it is so strenuously trying to enlist.

The Chinese people have been very greatly hampered for generations by the rigidity of the old customs and laws, and within recent years to these bonds have been added the shackles of [illegible] imperialism. The 1911 revolution gave [illegible] relief to the burdened masses as it merely [illegible] a change of masters. The discontent of the [illegible] gave potency to the Nationalist Revolution of [illegible] The Revolution has been a complete success as far as externals go. The Powers have been compelled to give up their former policy of joint action against China; China has been united under a central government for the first time since 1911; and [illegible] progress has been made in ridding the government of the curse of corruption.

But the question remains as to how far the Kuomintang has been successful in attacking the basic problems before this country. Has Western economic imperialism been curbed in any [illegible] the present government attained that [illegible] whereby it leads and at the same time is responsive to public opinion? Has the Kuomintang gained the confidence of the masses which is prerequisite for the success of its program? No one will deny that many underlying evils still exist, and it is the task of every educated Chinese citizen to dig to the root of the situation in order to find out the cause of the failure.

The central place of Dr. Sun in the thinking of the party is invaluable. There are few leaders in public life more worthy of the honor and reverence which has been bestowed upon him; but there is always the danger of externals—mere words and phrases—being emphasized rather than the spirit behind them, especially when a historic figure is given a halo of infallibility. Members of the Kuomintang often tend to depend too much on what Dr. Sun said on particular issues and even twist his words in a way to fit their own selfish ambitions. At the best, the reiteration of the words of the late leader is a denial of the self-evident fact that China is in a state of transition. Whereas the attitude and devotion of Dr. Sun are well worth imitation, it is necessary to recognise that his thoughts were necessarily conditioned by the circumstances in which he lived and worked.

[illegible] the objectives of the Kuomintang [illegible] the overthrow of imperialism and the [illegible] of the standard of living. Neither of [illegible] can be said to have been accomplished. [illegible] been marked progress in the negotiations [illegible] Russia, but such events as the breaking of [illegible] last year Shanghai by the British, and the [illegible] incident, show how important the government [illegible] is in the face of foreign aggression. Mass [illegible] in support of the government in its negotiations with foreign powers have been prohibited on the ground that they tend to rouse the resentment of the foreign power. As a result diplomatic policies are determined by the few and the people are denied the right to exercise a direct influence. Nor has the standard of living been improved by the Nationalist revolution. A number of militarists and officials have been deprived of their positions, and they have filled their pockets full, to live in ease in the concessions or in foreign lands. The men who possess political power in the present regime are not necessarily better equipped than those who preceded them. Many of them formerly belonged to reactionary parties, but have now seemingly embraced the principles of Sun Yat-sen. These men are not under party discipline, and they seem to be concerned primarily in blocking the plans for the peoples welfare. It is men of this type who are responsible for the fact that the Kuomintang has lost much of its prestige during the past year and a half.

Although in name the Kuomintang wields supreme power in China, both national and local, yet in fact the power still rests for the most part in the hands of military leaders. These men have at their disposition a vast number of soldiers and they close the door of any Kuomintang branch which dared to oppose them. The chief concern of each of these "non-militarists" is the strengthening of his own position and the enlarging of his sphere of influence. It is these military authorities who are chiefly responsible for the crushing burden of taxation—now as great or greater than under the old masters, and the so-called plans for disarmament have apparently been chiefly used to weaken the forces of petty adventurers whose plans conflicted with those of the big leaders. The Chinese Government is nothing but a bureaucracy of big generals without any one of them being able to gain sufficient power to establish a dictatorship. Among these generals there exist suspicion, jealousy, and fundamental differences of outlook; and it would seem that only mutual fear prevents the outbreak of further civil way. The party has sold its birthright in placing power in the hands of these military adventurers and could no longer control them if it wished to.

Human beings are everywhere naturally conservative, and it is too much to expect the habits and customs of generations to be uprooted in a year. Much progress has been made in China and this is no time to despair of the future, but there are certain fundamental evils which must be eradicated before the country can build for tomorrow. The corrupt elements within the party must be driven out, and some method divised whereby the military element be brought distinctly in subjection to civil control. There must be some way by which the people themselves can assume their rightful place in determining the policies of the nation. Moreover there must be a realization of the fact that slogans and catchwords must be replaced by a national program of economic and social reformation if the Kuomintang is to win and hold the support of the common people of China.

The Chinese Peasant Movement

By Cato Young

WHO is the peasant in China?

Is he like the European serf centuries ago or the Russian peasant of the last century?

And, how many of them are there in China now?

He is, first of all, the landless farmer, the man who tills the land but who does not own it. Because he has to feed and clothe himself and his wife and children, he is forced to till the land. Because he does not have any capital and could not have any land of his own, he is forced to rent a few mow of ground from the landlord who has land to spare. And because he has use of this property of the landlord, he is obliged by law and custom to give up to the landlord a portion of the harvest of his hard labor.

He is, moreover, the manual farmer, the man who fights nature not with intelligence but with muscles. He has no capital to provide him with modern tools which man uses to conquer nature and natural forces. Instead of being the master of the land, he is made the slave of it.

He is, again, the subsistence farmer, the man who feeds and clothes our brothers and sisters but does not have enough to eat and wear himself. With his few mows of land, sometimes rented, sometimes owned, with a few primitive tools, he is fighting helplessly against the ruthless law of diminishing productivity which is so universal in the economic world. And what is the result of his hard labor? A bare living during good years; starvation, sickness, and death in bad years.

He is not unlike his European brothers centuries ago or the Russian peasant of the last century in many aspects. But he is more a free man than his earlier brothers. He is not bound to the land. He can have his own way in either business or living. In case his fight against the forces of nature is successful he might join the rank and file of landowning class. The rich and poor, landowning and landrenting, hard-working and easy-going, are not rigid castes in China but classes, flexible classes.

The number of his class is not extraordinarily large, probably not over one-third of all farmers. It is often said that there is no extreme tendency in China toward either wealth or poverty in the case of social and economic classes. Taking the size of holdings as a means of measurement, we have 17,805,000 farmers who had less than ten mow in 1917. This was about 36% of all the farmers operating farms of some size. The group holding from ten to thirty mow numbered 13,348,000 farmers or 26.8% of the total group. If we take the position of landrenting as a criterion, we find 24,587,600 owner-farmers amounting to 50.4%, 13,828,500 tenants, or 28.3% and 10,494,721 partial owners who rented some land, to, calling 21.5%. Both figures of size of holding and ownership are taken from the 1917 census of the Ministry of Agriculture, Incustry and Commerce. From the figures quoted above we can reach the tentative conclusion that the peasant class is not very large in present China as compared with the medieval serfs or the Russian peasants.

The next question which we must settle before we go on to relate the story of the Chinese peasant movement is the meaning of the peasant movement as it is applied to China. Although there were several revolts of considerable importance which were lead or supported by peasants, they were political rather than agrarian movements, striving for the fortunes of individuals rather than the welfare of the peasants as a whole. So our discussion will be limited to the momentous movement taking place during the recent revolutionary period and led by the Nationalist Party.

The recent peasant movement in China is primarily a reaction against the suppression of landlord on the part of the peasant. Heavy rent, crop failure, and political disasters all contributed to the restlessness of the peasant. He could not fight against nature with his limited knowledge and tools. Nor could he fight agaist armed soldiers and bandits with his hoe and knife. The line of least resistence is the poor landlord. So the whole peasant movement was started in Kwantung with the primary purpose of rent-cutting. For behind all this, there is a fundamental desire in the mind of every peasant. That is the desire for landownership, or as someone has aptly termed it, "the land hunger". So long as the land hunger is not satisfied, the hungry peasant will crop out here and there waging wars with the landlords. This [illegible] contrasted with the [illegible] the gradual betterment of the [illegible] status of the farmers. [illegible] foresight and intelligence, [illegible] realize its far-reaching [illegible]

Nor was the recent peasant [illegible] a spontaneous uprising. It was [illegible] organized under the direction of the [illegible] Since the general policy of the Nationalist [illegible] to organize all classes for the salvation of [illegible] and for the emancipation of all the peasants, being the largest class (80%) among the people, naturally looked upon by the Party as the foundation stone of the revolutionary movement.

It is common knowledge that Kwantung is the radiating center of all kinds of revolutionary movements. Peasant movements are no exception. The earliest uprising of this kind dated back to 1922. Pai Pai (白沙), a famous leader of the peasant movement and a member of the Communist Party, started the first peasant union at Haifien (海豐). Kwantung under the nominal sponsorship of the Nationalist Party. Similar movements were conducted in various parts of Kwantung during 1922-1924 for the main purpose of protesting against the heavy taxes collected for the support of the militia organized by merchants and landlords.

It was not until January, 1924, that the Nationalist Party Declaration of the First Representative Conference formally recognized agriculture as the fundamental industry of China and the peasants as the most oppressed class. Thus was established the policy that the Nationalist Government should help the peasants in enforcing the equalization of land right and the granting of credit. A Department of Farmers was established in the Central Executive Committee to take care of the farmers in every way possible. A special committee, called "The Central Peasant Movement Committee" was also created to help the Department of Farmers in the peasant movement. Several experiments have been conducted in the vicinity of Canton. A training school offering a short course of one to three months was organized for the training of suitable leaders of the movement. Under the leadership of these trained persons, the direction and supervision of the Department of Farmers, the special committee of peasant movement, and the support of the Nationalist Government in Kwantung, the Chinese peasant movement has grown very rapidly since that time. Up to labor day (May 1st) of 1925, peasant unions have been organized in twenty one counties (縣) of Kwantung with a total membership of 200,000. After the passage of another year we find peasant unions in sixty-six counties of Kwantung with a total membership of 626,457. Peasant movements in other provinces started later but were not so large in numbers as in Kwantung. In the fall of 1925, there were over

[illegible] in peasant unions all through [illegible] of course, ranked first, having a [illegible] The next province was Honan, [illegible] belonging to peasant unions. Third [illegible] the radical province, with a membership [illegible] (The membership in Honan province is [illegible] overestimated or overstated.) Other pro- [illegible] memberships of not over ten thousand [illegible] Such was the successful record of the [illegible] movement in China. Last Spring (1927) [illegible] series of internal conflicts among the [illegible] and external conflicts with the Com- [illegible] Communist leaders were persecuted or [illegible] away. The whole movement was disorganiz- [illegible] retrogressed to a standstill. While the [illegible] planned to reorganize the whole move- [illegible] on a sound basis, the Communists were wildly [illegible] landowners and burning houses in Kwantung [illegible] Hunan. At the present moment the Communist [illegible] has been cleared by the Nationalist Govern- [illegible] in almost every place. A new law has been [illegible] to reorganize the peasant unions with the [illegible] of reorganization vested in the hands of Party [illegible]. We can reasonably hope that the [illegible] movement will revive in the near future. [illegible] A sober attitude and intelligent planning [illegible] will be impossible for the peasants to rise to [illegible] level of modern farmers.

The whole story of the peasant movement which has taken place recently in China is a complete failure for the Nationalists, the communists, and the peasants themselves. The communists lost the control of the movement both politically and psychologically. Politically, because the Nationalists will never risk a trial of the foolish policy of class struggle again. Psychologically, because the peasants of China will never again have any confidence in them. It is a failure of the Nationalists in that they let the Communists smuggle in their red policy and technique under the name of the Nationalist policy. In other words, they have been utilized as tools by the Communists. The failure of the peasants has meant the complete loss of all that was promised them by the leaders. They are still landless, and work hard for only a miserable living.

From the viewpoint of the Communists, the peasant movement in China will never be as successful as it was at the time of the breakup of European serfdom or the recent Russian Empire. There are only some fourteen million tenants in China, less than thirty percent of the whole. The life of the tenants is not so desperate and hopeless as that of the serfs and peasants in the above countries. The landlords are not as powerful and absolute as the feudal lords. Moverover, landowning in China is not a traditional system, vested in a particular caste or group, leaving all the others without hope. Every thrifty and hardworking citizen has, in the course of ten years or so, an equal chance to earn money and buy land. A family can not be rich for more than three generations nor poor for more than three generations according to an old Chinese saying. A man's grandfather may be a peasant, owning no land. His father may build up the estate and get hold of a large piece of land. He may be unable to hold the land. His son may be landless again. China is a free society, not a rigid one as it was in European serfdom or the Indian caste system. The class struggle can never be successful in China among the farmers who have a free channel to rise to the upper classes.

From the viewpoint of the Nationalists, the movement has a better chance of success. Instead of utilizing a class of landless to fight a class of landowning, the Party aims to increase the current of the already free channels between the landless and the landowning classes. "Equalization of the Land Right" is the fundamental policy of the Nationalist peasant movement. It is not equalization of land area, of physical land; that is important. To require that every peasant should have a farm of ten acres or twenty is ridiculous when considered from the side of personal ability or the side of land productivity. One acre of first class land may be equal to five acres of inferior land in productivity. One man of ability may be able to cultivate three times as much land as an inefficient person. It is the equalization of land right, the right to own and operate land, the opportunity to own and operate land, that is the real spirit of the policy. Everybody should have a fair chance to own and use a piece of land in proportion to his and his family's need and ability. For the sake of fairplay, he should not have more. For the sake of efficiency in work and life, he should not cultivate less.

The trouble with the Nationalists is that they do not have enough leadership and expert service in the planning and direction of the whole movement. As one eminent Nationalist leader ([illegible]) said, almost everybody in the Party is trained and prepared to do the destructive work, the first step in any revolution. In the matter of organization and supervision they do not have enough knowledge or experience. So, as Dr. Sun had predicted, when they set the forces to work in the field, they can no longer control those forces. That has been the fundamental trouble with every movement that has been carried out in China since Confucius' time.

Another weak point which lies in the movement itself, is that it grew too fast for any human intelligence to keep pace with it. It was almost impossible for the leaders in charge to adjust the plans and programs to suit the changing situation. They did not get time to think, and the process of conscious adjustment takes time. When they noticed some maladjustment and tryed to cope with it, the situation changed again. So the Nationalists are not the only ones to blame.

Finally we may ask what is the future prospect of the peasant movement in China. So long as there are defects and ambitions in the life of the farmers, there will be movements of one kind or another for reactionary purposes and for improving their conditions. Whether they will be successful or not depends upon our foresight and intelligence. If we know what to do and do it faithfully, we know the time of success will not be far removed. The first thing we must take pains to remember is that we must not go too rapidly. When we do not know how to walk, how can we run? An old Chinese saying warns us that if we go too fast, we can never get anywhere. When we take time to think and plan, we are more liable to lay a sounder foundation for the movement. And a sound foundation means more chance for success and less probability of failure.

On the practical side, the most important thing is the headquarters which may be called the Department of Farmers or may be some new creation of the machinery of the Party. Here is the center of the movement, the place for the determination of national policies, the planning of local programs, and the training of local leaders. Men of foresight and devotion should be gathered here to investigate similar movements in Chinese history and in foreign countries, to carry on experiments of the various approaches to the problem of the peasant, and to determine policies and programs for the whole movement.

The training of local leaders deserves more attention from the central leaders. The term of training should be extended at least to two years. It is impossible to cover all the fundamental sciences that have to do with the movement and the various phases of the movement itself within three months or even a year. Every student should become acquainted with the current problems in the countryside and the basic sciences such as Economics, Sociology, Education, Agricultural Science, Social Psychology, Social Organization and Leadership which have bearing on the solution of the rural problems of China. In the second year attention should be directed to such particular subjects as the History of the Peasant Movement, Contemporary Peasant Movements, Agrarian Policy, Agrarian Organization, which are within the particular field of the peasant movement. [illegible] would be local leaders elected by [illegible] ed with the three [illegible] of the Party and the history, [illegible] policies of the Party. One or two [illegible] under the supervision of [illegible] necessary to introduce the [illegible] practical world.

In the promotion period, the [illegible] in the most strategetic position. [illegible] functional stage, the local units are as [illegible] the headquarters. They are the real units of [illegible] The strength of the movement cannot be [illegible] by the headquarters. It can only be estimated [illegible] the work and ability of the local units. [illegible] knows that headquarters are an important [illegible] we often put our strongest personnel [illegible] In regard to the local units, because of their [illegible] size, we usually lose sight of them, and [illegible] leaders are often stationed at them, in such a [illegible] they make a very bad impression upon the farmers.

Another problem of the movement is the indifference or even opposition of the people. They do not understand its meaning. Naturally they look upon the local leaders who come down from the headquarters with suspicion. So some [illegible] educational work must be carried on by the local leaders as a prerequisite of local organization and functioning. They must make their people understand and appreciate them and the message they carry with them. They must know that it is not for the leader, nor even for the Party that the movement is conducted. It is for the common good of the farmers, for the largest benefit of the largest number of farmers that the Party leads the movement and that the local leaders devote their time and effort. With the cooperation of the farmers, with the service of the leaders, with support the of the Nationalist Party and Government, and with the spirit of our Great Leader, the movement will never fail to realize the common goal which is before us.

The Problem of Unemployment in China

By Frank Y. C. Yen

I

THERE ARE many causes of poverty existing in the present world, but unemployment is perhaps the most important of all. It has both a direct and an indirect influence on poverty and pauperism.[1] The evils of unemployment are well recognized all over the world, and the solution for the unemployment problem contains the key for the solution of a great many problems from both an economic and a social point of view. It is understood that unemployed people influence personal happiness as well as the national welfare. If we fail to solve such a problem, it will cause degeneration of unemployed persons, families, and societies, as well as the nation as a whole[2].

China has recently swung into a period of national development. Many difficult tasks and hard facts confront her. A great many economic, social, educational, and political problems demand solution. To the Chinese students of economics and sociology, labor problems and social affairs attract more attention than anything else. To the Chinese students of political science, the present political reconstruction in China challenges their special atten-

1 Gillin, *Poverty and Dependency*, 454.

2 Towne, *Social Problems*, 140.

[illegible] problem of China, as it seems [illegible] face, for the labor move[illegible] young in spite of the fact that it has [illegible] progress in recent years. China is not [illegible] European nations and the United States; the [illegible] in these countries are quite different from [illegible] China. China's population is greater than [illegible] any nation of the world, yet her incorporated [illegible] is small, and industry is not well developed. [illegible] poverty, it involves a great deal of un[illegible]employment in China.

Since the capital of China has been moved from Peiping to Nanking, Peiping is finding it very difficult to adjust itself to the changing situation. A large number of serious problems of unemployment are confronting the Old Capital, and these events are frequently reported by the newspapers. It is estimated that there are about 180,000 people in Peiping under poverty conditions. This means most of them have no work. How important it is to solve such "livelihood" problem of China in general, and Peiping in particular!

The common causes of differences between the West and China are: China pays more attention to the spiritual side while the West stresses material civilization more. China has strong family ties while the West cares more for individuals. Chinese civilization started with the rural system. The new modern cities such as Shanghai, Canton and Hankow are mostly due to Western influence. When the Western movement began, the rural system broke down, hence unemployment increased. In the political unrest of recent years, with an unstable government, lies a great cause of unemployment. Even the small capitalists hesitate to go ahead to develop industry and the foreign capital flows in and controls many establishments.

Unemployment is one of the important problems facing China today because China is under the eyes of the world, going through changes not unlike those all modern governments have passed through, but she is having to meet these changes at once. She is going through a crisis similar to that experienced by many nations in the past. She is forced to face three trying things at one time. First, she is changing her form of government; secondly, she is trying to adapt herself to the requirements which science has forced upon modern civilization on all sides — herein lies the solution of the unemployment problem. In the third place, she has to oppose foreign interference. This would furnish a trying problem for any nation. China, in her adjustment, is striving to develop social reform as well as her educational system in its higher branches. This modernization will enable her to work out her salvation.

I believe that China will work out her [illegible] It is only a matter of time. The American Revolution was not wholly unified and industrial development was not unified and stabilized until after the Civil War. China has not yet had an opportunity, but poverty prevails because of the lack of economic organization. The absence of transportation facilities and organized banking, nationalism and a love of country are displacing indifference. We feel that it is our great duty and responsibility to make some changes, at least, for the future development of China. Doubtless, a study of the unemployment problem will serve as the means of prevention of poverty in China.

The general significance of unemployment is understood by all, but it is somewhat difficult to define with accuracy. There is no matter of principle involved; it is simply a question of the adequate sense in which it is most convenient to use a particular common word. There are two conditions that the definition must obey. It must be so fashioned as to prove a useful tool in the investigation we have in hand; and it must, subject to that condition, conform as closely as possible to the general drift of popular usage. The search for a definition therefore, must be guided and controlled by these two tests. Mr. B. Seebohm Rowntree defines unemployment as follows: "A person is unemployed who is seeking work for wages, but is unable to find any suited to his capacities and under conditions which are reasonable, judged by local standards."[1] His definition of unemployment, it is said, has been accepted by investigation in America.

The classes of the unemployed may be divided into five groups[2]. The treatment for each of these groups requires different methods and systems. Whether it is better to prevent through legislation, criminal institutions, charitable agencies or otherwise differs with person, time and place. There are no scientific rules which can be laid down here. The classification of the five groups are: First, those who are temporarily unemployed who are employable. These are able and willing to work but cannot find jobs at a given time. Secondly, the temporarily unemployed who do not long hold a job, because of their personal lazy habits and bad temperaments or inefficiency. Thirdly, those who are somewhat permanently unemployed but who are employable. This group is due to changeable industrial conditions. Fourthly, those who are permanently unemployed and unemployable. The hoboes and tramps belong to this group. In the fifth place, those *who are permanently unemployed* and unwilling to work. The beggar is the best example of this class. The remedy for each of these classes should be different according to the conditions.

In order to cure an evil, we must use such a method as the physician uses to cure a sick man. We must first determine the causes and results of past experiments. From this we can probably suggest some remedies to be used in the same way as the physician uses medicine to treat the disease to get rid of the causes of the illness.

---

1 Forsberg, *Unemployment Insurance*, 4.
2 Gillin, *op. cit.*, 455.

II
THE CAUSES OF UNEMPLOYMENT

THE CAUSES of unemployment may be divided into four distinct groups, namely, industrial, personal, social and natural causes.

The industrial condition is a main cause of unemployment.[1] A large amount of unemployment is due to industrial causes. It is chiefly inherent in the present industrial system. The most important points that may be mentioned are the seasonal fluctuations, a disorganized labor market, fluctuations due to maladjustment in business organization, changes in buying capacity, changes in popular demand for articles consumed, and the irregularity of employment in various industries. The most serious one of these causes is the seasonal fluctuation. The summer and winter seasons vary greatly in employment. They are cycles which come regularly every year. A number of industries such as canning and preserving, the manufacturing of sugar, straw hats and many other commodities, have a busy period in the summer, others in the winter. Their demand for labor is during only a short season of the year. Where the industry does not equalize itself, the employer must make some special arrangement in order to keep labor steadily employed throughout the year.

The fluctuation of employment due to business cycles is also great. When business depression comes, a large number are discharged. The boom and depression repeat in business in a circle.[2] At a given *time every one available* is at work. As the bad period comes, many men of deficiency are forced out of work. Some unemployment lies in the lack of organization in the labor market because of the competition from the employer's point of view which has a good effect upon the rate of wages. It makes a surplus supply of labor inevitable even in the busiest seasons of industry. Strikes and boycott are mostly due to maladjustments in business organization. Unemployment breeds unemployment as far as the buying capacity is concerned, for the wage-earners themselves are the large consumers. Changes in popular demand for certain articles consumed sometimes cause workers to be out of a job. The invention of the motor, for example, has greatly diminished the demand for bicycles. The increasing size of industries and the irregularity of industry play a great part in unemployment. These are quite independent of the individual or personal causes which require particular notice.

Personal causes of unemployment are chiefly due to physical and mental defects.[3] It is hard for a disabled man to compete with able-bodied workers because of his physical and mental deficiencies. How many there are of these defective persons in China, I do not know. They make up a large part of the unemployed. It varies in different classes, and in [illegible] personal defects [illegible] ity. [illegible] of [illegible] results of [illegible] poss lack of education [illegible] them out of work in many [illegible] educational system has [illegible] deal of unemployment. [illegible] some usually find it hard to [illegible] for some one to find work [illegible] phisticated industrial world [illegible] al and vocational or prof[illegible] institutions. Sickness and [illegible] temporary or permanent disa[illegible] ness is sometimes a cause of [illegible] may be caused by the [illegible] viscement or perhaps different [illegible] Heredity in families carries it [illegible] generation. It is often based [illegible] mental defects received through [illegible] influence of environment is found [illegible] such as the forces of climate and [illegible] families live in filth, want and [illegible] because the worker of the family [illegible] his income at the saloon, where he [illegible] capacity and his chances to compete with [illegible] Liquor and social evils are always the [illegible] often the destroyers of mental, moral [illegible] capacity that interferes with industrial [illegible] and increases the causes for discharge from [illegible] ment. Shiftlessness is another personal [illegible] unemployment. Shiftlessness [illegible] individual habit. Some people change from [illegible] place often because they are not satisfied with [illegible] they are getting. The supply of labor is [illegible] more than the demand under the present [illegible] system. As they can never get the position [illegible] they like, they are forced out of a job. [illegible] run, they cannot help being poor so long as [illegible] habit controls them.

Social causes of unemployment are due to the disorganization of society. There is no doubt that the social order affects unemployed people. [illegible] has the greatest effect upon this measure. During the time of war a shortage of labor is created, but [illegible] the close of war, many men are forced out of [illegible] immediately.[4] Unemployment thus becomes a most disturbing factor, because many of the ex-soldiers are deprived of their jobs. An uncontrolled labor supply from immigration, lack of organization in the labor market and education of ill-organized society will affect the problem of unemployment immensely. A social demoralization also increases miseries.

Natural causes of unemployment are fire, floods, earthquakes, crop failures and storms. Many natural phenomena are beyond man's control. Yet some natural environment affects very little if man knows how to control and conquer nature, but it does great harm in the countries that are less developed.

The growth of population is closely connected with the problem of employment. The more people we have in the world, the more there are to do the work. Hence some would make the problem of the growth of population a part of the problem of unemployment.

(To be Continued)

1 Edie, *The Stabilization of Business*, 164.
2 National Bureau of Economic Research, *Business and Unemployment*, 5.
3 Towne, *op. cit.*, 145.
4 Cole, Out of Work, 53.

The Past Month In China.

Treaty With Belgium. On November 22, a new treaty dealing with tariff autonomy and extraterritoriality was signed between China and Belgium. This is the first new treaty to be concluded with any of the countries whose old treaties had been declared to have expired because of lapse of time, and therefore will naturally serve as a precedent for the others. Two provisions of the Belgian treaty are particularly interesting: (1.) January 1, 1930 is the definite date set for the abolition of extraterritoriality, (2.). Belgians are specifically given the right to live, trade and own property anywhere in China after extraterritoriality is done away with. This is significant because it gives a new concreteness to the discussions which have been held for years on the subject of extraterritoriality and definitely forces the issue. The treaty qualifies the abolition of Belgian extraterritoriality on January 1, 1930, by the provision that detailed arrangements are to be made for the assumption by China of jurisdiction over the Belgians. If this is not done by the time set, the Belgians are to come under Chinese law as soon as the majority of the Powers possessing extraterritoriality have surrendered their rights to it.

Treaty With Norway. The new treaty between China and Norway, published November 27, is, in its significant portions, the duplicate, word for word, of corresponding passages of the treaty with America last July.

Treaties With Italy and France. A new Sino-Italian treaty, signed November 27, is almost identical in terms, with the Sino-Belgian treaty. The new Sino-French treaty, not yet signed, is reported to be along the same lines as the treaty between China and Norway.

Other Treaty Negotiations. Treaty negotiations are progressing with the ministers of Great Britain, Holland and Portugal. As yet no negotiations have taken place between China and Japan.

United States Legation. Secretary of State, Kellogg, of the United States is reported to have announced that that government is raising its legation in China to the rank of an embassy, as proposed by Nanking.

Sino-Japanese Negotiations. On November 21, Mr. Yada, the Japanese consul-general at Shanghai went to Nanking with the intention of resuming negotiations with the Foreign minister, C.T. Wang. Dr. Wang refused to see him unless he was prepared to give a definite statement as to when Japan would remove her troops from Shantung. Although the following day a short meeting was held, no action could be taken until Mr. Yada could communicate with Tokyo. Nanking has since continued the policy of refusing to resume negotiations until Japan has withdrawn her troops from Shantung or at least has set a definite date for their withdrawal. An anti-Japanese movement is being carried on in several provinces.

Anti-Japanese Boycott. The "Anti-Japanese Boycotts Association" of Peking has been perfecting plans for imposing a heavy tax on all Japanese goods in the hands of Chinese merchants and a fine for employing Japanese. When the plan was put into action in Tientsin, the merchants petitioned against the action, although no hearing has been given to their plea by the local Kuomintang. The outcome is still uncertain. In Shanghai, the Kuomintang held a great anti-Japanese street propagadan movement lasting three days, early in December. The anti-Japanese society of Nanking recently passed a resolution forbidding Nanking merchants to handle Japanese goods after January 1.

Opium. The anti-opium conference was recently held at Nanking under the chairmanship of General Chang Chih-kiang. Several significant resolutions were reached to the effect that hereafter government officials shall be examined for opium smoking and if found guilty shall be suspended from their duties; hospitals in various districts shall be entrusted with the task of curing opium addicts; stricter laws shall be drafted for the punishment of violators of the anti-opium laws; prohibition enforcement officers shall be appointed by the central government; school textbooks shall deal extensively with the evils of the use of opium and the necessity of freeing China from them; that the goverment be petitioned to issue an order to the whole country to the effect that during the opium campaign reports of progress shall be given weekly at the Sun Yat-sen memorial services; and that November 1 of every year should be made anti-opium day and anti-opium propoganda should be everywhere intensified.

One of the most significant happenings of the month has been the development of events after the steamer Kiang An, entering Shanghai from Hankow, was discovered to be carrying some 20,000 ounces of opium. Such a stir has been caused in official circles that the offical in charge of the Shanghai Public Safety Bureaus, who was responsible for unearthing this information, has been asked to resign and the mayor of the city has resigned out of sympathy.

Famine Relief. The China International Famine Relief Commission at its recent meeting in Tientsin issued a statement that 12,000,000 people were already famine sufferers and that the total would probably rise to 20,000,000 before the end of the famine period. These figures are based on a careful analysis of the reports coming in from all

over the country. The state council at Nanking decided that various provinces should be called on to contribute to famine relief work making a total of $1,350,000. The commission has recently received a statement of famine conditions in Shantung, Honan, Shensi and Kansu, sent by Feng Yu-hsiang. He tells of the serious conditions in all these provinces where drought, floods, insects and banditry have added to the suffering of the people and strongly urges relief through labor on such projects as well digging, and road building.

Poverty in Peking.

It is estimated that 180,000 persons in Peking cannot live through the winter if there is not some means of poverty relief. The Salvation Army maintains ten soup kitchens and a straw shelter for the homeless man to use as a sleeping place. Over three thousand persons per day are fed at these soup kitchens.

THE BOOK END

"The Science of Revolution"

Marx and Lenin By Max Eastman; New York, Albert and Charles Boni.

THERE are a few books each year which are a permenent contribution to human thought. It does not seem like extravagant praise to place this work of Max Eastman's in that category. The book is primarily a criticism of the Marxian dogma which passes under the name of "scientific socialism". The author gives full credit to Marx as the man who first brought socialism down out of the skies and pointed the way by which capitalistic society was to be transformed into a socialist state. As a scientist Marx made three great contributions to social thought: (1). He saw that the basic factor in social change was economic in nature, and that human thought itself is conditioned chiefly by the prevailing mode of economic activity; (2). He realized that the laborer did not secure the whole product of his labor; and (3) He believed that only through the united efforts of those who suffered most, the workers as a class, could the new society be brought to pass.

However, according to Mr. Eastman, Marx was fully as much of a metaphysician as a scientist, and as such he laid the basis for an animistic dogma which is almost as absurd as the rest of the prescientific thinking of his day. As a disciple of Hegel, Marx found his ultimate values not in the real world round about him, but in the abstractions of philosophy. Consequently he found the basis of his doctrine, as Hegel had for his, in a philosophy of history which rested upon three assumptions all of which are basically unscientific: (a) that history is a process; (b) that it can be reduced to a single "cause"; and (c) that the principle of the "Dialectic" explains the process of history.

Eastman ridicules the orthodox Marxian concept that the forces operating in society will inevitably lead to a revolution and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Moreover he claims that the genius of Lenin lay in the "taking of the revolutionary motive back out of "history", where Marx and Engels had surreptitiously projected it, and locating it in the human breast where it belongs". He maintains thoughout the book that while Lenin believed himself to be a literal follower of Marx, he actually contradicted Marx's main thesis in his practical activity, when instead of looking upon the revolution as inevitable, he spent his entire life in organizing a party and perfecting a technique to bring about the desired uprising.

By substituting modern psychology for Hegel's mysticism, Mr. Eastman believes that it is yet possible to construct a science of revolution which can yet play an important role in the rebuilding of society. To him Marxism operates as a mere "wish-fulfillment" for the average socialist—in short it is a religion, not a science—and as such it blinds men to the need of realistic effort before the revolution can be succesfully carried out; while modern psychology in its emphasis upon action rather than ideas and its realistic understanding of human nature, furnishes an ideal basis for a scientific revolutionary technique.

Because of its realistic approach to the problems of life and especially because of the rigor with which he applies modern psychology, the book cannot but be an aid to clear thinking irrespective of the readers interest in the technical problems of Marxism. There is probably no other book in print which so lucidly interprets the socialist movement in the light of modern thought.

CHINA TOMORROW

IS YOUR MAGAZINE

Three Things you can do:

1. **Subscribe yourself;**

2. **Tell your friends;**

3. **Write us and tell us what you think about the magazine. Criticisms are welcome.**

ADDRESS YOUR COMMUNICATIONS TO:

CHINA TOMORROW

P. O. BOX NO. 8.

PEIPING, CHINA

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
MAY 1929
2657-D-32
WAR DEPARTMENT

G- 2 Report

4-1

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Statement of Chiang Kai-shek to all Kuomintang Members.

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. APR 30 1929

1. Quoted herewith is a brief summary of a ten thousand word statement by Chiang Kai-shek, published by the official Kuo Min News Agency, addressed to all members of the Kuomintang Party (March 15). The President in his own words leaves no doubt as to the lack of unity of thought and lack of political unity now existing in China.

2. Chiang Kai-shek is given to frankness of speech as are few Chinese. In this case, due allowance must be made for the immediate political struggles with which he is faced. The President is attempting to justify his bellicose attitude in connection with the Hunan affair. Nevertheless, if spokesmen for the Foreign Office were nearly as plain-spoken as are Chiang Kai-shek and Feng Yu-hsiang, the World would better understand the real conditions in China.

- - - - - -

Today marks the inauguration of the Third National Congress of the Kuomintang. It will go down in the history of the nation as a memorable day, for it ushers in a new era in the progress of the National Revolution in China. You will recall that since the last Congress at Canton, three years have elapsed, during which time such a conference has not been convened. The reason for the long interval is, I think, perfectly obvious to yourselves and requires no elucidation on my part. With the Northern Punitive Expedition successfully concluded, it is now possible for us to hold the Third Congress.

I cannot over emphasize the importance of the present Congress. The responsibities entrusted to it are as heavy as those placed upon the First Congress. I, therefore, urge you to devote your closest attention to the tasks before you.

During the past three years, questions of great importance have arisen both in the Party and in the Government and it is to be hoped that your deliberations and judgment will determine solutions for these difficult problems so that the National Revolution can proceed in the right path.

To find satisfactory solutions for our various outstanding problems, it is necessary that you have a thorough understanding of Party and Governmental affairs in their present state. I, therefore, venture to place before you, Comrades, a brief resume of the questions confronting both the Party and the Government. As I am giving my personal point of view, I trust that I may indulge in expressing personal opinions in connection with these outstanding problems.

I shall deal first with Party affairs. The fundamental defect in the Party is the lack of unity of thought. Our thoughts not being united, we have no common aim. No having a common aim, our activities lack concentration. The result is that there is no unity in our actions, and dissension creeps into our ranks. Our internal difficulties may all be traced to one cause and that is, no unity of thought.

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Statement of Chiang Kai-shek to all Kuomintang Members.

The foundation of the Kuomintang being, as you all know, the Three People's Principles laid down by our late Leader, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, we should cooperate with one another in carrying out these principles.

Unfortunately, however, some of our comrades have cast aside these principles, or interpret them according to their individual ideas. Confusion of thought and difference of views ensue with the result that our Comrades are at a loss as to the real meaning of our late Leader's teachings. The Three People's Principles are essentially a Socio-political doctrine. They deal with the political life of the nation as well as the social life of the people. For example, it is the policy of our late Leader to bring about an equitable distribution of land and to curb capitalistic exploitation of labor. But our late Leader availed himself of every opportunity to explain that China should not seek equality with the rest of the world through the medium of a class war. We must not infer from the fact that the Three People's Principles do not approve of class struggles as such, that, therefore, they are not a social doctrine.

Looking at the situation from a political standpoint, it is perfectly clear that the Revolution led by the Kuomintang is undertaken purely in the interest of the people as a whole. We must acknowledge that heretofore our unfortunate people have suffered. But until the entire country is unified, mitigation of the people's sufferings is well nigh impossible. The question, therefore, is: Is China really united now? A cursory survey of the political situation will show that it is not. The Provincial Governments are acting independently in financial matters within their respective areas. They buy arms and ammunitions without the sanction of the Central Government and recruit soldiers on their own accord. The Central Government is powerless over the Provincial Governments and cannot effectively stop them from such harmful activities. What is worse is that the Provincial Governments, taking advantage of their military strength, often dictate to the Central Government in questions affecting themselves with the result that it becomes necessary for the Central Government first to consult the Provincial Governments before issuing orders. To take a recent example. It was resolved at the 5th Plenary Session of the Central Executive and Supervisory Committees that the Divisional Political Councils should not either appoint or dismiss government officials under their jurisdiction on their own responsibility, and yet we have the case of the Wu-Han Divisional Political Council ar bitrarily dismissing the Chairman of the Hunan Provincial Government.

At the recent Military Conference, it was decided that troops should not be mobilized except at the express order of the Military Reorganization and Disbandment Committee; but hardly had the Conference ended when troop movements were started in the Wu-Han area. All of which goes to show that political unity has not yet been achieved.

The National Congress being the supreme organ of the Kuomintang should endeavor by all the means at its disposal to seek a definite solution of all outstanding problems in order that the sacrifices of our late Leader and other martyrs of the Party may not have been made in vain.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIV.

4-1 AUG 2657-D-321
20
1930

July 7, 1930

WAR DEPARTMENT

3110-Present Executive and Minstry

CHINA

PERSONNEL OF KUOMINTANG CENTRAL COMMITTEES AND THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
(as of May 30, 1930)

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. AUG 25 1930

The Central Executive Committee

Chiang Kai-shek
Soong Ching-ling (Mrs. Sun Yat Sen)
Tai Chi-tao
Wu Teih-cheng
Yeh Tsu-chang
Wang Peh-ling
Wang Peh-chung
Chang Chun
Chao Tai-wen
Liu Chi-wen
Ting Wei-feng
Chu Pei-teh
Hu Han-min
Chen Shao-ying
Wu Chao-chu
Yu Yu-jen
Chu Chia-chien
Li Wen-fen
Ho Chen-chun
Yang Shu-chuang
Chow Chi-kong
Tseng Yang-fu
Ten Yen-kai
T. V. Soong (chairman)
Chen Li-fu
Ho Ying-Ching
Sun Fo
Chen Kuo-fu
Chen Ming-chu
Shao Yuan-chung
Liu Shih
Fang Chen-wu
Liu Lu-yin
Feng Chu-wei
Ting Chao-wu

Standing Committee of the C. E. C.

Chiang Kai-shek
Sun Fo
Chen Kuo-fu
Hu Han-min
Tai Chi-tao
Ting Wei-fen
Tan Yen-kai
Yu Yu-jen
Yeh Tsu-chang

Overseas Committee of the C. E. C.

Chow Chi-keng (vice chairman)
Li Chi-an
Wu Kung-yi
Chen Yao-yuan (chairman)
Lu Wei-sen
Siao Chih-sen (vice Chairman)
Cheng Chin-nien
Huang Yiu-keng

The Central Political Council

Hu Han-min
Ten Yen-kai
Yu Yu-jen
Tai Chi-tao
Chao Tai-wen
Li Shih-tseng
Wang Chung-hui
Koo Ying-fen
Chaing Kai-shek
Yeh Tsu-chang
Ting Wei-fen
Yang Shu-chuang
Wu Chih-hui
Tsai Yuan-pei
Chen Li-fu (Chief Sec.)
Zau Lih-tze
Sun Fo
Chen Kuo-fu
Ho Ying-ching
T. V. Soong
Chang Ching-kiang
Lin Sen

Central Supervisery Council

Wu Chih-hui
Lin Sen
Wang Chung-hui
Teng Cheh-ju
Chang Ching-kiang
Tsai Yuan-pei
Li Shih-tseng
Hsiao Fu-chen
Koo Ying-fen
Chang Chi
Shao Li-tze
En-Ko-Pa-Tu
Zau Lih-tse

Standing Committee of the C. E. C.

Tsai Yuan-pei
Koo Ying-fen
Hsiao Chi-sen -sec.
Wang Chung-hui
Chang Ching-kiang
Lin Sen

From M/A No. 7769

Reserve Members of the C. E. C.

C. T. Wang	Yu Ching-tang	Ting Chao-wu
Chen Yao-yuan	Kwei Tsing-chi	Ke Hsin-ka
Ma Shao-chun	Chao Pei-lien	Ke Hing-ho
H. H. King	Chiao Yi-tang	Chang Tseng
Chen Cheh	Huang Shih	Kiu Wen-tso
Chang Tso-fang	Lu Teh-ping	Chen Tse-tang
Miao Pei-chen	Cheng Tien-fang	Miao Bin
Chiang Heng-yi		

Reserve Members of the C. P. C.

Li Wen-fan	Chu Chai-yua	Shao Yuan-chung
H. H. King	Chen Li-fu	C. T. Wang
Wang Peh-chung		

Reserve Members of the C. S. C.

Chu Lin-yi	Li Lieh-chun	Chen Puh-lui
Lin Yun-kao	Shang Chen	Liu Shao-chung
Chen Chia-yiu		Teng Ching-yang

THE CENTRAL RESEARCH COUNCIL

Chairman - Tsai Yuan-pei
General Secretary - Yang Chuan
Treasurer - Wang Ching-yi
Secretary - Hsu Shou-shan

THE STATE COUNCIL

Chiang Kai-shek (Chairman)	Hu Han-min	Tan Yan-kai
Wang Chung-hui	Chao Tai-wen	Sun Fo
Chen Kuo-fu	Ho Ying-ching	Lin Sen
Yang Shu-chuang	Chang Hsueh-liang	Tai Chuan-yen
Tsai Yuan-pei		T. V. Soong

Counsellors to State Council

Chu Chi-chui	Hsiao Yih-kun	Chang Chin-leh
Wang Huei-chi		

Secretariat of the State Council

Koo Ying-Fen (Chief Sec.)	Yang Hsieh-chi	Chow Chung-ling
Liu Min-wei	Li Chen-fu	Yang Yen-wei
Hsu Chih-chi	Chu Wen-chung	Wang Tseng-yin
Lao Lin-pei		Chien Chang-chao

Director of the Chief Political Department - - - - - - - - Koo Ying-feng
Director of the General Administrative Department - - - Ho Chen-chun
Director of the Government Printing Department - - - - - Chow Chung-liang
Director of the Documents and Records Department - - - - Yang Hsien-chi

State Council (Continued)

Counsellors to Chief Political Officials Office

Hsiung Yi-ping
Wang Shu
Chen Chia-an
Ou Yang-hsuan
Peng Hsueh
Chi Yun-lun

No. 7769

Military Department

Director of the Chief Military Department - - - - - -	Ho-Chen-chun
Director of the Ceremonies Department - - - - - - - -	Hsiao Chin
Military Counseller to the State Council - - - - - - -	Peng Hsin-ming
	Chiu Hung-chun
Director of the General Affairs Bureau - - - - - - -	Shu Shih-fu

Officers of the General Staff

Acting Chief-of-Staff - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	Chu Pei-teh
1st Deputy Chief-of-Staff - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	Liu Lu-hsien
2nd Deputy Chief-of-Staff - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	
Divisional Chief of the General Staff - - - - - - - -	Wang Chih
Director of the General Affairs Department - - - - - -	Wang Yiu-yo
Director of the 1st Department - - - - - - - - - - - -	Liu Kwang
Director of the 2nd Department - - - - - - - - - - - -	Lin Wei
Director of the 3rd Department - - - - - - - - - - - -	Wang Lueh
Director of the Military Surveying Bureau - - - - - -	Wu Teh-feng
High Advisers: Chang Chi-yu	Yo Wei-ching
Nu Hsu-lu	Lu Tsu
Wang Lung	Hsin Fei-kun
Chung Ti-tao	Yuan Hsi-tsih
Chien Tso-lun	
Members: Tsai Pei-yuan	Wang Yu-chuang
Pang Tsang-tang	

Officers associated with the Inspector-General of Military Training

Inspector-General	Ho Ying-Ching
Deputy Inspector-General	Chow Ya-ching
Inspector of Cavalry	Wang Kao-chih
Inspector of Artillery	Wang Hsiu-chih
Inspector of Infantry	Shih Chen-chih
Inspector of the Army Transport Corps	Li Kuo-liang
Inspector of the Army Labor Corps	Pan Chung-tao
Inspector of Engineering	Wu Hu-hsuan
Assistant-Inspector of Cavalry	Chang Ao-hsiang
Assistant-Inspector of Artillery	Yeh Ping-chih
Assistant-Inspectors of Infantry	Chang Che
	Nu San-chih
	Yang Yun-ping
Assistant-Inspector of the Army Labor Corps	Wu Ping-yuang
Assistant-Inspector of Engineering	Pan Pao-ta
Director of the Political Training Bureau	Chen Li-fu
Director of the Education Division of the General Affairs Department	Chen Chi-chih
Staff Members of the Education Division of the General Affairs Department	Hsieh Ping-chih
	Sheh Kuo-chu
	Ma Chung-lu
Director of Military Transportation	Yu Fei-pang
Director of the Compilation Bureau of Military Science	Li Ta
Chief of the Secretariat of the General Affairs Department	Kuo Tsi-tan
General Affairs Department	Wang Wen-yen
Chief of the Political Training Section of the Political Training Bureau	Chia Peh-tao
Chief Editor of the Military Magazine	Yen Er-yung
Assistant Chief Editor of the Military Magazine	Yang Yen-fang
Managing Editors of the Military Magazine	Chen Yi
	Yeh Chang-huang
	Li Yin
	Tan Cho-hsiung
	Li Yun-lung

Counsellors

Liu Ping-heng
Chen Chia-hou
Wang Yen-ping
Liu Chien-chun
Li Shih-men
Chang Shou-tung
Hsu Sen-yu

Members of the Military Advisory Council

Lin Ping-hsien
Liao Lei
Chang Yi-peng
Chin Hsa
Fu Chun-huai
Yang Shih-yuan
Au Yang-lin
Chi Yi-yao
Fu Chin-kuei
Tan Ching-ling
Koo Tsing-hsuan
Wang Shi-chang
Lu Feng-nien
Tseh Kao-shu
Chen Chien
Tsai Chu-yiu
Chu Shih-kuei
Chang Chin-teh
Yung Hung-lu
Li Wei-hsin
Tan Shao-fu

Counsellors to Military Advisory Council

Chow Lan
Liu Chi-leh
Chien Hsueh-tsu
Wei Yih-san
Kung Fan-wei
Tao Tun-li
Ma Chih-ti
Chao Pao-hsiang
Chi Yun-ao
Feng Hsiang-ting

National Military Reorganization and Disbandment Committee

GEneral Affairs Department

Acting Director of General Affairs Department — Li Tung-sen

Archives Section

Chief - Hsu Yung
Assistant Chief -
Secretary - Chen Sha-chi
Members - Wu Ching-tzo
Li Chang-min
Liu Shu-jen
Accountant - Yu Chi-sui

Personal Affairs Section

Chief - Chen Yih-hsu
Assistant Chief - Chow Shao-king
Members - Ko Ching
Shen Yi-chang

General Affairs Section

Chief - Chen Hin-ko
Assistant Chief - Tung Hsi-chi
Secretary - Chen Shu-chi

Reorganization Department

Director
Assistant Director — Chow Ya-wei

General Affairs Section

Chief - Chen Ka
Accountant - Chiang Chen
Secretary - Hsiao Tai-ai
Member - Yang Hsi-ting

Counting Section

Chief - Li Lei-fu

Inspection and Reorganization Division

Director - Chen Kwang-tsao
Assistant Director - Kung Shao-fung

Planning Division

Chief - Tan Chia-chin
Assistant Chief - Wang Ken
Chief of the Planning Department - - - - - - - - - - - - - Hsu Men-chen
Member - Cheng Chih-lan

Preparatory Section

Chief - Yu Tao-yi

Regulations and Rules Section

Chief - Yang Chih-kui
Member - Sze Tsung-wu

Statistics Section

Chief - Feng Hsi-fung
Member - Huang Chung-hsin

Disbandment and Employment Office

Director of the Disbandment & Employment Dept.
Assistant Director - Liu Chi

General Affairs Section

Chief - Liu Kuo-tseng

Administrative Section

Chief - Ma Shao-chung

Employment and Disbandment Section

Chief - Hsu Ting-yuen
Assistant Chief - Wu Hung-chang

Employment and Planning Section

Chief - Wang Hsueh-lin

Investigation Section

Chief - Liu Muh-sang

Transportation Section

Chief - Chang Siao-chuan

Finance Department

Director of Finance
Assistant Director - Chu Shou-kwang

General Affairs Section

Chief - Chao Hsiao-fu
Assistant Chief - Kuo Fu-en

No. 7769

Accounting Section

Chief	Chi Chin-chien
Assistant Chief	Li Shi-yuan
Members	Chin Chang-piao
	Chang Wan-cheng
	Ten Chi-hsi

Auditing Section

Assistant Chief	Chin Hung-hieh
Members	Teng Hung-nieh
	Wu Yao-chun
	Liu Shih-yao

Central Disbandment Office

Members

Sung Shih-yen	Chien Ta-chun	Chen Tao
Ho Chen-chun	Wu ying-tang	Wang King-yu
Chien Tsung-shih		

1st Disbandment Office

Director	Ho Ying-ching
Director of the General Affairs Department	Shih Chin-ting
Director of the Military Affairs Department	Lin Wei
Director of the Disbandment & Employment Bureau	Ho Kuo-kwang
Director of the Finance Department	Chow Chun-yi
Assistant Chief of the Finance Department	Chang Yeh-chun
	Chu King-yang

Members

Li Tao	Hang Hsiung-siao	Chien Chung-shih
Chen Chao-yin	Ko Ching-en	Hua Ting-yuan
Kwei Tsung-chi	Wang Fung-tsing	

2nd Disbandment Office

Director	
Associate Director	Shih Chin-ting
Director of the General Affairs Department	Chen Chi-yi
Director of the Military Affairs Bureau	Wu Hsi-chi
Director of the Disbandment & Employment Office	Hsu Hsiang-yun

Members

Fong Peng-jen	Chang Yuan-yin	Wang Lien
Feng Chia-hui	Kao Tso-tung	Hsia Tou-yin

3rd Disbandment Office

Director	Chow Tai
Director of the General Affairs Department	Fu Peng-hai
Director of the Military Affairs Bureau	Chow Wei-nan
Director of the Disbandment & Employment Bureau	Chen Tseng-tsze
Chief of the Finance Section	Kuo Hsiang-ping
Associate Director	Ku Ven-fa

General Affairs Department

Chief	Chen Ko
Accountant	Chiang Chen
Secretary	Hsiao Tai-ai
Member	Yang Hsi-ting

No. 7769

Counting Section

Chief - Li Lei-fu

Inspection and Reorganization Division

Director - Chen Kwang-tsao
Assistant Director - Kung Shao-fung

Planning Division

Chief - Tan Chia-chin
Assistant Chief - Wang Ken
Chief of the Planning Department- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Hsu Men-chen
Members - Cheng Chih-lan

Preparatory Section

Chief - Tu Tao-yi

Regulations and Rules Section

Chief - Yang Chih-kui
Member- Sze Tsung-wu

Statistics Section

Chief - Fang Hsi-fung
Member- Huang Chung-hsin

Disbandment and Employment Office

Director of the Disbandment & Employment Dept. - Liu Chi
Assistant Director

General Affairs Section

Chief - Liu Kuo-tseng

Administrative Section

Chief - Ma Shao-chung

Disbandment & Employment Section

Chief - Hsu Ting-yuen
Assistant Chief- Wu Hung-chang

Employment & Planning Section

Chief - Wang Hsueh-lin

Investigation Section

Chief - Liu Muh-sang

Transportation Section

Chief - Chang Siao-chuan

Finance Department

Director of Finance Department - Chu Shou-kwang
Assistant Director

No. 7769

General Affairs Section

Chief - Chao Hsiao-fu
Assistant Chief - Kuo Fu-en

Accounting Section

Chief - Chi Chin-chien
Assistant Chief - Li Shi-yuan
Members - Chin Chang-piao
Chang Wan-cheng
Ten Chi-hsi

Auditing Section

Assistant Chief - Chin Hung-hieh
Members - Teng Hung-nieh
Wu Yao-chun
Liu Shih-yao

Central Disbandment Office

Members

Sung Shih-yen
Ho Chen-chun
Chien Tsung-shih
Chien Ta-chun
Wu Ying-tang
Chen Tao
Wang King-yu

1st Disbandment Office

Director - Ho Ying-ching
Director of the General Affairs Department - - - - - - - - Shih Chin-ting
Director of the Military Affairs Department - - - - - - - Lin Wei
Director of the Disbandment & Employment Bureau - - - - - Ho Kuo-kwang
Director of the Finance Department - - - - - - - - - - - - Chow Chun-yi
Assistant Chief of the Finance Department - - - - - - - - Chang Yoh-chun
Chu Kung-yang

Members

Li Tao
Chen Chao-yin
Kwei Tsung-chi
Hang Hsiung-siao
Ko Ching-en
Wang Fung-tsing
Chien Chung-shih
Hua Ting-yuan

2d Disbandment Office

Director -
Associate Director - Shih Chin-ting
Director of the Genearl Affairs Department - - - - - - - - Chen Chi-yi
Director of the Military Affairs Bureau - - - - - - - - - - Wu Hsi-chi
Director of the Disbandment & Employment Office - - - - - Hsu Hsiang-yun

Members

Feng Peng -jen
Feng Chia-hui
Chang Yuan-yin
Kao Tso-tung
Wang Lien
Hsia Tou-yin

3rd Disbandment Office

Director - Chow Tai
Director of the General Affairs Department - - - - - - - - - Fu Peng-hai
Director of the Military Affairs Bureau - - - - - - - - - - Chow Wei-nan
Director of the Disbandment & Employment Bureau - - - - - Chen Tseng-tsze
Chief of the Finance Section - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Kuo Hsiang-ping
Associate Director - Ku Ven-fah

No. 7769

General Disbandment Office (cont.)

3rd Disbandment Office

Members

Ting Chao-wu	Tang Shih	Chang Shou-tung
Chao Yi-ahu	Yang Chen-yuan	Fung Yu-pang
Li Hsin-chung	Kuo Shin-ping	Lei Shou
Pung Tih	Lu Ying-koo	Hsia Teh-tao
Wang Tseng-tso		

4th Disbandment Office

Director - Hu Chung-tu
Director of the General Affairs Department - - - - - Chang Chang-sen
Director of the Military Affairs Bureau - - - - - - - - Li Chien-ho
Director of the Disbandment & Employment Bureau - - - Nih Kwang

Members

Ho Chien	Wang Fung-tsen	Tien Chung-yu
Wu Te-chen	Yang Teng-hui	Lu Hsi-yen

5th Disbandment Office

Director - Wang Fu-lin
Assistant Director - Han Fu-chu
Director of the General Affairs Section - - - - - - - - Yang Cheng-chih
Director of the Military Affairs Bureau - - - - - - - - - Hu Yi-lin
Director of the Disbandment & Employment Bureau - - - Wang Sih-chang
Director of the Finance Department - - - - - - - - - - Wang Hsiang-yun

Members

Li Tsung-pi	Feng Peng-jen	Liu Wei-yung
Wu Te-chen	Tuan Hai-fung	Li Hsin-chung
Chen Ching-shih	Chang Yoh	Tien Wen-chung
Kwei Tsung-chi	Chang Wen-ching	Fen Chih-shih
Kuan Shu-jen		

Naval Disbandment & Reorganization Office

Director - Yang Shu-chuang
Assistant Director - Chen Chi-liang
Chief of the Finance Section - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Chow Chao-sui
Commander of the Northeast Naval Squadron - - - - - - Chen Huang-liang
Commander of the 1st Squadron - - - - - - - - - - - - - Chen Chi-ling
Commander of the 2d Squadron - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Chen Shao-kwang
Commander of the 4th Squadron - - - - - - - - - - - - Chen Ching-yuan
Commander of the Central Squadron - - - - - - - - - - - - Tseng Yi-tseng

Standing Committee of the National Military Reorganization and Disbandment Committee

Tan Yen-kai	Chiang Kai-shek	Yang Shu-chang
Chang Hsueh-liang	Ho Ying-ching	T. V. Soong
	Ko Ching-en	Ten Sen-chi

National Defence Council

Chiang Kai-shek	Chao Tai-wen	Tan Yen-kai
T. V. Soong	C. T. Wang	Ho Ying-ching
Yang Shu-chuang		

No. 7769

National Finance Committee

Wu Kuan-chung
Tan Yen-kai
Yang Shu-chuang
Chang Hsueh-liang
Sun Fo
Chen Kui-fur

Chiang Kai-shek
Lin Sen
T. V. Soong
Hu Han-min
Ho Ying-ching

Wu Chi-hui
Chao Tai-wen
Tai Chi-tao
Tsai Yuan-pei
Chu Shao-kwang

Chief Secretary - Fan Hsin-fan
Secretaries - Huang Yiu-ying
Chien Wen-tsaio
Assistant Secretaries - Pang Sung-chow
Ho Yi-min

National Famine Relief Committee

Acting Chairman - Hsu Yiu-yin

Standing Committee

Hsu Shih-yin
Wang Cheng
Liu Chih-chow
Ho Yao-tsuo

Tang Shao-yi
Chu Ching-lin
Lou Chi-wen

Hsiung Hsi-lin
Yeh-Chuang
Liu Chih-lung
Chang Pu-lan

Ex-Office Members of the Committee

Chao Tai-wen
Yi Pei-chi
Sun Fo

C. H. Wang
H. M. Kung

T. V. Soong
Wang Peh-chung

Members

Tang Shao-yi
Tai Chi-tao
Liu Chih-lung
Ting Wei-fen
Sun Fo
C. T. Wang
Lei Chih-chow
Lin Yi-hsun
Chang Tsun-kwei
Yeng Chwang
Wang Hu
Ho Shih-yuan
Chiu Hsin-yun
Kwang Yin
Fang Pei-hsi
Li Hsuan-hui
Chen Yuan-chuan
Yang Ching-kiang
Lin Huan-ting
Lao Ching-hsin
Lan Yuan-kao
Ho Yao-tsu
Pan Chin-po
Chang Ju-hao
Chang Shao-tsi
Ho Chi-kung

Hsu Shih-yin
Wang Chung-hui
Yang Chao-tai
Lin Yun-kao
Koo Ying-feng
T. V. Soong
Chang Tso-ping
Chang Chi
Chiu Min-chang
Yu Ya-ching
Tsui Ting-hsien
Liu Wu-shing
Wang JenOwen
Ma Shao-chun
Wu Hsiang-chu
Teng Cheh-yu
Cheng Hung-nien
Chen Hui-teh
Li Wen-fen
Chen Pin-chein
Chen Hui-teh
Li Wen-fen
Chen Pin-chein
Tseng Yen
Li Shih-tseng
Hsin Shih-lien
Sheng Chen
Hsu Yung-chang

Hu Han-min
Wang Peh-chung
Hsiung Hai-lin
Wang Cheng
Wu Te-chen
Wang Chih-hsiang
Niu Yung-chien
Foo Ping-hsien
Feng Sen-tao
Chang Tu-len
Chen Chia-ken
Liu Chi-wen
Ma Fu-hsiang
Hu Wen-fu
Koh Hsiang Yueh
Hu Chung-hao
Siao Fu-chen
Cheng Yeh-siu
Kuo Piao
Tan Chao-ao
Chen Yu-chow
Cheng Ti-ju
Wang Shih-tseng
Yi Pei-chi
Yang Ai-yuan
Chao Pei-lien
Li Huan-ying

No. 7769

The Kemmerer Commission

(Members that Remain)

Expert in Public Credit	Dr. Arthur N. Young
Assistant Expert in Banking	Mr. F. B. Lynch
Expert in Budget and Budgeting Problems	Mr. F. A. Cleveland
Expert in Taxation	Dr. O. C. Lockhart
Expert in Customs Tariff Policies	Dr. Ben H. Wallace
Assistant Expert in Problems of Accounting and Fiscal Control	Mr. William Watson

Chinese Ministers to Foreign Countries

Minister to Austria	Chiang Tso-ping
Minister to Belgium	Foo Ping-chang
Minister to Brazil	Tai En-sai
Minister to Cuba	Ling Ping
Minister to Denmark	Loo Tsung-yao
Minister to Finland	Hsia Wei-sung
Minister to France	Kao Lu
Minister to Germany	Chiang Tso-ping
Minister to Great Britain	Alfred Sze
Minister to Holland	King Wanze
Minister to Italy	Quo Tai-chi
Minister to Japan	Wong Yung-pao
Minister to Mexico	Li Lu-chao
Minister to Norway	Chu Cheng-yen
Minister to Panama	Miao An-sao
Minister to Portugal	Wang Ding-chang
Minister to Sweden	Chu Cheng-yen
Minister to the United States	C. C. Wu

Chinese Acting-Ministers to Foreign Countries

Acting-Minister to Chili	Wang Teng-moh
Acting-Minister to Spain	Wang Ling-koh
Acting-Minister to Switzerland	Siao Chi-yung

Chinese Consul Generals to Foreign Countries

Consul-General to Canada	Li Tsing
Consul-General to Singapore	Teng Liu
Consul-General to Australia	Soong Fa-ziang
Consul-General to North Borneo	Kwei Chin
Consul-General to San Francisco	Chang Chun
Consul-General to the Philippines	H. H. Kwong
Consul-General at New York	Hsiung Zung-chi
Consul-General at Yokohama	Wong Yang-pao
Consul-General at Vladivostok	Hsu Hsiung-chwang
Consul-General at Kobe	Ling Teng-pu
Consul-General to Hamburg	Jen U-ming
Consul-General to Korea	Wang Siu-zang
Consul-General to Peru	Wei Tz-king
Consul-General at Honolulu	Huang Yun-soo
Consul-General at Manila	Kwang Hsu-kun
Acting Consul-General at Paris	Chang zao

Control Yuan

Director	Chao-Tai-wen
Vice-Director	Chen Ko-fu

No. 7769

Auditing Bureau

President - Yu Yu-jen
Secretary - Wang Wen-wei
Assistant Auditor - Yin Kung-wu

Legislative Yuan

Director - Hu Han-min
Vice-Director - Kin Sen

Wang Yung-ping
Pang Chih-hui
Chu Ho-chung
Lu Chih-yi
Shao Yuan-chung
Lin Bin
Wang Pao-tseng
Teng Tung
Shi Chin-yen
Chao Yin
Huang Chung-kuo
Ma Chao-tsing
Foo Ping-hsiang
Liu Kuan-hsuen
Tsai Hsuan
Liu Chih-hsuen

Wu Te-chen
Soong Mai-ling
Chow Cheng-lin
Ma Yin-chu
Wang Shih-chi
Shih Chiang-chia
Wu Hsiang-yin
Chow Nan
En-Keh-Pa-Tu
Lu Li-lung
Wei Huai
Chwang Chung-fu
Chen Chang-heng
Huang Shu-chu
Chou I-tang

Liu Keh-chow
Soumey-Tcheng
We Ting-sen
Miao Bin
Lu Ting
Chen Chao
Tao Hsuan
Quo Tai-chi
Chang Chih-nan
Tseng Chi
Tseng Shao-yen
Lou Ching-hsin
Teng Kai-sen
Niu Yung-chien
Tai Hsiu-chun
Lou Tung-sun

Five Standing Committee of the Yuan

Military Affairs Committee

Niu Yang-chien (Chairman)

Chen Chao-yin
Wu Te-chen

Wei Huai
En-Keh-Pa-Tu

Foreign Affairs Committee

Fu Pang-shen
Chow Fu-ching (Secretary)

Quo Tai-chi
Lou Yu-hsiun

Chow Lan

Economic Committee

Shao Yuan-chung (Chairman)

Wu Shang-ying
Chang Shih-nan

Huang Chang-kuo
Chen Ni-chung

Legislative Yuan

Law Drafting Committee

Chiao Yi-tang (Chairman)
Wu Chih-yi
Sun Chin-ya
Tsao Shao-chiu

Tseng Kai-chen
Tien Ting
Tai Hsiu-chuen
Fu Ping-shang

Shih Shangkwan
Tsai Hsuan
Lin Bin
Liu Koh-chuan
Lu Sui

Land Law Committee

Hu Han-min (Chairman)
Tai Chi-tao
Yen Hsi-shan

Wang Cheng-ting
Sun Fo
Chao Tai-wen

Chiang Kai-shek
H. H. Kung
T. V. Soong

No. 7769

Secretariat Department

Chief Secretary - - - - - - - - - Li Ven-fen

Li Hsiao-sen
Hsu Kan-tang
Chu Kuo-liang

Peng Hsiao
Huang Yuang-pin
Shih Tai-pu
Chan Hai-tseng

Chi Ching-hsiang
Tsing Lo-yu
Wang Yih-han

Compilation and Translation Department

Director- - - - - Liu Ying-lu
Editor - - - - - Wu Ching-pang

Director of Statistics
Sectional Chiefs

K. K. Liau
Chang Sing-yi
Chen Hua-yin
Liu Yi-mien
Ling Wei
Chu Bin-yuan
Yen Hsien-chih

Judicial Yuan

Director - Wang Chung-hui
Vice-Director - Chang Chi
Chief Secretary - Hsia Kuan-sen
Counsellors - Chien Tai
Wu Kuan-wu
Pang En-pei
Shen Chia-yi
Secretaries - Lin Pao
Hu Han
Wang Chung-hsian
Wang Chien-tsu

Ministry of Justice

Minister - L. W. Chu
Political Vice-Minister - L. W. Chu
Administrative Vice-Minister - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Hsieh Ying-chow
Secretaries - William Hsieh
C. P. Peng
Wang Chien-tsu
Tan Yi-wu
Chu Yung-show
Siang Chen-chun
Wang Ai-hsiang

Sectional Chiefs

Wang Jui
Wang Yuan-tseng
Hsu Shih-hsin
Yoh Hua

Chi Chu
Yang Cheng-tsu
Chu Lu Chien
Sou Hsi-hsun

Hu Yuan-chien
Liu Ying-lin
Ho Chao

Director of Divisions

Sochsi-Hsun

Liu Yuan-chu
Cheng Chan

Wang Hu-chuen

Counsellors

Shiwing Wetsen-hsu

Hsu Sheng-king
Chen Fu-min

Tchang Yi-Tchau
Hsia Kuan-sen

Supreme Court

President of the Supreme Court - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Lin Hsiang
Acting Chief Clerk - Chin Chi-hua

No. 7769

Supreme Court (Cont.)

Acting Clerks - Shu Chi-hsiang
Hsu Pe-yuan
Hsiao Chin-lui
Lin Shao-hsin

Chief Justices of the Supreme Court - - - - - - - - - - Chang Cheng-pan
Li Fo
Hsia Chin
Tung Hang-sen

Judges of the Supreme Court

Liu Chung-ying
Chang Hsiao-lin
Chen Muh-hui
Wu Chao-mei
Yen Tsai-chun
Ho Wei
Chu Teh-sen

Procurators of the Procuratorate attached to the Supreme Court

Lin Pin-hsun
Cheng Lieh (Act. Chief)
Mei-Kwang-hsi
Hu Hung-en
Wang Koh-kun
Wang Tsu-shih

Acting Chief Clerk - Shih Ken
Acting Clerks - Yu Wen-hua
Wu Chao-lien

Examination Yuan

Director - Tai Chi-tao
Vice-Director - Sun Fo
Act. Secretary-General - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Hsu Chung-hao
Secretaries - Chen Yu-fung
Kao Huai-shuan
Chen Tien-hsi
Hsu Chung-hao
Pan Tsung-yen
Pan Feng-chi
Counsellors - Shen Chen-ting
Chen Yang-piao
Liu Tien-tao

Examination and Selection Committee

Chairman - Tai Chi-tao
Vice-Chairman - Shao Yuan-chung
Members - Liu Lu-yin
Kwei Chung-chi
Tsiao Yi-tang
Yu Ching-tang
Chen Lih-fu
Secretaries - Wang Chu-ping 2d rank
Lung Tsien 2d rank

Experts Committee

Consisting of from 16 to 32 members, who are to assist the Examination and Selection Committee in supervising all government Civil Service examinations.

Wang Yung-ping
Wu Mian
Hu Yi-wen
Chen Shu-ping
Chang Mih-chun
Chang Shen-yi
Li Ching-ying
Lin Pai-shun
Hu Ting-an
Chen Lien-chung
Chang Ching-wu
Lai Lien
Sah Fu-chun
Wang Cheng-chi
Hu Peh-en
Tang Chiyu
Huang Wan-shu
Chang Chi-shung
Lu Chu

No. 7769

Ministry of Official Ranking

Minister	Chang Nan-hsien
Vice-Minister	Chiu Yoh
Chief Secretary	Mo Hung-hui
Secretary	Liu Feng-hsiang
Departmental Directors	Liu Tang
	Pang Kuo-chun
	Ma Hoh-tien

Executive Yuan

Director - Tan Yen-kai

Counsellors

Tuan Ping-chang	Li Ta-nien
Lu Shih-tseng	Hsia Hsin-tseng

Secretaries

Tsai Min	Teng Tseng-wei
Liu Chi-ping	Yu Tseng-wei

Ministries

Minister of Communications	Wang Peh-chung
Minister of Education	Chiang Min-lin
Minister of Foreign Affairs	C. T. Wang
Minister of Finance	T. V. Soong
Minister of Health	Liu Jui-heng
Minister of Industry, Commerce and Labor	H. H. Kung
Minister of Interior	Yang Chao-tai
Minister of Mining and Agriculturem	Yi-Pei-chi
Minister of the Naty	Yang Shu-chuang
Minister of Railways	Sun Fo
Minister of War	Ho Ying-chien

Committees

National Reconstruction Committee

Wang Chi-chung	Chang Chi-chang	Tsui Ting-hsien
Chiang Kai-shek	Hu Han-min	Tai Chi-tao
Sun Fo	Chang Chi	Tsai Yuan-pei
Chen Kuo-fu	Wang Chang-hui	T. V. Soong
Ho Ying-ching	Lin Sen	Chang Chih-peng
Chow Shih-chen	Liu Yeh-feng	C. T. Wang
Chang Hsueh-liang	Chao Pai-wen	Chen Tiao-yuan
Yang Shu-chuang	Wang Peh-chung	H. H. Kung
Yi Pei-chi	Chiang Men-lin	Niu Yung-chien
Chu Pei-teh	Hsu Shih-ying	Lung Yun
Yu Yu-jen	Han Fu-chu	Liu Wen-hui
Sun Lien-chung	Chang Tsi-hsiang	Hsu Yung-chang
King Shu-jen	Yang Ai-yuan	Tan Yen-kai
Ho Chi-kung	Teh Wen-chien	Liu Chi-wen
Tang Yu-lin	Chiang Ching-kiang	Chen Ming-chu
Lu Ti-ping	Shang Chen	

No. 7769

National Reconstruction Board

Chang Ching-kiang (Chairman)
Li Shih-tseng
Hu Han-min
T. V. Soong
Yeh Tsu-chang
Wei Tai-min
Cheng Hung-nien
Liu Chi-wen
Chien Yung-min
Ko Chien-en

Tseng Yang-fu
Chiang Kai-shek
Tan Yen-kai
Ho Ying-ching
H. H. Kung
Yi Pei-chi
Wang Tseng
Soumoy Teheng
Wu Chung-hsin
Chu Chia-chien
Chen Hui-teh

Wu Ching-heng
Li Tu
Hio Kuo-kwang
Sun Fo
Tai Chi-tao
Tsai Yuan-pei
Chen Li-fu
Ma Shao-chun
Li Tsung-huang
Li Hu-sheng

Mongolian & Tibetan Affairs Committee

Chang Chi
Lo-li-hu-Tu-Ken-Tu
Shang-Chia-Hu-Te-Ke-Tu
Keh-sin-Sheh-Jen

Li Pei-tien
Shih Ching-yang
Li Fong-king
Ma Fu-hsiang
Sah-Mo-Tun-Lung-Lu-Pu

Tsao Chih-hen
Chao Tai-wen
Chen Chi-sen
En-Keh-pa-tu

Director of the General Affairs Department - - - - - Liu Peh-chung
Director of the Mongolian Affairs Department - - - - Wu Hoh-lin
Director of the Tibetan Affairs Department - - - - Lu Sun-chien-kung
Director of the Peiping Office of the Committee - - Wang Ping-shan

Sectional Chiefs of the Committee

Hsiung Yao-wen
Tsu Min-chuan
Chu Fu-[illegible]

Wang Yu-kwang
Tai Ching-lien
Wu Chao-hsu

Ching Chun-wen
[illegible]a Wen-chun
Liu Hsi-chun

Secretaries:

Chang Chih Hsin
Nien Tien-chin
Chen Hsiao-fang
Siao Pi-teh

Counsellors

Wu Hoh-lin
Chang Yu-ho

Overseas Affairs Committee

Lin Sen (Chairman)
Chen Yao-wen
Chen An-jen

Chow Chi-kang
Huang Yu-kung
Lu Wei-sen
Wu Kung-yi

Chung Yung-kwang
Hsiao Fu-chen
Cheng Chin-nan

Opium Suppression Committee

Chang Chi-kiang (Chairman)
Chen Shao-kwan

Wang Wei-fan
Chun Ko
Lo Yung-yen

Ho Ying-ching
Niu Yung-chien
Li Teng-hui
Ma Ying-tsu
Tsiao Yi-tang

Departments

Department of the Secretariat
1st Class Secretaries - - -

Tai Hung-hing
Hu Mei

2d Class Secretaries
Chu Chang-liang
Tang Kiang

Li Fan-kuo
Yeng Ming-chang

Chen Yoh-hua
Tan Fu-chi

No. 7769

Opium Suppression Committee (Cont.)

Department of Administrative Affairs
Director - Chen Yung

Personnel of the Ministries

Ministry of Education

Minister - Chiang Min-lin
Political Vice-Minister - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Liu Tai-pai
Acting Administrative Vice-Minister -- - - - - - - - -
Director of the General Affairs Department - - - - - - - Chiang Shao-mo
Director of the Advanced Education Department - - - - - Sun Pen-wen
Director of the Elementary Education Department - - - - Chu Chin-nung
Director of the Social Education Department - - - - - - Chen Chien sin
Compiler & Investigator of the Compilation
and Investigation Department - - - - - - - - - - - - Cheng Hoh-sen

Secretaries: Sun Kwei-chun
Cheng Tien-ting

Counsellors: Chu Pao-chen
Yang Feng
Chao Nai-chuan
Chen Shih-cheng

Ministry of Health

Minister of Health - Liu Shui-heng
Political Vice-Minister - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Administrative Vice-Minister - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Hu Jau-jui
Director of the General Affairs Department - - - - - Chen Shih-kuei
Director of the First Division - - - - - - - - - - - - - She I-hsu
Director of the Second Division - - - - - - - - - - - - Wei Ping-pu
Director of the Third Division - - - - - - - - - - - - - Tung Ju-lin
Director of the Fourth Division - - - - - - - - - - - - Ting Chao-chi
Director of the Medical Service Department - - - - - Yen Chih-tsung
Director of the First Divison - - - - - - - - - - - - - Wang Chu-hsiang
Director of the Second Division - - - - - - - - - - - - King Pao-cheng
Director of the Third Division - - - - - - - - - - - - Wu Shih-chu
Director of the Health Department - - - - - - - - - - King Pao-hsiun
Director of the First Division - - - - - - - - - - - - Yao Yun-chang
Director of the Second Division - - - - - - - - - - - Ling Chi-yao
Director of the Third Division - - - - - - - - - - - - Yin Yuan-yao
Director of the Anti-Plague Department - - - - - - - - Tsai Hung
Director of the Second Division p - - - - - - - - - - Chou Shih-kuan
Director of the Third Division - - - - - - - - - - - - Chin Shih-yu
Director of the Statistics Department - - - - - - - - King Sun-pan
Director of the First Division - - - - - - - - - - - - Kuo Chi-yuan
Director of the Second Division - - - - - - - - - - Lu Chou
Director of the Department of Engineering - - - - - Chen Fang-tse
Chief Secretary - Chang Yu-fan
Chief Technical Expert - - - - - - - - - Wu Lien Teh Chen Chi-hsiang
Specially Appointed Secretaries - - - - - - - - - - - Ma Tsao-hsiang
Counsellors Nen Kwang-peng Chang Yu-fen
Tsai Shu-ling Chow Yen-wen
Liu Wu Chao Hsu-min
Huang Tze-feng
Specially Appointed Technical Expert - - - - - - - - - Chow Wu-teh

Board of Health

Ex-Officio Members : - -Hu Yoh-wei- - - - - Chen Fang-tze--Liu Sui-heng

No. 7769

Board of Health (Cont.)

Members

Yu Zeh-ping	Sung Wu-sen	Ling Ku-sen
Hu Hsuang-min	Yen Fu-ching	New Wei-sen
Wu Lien Teh	Yu-Yung-ti	Chu Ming-yi
Fang Ching	Ho Ting-an	Hu Hung-chi
Chuan Chao-ching	Huang Tse-fang	Ho Cheh-chang
Chou Chuen-chang		Yang Mou

Ministry of Public Health

Central Health Committee

(Responsible for the formulation of public health measures and also act in advisory capacity to the Ministry.)

Members

Yen Fu-ching	Kiang Mai-ao	Yu Yen
Yu Feng-ping	Wu Lien-teh	Lin Tien-sen
Sung Wu-sen	Chu Ming-yi	Fong Ching
Hu Ting-an	Hu Hung-chi	Chan Shao-ching
Chow Chun-chang	HanHsuan-lin	Wang Chi-chang
	Li Hsueh-yin	

Ministry of Railways

Minister -	Sun Fo
Political Vice-Minister - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	Lien Sung-hai
Administrative Vice-Minister - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	Li Chao-huan
Director of the General Affairs Department - - - - - -	Chen Yen-chun
Director of the Construction Department - - - - - -	
Director of the Finance Affairs Department - - - - -	Hu Chi-hsiang
Acting-Director of the Railway Administration Dept.	F. K. Sah
Chief of Business Department - - - - - - - - - - - - -	Liu Wei-tze
Director of the Through Traffice Department - - - - -	Tsai Tsing-chi
Assistant Technical Experts of the Through Traffic Dept. - -	Huang Chen-sing
	Chow Chih-chung
Legal Adviser to the Ministry - - - - - - - - - - - -	J. A. Waddell
Adviser to the Ministry - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	Jean Fontenoy
Adviser on Railway Administration - - - - - - - - - - -	J. H. Mantell
Technical Adviser - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	J. Lockhart
Technical Inspector - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	Yen Teh-ching
Counsellors: Secretaries: Hu Tien-chin	Hu Cheh
Chen Chun-po	Hu Ti
Hsieh Pao-chao	

Technical Experts

Huang Han-ho	Lu Lin-chien	Hsia Ching-shou
Sun Moh	Shen Tao-tsi	Sze Chia-kun
Chen Seng-chi	Ti Wai-tsang	Cheng Hua
Hsieh Wai-yuan	Wu Wei-teh	Tsai Kuo-tsao
Kwang Ying-chih	Lu Wei-pu	Huang JuOhsia
Li Yao-hsiang	Chow Liang-ching	

Assistant Technical Experts

Li Yu-shing	Shen Tao-wei	Wang Chin-tsai
Li Wen-chi	Li Han	Lu Wei
Hsia Hsin-cheng	Ling Yung-fu	Hu Hsueh-yuang
King Hsueh-sui	Liang Kuan-lu	Moh Kai-fu
Chen Yung-kuao	Wu Chao-tang	Jen Chi-ming
Tang Chi-kuo	Tso Cheng-yun	Cheng Chia-chun
	Huang Yun-yao	

Sectional Chiefs

Chang Ying-tang	Hsiao Chi-nan	Shih Tao-yi
Yang Hsin-feng	Li Tsai-chin	Tso Chen-hsiung
Chen Yoh-chuan	Liao Yen	Liang Tsu-yuan
Han Hsiao-chin	Liang Chuen-jen	Hwang Yueh
Chang Tao	Mo Chia-fu	Loh Ching-teh
King Ching-yang	Koo Cheng-tseng	Huang Chung-su

Ministry of Railways

Sectional Chiefs

Huang Cheng-sen	Kou Chen-tseng	Chang En-huang
Chao Jen-shun		

Sectional Chief of the General Affairs Department — Cheng Tsi-shih

Sectional Chiefs of the Finance Department

Liang Tsu-yuan	Ling Tsi-tsen	Cheng Ting-chuh
	Liao Yen	

Sectional Chiefs of the Adminstration Department

Chow Pei-wen — Ma Shaopwen

Sectional Chiefs of the Construction Department

Chao Jen-tsing

Technical Experts to the Adminstration Department

Kwang Yin-chi — Soong Ching-min — Sze Chia-ken

Junior Technical Experts

Wang Wai-hsin	Hsiah Hsieh-kiang	Tu Yoh
Li Tsai	Li Shi	Chang Fu-chuan
Moh Chia-fu	Chow Chih-chung	Yang Shao-hui
Liu Kuo-tseng	Lin Tsao-kun	Koo Chung-chieh
Chen Kuan		Yiu Shen-tsao

Counsellors: Liu Wei-tzo
Chang Eng-huang
Ching Tsing-yang

Ministry of War

Acting Minister of War - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Ho Ying-ching
Administrative Vice-Minister - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Chen Yi
Political Vice-Minister - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Chu Shao-kwang
Acting Chief Secretary - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Chen Ching-lien
Acting Director of the General Affairs Department - - Wang Feng-ching
Acting Secretary of Documents, General Affairs Dept. Tsai Yuan
Secretary of the Administration Section - - - - - - - - Shao Yu-lin
Secretary of the Social Affairs Section - - - - - - - - Han Fu-ta

Counsellors

Wang Shih	Ling Li	Chiang Shao-chang
Yi Fu-yih	Chou Yao-kuan	Tai Shou-min
Lei Yen	Chen Cho-ju	Li Chin-wu
Lui Piao (Chief Counsellor)	Leng Hsin	Chang Ching-yu

No. 7769

Office of the Army Department

Director	Tsao Hsi-sheng
Assistant Director	Huan Hsiung-hsiao
Chief Secretary	Chang Pei-tsze
Director of the General Affairs Department	Kao Tin-tsao
Director of the Adjutant General's Office	Tung Yi
Director of the Compassionate Grants Division	Chi Chi
Director of the Officers Record Department	Wang Kuan
Director of the Military Affairs Division	Chen Cheh-yun
Chief of the Military Affairs Section	Soo Li-ping
Chief of the Infantry	Chen Erh-shu
Chief of the Artillery	Kung Fan-chin
Chief of the Cavalry	Yu Yoh-chiung
Director of the Costal Defence Bureau	Wu Ching-nan
Acting Chief Military Adviser	Chang Hsi-char
Director of the Hydrographic Bureau	Wu Ching-nan
President of the Wampao Military Academy	Ho Jui
President of the Wuchang Military Academy	Chin Ta-chun
Acting-President of the Central Military College	Chow Pin
Secretary	Chang Pei-tze
Secretary	Chow Chia-ying

Department of Arms & Munitions

Director of the Department of Arms	Chen Ying-chi
Chief of the Munitions Department	Pang Ku-sui
Chief of the Inspection Section	Wen Wen Yen-ping
Chief of the Disbursement Section	Loh Chien
Director of the Medical Department	Chiang Koh-chuang
Director of the Medical Section	Fan Teng-fun
Chief of the Medical Supply Section	Liang Jen-chu
Director of the 1st Army Hospital	Luo Chang-chin
Director of the 2d Army Hospital	Sung Wu-yu
Director of the Department of Communications	Shiu Wek
Chief of the Sanitation Section	Liu Yuan-yen
Chief of the Telegraph Section	Wang Chih-loh
Director of the Army Hospital at Hangchow	Sun Shu-chang
Director of the Army Hospital at Hsuchow	Tai Hsiao-lun

Court Martial Section

Director of the Martial Law Department	Wang Ching-nan
Chief of the Execution Section	Li Ting-wu
Chief of the Military Police Section	Pei-I-chen

Aviation Department

Director-General of the Aviation Department	Chang Hui-chang
Assistant-Director of the Aviation Department	Huang Pin-heng
Chief of the Central Section	Shih Kuang-yun
Chief of the Document Section	Wu Pang-chin
Chief of the Education Section	Tsao Pao-ching
Chief of the Military Affairs Section	Chin Chu-tang
Chief of the aerial Equipment Section	Li Ching-yuan
Chief of the Aerial Affairs Section	Chang Loh
Commander of the 1st Squadron	Chang Yu-uo
Commander of the 2nd & 3rd Squadrons	Ao Yang Chang
Director of the Air Force Hospital	Shu Wan-chien
Superintendant of Aeroplane Manufactory	Shen Teh-hsi
Director of the Aviation Bureau of Amoy	Chen Wen-ling
Chief Engineer	Wang Tseng-fei
Secretary	Wu Sung-chi
Sectional Chief	Wang Chao-tu

No. 7769

Ministry of War (Cont.)

Arsenal Department

Director-General of Arsenals	Chen Yi
Assistant Director	Hsu Ting-yuang
Chief Counsellor	Lai Pao
Counsellor	Shen Kan
Section Chief	Chow Shan-nu

Secretaries

Li Shih-seng
Tu Wei
Mao Yi-ko
Hu Wei

Commissariat Department

Director of the Commissariat Department	Yu Fei-ping
Assistant Director	Chin Yu-chang
Secretary	Sze Tsi-ying

Accounting Department

Director of the Accounting Department	Tu Chih-yih
Secretary of Statistics	Yun Ta-sun
Secretary of the Treasury	Hwang Hsiao-chang

Military Supplies & Stores Department

Director	Pei Yun-sen
Counsellor	Yen Kuan

Preservation Department

Director of the Preservation Department	Hsu Chung-yan
Chief of the Uniform & Blanket Section	Pei Yung-chung
Chief of the Provisions Section	Lu Teng-yin
Chief of the Equipment Section	Yen Ling

Construction Department

Director of the Construction Department	Chiu Hang-chun
Chief of the Planning Section	Liu Ming-shun
Chief of the Auditing Section	Chen Ping-nan
Chief of the Construction Section	Li Yen-kwang
Chief of the Inspection Section	Hsieh Shih-an
Engineer	Chen Hua-yeh

Soldiers Labor Problem Committee

Chairman	Feng Shen-yin
Vice-Chairman	Liu Chi

Members

Ken Chih-yuan
Ho Yao-tsu
Lin Ming-chung
Chang Shao-chen
Wang Shih-kung
Li Lei-fu
Chao Yao-fu
Chang Shao-yung
Yu Fei-pang
Tung Yi
Chang Nua-pu
Chin Ching-tseng
Jen Tsing-hai
Chin Teh-hsun
Ma Chih-ti
Wu Tsao-hua
Wang Tsang-shu

Counsellors

Li Chin-wu
Chang Ching-yu
Yu Tien-shu

No. 7769

Ministry of War (Cont.)

Soldier Labor Department

Sectional Chief - Shao Chang-tien

Soldier Labor Investigation Committee

Chairman - Sung Shih-ma

Members

Liu Tsu-tsai Tang Chi-tao Ling Ta-chung

Assistants to Committee

Yang Chin-chia Li Hui-kwang Tu Wei
Chow Chi-hung Chow Hsun-kung

Ministry of Industry, Commerce & Labor

Minister - H. H. Kung
Political Vice-Minister - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Chen Hun-hien
Administrative Vice-Minister - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Moh Hsiang-yueh
Director of the General Affairs Bureau - - - - - - - - Kai Ping-feng
Chief English Secretary - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Jabin Hsu
Director of the Industrial Department - - - - - - - - - Cheng Lin
Chief Secretary - Lin Ching-hsien
Director of the Commercial Department - - - - - - - - - Chang Yi-fu
Director of the Labor Department - - - - - - - - - - - M. Thomas Tchow
Chief Technical Expert - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Z. Z. Zee
Technical Expert - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Cheng Yun-chang
Inspector of Factories - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - L. T. Wong
Secretary - Tsu Chuan

Sectional Chiefs

Chang Ping-wu (Ind. & Commercial) Wu Hah
Tso Shih-kang Kenneth Fu S. C. Chen
Philip Han Wang Shih-nai Johsen Shih

Ministry of Communications

Minister - Wang Peh-chung
Political Vice-Minister - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Li Chung-kung
Administrative Vice-Minister - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Wei-L-cheng
Director of the General Affairs Department - - - - - Fu Ting-sheng
Chief of the 1st Division - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Hsieh Chin-ti
Chief of the 2nd Division - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Hsiang Tai-ting
Chief of the 3rd Division - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Hu Tai-hien
Chief of the 4th Division - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Hu Chuang
Chief of the 5th Division - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Chang Hsieh-cheng
Chief of the Telegraph Administration - - - - - - - - Chuang Chin-hun
Chief of the 1st Division - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Ni Chuan-ju
Chief of the 2nd Division - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Hwang Ching-tseng
Chief of the 3rd Division - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Kuo Shih-yun
Chief of the 4th Division - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Ku Kwang ping
Chief of the 5th Division - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Chen Yang-ching
Director of the Postal Administration - - - - - - - - Liu Shu-fan
Chief of the 1st Division - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Liu Nai-yu
Chief of the 2nd Division - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Lung TaOfu
Director of the Navigation Department - - - - - - - - Tsai Pei-yuan
Chief of the 1st Division - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Chien Tsing-chi
Chief of the 2nd Division - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Liu Chih-chen
Chief of the 3rd Division - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Chang Pao-i
Chief of the 4th Division - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Li Ching

Ministry of Communications (Cont.)

Director of the Engineering Department - - - - - - - - - Wei-I Chang
Adviser to Ministry of Communications - - - - - - - - John Fontenoy

Technical Experts

Shang Moh-tseng	Sun Chang-chung	Nai Kai-i
Niu Yin-kiang	Chen Ti-yung	Ho Chih-tseng
Chao I-ling	Chen Tai-yuan	Mo Young
Chien Tsing-chi		Ku Chia-ting

Counsellors

Hsu Haupchih	Lin Shih	Wang Fu-yi

Secretaries

Hsuang Ching	Hwang Shu-fang	Feng Huan

Bureau of Radio Communication under Ministry of Communications

Director of Bureau of Radio Communication - - - - - - - Li Van-yi
Acting Director - C. C. Wang
Chief Secretary - C. C. Yun
Chief of the Administration Department - - - - - - - - K. T. Tu
Chief of the Business Department - - - - - - - - - - - U. T. Tsu
Chief of the Accounting Department - - - - - - - - - H. L. Wang
Chief of the Inspecting Department - - - - - - - - - S. C. Li
Engineers:

C. W. Chen	K. Y. Yin	W. Y. Wu
P. L Shen	C. C. Tsao	W. L. Chow
C. E. Chung		

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Minister- C. T. Wang
Political Vice-Minister - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Lin Chin-luen (Frank Lee)
Administrative Vice-Minister - - - - - - - - - - - - - Wang Chia-chen
Director of the General Affairs Department - - - - - Soong Tse-liang
Assistant Director of the General Affairs Dept.- - - Chen I-ling
Chief of Telegraph Department - - - - - - - - - - - - - Yin Chang-teh
Chief of the Documents Department - - - - - - - - - - - Wu Chao-nien
Chief of the Ceremony Department - - - - - - - - - - Chang I-ling

International Affairs Department

Director - Chi Chien
Assistant Director - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Ling Shao-nan
Chief of the 1st Divisio n - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Ling Shao-nan
Chief of the 2nd Division - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Chen Hai-chao
Chief of the 3rd Division - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Hu Hsiang
Chief of the 4th Division - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Hsu Ting

European & American Affairs Department

Director - Hsu Moh
Assistant Director - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Chu Shih-chuan
Chief of the 1st Division - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Chu Shih-chuan
Chief of the 2nd Division - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Shang Shih-huan
Chief of the 3rd Division - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Low Kuan-lin

No. 7769

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Cont.)

Asiatic Affairs Department

Acting Director	Hu Shih-chen
AAssistant Director	Chiang Hua-peng
Chief of the 1st Division	Kin Sen
Chief of the 2nd Division	Chiang Hua-peng
Chief of the 3rd Division	Chu Shuyuan

Intelligence & Publicity Department

Director	Tiao Ming-chien
Assistant Director	C. Kuangsen-young
Chief of the 1st Section	Chen Shou-yu
Chief of the 2nd Section	C. Kuangsen-young
Chief of the Accounting Section	Moh Chao-kun
Chief of the Social Affairs Department	Chen Chih
Chief of the Compilation Bureau	Hwang Chung-shu

Sectional Chiefs of the Ministry

Wang Kwang	Kwang Kwang-lin	Wang Tsu-lien
Liu Nai-fan		Li Tih-chun

Secretaries

Chin Chih	Hwang Chi	S. K. Chen
Hu Shih-chi		

Counsellors:	Chen Yih-lin	Fan Kwang

Ministry of Finance

Minister	T. V. Soong
Political Vice-Minister	Chang Shou-yung
Adminstrative Vice-Minister	Li Tiau-sen
Counsellor	Chin King-fu
Director of the General Affairs Department	Teh Tah-cheng
Director of the Custom Administration Department	F. Chang
Director of the Salt Adminstration	Tsau Ling
Director of the Internal Tax Bureau	Chia Shih-i
Director of the Loans & Bonds Bureau	Cheng Lai
Director of the Currency Bureau	Hsu Kao
Director of the Treasury	Yu Mai-sun
Director of the Accounting Department	Ching Fen
Director of the Tobacco & Wine Tax Bureau	Yen Ching-hsin
Director of the Stamp Tax Bureau	Chen Sha-king
Director of the Consolidated Rolled Tobacco Tax Department	Chen Su-tu
Inspector-General of the Customs	F. W. Maze
Chief Inspector of the Salt Gabelle	Liu Tsung-yi
Associate Inspector of the Salt Gabelle	Hussey Freke
Assistant Inspector of the Customs	W. R. Myers

Counsellors to Ministry of Finance

Chiang Wei-hsien	Kuo Shin-hsia	Shen Ching-chi
Yang Chun	Wu Ching-yu	Li Chi-sen

Secretaries of 2nd Rank, Ministry of Finance

Yang Ping-chuen	Chen Feng-yi

No. 7769

Ministry of the Interior

Minister -	Yang Chao-tai
Political Vice-Minister - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	Wu Te-chen
Administrative Vice-Minister - - - - - - - - - - - -	Chang Wu-hua
Director of the General Affairs Department - - - - -	Li Tung-sen
Director of the Civil Affairs Department - - - - - - -	Wang Ting-ying
Director of the Police Administration Department - -	Tsai Kuang-hui
Director of the Territorial Administration Dept. - -	Ma Tu
Director of the Rites & Ceremonies Department - - - -	Shih Tzo-lin
Administrative Vice-Minister - - - - - - - - - - - - -	Wang Shao-chun

Cousellors

Lu Chen-hsiu	Tu Wao-chi	Kao Han
Wang Huai-ming		Lau Sua-chin

Secretaries

Chief Secretary - Tseng Teng

Secretaries to the General Affairs Department

Ai Hua-ching	Shao Chien	Hsi Chu-lin
Li Lu-hsiang	Chen Chung-teh	Tu Chao-hung
Tseng Tung		Wang Yi

Secretaries to the Civil Affairs Department

Chen Ching	Tuan Feng-li	Chen Kuan
	Chu Chu-yun	

Secretaries to the Police Administration Department

Chang Hsiang-kan	Li Hsi-wu	Wang Shih-yang
	Shao Mao	

Secretaries to the Territorial Administration Department

Chao Kuang-ting	Ling Chao-wu	Li Kuei-tang
	Yen Chi-ching	

Members of the Registration: Chao Chien Han Yung-chung

Ministry of Mining & Agriculture

Minister -	Yi Pei-chi
Acting Political Vice-Minister - - - - - - - - - - - - -	Hsiao Yu
Acting Administrative Vice-Minister - - - - - - - - - -	Chen Yoh
Director of the General Affairs Department - - - - -	Chen Yoh
Director of Agriculture - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	Hsu Ting-hu
Director of the Mining Administration - - - - - - - -	Hu Peh-yuan
Sectional Chief of the Ministry - - - - - - - - - - -	Yao Chuan-fa
Acting Technical Inspector - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	Hu Peh-yuan
Acting Director of Forestry Administration Dept. - -	Liu Yung-shu
Secretary -	Cheng Yuan
Secretary -	Wu Ying

Technical Experts

Liang Tsin	Tsai Wu-chi	Lo Tze-tung
Huang Tsung-chen	Chen Hsiang-tseng	Yai Hsin-huang
	Hsiao Chu-chung	

Counsellor: Chin Wen-sze

Ministry of the Navy

Minister	Yang Shu-chuang
Political Vice-Minister	Chen Chao-kwan
Director of the General Affairs Department	Li Shih-chia
Director of the Naval Discipline Department	Yang Ching
Director of the Munitions Department	Ting Hsien-chi
Chief of the Training Department	Lu Shih-feng
Chief Secretary	Yeh Yang
Chief of the Gendarmerie Affairs Section of the Maritime Administration Department	Yang Yu
Director of the Naval Disbandment and Reorganization Regional Office	Chen Chi-liang
Director of the Maritime Administration Department of the Navy	Hsu Chih-hsiang
Director of the Costal Defense & Patrol Bureau	Wu Chen-nan
Director of the Editing & Translation Department	Lu Teh-yuan
President of the Foochow Naval Academy	Hsia Sun-peng
Chief Technical Expert	Sheng Tzu-hsi
Technical Expert	Shen Sun-yu
Adjutant to the Ministry	Lo Chung-min

Parker G. Tenney

Parker G. Tenney
Captain, Field Artillery
Assistant Military Attache

Distribution:

4 MID
1 File
1 Tientsin

REPLACE

No. 7769

ADD29, ADD30, ADD31, REPLACE 32

OFFICE CHIEF OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
AUG 24 1935
WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Political Parties and Groups - Gen

The Decline of the Kuomintang

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. OCT 22 1935

1. History of the Decline.

The decline of the Kuomintang as a revolutionary party really began, as did the decline of the Roman Empire, before the party had reached the full extent of its power. Prior to 1927, while the North was still unsubdued, the party had been full of revolutionary ideas, ideals and spirit. A large part of this vigor came from the radical left wing of the party. The revolutionary armies, embued with enthusiasm for a new deal, crushed the old style mercenaries of Wu Pei-fu, Sun Chuan-fang and Chang Tsung-chang with the greatest of ease. The fighting spirit which made these victories possible came from the propaganda spread by the radical wing of the party. But the equally necessary money, equipment and military leadership came from the conservative right wing. The excesses committed by the communistically inspired troops in Canton and elsewhere made a split inevitable between the two wings. The conservatives, led by Chiang Kai-shek, presented the left with an ultimatum demanding that the left accept the abandonment of many of the most vital of the radical tenets or face the loss of right wing money, war supplies and leadership.

Dissension immediately developed in the left wing councils. The extremists refused to yield a point on communism, the moderates wanted to compromise, while the "practical politicians" bolted at once to the right wing. Within the left, the radical "rump" prevailed, rejected the ultimatum and read the right wing leaders out of the party. The right wing and center set up their own government at Nanking and obtained recognition from the powers as the National Government of China.

The story of the struggle between the rival governments in 1926 and 1927 is not of interest here. Suffice to say that the right wing at Nanking triumphed. The radicals at Hankow, helpless without the armies of Chiang Kai-shek, were forced to give in.

From the complete triumph of the conservative wing of the Kuomintang in the spring of 1928 may be dated the beginning of the decline of the party as a revolutionary force. The new Kuomintang, purged of its radical elements, was convinced of its dependence upon the military strength of Chiang Kai-shek and his Whampoa clique of professional officers. The doom of the Nationalist revolution as a revolution was sealed when the soldier Chiang Kai-shek came to supreme power, just as the doom of the first French republic was sounded when the soldier Bonaparte became First Consul.

The fact that all China was not yet under Nationalist control furthered Chiang Kai-shek in the establishment of his personal dictatorship. He was indispensable to the Kuomintang as reorganized and he knew it, just as Napoleon was indispensable to the armies of revolutionary France.

From M/A, China Report No. 9213 September 25, 1935

CHINA (Political)

Subject: The Decline of the Kuomintang

Chiang Kai-shek is as able a statesman as he is a soldier. He realized that while his military talent was necessary to the Nationalist armies, the revolutionary spirit was equally as indispensable. The Kuomintang rode to power on an anti-foreign and communist platform. After 1927 this platform was junked. A revolutionary program was necessary so immediately upon assuming power as head of the Nanking Government Chiang raised the war cry of the San Min Chu I or Three Principles of the People. With renewed enthusiasm for the doctrines of Sun Yat-sen, his armies swept forward to complete the conquest of China and accomplished it within a year.

But Chiang Kai-shek is no revolutionary and therein lies the reason for the decline of the Kuomintang as a revolutionary party. If Chiang was a revolutionary at any time he lost that character the instant he came to power or before. He undoubtedly longs for a great, free, and prosperous China. But China must arrive at this state under his own personal control.

What was the reaction upon the Kuomintang of this state of affairs? It was just what might have been expected. As soon as events demonstrated that the revolution was dead as far as the leader was concerned, the revolutionary spirit among the rank and file gave up the ghost. The real revolutionaries withdrew from party activity or went South to set up the rival Canton government of 1931, and left control of the party to the "practical politicians" and job seekers. The schism of 1931 left not a real revolutionary leader in the Central Kuomintang councils. All that remained at Nanking were personal henchmen of the dictator or political sycophants of the type that flowers so bounteously in this country. Some of the old time revolutionists came back to the party after the rape of Manchuria in 1932, driven solely by their patriotic desire to unite in opposition to Japan. How they were betrayed at Nanking is a matter of history.

To suppress whatever of the old revolutionary idea was left within the party the secret society known as the "Blue Shirts" was organized within the party itself. This clique is supposed to be animated by but one purpose, complete and unquestioning support of Chiang Kai-shek as dictator. It conducts its operations after the fashion well exemplified by the fascist parties of the West, or better still by the old American Ku Klux Klan. Murder and threat of murder are used to bring into line such party members or officials as cherish ideas inimical to the dictator.

2. <u>Results of the Decline of the Kuomintang</u>.

The Kuomintang at present strongly resembles the political machines in the United States, such as Tammany Hall or the Republican clubs of Pennsylvania. Nominally devoted to the salvation of China through the principles of Sun Yat-sen it really concerns itself with nothing but the perpetuation in office of and division of political perquisites among its members.

CHINA (Political)

Subject: The Decline of the Kuomintang

The principles the Kuomintang is sworn to uphold are of course the San Min Chu I, or "Three Principles of the People", proclaimed by Dr. Sun. These principles may be roughly restated as follows:

1. The principle of National Independence or Sovereignty.
2. The principle of Popular Government.
3. The principle of popular livelihood or the furtherance of national prosperity.

To understand how the Kuomintang has forfeited the respect and loyalty of the Chinese people we need only to review the disasters the party has suffered to befall the above three principles.

(a) The First Principle.

In 1931 the Kuomintang suffered China to lose Manchuria without a struggle.

In 1932 the Kuomintang permitted the National Government shamefully to betray the 19th Route Army defending Chinese sovereign rights in Shanghai.

In 1933 Jehol was abandoned.

From 1933 to the present time Japan has been permitted steadily to encroach upon Chinese sovereignty in Chahar, Suiyuan and Hopei provinces.

The defence offered by the Kuomintang for the above failures to defend national sovereignty is the old alibi of force majeure. But real revolutionary governments do not yield to force majeure without a struggle. Revolutionary France, only one of many similar examples, prevailed against all Europe. The real answer is that the spirit of the nationalist revolution has been quenched in the Kuomintang.

In fact the Kuomintang is now being turned into a means of suppressing nationalist feeling. In early August, after the New Life Weekly case, the Nanking Government "spokesman" declared that the Kuomintang assumed complete responsibility in suppressing anti-Japanese activities. Kuomintang units which have not succeeded in carrying out this duty have been abolished or "reorganized" in Kwangtung and Fukien. That the party, whose very excuse for existence is nationalism, can suffer itself to be put to such uses shows the extent of its decline as a revolutionary force.

The Kuomintang units in provinces just coming under Japanese control, - namely Chahar, Hopei and lately Suiyuan - have been abolished by order of that power. In the writer's opinion the reason for this Japanese action is not really fear

CHINA (Political)

Subject: The Decline of the Kuomintang

of the Kuomintang propaganda but rather in order that Japan may obtain a freer hand in control of office holders in the said districts. In future the North China political machine will be steered by the Kuantung Army rather than by the Kuomintang.

(b) The Second Principle.

After seven years of promises by the Kuomintang, popular government is farther off than ever. The constitution is still incomplete and in so far as it protects popular rights almost wholly inoperative. A peculiar system of dual legal jurisdiction has been set up to render the rights of the people under the law codes null and void. Cases arising under acts promulgated by the Legislative Yuan are duly tried in regularly established civil courts. On the other hand the Party Dictatorship under Chiang Kai-shek continually issues edicts direct "from the throne", in many cases contradicting the regular law. Cases arising under these edicts are tried before military tribunals which pay no attention whatever to the legal rights of the parties involved or to the legality of the edicts under which the case is tried.

(c) The Principle of Popular Livelihood.

This principle is so general in nature that failures in its application are not so clearly indictable. It may be said without fear of contradiction, however, that whatever has been done, if anything, to alleviate the conditions of the masses in China has not been the result of any policy sustained or directed by the Kuomintang.

It may be seen from the above that in its seven years of hegemony the Kuomintang has not only failed in all its objectives but has lost ground. This defeat can only be explained by the loss of revolutionary spirit among its membership.

3. Conclusion.

In monarchical days, whenever a Chinese dynasty collapsed the historians explained to the people that that dynasty's "Mandate of Heaven" had expired. The Chinese philosophers from the earliest times have recognized the right of revolution. When a dynasty had forfeited or lost the Mandate of Heaven under which the ruling house held sway it became the duty of the people to push the expiring dynasty off the throne and make way for a new Son of Heaven.

The signs that a ruling house had lost its celestial letters patent were remarkably uniform in each case. They consisted of a series of national calamities. Floods, droughts, pestilences or foreign invasions were all reliable omens that China was about to have a change of government.

CHINA (Political)

Subject: The Decline of the Kuomintang

During the past four or five years China under the Kuomintang has suffered such a series of shocks as would rock the foundations of any government anywhere. Foreign aggression, financial and agricultural depression, disastrous floods and devastating droughts have all occurred, usually in combination. The Chinese "man in the street" as well as "the man with the hoe" unite in feeling that such a series of national misfortunes can only indicate a serious lack of harmony between their government and whatever celestial power has charge of China's destiny.

Such being the case the wonder is not that the Kuomintang is losing its grip but that it continues to hold power in the land at all. Most observers no longer wonder whether the present regime can last indefinitely; the question now is only "How long?".

At this point it is well to take note that Chiang Kai-shek and the sad relic that is still called the Kuomintang must stand or fall together. Chiang of course is a military leader. But in a country the size of China a military dictator must have a political system to back him up. Distances here are so immense and communications so poor that no dictator can strike everywhere at once. Chiang realizes this. He knows that in China he must have some hold on the minds of the people as a whole if he can hope to exercise control in all parts of the country. It is for this reason that he revived the old slogans of Sun Yat-sen when he took charge of the Northern expedition and united China as referred to above.

But Chiang no longer deceives anyone, not even himself, that the San Min Chu I is the mainspring of his government. The people and the army have been thoroughly disillusioned as to any possibility of the San Min Chu I ever bearing fruit under his regime. Realizing this, Chiang has sponsored the "New Life Movement" to reawaken some national feeling in the party and make the people feel that the party really has some ideals. But this movement has failed notably to draw the red herring across the train of the vanishing San Min Chu I. Among the literate populace and in the press not too directly under Nanking control it has been greeted with ill concealed jeers. The possibility that all the ills China is heir to may be cured by the "New Life Movement" with its sanitation, physical culture, good manners and strict regulation of the length of women's hair, dresses and stockings is a little far fetched to be accepted in this time of dire national danger.

To the mind of the writer of this report the present regime is now being maintained in power not by any vitality in the Kuomintang, not by any faith of the people in the principles or personalities of those in power, but merely by reason of the Japanese problem, however paradoxical that may seem. The

CHINA (Political)

Subject: The Decline of the Kuomintang

impotence of the National Government before Japan is one of the main reasons for the popular lack of confidence in the government which will eventually cause its fall. At the same time it is recognized that now is not the time to indulge in a civil war. A national government no matter how helpless is a necessity in the present crisis. All patriotic and thinking Chinese shudder to contemplate the advantage Japan would take of the interegnum in national affairs bound to be the result for a longer or shorter period of revolution or civil war.

In other words the National Government now is existing merely on sufferance. Such an existence of course cannot be prolonged indefinitely and the longer it is so prolonged the greater is the decay observable.

This decay is observable in all directions. Its military aspect is perhaps the most impressive. The Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek, is a soldier of no mean talents. He has poured the nation's revenue and the best thought obtainable into national armament for all the seven years of his reign. His army of several hundred thousand men is better equipped, trained and led than any native army China has ever seen. He has even raised and maintained an expensive air force that draws praise from many observers. What is the result? His army is not only admittedly helpless before any foreign threat, but his crack foreign trained divisions have repeatedly gone down to defeat before ragged, hungry, ill armed groups of communist-bandits. The answer is that Chinese never have and never will fight well for a dictator. The Chinese is a slave to decorum and the principles of propriety. He has served well in the past for duly anointed Sons of Heaven because all his revered sages tell him that such is the duty of the superior man. And he has fought savagely many times for ideas he could understand as in defense of Shanghai or in the Nationalist Revolution itself. But when he is fighting for a warlord he regards himself as a degraded mercenary, and a Chinese mercenary is perhaps the poorest soldier to be found upon the face of all the earth.

COMMENTS: China is becoming restive under Japanese pressure. Expression of this discontent is throttled by censorship but is nevertheless present.

Like any other nation, China can be pushed so far and no farther. Eventually resentment against the National Government for its weakness against Japan will burst into flame. A new leader and a new party will arise willing actually to fight for the country at whatever risk to their position. When that occurs Chiang Kai-shek and the degenerate Kuomintang must take to the tall timber.

There is evidence already that Chiang is preparing himself an inaccessible refuge in Szechwan. The fact is indisputable that military installations and material are being removed from the Yangtze Valley to the vicinity of Chengtu.

CHINA (Political)

Subject: The Decline of the Kuomintang

To say that this move is in preparation for national defense against Japan is silly. A glance at the map will show that removal of the army to Chengtu gives up the whole heart and soul of China, the Yangtze Valley, to whatever aggressor may appear. Chiang Kai-shek is feathering himself a high and well guarded nest from which he may view with personal detachment whatever may happen to the rest of his beloved country.

Joseph W. Stilwell

BAT

Joseph W. Stilwell
Colonel Infantry
Military Attache

Distribution:
6 MID
1 File

G-2 Report

3100

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

6-1

REPLACE pages 118, 118.1, 118.2

MIL. INTEL. DIV.
JAN 29 1936
2657-L-321
32
WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Executive - General

Personnel of National Government

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JAN 29 1936

State Council:

Chairman of the State Council..... Lin Sen

Members of the State Council:

Gen. Chiang Kai-shek	Wang Fa-chin
Gen. Li Lieh-chun	Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang
Hu Han-min	Chao Tai-wen
Chou Lu	Dr. H. H. Kung
Dr. Tang Shao-i	Wang Shu-han
Chen Ko-fu	Enk'opat'u
Chang Jen-chieh	Liu Shang-ching
Yeh Chu-ts'ang	Gen. Pai Wen-wei
Dr. Ts'ai Yuan-pei	Chang Chi
T. V. Soong	Gen. Cheng Chien
Hsiao Fu-cheng	Liu Shou-chung
Wang Po-chun	Ching Heng-i
Teng Tse-ju	Yang Shu-chuang
Gen. Hsiung K'e-wu	Chou Chen-lin
Hsieh Chih	Wang Cheng-ting
Gen. Hsu Chung-chih	Hsu Shao-cheng
Marshal Yen Hsi-shan	Yang Shu-k'an

Executive Yuan:

Director..... Chiang Kai-shek
Assistant Director..... Dr. H. H. Kung

Ministries:

Minister of Communications	Ku Meng-yu
Administrative Vice-Minister	Yu Fei-peng
Political Vice-Minister	Yu Fei-peng
Minister of Education	Wang Chih-chieh
Administrative Vice-Minister	Chien Chang-chao
Political Vice-Minister	Tuan Hsi-peng
Minister of Finance	Dr. H. H. Kung
Administrative Vice-Minister	Hsu Kan
Political Vice-Minister	Tsou Lin
Minister of Foreign Affairs	Chang Chun
Administrative Vice-Minister	Chen Chieh
Political Vice-Minister	Hsu Mo
Ministry of Industry	Wu Ting-chang
Administrative Vice-Minister	Y. T. Tsur
Political Vice-Minister	Liu Wei-chih
Minister of Interior	Chiang Tso-pin
Administrative Vice-Minister	Chang Tao-fan
Political Vice-Minister	Tao Lu-chien
Minister of the Navy	Admiral Chen Shao-kuan
Administrative Vice-Minister	Chen Hsun-yung
Political Vice-Minister	Chen Chi-liang

REPLACE pages
118, 118.1, 118.2

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Executive - General

Personnel of National Government

Minister of Railways	Chang Kung-chuan
Administrative Vice-Minister	Tseng Tsung-chien
Political Vice-Minister	Tseng Yang-fu
Minister of War	Gen. Ho Ying-chin
Administrative Vice-Minister	Tsao Hao-shen
Political Vice-Minister	Ku Chu-t'ung
Chairman of Mongolian and Tibetan Commission	Gen. Huang Mu-sung
Chairman of Board of Overseas Chinese Affairs	Chen Shu-jen
Chairman of Anti-Opium Board	Dr. J. Heng Liu

Legislative Yuan:

Director.....	Sun Fo
Assistant Director.....	Yeh Ch'u-ts'ang

Judicial Yuan:

Director.....	Chu Cheng
Assistant Director.....	T'an Cheng

Ministry:

Minister of Judicial Administration	Wang Yung-pin
Administrative Vice-Minister	Hsieh Chien
Political Vice-Minister	Hung Lu-tung

Examination Yuan:

Director.....	Tai Chi-t'ao
Assistant Director.....	Niu Yung-chien

Control Yuan

Director.....	Gen. Yu Yu-jen
Assistant Director.....	Hsu Chung-chih

National Military Affairs Committee:

Chairman.....	Gen. Chiang Kai-shek
Vice-Chairman.....	Gens. Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan

Members:

Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang	Gen. Su Ping-wen
" Yen Hsi-shan	" Chiang Kai-shek
" Chang Hsueh-liang	" Ho Ying-chin
" Li Tsung-jen	" Chu Pei-te
" Li Lieh-chun	Admiral Ch'en Shao-kuan
" Ch'en Chi-t'ang	Gen. T'ang Sheng-chih
" Ma Chan-shan	" Ch'en T'iao-yuan

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Executive - General

Personnel of National Government

Chief of General Staff..... General Ch'eng Chien

Superintendent-General of Military Training -Gen. T'ang Sheng-chih

Chairman of Council of Military Counselors.. Gen. Ch'en T'iao-yuan
(Military Council)

Source: Chinese Government.

Joseph W. Stilwell,

SVC

Joseph W. Stilwell
Colonel, Infantry
Military Attache

Distribution:
6 MID
1 File

G-2 Report

RESTRICTED

3000
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL., INTEL. DIV.
JUN 17 1937
2657-D-321
33
WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Government - General

Important Officials in the Chinese National and Provincial Governments

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUN 16 1937

PROVINCE	CAPITAL AND CHAIRMAN OF PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION	PACIFICATION COMMISSIONER AND HDQRS	OTHER OFFICIALS
Hopei	Paotinghsien Gen. Feng Chih-an[2]	Gen.Sung Che-yuan Peiping	Mayor of Peiping, Gen.Chin Te-chun[11] Mayor of Tientsin, Gen.Chang Tze-chung[12]
CHAHAR	Kalgan Gen. Liu Ju-ming[3]	Same as Hopei	
SHANTUNG	Tsinan Gen. Han Fu-chu	None	Mayor of Tsingtao, Admiral Shen Hung-lieh[4]
SHANSI	Taiyuan Mr.Chao Tai-wen[5]	Mar.Yen Hsi-shan Taiyuan	
SUIYUAN	Kweisui Gen. Fu Tso-yi	Same as Shansi	
SHENSI	Sian Gen.Sun Wei-ju[1]	Abolished	Commissioner in Charge of the Provisional Hqs of the Military Affairs Commission in Sian, Gen. Ku Chu-tung[7]; Vice-Com., Gen. Ho Chu-kuo[1]
KANSU	Lanchow Gen.Ho Yueh-tsu[1] (Acting)	Abolished	
NINGHSIA	Ninghsia Gen.Ma Hung-kuei[6]	None	
CHINGHAI	Sining Gen. Ma Lin[8]	None	
SINKIANG	Tihwa Mr. Li Jung[9]	None	Tupan of Singkiang Border Defence, Gen. Sheng Shih-tsai[10]
KIANGSU	Chinkiang Mr.Chen Kuo-fu[13]	Gen.Yu Hsueh-chung Hwaiyin	Mayor of Nanking, Mr. Mao Chao Shun[17] Mayor of Shanghai, Mr. Yu Hung-chun[16] (Acting)

From M/A, China Report No. 9552 May 21, 1937

RESTRICTED

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Government - General

Important Officials in the Chinese National and Provincial Governments

PROVINCE	CAPITAL AND CHAIRMAN OF PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION	PACIFICATION COMMISSIONER AND HDQRS	OTHER OFFICIALS
ANHUI	Anking Gen.Liu Shang-ching[1]	Same as for Honan	Tupan of Honan-Anhui-Hupeh borders, Gen. Wei Li-huan[1] with Hqs. at Liuan, Anhui
HONAN	Kaifeng Gen. Shang Chen[14]	Gen. Liu Chih[15] Deputy Commissioner, Gen.Wang Shu-chang[1] Kaifeng	
HUPEH	Wuchang Gen.Huang Hsao-hsiung[1]	None	Commis.of Provisional Hq.of Military Affairs Commis.in Wuhan, Gen. Ho Cheng-chun[18] Pacification Com.of Honan-Hupeh-Shensi borders, Gen.Shang Kuan-yun-hsiang[1], with Hq.at Siangyang, Hupeh. Mayor of Hankow, Mr. Wu Kuo-chen[19]
HUNAN	Changsha Ho Chien[20]	Gen. Ho Chien Changsha	
SZECHWAN	Chengtu Gen.Liu Hsiang[21]	None	Tupan, Gen.Liu Hsiang. Commissioner of the Provisional Hq.of the Military Affairs Commission in Chungking, Gen.Ho Kuo-kuang[22]
SIKANG	Kangting (Tachienlu) Gen.Liu Wen-hui[23]	None	
CHEKIANG	Hangchow Mr. Chu Chia-hua[1]	None	Pacification Com. of Chekiang-Fukien-Kiangsi border areas, Gen.Chang Fa-kuei[24] with Hq.at Kiangshan, Chekiang.

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Government - General

Important Officials in the Chinese National and Provincial Governments

PROVINCE	CAPITAL AND CHAIRMAN OF PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION	PACIFICATION COMMISSIONER AND HDQRS	OTHER OFFICIALS
FUKIEN	Foochow Gen.Chen Yi[25]	Gen.Chiang Ting-wen[26] Foochow	
KIANGSI	Nanchang Gen.Hsiung Shih-hui[27]	Same as Fukien	Pacification Com. of Hunan-Kiangsi border areas, Gen.Liu Hsing[28] with Hq.at Pingsiang, Kiangsi.
KWANGTUNG	Canton Gen.Wu Tieh-cheng[1]	Gen.Yu Han-mou[29] Canton	Mayor of Canton, Mr. Tseng Yang-fu[30]
KWANGSI	Kweilin Gen.Huang Hsü-chu[31]	None	Commanding General of the 5th Route Army (Kwangsi troops), Gen. Li Tsung-jen[32], with Hq.at Kweilin, Vice-Commander, Gen. Pai Chung-hsi[33]
KWEICHOW	Kweiyang Gen.Hsueh-yueh[34]	Same as for Yunnan	
YUNNAN	Yunnan Gen. Lung Yun[35]	Gen. Lung Yun Kunming	

NOTES:

(1) See our No. 9547, paragraph 1.
(2) Former Kuominchun leader. Now commanding the 37th Division, 29th Army, under Sung Che-yuan.
(3) Former Kuominchun leader. Commands 142rd Division, 29th Army.
(4) Formerly commanded the Fengtien Navy under Chang Hsueh-liang. Now commands a squadron of the National Navy.
(5) Civil official, a former secretary of Yen Hsi-shan.
(6) Son of the famous Mohammedan General Ma Fu-hsiang, whose Kansu braves were included in the garrison of Peking during the siege of the Legations in 1900. Also a Mohammedan.
(7) Former Governor of Kweichow, and commander of the 2nd Central Government Division. A close adherent of Chiang Kai-shek.
(8) Mohammedan leader long identified with Chinghai, formerly Kokonor.

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Government - General

Important Officials in the Chinese National and Provincial Governments

(9) Civil official and former Chief of Civil Affairs Bureau of Sinkiang.
(10) A Fengtien man and former Chief of Staff to Chin Shu-jen, former Chairman of Sinkiang who was driven out of the province several years ago. Not on the best of terms with Nanking.
(11) Former Chief of Staff to Sung Che-yuan.
(12) Commander of the 38th Division, 29th Army, under Sung Che-yuan.
(13) Veteran Kuomintang Party man.
(14) Former adherent of Yen Hsi-shan who has transferred his allegiance to the Central Government. Commands the 32nd Central Government Army.
(15) Close adherent of Chiang Kai-shek. Formerly commanded First Division of the Nationalist Army.
(16) Formerly Chief Secretary of Wu Tieh-cheng, recent Mayor of Shanghai. Yu will probably not get the permanent appointment of Mayor of Shanghai.
(17) Kuomintang Party man.
(18) Close to Chiang Kai-shek
(19) Formerly Chief of Bureau of Social Welfare in Nanking.
(20) Former subordinate of Tan Yen-kai, now deceased, who commanded the First Army in the Nationalist Revolution. Close to Chiang Kai-shek and the Party.
(21) A Szechwan warlord of the old school.
(22) A Chiang Kai-shek man.
(23) A relative and enemy of Liu Hsiang. Formerly held part of Szechwan, and warred continually with Liu Hsiang, to the great harm of the people of the province.
(24) Famous Commander of the "Ironsides" Army during the Nationalist revolution.
(25) Chiang Kai-shek man.
(26) A relative of Chiang Kai-shek's. Formerly commanded the 9th Division.
(27) A former Mayor of Shanghai and Kuomintang Party man.
(28) A Kwangsi man and former adherent of Li Tsung-jen whose allegiance is now to the Central Government.
(29) Commands the Kwangtung First Army. His surrender to Nanking last year was one of the principal causes of the failure of the Kwangtung-Kwangsi revolt against the Central Government.
(30) A former official of the Chekiang Provincial Government. Has acquired some reputation as a builder of motor roads. A close adherent of Chiang Kai-shek.
(31) Acquired some reputation as a troop leader in fighting against the Reds in Kiangsi. Close to Chiang Kai-shek.
(32) After having long opposed Chiang Kai-shek, he is now supposed to be loyal to the Central Government, but some doubts may be entertained as to the sincerity of his change of heart.

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Government - General

Important Officials in the Chinese National and Provincial Governments

(33) Same status as Li Tsung-jen. He is officially subordinate to Li, but is generally credited with being the more able of the two.
(34) Another Chiang Kai-shek man who fought hard against the Reds in Kiangsi.
(35) Yunnan warlord of the old school.

Joseph W. Stilwell,

DDB

Joseph W. Stilwell
Colonel, Infantry
Military Attache

Distribution:
6 MID
1 File

No. 9552

6-1

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL., INTEL. DIV.
MAY 9 1938
WAR DEPARTMENT

RESTRICTED

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Government-General

The Sixth National Kuomintang Congress

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 4 1938

The Sixth National Congress of the Kuomintang Party adjourned in Hankow on April 1st after a three day session. The fact that the Congress was being held was kept as secret as possible for fear of attracting Japanese air raids. Domei's intelligence service, however, seemed well informed not only of the fact that the Congress was in session but also concerning its transactions. But although the Japanese air service must have been informed of the Congress, no raids were conducted on Hankow during its session, and the 500 delegates said to have come from all parts of China were not disturbed.

Prior to the opening of the Congress it was generally understood that the question of relations between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists would be one of the most important matters in the agenda of the meeting. Reports of friction between the Reds and the Kuomintang have been circulated for some time, and while these reports have emanated largely from Japanese quarters in which their propagation was undoubtedly largely a matter of the wish's being father to the thought, still it has been generally known for some time that the relations of the Communists and the Kuomintang have not been altogether harmonious. The principal bone of contention has been the fact that while the Kuomintang has been perfectly willing to allow the Reds to fight for China, the latter have never been officially recognized as a party having any status in the Chinese government.

On March 29th the Hankow Hsin Hua Jih Pao (New China Daily), the organ of the Communist Party, published proposals for the unification of parties in China, which are believed to have been presented to the Congress as the substance of the Reds' desires. The essence of the proposals was as follows:

"The permitting of existence to only one political party and refusing legal status to other parties is not justifiable, while the abolition of all parties and merging them into one is impossible.

"Therefore we propose the organization of a people's revolutionary alliance under the following three principles:

'(1) A joint policy to be adopted by all parties, to be followed by individual parties; (2) Representatives of various parties to organize a united administration

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Government-General

The Sixth National Kuomintang Congress

to formulate an anti-Japanese program and adjust party affairs; (3) All parties participating in the alliance to retain their own political and organizational independence.'"

The idea behind these proposals is clearly to give the Communist Party a legal status, to admit it to participation in the government, and to permit it to retain its present organization and fundamental principles.

Other matters to be brought before the Congress, according to Domei, included the following:

(1) Revision of the Kuomintang' s by-laws and organization of the "People's Political Committee".

(2) Measures for the readjustment of relations with other countries and for the acquisition of foreign aid.

(3) Adjustment of finance and resources to provide for protracted armed resistance against Japan.

(4) Improvement in the system of guiding public opinion.

(5) Mobilization of military power and resources by national mobilization.

(6) Attitude toward the new regimes in North and Central C hina.

Judging from the published closing manifesto of the Congress Domei had the program very well "G-2'd" in advance.

As to the actual accomplishments of the Congress they appear to have been considerable. While the Communist Party was not openly recognized and given an official status, the Congress decided that hereafter the people shall have absolute freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of assemblage, and freedom in the formation of associations, provided such activities do not interfere with the war against Japan. If this resolution is lived up to, it should amount to tantamount recognition of the Reds. Open recognition may possibly have been avoided for fear of possible alienation of support of China's cause by England and the United States.

Reports from Hankow state that the Communist organ Hsin Hua Jih Pao expresses great satisfaction with the results of the Congress, which would certainly seem to indicate that the Reds feel they have been well treated.

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Government-General

The Sixth National Kuomintang Congress

A most important decision of the Congress was the appointment of Chiang Kai-shek as "Tsung Tsai" or General Director, a post hitherto held only by the sainted Sun Yat-sen. Chiang Kai-shek is reported to have refused this honor but was finally prevailed upon to yield to the desires of "peepul." He thus distinguishes himself from the late J. Caesar ("You all did see, how on the Lupercal, I thrice presented him a kingly crown, which he did thrice refuse").

On Chiang Kai-shek's own motion, so say the public prints, the Congress made Wang Ching-wei "Fu Tsung Tsai" or Deputy General Director.

Doubtless with the intention of dispelling reports that the Chinese government is in danger of submitting to Communist ideals, the Congress adopted a resolution that hereafter the San Min Chu Yi ("The Three Peoples Principle") of Sun Yat-sen is to be the highest guiding principle for national thought.

Changes in the organization of the Party were effected by the abolishing of the system of reserve members, by which applicants for membership in the Party were required to go through a period of probation. In place of reserve members the Congress provided for the creation of Kuomintang Y outh members who are to be educated in the principles of the Party.

The Congress also provided for the creation of a People's Political Council to give the people an opportunity to participate in the Government before the adoption of a constitution and the establishment of constitutional government. R eports state that in this Council each province is to be represented by three delegates, to be chosen by the Central Government from six candidates elected by popular vote.

Concerning foreign relations, the manifesto of the Congress declares that China will be guided by two principles: first, to respect scrupulously all treaties designed for the maintenance of international peace to which she is a party; and second, not only to preserve but further to promote the friendly relations existing between China and other powers.

Other less important decisions of the Congress were to reiterate China's desire for peace and her determination to provide security for her northern provinces, and to warn the people not to hope for foreign assistance but to carry on the struggle by their own efforts.

Summing up the results of the Congress, the most important appear to be the tacit recognition of the Communists

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Government-General

The Sixth National Kuomintang Congress

as a definite part of the Chinese Government and the establishment of C hiang Kai-shek in the position of virtual dictator, thus setting aside all reports that his power is on the wane. Comparing the results of the deliberations with those of former congresses, one is struck by the clear cut, outspoken, and concrete nature of the closing manifesto, in decided contrast to the vague pronouncements which have often been the only tangible results of the labors of Kuomintang Congresses in the past.

For and in the absence of the Military Attache:

David D. Barrett
David D. Barrett
Major, Infantry
Assistant Military Attache

Distribution:
6 MID
1 File

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
JAN 12
WAR DEPARTMENT

X-1 1927 2657-J-324

G-2 Report 5600

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Internal Situation and its Relation to International Affairs.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. JAN 12 1927

At the present time American and British statesmen are vieing with each other in their frequency and warmth of expression of sympathy for the Chinese in their struggle for "freedom". The Canton Nationalists, and their Russian directors, are the recipients of all this sympathy. Wholly aside from the natural aspirations of a very limited group of intelligent Chinese people, a particular Chinese political faction or party is the benificiary of all western well-wishing. One cannot but wonder what the northern Chinese militarists and politicians think of the foreign statesmen who shower sympathy and compliments on a rival Chinese group which has caused those western statesmen their greatest concern. Yet, after all, the Chinese well understand the principle of bestowing soft words on those most dangerous to you. These same western spokesmen refer always to the present situation as a purely Chinese internal affair. Here in China, too, foreigners discuss the situation often at length, and generally approach it in the light of a Chinese internal fight or, at most, a struggle between the Chinese and their "imperialistic" enemies - meaning Great Britain, Japan and America.

The Nationalist movement was a very natural Chinese conception. For want of a better means of expressing it, the present movement sprung from political preachments of Sun Yat Sen. Nationalism is not new. For some years it has struggled against the inertia of China's unthinking millions, and would still be struggling were it not for the insinuation of Soviet Russia into the affair. Russia has given the so-called nationalism an impetus and direction which it otherwise would not have had. Japan has always been a "meddler and muddler" in Chinese politics. The Washington Conference caused Japan to modify her tactics and pursue a policy more in keeping with the western powers. Russia's entry into the arena forced Japan to separate herself from concerted action with the western powers and re-enter Chinese affairs with her old energy but employing different methods. Japan had to look after her interests even though England and America became passive.

Without going into the reasons justifying the statement, it may be said that what once was a feeble Chinese nationalist movement, a movement which tugs at the heartstrings of western liberals, is today the skirmishing of covering detachments of Soviet Russia and Japan on Chinese soil. Chinese nationalism is a reality, but it is at its infancy and not powerful. So far as we are concerned, Chinese nationalism should be observed with interest, but only incidentally. Our vital interest is what we shall do or not do in this matter of the Japanese-Russian conflict, the covering detachments of whose forces are figuratively now in contact along the Yangtze. It is useless to repeat the growth of the influence and present position of Soviet Russia in Chinese affairs; that is well known. As to the immediate nationalist military outburst, the Russian part is understood, but little has been said of what Japan is doing.

In China today, what country is most immediately and vitally affected by the success of the nationalist (Canton) movement? Certainly

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Internal Situation and its Relation to International Affairs.

not America. Great Britain's trade suffers and this makes her political situation at home more difficult, much to the satisfaction of Soviet Russia, but Great Britain can stand more violence and still exist. To Japan China is vital. Japan can never be passive, as we are, to developments in China. It may be prosaic to say that Japan prospers from a weak China, but it is no less true. Speaking of China south of the Wall (the status of Manchuria is no more in doubt), the policy of Japan has for years been unchanged except as to details of application. Japan wants a divided China or a China whose government is only so strong that it must lean on Japan for support. Nationalism or no nationalism, disorders or no disorders, Japan's policy changes little. She, of all nations, has the least to fear from disorders in China. She manifests little concern for the life of her nationals. Her methods are such that as Great Britain loses trade, she gains it. She daily picks up business which England loses. Customs returns prove this. Japan, now appreciative of the cancellation of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty instead of resenting it, is free to act independently and she benefits with each new embarassment to England. In each case of recent industrial disorders, the first violence was directed at Japanese firms, and later was neatly shifted onto British firms and British officials. Japan knows the Chinese, and she is no longer restrained in her methods of dealing with them by any treaty with Great Britain.

As mentioned previously, the press of England and America contain frequent expressions of opinion of prominent men concerning the Chinese situation. The general tone of them is favorable to Canton. Japanese statesmen utter no statements except the most innocuous declarations of sympathy for all parties and assurances of neutrality in the internal affairs of China. Even the strikes directed against Japanese and the killing of Japanese subjects evoke no strong protests from the legation or press. Japan is playing her game alone.

What does Japan want of China? She wants gradually to absorb the white man's trade, principally Great Britain's. This she is doing, and China's chaos assists rather than hinders the undertaking. To quote the ideas of Sir Francis Aglin, Inspector General of Customs, there are three conditions which are the foundation of Japan's present China policy, namely, (a) no interference in the pursuance of her exploitation of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia; (b) no interruption in the steady exportation of iron ore from the Yangtze Valley; and (c) forestalling the creation of a strong central government under Russia's domination. There is considerable doubt as to the Japanese foreign office desires in the matter of a strong government versus a divided control in China. There is no doubt as to Japan's aversion to a Chinese government under Russia's influence.

It would hardly be possible to conceive of Japan being hopeful of keeping effective the above fundamental conditions of her policy if the nationalist government attained complete control of China north to the Wall. Russian influence over the Canton Government might be eliminated

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Internal Situation and its Relation to International Affairs.

if Japan and the western powers made this elimination a common objective. Japan might maintain the flow of iron ore from the Yangtze Valley, but if the nationalists held to their present avowed aims, the iron ore monopoly would not be so easily continued. It cannot be doubted that if the nationalists organization held to its aims and were successful in securing control over all of China south of the Wall, it would soon force Japan into an embarrassing position in Manchuria. Assurances might be obtained from the Canton Government that they would keep hands off Manchuria, but such promises would never be kept once they felt real power. In brief, Japan's aims are best subserved if the nationalist government does not obtain control of all China.

On the other hand Russia certainly dreams of a revolutionary government controlling China, a government which Soviet Russia has installed and which she still directs. Here, aside from any other conflict of national aims, we have Japan and Russia at odds with each other. The present situation which so generally is viewed as a Chinese internal affair, as a nationalistic aspiration to produce a new China in spite of the obstacles placed in its way by western powers, is in fact a conflict between Japan and Russia. To recognize it as such is vital to western nations.

If it is true that Japan can hold no brief for nationalist success, and if it is true that she is in position by the shifting of material aid and by oriental diplomacy to influence the outcome of the nationalist movement, it is reasonable to expect that a stalemate will result from the struggle between North and South. It would seem logical to look forward to a situation where the Cantonese hold the area south of the Yangtze, the Ankuochun, conducting the government of Peking, holding Northern China, with a continuation for some time of much the same disorderly forces that we have witnessed in the past five years. Meanwhile the conflict of interests between Russia and Japan will become more acute unless unforeseen international adjustments are effected.

John Magruder,
Major, G. S.,
Military Attache.

M/A China Report No. ~~5606~~ 6006 Dec. 11, 1926

British Memorandum of Dec. 18, 1926.
Made Public Dec. 25, 1926:

For some time past His Majesty's Government have watched with growing anxiety the situation in China, and they believe that this anxiety will be shared by the Governments of the interested Powers. Five years ago the Powers assembled at Washington and, taking into consideration the circumstances then existing in China, they agreed among themselves, in conjunction with the representatives of the Chinese Government, that their future policy should be guided by certain general principles designed to safeguard the integrity and independence of China, to promote her political and economic development and the rehabilitation of her finances. It was agreed to grant her certain increases on her treaty tariff in order to provide the revenue required for these purposes. It was further agreed that a commission should examine the question of extra-territoriality with a view to amending the system now in force by the elimination of abuses and accretions and by the removal of unnecessary limitations on China's sovereignty.

Unfortunately the Tariff Conference did not meet for four years, and during that period the situation had greatly deteriorated. During a succession of civil wars the authority of the Peking Government had diminished almost to vanishing point, while in the south a powerful Nationalist Government at Canton definitely

disputed /

disputed the right of the Government at Peking to speak on behalf of China or enter into binding engagements in her name. This process of disintegration, civil war and waning central authority continued with increased acceleration after the Tariff Conference had met until eventually the conference negotiations came to an end because there was no longer a Government with whom to negotiate.

The Commission on Extra-territoriality has meanwhile completed its labours and presented its report, but here, again, we are faced with a similar difficulty due to the disintegration of China. The recommendations contained in the report, while suggesting certain reforms capable of being carried into immediate effect, presuppose for their full execution the existance of a Government possessing authority to enter into engagements on behalf of the whole of China.

During all these civil wars it has been the consistent policy of His Majesty's Government to abstain from any interference between the warring factions or Rival Governments. Despite the disorders which civil war engenders and the grievous losses inflicted on the vast commercial interests, both Chinese and foreign, His Majesty's Government have declined to associate themselves with any particular faction or to interfere in any way with the civil commotions. His Majesty's Government believe that the Powers have adopted a similar attitude and that this is and will continue to be the only right attitude to maintain.

The situation which exists in China today is

thus/

thus entirely different from that which faced the Powers at the time they framed the Washington treaties. In the present state of confusion, though some progress has been made by means of local negotiation and agreements with regional Governments, it has not been possible for the powers to proceed with the larger programme of treaty revision which was foreshadowed at Washington or to arrive at a settlement of any of the outstanding questions relating to the position of foreigners in China. The political disintegration in China has, however, been accompanied by the growth of a powerful nationalist movement which aimed at gaining for China an equal place among the nations, and any failure to meet this movement with sympathy and understanding would not respond to the real intentions of the Powers towards China.

His Majesty's Government, after carefully reviewing the position, desire to submit their considered opinion as to the course which the Washington Treaty Powers should now adopt. His Majesty's Government propose that these Governments shall issue a statement setting forth the essential facts of the situation; declaring their readiness to negotiate on treaty revision and all other outstanding questions as soon as the Chinese themselves have constituted a Government with authority to negotiate; and stating their intentions pending the establishment of such a Government to pursue a constructive policy in harmony with the spirit of the Washington Conference but developed and adapted to meet the altered circumstances of the present time.

His Majesty's Government propose that in this joint declaration the Powers should make it clear that

in /

in their constructive policy they desire to go as far as possible towards meeting the legitimate aspirations of the Chinese nation. They should abandon the idea that the economic and political development of China can only be secured under foreign tutelage, and should declare their readiness to recognise her right to the enjoyment of tariff autonomy as soon as she herself has settled and promulgated a new national tariff. They should expressly disclaim any intention of forcing foreign control upon an unwilling China. While calling upon China to maintain that respect for sanctity of treaties which is primary obligation common to all civilised states, Powers should yet recognise both essential justice of Chinese claim for treaty revision and difficulty under present conditions of negotiating new treaties in place of old, and they should therefore modify their traditional attitude of rigid insistence on strict letter of treaty rights. During this possibly very prolonged period of uncertainty the Powers can only, in the view of His Majesty's Government, adopt an expectant attitude and endeavour to shape developments so far as possible in conformity with the realities of the situation so that ultimately when treaty revision becomes possible, it will be found that part at least of the revision has already been effected on satisfactory lines. It would therefore be wise to abandon the policy of ineffective protest over minor matters, reserving protest - which should then be made effective by united action - only for cases where

vital /

vital interests are at stake. Every case should be considered on its merits and the declaration should show that the Powers are prepared to consider in a sympathetic spirit any reasonable proposals that the Chinese authorities, wherever situated, may make, even if contrary to strict interpretation of treaty rights, in return for fair and considerate treatment of foreign interests by them. The declaration should show that it is the policy of the Powers to endeavour to maintain harmonious relations with China without waiting for or insisting on the prior establishment of a strong Central Government.

It is the earnest hope of His Majesty's Government that the Powers will agree to adopt the principles of the policy outlined above and apply them to the realities of the present situation. Certain recommendations in the reports of the Commission on Extra-territoriality referred to in paragraph 3 above and certain other reforms not covered by that commission's report but falling under the general heading of extra-territoriality can be carried into effect even in present conditions without great delay. There is, however, one step of more immediate importance which in the opinion of His Majesty's Government the Powers should agree to take at once. His Majesty's Government believe that an endeavour should be made to undo the evil results which have flowed from the failure of the Tariff Conference to implement the promises as to tariff increases made by the Powers to China nearly five years ago, and they propose, therefore, that the Powers should agree to the immediate unconditional grant of the Washington surtaxes.

By the /

By the China Customs Treaty signed at Washington on the 6th February, 1922, the Powers promised to grant China certain tariff increases (commonly known as the Washington surtaxes) "for such purposes and subject to such conditions" as the special conference might determine. That special conference is the Tariff Conference which, after a delay of nearly four years, met in Peking on the 26th October, 1925, and has now to all intents and purposes definitely failed. The promised surtaxes have not been granted. The foreign delegations were not satisfied with the assurances which the Chinese delegation offered at the session of the 18th March as to the purposes to which the Chinese Government would themselves devote the proceeds of the surtaxes. They were prepared to grant them only upon conditions which ensured that the proceeds would be placed under foreign control and applied - in great part - to the liquidation of the unsecured debt.

From the very outset His Majesty's Government were opposed to the question of the unsecured debt being dealt with by the Tariff Conference at all, and they frankly expressed this view in a confidential memorandum communicated to the Consortium Powers early in 1923. They foresaw that it might defeat the intentions of the Washington Conference, which were to assist the economic and political development of China and to relax - not to tighten - foreign control. They held that, the object of the concessions proposed at the Washington Conference being to benefit China, the principal purposes to which the customs surtax should be devoted ought to be productive objects, such as railway construction, and social or

economic /

economic reforms which would be a permanent benefit to China as a whole. The most promising of these reforms was in their opinion the abolition of li-kin, which, moreover, was expressly contemplated in the treaty itself.

It has been argued that debt consolidation would also be a permanent benefit to China because it would restore China's credit. This argument would doubtless be valid if there were a Government in effective control of the whole country, but in China to-day debt consolidation could only enable the faction which happened to be in power in Peking to resort to fresh ruinous and unproductive borrowing. His Majesty's Government were therefore opposed to making the consolidation of the unsecured debt one of the purposes to be attained by the Tariff Conference, although their own nationals were directly interested in the funding of some of these debts.

A further objection to the inclusion of the unsecured debt among the subjects to be dealt with at the Tariff Conference was brought into relief by the grant in principle of tariff autonomy. That raised at once in acute form the question of control over customs revenues. His Majesty's Government viewed with grave misgiving the proposal that foreign control should be extended over additional revenues which might be increased by tariff autonomy. In 1921 it was natural that the Powers should demand guarantees for the due fulfilment of the benevolent purposes which the Washington Conference aimed at achieving. But what might have been practicable in 1921 was no longer possible in 1926. It was obvious that China would not now submit to any

extension/

extension of foreign control either for debt consolidation or for the abolition of li-kin, and it seemed to His Majesty's Government that for the Powers to unite in an attempt to impose control upon an unwilling China would be entirely opposed to the spirit of the Washington treaties, and to the policy which His Majesty's Government had consistently advocated. At the same time His Majesty's Government felt that it was essential that the Washington promises, so long overdue, should be implemented. Accordingly, on the 28th May last, in reply to an enquiry from the United States Government as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the Tariff Conference, they proposed in a memorandum, copy of which is annexed hereto, that the Powers should abstain from any attempt to exact guarantees or conditions, but should forthwith authorise the levy of the surtaxes.

Owing to the collapse of the conference no action on this proposal was possible. The situation, however, suddenly developed in the very direction which was anticipated when the proposal was made. The Cantonese did, in fact, seize the Washington surtaxes by levying, in defiance of the treaties, certain additional taxes on the foreign trade of the port. His Majesty's Government have with much reluctance joined in the protest against the new taxes for the sake of maintaining solidarity with the Powers, but they are not satisfied that this is the right policy for the present situation. They regret that they did not more insistently press their views at an earlier stage of the conference, but they

think /

think that it is still not too late, despite the protest already made, to return to the alternative course proposed in the memorandum of 28th May. His Majesty's Government therefore strongly urge that the Powers should now authorise the immediate levy of the Washington surtaxes unconditionally throughout China. They hope that this may provide a basis for regularising the position at Canton.

The principle objection that will probably be made to this proposal is that in strict logic it would amount to condoning a breach of treaty. This argument, however, does not sufficiently take into account the realities of the situation. The basic facts of the present situation are that the treaties are now admittedly in many respects out of date, and that in any attempt to secure a revision the Chinese are confronted on the one hand with the internal difficulty of their own disunion and on the other with the external difficulty of obtaining the unanimous concurrence of the Powers. The latest instance of this is the failure of the attempt to alter the tariff of 1858. His Majesty's Government attach the greatest importance to the sanctity of treaties, but they believe that this principle may best be maintained by a sympathetic adjustment of treaty rights to the equitable claims of the Chinese. Protests should be reserved for cases where there is an attempt at wholesale repudiation of treaty obligations or an attack upon the legitimate and vital interests of foreigners in China, and in these cases the protests should be made effective by the united action of the powers.

His Majesty's Government have consistently carried out the obligation of full and frank consultation imposed upon

all

all the Powers alike by article 7 of the Nine-Powers Pact and it has been their constant aim - sometimes even when this involved a sacrifice of their opinion - to maintain the solidarity of the Powers. It is in pursuance of this aim that His Majesty's Government are now communicating to the Powers this statement of the principles by which they believe that policy should be guided in future. They feel assured that the Powers will share the anxiety of His Majesty's Government to act towards China in the spirit which inspired the Washington Treaties, and it is their earnest hope that the Powers will agree that that spirit cannot better be fulfilled than by adopting the policy which is now presented for their consideration.

It seems to His Majesty's Government that the first step towards the carrying of this new policy into effect should be the immediate unconditional grant of the Washington surtaxes. Lest it be supposed that the grant of the surtaxes might favour one faction at the expense of the others and so provide a further incentive to civil war, His Majesty's Government deem it important to point out that, as no conditions would be attached to the grant the proceeds of the surtaxes would not necessarily be remitted by the Commissioners of Customs to the custodian banks at Shanghai. It would in each case be for the competent Chinese authorities to decide all questions as to the disposition and banking of these additional revenues. His Majesty's Government will be glad to learn at the earliest possible

moment

moment whether the Powers agree to the unconditional grant of the Washington surtaxes.

(COPY)

FEB 10
2657-9-32
WAR DEPARTMENT

This Document is the Property of
His Britannic Majesty's Government

CHINA. May 28, 1926.

CONFIDENTIAL. Section 1.

(F 1998/8/10) No. 1.

Memorandum communicated to United States Embassy, May 28, 1926.

His Majesty's Government have received through the United States Embassy in London a message from the United States Government enquiring whether His Majesty's Government endorse the attitude ascribed to the British delegation at Peking of desiring to abandon the negotiations at Peking and break up the Tariff Conference; and expressing the hope that His Majesty's Government will continue to co-operate with the other interested Powers in bringing to a conclusion the task which was begun last October.

2. His Majesty's Government desire to assure the United States Government that the report received by them that the British delegation desire to withdraw from the negotiations at Peking appears to be based on a complete misunderstanding. His Majesty's Government have no intention whatever of breaking up the Tariff Conference. It is true that the question has been considered whether at the present juncture it might not be convenient to arrange a brief suspension of the conference over the summer months. It was realised, however, that in existing circumstances suspension of the conference might prove to be more prolonged than was intended, and in order to prevent the possibility of misunderstanding as to the sincerity of the Powers, His Majesty's Government considered it to be of the

greatest

greatest importance that, before even such a brief suspension as above contemplated took place, there must first be a complete liquidation of the promises made at Washington.

3. The British delegation in Peking fully shared this view, and appreciated the prime necessity of liquidating the Washington Treaty. A considerable interchange of views has, however, taken place between the Foreign Office and the delegation in regard to the proceedings of the Conference on the subject of the unsecured debt; and it is probable that the misunderstanding to which reference is made above has arisen in consequence of the attitude which the delegation has been instructed to take on this matter, and which was formally stated by the Chief British delegate at the meeting at the Netherlands Legation on the 6th May.

4. The United States Government will no doubt recollect that His Majesty's Government were from the first averse to the imposition on the Chinese Government of any scheme of consolidation of the unsecured debt as part of the work of the Tariff Conference, and that they only agreed later and with great reluctance to the discussion of any scheme at the conference. If the schemes of the foreign delegations for the consolidation of the unsecured debt should postulate too strict a control over China's customs revenues (shortly to be increased by tariff autonomy) His Majesty's Government are afraid that a dangerous deadlock may arise, for the discussions on this subject show that the Chinese, though willing to bind themselves to devote a proportion of their revenues to the unsecured debt, have declined to allow the details of debt consolidation to be dealt with by

the

the Tariff Conference, and will refuse to submit to any extension of foreign control - for that or any other purpose - over China's customs revenues.

5. His Majesty's Government, after full consideration and prolonged consultation with their delegation in Peking, have come to the conclusion that, while they are ready to agree to any reasonable scheme for dealing with the unsecured debt put forward by the Chinese and agreed to by the other Powers, it would not be right to associate themselves with any attempt to force upon the Chinese a greater degree of foreign control over the revenues required for that purpose than they are prepared voluntarily to concede. A policy involving increase of foreign control, and capable of being regarded as an encroachment on that sovereignty and independence of China which the Powers agreed at Washington to respect, is so fundamentally opposed to the traditional policy of the United States towards China that His Majesty's Government are disposed to believe that the State Department will share their anxiety on this subject.

6. It is true that His Majesty's Government originally desired to exact proper guarantees from China in regard to the abolition of li-kin as a condition precedent to the grant of the Washington surtaxes, but they have come to the conclusion that, in the altered circumstances and changed atmosphere of to-day, any attempt to insist upon guarantees against the will of the Chinese Government would only result in postponing indefinitely the liquidation of the Washington promises. They are as anxious as the United

States

States Government fully to implement these promises at the earliest possible moment, and believe that it would be contrary to the intentions of both Governments, both at and subsequent to the Washington Conference, to subordinate the fulfilment of these promises to the imposition upon China of a scheme for the consolidation of her unsecured debt and extension of foreign control over her customs revenues. Any failure to implement the Washington Treaty might create a very dangerous situation, and His Majesty's Government now therefore hold the view that if any reasonably satisfactory assurances are given by the Chinese Government as to the use which it proposes to make of the new revenues the Powers should accept such assurances, abstain from any attempt to impose control or exact guarantees, and forthwith authorise the levy of the surtaxes. They feel confident that a policy, so closely in accord with the friendship and generosity always displayed by the United States of America towards the people of China, will receive the full and cordial support of the United States Government.

Foreign Office, May 28, 1926.

2659-D-325
WAR DEPARTMENT

Subject: Impressions:

1. Anti-Foreignism and Nationalism
2. The Nationalist Movement.
3. The Chinese Army.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. MAR 2 1927

The following impressions were formed upon my return to China after an absence of two and a half years and were written in October, 1926. For certain reasons they were not forwarded at that time. As a result of later developments and observation minor changes might have been made in my original impressions but, in the main, my conclusions based on unchanging Chinese characteristics still seem to me to be essentially correct. I feel that undue stress has been placed by our public men and our press in America upon certain features of the so-called Chinese "struggle for freedom". I believe that a degree of idealism has been attributed to Nationalistic leaders which they do not deserve and that the depth and momentum of nationalism have been given an undue importance. The extraneous influence of the Soviet Russians has been considered too lightly. In brief, I am inclined to the belief that our recent policy in China has been based on faulty estimates of what actually is happening in China. Weakness and indecision in the West has been interpreted as strength and changed conditions in China.

The widespread radical-inspired labor agitation and mob violence has developed since these impressions were written.

1. Anti-Foreignism and Nationalism. October, 1926

The attitude and manner of the man on the street under perfectly normal conditions is no sure index to the feelings of a people. However, from the accounts of the numerous incidents in which anti-foreignism was evident read while in America, I was prepared to expect a notable difference in the attitude toward foreigners of Chinese crowds, ricksha coolies, laborers and domestic servants. While en route, I was only in Hongkong,

Shanghai and Tientsin, port towns, it is true, but it is here that one most expects to sense radial antipathy. In no instance could I observe any evidence of increase in dislike for foreigners. It has always been observed that as one travels from North China to Shanghai and thence to Hongkong he notes a progressively increasing indifference, if not surliness, on the part of coolies, servants and street groups. The northern Chinese are traditionally better natured and more sympathetic; perhaps more stupid.

Travelling from south to north, the impressions previously gained held true, and I could not bring myself to feel that the attitude of the Chinese man on the street had changed for the worse. The contrary of this is always expressed by people who return to Manila after the lapse of a few years. I am, however, generally assured that during certain crises in Chinese-foreign relations there was evident an attitude of hostility among the masses of people. There have been, and are still, instances in various cities aside from Shanghai and Canton of the street crowds, servants, etc., being inflamed against foreigners. These instances are usually traceable to definitely organized radical elements or officers who find it expedient to foster anti-foreignism. In Peking, during the period when the Kuominchun were holding their position near Nankow, I am told that even the day laborers were restive, given to political talk, and were wholly indifferent as to the quality and amount of work performed. Of course this was the heyday of local student activities. The drastic measures of Tuan Chi-jui's bodyguard in killing students effectively and immediately stopped public student demonstrations, and labor unrest as well.

I cannot avoid the conclusion that the great mass of Chinese people, even in port cities, is less affected by an unusual or deep feeling of hostility toward the foreigner than the pronunciamentoes of radical students and officials would lead us to believe. As for the greater mass of Chinese peasants all over China, they have not materially changed their attitude toward foreigners since the day they gazed stupidly at their first missionary. I do not say that students, politicians and radicals

have not adopted nationalism and are not stirring up crowds to agitate most menacingly toward foreigners upon occasions. Nor do I say that at heart the Chinese are not naturally resentful of foreigners - their presence and their works. I do say that after the absence of a few years I can see little fundamental change in the attitude of the mass of Chinese toward foreigners. I further believe that most Chinese demonstrations against foreigners arise not from an increasing feeling of hostility on the part of Chinese common people but from a carefully planned campaign by agitators who may be students, radicals (in Russian pay or not) or officials. In general I believe that officials can start anti-foreign demonstrations and can equally well stop them. This I consider an important point.

I would not want to give the impression that I think things are standing still in China. Revolutionary forces are at work here, but I fail to see that they have permeated deeply into the Chinese masses. As each year passes, the leaven of nationalism, radicalism, anti-foreignism (I prefer to group the forces under the name of pro-Chinese-ism) is working more thoroughly throughout the mass. Faster still, and more important to us, so far as the conduct of the masses is concerned, is working the destructive forces of sheer lawlessness and lack of control which are general throughout China and which result from the disappearance of the Empire and the substitution of nothing in its place - not from justifiable pro-Chinese-ism. Most of the incidents of violence to lives and property in the interior of China today result from absence of constituted authority, and resulting chaos, rather than from any spread of pro-Chinese-ism. Almost every robbery, killing or kidnapping is inspired by the same motives as the same criminal act in New York City, and one would hardly attribute motives of nationalism or anti-foreignism to a gunman in Gotham.

There is this difference in the menace to a missionary in Kweichow and the danger to a foreigner in Tientsin: In the former case, criminals are free to operate due to the breakdown of authority of Chinese officials; in the latter case, disorderly elements are incited to violence by radicals, students or nationalistic officials, ~~with the permission of~~ the officials. Aside from the groups last mentioned which are relatively

a small but important part of China, I believe the attitude of the Chinese people toward foreigners is little changed. Hence, any proposed method of arresting the present tendencies in China or insisting upon just treatment of our nationals by force, must have to do with impressing our will upon officials who still undeniably do control certain areas. Little concern need be had for the "400,000,000", who are as supine as ever.

The change that is taking place in China is, then, the increase of lawlessness among the masses and the rise of pro-Chinese-ism among the small articulate group of radicals, students and officials, both diplomatic and militaristic. As pro-Chinese-ism increases among the latter, lawlessness, having nothing to do with nationalism, increases among the former. The present aggressiveness as directed against foreign interests is purely the work of a small active group and, in general, is yet susceptible to control or direction by a limited number of officials. Of course the degree of this control decreases daily, and the aggressive pro-Chinese-ism is daily permeating lower and lower in the ranks of Chinese officialdom, just as sheer lawlessness becomes more wide-spread among the masses.

Some doubt may be expressed as to the degree of control officials still have over the agitators. It is quite well established that in Canton the conservative element of the Kuomintang could have controlled the radical agitators, who were simply paid men, had they available sufficient money. They could not pay the strikers; the Russians could and the latter dominated the situation. It must not be overlooked that money can make or stop agitation of any kind in China. Russia's final card in each situation where she combats indifference or conservatism is the freeing of money.

I do not believe that the situation is so far gone that the clear-cut announcement by a strong western power or a group of such powers that treaty stipulations will be upheld, regardless of the force to be employed, that a certain number of officials would not immediately fly to cover. As soon as the power or powers began to apply actual

force and no back-steps in the way of altruistic announcements or reservations were published, I am convinced that the majority of the official class would show signs of fear at the possibility of being left on the wrong side of the fence. In other words, despite recent bombast, Chinese racial traits have not undergone a radical change. Chinese do not adopt lost causes. Chinese are timorous before direct action, and Chinese have only veneered their respect for western force with an appearance of boldness which thickens only as western powers depart from their traditional direct action in favor of wholly misconstrued altruistic compromises.

I am not saying that the west should use force in China, but I am convinced that they could still do so effectively. The fear of "reactions all over China" has become a bug-a-boo which I think is wholly unwarranted. Half measures would result in unhappy repercussions all over China, but cold, deliberate decisions to use force without stint and an announcement to that effect, combined with notice to all officials that they would through all grades be held responsible for any violence to foreigners with their lives and their wealth, would occasion consternation among Chinese officials just as it did in the past. And if, as I believe, the officials still retain a fair degree of direction over those elements which now only are stirring up anti-foreignism, they could prevent the outburst of violence we have so come to fear. It must be remembered that the 400,000,000 are supine except in so far as organized incitement plays on them and continues to play on them. There is little evidence to show that respect for western force has disappeared in China, even though recent western diplomacy has come to be recognized as the sheer bluff it is.

2. The Nationalist Movement. Much importance has been attached to a rising sense of nationalism in China. As has been stated before, this is a force which is growing rapidly, but has as yet permeated little into the Chinese masses. Considerable sentimentality is being voiced in England and in America as to the real meaning of this nationalist movement.

Mr. Borah has today been quoted as saying that the real trouble here is a clash between Chinese nationalism and imperialism, and that "any nation which adopts a policy of forcible intervention there will become an assassin of justice in the Orient". Moscow could not have better expressed it, and nothing could be less faulty as an obversation of what is wrong in China. It cannot be denied that western nations, "capitalist and imperialist" as they are, have hastened China's internal conflict, which fundamentally is an inevitable clash between the dusty, lethargic past and modernity. A revolution is in progress in China and it is accompanied by a loosing of selfish and savage instincts which men display in most violent revolutions. Just what influence imperialistic nations are having upon the present cat and dog fight in China today I am at a loss to see, except that diplomatically they are trying to slow up an undirected tendency toward chaos which if permitted to gain momentum will result in the destruction of wealth and loss of lives in a way roughly comparable to the same processes in Russia. I can see no inhumanity in the imperialism which does not seek to arrest a revolution but which insists only upon applying intelligent brakes thereto. I can observe no policy of Imperialistic Powers which today is not sympathetic and liberal toward China. The Western Powers insist only upon international responsibility rather than upon a senseless disregard for every established obligation and working agreement.

The only violent contact is between China and Russia. The latter country has actually intervened and forcibly intervened in China with money, soldiers and propaganda. She is attempting to direct affairs in China in a way which, with the possible exception of J apan, has never been attempted by western nations. That this Russian direction has in it any object other than furtherance of world revolution, only Mr. Borah can see. In spite of the organization which the Russians are imposing upon the Canton-Kuominchun group, if Russian efforts in China are constructive it is a conception unique to few besides Russians. If present Soviet activities in China

differ from the activities of Czarist Russia they differ only as to technique and as to ultimate aims, which aims are of most dubious improvement over those of old Russia.

This "Justice in the Orient" of which a nation adopting a policy of forcible intervention will be an assassin, has an appeal to American ears peculiarly political. I contest the statement beforehand of any man who produces evidence of any justice, as we know it in America, which has been displayed by China in her dealings with inferior, equal or superior nations. I defy anyone who pretends that China or China's statesmen, past or present, have carried out any agreement without availing themselves of every opportunity of evasion, and did not seek advantage in every agreement unless prevented by pressure or force. There exist unequal treaties which have been forced on China, and the methods by which these treaties came into being are certainly not above reproach. Many terms of these unequal treaties are necessitated by conditions peculiar to China, conditions which Chinese could not or would not efface. With China's attitude toward international agreements, and this attitude is traditional, the terms of no treaty, equal or unequal, can be carried out without constant pressure being exerted by the other party to the treaty. This statement is broad, but will be contested by no man who has intimate experience in dealing with the Chinese. Stated otherwise, there can be no such thing as the practical application of an equal treaty with China. Either China will encroach to her own advantage upon the wording or spirit of the treaty, or some method of forcing regard for the treaty must be imposed by the other party. The unhappy choice remains for western powers between using force in some form to exact justice in China's adherence to a treaty or having China take every advantage she can of each situation which arises. This is not exaggeration. It is folly to expect justice in China; neither her own people nor her neighbors have ever experienced it, internally or internationally. Is the West to be considered an assassin if she exacts by forcible intervention reasonable justice which she can exact from China at the present time in no other way.

Much of the attention paid the Nationalist movement conducted by the Cantonese is due to publicity methods directed from Moscow and Canton. The recent military successes also have been sensational. The majority of foreign observers in China concede that the Cantonese are conducting a unique operation, insist that it will succeed, and that we shall soon have to recognize the Kuomintang government instead of the group now holding Peking. From this it naturally follows that China will free herself from western imperialism, northern militarists, etc., and that the era of peace will have come. On the theory that if one cries "Wolf" sufficiently often the wolf ultimately appears, some movement in China should succeed. Reasoning otherwise, namely, that so many movements that promised well have loomed up brightly, burned a space, and then become extinguished, we can well be cynical about this effulgence which floods the territory south of the Yangtze. The Canton Nationalist movement is undeniably popular. In the South the Canton forces have received a notable welcome. Kuomintang members are widespread, they are often shrewd and influential men, and they are spreading favorable propaganda everywhere. Russian-directed propaganda teams also are actively enlisting sympathy for the movement all over China. The avowed aims of the Kuomintang, to free China of northern militarists and foreign imperialistic influence, appeal to all Chinese who do not find it to their advantage to hold to other aims. The Chinese, up to a certain point, fly to a winning cause. All of the foregoing factors favor the Cantonese.

Against these favorable factors are the following: Much of the present enthusiasm of the southern provinces is due to the expulsion of the hated northern soldiers from their midst; southern soldiers will soon be equally irksome. The Cantonese politically are not peculiarly stable. On the contrary, they are much given to disrupting party feuds. The Chinese often fly to a winning cause, but they have an inmate fear of too much centralized control, and the moment a group attains a great amount of power, they begin their inevitable levelling processes to weaken the "White Hope". The northern militarists, while decidedly not cemented by

a common aim, can array more and better equipped troops, and the personal interests of their leaders are as much at stake as the personal benefits of the southern leaders. Remember that Chang Kai-shih's heart is not burning with intense nationalism any more than is Chang Tso-lin's. After the first enthusiasm of southern soldiers and southern sympathizers, the natural Chinese tendencies toward disintegration will set in. The "400,000,000" are little concerned with nationalism. The real agitators for nationalism will not stand success better than have thousands of Chinese reformers aforetime.

Again I must repeat that I realize things are not standing still in China; however, I have personally observed the rise and fall of many movements in China in which both Chinese and foreigners pinned their hopes for a brighter future. The Shanghai Peace Conference would unite north and south and all would be well. The expulsion of the Anfuites would free China from the blighting hand of Japan, and China could then start joyously on her way. Wu Pei-fu would unite the country by force and a new era would dawn. Feng Yu-hsiang would drive out the other militarists (and the Britishers) and plant gardens all over China. Now Sun Yat-sen's spirit, the spirit which in the flesh seemed only to stir up trouble, is now revived by Russian advisors with Russian money, and elevated as the host by Chang Kai-shih. Chang Kai-shih! reeking with idealism! - and we in China hope that China is saved by the Nationalist movement.

I cannot but express my serious doubts about the ultimate success of the Canton nationalist movement. I do not think it will succeed, nor do I think that the Chinese if left wholly to their own devices by the imperialistic United States and Great Britain will for years evolve any government capable of preventing conditions comparable to those existing today, or worse, or capable of conducting responsible international relations. I further fear that without some very definite intervention on the part of the United States or Great Britain, or both, Russia may bring about a condition of chaos here compared with which the conditions

today are mild. The form of intervention today could, I believe, still be in the nature of a definite announcement that henceforth China will be strictly held to her present obligations until such time as these obligations are modified by recognized procedure; that any failure to discharge these obligations will be dealt with by all the forces at our command. The announcement accompanied by a few minor demonstrations of our sincerity would, I believe, today start us on the road to proper relations. If this is delayed the situation, greatly aggravated by Russia, may ultimately have to be handled not by minor expeditions but by war, the nature of which will be difficult to foresee, but which will involve more than China.

3. The Chinese Army Today. I have been impressed with certain statements which I have recently read of the improvement in Chinese military forces. There are many who believe that tremendous strides have been made by certain prominent militarists in increasing the combat efficiency of their troops. This is undeniably true. Certainly it would be unreasonable to expect that all of the operations of the past two years had not produced results due, if to no other reason, to continued experience of the leaders and their staffs in actually leading troops in combat and in shifting them over rather widespread fronts. Likewise, the troops themselves have benefitted from battle experience. There is a slightly increased number of men under arms, and there are more modern implements of war in the hands of troops. The arsenals at Mudken are modern and capable of turning out more materiel, as is also the Canton arsenal. Other arsenals have perhaps become less efficient during the same time.

However, no national army has come into existence, and the two most effective forces today, namely, Fengtien and the Cantonese, are bent on each other's destruction. Minor leaders are still following the policy of shifting to the winner or of combining against the winner, depending upon their personal aspirations. In brief, no cohesion in the Chinese military forces has developed.

No Fengtien divisions have shown any marked superiorty over Wu Pei-fu's old divisions, nor have any Cantonese divisions as yet demonstrated any right to claim superiority over Fengtien units. Fengtien troops are the best equipped today, but, except for increased numbers of machine guns, field guns, and trench mortars, are not better equipped than were the old Northwest Frontier Defense Troops. There have been instances of late where the will-to-win was evident among Chinese forces of all leaders, as it was among Wu Pei-fu's troops in 1920, and as it has been at various times in Chinese history.

Conceding a certain degree of recent improvement in Chinese forces, the following must not be forgotten; practically every weapon employed is of foreign manufacture or was manufactured under foreign supervision. Not a single weapon was conceived by a Chinese. Every new principle in attack or defense observed in recent operations was employed at the suggestion of, or at the insistence of, some foreign instructor. The Cantonese today are successful due to Russian technical and tactical assistance and to Russian propaganda methods.

Again conceding improvement in the Chinese military forces, such improvement is directly attributable to foreign assistance and usually insistence. In the meantime what are foreign armies doing? Judging since the days of the Chinese Revolution, can one say that the Chinese equipment or knowledge of the military art has increased relatively to that of western armies? Except for a slightly improved quality of leadership, I cannot observe any great improvement in modern units over units I saw in 1920. Let any Chinese leader today organize his own defense and, in spite of universal appreciation of depth of position, he will organize one line of defense. I do not believe that Chinese machine guns and ammunition compare with American standards. In spite of instruction from Russian and Japanese officers, Fengtien artillery which has recently been reported on very favorably, cannot be said to compare with European or American artillery in the simplest methods of fire control or in materiel. As for fire direction, there is none; and as for tactical handling and methods of precision fires, the Chinese

have no conception. The more technical the arm, the less relative efficiency may be expected of the Chinese. It is interesting to hear of his lack of respect for artillery and airplanes, which only indicates his inability to employ them effectively.

Assuming that Chinese appreciation for and ability in the military art increases rapidly, his lack of technical skill will always place him in a disadvantageous position, vis-a-vis western military forces. It is erroneous to compare him with the Japanese and their extraordinary development along military lines. The qualities which have made the Japanese modern and efficient, even technically, as soldiers, have always been notably lacking in the fundamental character of the Chinese. The Chinese have varied in their development, or lack of development, so markedly from the Japanese along all lines that analogies drawn between the two people are misleading. This could be shown more extensively if space permitted. With all of the practice that western armies have had in attack, defense and maneuver, and with all the thought military men have intelligently concentrated on these subjects, a Chinese army, equally equipped, would have no chance of success against a modern force. Adding the tremendous advantage of western technical devices and equipment (air force, modern artillery, gas, etc.) which the Chinese do not have, and will never have so highly developed, an inevitable rout would be in store for a Chinese force of even a much greater strength. Russia in the war showed the futility of mere strength in men. The 400,000,000 must not be taken seriously, because it is traditional that the 400,000,000 are supine - they do not fight.

John Magruder

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

File this
W.S.R.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
26
1927 2657-J-338
MAY 24
CONFIDENTIAL
WAR DEPARTMENT

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL (consult Department's multigraphed instruction of February 17, 1926, Diplomatic Serial No. 462).

AMERICAN TREATIES WITH CHINA.

Article prepared for the use of the Foreign Service School by Consul J. K. Davis, Division of Far Eastern Affairs, June, 1926.

a. The American Treaties: American relations with China are regulated by a series of eight treaties which, together with a number of less formal agreements, have been signed between the two countries. Of these, five have to do with trade and general relations, two are devoted to the problem of Chinese immigration into the United States and the last confirms a revision of the Chinese Customs tariff. The titles of these treaties and the years in which they were negotiated are as follows:

Year	Title
1844	Treaty of Peace, Amity and Commerce.
1858	Treaty of Peace, Amity and Commerce.
1868	Treaty as to Trade, Consuls and Emigration.
1880	Immigration Treaty.
1880	Treaty as to Commercial Intercourse and Judicial Procedure.
1894	Convention Regulating Chinese Immigration.
1903	Treaty as to Commercial Relations.
1920	Treaty Confirming the Application of a Five per cent Ad Valorem Rate of Duty to Importations of Goods into China by Citizens of the United States.

b. Background of the Earlier Treaties: The entire body of treaties between China and other countries has its background the conditions obtaining in China between the institution of trade with western countries and the brief wars between China and Great Britain in 1840, and between China and the British and French allies in 1858-1860. As has been indicated in the section on Chinese history, during their earlier relations with official and trade representatives of western nations the Chinese officials adopted an attitude of haughty contempt. This attitude coupled with their utter ignorance of the usages of international law and their indifference to the advantages to be derived from legitimate international trade, made all official and trade intercourse with them exceedingly difficult and unsatisfactory, and eventually brought about the war with Great Britain in 1840-1843. As a result of the pressure brought in this war the British were enabled to obtain the signing of the Treaty of Nanking in 1842, and the Treaty of the Bogue in 1843.

The fruits of the British victories were shared by other nations and in 1844 the Treaty of Wanghea was signed

with

with the United States and a few months later the Treaty of Whampoa with the French. Speaking of the provisions of these treaties H. B. Morse states that they have "in general established certain broad principles which, since that date, have formed the foundation on which has been erected the superstructure of the diplomatic and commercial relations between China and upwards of a score of foreign nations which have entered into common treaty relations."

Subsequent to the negotiation of these treaties the Chinese made every effort to avoid fulfilling their requirements, and a period of constant friction ensued which culminated in the war between China and the French and British allies in 1857-1860. As a result of this war a further series of four treaties was signed which added to the foundation laid down in 1842 and 1844, and consisted of the British, Russian, American and French treaties of Tientsin.

The most important of all eight of the Sino-American agreements are the Treaty of Wang Hea, 1844, and the Treaty of Tientsin, 1858, the provisions of which constitute even up to the present the basis for American intercourse with China.

c. The Treaty of 1844, commonly known as the Treaty of Wang Hea, was negotiated by the Honorable Caleb Cushing and contains in general the same provisions as the British treaties of Nanking, 1842, and of the Bogue, 1843. Its most important provisions are:

(1) The opening of five ports to American trade.
(2) The right to station American Consuls at each port.
(3) Officials of the two countries having corresponding rank to be on an equal footing.
(4) Americans in China to be under the jurisdiction of their own Consular representatives and not under Chinese law.
(5) The establishment of a uniform and moderate tariff upon all goods imported and exported by Americans.

d. The Treaty of Tientsin, signed in 1858, was arranged by the Honorable William B. Reed. Besides the majority of its clauses which merely repeat and revise those of the first treaty, it contains the following important additions:

(1) Provision for an American Diplomatic representative to China with the right to visit the capital from time to time.
(2) American missionaries and their converts to have full religious freedom.
(3) All rights granted or which might in future be granted to the most favored nation to accrue automatically to the United States.

Two of the most important privileges enjoyed by Americans in China were not provided for in this treaty but were acquired at this time from the British Treaty of Tientsin by virtue of "the most favored nation" clause. These are the right for the American diplomatic representative to reside in Peking and for the travel of Americans in the interior "for their pleasure or for purposes of trade", on passes issued by their Consuls.

It is interesting to note that the section of this treaty providing for religious freedom was inserted at the instance of the two American missionaries who had rendered invaluable services during the negotiations as interpreters. However, the treaty provision which has made possible the greater part of American missionary propaganda in China is not contained in an American treaty but in the French treaty of 1860, and has been enjoyed by virtue of the most favored nation clause. Incidentally, this provision which reads "And it shall be lawful for French missionaries in any of the provinces to lease or buy land and build houses" appears in the Chinese text alone, and the Chinese government has always maintained that it was surreptitiously included. It was not until the negotiation of the American Commercial Treaty of 1903 that American missionaries secured a more direct treaty warrant for conducting their work outside of the open ports.

e. Immigration Treaties: Anson Burlingame, upon the termination of six years service as American Minister to China, accepted an appointment as a High Commissioner of the Chinese Emperor and headed a mission to the capitals of all the treaty powers for the purpose of furthering Chinese interests. While in Washington on this mission he negotiated the treaty of 1868, whose principal provisions are:

(1) A recognition of the territorial integrity of China by the United States.
(2) A recognition of China's right to regulate its internal trade not affected by treaty.
(3) A recognition of the right of voluntary emigration.

In the light of subsequent history it is interesting to note that great importance was placed by both Secretary of State Seward and President Grant upon ensuring the right of Chinese coolies to emigrate. The reason for this attitude was their desire to secure a large flow of Chinese laborers to assist in the development of our Pacific coast states.

Within a few years, however, American sentiment underwent a radical change and great popular opposition to the Chinese immigration arose which was translated into the passage of so radical an exclusion bill by the Congress that it was vetoed by President Hayes as violating an international obligation. The President then sent a commission to Peking which in 1880 negotiated a treaty with

China

China that authorized the American government to "regulate, limit or suspend such coming or residence" of Chinese laborers to the United States.

The sentiment against the coming of Chinese laborers became so strong and resulted in the passage of such embarrassing acts by the Congress, that in 1894 another treaty was negotiated with China whereby the coming of Chinese laborers was specifically prohibited for a period of ten years. This second treaty was denounced by the Chinese government in 1904 and the present exclusion of Chinese laborers rests upon the earlier treaty.

Chinese teachers, students, merchants and travellers for curiosity or pleasure are specifically exempted from the exclusion provisions of this first Treaty.

f. Treaty as to Commercial Intercourse and Judicial Procedure of 1880: The commercial intercourse and judicial procedure treaty of 1880 was negotiated at the same time as the immigration treaty of that year and was in the nature of a quid pro quo for the latter, since at the instance of the Chinese government a clause was inserted in it forbidding American citizens from participating in any way in the opium trade in China.

In general this treaty is of relatively small importance. Its three provisions are:

(1) A prohibition of the import of opium into either country and against Americans engaging in the opium trade in China.
(2) An agreement for mutual "most favored nation" treatment as regards duties and tonnage dues.
(3) An agreement for the attendance of American assessors at trials of Chinese cases in which Americans are the plaintiffs.

g. Treaty as to Commercial Relations. 1903: In the Treaty of 1903 it was in general endeavored to enlarge and bring up to date the privileges of Americans in China, and to make provision for certain changes which it was then believed would soon take place.

Among the more significant provisions of this treaty are those providing for:

(1) The abolition of Likin or system of inland transit duties. (This however, has as yet never been attempted by the Chinese government.)
(2) The making of adequate regulations for the protection in China of trade marks, patents and copyrights. (These provisions have as yet not been satisfactorily carried out.)
(3) The confirmation of the regulations issued by the Chinese government in 1898 throwing open the inland waterways of China to commerce by steam vessels, and a provision for the participation of

American

American citizens in this trade.

(4) The opening of the cities of Mukden and Antung to foreign trade.

(5) The right of American missionaries to rent or lease in perpetuity buildings and land in any part of the empire for mission purposes.

(6) The enactment by China of mining laws and regulations which "will offer no impediment to the attraction of foreign capital nor place foreign capitalists at a greater disadvantage than they would be under generally accepted foreign regulations". (No satisfactory regulations of this nature have as yet been issued.)

(7) The assistance by the United States in the reform of China's judicial system, and the eventual abolition of extraterritoriality when conditions warrant such a step.

h. Treaty Confirming Revision of China's Import Tariff. 1920: The Chinese Import Tariff when originally made was intended to impose a duty of five per cent ad valorem duty on all imports. However, as the majority of items consist of specific duties, and since the prices of the commodities covered are constantly changing, frequent revisions have been necessary in order to make the five per cent duty effective. The treaty of 1920 merely confirms such a revision.

4-1 1 Enc

G-2 Report 3820 1927 2657-D-339

WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Policies of Nationalist Government.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 16 1927

1. The following interview by General Pei Chung-hsi, Commander of the 1st Division, 1st Cantonese Army, now at Shanghai, is most significant. It should be noted that General Pei is a subordinate of Chiang Kai-shek who is generally considered a moderate. He is a moderate as compared with the Hankow extremists, but decidedly radical from the Western point of view.

2. This is a "Tass" interview, and as such has a Russian bias. Also the extreme views of General Pei, relatively speaking a moderate, give an indication of the compromises in public announcements which all Chinese Nationalists must make to the Central Executive Committee dominated by Communists.

John Magruder
John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

Distribution:
4 MID
1 Tientsin
1 File

From M/A, China Report #6099 March 30, 1927

General Pei Chung-hsi On Movement Of Politics Of Southern

Questions Of Nationalism, Trade Changes And Social Aid Are Discussed In Interview

Tass

SHANGHAI, March 27.—In a lengthy interview with our correspondent lasting two hours General Pei Chung-hsi stated:

"I have heard with greatest joy about the enthusiasm which the masses of the U.S.S.R. are manifesting in connection with our latest victory. At present the whole world is divided into two camps: the camp of imperialists and the camp of the struggle against the imperialists. The last victory of the Chinese Nationalist Movement and the capture of Shanghai is a blow to imperialism.

"We are following the covenants of our leader, Dr. Sun Yat-sen. We can render real resistance to the united front of the imperialists, only leaning on and going with the masses of our country and with all peoples treating us as equals. We firmly hope for further support from the masses of the U.S.S.R. and for the further development of our revolution."

On the question of relations between the armed forces and the working masses of Shanghai, General Pei stated:

Not Purely Military

"Beginning from July last the National Revolutionary Army has been going from one victory to another. It would be a great mistake to regard our victories as merely military achievements. The National Revolutionary Army can conquer only by relying on the masses, which has been the case beginning from Canton up to the capture of Shanghai. Our victory is a victory of the masses.

"We know well the hopes of the imperialists, particularly of the British, but they won't come out. Their hopes will never be realised. A split between our army and the masses is impossible. Our armed forces with the people and we are following this principle.

"Our task is to deny the imperialists of the possibility of combining with militarists. After exterminating these armed agents of the imperialists inside China we shall pass to the struggle against the economic yoke of imperialism.

"About external politics, we do not contemplate at present to enter into an armed struggle directly with imperialism. Acting in close co-operation with the people, we shall continue our foreign policy.

"The Shanghai question is very complicated; Shanghai is not only a problem of the Chinese Revolution but has a world significance. In Shanghai we come into a direct struggle with imperialism armed to the teeth, but we do not contemplate to divert from the teaching of Sun Yat-sen. We do not intend to occupy the Concessions and the Settlement here by armed force.

"We are leaving this question for our Central Committee and Nationalist Government, awaiting their definite instructions when the whole plan regarding these problems will be worked out for the whole country. Personally I am convinced that it will not be difficult to abolish unequal treaties and restore concessions.

Then Use Boycott

"If after that imperialism still will not satisfy our demands, we have the weapon of the economic boycott, by which we can compel them to accept our demands."

Touching on the question of communism and the Communist Party, Pei Chung-hsi said: "The Chinese Revolution is a part of the front, of the world revolution. Imperialists are trying by calumnies and lies to disunite this front, but will not succeed. British papers in China are spreading all kinds of malicious lies and calumnias. There is nothing else left but close them up, but unfortunately we cannot do it at present.

"Regarding co-operation with the Communists, we have the

backward. Communists understand very well the impossibility of establishing Communism in the present state of China. Even the U. S. S. R. is compelled to carry on the New Economic Policy with a final tendency to Communism, but not full communism at present."

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
MAY 27 1927
WAR DEPARTMENT

AMERICAN LEGATION
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE.
PEKING, CHINA.

2657-9-34

March 30, 1927

#7001

Subject: Interview by Mr. Sadao Saburi.

To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D.C.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 16 1927

1. The accompanying interview by Mr. Sadao Saburi, head of the Treaty Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office, is an intelligent and informing analysis of certain aspects of the Nationalist movement. However, I feel quite sure that Mr. Saburi's confidential presentation of the situation to the Foreign Office was considerably modified as to the degree of the Russian influence in the movement. The Japanese, in their efforts to prevent propaganda from being directed against them as long as possible, have thus far been extremely cautious in saying anything adverse to Russian activities, but they have watched them with alarm. Only today the Japanese Military Attache, Lieutenant General Honjo, told me that his people had long viewed the Nationalist movement as a reasonable attempt on the part of the Chinese to attain freedom, but that now sentiment in Japan is rapidly changing and that he himself entertained no illusions as to the predominant role played by Russians and other revolutionaries in the movement.

John Magruder
John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

1 encls.
elh

W.D.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] To Get Money

Sun Minister of Foreign Affairs Partly Due To Help From Russians; May Compromise

"Some people seem to attach undue significance to my recent tour in China," said Mr. Sadao Saburi, head of the Treaty Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office in the course of a speech at a luncheon in Tokyo last week. "They do so quite gratuitously, for I had no special mission to perform. After rather strenuous labors for more than a year in Peking in connection with the Customs Conference and the Extra-territoriality Commission, I was given an opportunity to travel in China simply for a change of scenery.

"As a tourist, I have brought back with me a basful of impressions. But as a political observer I have little to tell. It is true that I happened to be in Peking during a period in which dramatic events occurred, attended by fierce wars outside the city wall and no small amount of bloodshed within, resulting in radical shiftings of political power in the North. The two or three months of my travels witnessed startling developments in the Yangtze Valley due to the arrival of the Cantonese in Wu-han. Naturally I watched with keen interest the political and military situation in China and studied with special care its international aspects.

"Fighting for Unity"

"As a newcomer and a humble student, I sought information from statesmen, diplomats, scholars, businessmen and journalists, both native and foreign, both in the North and in the South. But despite my earnest efforts to learn, and the many interviews and conversations I have had, I must frankly admit my inability to speak authoritatively on the varied phases of the present situation.

"In the course of conversations in Peking I heard many prophesy that China would split up into more than one state, [illegible] for the [illegible] that [illegible] north [illegible] centrally from the [illegible] when I came to leave, I found no such clear-cut division between north and south. On both sides, the leaders, both political and military, are fighting among themselves not for schism but for unity.

"Again, there are some foreign experts of Chinese history and Chinese affairs in general who hold that the Chinese are a race of people, docile, peace-loving, industrious, civil and cultured, but peculiarly inadept in politics and self-government, and that they can best be ruled by a strong hand from outside, be it a Mongolian or a Manchurian, or be it in the form of a combination of modern Powers. But the plain fact is that I have met no single intelligent young men of China today who holds such a view of his own people, and that we all see China becoming daily more self-conscious, self-assertive, independent and defiant in her dealings with outside Powers. Inspired by the change that has come over world thought of late years, China demands to be freed from foreign tutelage and to become a complete master in her own house.

Nationalists in Favor

"The so-called nationalist movement, with which the Southern Government is identified, is by no means confined to the South. The same sentiment and spirit permeate all intelligent people in the North. Sun Yat-sen was preaching his San Min-Chu-Yi (the Three Peoples' Doctrine) for more than two decades before his death. And every patriotic Chinese, whether Sun's follower or his antagonist, aspires to the same end.

"The Chinese may have special virtues and defects, or certain traits and idiosyncrasies peculiar to their own race. But they share also universal human nature, which resents humiliation, which cherishes pride and honor, which craves independence and equality. In this I am convinced that the nationalist movement is really a national movement and a Chinese movement.

Russian Aid Admitted

"Do not misunderstood me! I am not denying that the efficiency so far exhibited by the [illegible] Nationalist [illegible] its [illegible] [illegible] ated by outsiders.

"I am not personally [illegible] the Nationalist [illegible] and all they have [illegible] reached Hankow [illegible] Japanese concession had [illegible] through a [illegible] with the [illegible] organized [illegible] unions and left the city [illegible] days before the now historic incident took place in the British concession.

"Neither does the rapid and almost unexpected progress so far made by the Cantonese necessarily warrant too great optimism for their future. There are, it seems to me, yet many obstacles, military, financial and political to be overcome. Particularly, within the Kuomintang we see a group of different affiliations—from [illegible] and branch men to those of a moderate tinge. They have not always been on friendly terms and there have been differences of opinion and even of actual interests. And today we hear rumors about discord between leaders in Wuhan and those in Nanchang.

Adjustment Necessary

"Further discords may recur, in which case the future of the nationalist movement would be gravely compromised. All I can say with sincerity is that today in China, regardless of geographical boundaries, there is flowing a strong and sometimes turbulent current of nationalism, which involves and tends to threaten the treaty rights and vast interests of foreigners. The Powers should realize that this movement, however menacing it may appear, is not foreign but Chinese, and they should act accordingly if they are to deal with the present Chinese situation justly and adequately.

"It does not mean scrapping all existing treaties of immediate and unconditional surrender of everything we have got in China. It only means a general adjustment of international relations on a new basis of justice and sympathetic co-operation. In the present Chinese situation, Japan's interests are more involved than any other country's. But, placing her policy on this basis, she has not changed her attitude toward China,

which was clearly indicated by the Japanese delegate at the opening session of the Customs Conference in October, 1925.

"The same liberal attitude of sympathy and tolerance, of non-interference and of co-operation, was eloquently expressed by Baron Shidehara in his recent speech before the Diet. I am glad to say that the sentiment expressed was echoed by the public opinion of Japan.

Prejudices Against New

"There is always a conflict between newborn ideals and old realities—a wide gap between what ought to be done logically and what can be done actually. Life is often a compromise between the two. In politics—especially international politics—it is almost always so.—*Japan Advertiser.*

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIV.
WAR DEPARTMENT
RECEIVED G/2 W.D. JUN 2 1927

G-2 Report

CHINA (Population & Social Conditions)

Subject: Chinese Radical Movement in Siam.

1. The following extracts from reports by the U. S. Charge d'Affaires at Siam, dated February 16th and 22nd, 1927, respectively, referring to the Chinese question as bearing on Siam, are of interest as showing the spread of the above movement to Siam and the probable trend of events in all places having a large concentrated Chinese population, particularly the Philippine Islands.

"It is estimated that there are about two million persons in Siam either wholly Chinese or of Chinese extraction. This amounts to approximately 20% of the entire population of Siam. There are about two hundred thousand Chinese in the city of Bangkok of a total population of four hundred and fifty thousand. Aside from a handful of Siamese tram line and railway workers, the laboring class is Chinese.

"I learn from a reliable source that there exists in Siam a network of societies and organizations engaged in spreading communistic propaganda, dominated by Cantonese many of whom are sent to Siam as fully qualified Bolshevist agitators. These agitators are apparently in constant communication with, and carry on the aims and doctrines of the southern Nationalist (Canton) government of China. These doctrines are anti-foreign (chiefly anti-British). anti-Christian, anti-Imperialist, anti-Royalty and anti-capitalist. It is estimated that over ninety per cent of the Chinese in Siam are in sympathy with this movement. In this connection, it may be of interest to state that during the recent China New Year three day celebration when flags were displayed outside almost every house in Bangkok's business section, that is to say, the Chinese quarter, at least nine out of every ten flags displayed, by actual count, were those of the so-called Nationalist Government while the remaining one-tenth were the five striped flag of Northern China.

"This propaganda from Canton would appear to be a problem pertaining to the Chinese exclusively, as its spread to native Siamese is highly improbably. The bulk of the latter, excepting nobles, government officials, and clerks living in Bangkok, live in the country regions and are generally proprietors of their own small holdings. The most important method employed by agitators in spreading propaganda and its literature is through the medium of schools. Instances have been known where Chinese instructors employed in foreign schools have taken advantage of their position to teach bolshevik doctrines and when discovered have gone over to Chinese communistic schools taking considerable numbers of Chinese students with them.

The presence in Siam of so many Chinese who even less than formerly become assimilated in the country is a matter of no little concern to the Siamese Government. With the infiltration of communistic ideas into these Chinese accompanied by an ever increasing anti-British feeling, the Siamese Government is confronted with the possibility of grave industrial difficulties between the Chinese and the British who from the point of view of number and importance of interests form the overwhelming majority of foreign interests in Siam. Such a state of affairs might result in grave consequences

From M/A, China Report No. 7009 April 6, 1927

CHINA (Population & Social Conditions)

Subject: Chinese Radical Movement in China.

for Siam. The fact that the Government is alive to the possibilities is evident to me by reason of the fact that since my recent arrival here the question has been broached in conversation by numerous Government officials each of whom has expressed considerable concern over it.

"As an instance of the close connection and cooperation maintained between the Chinese here and those in China, it may be of interest to the Department to relate the following incident.

"The Steamship BELGENLAND making a round-the-world tour visited Bangkok for one day on February 15. A special dinner was arranged at the leading hotel at Bangkok for the 400 passengers and a large number of Chinese "boys" were employed in the emergency. When the time came for dinner to be served it was found that the Chinese servants had declared a strike and refused to serve the passengers. After an investigation later as to the reason for the strike it was found that Chinese agitators had persuaded the "boys" not to serve the BELGENLAND'S passengers as that vessel owing to the disturbances in China had omitted to call at Shanghai thereby preventing the Chinese merchants at that port from reaping the usual harvest out of American round-the-world tourists.

"This incident is of minor importance but it is nevertheless significant in showing the close relations and sympathy maintained between the Chinese here and their brothers in the north."

xxx xxx xxx

"In the course of an informal conversation I had with Prince Traidos, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, he broached the subject of the situation in China. He said that he was greatly interested therein as bearing upon the situation with regard to the Chinese in Siam. Since the Cantonese forces had met with success in their invasion of the North during the past few months he had noticed, he said, a distinct change in the attitude of the Chinese here in their relations with the Siamese, Siam, he said in the past, without any treaty relations with China, had admitted any and all Chinese freely into the country without restriction, in the expectation of assimilating them. The Chinese had been on a basis of absolute equality with the Siamese and in point of fact had been in a more favorable position than native Siamese in that compulsory military service was not required of them. In previous years the Chinese had intermarried with the Siamese and produced loyal Siamese subjects. During the past ten years however the Chinese had brought their own women and the situation had changed.

Prince Traidos said that he was following the situation in China with the greatest concern and was apprehensive as to the repercussion it might have in Siam. He was particularly anxious to know what the policy and attitude of the so-called Nationalist authorities were in territories newly occupied by them. Were they aggressive in imposing communistic ideas upon the Chinese and foreigners in the territories recently occupied? He was particularly interested in this question as bearing upon the possible attitude of the Chinese here towards foreign interests, notably the British. I replied that judging from reports received while I was at Peking from Hankow and Wuchang on the subject that there were indications that once firmly

CHINA (Population & Social
Conditions)

Subject: Chinese Radical Movement in China.

established there, the Cantonese administration would embody certain communistic principles which would make the position of the foreigner difficult in so far as concerned his commercial interests. However it was perhaps too soon to answer the question definitely.

"Prince Traidos said that whereas up to the present the Chinese in Siam had been permitted to enter and leave Siam with absolute freedom, measures restricting and controlling immigration which would apply to all aliens were shortly to be adopted. He added that recently the Siamese Government had deported a number of undesirable Chinese.

"The Prince went on to say that he had recently received a number of communications from Eugene Chen in which the latter had taken the attitude that the Siamese Government was oppressing and needlessly restricting the Chinese in Siam. This, as was well known to everyone, was so far removed from the truth that it looked as though the Nationalist Government were endeavoring to initiate a quarrel with the Siamese Government."

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

Distribution:
4 MID
1 Tientsin
1 File

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
1927
2657-D-3
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CHINA

Subject: Russia in Chinese Nationalist Movement.

(From observations in Hankow, March, 1927)

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. JUN 2 1927

1. Resume of Russia's Entry into Kuomintang.
2. Supremacy of Russian Influence Today.
3. Propaganda Methods.
4. The Army.
5. Labor.
6. Social Effects on the Chinese.
7. Effect on Foreigners.

1. Resume of Russia's Entry into Kuomintang.

In China intense situations built up on emotions and aspirations not native to the Chinese tend quickly to subside. This generalization has been applicable to the Nationalist movement. The natural supineness of the Chinese masses is such a ponderous force of inertia that the continued efforts of Dr. Sun and his followers were unable to keep stirred up a genuine nationalistic feeling among a people whose aspirations seldom rise above immediate needs and personal aims. Leaders whose time was consumed in overcoming the mass tendency to subside after a fine burst of enthusiasm and in deriving individual benefits from each new situation had little energy remaining to institute reforms, and so the Kuomintang floundered. Admitting their own incompetence and admitting the lack of a permanent urge to pure nationalism among their people, the Kuomintang leaders sought assistance from without.

The teaching in Christian schools furnished many recruits to the Kuomintang cause, but failed to provide military and material means for overcoming existing obstacles. America was sympathetic but lacked the imperialistic aims which permitted the pouring out of war materials and staff supervision for a military campaign. England was blind to the possibilities of the field prepared by the fanaticisms of Dr. Sun and perhaps too short-sightedly materialistic to see any benefits from the institution of a strong central government, admitting its possibility. The Englishman

CHINA

Subject: Russia in Chinese Nationalist Movement.

in China always has been incapable of thinking of China except in colonial terms. Dr. Sun at the end of the war entertained plans of employing ex-German army officers to conduct his campaigns, but Germany was too poor to assist in a material way. It is now well known how he turned to Russia as the only hope.

The dictatorship of a compact party in Russia permitted immediate action without any appeal to the people of Russia, provided a plan appealed to the dictators. Balked in the West in their revolutionary program, the invitation to expand in Asia was almost too good to be true. The Russian dictators acted promptly and effectively. The first Russian efforts in North China to deal directly with the Chinese people in urging communism was a pathetic, almost ludicrous failure. One still remembers the personnel of the first Soviet missions to Peking in 1921 preaching their theories to individual ricksha coolies on the street. One still remembers their first crude propaganda pamphlets expressing abstruse political theories addressed to a people whose mental processes never reached beyond questions of food and prices. One cannot, however, forget that these same political fanatics did begin to gather some recruits in the universities among professors and students. All political observers at that time wrote confidently home of the impossibility of communism appealing to a nation of traders, individualists, and land owners.

It was inevitable that the Russians would find Sun Yat-sen. The appeal for help from Dr. Sun opened the eyes of Russian leaders to the possibilities offered by insinuating themselves into a revolutionary organization, already strong and widespread, like the Kuomintang. The Russians moved to Canton in increasing numbers after Sun returned from one of his exiles in Shanghai. The steps by which Russian influence grew in the Kuomintang will not be discussed but it is well known that before the Kuomintang moved north the power in the Party gradually had come under Russian influence, if not control.

CHINA

Subject: Russia in Chinese Nationalist Movement.

The Russians, never forgetful of their ultimate aim to create in China a government sympathetic with and modeled on Russia - frankly, to Bolshevize China - had to allay the suspicion of Western Powers, and appeal to the Chinese people more generally than did the old Kuomintang. They accomplished both of these in a way that must and does command the respect of politicians the world over. The Russians who engineered the taking over of a Chinese movement and succeeding with it deserve the highest honors of their country. Their accomplishment was facilitated by the fact that Russia knew what she wanted and Russian agents were free in every case to take positive and aggressive, even if unscrupulous action, while agents of all Western Powers were everywhere handicapped by home governments which did not know what they wanted. All the advantages which accrue in a military way to the attacker were enjoyed by the Russians while Western officials were everywhere forced to indecision, lack of initiative, and timidity. The cult of liberalism rampart in the West worked for the Russians and we witnessed the unwholesome spectacle in China of seeing strong Western Powers led by the nose to their own disadvantage by a group of Russian Bolsheviks and Chinese fanatics.

The suspicion of Western Powers was allayed by the adoption of all the liberal revolutionary slogans dear to Western peoples. The Kuomintang Party with its mass of young students already had learned them and knew how sweet they were, particularly in American ears. The Russians knew well how to retain this advantage in the beginning of their operations. These liberal and Nationalist platitudes appealed to a small group of the returned student type of Chinese and intelligentsia but were as sounding brass and tinkling cymbal to the great mass of Chinese people. Chinese gentry by nature only want to be left alone to trade and not be buffeted about by senseless change. Nothing that the Russians had to offer in the

way of political theories appealed to the gentry of China any more than they did to the bourgeoisie of Europe. The Russians finding in the gentry and the lower classes no genuine and permanent urge to real nationalism began to search about for campaign material appealing to all classes. The Kuomintang already had seized upon the brutality of Northern militarists, a justifiable hatred already entertained by all classes. The intelligentsia already were articulate against the unequal treaties and with no little justification. The lower classes joined in this without understanding why, but they genuinely entertained a sullen dislike for the good and bad in all that could be classed as foreign. Baiting of foreigners has always been popular in China. All this material existed when the Russians came and was a worthy foundation, but the Kuomintang had not gone far with it. There was little here to appeal to the large mass of laborers and tenant class on the farms. The Chinese politician considered these classes unworthy of notice. The Russians had built up their power in Russia on just these classes, and naturally seized upon them to imitate their revolutionary methods used at home. Contrary to popular views, there is a large farm tenant class in the southern provinces who were getting small benefits from their labor.

The series of troubles between Canton and Hongkong accompanied by boycotts and strikes while not of Russian making were taken advantage of by the Russians as fishing waters. Their revolutionary technique soon permitted them to influence if not dominate the labor situations. The stupid handling of their relations with Canton by the Government of Hongkong gave the Russians a great impetus in their process of worming into local affairs. Borodin began to be appreciated for his shrewdness by Dr. Sun and his subordinates. More Russians came and were placed in key positions. The organization of labor was enlarged; the Chinese communists became a party

CHINA

Subject: Russia in Chinese Nationalist Movement.

to be reckoned with; the Whampoa Military and Political Academy began to produce enthusiastic soldiers and young revolutionaries; the Kuomintang gradually took on the organization by committees, following the lines of the Communist Party in Russia. Propaganda began to appear which was radical and revolutionary but which was carefully sugar-coated for the West into a delectable bit of liberalism and nationalism. The Kuomintang Army adopted the Russian organization, and Russian money and Russian arms in great quantities began to be distributed under the direction of Borodin. By this time Borodin was a power. He was the arbiter of the flow of war materials and money credits; he was high political advisor in the secret councils of the Central Executive Committee; he was, due to his largess and his revolutionary expertness, the most influential man in directing the powerful National Labor Union; he was the head of that "invisible hand", the Communist Party, and he was a forceful personality in himself. Here was a man whose word was almost magic, since he could give wise counsel, disburse money and materiel, could threaten and ultimately intimidate or terrorize.

In 1926, when Chiang Kai-shek effected his military coup d'etat, he became master of the Central Executive Committee, and decreed the expulsion of the Russians and Chinese radicals, Borodin proved his power greater than the strongest Chinese member of Kuomintang. Chiang Kai-shek was coerced into retracting his demand, issued a manifesto defending the Russians and ended by driving from Canton the leaders of the Right Wing of the Kuomintang. From this time on, the Nationalist movement of China could no longer boast of being a Chinese affair. Right Wing Kuomintang members went the way that Kerensky followers did in the autumn of 1917. It became a revolution, social and economic, along Russian lines, in which Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles were a childish lisp and Russian personalities dominated the Party organization, foreign policy, the army and finances. From this time on the history of the movement has been a gradual

tightening of the discipline of the Party, a more complete control of the Party by the extremists, and a more outspoken trend toward Communism with each new military expansion.

During the troublous days in Canton Borodin and his Russian assistants learned much about Chinese character. The Kuomintang Party had never held together long enough to see a successful issue to their plans. Jealousy, avarice, individualism and such traits always have caused division and internal dissention within their own ranks. If left to themselves, it is doubtful if the Northern expedition so long planned by Dr. Sun would yet have crossed the Kwangtung frontier. The biggest task performed by the Russians was to learn Chinese weaknesses, foresee their appearance, and in each case prevent the individual from taking action divergent to the cause. The Chinese leaders did try to follow their natural tendencies and still do, but the Russians and their extremist Chinese sympathizers watch such attempts and frustrate them by pressure and intimidation applied through what they call the "economic arm" and the "invisible hand". If all else fail, assassination is resorted to. The Russian espionage methods and system of paralleling each governmental agency, civil and military, with political agents operating directly under the Political Bureau was perfected. These political agents are, so far as practicable, communists. The committee method of administration and the assigning to all civil and military units of spies or checkers, are based upon the theory that the individual can never be trusted. This system was found necessary in Russia and applies admirably in China. As it prevented the proletariat from being proletariat in Russia so it has prevented the Chinese officials from following their natural bent. So far has this mistrust of the individual been carried that recently the chairmanship of committees has been abolished and a "board of chairman" instituted whereby the power

of any individual is curbed by rotating the duty as chairman in the board.

The progress of the Nationalist movement during the advance to the Yangtze River has been fully reported. The Nationalist Government was installed at Wuhan, but Chiang Kai-shek remained with a coterie of his followers at Nanchang, Kiangsi. When I arrived at Hankow on March 10th, Chiang Kai-shek's forces were drawing their lines tighter about Nanking and Shanghai at the same time that political differences were becoming acute between him and the extremist group in Hankow, represented on the Russian side by Borodin and the Chinese side by Hsu Ch'ien. The Central Executive Committee assembled during the first week in March and proceeded with certain enactments and the reorganization of committees, all designed to curb the power of Chiang Kai-shek and further to centralize authority with the Central Executive Committee.

Chiang Kai-shek, with some of his followers, refused to attend the meeting, although at the same time he was Chairman of the C.E.C. At the beginning of the Northern campaign, unusual powers were entrusted to Chiang Kai-shek on the score that the Commander-in-Chief should not be handicapped in his military operations by awaiting decisions from a distant military committee. At this time, too, Chiang was personally more powerful than the committee. Once having successfully conducted the campaign, he set about in true Chinese form to appoint governors, civil and military officials, and to disregard mandates from the rather makeshift nucleus of the C.E.C. which gathered at Hankow and which claimed to be the supreme party authority. In fact Chiang Kai-shek was attempting to dictate to the Hankow group.

The break within the Kuomintang ranks was widened. From Nanchang Chiang denounced Hsu Ch'ien and Teng Yen-ta, the leading communists, and the communist attempt to dominate the Kuomintang. Before leaving Canton a bitterness had sprung up between Chiang and Borodin because of their

frequent encounters to limit each other's power. Chiang attacked Borodin and deeply resented the tightening cords with which Borodin bound him by means of his political agents imposed on the Army, and the agitation of labor which Borodin could employ through this influence over the National Labor Union. Hsu Ch'ien and Teng Yen-ta denounced Chiang as an anti-revolutionary, as a feudally-minded dictator. They declared he was attempting to destroy the discipline of the party. Discipline of the party had come to mean in reality discipline by a small group of extremists in the party, which extremists were Borodin's communist agents. Posters appeared in Hankow stating "Down with Chiang Kai-shek, Running Dog of the Imperialists". The personal jealousy between Tang Sheng-chih and Chiang was played on to prevent any possible rapprochement between the two militarists, both of whom secretly were bitter over the limitation of their powers, even within their own armies, by Russian-imported device of commissars. In spite of the personal differences between Tang and Chiang, they might have found common cause to drive out the Russians and Chinese communists. The reason this did not happen was because the communists' domination of the Party, the Army and all the labor and farm organizations, was already too effective. Tang, in Hankow, was in duress; Chiang at Nanchang was engaged in military operations against Sun Chuan-fang and could have exacted dubious obedience from his subordinates to march against Hankow.

As the importation of mongooses into Hawaii to eliminate snakes resulted in the destruction of birds, so the acquiescence of Chiang Kai-shek in Russian methods of rigid party discipline and the releasing of ignorant masses to assure victory against the North resulted in shearing him of all spoils of victory. The C.E.C. met in Hankow in March, and Borodin with his sympathetic Chinese communists succeeded in perfecting the reorganization of the Party along identical lines with the Communist Party in Russia; the individual, theoretically at least, was left powerless

in the hands of the committees within the C.E.C., and communists or extremists were everywhere in control of all committees. The Military Committee, consisting of nine militarists and six civilians, was the supreme military authority and Chiang Kai-shek, Tang Sheng-chih and Feng Yu-hsiang were of equal rank, each subordinate in all matters to the committee.

(For the organization of the Kuomintang and composition of all committees see Report No. 7004.)

2. Supremacy of Russian Influence.

The steps have been discussed whereby the Russians, principally Borodin, gained their unusual authority in directing the revolution. Borodin's power is not supposititious. I heard specific instances from reliable sources of his ability to get things done which no Chinese could accomplish. No Chinese or foreigners in Hankow denied his power, as do Kuomintang agents in the United States. Mr. Eugene Chen admitted to me the remarkable qualifications and excellent service performed "as advisors" by the Russians. He said "These men do not merely sign their names to payrolls as do the so-called advisors in Peking - they perform service". Foreign technical men assured me that the Russian technical advisors in public services were really competent men.

As to the number of Russians in the organization I could get no statement. Eugene Chen told me "not many, I can assure you". At the end of 1926, however, some 300 was the number given by responsible Chinese. Since they are paid with Russian money, the Chinese probably do not know how many Russians are engaged in all the Kuomintang agencies and the purely Russian propaganda agencies. Since all important advisors ride in motorcars, it is generally believed that the Chinese give them liberal allowances in addition to their pay, which is said to be small. Incidentally, the Russians observed in the streets of Hankow were attended by guards on their motors.

CHINA

Subject: Russia in Chinese Nationalist Movement.

Mr. Yamamoto, leader in the Seiyukai Party of Japan, who visited Hankow to study the Russian dominance in the movement, expressed to his personal friend, Lt. General Honjo, Japanese Military Attache, who in turn told me, as follows:

"Eugene Chen is a journalist who writes brilliantly; Sun Fo is a half mad revolutionary adventurer with no political ability; T. V. Soong is a boy working seriously, with no political knowledge of what is going on about him. With this governmental group Borodin toys. Borodin is a man of great knowledge of affairs, with a pleasing personality and a very dominating personality." Although I did not talk with Borodin, my estimate of the Chinese Ministers is identical with Mr. Yamamoto's.

3. Propaganda Methods.

In Hankow the atmosphere was oppressive with propaganda. Hardly a square foot of space in Hankow and Wuchang within reach was free from posters of Russian design and expressing Russian ideas. Fearful illustrations picturing murder, rape and arson by Northern militarists were side by side with vicious caricatures of John Bull engaged in every form of imperialistic evil. H appy peasants garnered and healthy Russianized Chinese coolies plied their tools under the beatific gaze of kindly, well groomed Cantonese subalterns. Daily the bill posters furnished new thoughts for the thousands of unemployed coolies - thoughts venomously anti-foreign and anti individuals or institutions which conflicted with the Russian aims. Other posters promised all manner of desirable things for inferior Chinese classes and dire vengeance against the gentry who alone could make any economic improvement possible. No space was spared. Even the dignified brass name plates of the Hongkong-Shanghai Bank were effaced by terrifying posters.

CHINA

Subject: Russia in Chinese Nationalist Movement.

The press was completely given over to propaganda. No Chinese journal could be published which expressed a sentiment even remotely "anti-revolutionary". When I was in Hankow, there were two publications in English, the "Central China Post" and the "Hankow Herald". "The People's Tribune", edited by the American radicals, Prohmes, opened after my arrival. The "Post" was a typical reactionary British journal. The "Herald", owned by Schwartz, an American-German Jew, was pro-Nationalist but moderate and reliable. These two have since been closed by the simple device of continuous strikes fomented undoubtedly by the National Labor Union. The "Tribune", being the mouthpiece in English of the Government and the extremists, is still being published.

Every method known in Russia for the spread of favorable propaganda is employed in Wuhan. The Nationalist News Agency is a governmental publicity organization which publishes enough news of a reliable kind to allay suspicion as to its real nature. It might be said that the news it fails to publish constitutes its principal unreliability and creates a misleading impression in foreign countries. Another publication, being sent all over the world, is mimeographed in English and German, under the title "Chinese Correspondence". It is edited by two German-Jew Communists and prepared incongruously in a deserted mission station in Wuchang for the Political Bureau of the Nationalist Army. I visited the home of "Chinese Correspondence", met the editors, who adopted a nervously suspicious attitude, and forced my attentions upon them. By insisting upon plying the most brazen questions as to their activities I broke down their defense and spent two hours in a most informing conversation. These two Germans admitted being world revolutionaries, and were seriously pursuing their aims by furthering the Chinese revolution. They quite frankly admitted the huge part played by the Russians and other revolutionaries in directing the movement. They were fully aware of Chinese qualities,

which make for disunion, and were illuminating in outlining the various methods known in revolutionary technique whereby Chinese leaders were prevented from freeing themselves from discipline imposed by the Party. They attacked the imperialism of Britain and upon occasions plainly showed their belief that America was guilty of imperialism only to a lesser degree. They paid Britain the compliment of being the arch-imperialist, which once unseated would prepare the way for easy attack on others. Russia's aim was to create a revolutionary China like herself.

Convincing agents are present in every country to interpret "Chinese" Nationalism in terms best suited to the political tastes of the particular country. Every foreigner who writes is fed the kind of propaganda suitable to his predilections. Missionaries were once used to excellent advantage and had actually to be driven from their homes before they would admit that Chinese Nationalism was in reality a foreign-fed flame. American advocates and propagandists, of which there are too many, are in the main sincere well-wishers for a unified China under Kuomintang. These are carefully supplied material purged of all Russian content. Compare the propaganda, for example, spread in Russia concerning the Chinese revolution with that written by Mr. Grover Clark. Mr. Alfred Sze makes a point of belittling Russian influence in China which he must, due to his close contact with Hankow, know to be dangerously great. In Wuhan Nationalist officials boast of revolutionary tactics which are denied by their agents in the United States.

4. <u>The Army</u>.

Details will be dealt with in digest reports.

The Nationalist Army can be described in general terms as similar to the Northern armies. The original Cantonese contingents which marched north from Kwangtung in the spring of 1926 were rather superior, as Chinese

units go, due to a large proportion of Whampoa cadets among the officer personnel. These cadets, Russian trained, were of superior mentality, well grounded in military rudiments and had the politico-military morale of young crusaders. The Cantonese have always been considered mediocre as soldiers but these were Canton's best. As new areas fell to the Nationalists, many units were incorporated into their armies and diluted the original nucleus. The Whampoa cadets were killed off at Wuchang and Nanchang. The leaven of these really capable young men became less effective and the large bodies of typical Chinese armed coolies became more difficult to indoctrinate with the revolutionary zeal.

Today the Southern Army is no longer homogeneous; it is not nearly so well equipped as the Fengtien forces; the soldiers are not so sturdy as the northerners; and many of the commanders are Nationalist only in name. The expansion has been so rapid that there have not been enough trustworthy officers to go around. Senior officers in many cases are militarists first and Nationalists after. The staff work of the Russian advisors, however, is unique in China. The organization and military doctrine is Russian, and is reasonably uniform among the best Nationalist units. The Nationalists have a "cause" and this they are never permitted to forget for a moment of the day. The Political Bureau agents who parallel the military commanders are responsible for this. They check up on commanders and ceaselessly preach revolution. Whatever one may suspect as to the genuineness and depth of revolutionary zeal among officers and men, they have morale. This, advance, propaganda, and the assistance of the local inhabitants in new areas constitute the essentials of Nationalist success.

There is a suspicion and latent anti-foreignism encouraged in the Army which at the time I was in Hankow made military observations difficult. It was disagreeable, if not dangerous, to observe military units at work. They did not welcome being watched by foreigners. Specific

requests by me to officials to be brought into contact with some English-speaking young officers, were politely ignored. The officers, of whom I observed many in Wuchang, were noticeably young. They had an air of great confidence. They were very smart, foreign-style uniforms, similar in cut to those of Italian officers.

5. Labor.

The Chinese laboring man and farm tenant is a type more ignorant, superstitious and gullible than can be appreciated by those who have not lived in China. That this class deserves better wages and standards of life nobody can deny. The question is how to assist the laborer. The Russians have set about deliberately to give this ignorant mass political consciousness immediately. A process requiring years has been applied abruptly and has resulted only in creating violent prejudice and angry forces which cannot be permitted free play without creating chaos, a fine example of which is the province of Hunan. The Russians also have pictured to laborers a wage scale which the industrial system of China will not support without a gradual readjustment. Wages have been arbitrarily increased and employment has ceased in keeping with inexorable economic laws. Foreign employment in Hankow has all but dried up, and Chinese employers have retrenched as completely as permitted by arbitrary laws directed against them. Unemployment daily increases and labor enjoys only the fiction of high wages.

It should be observed that labor did not organize naturally. Labor organization was frankly employed as a weapon of revolution and the process of accomplishing its organization was forced and methodical. Labor organizers boasted of the number and variety of unions as munitions manufacturers would boast of output. Parades and demonstrations by labor unions, while initially entered into enthusiastically, later became very irksome to the

members, and the National Labor Union has often to resort to coercion to get them on the streets. Pickets, superior in authority to police and soldiers, order out the unions for parades and marshal them like so many sheep. Ranting agitators can soon stir up the mob spirit, but the tendency of the union members is to subside and work for rice. The beginnings of disillusionment among labors were becoming apparent in March, since when it has become widespread.

The Chinese officials are quite aware of having stirred up the masses artifically and that once having stirred them up, dangerous forces have been let loose. Eugene Chen boasted to me of the huge war-making power of the masses when directed against the phlegmatic gentry and the Northern militarists. When I questioned him about the boomerang effect of his trained agitators he said something to the effect, "We stir them up to a consciousness of their power and permit them to practice it. We win their confidence since they see we do not shoot them down. Later when their violence may be embarrassing, we can appeal to them to restrain themselves and even suffer self-denials to contribute their share to the revolution". What could be more faulty reasoning when dealing with ignorant Chinese coolies? It is upon such fallacies that the whole revolution is being based. Chen knows they are fallacies. The unsoundness of revolutionary methods is not becoming everywhere apparent. There is not wealth enough accumulated in China to support a faulty economic system such as was the case for a time in Russia. Even now in South China it is becoming apparent that hunger closely follows cessation of employment.

Many absurdities are evident in the extent to which unionization is carried. The penalties applied for disregard of ignorantly conceived union exactions often results in tragedy. I saw a parade of sore-footed amahs being herded through the streets wondering what it was all about. One of their banners bore the inscription "We want votes in parliament". The Prostitutes' Union paraded also. They craved relief from onerous taxes - a more practical appeal than voiced by most men's unions.

CHINA

Subject: Russia in Chinese Nationalist Movement.

6. Social Effects on Chinese.

Much just criticism heretofore has been heaped upon Christian missionaries for the disturbing effect of their teachings upon the youth of China. It was charged by Chinese and foreigners alike that missionaries, in their zeal to convert, destroyed many of the ethical concepts which were the pillars of Chinese society, such as ancestor worship, filial piety, family discipline, etc. The Russians in a few years have dragged more anchors than the Christian missionaries ever did. The real extent to which the by-products of Russian fanaticism has effected the Chinese people is not now known, but there are many signs of old Chinese moral beliefs having been shaken. This is mentioned only to show that the influence of Russians in the revolution has been more intimate and more widespread than mere contributions of material and advisory assistance. Chinese ethics incompatable with revolutionary ideas are attacked with that viciousness which only young Chinese pried loose from the past can attack.

The principal effect of violent social change is observable in the new code of freedom of women. Many posters in Nationalist territory demand the freeing of women from the restraints of the past and their organization to clinch their new freedom. This is only another indication of the mad forces which the Russian lets loose in his insistence upon transforming the world in a day. The inevitable results have followed, and the Chinese women affected by revolutionary zeal have become promiscuous and vulger. This observation of lack of moral restraint among women has become general in Nationalist territory. Laborers in Hankow have observed the tendency with concern and picturesquely compared the habits of their wives with "alley cats".

7. Effect on Foreigners.

What foreigners have suffered from the revolution is almost negligible as compared with the Chinese gentry. In revolutionary eyes the gentry of China is the bourgeoisie of Europe. The suffering of the

#7017

foreigner, however, is more easily visualized. It is necessary to have travelled in the Yangtze Valley in March, 1927, to appreciate what were the real conditions. One scarcely saw a normal foreigner. Some were dazed, some were shocked with recent experiences and all were nervously expectant with what might next happen. All down-river boats were filled with refugees from areas where they had been frightfulness they could not comprehend and which seemed so futile. There was no evidence here of imperialist guilt. They felt themselves victims of a power more unscrupulous than any imperialist power, and sceptical of home governments which could not understand. Missionaries almost without exception were disillusioned and chagrined that a movement which they had encouraged had so brutally ejected them from their homes. They no longer held that it is a Chinese directed movement. Some frankly welcomed every evidence of foreign force in Chinese waters and a few even called for more. I talked with many missionaries but none who still entertained the idea that the protection of our nationals was an erroneous policy.

Business men who were not connected with large firms were seeing their efforts of years wasted. Many of them were simply "broke". In Hankow at that time no foreign firm had any protection. The Nationalist Government was a creature of a small clique of communists and extremists who in turn were dominated by Russians to whom capitalist institutions were anathema. Eugene Chen had himself just been ejected from the Standing Committee and was most concerned about his own political position. The Government itself (as distinguished from the C.E.C.) was powerless except to apply exorbitant taxes and restrictions on trade. Labor unions could render business men helpless, and did. Pickets of the unions could close business houses on any pretext and police and soldiers were helpless to interfere. Any necessary discipline exacted by employees could result in

CHINA

Subject: Russia in Chinese Nationalist Movement.

a violent demonstration from which the foreigner had to retreat. The foreigners were intimidated by mobs which suddenly appeared upon the signal of a ricksha coolie's yell. The Russian advisors and Chinese extremists plainly indicated that they welcomed the disappearance of foreign business.

It is a depressing sight to see numbers of White men with their hands up. Their hands are up, and they are all aware of it, before a force which is malign for China and the world. Their greatest bitterness is that they feel they are deserted by their home governments because they believe their home governments fail to appreciate that the Nationalist Movement in China is directed by forces of despotism rather than forces of liberalism.

John Magruder
John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache.

Distribution:
4 MID
1 Tientsin
1 Legation
1 File

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
JUL 12 1927
WAR DEPARTMENT

Y-1 - 2657-D-343

G-2 Report

2140 - National Aspirations

CHINA (Population & Social Conditions)

Subject: Attitude of the Chinese toward America and Americans.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. JUL 12 1927

1. In discussing the feeling of the Chinese toward us, distinction must be made between the popular and the governmental point of view. The great mass of the people of China have come into slight contact with us and with our institutions. They know about Standard Oil, they read tabloid news about us in the newspapers, and most of them have seen American missionaries; but that is almost the limit of contact afforded the Chinese dwelling in the interior. On the other hand, official China, by virtue of the treaties under suffrance of which Americans dwell in China and transact their business there, is more keenly aware of America and has more definite views about us, though it must be made clear from the start that such views generally abound in misunderstandings.

2. Taking first the popular point of view, it must be noted that total ignorance among the Chinese populace as to the existence of America is on the wane; but there undoubtedly are millions of people in China to whom America is a name and nothing more. To the masses who have heard enough of America or seen enough Americans to evince a critical interest in us, we are regarded with a tolerance born of indifference. Generally speaking we have little to offer that intervenes decisively in the struggle of the average Chinese to get his living for the day and for one day only, and we are regarded with the detachment that this point of view engenders.

3. With regard to the comparatively small number of Chinese with whom we come into contact locally, either in affairs of business, professionally, philanthropically or socially, we are generally liked. This liking is believed to exceed that accorded the nationals, as a whole, of any other country. It has been singularly fortunate in this connection that the activities of the greater number of Americans of shady character who come to China have been generally directed against foreigners rather than Chinese. While the Chinese feel thus warmly toward us, their liking should by no means be confused with respect. This latter is manifested toward the British and Germans in much greater degree than toward Americans. The case of the Germans is peculiarly significant, for by virtue of the forceful methods they employed during the days of their political power in China, they are accorded marked consideration at the present time when that power has evaporated. It may be argued that it is the Germans' renunciation of their rights that has brought them such a peculiar return; but it must be noted that today the Germans are most respected of all in Shantung and Tsingtao, the places they ruled justly but with a heavy hand.

4. This general liking on the part of the Chinese as a whole does not extend to the small but influential and vocally important group of returned students, no matter whether they have been educated in America or elsewhere. The returned student comes back to China educated in terms of the West and with a thick coat of western culture. When he deals with China in terms of the West he fails and the fruit is disillusionment. If he reverts to oriental methods of procedure and thought, this reversion is almost always accompanied by a conscious or unconscious rejection of

CHINA (Population &
Social Conditions)

Subject: Attitude of the Chinese toward America
and Americans.

the occident in all its aspects, mental and personal included. For this reason the nationalism of the foreign educated Chinese is almost invariably tinged with anti-foreignism, and their feelings toward America are no exception to the rule.

5. It must be noted further that the feelings of friendship by the Chinese in the mass toward America as a nation, while existent, cannot be described as deep rooted. It is not strong enough to single out America and Americans generally either favorably or unfavorably in the event of general anti-foreign agitation or persecution.

6. Coming to the point of view from which the various Chinese governments and politicians regard America, there will be found in it the legitimate self-interest common to all sovereign entities combined with an extreme measure of cynicism and self-seeking that puts the gaining of immediate ends, especially financial ones, in advance of policies that normally would promise larger profits spread out over longer periods of time. The evanescent character of Chinese governmental institutions and personnel causes the Chinese statesman to live in the present, rather than in the past and in the future. "The traditional friendship between America and China" is a phrase reserved for banquets rather than negotiations.

7. The governmental attitude of cynicism when it comes into contact with American idealism as manifested by our various political gestures results primarily in distrust of what we propose. When our idealistic proposals offer immediate and obvious material benefit, they usually are accepted with mild surprise rather than gratitude, and are exploited so far as is permitted by the belief that our candor must conceal unterior motives. A typical instance of this governmental attitude is afforded by the reaction of the Chinese Government to the return in 1925 of a considerably greater portion of the American Boxer Indemnity than was originally stipulated. The money was received, formal thanks were given, and aside from some newspaper accounts of the incident in the ensuing two weeks, the matter has never been alluded to since.

8. Because of the comparative smallness of our economic stake in China, because of our traditional detachment from Chinese political issues, and because of our reputed disinclination to exact satisfaction for affronts, it is customary for Chinese statesmen to regard America as a political unit available for use when needed (witness the present Nationalist exploitation of American public opinion), and capable of being safely ignored when such a course is convenient. A direct consequence of this belief is that Chinese governments are comparatively ignorant and generally intolerant of our economic, financial and potential military power.

John Magruder

TJB

John Magruder
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache

Distribution:
4 MID
1 Tientsin
1 File

1927 2657-9-344
3110
WAR DEPARTMENT
AUG

G-2 Report

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Chang Tso-lin's Government at Peking.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. AUG 9 1927

1. With no pretense of regularity or continuity from some previous government, technicalities were waived aside by the Fengtien Party and on June 18th Chang Tso-lin installed himself as Dictator of the Government in Peking. Heretofore he has been Commander-in-Chief of the Ankuochun and dictator in North China but technically held neither authority over nor responsibility for the governing cabinet. Now with the title of "Ta Yuan Shuai" (which means literally Generalissimo) he disregards all questions of continuity of authority, assumes full responsibility and appoints his own cabinet "to assist the Ta Yuan Shuai in carrying out political affairs". He is in every sense of the word a dictator.

2. The ceremony of installation was drab, almost tragic. There was no enthusiasm and little interest in the change of government. On June 20th, Pan Fu, named Premier, submitted the list of cabinet members which was approved by Chang Tso-lin. They are as follows:

Foreign Affairs	- Wang Ying-tai	(Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Koo Cabinet)
Military Affairs	- Ho Feng-liu	(Anfu Party, formerly Defense Commissioner of Shanghai. This ministry, newly formed, includes departments of Army General Staff, Navy and Aviation.)
Interior	- Shen Jui-lin	(Anfu Party, now residing in Dairen.)
Justice	- Yao Chen	(Anfu Party.)
Communications	- Pan Fu	(concurrently.)
Finance	- Yen Chih-pu	(Fengtien Party. Has managed Chang Tso-lin's personal affairs.)
Industry	- Chang Ching-hui	(Minister of War in former Cabinet.)
Education	- Liu Che	(Fengtien Party.)

Chief Cabinet Secretary - Hsai Jen-hu.

3. The reason for the formation of the Fengtien-Anfu Government at this time is not clearly understood. It is however generally believed that the step was taken at the insistence of Sun Chuan-fang. The latter is conceded to be one of the shrewdest of Chinese politicians. He has little reason to seek advantages for Chang Tso-lin or his erstwhile enemies, and his objective in this move is wholly obscure. It is believed that the Japanese were averse to the formation of the dictatorship.

4. Following Chang Tso-lin's assumption of office on June 18th, a mandate was issued providing:

(1) The Tayuanshuai shall control the naval and military forces of the Republic.

(2) The authority of the Republic shall be vested in the Tayuanshuai, who shall be responsible for safeguarding the legal rights of the citizens thereof.

(3) A Kuowuyuan (Cabinet) is to be attached to the military government to assist the Tayuanshuai in carrying out political affairs. It shall be composed of a Premier, a Minister of Foreign Affairs, a Minister of Military Affairs, a Minister of Finance, a Minister of Interior, a Minister of Justice, a Minister of Education, a Minister of Industry, a Minister of Agriculture and Labor and a Minister of Communications.

From M/A, China Report No. 7078 June 24, 1927

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Chang Tso-lin's Government at Peking.

(4) Mandates issued by the Tayuanshuai shall be counter-signed by the Premier, except that those concerning individual Ministries shall be counter-signed by the Ministers concerned. In the case of mandates in connection with the appointment or dismissal of Cabinet Ministers they shall be counter-signed by the Premier.

(5) The organization of the Kuowuyuan and the various Ministries will be separately enacted.

(6) All laws and mandates which were in existence before June 17 of this year, and which are not incompatible with the present mandate shall remain in force.

John Magruder,
John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

Distribution:
4 MID
1 Tientsin
1 Japan
1 File

G-2 Report CHINA - Political 4-1 OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF MIL. INT. DIV. 3708 SEP 21 1927 2652-9-34 SEP 21 1927

Yang Yu-ting Seeks Justice from American Opinion.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. SEP 21 1927 WAR DEPARTMENT

An American-educated Chinese friend of mine who is especially interested in combatting erroneous impressions among the people of America, created by the expert Kuomintang and Russian propaganda, recently requested me to arrange an informal meeting between Yang Yu-ting and the Minister prior to the latter's departure for Washington. It was desired that General Yang, certainly one of the most practical and constructive Chinese leaders, have an opportunity to present the Fengtien case in an atmosphere of informality. In the course of the conversation which took place at my house on August 8th, some interesting points were touched on, some of which are believed to be worth reporting.

All Fengtien leaders are aware that America is flooded with so-called Nationalist propaganda, and they resent the exclusive use of the word Nationalist. They deeply deplore this without knowing how to combat it. They know that an entirely fantastic idea of the real situation exists in America, which results in widespread sentiment for political ideals which in actuality do not exist in Kuomintang camps. They know that "Northern militarists" are pictured as black-hearted villians, without ideals, without virtue. They deplore this prejudicial view for sentimental as well as material reasons -- and with justification. American officials have consistently reported and recent events have proven that the much heralded Nationalist movement was first of all foreign, if not in its genesis, certainly in its operation and early development, and that the Chinese features of it were largely a facade, back of which played forces which have proved themselves more damaging to China than all the reactionary tendencies of Chang Tso-lin. General Yang Yu-ting naturally unaware that American officialdom is informed while the general public is so palpably misled by propaganda feels, as do all Fengtien leaders, that our officials in China have been deceived by appearances and have failed in showing true lights on China. He was naive in his desire to impress the Minister with facts and conditions only too familiar to the Minister and fully reported by him to Washington.

M/A China Report No. 3104. August 10, 1927.

Yang Yu-ting Seeks Justice from American Opinion.

It is most important to diffrentiate between the relative simplicity of the Northern Chinese and the Southerners. The Fengtian people in particular are notably frank and open by nature. They are not propagandists and almost invariably present their case in an unconvincing and unfaverable light. They are not given to much talk and endless theorizing as are the Cantonese. They are even so simple as to expect the world to judge them by their deeds instead of their words. Yang Yu-ting is a typical Northern Chinese. Contrasted with a glib Cantonese, General Yang often appears stupid and his cause aimless. But General Yang stated some facts which are easily verified and which if fully appreciated in America should cause a considerable shifting of opinion in favor of the group he represents. He described the break up of Nationalist movement in the South into groups led by militarists just as avaricous and self-seeking as any the North has known. These are now at each others throats to uphold their selfish ends. He described the social and economic chaos existing in the South in which Chinese and foreigners have no security of life or property and no assurance for the future. He quite justly described a situation where animal forces were loosed, forces which in no case have proven to be constructive. The magnificent promises of the Nationalists he rightly scoffed at. And then he calmly enumerated the developments which are now taking place in Manchuria. He asked: "Where are railways being built except in Manchuria?" He stated that in four places railways are under construction with Chinese capital and in spite of serious Japanese objection. The line connecting Tahushan with Paiantalu is soon to be completed, after which there will be an all-Chinese railway from Anganchi on the Chinese Eastern to the sea. Plans are prepared for the port of Hulatao and construction will be begun this winter without foreign loans. All cities in Manchuria are connected by wireless. Mukden has a station which has had tests with Germany and France. Long distance telephones are being constructed between the larger towns. The contract for an automatic telephone system for Mukden is being let this month. In every way encouragement is being given to electrical development by purely

Chinese companies. Contracts are being made for constructions of various kinds and the money is forthcoming. Where else in China is this so?

The conventional explanation that the Japanese are back of all this is no longer true. General Yang frankly admitted the constant friction existing between the Chinese and Japanese administrations in Manchuria and the growing independence of the Chinese in the development of their own resources despite Japanese obstruction. The maligned reactionaries and militarists of the North who had the practical sense to resist the importunities of three separate delegations of Russians, including Borodin, are in the same practical way developing territory along modern lines while the Southerners are still destroying.

John Magruder,
JOHN MAGRUDER,
Major, General Staff,
MILITARY ATTACHE.

Distribution:

MID 4
Tokyo 1
Manila 1
Tntsin 1
File 1

M/A China Report No. 7104 August 10, 1927.

G-2 Report

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF, MIL. INTEL. DIV.
OCT 1 1929
2657-D-348
WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Message of Madame Sun Yat-sen to Berlin Congress.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. SEP 30 1929

The following article appeared in The Shanghai Times (British) of August 7, 1929, headed "Terrorism is Urged as a Weapon - Madame Sun Yat-sen Sends Message to Berlin Congress":

"Terrorism is the weapon which the masses will use in their revolt against the atrocious reactionary elements for the ultimate attainment of their ends," is the concluding passage in a telegram sent by Madame Sun Yat-sen to the second congress of the International Anti-Imperialist League held in Berlin on August 1.

Madame Sun is living in seclusion in the International Settlement in Shanghai and it was in her capacity as the Honorary President of the local branch of the league that the following telegram was sent:

"Notwithstanding the fact that the oppressed races of the world are now adopting a strong united front to oppose militarism and imperialistic wars, the reactionary National Government of China is siding with the imperialists and is relentlessly oppressing those Chinese who are demanding racial independence. On no other occasion have the leaders of the Kuomintang, a reactionary body, more fully exposed their shameless and treacherous character than on this particular occasion. These reactionary elements have betrayed the nation in the revolutionary movement and have now become the puppets of the imperialistic Powers. As things have come to this pass the National Government will probably declare war on both the Third International and Soviet Russia.

"But let it be known that the Chinese masses cannot be enslaved and led astray by misleading propaganda and oppression. They are fully awakened to the sense of revolution, and they are thoroughly convinced that they can fight for their freedom through revolution only.

"Terrorism is the weapon which the masses will use in their revolt against the atrocious reactionary elements for the ultimate attainment of our ends."

Parker G. Tenney
Parker G. Tenney
Captain, Field Artillery
Assistant Military Attache.

Distribution:
4 MID
1 Tientsin
1 File

From M/A, China Report No. 7580 August 28, 1929

4-1

AMERICAN LEGATION
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE.
PEKING, CHINA.

1927 2657-9-3 NOV 21

September 26, 1927

#7135

Subject: Mrs. Sun Yat-sen Tours as Russian Propagandist.

To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D.C.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. NOV 16 1927

1. In view of the damaging and misleading propaganda which may be spread by and about the widow of Sun Yat-sen, the following statement issued by the Nationalist News Agency is quoted as evidence that Mrs. Sun is a puppet of Moscow rather than a spokeswoman of Chinese Nationalism. If Mrs. Sun is not a Communist she is lending herself to the Russian scheme of discrediting every feature of the Chinese nationalist movement which is not dictated by Soviet Russia and Chinese Communists.

2. American public opinion would be grossly misled were Mrs. Sun allowed to enter the country.

- - - - - - -

"MOSCOW, September 6. -- A statement denouncing the counter-revolution on the Yangtze and explaining the purpose of her present world tour was given out to the press by Soong Ching-ling (Mrs. Sun Yat-sen) upon her arrival in Moscow today. Mrs. Sun, leader of the Left Kuomintang, who on July fourteenth issued a statement at Hankow announcing her withdrawal from the Wuhan Government because that government was no longer carrying out the policies laid down by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, is now on a tour of the world on behalf of the revolutionary Kuomintang.

"Her statement in full follows:

'I have come to express appreciation for what the people of the Soviet Union have done for revolutionary China. During the recent crucial years of China's war against imperialist domination, it has been mainly to the people of Russia we have been able to turn for sympathy, cooperation and counsel. Your people have stood side by side with us in our struggle to free China from oppression. In extending this cooperation, revolutionary Russia has fulfilled her mission as a friend of the oppressed peoples of the world and I, in expressing appreciation, am speaking in the name of one of these oppressed peoples.

'A period of reaction has set in in China. The united front of the revolution is broken. There have been betrayals and desertions and a complete disterting of the Nationalist Movement. Millions of organized peasants, in accordance with Kuomintang teachings, joined the struggle for the realization of the slogan "Land to the peasants". Without an agrarian revolution it is impossible to overthrow feudalism. All further progress in the revolution is impossible without a realization of the agrarian revolution. From this it follows that all who act against the agrarian revolution, i.e. against the economic emancipation of tens of millions of peasants, find themselves in the ranks of the counter-revolutionaries.

'Today the great Central Yangtze Valley, which a few months ago was the focal point of the struggle for freedom from world imperialism, is in the grip of counter-revolution, and the greatest blot upon China is that this shameful counter-revolution is being led by men who have been intimately associated in the public mind with the Nationalist Movement.

'As a result there is confusion in the mind of the world today, which looks to the leaders for explanation of the nature and aims of the movement. Therefore another big purpose of my present journey is to make clear to the world that the men on the Yangtze who are now representing themselves as the spokesmen of Nationalist China, do not speak for China's revolutionary masses.

'The Revolutionary Kuomintang is violently opposed to the present reaction. Feudal militarism has cropped up traitorously under the revolutionary banner and has stolen many of the material fruits of the victories won by the revolution. But the spirit of the revolution is still undaunted and it is in the name of the revolutionary masses of China I come to explain that the revolution, although for the moment despoiled of its territorial gains, is still strong, vital and confident. I speak for revolutionary China, which is distinct and apart from the present feudal officials and militarists on the Yangtze. These men, having alienated the people, are now trying again to drag China along the familiar road of petty feudalistic wars for personal gain and power. The result is chaos, but it is a chaos that is only on the surface. Underneath there is a strongly intrenched and strongly organized revolution which cannot be crushed and whose voice will soon be heard around the world.

'There is a third mission I would fulfill on my present journey. Death claimed Dr. Sun Yat-sen before he could carry out one of his most cherished desires, to come to Moscow and here, in person, confer with the strong revolutionary friends of China. His death was hastened by the severities of forty years of revolutionary struggle and by frequent

breaches of revolutionary discipline on the part of the very men who are now again betraying him while pretending to speak in the name of his principles. Before he died he asked me to visit Moscow for him. And so I come, in his name and in the name of the revolutionary masses of China, to assure Soviet Russia of our appreciation for the cooperation her people have given us in the past and to express our confidence that this cooperation will continue in the years of struggle that are ahead.'"

John Magruder

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

elh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Copy No. 1

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
NOV 23
WAR DEPARTMENT

In reply refer to: NWR-TEM-rjh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By ____, NARS Date 4-10-73

2-1 2657-J-349 1 927

November 8, 1927.

Subject: Mrs. Chiang Kai-shek.

To: A. C. of S., G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C.

1. It will be recalled that Mrs. Chiang Kai-shek, reputed wife of General Chiang Kai-shek, late Chinese Nationalist leader, passed through this port September 2, 1927, on the Dollar Liner PRESIDENT JACKSON, en route to the mainland. According to reports she is now somewhere in the eastern part of the United States, presumably in New York City. Subsequent to her arrival on the mainland press dispatches from the Orient quoted General Chiang as denying that this woman was his wife and almost simultaneously the General announced that he was engaged to marry a Miss Mei-ling Soong, the youngest sister of Mrs. Sun Yat-sen, widow of the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

2. Of interest are the two rumors concerning Mrs. Chiang. First, that she was carrying with her several million dollars in securities which were to be deposited in mainland banks to be used later by General and Mrs. Chiang when he had joined her in Europe. Second, one Z.H.Yang, of Korean nativity, who had been on duty for the past two years as a Japanese vice-consul in Honolulu, suddenly insisted upon departing for the mainland on the same vessel which carried Mrs. Chiang - the supposition being that possibly the Japanese government was, in some manner, interested in Mrs. Chiang and desired to establish contact with her through an agent.

3. This office has been advised by one who traveled with Mrs. Chiang to the mainland and who later accompanied her across the continent as a secretary concerning the activities of Mrs. Chiang from Honolulu to New York and the movements of Yang as far as San Francisco. The publicity which attended the arrival of Mrs. Chiang on the Pacific Coast and, subsequently, across the continent to New York is already known. Reports indicate that Yang did not establish contact with Mrs. Chiang on the voyage to San Francisco, nor after her arrival on the mainland. Yang, several days after he arrived in San Francisco, proceeded up the Pacific Coast to the northwest, going to Vancouver, B. C. Recently, another report was received from this informant which chronicled briefly Mrs. Chiang's movements up to the time he left her to enroll as a student at Cornell University. The following extracts from this report may be of interest:

> "I think it safe to say that there is no question that the woman (the reputed Mrs. Chiang) is his (General Chiang's) wife as everyone knows. I think the denial by the General is prompted by his fiance', Miss Soong, - to save her the embarrass-

Intd in F.E. + W.P. + Y-B

ment of marrying as a concubine to someone who already has a wife. I might say that while on the President Jackson Mrs. Chiang was all the time receiving radio communications from the General himself advising the Madame to go straight to New York as soon as possible and keep out of the spotlight. This she did and she was out of reach of newspapermen when the announcement of Miss Soong's betrothal was made.

"As for the Korean (Yang), he did not succeed in making any connections whatsoever with Mrs. Chiang. I saw to it that whatever securities the Madame had were safely deposited in one of the largest banks in the United States. You realize, of course, that the fabulous rumor about her carrying millions of dollars in securities is improbable. (Note: Informant fails to mention, if he knew, the amount of securities Mrs. Chiang deposited "in one of the largest banks in the United States," nor does he mention the bank.)"

4. The above report is furnished you for your information.

RECEIVED
27 NOV 22 PM 2 15
RECORD SECTION

T. K. P. Stilwell,
Major, General Staff,
A. C. of S., G-2.

AMERICAN LEGATION

OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE,
PEKING, CHINA.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
DEC 26 1929
WAR DEPARTMENT

November 25, 1929

No. 7623

Subject: Feng Yu-hsiang.

To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D. C.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. DEC 26 1929

1. Accompanying are notes prepared by Mr. Timperley, an Australian journalist representing the Manchester Guardian, with a view to the preparation of an article on this remarkable personality. The information was supplied largely by a Mr. T. Y. Jen, American returned Christian student and secretary to Feng Yu-hsiang, and in general is believed to be an honest expression of opinion.

2. There is at least one error to my knowledge in the notes; namely, the statement that Feng received no munitions from Russia after the retreat from Nankow Pass. This is known to be incorrect, but does not affect the question of Feng's character.

John Magruder
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache

1 encls.
elh

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
DEC 28 1929
WAR DEPARTMENT

4-1

2657-D-357

NOTES OF INTERVIEW WITH T.Y. JEN, NOVEMBER 11,1929

Attitude Towards Religion——Is Feng Still a Christian?

Feng became a Christian not on theological grounds, not because he was afraid of going to Hell if he did not nor because he hoped to go to Heaven if he did, but because he saw that there were many things about Christianity which he thought would be good for the Chinese people. He got the notion that Christianity was what China needed. It was therefore largely a patriotic motive that led him to become a Christian. He saw that Christian women did not bind their feet and that Christian men did not gamble; that they practised monogamy and sent their children to school.

Feng was an ethical rather than a theological convert. He preached Christianity to others and got great results from it in the training of his army. But this was when he had only about 30,000 soldiers. When he rose to the rank of Marshal and had under his command Buddhists and Mohammedans he realized it would not be feasible to convert them all to Christianity. After his trip abroad he abandoned Christianity as a means of creating military morale. For this there were two main reasons:

(1) He had accepted the Kuomintang principle of religious freedom.

(2) As a result of further enlightenment he became more than ever convinced that the superstitious and mythical elements in Christianity could not stand the test of scientific analysis.

Christianity, in short, viewed as a device to reconstruct and reform the country, was not enough, for it lacked a comprehensive social program. This he found supplied by the social program of the Kuomintang, which he joined in 1925.

However, Feng admits positively he is still a Christian, in that he still has a tremendous regard for Christ's principles and models his life upon the ideals and teachings of Christ.

Is Feng a Bolshevik—What Is His Attitude Towards Communism And Soviet Russia?

Feng almost took to communism at one time. He saw much good in it but rejected it as a social program for China because he felt it would lead to disorders.

All the supplies he got from Russia were paid for. There were no secret agreements. Since the retreat from Nankow he has not had a single rifle, cartridge or dollar from Moscow.

Formerly Feng had a few Russian advisers, including some communists sent by the Kuomintang. He sent them away two years ago and now he has no foreign advisers whatever.

What Is Feng's Dominating Idea?

To raise the status of the country and improve the lot of the common people.

His dominant idea has been to train a strong army with which to save the country and uplift the people. To this he has devoted 20 years and the result is seen in the Kuominchun.

Feng is very interested in what Kamal Pasha has been doing in Turkey. For a time he read everything on the subject that he could get hold of.

Feng's Personality.

Has great natural gifts, including a remarkably good memory. In former days when his command was smaller he was able to remember all of his officers and details about their families andprivate lives. At that time he was Inspector-General and his troops numbered but 30,000.

Is an eloquent speaker and a nimble debater. Particularly when addressing his troops, sometimes as many as 10,000 at a time, he is moving and magnetic.

Straightforward, impulsive and uncompromising. He listens attentively to advice but he is the man who issues the orders.

Strict disciplinarian but tempers severity with kindness and justice. Is a benevolent despot.

Takes good care of his men and as a result they have a sort of mystical faith in him. They feel he will never forget them and that he will never let them down.

Frowns upon nepotism. Would not let his own brother take office as director of Peking-Hankow Railway.

Has keen sense of humor. Compassionate. Practical minded.

Manner of Life:

Lives as common soldier or coolie, never wearing badge of rank in the field. Eats soldier's food in the field and lives as they live.

Has but one wife. Does not smoke, drink nor gamble and tries to prevent his soldiers from doing so.

Humility and simplicity are characteristics of his private life. He is not an ascetic but believes that high living is out of place in China under present conditions. He does not want to live better than the common man is able to live. His life ideal is something akin to that of the Greek Stoics. His training methods are like those of the Spartans. He endeavors to imbue his men with the spirit of Cromwell's army. Own life is that of a Puritan.

All this he does spontaneously and because it strikes him as being the right policy to pursue. It is possible he may never have heard of the Stoics, or the Spartans, or of Cromwell.

Feng is Self-Made Man:

Feng has a tremendously strong will and has educated himself by his own efforts. He had not more than a couple of years schooling but when he joined the army he saved money to buy books and learn characters. Used to pay $2 a month to an old rice-cake vendor around the camp who was a broken-down scholar and gave him tuition at nights. After the other soldiers had gone to bed he sat up reading with a candle. When they complained he scooped out a hole in the mud wall behind his bunk and kept his candle burning there.

In this way he mastered one book after another. Then he went on and absorbed military training and tactics. Went to a training class and took first place in the examination for petty officers. Rose from ranks, taking every step. Thence sympathy with rank and file.

Still studies hard, spending every minute of leisure reading books and writing Chinese characters. Lately has turned to painting and also writes poems in spoken language. Put in some time learning English.

Feng often regrets having discarded Christianity as a training device. He finds that wheraas previously he had the spirit but no program, he now has a program (the Kuomintang program) but his army lacks its old spirit.

- - - -

4-1

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
FEB 1928
2657-9-357
FEB 28 '57
WAR DEPARTMENT

AMERICAN LEGATION
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE.
PEKING, CHINA.

December 23, 1927

#7188

Subject: Feng Yu-hsiang Today.

To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D. C.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. FEB 8 1928

1. The following observations of Feng Yu-hsiang and his work in Honan were made by an intelligent missionary who wishes his name kept secret. It was sent personally to Mr. John K. Davis, Chinese Secretary. The general picture of Feng Yu-hsiang is so complete and apparently so accurate that the information is considered current and important. Some of Feng's statements are to be accepted with such reservations as are applicable to all Chinese interviews.

- - - - - - -

I. In his army:

A. His own immediate army numbers about 160,000.
B. Other armies owing allegiance to him but not always obeying his orders aggregate about 200,000.
C. Discipline in his own immediate army almost as good as before. That in the other armies distinctly inferior.
D. Christian work in his armies entirely suspended. "San Min Chu I" has come to take the place of the Bible in his camps.
E. Armies have not been paid for more than 8 months. No spirit of mutiny because from the highest officer down to the meanest private they share and share alike. When the Nanking government supplied him with a million dollars recently, the sum was divided equally among his men each receiving $6.50 including General Feng himself.
F. Greatest weakness is shortage of ammunition. There is an exaggerated slogan in his army that with three rounds of ammunition they must fight their way to Moukden. His recent victory over Shantung was won by his "Big Sword Battalions", at considerable sacrifice of life, over 5000 dead and wounded among his own men.
G. In order to secure recruits, General Feng has resorted to partial conscription in Honan. Each village is to produce a certain quota of able-bodied youths for his army. In consequence, there is depp resentment against him in the province.

II. <u>In civil affairs:</u>

A.. Honan, Kansu, Shensi are being amalgamated into one administrative area.

B. The civil government of these three provinces is controlled by the Kuomintang.

C. General Feng is the Kuomintang in that region.

D. Although these three provinces are nominally under Feng, yet actually he controls only parts of each. For example in Honan, out of 108 hsiens, he controls only about 50.

E. Civil officials, including the Governor, all receive $20 per month as living expenses. Even this is not always forthcoming. Here again, these officials do not complain, partly because high and low are treated alike and partly because they are living in hopes of better days.

F. Feng is giving a great deal of attention to rural improvement. He has created an institute for training farmers. Each hsien is required to send six men to the institute for three months. In this time, he gives them training in: (1) Military drill; (2) Cooperative buying and selling; (3) History and principles of the Nationalist Movement; (4) Elementary facts of scientific farming; (5) Better village planning.

G. Secret communistic influence is still action in his area.

III. <u>Personal conversations with General Feng.</u>

1. Q. What is your policy for the unification of China?
   A. Urge Kuomintang leaders to drop all internal squabbles and concentrate on Northern Expedition. For myself, I obey implicitly the decisions of the Kuomintang in this matter.

2. Q. What is your policy toward foreign nations?
   A. Those who are not against us are with us. We should discriminate between foreign nations and concentrate our attention upon those whose imperialistic tendency toward China is pronounced. I do not anticipate much difficulty from either the United States, or Great Britain. Our real problem diplomatically is with Japan.

3. Q. What is your attitude toward Communism?
   A. The principles of communism are good. They are like Jesus' command to feed the little ones. But they cannot be realized in another 1000 years.
   I greatly admire the spirit of sacrifice of the communist. Unless we have this same spirit in the Kuomintang, we cannot succeed. But the policy and program of the communistic party in China today are so utterly damnable that they must be opposed, tooth and nail.

4. Q. What is your present relationship to Russia?
A. When my armies retreated from Nankow, we never could have fought our way back into Kansu and Shensi without Russian assistance. This assistance was in ammunition only - not money. Even the ammunition was given but parsimoniously. If we asked for a hundred rounds ten would be given.
Q. But this ammunition must have been supplied to you on certain conditions?
A. On one condition only; that is, to prosecute the Revolution. The psychology of the Russians was that as long as they could help us to fight against each other in the name of the Revolution, we would eventually reduce China to such a condition of chaos that it would be easy then for them to carry out their plan to strike at the Western Powers through China.
5. Q. What is your attitude towards Christianity?
A. Christianity is a good religion. Like Communism, it will take another thousand years before people will have grown sufficiently to live real Christian lives.
Q. What is your attitude towards foreign missionaries?
A. I do not object to missionaries if they really come to serve our people. But so many missionaries do not have this purpose except as a talking point. I remember once challenging a missionary when he told me that his mission was spending several million dollars a year "on China". But the real fact was that most of that money was spent in building palatial residences for their own missionaries, paying salaries of missionaries and only a very small part was spent directly on Chinese.
Q. What would you advise Chinese Christians to do under the circumstances?
A. Give up your comfortable ways of living and identify yourselves with the common people in the spirit of the Master when he said "Even as ye have done it to the smallest among yourselves, ye have done it unto me".
Q. Why have you dropped Christian work in your army?
A. I believe in religious freedom for all people. In my army, there is a large block of Mohammedan soldiers. If I push Christian work actively as I used to do in my army, they will misunderstand.
Q. People say you are now anti-Christian.
A. Which of my actions can be so construed?
Q. What about your occupation of private property belonging to Christian bodies? For example, your own headquarters is located in The Baptist Mission Compound.
A. I took over the Baptist Mission Compound not from the mission but from the communists. The Christians are free to come to the church here to carry on their services.

6. Q. You will pardon my next question. People say you always betray your friends. What would you say to such a criticism?

A. In any act of cooperation, there are two parties concerned. People blame me when the cooperation fails. Why do they not try to find out whether the other party has lived up to the conditions of cooperation. For example, when General Chiang Kai-shek and I met in Hsuchowfu, our understanding was to unite Hankow and Nanking and concentrate all forces for the Northern Expedition. But as soon as we parted, the N anking forces were diverted to attack Hankow and I was asked to send an army down to Hankow from Chengchow. I never had any such understanding with General Chiang and I suppose people blamed me when I did not respond.

Furthermore, people fail to understand the difficulties I am up against in Honan. The province is full of soldiers whose loyalty is known to be for the highest bidder. How can I make any military movement until I am reasonably certain that these troops will not cut in, in my rear?

7. Q. What sort of understanding did you have with Governor Yen of Shansi?

A. Shansi was to move against Peking via the Peking-Suiyuan and the Peking-Hankow railways. I was to move on Shantung via Hsuchow and Tsining. It is specially stipulated by Governor Yen that I should not send any troops up the Peking Hankow Railway that being his sphere. This was adhered to religiously by me, until lately, when Governor Yen sent down a personal representative to appeal for reinforcements. General Sun Lien-chung and forty thousand of my best troops are now fighting their way up the Railway to reinforce Shansi.

8. Q. What is your attitude toward the opium question?

A. As soon as the military situation eases a little, we must put down this evil. I have always stood for total suppression of the drug and my attitude has not changed.

IV. <u>My own reactions:</u>

A. General Feng at heart is still a Christian. His faith, not having had an adequate intellectual basis, is now undergoing a very critical test largely caused by his contact with Russia.

B. I felt a marked difference in his men between the time when they were in Peking last year and now in Honan. Then they was one group loyal to each other. Now there is much whispering, back biting and suspicion among them. This is due largely to the fiendishly clever machinations of the communists.

C. His soldiers, fed by communistic propaganda while in Kansu, are showing an attitude of truculence toward foreigners.

D. His civil government is honest.

John Magruder

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

No encls.
elh

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
APR 1928
DEPARTMENT

AMERICAN LEGATION
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE.
PEKING, CHINA.

4-1
2657-9-353

March 8, 1928

#7229

Subject: Observations by Colonel Isaac Newell, 15th Infantry.

To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D. C.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 16 1928

1. Following is a very informing report prepared by Colonel Isaac Newell, 15th Infantry. It is believed to be a composite picture of the situation as viewed by Chinese and foreigners in Shanghai.

- - - - - - - - - - -

March 1st, 1928

OBSERVATION ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION OF THE NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT - NANKING

1. During a weeks' stay at Shanghai, February 17th to 24th, the time was spent interviewing the leaders of the Nationalist Party and foreigners who are in position to have some conception as to what the present Nationalist Government is attempting to do. The following is a partial list of the people interviewed:

Mr. Cunningham, U. S. Consul-General.
Mr. Spiker, U. S. Consul.
The British Consul-General.
Dr. Ferguson, Advisor to Peking Government.
Mr. Powell, Editor China Weekly Review.
Mr. Green, Editor North China Daily News.
Mr. Sokolsky, Assistant Editor of the Far Eastern Review and Reporter to North China Daily News.
Quo Tai Che, Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, Shanghai, and till this week acting Minister of Foreign Affairs.
H. H. Kung, a decendant of Confucius, and said by many to be the "Political Boss" of the Nationalist Party. He stands very close to Feng Yu-hsiang.
Madame Chiang Kai-shek.
" H. H. Kung (Both of these are sisters of Mrs. Sun Yat-sen and to T. V. Soong, Minister of Finance.)
David Yui, Head of the Chinese Y.M.C.A.
Hu Shih, one time Dean of Peking University and now connected with Nanking University.
Dr. Riesner, Dean of Nanking University of Agriculture.
Several other prominent Chinese were interviewed.

2. Political and Military Situation.

It will be remembered that the Hankow Government and Chiang Kai-shek were kicked out by the Kwangsi faction of the Kuomintang Party, who had control of the Nationalist Government at Nanking. In other words the military faction threw out the Canton faction of the Nationalist Party. Chiang Kai-shek belonged to neither of the two factions but was put into power by the Canton or Civil faction of the Kuomintang Party.

Chiang Kai-shek staged his "come-back" through the efforts of Wang Chin-hiu, the most radical of the Canton faction and T. V. Soong, the brother-in-law of Sun Yat-sen and the man who in the province of finance is trusted by both factions. It is to be noted that the Kwangsi or military faction refused to attend the meetings of the party when Chiang Kai-shek returned to power.

From every side, one gains the impression of lack of unity in the present Nationalist Government at Nanking. There appears to be only one connecting link between the factions headed by Chiang Kai-shek on one side and by the Kwangsi generals on the other, and that is the Minister of Finance, T. V. Soong. Soong has organized a regular system of finance in the three provinces Kiangsu, Kiangsi and Chekiang, and claims he has done the same in Anhwei and Fukien, though that is doubtful. In any case, Soong appears to be holding a strategical position as all factions are looking to him for money.

The line up of the various factions appears to be about as follows:

a. Chiang Kai-shek, making an alliance with Feng Yu-hsiang, has taken command of the First Army and is advocating the advance on Peking.

b. The Kwangsi faction, headed by Pei Chung Hsi and Ho Ying-ch'en, are opposed to Chiang Kai-shek.

c. Li Chi-sen at present in control of Canton.

Chiang Kai-shek since returning to power, has by his appointment widened the breach between himself and the Kwangsi faction. One of his conditions before returning was for Pei Chung-hsi to give up Shanghai. This the latter did but left his Chief of Staff as Garrison Commander of Shanghai and Woosung, who now refuses to obey the orders of Pei to join him with his troops at Hankow. By some it is thought that this is all stage play and that General Pei Chung-hsi is leaving his Chief of

Staff at Shanghai to keep an eye on Chiang Kai-shek. Until last week Chiang Kai-shek, while Generalissimo, had command of no troops except a small body-guard. He has now relieved General Ho Ying-ch'en from command of the First Army and assumed command of that army himself. He appointed General Ho his Chief of Staff but the latter has not yet accepted that position and is now in Chekiang and Shanghai "taking a much needed rest". (I had the pleasure of meeting General Ho, who is a Japanese trained officer. He does not speak English.) And further, Chiang's alliance with Feng, who is an enemy of Pei, is not approved by the military factions.

There is a distinct feeling among some that Chiang Kai-shek by replacing officials appointed by the Nanking Government during his absences is making many enemies at a time when he needs friends.

There is a strong feeling among many that Chiang is skating on very thin ice and that he will not long be in power. This view is held by Mr. Spiker, the American Consul, and other foreigners and one could read between the lines that the same view is held by some of the prominent Chinese. This view is supported by the facts that Shanghai is held by the Chief of Staff of General Pei; General Ho who was relieved from command of the First Army by General Chiang, has not yet accepted the position of Chief of Staff to General Chiang; there is evidence to show that General Le Chi-sen at Canton is dickering with General Pei who is making his way down from Hankow to Canton; and because the First Army itself is composed of three factions; one supporting General Chiang; another supporting General Ho and the third, which is more or less communistic, is neutral to the two. And further, T. V. Soong has lately sent only $300,000 to Feng and Chiang, while he sent to General Pei at Hankow, and Feng's enemy, $750,000.

It is worthy to note that General Chiang Kai-shek in order to secure a quorum in the governing committee, had to forgive five of the communists who were kicked out of the party on account of their activities in the Canton coup d'etat last November.

3. General Observations:

a. There is a feeling among some important Chinese that the Nationalist Government has broken or is breaking up into several military factions similar to those existing in the North.

b. There is a difference in opinion as to the advisability of undertaking the campaign against Chang Tso-lin at this time.

c. There is, on the part of some, a serious doubt as to the advantage of the alliance with Feng Yu-hsiang. It was expressed by some that if Feng and Chiang succeeded in getting to Peking, Feng would hold Peking and kick Chiang out.

d. It came from several Chinese sources that the Nationalist Government has stopped the circulation of inflammatory propaganda among the masses.

e. The hold of Li Chi-sen on Canton is not very secure. He is without money and is able to hold his position by taking with him two semi-communistic Canton Generals.

f. Those Chinese associated with Chiang Kai-shek claim that the Nationalists will be in Peking within the next three months. This is claimed by Quo Tai-che, H. H. Kung, Madame H. H. Kung, Madame Chiang Kai-shek and many others. The taking of Peking in three months appeared to be a hope rather than a belief.

g. At this time the strongest element of strength in the Nationalist Government appears to be Minister of Finance, T. V. Soong. He is getting his hands on all the money and parcels out what he sees fit to the different military factions. Apparently he has the confidence of all.

h. At present the Nationalist Government is in a hopeless muddle and it is difficult to see where the two main factions can get together in the near future.

ISAAC NEWELL
Colonel, 15th Infantry.

- - - - - - - -

John Magruder
John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

elh

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV
JUL 3 1928
2657-J-355

G-2 Report. 3040.

CHINA-JAPAN (POLITICAL).

Subject: Pact Text Between China and Japan.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUL 2 1928

A despatch in the local Press from Peking, under date of June 19, 1928, states that the text of a treaty signed on March 19th between Chang Tso lin, leader of the Northern forces, and Japan, is published today in the local Chinese newspapers. Yang Yu Ping, one of the generals of the Northern Army, acted for Chang Tso lin, while Japan was represented by her Minister to Peking, Yoshizawa. The treaty has ten articles which include:-

In order to combat the Bolshevist threat, Japan will be allowed to send troops into China, to aid the Chinese Government.

The military expenses will be shared and will include the furnishing of munitions by China to the Japanese troops.

The Japanese Government will donate 50,000,000 yen for military expenses, in consideration for which she will be allowed to construct three railway lines in Manchuria.

China will accord a "privileged situation" to Japan in the provinces of Foug-Tien, Kirin, Hei-Long-Kiang, Mongolia, Shantung, and Feng-Tien.

The Chinese Government will not consent to conceding the six districts named above with the islands which are dependent on them.

The ports of Dairen (Dalny) and of Port Arthur, with surrounding territory as well as Kuan-Tung, will be given up to Japan.

Tsing Tao and the bay of Kiao-Tcheou will be leased to Japan for ninety-nine years.

No other railway running parallel to the South Manchurian railway will be constructed by China.

The twenty-one demands formulated by Japan, May 25, 1916, will continue to hold.

M.A. London. Report No. 22309. June 20, 1928.

JOHN R. THOMAS, Jr.,
Colonel, General Staff,
Military Attache.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
5-1 1928 2657-J-356
JUL
3820
WAR DEPARTMENT
RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUL 10 1928

G-2 Report Japan (Political)

Subject: The Manchurian Situation.

While, of course, it is impossible to forecast the development of the present critical situation in Manchuria, it seems most probable that, with the elimination of Chang-tso-lin, the Three Provinces will fall into that condition of unrest and disorder which has characterized China proper for so many years. Whatever else may bessaid of Chang-tso-Lin, the fact remains that the provinces under his control have been comparatively peaceful during the interminable civil wars prevalent in other parts of China. At present it seems very doubtful if a successor can be found who is able to hold the Three Provinces together - and to find a man who can keep out Nationalist influence as well seems well nigh hopeless. The present predominance of General Feng gives rise to the fear that his old friend, Soviet Russia, might be encouraged to undertake anew in Manchuria certain enterprises which that country has long cherished, but which Chang-two-Lin has prevented.

The situation is a most disquieting one especially to Japan. Civil War in Manchuria, the probability of Nationalist influence becoming predominant there, the fear of renewed Soviet activity, in a region where not only Japan has extensive interests but which is in close proximity to Korea as well, are reasons enough for the intense anxiety now prevailing in Japan. Whether the world admits that Japan has "especial interests" in Manchuria, or not is of no great importance - actually she considers that she has and it is certain that she will take any action deemed adequate in the protection of her interests. As such action may and probably will, involve the employment of measures not contemplated by any existing treaty on the subject, the question of the attitutde of the United States toward the matter becomes of great importance to both countries.

It is well to bear in mind that the Japanese are more or less hysterical on the subject of China, magnified a hundred-fold where Manchuria is concerned. Public men, writers, leaders of the Opposition and newspapers may criticize the Governments' action in China proper, but all criticism ceases of measures taken with respect to Manchuria, however "positive" they may be. Economically and strategically, Japan considers Manchuria vital to her national existence and anything that threatens Japanese intereststhere brings an excitable people to the point of hysteria. The Japanese are especially sensitive to, and apprehensive of American public opinion. The present Military Attache was in Japan for some two years before the Washington Conference, and the extreme resentment and irritation aroused among all classes of the Japanese people, by American criticism, is still fresh in his mind. While that condition is largely forgotten now in America and probably was never fully appreciated except by a few people, the Military Attache is firmly convinced that the Washington Conference eased a situation that might well have led to serious trouble between the two countries. That psychological condition of the Japanese people might easily recur as a result of the present Manchurian situation.

With such a condition in Manchuria and in view of the hypersensitive reaction of the Japanese people toward everything pertaining to that region, the attitude of the United States, should conditions develop as outlined above, becomes of considerable importance. Should it be our policy to take a firm stand in protection of Chinese and neutral interests and insist upon all other Powers doing the same - that of course is one thing. Should it <u>not</u> be our policy actively to interfere with Japan in the measures she may take in protection of her interests in Japan, then it is believed worth while to point out that an attitude of criticism on the part of our public men and our press will not only do no good but

will be of immense injury to the relations between the two countries. The "holier-than-thou" attitude of a certain section of our public is intensely galling to this country, while a "pin-prinking" policy causes only irritation and resentment without any compensating advantage. Where Manchuria is concerned these people are in no mental condition to accept criticism calmly, especially from the United States. As an example, even an innocent remark of the Secretary of State concerning Japan's so-called "special interests" in Manbhuria roused all the local papers to immediate action. Careless "head-line" cables from newspaper correspondents in America are always dangerous and especially so under such conditions as exist at present.

It is not presumed in this report even to suggest what our policy should be at this time. It is only desired to point out that, if no active steps are contemplated, thoughtless criticism can do only harm. The present Manchurian situation is a very vital matter to Japan, and the present not too satisfactory relations between Japan and the United States could be easily made immeasurably worse by hasty and ill-considered criticism in the United States.

C. Burnett.

C. Burnett,
Lieut. Colonel, Cavalry,
Military Attache.

Ma/Tokyo Report No. 3560 June 18, 1928

AMERICAN LEGATION
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE.
PEKING, CHINA.

4-1

1928 2657-J-357

June 12, 1928

Subject: German Economic Aspirations in China.

To: The Military Attache, American Legation, Peking.

1. In 1920, while on duty in Germany, I talked on several occasions to General Ludendorff. Present at these conversations were always Colonel Bauer and Korvetten Kapitain Ehrhardt, well known leader of the Kapp-Putsch in 1920. Major Philip Bagby, the A. C. of S., G-2 at Coblenz, in October, 1920, had a conference with Ludendorff in Munich at which I was present as interpreter. During this conference Ludendorff, who was bitterly opposed to the Ebert Regime, made certain definite proposals for a closer cooperation between the United States and Germany. These proposals I believe are on record in the Military Intelligence Division in Washington.

One of these proposals was the cooperation of the United States with Germany in the reconstruction of Russia, as soon as the downfall of the Bolshevist regime was brought about. Ludendorff was firmly convinced that this was only a matter of weeks or months. He had made all arrangements with the White Russian Government, a bunch of rattle-brained Russians with their heads in the clouds, residing in Berlin, to furnish staffs of military, naval, industrial, technical and financial experts for the reconstruction of Russia and to the greater glory and benefit of Imperial Germany and right-minded Germans. The United States was to furnish the finances, and get any concessions they wanted, and all business the Germans could not handle. Colonel Bauer, the right-hand man of Ludendorff during the war and constant companion after the war, was to be chief of the military mission to White Russia.

2. In April, 1928, while travelling on the train from Tientsin to Tsinan, I met a German, Mr. William Weber of Shanghai, the general manager of the German Dye Syndicate in the Far East. This gentleman, under the impression that I was a German business man, told me much of the aspirations of Germans in China. He said in effect: "The time has come for Germans to become the most influential foreigners in China. Colonel Bauer arrived in China this spring as military adviser to Chiang Kai-shek. He has left again for Germany, some say because he became disgusted with Chiang Kai-shek, but I have very good reason to believe that he returned to Germany to organize staffs of military, technical and financial experts, and that he will soon return to China. When the Nationalists reach Peking, the Nationalist Government will become the

government of China. Troubles between foreign powers with extra-territorial rights and this government are inevitable. Much negotiating and arguing about customs autonomy, abolition of unequal treaties and return of concessions will take place. Boycotts of foreign goods and shipping will be unavoidable. We Germans will not be affected by these boycotts. We shall be the only friends of China. Germans will be advising the China Government. We shall take the Chinese markets with the exception of oil and American motor cars. And what we Germans get, we will hold. There will be many years of struggle between foreigners with extra-territorial rights and China, and in that time German influence and business will have become firmly established in China".

On my trip to the Yangtze Valley, I had occasion to talk to a number of prominent German business men as a German, and found them of practically the same opinion as Mr. Weber. They all firmly believe that Germans can only gain by the establishment of the Nationalist regime in China.

3. In Nanking I was able to confirm the report that Colonel Bauer had come to China as "Kao teng chün shih ku wen" or "high military adviser". According to my Chinese informant, a general staff officer, he returned to Germany to organize staffs of experts and to bring them to China. I have also been told by people whom I believe to be reliable that General Chiang, during the fighting in Shantung in April and May, had two or three German military advisers on his staff. It was suggested to me that this was one of the reasons that Chiang Kai-shek did not want me at his headquarters as military observer.

4. Chiang Kai-shek is trying to keep his connection with the Germans a secret, as he expects bitter opposition to his relations with Germany from some foreign powers, especially Japan. Consequently even Chinese and foreigners close to Chiang were unaware of his dealings with the Germans.

5. On my return from Honan I informed Mr. Sokolsky in Shanghai as to the activities of Colonel Bauer in China. He confirmed my report in the following radio to the Legation:

"185, 6 June, 2 p.m. For Magruder from Sokolsky:

'Please tell Ratay I fully confirmed his information regarding Bauer. Kung met Bauer in Nanking. Chien Ta-chung knew of arrangement. T. V. Soong not informed. Following is the history of the relationship.

'Before Dr. Sun made arrangements with Soviet Russia, he sent a commission to Germany to see whether he could engage Ludendorff to organize his army. His protracted negotiations with Ludendorff were dropped when the Russians joined him, but the contact had been

established and certain Germans connected with Ludendorff became familiar with some of the important members of the Kuomintang. When the Nanking Government was established a commission was sent to Germany to resume negotiations with Ludendorff. I have not been able to ascertain the membership of this commission or the date when they left China, but the fact of the commission's existence is positive. Bauer came to Nanking and according to my information his conduct was too bossy and Chiang Kai-shek found it impossible to get along with him and asked him to return to Germany. I have been unable to ascertain whether he will return, as Ratay suggests, but I have been informed that Chiang Kai-shek has set aside a fund of $5,000,000 for the purpose of purchasing machine guns in Germany. His idea is that Chinese soldiers are more successful with machine guns than with any other form of weapon. He plans to have one machine gun for every fifty soldiers and be believes that in that way he could produce a small mobile army which could defeat any army in China.'"

6. Whether this advisorship of Colonel Bauer is a private agreement between Ludendorff and Chiang Kai-shek, or whether the scheme of placing Germans in an advisory capacity with the Nationalist Government is backed by the German Government, is problematical. The possibility, however, exists of Germans taking into their hands the guidance of the government in China to the total exclusion of all other foreigners. Such action on the part of Germans would have serious enough consequences to bear careful watching.

J. P. Ratay
Captain, F. A.,
Assistant Military Attache

elh

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV
DEC 13 1928

OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHÉ
AMERICAN LEGATION
BELGRADE

No.2578 KINGDOM OF THE SERBS, CROATS, AND SLOVENES November 5, 1928.

2607-D-307

2257-B-

Subject: Colonel Bauer of Germany (and China?).

To: A. C. of S., G-2, W.D., Washington, D.C.

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. DEC 10 1928

1. During the past ten days the European and the English press have contained items regarding the alleged employment of Colonel Bauer, and a group of German specialists, by the Chinese government, for the purpose, presumably, of improving the munitions establishments of China, and perhaps for purposes of general reorganization.

2. When I was Military Attache to Berlin, 1919-1921, I came into contact with Colonel Bauer and his affairs in a way which revealed something as to his personality and as to the actual merit of his accomplishments. As we all recall, he enjoyed quite a reputation in, and outside of Germany, at the close of the war, as an artillery production expert. It was generally understood that he was something of a genius along the lines of industrial organization designed to constantly improve the quantity and quality of gun and ammunition output. My recollection is that he was credited with the foregoing rather than with skill as a designer of matériel.

3. I recall clearly that I asked the late Mr. Hugo Stinness and also the Directors of Krupps' at Essen, about Colonel Bauer, as I knew all of these people well and they were generally quite straight with me. When I said to Mr. Stinness that I understood that Colonel Bauer had obtained extraordinary results along the line of artillery production, he shrugged his shoulders and said in effect: "Well, Colonel Bauer always came to us with an order from Hindenburg or Ludendorf requiring certain results in production. An order from such a source had to be complied with; no excuses were accepted. But it was we industrialists, and not Colonel Bauer, who devised the ways and means of getting the results that met the artillery program. Colonel Bauer merely told us what higher authority demanded."

It was evident to me that Colonel Bauer was not rated as a genius by Mr. Stinness.

4. The Directors of Krupps', while not as crisp in decision and as outspoken as Mr. Stinness, rated Colonel Bauer in about the same way. They said that it was manufacturers like themselves, Stinness, and others who had done the organization work, generally credited to Colonel Bauer.

5. My own direct view of Colonel Bauer's personality was obtained during the "Kapp putsch" of March, 1920, when Monarchist troops seized and held Berlin for several days and then, as the country did not support them, yielded the city to the forces of the Republic. When the Monarchist troops marched out through the streets there was some bloodshed and all sorts of rumors were in the air as to reprisals against those Monarchist sympathizers who had taken part in the "putsch". Bauer had been very prominent among those. In the midst of the resulting panicky situation, some German friends of mine brought Colonel Bauer to see me at the American Embassy, as they said his life was in great danger and, as I had been perfectly fair to both sides, they thought some kind of paper, or safe-conduct, from me would protect the Colonel. This was all very flattering, but of course I could have nothing to do with it and had to tell them so. During all of this time Colonel Bauer, whom I had never seen before, was as white as a sheet and one of the most anxious-looking men I have ever seen. In fact he was so shaky and unstrung that I had some doubt as to whether he really was Colonel Bauer. So I had him take a seat close to me where I could get a good look at him, and, as even this did not quite satisfy me I finally asked him point blank whether he was "the Colonel Bauer", of artillery production fame. He admitted that he was. After receiving my decision that it would be improper for me to intervene in local affairs, even to safe-guard Colonel Bauer, he and his friends withdrew, and eventually made their escape from Germany. What impressed me in the foregoing affair was the astonishingly complete break-down of the Colonel's nerve in the face of a situation which, while tense, ought not to have balked a man of resources, but ought to have inspired him to "fight the situation", so to speak. In fact I went so far as to assure him that all he needed was to get a set of false whiskers, put on a little "make-up", some old clothes and a bold face and go right on out of the city.

6. In the light of the foregoing evidence, my estimate of Colonel Bauer has always been:

(a) A real "go-getter" (perhaps with considerable capacity to insist), as long as he had the orders of a powerful Commander-in-Chief in his pocket.

(b) Probably a man of orderly mind - in the atmosphere of administrative staff tranquillity - capable of supervising the documentary phases of a production program, prior to the manufacturing phase.

(c) A man subject to unusual panic and nervous break-down in the face of danger.

7. This account of Colonel Bauer is forwarded as of probable interest if and when he may be employed in China, because:

(a) It indicates something as to his capacity and methods, and

(b) It shows, in a general way, how it will be possible to get rid of him should his activities become seriously harmful to our interests.

Edward Davis

EDWARD DAVIS,
Colonel, Cavalry,
Military Attache.

AMERICAN LEGATION

OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE,
PEKING, CHINA.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
JUL 24 1929
WAR DEPARTMENT

2657-9-357
18
7

June 9, 1929

No. 7543

Subject: German Officers in China.

To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D. C.

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. JUL 24 1929

1. Mr. Karl von Wiegand, the well known Hearst International correspondent, gave me some interesting information regarding the German officers brought to China by the late Colonel Bauer. It was Mr. von Wiegand who was responsible for bringing Colonel Bauer to the attention of Chiang Kai-shek in 1927, which suggestion resulted in Bauer's employment. The facts about the present status of the German officers have been difficult to obtain for the reason that these officers are very secretive and scarcely ever associate with foreigners, even with German nationals. All the information which follows comes from Mr. von Wiegand, who personally knows and has interviewed various members of the Bauer mission.

2. There are at present fourteen or fifteen officers and four secretaries in the Bauer group. Of these one police specialist (Dr. von Kreitner) is an Austrian, and Colonel de Fremeny, ordnance expert in charge of arsenals, is Dutch. En route to China is Lieut. Colonel von Kriebel, formerly Chief of Staff to General Echerisch, who was supposed to act as executive assistant to Colonel Bauer himself. Now that Colonel Bauer is dead, it is not known what his status will be. Seven other officers, all aviation experts of one kind or another, are soon coming.

3. Colonel Bauer's death was a great loss to Chiang Kai-shek. The former had become a very intimate adviser to Chiang and was exerting a profound influence over him, both along political and military lines. Bauer had reached the position where he was becoming the target of Chiang's enemies and, more important, was incurring the jealousy of the President's own following. Bauer, as Mr. von Wiegand said, naturally tended toward strong centralization of power and doubtless was urging Chiang along the dictatorial path. Bauer's secretary, whom von Wiegand has known for years, stated that the feeling of certain Chinese cliques against Bauer was causing him much concern. The secretary is convinced that Bauer's death from smallpox was due to the use of hot towels deliberately infected by interested Chinese parties. This story also is current among the Chinese.

4. The leaderless German advisers are now discontented and there is great jealousy and dissension among them. Their pay is very low. Some of them get only $400.00 L.C. per month. Bauer himself got only $1400 and, to retain his independence, had always refused to enter into a contract. He was a personal employee of Chiang Kai-shek.

5. The attitude of the German government is quite definitely antagonistic to the whole Bauer mission. Shortly before Bauer's death a local German official approached him with the request that he give up his activities. Bauer replied that he and his men were forced to accept employment from economic necessity and that if the German government could offer them something as good, and then only, would they give up the work. The present senior, Lt. Col. von Wangenheim, is quite incensed with German official objection to his efforts. It seems clear that the German government is fearful of Chinese reaction to the German intrusion into Chinese affairs.

6. Colonel Bauer's activities were widespread. His advice was not limited to military matters but covered the field of industrial and economic development. In general it was broadly designed to enhance the military power of Chiang Kai-shek. Bauer was influential in planning for the immediate situations, such as the Kwangsi war and the impending clash with Feng Yu-hsiang. He also was instituting progressive military plans for the future. The two plans he most stressed were the rapid development of military aviation, and the training of a model division, to consist practically entirely of officer material. Already a model training battalion has progressed to the point where it is being enlarged into a second battalion. These battalions are being secretly trained at Nanking quite apart from the Central Military Academy. It seems that the Central Military Academy, successor to the Whampoa Academy which was of Russian conception, had developed traditions not in keeping with the German idea and Bauer was instituting a new method of preparing officers in his highly selected, highly trained model division. Without Bauer's personality to push his plans, it is doubtful if his larger conceptions will ever be realized.

7. It is interesting that Bauer was greatly impressed by Chiang Kai-shek's enthusiasm for and ability to grasp tactical and strategical ideas. Chiang, Bauer believed, had a natural gift for sound military thinking. He was esteemed a man of great ability and capacity for tremendous work.

8. Mr. von Wiegand was told that the French have been very insistent upon replacing the Germans by an official military mission. A French mission was offered to Chiang Kai-shek at no cost to the Chinese government, but was definitely declined. At present the French are continuing their efforts to oust the Germans by pressing the Chinese to accept a group of Belgian officers, a plan devised by the French General Staff.

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

No encls.
elh

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
APR 10 1930
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CHINA (Political)

Subject: German Advisers to Chiang Kai-shek.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 9 1930

1. Reference is made to the series of reports under the subjects "German Economic Aspirations in China" and "German Officers in China", the last of which were Nos. 7461 and 7543, respectively.

2. Since June 9, 1929, when Report No. 7543 was submitted, the number of German advisers has gradually risen from fifteen to forty-two. These are all employed and paid by Chiang Kai-shek in his capacity of personal militarist rather than President or Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese forces. At least this is the accepted version of the Chinese. The German ex-officers are all engaged in advising, training or teaching Chiang Kai-shek's own organizations to the exclusion of those of other leaders.

3. The group of officers constitute what might be considered a military mission rather than a number of individual advisers. It is believed that considerable authority resides in the central administration headed by Lieutenant-Colonel von Kriebel. How this authority derives is an interesting point. One questions the confidence that would be reposed in a purely unofficial, unattached group of advisers by the members themselves. Without more assurance than the word of Colonel Bauer and his successors, were they pure adventurers, it is difficult to believe that responsible Germans, many of whom have families, would have risked the uncertainties of Chinese employment. Despite the scarcity of positions for ex-officers in Germany, there is an unavoidable suspicion that some official or unofficial political organization or industrial group in Germany sponsors and, in furtherance of its own purposes, guarantees the activities of these German advisers.

The German diplomatic and consular officials consistently deny that the German advisers have any official connections. Further than that, the officials frequently assert that the activities of the advisers are embarrassing to the foreign office. Not only are the French and British suspicious that certain clauses of the Versailles treaty are being infringed upon, but the Chinese of other factions are questioning this German assistance to a particular internal faction. Certain German residents genuinely deplore the publicity occasioned by the advisers, and fear the possibilities of unfavorable reactions upon their business.

If it be conceded that the German Foreign Office not only is unconnected with the activities of the advisers but is unfavorable to them, there still remains the possibility that the War Office is not without interest in the venture. The British Military Attache informs me that in at least two instances recently officers from the active German army have separated themselves from the service, with an undefined status, and joined the advisers in China. This information came from Berlin. Aside from the foregoing considerations there is no evidence of official German connection with the venture. Nevertheless, there is considerable suspicion that some department of the German government is officially interested.

4. When the activities of Colonel Bauer were first reported by this office, following disclosures made by Captain Ratay, it was thought that the whole scheme was essentially economic rather than military; that the military advisers were placed with a view to strengthening the regime of Chiang Kai-shek which, in turn, would be inclined to favor and be capable of absorbing the products of German industry. Bauer insisted upon calling himself an "economic adviser". He inspired the Chinese

CHINA (Political)

Subject: German Advisers to Chiang Kai-shek.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 9 1930

mission which visited Germany in 1928 and led them on tours of inspection of German industries. He seems to have associated himself in this venture with German industrialists. Lieut. Colonel von Kriebel, the executive officer who was chosen by Bauer, and who was en route at the time of Bauer's death, since his army service was associated with a banking establishment. He is now head of the mission.

5. At the present time some of the German advisers are known to be actively engaged as middlemen in the arms business. A certain British firm queried T. V. Soong as to why he does not eliminate the squeeze paid to Germans by permitting other than German firms to tender bids. It has practically come to the point where Chiang Kai-shek's government buys everything from Germany that Germany can supply. The Radio Corporation has recently charged that due to pressure exerted on Chiang Kai-shek by the German Minister and the advisers, a wireless contract was given the Telefunken Company despite initially lower bids by the American company.

Some tanks have recently been purchased in England and inquiries have been made regarding British gas projectors. These Germany cannot supply. Motor cars, because Germany cannot approach the prices, are bought from American firms. I gather that German officers tend to become middlemen in the majority of military purchases. Colonel Bauer expressed to Captain Ratay in Berlin in 1928, that his object was to provide the Chinese with all necessary materials for their economic reconstruction from the German industrialists except where, as in the case with motor transport, other countries offered obviously better prices. The purely military effort of Bauer's mission seems to have been to strengthen the existing government, placing it in position to make large expenditures on reconstruction and, by way of compensation for military services, to be able to throw to Germany the predominate economic advantage.

6. Without other proofs than previously stated, my belief is that the German advisers constitute, in effect, a German economic-military mission which the German Foreign Office did not initiate and possibly even frowned upon in the beginning. Officially the Foreign Office is in position to, and does, repudiate the mission but may possibly use it in certain instances. This mission may have some underground connections with the German War Office. Because of its past history and present activities it seems that the mission has close connections with German industrial groups. It is possible that the latter have so appreciated its possibilities as to support the mission and elevate its importance to more than a scheme of adventurers for affording occupations to individual ex-German officers.

If my suspicions are only partially warranted, American trade interests are affected sufficiently by the extraordinary influence of this German mission as to justify consideration by our Government of measures to combat its subtle monopolistic effects.

7. From a purely military point of view the mission exerts a great influence on Chinese internal affairs. Viewed superficially, it may be considered that since Chiang Kai-shek is the dominant factor in the recognized government of China, the professional assistance of the German advisers tends to enhance the power of the government and to stabilize the general conditions in China. One could argue endlessly on this point. It may be recalled that at various times in the past it has been shown

CHIN A (Political)

Subject: German Advisers to Chiang Kai-shek.

that the dominant military clique in control of Chinese governments has not represented the will of the people and has been overthrown. There is not as yet sufficient accomplishment to the credit of Chiang Kai-shek's regime to convince one that his clique is unique, except in unimportant respects. The majority of thinking Chinese people feel that Chiang Kai-shek too heads an impermanent establishment. The military efforts of the German mission may at the moment be merely wasted in trying to bolster up a Chinese faction which may become even more heartily detested by the Chinese people.

8. It is this possibility which makes German officials and German merchants in regions not under Chiang Kai-shek's control dubious over the consequences of the mission's activities. Already the opposition factions are beginning to stigmatize the German advisers and to question German officials regarding them. Persistent rumors that Chiang Kai-shek is being supplied with gas for future operations suggest the possibility of anti-German sentiment, despite the fact that the gas war thus far has only reached the stage of propaganda.

The only facts known regarding the alleged preparations for the use of gas are: British firms have been approached as to the possibilities of obtaining "spray projectors"; and, from a German source, I have heard that a German gas expert named Dr. Metzner (!) was recently injured at Nanking while engaged in gas experiments or manufacture.

9. It is difficult to estimate the real influence of the German advisers as a military factor favorable to Chiang Kai-shek. The Chinese attributed considerable importance to their assistance in the recent H onan campaigns and also the last attacks on Canton. Chiang Kai-shek himself is more enlightened in a military way than other Chinese leaders and seems to be profiting from the scientific advice in strategic and tactical matters as well as in questions of organization and training. So long as Chiang Kai-shek remains in power it may be expected that the efforts of the Germans will constitute an important factor in Chinese civil wars as well as in the commercial field.

John Magruder
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache

Distribution:
4 MID
1 Legation
1 Tientsin
1 File

4-1

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

APR 16

2657-D-357

AMERICAN LEGATION

OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE,
PEKING, CHINA.

March 8, 1929

WAR DEPARTMENT

2657-D-357
2

No. 7461

Subject: German Economic Aspirations in China.

To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D. C.

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. APR 16 1929

1. Reference Report No. 7278 and the ensuing series on the same subject, following is a copy of an enclosure to a confidential report by the American Consul General, Shanghai, dated February 7, 1929 (No. 5846). Mr. Cunningham states regarding the enclosure, which was prepared by the Intelligence Department of the Shanghai Police, "No investigations have been made concerning the statements contained in this memorandum, but the facilities which the police have for collecting such information are exceedingly good and I am therefore inclined to give credence to these statements".

- - - -

February 5, 1929

German Influence in China.

Inquiries indicate that German citizens are coming to China in increasing numbers and are doubtlessly endeavoring to regain their pre-war prestige which made them so much feared and respected by Chinese in China. This is evident by the engagement of Col. Bauer and 17 German assistants, which latter number is to be increased to 28, in the faculty of the Military Academy in Nanking; by the arrival in Chientao recently of a dozen Germans professedly an evangelical mission, but believed to be a party of capitalists and industrial specialists; by the arrival in Shanghai in January last of Dr. Gustav Amann, formerly adviser to the Canton-Wuhan Government and now adviser to the Nanking Government and by the report that Col. Von Kreitner, former Chief Secret Service Agent on the Austrian-Russo frontier, is to be appointed soon to the office of the Minister of the Interior in Nanking.

Since January, 1928, 57 German citizens have arrived in Shanghai and include bank clerks, physicians, mechanics, employees for local German firms, film merchants, merchants, stenographers, boarding house keepers, engineers for the local Greyhound Stadium, musicians, teachers and professors for Chinese universities. These undoubtedly are the forerunners of

many relatives and associates and only include those who have arrived and taken up residence in boarding houses or hotels. A probably far greater number have arrived and taken up residence in private homes or established their own abodes.

In support of this assertion it is significant that in an article entitled "Extraterritoriality and Trade", which appeared in "The Canton Gazette" of December 17, 1928, the first paragraph reads:

> "An object lesson is furnished by the figures quoted by a German Government spokesman the other day when the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Reichstag sanctioned the German-Chinese Trade Agreement, together with the agreements between Germany and the Union of South Africa and Germany and Panama. Dealing with the Sino-German document, the German Government spokesman pointed out that all restrictions of Germany's position compared with other countries in the trade with China have been eliminated, that the post war trade with China had exceeded since 1925 all pre-war figures, that the value of goods exchanged with China in 1927 had surpassed 1913 by 48 per cent, and that the first six months of 1928 had already reached the total figure of the 1913 trade to Germany while both years had exceeded the trade to China by 100 per cent."

The figures quoted in this last are considered to be a conservative estimate and are to a certain extent corroborated by the fact that local British and Chinese stores as well as Japanese are stocked with goods of German manufacture, while the godowns of some of the local shipping and transportation companies contain large cargoes of cheap German merchandise awaiting shipment to the interior and other parts of China.

Probably another reason for the advancement and encouragement of German citizens and trade in China is to be found in an article headed "Wanted: an alliance with Germany" which appeared in the "China Critic" of January 24, 1929 and which in part reads "Germany, by her friendly policy to China, has won the favor of the Chinese. We have not heard of any attacks on the Germans by the mobs, molestation of German properties or firing on German ships" and continues, "The German 'unequal treaties' ended with the war and the Germans were the first white men of consequence to find themselves placed on a basis of equality with the Chinese."

Although the article mentioned in the "China Critic" is probably not expressive of the feelings of the majority of Chinese it is typically expressive of the young educated class of Chinese that are still imbued with the unequal treaty fever and so long as German military advisers and government experts are willing to assist the National Government of China in the military and commercial reconstruction of the country, German citizens will be made increasingly welcome in China and German trade will increase.

(Sgd.) R. C. Aiers
A/D. C. I.

- - - - - - -

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

elh

CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
MAR 20 1933
6940
Military Missions
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: German Military-Economic Mission Employed by Chiang Kai-shek

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAR 28 1933

The following is a list of the known members of the German Military Economic Mission employed by Chiang Kai-shek with the details that are known about them.

Name	Activity	Remarks
Advisers with General Headquarters		
1. Wetzel	General Staff, Chief of Mission	At conclusion of the World War this officer is reported to have been Chief of Operations of Imperial General Staff and a particular favourite of Ludendorff's. He is now about 65 years old and shows his age. He is very polite and courteous. He has been criticised by the Chinese for not being practical and is not respected as Col. Bauer was. The Germans criticise him for not being forceful in his dealings with the Chinese.
2. von Busekitz	General Staff, Aide to Chief of Mission	A very high type of man who speaks perfect English but does not mix with other nationals.
3. Krummacker	General Staff, Adjutant to Chief of Mission	Associated with Artillery School in addition to his other duties. A heavy drinker, speaks good English and would like to mix with other nationals.
4. Rave	General Staff, Adviser for heavy artillery	Former Naval Officer and German submarine Commander during the World War. A very high type of man who has no patience with the Chinese which is liable to result in his dismissal. His work has been confined almost entirely to the forts along the Yangtze River.

From M/A, China Report No. 8517 February 27, 1933

CHINA (Military)

Subject: German Military Economic Mission Employed by Chiang Kai-shek

Name	Activity	Remarks
Advisers with Schools		
5. Lindemann	At War College	Ex-Colonel - German Army.
6. Spemann	At War College, also adviser for Artillery	Retired Brigadier-General, 1928. Very friendly and socially inclined.
7. Godovius	At War College	Retired as Brigadier-General, German Army, 1928.
8. von Kriebel	At War College	Was temporary head of mission between Bauer and Wetzel. Unsubstantiated rumors report him unpopular with his colleagues.
9. von Waggenheim	At War College	Ex-officer.
10. Lassen	At War College	Ex-cavalry officer. Retired as Colonel, January 31, 1929.
11. Welkoborsky	Adviser to Infantry School of Nationalist Government	Ex-officer.
12. Bloedhorn	At Central Military Academy	
13. Kaiser	At Central Military Academy	
14. Egide	At Central Military Academy	
15. Hunolstein	At Central Military Academy	
16. Dalmeyer	At Central Military Academy	Retired as Captain, 1931. Arrived Nanking, 1932.
17. Heise	Adviser, Artillery School	Retired Major of Artillery. Two years as instructor to Turkish Army after World War. In China 4 years. Speaks splendid English and indiscreet in remarks. Splendid source of information. Likes to drink.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: German Military Economic Mission Employed by Chiang Kai-shek

Name	Activity	Remarks
Advisers with Schools		
18. von Knobelsdorf	Adviser, Artillery School	
19. Gilbert	Adviser, Artillery School	
20. Belitz	Adviser, Artillery School	
21. Heins	Adviser, Artillery School	Arrived Nanking, 1933. Speaks English - friendly.
Advisers for Ordnance		
22. Colonel de Fremery	Ordnance Expert	Dutch officer. Highly regarded and friendly to foreigners. Not actually a member of the mission but known to cooperate with it.
23. Dulhevev	Ordnance Expert	German Artillery officer during war. Has been connected with Chinese arsenals for about 10 years. Formerly at Taiyuanfu. Extremely discreet and uncommunicative.
Advisers for Aviation		
24. Boehler	Aviation	
25. Fuchs	Aviation	Ex-aviation officer, Friendly to foreigners.
26. Lehman	Aviation	An excellent man. Friendly and socially inclined. He and his wife both speak English. At present is located at Nanking. He is believed to occupy a special position as a government adviser and not believed to be directly under Wetzel.
27. Hautmann	Aviation	
28. Roofe	Aviation	Friendly. Located at new aviation field, Nanking.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: German Military Economic Mission Employed by Chiang Kai-shek

Name	Activity	Remarks
Advisers for Aviation		
29. von Alten	Aviation	Retired as Lt.-Colonel, September 30, 1929.
Advisers with troops.		
30. Meyer	Attached to 87th Division	Ex-artillery officer.
31. Martin	Attached to 87th Division	Ex-armorer.
32. Moritz	Attached to 87th Division	
33. Stovtzner	Attached to 87th Division	
34. Bohle	Attached to 87th Division	
35. Nolte	Attached to 87th Division	
36. Weber	Attached to 88th Division	Friendly to Americans. At present with Division in Hankow. Is highly regarded.
37. Hummel	Attached to 88th Division	Formerly instructor of police, Peiping.
38. Streppel	Attached to 88th Division	
39. Kotz	Attached to 88th Division	Retired as Major of Artillery. Chief adviser to the 88th Division, specializing on tactics. It is reported that he acts as Chief of Staff of Division. This is doubtful, and it is believed more probable that he acts as adviser to Chief of Staff.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: German Military Economic Mission Employed by Chiang Kai-shek

Name	Activity	Remarks
Advisers for Cavalry		
40. von Boddien	Cavalry	Splendid type of man and a German Count. He and his wife speak English, are very friendly and socially inclined.
41. Lolenz	Cavalry	
Advisers for Communications		
42. Haubs	Communications	
43. Pirner	Communications	
Advisers for Chemical Warfare		
44. Metzner	Attached to War College	Chemist.
45. Moltke	Gas	Ex-gas officer.
46. Koevner	Gas	Ex-gas officer.
47. Neuberger	Gas	Ex-gas officer.
48. Blume	Chemical Warfare	Chemist.
Advisers for Medical Corps		
49. Dr. Freerman	Medical	
50. Leber	Medical	
51. Bautz	Medical	
Advisers for Engineering		
52. Moellenhorff	Engineer	Ex-engineer officer. At one time with 88th Division. Present location unknown.
53. Hennic	Engineer	
54. Keiper	Mining Engineer	

CHINA (Military)

Subject: German Military Economic Mission Employed by Chiang Kai-shek

Name	Activity	Remarks
Advisers for Tanks		
55. Pievater Prallat	Tanks	Ex-tank officer.
Advisers with Police Units		
56. Baron Stein	Chief adviser to Salt Gabelle Troops	Formerly General Staff Officer, German Army. At one time language student in Russia. Reported under direct contract to Mr. T.V.Soong, which contract is said to prohibit use of other advisers with Salt Gabelle Troops. Speaks English.
57. Wendt	Police adviser	
58. Schuburg	Salt Gabelle Police	
59. Stein	Salt Gabelle Police	
60. Drinsky	Instructor of Police, Hankow	
Miscellaneous advisers and advisers whose activities are not known		
61. Stretzler		Ex-officer.
62. von Berhring		Ex-officer.
63. Mayer		Ex-officer.
64. Fisher		Ex-officer.
65. Nanthorn		Ex-officer.
66. von Xanthier	Civilian adviser	
67. von Schubert	Adviser to Ministry of Finance	

CHINA (Military)

Subject: German Military Economic Mission Employed by Chiang Kai-shek

Name	Activity	Remarks
Miscellaneous advisers and advisers whose activities are not known		
68. Koppen	Financial Adviser with Ministry of War	Ex-Quartermaster Officer, German Army1
69. Zander		
70. Krug		
71. C. Zing		
72. Nissen	Acts as clerk for aviation activities at Nanking.	

NOTES:

There are reliably reported to be a total of eighty advisers with this mission at the present writing, and twenty more are expected to arrive in China within the near future.

Advisers at the War College conduct classes in topography and tactics only. In addition, they teach the Chinese instructors and assist in the Research Department of the School.

In the other schools the instructors do not conduct general classes but instruct the Chinese instructors and supervise the instruction.

There are reported to be at least twenty advisers with the Central Military Academy, and ten with each the 87th and 88th Divisions.

SOURCE: The information in this report is from the Digest 6940 "Military Missions", and a study made by this office. The office was furnished a list of the mission by a confidential agent working through Headquarters of the German Mission in Nanking.

COMMENTS: The very nature of the mission is such that more or less secrecy is maintained in regard to it and its activities, and the list therefore is not complete but contains the best information available at this time.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: German Military Economic Mission Employed by Chiang Kai-shek

The progress made by the Central Government Troops under the supervision of this mission in training and military science has been such as to convince the most doubtful that China will have a powerful and modern fighting machine which should eventually be equal to that of any power in the world, provided the mission continues its activities. Not only are troops and officers being trained along modern methods and equipped with modern weapons but also plans are being made for the construction of steel plants, arsenals, lines of communications, etc., and the mobilization of the National Resources.

The influence of this mission upon the training of the Central Government Troops has been such that no other troops in China are to be compared to them. Their discipline, appearance, and morale distinguish them from other troops in China that have not had the same advantages in training. During the recent Shanghai incident these troops demonstrated the fact that, in spite of lack of proper supporting arms, they are able to so site their trenches and their discipline and morale is such that they are able now, for the first time in history, to put up a reasonable degree of resistance against a modern fighting machine.

The majority of the members of this mission are very high class men, well versed in their specialities. They have their own club and little community in Nanking and do not as a rule associate with other nationals. Practically all members of the mission were officers in the German Army prior to and during the World War and are now reserve officers. It is only natural to expect that they would return to Germany during a military emergency there, and in conversation some have expressed the hope that they may return to their own army if and when it is increased. It is only natural that these advisers advocate the purchase of German materials.

The Chinese officials rely on these advisers a great deal, but do not want to give that impression as it would of course cause them loss of "face" before their own people. As a result, the members of the mission are used almost entirely to advise and to teach officers, having no direct authority over military personnel.

It is believed that, since the establishment of the new Central Government Aviation School at Hangchow, the influence of this mission in aviation activities will decrease and that China aviation will develop along American lines. General Wetzel has stated that this would be the natural result for the Treaty of Versailles had made their training of military pilots impossible and, as a result, German aviators could not be expected to compare with Americans.

Some newspaper correspondents have maintained that the members of this mission are directly connected with the German War Office. This statement has been emphatically denied by members of the mission, German Consular officials, and by Chinese military officials.

G-2 Report

6940
Military Missions

CHINA (Military)

Subject: German Military Economic Mission Employed by Chiang Kai-shek

The following, Wetzel, Chief of Mission, von Busekitz, Aid to the Chief of Mission, Kung, and C.Zing, arrived in Peiping during the month of January, 1933, and are expected to act as advisers to Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang during the present emergency. It is planned to have a permanent mission of this nature working in North China and paid by Nanking. This will tend further to coordinate military training and to bring the forces in North China more under the influence of the Nanking Government.

For and in the absence of the Military Attache:

S. V. Constant
S. V. Constant
Major, Cavalry
Assistant Military Attache

RHS

Distribution:
4 MID
1 File

From M/A, China Report No. 8517 February 27, 1933

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
JUL 22
WAR INFORMATION

AMERICAN LEGATION
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE.
PEKING, CHINA.

4-1 2657-I-358

June 14, 1928

Subject: Feng Yu-hsiang and His Administration of Honan.

To: Military Attache, American Legation, Peking.

1. Feng Yu-hsiang is today the outstanding figure in political and military affairs in China. The few military successes in the last anti-Northern drive which resulted in the capture of Peking were due almost entirely to his troops. Chinese as well as foreigners admit that he is the most able organizer and administrator of all the factional leaders, and the best disciplinarian. At the same time on account of his perfidies in the past, he is the most widely distrusted man in political life in China today. At Nanking and Hankow in Chinese official circles, it is not considered a possibility but a certainty that he will break with the Nanking Government as soon as the opportune moment arrives. Feng's own subordinates state that he will never be content to remain "number two" in Nationalist China.

2. Marshal Feng has definitely abandoned christianity, which he professed for so many years. He is now the adherent to a modified form of communism, which does not include communism of property. It is generally believed by people near to him that he is using communism in the present emergency as a means to an end, and that he will discard it as he discarded christianity. It has been repeatedly reported that Feng at present is surrounded by Russian advisers. I do not believe that this is the case. There are only about a dozen foreigners in Kaifeng and less than that number in Chengchow. If a foreigner arrives in that part of the country, foreigners and Chinese know about him almost at once. I am assured by reliable men that at present Feng has only one foreigner on his staff, a Mr. Sperling, who was formerly a non-commissioned officer in the German Legation Guard.

3. Arriving in Honan, the province under the administration of Marshal Feng, from the Yangtze Valley under the Nationalist regime, I was struck by the order and peaceful conditions prevailing in the province, which before the capture by Feng Yu-hsiang less than a year ago was a bandit-ridden, war devastated and poverty stricken country. The traveller notices the cleanliness of trains and stations on the Lunghai Railway, the absence of loitering soldiers and beggars at the stations, the courtesy of the railway officials, and that the trains are on time.

4. Everywhere one sees young willow trees which were planted this spring as part of Feng's reforestation scheme. At Kaifeng alone over 130,000 were planted this spring. I was told that Feng issued orders that every land owning family must plant fourteen a year for five years for every member of the family. He expects in that way to reforest Honan in five years.

5. In the principal cities such as Kaifeng and Chengchow, the streets have been repaired and in some cases even widened. They are cleaned and swept every morning at dawn, and dumping of refuse in thoroughfares or alleys is punished severely. The shop-fronts in the cities have all been painted the blue color of the Nationalist flag, with decorative effects in red and inscriptions in white. The red light districts have been turned into respectable quarters and gambling and opium smoking is punished by imprisonment. There are no beggars on the streets. The poor and aged have been placed in asylums supported by the government.

6. On prominent walls of public buildings large colorful pictures are painted depicting busy street scenes teeming with automobiles and well-dressed people, from which the rickshas and burden-bearing coolies are noticeably absent. Other pictures depict children's playgrounds, or foot-ball field and tennis courts with old and young people, men and women, playing games. There are also propaganda posters directed against the Northern militarists, and such slogans as "Down with Imperialism", "Abolish Unequal Treaties", etc. Feng's "twelve commandments" are painted in prominent places of the towns in large red characters against a background of blue. These enjoin strict morality, economy and obedience, and order all people "to be industrious and to rise early". P olicemen enforce the last order by making the rounds of all houses at 6:30 a.m. and admonishing the people to get up and go to work.

7. All temples have been taken over by Feng and converted into schools; markets and public recreation grounds. The Buddhas have been taken out and pictures of Sun Yat-sen and Feng substituted for them. Vacant lots in the cities have been turned into playgrounds with usual apparatuses or into public parks with colorful pagodas and tea houses. Courteous attendants at the parks and recreation grounds meet the visitor, foreign as well as Chinese, conduct him over the grounds and point out to him with great pride the benefits of Feng's administration. These attendants always refused my tips, stating that they were paid by the government.

8. The Province of Honan, and I am told also Shensi and Kansu, are governed by councils. The officials, such as the chairman of the provincial executive council, the commissioner of foreign affairs, the chairman of the district council or magistrate, are all paid $20 Mex. a month. The provincial commissioner of foreign affairs told me that he had to give lectures in the college two or three times a week in

order to be able to live at all. I have been assured by Chinese and foreigners that the officials in Honan, in spite of the low salaries, are honest. The offering or accepting of bribes is punishable by death only. Only a decision of the assembled officials of the department or district concerned at which the accused is present, is necessary to cause the summary execution of a dishonest official. Such executions are quite frequent occurrences. No official is allowed to employ in his department or office a member of his family or even a distant relative. Silk clothing is prohibited for all people, and officials of all classes are prohibited from wearing the long gown, but must wear a prescribed uniform. Civilians who wish to see officials must first discard their long gowns. In Kaifeng there is a school for the training of civil officials with about 150 students.

9. The troops of Marshal Feng are without doubt the best disciplined in China. Although the soldiers have not been paid for years, the morale is excellent. Feng tells his soldiers that he is too poor to pay them, and they believe him. He and all his officers wear the same uniform, costing $2.00 Mex., and the same straw hat, costing a few coppers, as the soldiers. They have no rank insignia except the Sam Browne belt and a label on the left breast pocket with their rank inscribed. The officers eat the same food as the soldiers. No man in military uniform, whether a general or a private, is allowed to ride in a ricksha. This would be degrading humanity. Smoking, drinking and gambling in the Army is punished by imprisonment. The troops are drilled from dawn to dark, until they literally drop in their tracks, Feng's idea being a man physically exhausted prefers sleep at night to doing mischief. "Passes" for soldiers are almost unknown, and soldiers, except those on duty, are never met with on the streets after dark.

10. While at Kaifeng I had occasion to talk to Dr. Hu, the Assistant Surgeon General of Feng with the rank of Major General, who is a Harvard graduate and formerly a well-known surgeon in Shanghai. He has been with Feng's army for about two years. He is paid $12 Mex. a month, issued a two dollar cotton uniform, and given two meals aday. He is in charge of the Military Medical School in Kaifeng with about 120 students, and does surgical work in four hospitals. He is the real organizer of Feng's medical service, and I was told by a foreign surgeon that he was really most successful under very trying conditions. Although Dr. Hu is slightly lame in one leg, he is not permitted to use a ricksha since he is a military man, but walks every day several miles between the various hospitals. He was the first man who furnished a Chinese army with properly sterilized first-aid packages, when two months ago he prepared and sent to the army at the front 40,000 packages.

He informed me that the so-called heavy casualties in all of Feng's forces during the fighting in April and May this year amounted to only 8,000 wounded and 1,000 sick. He did not know how many were killed. He told me that the wounded when admitted to the hospitals are given a bonus ranging from $4 Mex. to a private to $1,000 Mex. to a general; that Feng has established between Sianfu in Shensi and Kaifeng ten homes for disabled soldiers in which they are taught a trade and paid $20 a month, while in the homes. These monies are used to establish them in business when they are released from the institution. The families of soldiers and officers are taken care of by public societies which are subsidized by the government.

11. Dr. Hu maintains, although he admits all faults and shortcomings of Marshal Feng, that Feng is the only hope of China in the present chaos. When after talking to Dr. Hu for over four hours I asked him why he slaved for $12 Mex. a month like a coolie, while his family was starving, instead of sitting in a comfortable office in Shanghai, he said with a wry smile: "The reason is 'Feng inspired' patriotism". Foreigner and Chinese alike assured me that Feng is surrounded by men like Dr. Hu and that Feng's successes are due entirely to his ability to inspire men with a self-sacrificing, patriotic spirit.

J. P. Ratay
Captain, F. A.,
Assistant Military Attache.

elh

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
1928 3000
2637-J-368
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CHINA (Political)

Subject: The New Government of Manchuria.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. SEP 18 1928

While the extension of the rights of the people and curtailment of the powers of the militarists is promised in the new constitution for the Northeastern Provinces, and the principle of the sovereignty of the people seemingly made the basis of the new government, an examination of the articles of the constitution and the regulations governing the several assemblies and councils shows that effective safeguards on the powers of the people have been introduced, and that the real power is still in the hands of the small group of military leaders headed by Chang Hsueh-liang.

The Federal Assembly.

The Federal Assembly is a representative body composed of ten members from each Provincial Assembly, called together early in July by Chang Hsueh-liang for the purpose of drafting a constitution and inaugurating a federal self-governing system for the Northeastern Provinces. The Constitution, as adopted, retained the Federal Assembly as the highest legislative body in the district, organized "on the fundamental doctrine that the sovereignty of the State is in the people's custody". Theoretically, the Assembly exercises supreme military and civil control over the district, and supervises and decides all political affairs transacted by the People's Council. Actually, it has very little power and exists solely to keep up the pretense of a representative government, as an examination of the People's Council will readily show.

The People's Council.

According to Art. 4 of the Constitution, the Northeastern People's Council is established "in order to improve and facilitate the administration of the District and to supervise all important administrative affairs". As defined by the Constitution, it's function is that of a standing committee of the Federal Assembly, whose concurrence must be secured on all important matters. The members of the Council, 17 in number, are appointed (theoretically) by the Federal Assembly to act for the Assembly in matters of administration. As a check on the powers of this Council, the Constitution specifically states that on matters of war, agreements and treaties with foreign powers, taxes, loans, etc., the concurrence of the Federal Assembly must be secured. The reins of government are thus presumably firmly in the hands of the representatives of the people.

The reins are quite definitely snatched away, however, by the terms of Art. 12, which states that "The Northeastern People's Council shall have power to appoint and dismiss the highest officers and officials in the District, excepting those of the Commander-in-Chief of the Manchurian Guard and the Civil Governors, for whose dismissal the consent of the Federal Assembly is required", and the Fengtien military group is left in firm control by the provisions of Art. 3 of the regulations establishing the People's Council - "The Military Commanders of the Northeastern Provinces and personages of high character and splendid equipment who are held in high esteem will be recommended by the People's

CHINA (Political)

Subject: The New Government of Manchuria.

Council to the Federal Assembly for membership in the Council. Prior to the establishment of the People's Council, the Commander-in-Chief of the Manchurian Guard shall present the names to the Federal Assembly for approval." The Constitution having been drawn up and the new government inaugurated at the instigation of the Young General, and the operation of both dependent upon the surrender by him of the despotic power inherited from his father, it naturally follows that the personages of "splendid equipment and high character" named by him would be made members of the Council. Eight of his appointments have already been made, all from old military and civil leaders of the Fengtien Group, with Chang Hsueh-liang as Chairman of the Council. With the military leaders forming a majority in the Council, with no term of office fixed, and with the authority to appoint and dismiss officials at will, no great imagination is necessary to see what becomes of the rights of the people and the sovereignty of the State.

Similarity Between the Manchurian and Nanking Governments.

An analysis of the new Manchurian Government shows it to be strikingly similar to the Nationalist Government at Nanking. With the military leaders members of the People's Council and with the power to appoint and dismiss officials at will, this Council becomes the Central Political Council of Nanking; the Federal Assembly corresponds to the Central Executive Committee in the Nationalist Government; the Provincial Governments are similar to the Branch Political Councils; and the Commander of the Manchurian Guard to the Chairman of the Military Council. Once this similarity becomes clear, Art. 13 also takes on a new significance. This article states that "This Constitution shall be abolished when the political situation in China becomes unified", which can mean but one thing - the new government will be converted overnight into a branch of the Nationalist Government when an agreement can be reached.

Helmer W. Lystad
Helmer W. Lystad
First Lieutenant, Infantry.

Distribution:
4 MID
1 Tientsin
1 File

1st Ind.

Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peking, China, August 8, 1928 - To: The A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D.C.

Reviewed and concurred in.

John Magruder
John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

4-1
DEPTH. CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
SEP 1928
2657-D-368
WAR DEPARTMENT

Copied from the Manchurian Daily News
No Chinese Text Available

PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION FOR NORTHEASTERN PROVINCES DISTRICT.

Art. 1 In order to ensure the peace and security of the Northeastern Provinces District, the Provisional Constitution has been established for common observance.

Art. 2 The sovereignty of the District belongs to the People.

Art. 3 The Federal Provincial Assembly of Manchuria is the highest legislative institution provisionally entrusted with the People's rights, and is organized as is separately fixed.

Art. 4 The Northeastern Provinces District, in order to improve and facilitate its administration, has established the Northeastern People'sCouncil to supervise all important administrative affairs of the District. The same Council shall secure the concurrence of the Federal Provincial Assembly.

Art. 5 The military affairs of the District shall be attended to by the Commander-in-Chief of the Manchurian Guard and the Commanders of the Provincial Guards, whilst the civil administration shall be looked after by the Civil Governor of each Province.

Art. 6 The organization of the Northeastern People's Council shall be fixed separately.

Art. 7 Any of the following matters, passed by the Northeastern People's Council shall be submitted to the Federal Provincial Assembly for concurrence.

1) Conclusion of agreement with foreigners.
2) Warlike and strategic operations.
3) Increase of the people's burden or flotation of a loan.
4) Laws for common operation in the Northeastern Provinces District.
5) Matters outside the scope of authority of the Federal Provincial Assembly.

Art. 8 The Northeastern Provinces District Government shall be responsible to the Provincial Assembly of each Province according to the Provincial Assembly Provisional Law.

Art. 9 All existing laws and regulations that do not clash with the present Constitution shall be considered as valid.

Art.10 The present Constitution shall take effect when approved of, and proclaimed, by the Federal Assembly.

Art.11 Any flaws in the Constitution, if found, shall be corrected by the Provincial Assembly.

Art.12 The Northeastern People's Council shall be invested with the authority to appoint and dismiss the highest officers and officials in the District, excepting those of the Commander-in-Chief of the Manchurian

Guard and the Civil Governors, for which the consent of the Federal Provincial Assembly is required. The appointment and dismissals, while the Provincial Assembly is not in session, may be submitted for its concurrence at the next session.

The Provisional Supreme Court is established in order to safeguard the rights of the District people. Its organization is separately fixed.

Art. 13. The present Constitution shall be abolished when the political situations in China get unified.

FEDERAL PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY OF MANCHURIA.

Art. 1. In order to ensure the peace and security of the Northeastern Provinces, while the administration of the country is not yet unified, the Federal Provincial Assembly of Manchuria is established as the highest legislative institution. This Assembly has been organized on the fundamental doctrine that the sovereignty of the State is in the People's custody.

Art. 2. The Assembly is located within the walled city of Mukden.

Art. 3. The Assembly is organized of 10 representatives of the Provincial Assemblies of Fengtien, Kirin and Heilungkiang.

Art. 4. The tenure of office of each member shall last 6 months subject to re-election on the expiry of the term.

Art. 5. The tenure of office of the members of the first Assembly shall date from June 1, 1928.

Art. 6. Any member of the Assembly, after his appointment, can not resign or be relieved by another unless permitted by the Assembly.

Art. 7. The present Assembly shall cooptate three Chairmen from among its members to preside over the Assembly by turns.

Art. 8. The present Assembly shall have one Chief of the Secretariat and a number of Secretaries.

Art. 9. The present Assembly is the institution that can exercise the supreme military and civil authority of the District and shall be invested with the authority to supervise and decide all political affairs transacted by the Northeastern People's Council.

Art. 10. The present Assembly shall hold an ordinary session once during each term, subject to extraordinary convocation as occasion requires.

Art. 11. None of the members shall divulge any of the bills for debate or any resolutions passed before their announcement. An offender shall be expelled, and a substitute shall be elected from the Provincial Assembly concerned.

Art. 12. The detail regulations governing sessions and for the conduct of routine of the present Assembly shall be fixed separately.

Art. 13. This Assembly shall fix the expenditure of the Council, the travelling expenses for its members and other expenses.

Art. 14. Any flaw in the present Principles, if found, shall be corrected as occasion demands.

Art. 15. The present Principles shall take effect from date of issue.

NORTHEASTERN PEOPLE'S COUNCIL.

Art. 1. In order to insure the welfare of the Northeastern Provinces District, the Northeastern People's Council has been especially established.

Art. 2. The Council is located in the walled city of Mukden.

Art. 3. The Military Commanders of the Northeastern Provinces and personages of high character and splendid equipments who are held in high esteem be recommended by the Federal Assembly for approval as members of the Council. Prior to the establishment of the People's Council, the Commander-in-Chief of the Manchurian Guard shall present the names to the Federal Assembly for approval.

Art. 4. This Council shall transact business on a joint responsibility system and all important matters of the Northeastern District shall be referred to the plenary session of the Council for decision.

Art. 5. Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Council shall be cooptated from among the members.

Art. 6. This Council shall be invested with the authority to appoint and release any of the highest officials and officers of the Northeastern Provinces District.

Art. 7. Such existing laws and regulations that do not clash with the present Principles shall be valid.

Art. 8. The regulations for conduct of business of the Council shall be fixed separately.

Art. 9. Any flaw, if found, in the present Principles, shall be corrected as occasion demands.

Art. 10. The present Principles shall take effect from the date of issue.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
MAY 27 1929
2657-D-3629
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

3400 - Local Governments

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Provincial Governments.

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. MAY 27 1929

1. Provinces in China are governed by committees known as provincial governments (Sheng Cheng Fu). These committees consist of from 9 to 13 members, one of whom is the chairman, all appointed by the National Government. The provincial committee administers all matters in the province in accordance with Kuomintang Party principles, and such laws and regulations as are promulgated by the National Government. There are no rights inherent in the provinces due to a constitution, but only such rights as are conceded by the Central Government.

2. The provincial government receives instructions from and deals directly with that ministry of the Executive Yuan which is responsible for the matter at issue. The provincial party organization has no legal authority over the provincial government but it does in fact today bring pressure to bear and interferes in various ways with the provincial administrative machinery.

3. Special Municipalities (Te Pieh Shih) are similarly organized and have the same relationship to the Central Government as the provincial governments. Examples of special municipalities are Shanghai, Canton and Peking.

4. The provinces are divided into hsiens at the head of each being a hsien magistrate and an administrative office known as the Hsien Cheng Fu. The next lower administrative unit embraces a village and is called the Tsung Cheng Fu.

5. The organization of the provincial government varies somewhat in the different provinces. That for Hopei (Chihli) may be taken as typical. It comprises the following departments:

(a) Secretariat. Keeps records, handles correspondence and compiles reports.

(b) Administrative Department. Appointment and supervision of civil officials and police; elections, famine relief, sacrifice, religion, opium suppression.

(c) Finance Department. Collection of provincial taxes; prepares accounts and budget.

(d) Construction Department. Construction of highways, railroads, river conservancy works, surveys.

(e) Education Department (pending the introduction of the university system.) Educational institutions, libraries, museums.

(f) Department of Agriculture and Mines. Mining, forestry, fishing, farming.

(g) Department of Labor and Commerce. Labor unions, chambers of commerce, guilds, industrial affairs, factories, exhibitions, measurements and weights.

From M/A, China Report No. 7493 April 19, 1929

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Provincial Governments.

Note: The Central Government is trying to bring all provinces into direct relationship with Nanking but in this it has been only partially successful.

6. In theory those provinces grouped under the military and administrative control of Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan, respectively, deal directly with Nanking. In practice all important matters go through the administrative organs of these leaders even though there is no legal basis for such organs.

7. In Manchuria the situation is different (see ~~Report No. 7458.~~ 2657-D-360) Upon the voluntary adoption of the habiliments of Kuomintang, the Northeastern People's Council (see The New Government of Manchuria, 3400 Digest) was changed in name to Northeastern Political Council. There is no legal basis for the existence of such an intermediary organ between the provinces and Nanking. Nevertheless the Manchurian leaders insist upon maintaining the political integrity of Fengtien, Kirin, Heilungchiang and Jehol as an area enjoying some degree of autonomy. The individual provinces have organized provincial governments following the lines prescribed by Nanking but the Northeastern Political Council remains as an effective regional government. There is a live issue between the Manchurian leaders and Nanking over the question of the retention of this regional government. It is not likely that it will be voluntarily abolished, and it seems improbable that Nanking will be in position for some time to force her point, despite the fact that all branch political councils in China proper were disbanded in March, 1929.

8. The exact organization and functions of the Northeastern Political Council are not known at present. In any event they are undergoing constant changes. It would seem advisable to remove from the Digest the whole subject, "The New Government of Manchuria" (3400).

John Magruder
John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

Distribution:
4 MID
1 Tientsin
1 File

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
2657-J-360
WAR DEPARTMENT
RECEIVED G/2 W. D. SEP 3 1930

G-2 Report.

Loyalty of Local Governments.
Leading Personalties.

CHINA (POLITICAL)

The Present Manchurian Government.

The following has been prepared by Major John Magruder, Field Artillery, and Lieutenant Thomas D. White, Air Corps.

The government of the Three Eastern Provinces, as the Chinese term Manchuria, is nominally under the Central Government of China, but actually independent. Adherence to or independence of Nanking depends entirely upon expediency.

An excellent example of this position was shown during the Sino-Soviet conflict of the summer of 1929.

In order to garner the sympathies of foreign governments which Chinese politicians generally believed would be given to them as against the U. S. S. R., Manchuria agreed to place diplomatic negotiations in the hands of the Nanking Government, and while Manchurian military forces were being annihilated by the Russians along the Chinese Eastern Railway Nanking sent no troops. The usual representatives were sent "to comfort" the soldiers but neither financial nor military support was given. This may be laid equally to the fact that Nanking was unable to send troops so far away and that the Manchurian authorities preferred to be defeated by Russia than to have the influence of Nanking increased within their boundaries.

A second example of Manchuria's independence is vividly brought out in the present conflict between the Central Government and the so-called Northern Allies, Yen Hsi-shan and Feng Yu-hsiang.

Manchuria is located in the most strategic position imaginable with regard to striking the rear of the Northern forces. Nanking cajoles, bribes and issues almost daily announcements that Chang Hsueh-liang, the young War Lord of Manchuria, has thrown in his lot with Nanking. The opposing forces under Yen and Feng issue equally frequent reports to the effect that Manchuria is allied with them. The fact that Manchuria makes no move other than to acquire special advantages at the expense of the opposing factions (Mayoralty of Tsingtao from Nanking; Customs supervision of Chinwangtao from the North) forcibly proves Manchurian independence.

A diagram showing the scheme of the Government of the Three Eastern Provinces is appended.

A list of the present holders of important offices in each of the Manchurian provinces, Liaoning, Kirin and Heilungkiang, follows:

From M/A Report No. 7776 July 23, 1930

LIAONING PROVINCE (FENGTIEN)

Chairman of Liaoning Government - - - - - - - - - - -	Tsang Shih-yi
Members of the Liaoning Government - - - - - - - - -	Wang Ching-huan
	Kao Chi-yi
	Hsing Shih-lien
	Kao Wei-yu
Bureau of Construction - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	Peng Chi-chung
Bureau of Labor and Commerce - - - - - - - - - - - - -	Chang Hsien-fang
Bureau of Administration - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	Chen Wen-hsueh
Bureau of Agriculture and Mines - - - - - - - - - - -	Liu Hao-ting
Bureau of Education - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	Wang Yu-kuei
Bureau of Finance - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	Chang Cheng-lu

Note: Chiefs of these bureaux are concurrently members of the Provincial Government.

Secretariat Department Chief Secretary - -	Hsu Pao-heng
Provincial District Police Department - - - - - - - -	Sun Hsu-chang

KIRIN PROVINCE

Chairman of Kirin Government - - - - - - - - - - - -	Chang Tso-hsiang
Members of the Kirin Government - - - - - - - - - - -	(number unknown)
Bureau of Construction - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	Chang Liang-chuan
Bureau of Administration - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	- - - - - - - -
Bureau of Agriculture and Mines - - - - - - - - - - -	Ma Pien-ke
Bureau of Education - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	Wang Ke-keng
Bureau of Finance - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	Yeh Shu-chang
Bureau of Foreign Affairs - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	Chung Yu

Note: Chiefs of these bureaux are concurrently members of the Provincial Government.

Secretariat Department Chief Secretary - - -	P'an Shu-sheng

HEILUNGKIANG PROVINCE

Chairman of Heilungkiang Government - - - - - - - - - -	Wan Fu-lin
Members of the Heilungkiang Government - - - - - - - -	Tou Lien-fang
	Yuan Ching-en
	Su Pin-wen
	T'ao Ching-wu
	Sung Wen-yu
Bureau of Construction - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	Ma Ching-kuei
Bureau of Administration - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	Liu Ting-hsuan
Bureau of Agriculture and Mines - - - - - - - - - - -	Kao Chia-chi
Bureau of Education - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	P'an Chin-wu
Bureau of Finance - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	P'ang Tso-pin

Note: Chiefs of these bureaux are concurrently members of the Provincial Government.

Secretariat Department - - - - Chief Secretary - - -	Wang Wei-cheng

Nelson E. Margetts
Lieutenant-Colonel, Field Artillery
Military Attache

Distribution:

4 MID
1 File

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
SEP 5 1930
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report.

OUTER MONGOLIAN GOVERNMENT.

The following report on the Outer Mongolian Government has been prepared by Lieutenant Thomas D. White, Air Corps. This information has been obtained from General K. V. Dmitroff, now residing in Harbin, he was formerly Colonel in the Imperial Russian Army and later Chief of Staff to the Ataman Semenoff. The source from which this data was obtained should be guarded with the strictest confidence.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. SEP 3 1930

The Government of Outer Mongolia with its capital at Urga, has become completely entoiled in the tentacles of the USSR. Mongolia while proclaiming itself a Republic, is in reality little more than a political dependency of Soviet Russia.

Rather an elaborate system of government organs has been set up under Soviet guidance giving the Mongolians a sense of independence and self-government, but actually the reins of control are crossed and intermoven by subtle Russian lines of influence which lead the real power to Moscow.

A diagram attached gives in graphic form the inter-relations of the various governmental departments.

A brief description of each of the above departments is given below, except those whose functions are self-evident from their designations.

Grand Council.

This is the legislative body. It meets once a year in November and continues in session for about two months. The Grand Council is composed of about 150 delegates who are theoretically elected each year. Actually however, the composition changes but little from year to year due to an insufficiency of experienced political workers.

Little Council.

This is the executive body and sits throughout the year. It is charged with the carrying out of the orders and laws promulgated by the Grand Council. The members of the Little Council are selected yearly from the Grand Council. There are fifteen members.

The Little Council in turn, selects from its number the Council of Ministers and distributes their portfolios as follows:

Council of Ministers.

1. Ministry of Peoples' Education.
2. Ministry of War.
3. Ministry of Peoples' Economy.
4. Ministry of Interior Affairs.
5. Ministry of Finance.
6. Ministry of State Control.

The Chairman of the Economic Soviet and G. V. O. are members of the Council of Ministers.

Report.

Mongolian Transport.

A government motor transport monopoly consisting of a fleet of seventy commercial machines.

Soviet Organs.

A Representative resides in Urga as the direct appointee of Moscow.

The Chairman of the Economic Soviet is the plenipotentiary. representative of the Comintern. The present incumbent is one Irteniev.

The head of the G. V. O. (State Interior Guard.) is a Latvian Communist by the name of Hansen. This organization corresponds to the G. P. U. or Cheka of the USSR.

Mongolian Army.

The Mongolian Peoples' Revolutionary Army maintains a strength of approximately 7,000 men and officers. In the event of a general mobilization the USSR. estimates that this may be increased to between 20,000 and 22,000.

The army is technically under the command of the Mongolian Commander-in-Chief, but there are Soviet instructors in every unit, sometimes as many as thirty Russin officers to a regiment. The senior instructor in each unit is the actual commander in spite of the presence of the Mongolian Commander.

The uniform is patterned after the Soviet style.

The main force of the army is located in Urga where approximately 4,000 men are stationed.

The units are largely independent cavalry brigades. Each brigade consists of three regiments of 600 men each. There is one additional separate regiment.

Troops are armed with Russian rifles, Colt and Maxim machine guns.

There is a Mongolian Military Academy with 300 students at Urga.

In the former Consular Settlement of Urga a radio station has been erected and is at the disposal of the USSR. Political Representative.

The Military Garage at Urga maintains 150 automobiles, mostly trucks. This division comes directly under the G. V. O. The Mongolian Transport has about seventy machines in commercial service. There are also about sixty private automobiles available in Urga.

There are no military airplanes in Mongolia. Two commercial machines at Urga and one at Sambeis are used for liaison.

The military warehouse at Urga comes under the G. V. O.

Morale of Mongolian Army.

The majority of the Mongolian army, in keeping with the general Mongol population, are essentially anti-communistic. This may be traced first, to the very evident fact that the economy of the Mongols, who are largely nomads, in no way needs the industrial Communistic formula for attaining Utopia. Second, the Lamas oppose the present regime and these priests, by sheer weight of numbers at least, have an extensive influence among the people.

Report.

In April of this year (1930) a revolt occurred in one of the military units stationed in Urga. About 400 troops took part but were promptly subdued by the guard of the USSR. Political Representative and by cadets from the Military Academy.

Distribution of Mongolian Troops.

The main force is located at Urga, approximately 4,000 men. One separate brigade is found at Kobdo in western Outer Mongolia.

Two regiments of the 1st Brigade constitute the guard of the eastern frontier of the Halkha district, reserves at Sambeis. (See map attached)

The line Sambeis-Saido-yamen-Lamahit is the axis of communication and reserves of the Mongolian army in the Halkha District. From this axis, outposts are distributed along the line Tsiganor-Bakalai-Dulan-Hara-Arshan road. These outposts consist of 20-30 cavalry each.

During the summer months the troops of these outposts live in yurts; in winter mud houses (zemlianka) are constructed and heated with iron stoves. The greater part of the forces, however, are withdrawn to Sambeis during the severest months and then move out again in the spring.

Soviet Russian Troops in Mongolia.

Soviet troops in Mongolia are of three kinds viz: Instructors in the Mongolian army; Guards of the Political Representative of the USSR. and the State Interior Guard. (Russian Section) (G. V. O.)

In consequence of Soviet distrust of the loyalty of the Mongolian army the Russian garrison at Urga (Guard of the Political Representative) has been increased to 500 cavalry with one field battery consisting of two 6 inch guns.

It is known that General Ghekker, formerly Soviet Military Attache in Peking, is now one of the senior instructors in the Mongol army.

N E Margetts

Nelson E. Margetts
Lieutenant-Colonel, Field Artillery
Military Attache

Distribution:

4 MID
1 File

DIAGRAM OF THE INTER-RELATION OF THE MONGOLIAN AND SOVIET GOVERNMENTS.



* G.V.O. = ГОСУДАРСТВЕННАЯ ВНУТРЕНЯЯ ОХРАНА

——— DIRECT MONGOLIAN MILITARY CONTROL

– – – – – INDIRECT " " "

—·— DIRECT " CIVIL "

——— DIRECT CONTROL THRU COMINTERN

– – – – – SECRET BUT ACTUALLY CONTROLLED BY USSR

3400
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
M.I. DIVISION
NOV 7
2657-J-360
WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA(POLITICAL)

New Officials for Peiping and Tientsin

October 7, 1930

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. NOV 6 1930

The recent assumption of control of Hopei Province by the Fengtien authorities naturally resulted in a reappointment of provincial officers. It is interesting to note that Mukden appointed men to every office; Nanking confirmation will most likely follow in due course.

The following list of the new officials is submitted as of possible interest:

HOPEI PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT

General Wang Shu-ch'ang . . . . . Chairman
General Yu Hsueh-ch'ung . . . . . Garrison Commander of Tientsin, Peiping and Shanhaikwan
Yao Hung . . . . . Commissioner of Finance
Shen Yun-mu . . . . . Commissioner of Education
(Chang Chien-yen, formerly Chief of Peiping Municipal Educational Bureau, was originally recommended by Mukden for this office, but it is reported that Shen Yun-mu, also a Mukden man, actually received same.)
Wang Wei-cheng . . . . . Commissioner of Civil Affairs
(Lou Hsueh-hsi was originally recommended by Mukden for this office, but it is reported that Wang Wei-cheng actually received same.)
Lin Ch'eng-hsiu . . . . . Commissioner of Construction
(Lin Ch'eng-hsiu was formerly Director of Government Land Office, Mukden.)
Ch'ang Ping-yi. . . . . Commissioner of Agriculture and Mines
(Ch'ang Ping-yi was formerly Superintendent of Customs, Harbin.)
Ho Yu-fang . . . . . Commissioner of Commerce and Labor
(Ho Yu-fang was formerly Mayor of Harbin.)
Shih Wei . . . . . Director of Hopei Stamp Bureau
Han Lin-sheng . . . . . Customs Superintendent at Tientsin
(Han Lin-sheng until recently was Director of Kirin-Changchun and Kirin-Tunhua Railways.)
Hun Wei-kuo . . . . . Changlu Salt Commissioner
(Hun Wei-kuo until recently was Superintendent of Customs, Newchwang.)
Ko Kuang-t'ing . . . . . Director of the Peiping-Hankow Railroad
(Ko Kuang-t'ing was formerly one of Mukden's delegates to Yen Hsi-shan.)
Tseng Kuang-hsiang . . . . . Director of the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway
(Tseng Kuang-hsiang was formerly with the Peking-Mukden Railway.)

TIENTSIN MUNICIPALITY

Chang Po-ling (now President of Nankai College, Tientsin) was recommended for the office of Mayor, but flatly declined the offer on the ground that he had had no experience in municipal affairs.

Tsang Ch'i-fang . . . . . Director of Social Welfare and Acting Mayor
(Tsang Ch'i-fang is a Dean of Northeastern University.)
Chang Hsueh-ming . . . . . Director of Public Safety
(Chang Hsueh-ming is a younger brother of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang.)
T'ao Ching-ch'ien . . . . . Director of Public Service
(T'ao Ching-ch'ien was formerly Chief of Police, Mukden.)

Ning Hsiang-nan . . . . . Chief of Second District, Tientsin
Lu Lu . . . . . Chief of Third District, Tientsin
Liu Hai-nien . . . . . Director of Finance
Chao Wan-lin . . . . . Director of the Telegraph Administration
Tuan Mow-lan . . . . . Director of the Telephone Bureau

PEIPING MUNICIPALITY

Chu Ch'i-ch'ien, a Minister of the Interior under Yuan Shih-k'ai, now President of the Chinese Architectural Society, was offered the office of Mayor and is said to have accepted but at the last minute declined the appointment.
Kao Ch'ing-ho . . . . . Chief of Office of Foreign Affairs at Peiping
(Kao Ch'ing-ho was formerly Commissioner of Foreign Affairs at Mukden.)
Wang T'ao . . . . . Director of Finance and Acting Mayor
Wang Chieh-chieh . . . . . Director of Education
Pao Yu-lin. . . . . Director of Public Safety
(Pao Yu-lin is a son of Pao Kuei-ch'ing, ex-Tuchun of Heilungkiang, and brother-in-law of General Chang Hsueh-liang.)
K'ang Jui-fu . . . . . Director of the Telephone Administration
(K'ang Jui-fu was formerly Chief of Telephone Administration, Mukden.)
Wu Ying-t'ang. . . . . Chief of Telephone Bureau

MEMargetts

MEM/edb

Nelson E. Margetts
Lieutenant-Colonel, Field Artillery
Military Attache

Report No. 7839

Distribution:

4 MID
1 Tientsin
1 File

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
DEC 9 1930
2657-J-360
WAR DEPARTMENT

MANCHURIA IN PERSPECTIVE

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. DEC 5 1930

"In order to undertake the reconstruction of China, the first essential is to eliminate warfare..." Thus spoke Chang Hsueh-liang, warlord of Manchuria, on September 18th. And as though he were taking a lesson from the West which waged war to end wars, the Young Marshal moved his armies through the Great Wall.

His troops have occupied Tientsin and Peiping; his dispositions on the Tsin-pu, Kin-han and P'ing-sui railroads are strategically placed. On the route last-named he has pushed through to Charhar; Sui-yuan beckons from beyond.

The movement was orderly; the incoming Mukden officials were even entertained by departing Shansi incumbents. Yet the Young Marshal swore allegiance to Nanking and refused to have his name used in connection with the short-lived Peking government of the Northern Coalition.

Ostensibly Mukden holds North China "in trust" for the Chinese people. The Chinese people themselves, dared they speak, would quote the ancient parable of "fisherman's profit" in which a kingfisher pecked at the meat of a clam; the clam closed his shell. Neither bird nor clam would release his hold; a fisherman chanced by and took them both. Whether Chiang or the Feng-Yen combination is the clam makes no difference: Mukden controls North China.

The motives? One need go no farther than elementary Chinese psychology. A rich area served by the most profitable railroad in China was to be had for the taking. No Chinese with the power to take could stifle his greed.

Besides, the threat of Chiang Kai-shek with a free hand across the Yellow River (he was already at Tsinanfu and able to march on) cast a shadow through the wall at Shanhaikuan. Mukden desires no interference by Nanking and the Kuomintang.

Chang Hsueh-liang is subservient to Nanking when it suits his need; notably only in matters of foreign affairs. The Chinese Eastern Railway controversy is an excellent case.

Manchuria, defeated by Russia in a war just one year ago, signs the Habarovsk Protocol and agrees to negotiate with that document as a basis. Nanking repudiates the Chinese delegate's action, claiming that he had acted ultra vires.

Although a Chinese delegate has been in Moscow for months, meetings were held for the first time on October 11. The Soviets insisted on the Harbarovsk agreement as a basis; the Chinese refused. Hence a deadlock has arisen. Affairs on the Chinese Eastern Railway continue unsettled, the Chinese having a greater advantage under present conditions than they may reasonably expect to maintain after formal negotiations have been concluded.

Mukden has bowed to Nanking thus far in the international aspects of this case, hence deriving whatever benefits may arise from Nanking's friendly relations with foreign powers suspicious of Soviet Russia. Interminable hedging and evading of the crucial point is a well known Chinese weapon in diplomatic practice. The dual aspect of Nanking and Mukden versus Soviet Russia serves satisfactorily to complicate matters from a Chinese standpoint.

From M/A China Report No. 7855 Oct. 30, 1930

How long Russia will endure indecision is a question which Nanking may now be weighing in her attitude toward Mukden.

Mukden's move into North China ostensibly is with Nanking's complete acquiescence, a mouthing which is covered by a very thin veil. For had Mukden really been in active favor of Nanking she might have closed in behind the Yen-Feng combination months ago and gained a sweeping victory for Chiang Kai-shek. That Mukden moved only when it was obvious that Yen and Feng were on the verge of collapse is clear proof of her secret antagonism to Nanking.

The aggravation of Mukden-Soviet relations, then, looms as a check in Nanking's hands. Soviet aggressions or reprisals would take place in Manchurian territory. How effectively the delicate chain of checks and counter-checks rests in equilibrium is a matter for conjecture which leads one into a realm of great possibilities.

If Mukden feels strong enough, she may cast off Nanking altogether and make a direct settlement with Russia. There are rumors of Soviet intentions of creating a de facto Legation at Harbin. A r'approchement between Mukden and Soviet Russia might have far reaching consequences for the war-weakened Nanking Government.

The Soviets have recently communicated directly with Mukden demanding that steps be taken for the suppression of White Russian activities on the Siberian border, for the restoration of telephone service on the C.E.R. to Soviet control, and referred to the Russian right to station garrisons along the C.E.R.

Chang Hsueh-liang is reported by Japanese sources to have agreed to take steps against the White Russians, since such action would be at the expense of a foreign people and would cost him little.

It is interesting to note that an unprecedented event took place on October 14 at Harbin, when the consuls of the United States, Great Britain, France, Japan and other countries entertained the Soviet Consul General. The conversation which took place is unknown.

Another viewpoint is worthy of being noted since it represents the Mukdenites in a more favorable light and reflects the opinion of a well-known American student of Manchurian affairs.

Mr. C. Walter Young of the Department of Politics, Johns Hopkins University, and author of "The Foreign Relations of Manchuria", has recently come to Peking via Moscow and Mukden. His estimate of Chang Hsueh-liang is almost sentimental in his belief that Chang's move into North China was motivated entirely by patriotism.

A public announcement by Chang Hsueh-liang on October 29 is typically naive and is quoted below in full. Particular attention is drawn to the specification that this policy applies "inside the wall" -- Manchuria's autonomy is tacitly reaffirmed. Also it should be noted that officials in North China have already been appointed by the Young Marshal, though they are to be only temporary, according to his statement.

> "'The orders of the central government will be followed exactly,' said Marshal Chang. "The movement of Manchurian troops and the areas to be guarded by them will be dictated from Nanking. The central government will also have charge of civil questions, such as appointment of officials and reorganization of certain government offices in North China.
>
> "'I stated my position clearly when I sent troops into North China, and intend to follow the policy then announced. At the

beginning of the transfer, I was afraid that some trouble might be created, and therefore I appointed temporarily officials to take over all government offices.

"'But I am now satisfied that everything is in good working order, and will leave both military and civil questions inside the wall to the central government.'"

As Chang Hsueh-liang is the central figure in Manchurian politics, a brief survey of his position is timely.

Supported by Chang Tso-hsiang, governor of Kirin and sworn brother of Chang Tso-lin, the Young Marshal's father, Chang Hsueh-liang is able to maintain a degree of balance not inherent in his own nature. He has, in addition, other able and powerful advisers such as W. H. Donald, Wellington Koo and Lo Wen-kan. The Young Marshal personally is extremely wealthy, said to have $50,000,000 in his own name. He is in control of the richest area in China. His move into North China cannot fail to strengthen a position which has recently been more stable than rumor-mongers would have it. The summary execution of Yang Yu-ting nearly two years ago has had a salutary effect on household intrigues.

N E Margetts

TDW/edb

Nelson E. Margetts
Lieutenant-Colonel, Field Artillery
Military Attache

Distribution:

4 MID
1 Files

G-2 Report 3400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

J-1

REPLACE 240
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
10 2657-J-3
WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Provincial and Municipal Govts. & Leading Personalities.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. SEP 10 1935

Provincial Governments

Province		Chairman
Anhwei	(1)	Liu Chen-hua
Chahar	(1)	Chin Te-ch'un (Acting)
Chekiang	(1)	Huang Shao-hsiung
Chinghai		Ma Lin
Fukien	(1)	Chen Yi
Heilungkiang	(5)	
Honan	(1)	Liu Chih
Hopei	(1)	Shang Chen
Hsikang (Sikang)		(Under organization - civil affairs under Liu Wen-hui of Szechwan)
Hunan	(1)	Ho Chien
Hupeh	(1)	Chang Chun
Jehol	(5)	
Kansu	(1)	Chu Shao-liang
Kiangsi	(1)	Hsiung Shih-hui
Kiangsu	(1)	Ch'en Kuo-fu
Kirin	(5)	
Kwangsi	(2)	Huang Hsu-ch'u
Kwangtung	(3)	Lin Yun-hai
Kweichow	(1)	Wu Chung-hsin
Liaoning	(5)	
Ninghsia	(1)	Ma Hung-k'uei
Shansi	(4)	Hsu Yung-ch'ang
Shantung	(1)	Han Fu-ch'u
Shensi	(1)	Shao Li-tze
Sinkiang		Li Jung
Suiyuan	(4)	Fu Tso-yi
Szechwan		Liu Hsiang
Yunnan	(1)	Lung Yun

Municipal Governments

Canton	(3)	Liu Chi-wen
Hankow	(1)	Wu Kuo-chen
Nanking	(1)	Ma Ch'ao-chun
Peiping	(1)	Yuan Liang
Shanghai	(1)	Wu T'ieh-ch'eng
Tientsin	(1)	Cheng K'e
Tsingtao	(1)	Admiral Shen Hung-lieh

(1) Appointed by and loyal to Chiang Kai-shek.
(2) The controlling politician in this province is Li Tsung-jen.
(3) " " " " " " " Ch'en Chi-t'ang
(4) " " " " " " " Yen Hsi-shan.
(5) Control of these provinces is nominal only, due to Japanese military occupation.

From M/A, China Report No. 9183 August 14, 1935

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Provincial and Municipal Govts.

Leading Personalities.

Source: Study in M/A Office.

COMMENTS: In the last year it will be noted that the number of Chairmen appointed by Chiang Kai-shek and noted as being loyal to him has increased. In North China a new problem has arisen due to increased Japanese pressure on that area. While it is too soon to say that the Japanese can choose the key Chinese officials for these provinces, yet it is certain that they can and have forced out many who have proved unacceptable to them.

Sung Che-yuan, the Chahar Chairman, was forced out by the Kuantung Army. Chin Te-ch'un, now acting in his place, is an unknown quantity. He was Sung's assistant and whether or not he will remain there as permanent Chairman remains to be seen.

In Szechwan, Liu Hsiang is still carried as independent. He was made Chairman originally by Nanking after he had eliminated all his competitors, though he was not Nanking's choice. Now that Chiang is in this province with his troops, Liu has no alternative but to accept the reorganization forced upon him by the Generalissimo. It is believed, however, that should Chiang's power be continued for some time in Szechwan, Liu will be converted to permanent loyalty to Nanking.

S. V. Constant
S. V. Constant
Major, Cavalry
Assistant Military Attache

Distribution:
6 MID
1 File

No. 9183 1st Ind. JWS:elh

Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peiping, China, August 14, 1935 - To: Chief, Military Intelligence Division, Washington, D.C.

Approved.

Joseph W. Stilwell
Joseph W. Stilwell
Lieutenant-Colonel, Infantry
Military Attache

G-2 Report

3400

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

6-1

JAN 16 1936
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL., INTEL. DIV.
WAR DEPARTMENT

2657-J-360

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Local Governments - General

Political Divisions of China

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JAN 16 1936

INTRODUCTION

China is nominally a country unified under the Kuomintang Government at Nanking. Actually, as every one knows, it is divided into several larger or smaller semi-autonomous local governments or spheres of influence. In the North we have the domain of Shantung under Han Fu-chu, for instance. In the South the Kwangtung-Kwangsi system. The development and changes in these local governments or spheres of influence have been recorded as they occur. But there has been no report from this office giving a picture of the distribution of governing power in the country as a whole as it is to-day.

BACKGROUND

Prior to the Kuomintang revolution of 1926-1928, all China was divided into the military domains of dozens of rival militarists.

In 1926 Chiang Kai-shek set out from Canton with the mission of bringing all China under the control of the Kuomintang. On the surface he succeeded except for Chang Tso-lin's three Manchurian Provinces. But by the time the Northern Expedition had reached Peiping its strength and vigor had waned considerably. In order to gain at least a nominal picture of unification, Chiang was forced to compromise with several Northern militarists besides Chang Tso-lin. Chiang conquered Central China. He never conquered the North. He won nominal submission by various political moves but was forced to leave many of the old school militarists in actual power.

In the South the defection from Chiang's regime of the two Kwang Provinces further reduced the area under his control.

Hence the appearance of the political map of China to-day. The great mass of Central China under direct control of the Generalissimo; in the North, several islands of independence under the rule of militarists who survived the campaign of 1926-27; in the South, the Kwangtung domain of Ch'en Chi-tang and the Kwangsi duumvirate, Li Tsung-jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi. It is the purpose of this report to outline these spheres of independence in order to give a picture of the distribution of power in China as a whole as it actually is to-day.

1. Shantung. Shantung has been independent of Nanking's actual control for practical purposes since 1932. It is the private property of its Chairman, Han Fu-chu. Han was a former lieutenant of Feng Yu-hsiang, but when Feng was fighting Chiang Kai-shek in 1930, Han Fu-chu knew which side his bread was

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Local Governments - General

Political Divisions of China

buttered on and "compromised" with the Generalissimo. As a reward, he was given the "Chairmanship" of Honan. Subsequently, he moved out of Honan with his army into Shantung to make himself an independent domain there at the expense of the existing rulers, Liu Chen-nien and Admiral Shen Hung-lieh, the Mayor of Tsingtao.

Liu was finally forced out of Shantung in 1932. Admiral Shen compromised with Han and retained considerable power until 1933 when his three cruisers "deserted to Nanking" leaving him without forces. Since then he has been completely under Han's control and Han reigns unrivalled and undisputed.

The relations between Shantung and Nanking have been excellent, based, as they are, on a policy of live and let live. Han collects the revenues of Shantung and allows Nanking a share of the salt and tobacco taxes in return for his military subsidy. All officials are appointed by Han though their warrants of course have the Nanking chop. But Han, however harmoniously he has gotten along with Nanking during the past few years, remains an independent warlord of the old type. In the next upheaval in China which way Shantung will jump is an unknown quantity.

Han Fu-chu maintains an excellent private army of five divisions. Four of these divisions are of Feng Yu-hsiang's old Kuominchun, for many years the most formidable troops in China. The fifth he added himself when Admiral Shen found himself bereft of naval power.

Han has been approached by Japan during the past year as what Northern general has not. He has listened carefully to their propositions, but so far has given no indication of wanting to play their way.

2. Shansi-Suiyuan.

These two provinces comprise the feudal satrapy of the "last of the barons" - Yen Hsi-shan. Yen was a returned Japanese military student serving in the old Imperial Army at the time of the 1911 revolution. He sided with the Republic and proceeded to conquer Shansi for the new regime. Having conquered that province, he settled down to be its lord and master, which he has been ever since except for a brief interval in 1930.

Yen was one of the old militarists with whom Chiang Kai-shek compromised on his Northern expedition. In return for being allowed to keep his province, Yen helped Chiang against the Fengtien Army in 1928. The alliance, however, was very short-lived. Yen's heart was certainly not in it. In

No. ~~9198~~ 9254

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Local Governments - General

Political Divisions of China

1930 Yen openly revolted against Nanking, attempting to revive the old Peking government with himself as leader. This movement was quickly suppressed and Yen was forced to flee to Dairen.

The following year, 1931, Yen took advantage of the Canton schism, coupled with Shih Yu-san's outbreak in Hopei, to return to Shansi by airplane from Dairen. Chiang Kai-shek had his hands very full at the time with other matters, and when Yen promised not to join in with Shih Yu-san, Chiang was very glad indeed to let him return to his old place of power. Yen had conquered Suiyuan from the Fengtien Army in 1928 and since that time Suiyuan has been included in his domain. He reigns with the title of "Pacification Commissioner for Shansi and Suiyuan". The Chairmen of these two provinces are his military lieutenants.

Yen is more independent of Nanking than his brother warlord, Han Fu-chu, in Shantung. In spite of his reputation as a model governor, he is really a capricious old despot. He is only 53 years of age at present but it is said that he is already becoming a little senile.

Yen has control of about ten divisions. The quality of his troops is doubtful. But Yen is so strongly entrenched politically in his domain that it is doubtful that he could be ousted by any National Government.

Yen Hsi-shan has apparently resisted Japanese advances. It is believed that in a showdown between Japan and China about Northern autonomy he will cast his lot with Nanking.

3. Chahar-Hopei.

Up to the summer of 1935, Chahar ranked as part of Nanking's territory under control of a dependable and unambitious general, Sung Che-yuan. But Japanese policy dictated that four-fifths of Chahar be demilitarized and added to their sphere of control. This left Sung Che-yuan with his powerful 29th Army on his hands and no place to go. Nanking was forced to get him out of Chahar as per Japanese orders and had no choice but to let him crowd into Hopei on top of Governor Shang Chen and his 32nd Army. It was inevitable that a contest of intrigue should ensue between the two generals for power in Hopei Province.

Shang Chen had up to this time governed Hopei as one of the provinces directly under Nanking. Changes are now taking place, the final outcome of which cannot be definitely predicted. As said above, a contest of intrigue has taken place between Sung Che-yuan and Shang Chen for power in Hopei. The Japanese, ever alert for such an opportunity, have backed Sung Che-yuan

No. ~~9198A~~ 9254

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Local Governments - General

Political Divisions of China

to the hilt with the expectation of Sung's cooperation in their schemes as a reward. It is believed that Sung let himself be led farther into the morass of intrigue with Japan than he intended, principally because of the schemes of his subordinate, Hsiao Chen-ying. To date, December 1935, the results of these machinations have been as follows: Shang Chen has been gradually forced out of all power in Hopei. It is said now that he is to be sent to another province - Shensi or Honan. Chahar and Hopei have been detached from Nanking's control and are to have some sort of autonomous government under Japanese auspices. Sung Che-yuan's future status will depend on how far he is willing to play the Japanese game. If he is willing to be their puppet he may be allowed to remain as nominal head of the new "autonomous" state. If not, he will be forced out just as was Shang Chen.

4. The Southwest Provinces.

The provinces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi maintain their independence of Nanking by means of an adamant offensive and defensive alliance between the Kwangtung warlord Ch'en Chi-tang and the Kwangsi duumvirate, Li Tsung-jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi. These warlords implemented the Canton revolt of 1930-31 and emerged from that revolt with their autonomous power tacitly recognized by Nanking. The nature of their government is fully described in G-2 Report No. 9215.

5. The Nanking Domain.

The remainder of China proper is under the direct control of the Nanking Government, which means under the direct control of Chiang Kai-shek. It includes the provinces of Kiangsu, Anhwei, Chekiang, Kiangsi, Fukien, Hunan, Honan, Hupeh, Shensi, Szechwan, Kweichow, Yunnan, Ninghsia, Chinghai and Sikang. The position of Russia in Outer Mongolia and Turkestan and the practical independence of Thibet put these vast districts outside the sphere of Chinese politics.

Nanking maintains its power within the sphere left to it by means of Chiang Kai-shek's military hierarchy. Only two provinces have civilian governors, - Kiangsu, in which Nanking is situated and which is directly under the thumb of the Generalissimo; and Shensi, which is the present communist battleground.

The governors of all the other provinces are tried and true veterans of Chiang's old army that conquered Central China in 1926-27. They are all strictly military men and so regard themselves. An order to them is not an order unless it comes from their military commander, Chiang Kai-shek.

No. ~~9198~~ 9254

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Local Governments - General

Political Divisions of China

SUMMARY.

Attached hereto is a map of China showing the distribution of power in China proper. It will show the following divisions:

1. Shantung, the domain of Han Fu-chu.
2. Shansi-Suiyuan, the domain of Yen Hsi-shan.
3. Chahar-Hopei, autonomous under Japanese auspices.
4. Kwangtung-Kwangsi, the "Government of the Southwestern Provinces".
5. The Nanking Domain.

COMMENTS.

China proper is unified only in the sense that the larger part of it is under the control of one military leader who rules by means of his military subordinates. When, for any reason, this military hierarchy breaks down, the domain of Nanking will fly into as many component bits as there are military leaders.

Joseph W. Stilwell

B A T

Joseph W. Stilwell
Colonel, Infantry
Military Attache

1 map attached

Distribution:
6 MID
1 File

No. ~~2198-A~~ 9254

41
DEPTH CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
SEP 19 1928
26J7.9-361
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CHINA (Political)

Subject: The Fifth Plenary Session of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. SEP 18 1928

After several disagreements and postponements the Fifth Plenary Session of the Central Executive and Central Supervisory Committees, originally scheduled to start on August 1st, was finally opened in Nanking on August 8th, and despite a subsequent factional split which seriously threatened the break-up of the session, has smoothed out all major party differences and reached several very important decisions on party and governmental affairs.

Preliminary Disagreements and Postponement of Opening.

Even before the date set for the opening meeting, friction developed between the various groups on the Executive Committee over the proposals of the radical group from Canton, who announced that they would not take part in the session until assurances had been received that their proposals would be placed on the agenda for the session. The moderate and conservative groups refusing to consider the radical Canton program, which called for a complete revision of the existing platform of the Kuomintang to the end that the party reign supreme, the day set for the opening found the Canton group missing and the session lacking a quorum. A postponement of the formal opening until August 4th was decided upon by the members already assembled in Nanking in order to give time to certain absent members to reach Nanking and to allow sufficient time to discuss in advance just who should be allowed to attend. Several informal meetings were held on the 1st and 2nd, with 24 members participating, including Chiang Kai-shek, Li Tsung-jen, Li Chi-shen, Tsai Yuan-pei and other prominent members, all of which resolved themselves into a discussion of the same issue that delayed the opening of the Fourth Session last December - whether or not the radical members of the Committee should be given seats in the session. Although a formal invitation to attend had been sent the Canton clique by the Committee Secretariat, certain groups, headed by Wu Chih-hui and Tsai Yuan-pei, representing the Supervisory Council and the conservative factions, contended that they should be barred from attendance until the Third National Congress had passed on their status, as all the members of the group had been barred last December for alleged complicity in the Canton Communist Corps. Another group headed by Li Tsung-jen of the Kwanghsi faction, insisted that the radicals should be admitted so that the session could proceed with the more important work before it, and the matter came to a deadlock.

No decision on this question was reached at the first preliminary session presided over by Chiang Kai-shek, the meeting proceeding to a discussion of the bills to come up before the regular session, which, it was agreed, would be formally opened on August 4th. A circular telegram was sent to all branch offices of the Party asking for suggestions for carrying out a new administrative and economic

policy suitable to existing conditions, and several delegations were received urging unification of finances, disbandment of troops, a national budget, tariff autonomy and various other reforms. A preliminary discussion was held of the bills to be presented to the coming session, but no real business was transacted and no important decisions reached.

The question of admitting the Canton members not having been decided by the 4th, the formal opening was again postponed to August 8th and another preliminary meeting arranged for on August 7th. Although considerable disagreement still existed, Chiang Kai-shek and Li Tsung-jen finally persuaded the meeting to bury past differences and invite the radical members, and on August 6th General Chiang himself went to Shanghai to conciliate the group and urge its attendance. His efforts resulted in the promise of five of the clique to attend, the most radical members, Ku Meng-yu and Chu Kung-po, who were most active in the cooperation with the Soviet Russians last year, flatly refusing to have anything to do with the session.

It was also decided at the first preliminary meeting to elect Feng Yu-hsiang, Yen Hsi-shan and Admiral Yang Shu-chwang to membership on the Committee and invite them to attend. To this invitation Feng replied that he would not attend unless his opinions were specially requested, and General Yen, being unable to attend himself on account of illness, named three delegates to represent him in the session. Feng did attend some of the late sessions however.

At another informal meeting on August 7th, presided over by Gen. Yu Yu-jen, a presidium for the coming session was formed of Gen. T'an Yen-k'ai, Gen. Chiang Kai-shek, Mr. Tai Chuan-yen and Mr. Ting Wei-fen, and the committee for the examination of proposals and bills divided into 3 sub-committees; the First, presided over by Gen. Yu Yu-jen to examine all bills on Kuomintang affairs, the Second, under T'an Yen-k'ai to consider all proposals concerning the Nationalist Government, and the Third, under Chiang Kai-shek, to review all proposals relating to the army and military affairs; the work of all sub-committees to be completed by the 10th and the important matters put on the agenda for the conference on that day.

Formal Opening and Results of First Meeting.

The first regular meeting of the session was formally opened on August 8th with 38 members present, including all the Canton members except Ku Meng-yu and Chen Kung-po. Feng Yu-hsiang did not attend.

After a brief formal ceremony including the reading of the will of the late Sun Yat-sen, a three minutes' silence for the revolutionary dead and an opening address by Chiang Kai-shek, a business session was held under the chairmanship of T'an Yen-k'ai. After adopting a message of encouragement to the officers and men of the revolutionary armies in the North, it was decided at this meeting that

1. The funeral of Sun Yat-sen would be held on January 1, 1929.

CHINA (Political)

Subject: The Fifth Plenary Session of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee.

2. All bills for the reorganization of Party affairs would be referred to a special committee which will report to the Plenary Session later.

3. All proposals submitted to the Plenary Session will be referred to the three sub-committees appointed at the preliminary meetings.

4. The next regular meeting would be called on August 10th.

The three sub-committees started work at once on the numerous bills brought up for consideration, about 100 in number, among the most important of which was that submitted by T'an Yen-k'ai and Tsai Yuan-pei advocating:

1. Immediate abolition of extraterritoriality and retrocession of foreign concessions, settlements and leased territories.

2. Demand for immediate withdrawal of foreign troops and warships and closing of inland rivers to foreign warships and merchantmen.

3. Abrogation of unequal treaties and if powers concerned reject China's demands and new treaties not concluded in six months, nationals of powers concerned to be treated as non-treaty aliens.

4. Enforcement of tariff autonomy in January, 1929 without recourse to a tariff conference with interested powers.

Considerable discussion also took place over Chiang Kai-shek's plan for disbandment of troops and reorganization of the Army, Soong's financial reforms, Feng's proposal for establishment of a National Defense Council and an Army Affairs Council to replace the present Military Council, and various radical proposals of the younger members of the Canton factions. Most of these more important matters, after a general discussion, were referred to permanent committees for more detailed consideration, and will be reported on at a later date.

By far the most difficult problems confronting the session, however, were the questions of abolishing the branch political councils and the suppression of student participation in political affairs, both of which involved fundamental party and factional differences, and over which a definite split occurred and a complete breakdown seriously threatened.

The left wing, headed by the radical faction, demanded that mass meetings be made part of the policy of the government and that the Branch Political Councils be abolished, the latter on the grounds that these organizations tend to defeat financial consolidation and split the country into rival spheres of power. This view was also held by Chiang Kai-shek, T. V. Soong and others of the moderate group, who were thus, strangely enough, aligned in the following quarrel with the Canton faction to whom they were previously opposed.

CHINA (Political)

Subject: The Fifth Plenary Session of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee.

The older conservative members of the party, headed by Chang Ching-kiang, Li Shih-tseng, Wu Tze-hui and Tsai Yuan-pei, sided with the Kwanghsi group, lead by Li Tsung-jen, Pai Chung-hsi, and Li Chai-sum, and closely associated with Feng, who strongly advocated the retention of the branch councils, holding that they were not dangerous units but merely branches of the Nanking Government which would tend to give local strength and support to the party.

The aims of the Kwanghsi faction, possessing the greatest military strength, in possession of all the railways and strategic points in China, and closely supported by Feng, had been apparent for some time. That this group firmly intended keeping its territory outside the Nanking authority was clear from its efforts some time ago to retain its financial independence of Nanking, and unless the branch councils were soon abolished and their political power checked the complete dominance of the party and the government by this group was inevitable.

All efforts at a compromise met with failure and with the sudden departure on August 9th of Chiang Ching-kiang and Li Shih-tsung, leaders of the old party group, a resumption of the session seemed extremely doubtful.

Compromises Reached and Session Resumed.

Although the absence of Chang Ching-kiang and Li Shih-tsung would still leave a quorum, it was felt by the remaining members that their absence would have a demoralizing effect on the conference, as they had a strong influence among older members of the party, and that a real danger existed that the split might result in a breaking out of new factional wars. Repeated efforts were consequently made to bring about the return of the absent members, but all without result, and the 2nd session was opened on August 11th without them.

At the second meeting resolutions were passed on plans for revolutionary unification and popular movements, and a resolution adopted calling for a constitution and legislative and supervisory boards for the Nationalist Government, but it adjourned without deciding on the troublesome question of the branch councils. Views were expressed, however, favoring the withdrawal of the bill from the conference and leaving it to the Central Party Conference in January, or settling it by compromise as it had reached a deadlock and the session was likely to break up over it.

Through the strong cooperation of Chiang Kai-shek and T'an Yen-k'ai and their ceaseless efforts to bring about a reconciliation and a successful conclusion to the session, the leaders of the Canton group, who had gone to Shanghai, except Chiang Ching-kiang, were finally persuaded to return for the third meeting to be held on August 13th, and the other factions reconciled to a compromise.

Report

CHINA (Political)

Subject: The Fifth Plenary Session of Kuomintang Central Executive Committee.

The Third Meeting.

The reconciliation having been effected, the third meeting was held on August 13th, when an effective and satisfactory compromise was reached by deciding that:

1. Membership in the Central Political Council will be fixed at 46 and members of the Council will be appointed by the Central Executive Committee.

2. Branch Political Councils will be abolished at the end of this year and their authority gradually restricted in the meantime.

3. A committee of technical experts will be organized to work out detailed regulations governing the organization of the Central Executive Committee after the present session.

The Fourth Meeting.

A fourth meeting was decided upon for August 15th, at which time it is expected the remaining problems before the conference can be discussed and the Fifth Plenary Session adjourned.

Distribution:
4 MID
1 Tientsin
1 File

Helmer W. Lystad
First Lieutenant, Infantry.

1st Ind.

Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peking, China, August 16, 1928 - To A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D. C.

Forwarded.

John W. Carroll
Captain, Cavalry

For and in the absence of:

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

ASSIST CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
1928 2657-D-36 OCT 30
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CHINA (Political)

Subject: The Fifth Plenary Session of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee.

(Continuation of Report No. 7312.)

2657-D-36 (1) RECEIVED G/2 W.D. OCT 2 1928

After a very successful meeting on August 14th at which a number of important decisions were reached, the Fifth Plenary Session of the Central Executive and Central Supervisory Committees of the Kuomintang was brought to a formal close on the afternoon of August 15th. Notwithstanding the sharp differences attending the opening meeting, and which precipitated a crisis during the session, the later meetings were marked by a spirit of moderation and willingness to sacrifice factional to party interests entirely unexpected in a Chinese political body representing as many divergent views and interests as the present Kuomintang.

Except for the absence of two of the Old Party leaders who left in protest against the admission of the radical group, all factions and elements were fully represented in the later meetings, and although strong differences of opinion still existed on important questions of party and governmental policy, these differences were frankly stated and openly discussed in the meetings, and compromise agreements reached which received almost unanimous approval. Contrary to expectations in many quarters, the radical group did not dominate the session and the action taken on the more important questions leaves the moderates still in substantial control of the party and government.

Although no predictions can be made as to the ultimate results of the session, the conciliatory attitude and the willingness to cooperate shown by the various groups at the last meetings of the session would indicate that the Nationalist administration has materially strengthened its foundations and will soon be able to proceed with its program of reconstruction.

The results of the last meeting were as follows:

1. Proposed Constitution.

The recommendations of the Law Codification Bureau for the drafting of a Constitution were approved in principle by the session and the bill referred to the Central Executive Committee for the working out of details and presentation to the Third National Party Congress. These proposals called for the formulation, within a specified period, of a provisional Constitution containing a definition of the rights and obligations of the people, a definition of the regulations and organization of the Central Government, a definition of the powers and functions of the local governments, and a definition of the relationship between the party and the government.

2. Reorganization of the Nationalist Government.

The meeting decided to proceed at once with the organization of the five major governmental departments called for in Dr. Sun Yat-sen's book on the reconstruction of the Chinese Republic - executive, legislative, judicial, supervisory and examination. Under the executive

CHINA (Political)

Subject: The Fifth Plenary Session of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee.

department will be established ministries of foreign affairs, the interior, education, communications, trade and commerce, and agriculture and mines. In addition to these departments there will be bureaus on reconstruction, emigration, and Mongolian and Tibetan affairs. The organization of these departments and ministries and the order in which they will be established was referred to the Central Executive Committee for decision.

3. Disbandment of Troops and Military Unification.

The session approved the general principles outlined in the disbandment proposals of Chiang Kai-shek and went on record as favoring unification of military administration and adoption of a system of conscription. The existing armies are to be reduced as soon as possible so that the total military expenses of the government will not exceed fifty per cent of the annual receipts, and the disbanded troops will be used for road construction and other reconstruction projects. It was further decided that military education should be unified and under the Central Government, and that no military leader should be permitted to organize military schools or schools of a military charact er. The working out of details of the various plans has been left to the Nationalist Government.

4. Financial Reforms.

The bill submitted by T. V. Soong, Minister of Finance, for the unification of national finances, establishment of a budget system, reorganization of taxation and adoption of a financial and economic policy to improve the living conditions of the people, was adopted by the meeting and referred to the Nationalist Government for the working out of details.

5. The Central Executive Committee.

The bill suggesting that members of the Central Executive Committee be required to remain in Nanking to attend to the duties of the Committee was approved, and it was decided that all decisions of the Political Council should be referred by the Central Executive Committee to the Nationalist Government for execution.

6. Abolition of University Council.

The Nanking University Council will be abolished and in its stead a Ministry of Education established in accordance with the principles advocated by Sun Yat-sen. Other matters relating to education were referred to the Standing Committee of the Government.

7. Foreign Relations.

The foreign relations bill submitted by the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee and the bill proposed by Wang Fan-chin calling for an anti-imperialist foreign policy were both referred to the Central Political Council.

Report

CHINA (Political)

Subject: The Fifth Plenary Session of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee.

8. Third National Party Congress.

The third National Congress of Kuomintang delegates will be convened at Nanking on January 1, 1929.

Helmer W. Lystad
First Lieutenant, Infantry.

1st Ind.

Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peking, China - August 29, 1928 - to: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D.C.

Forwarded.

John W. Carroll
Captain, Cavalry

For and in the absence of

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

4-1
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
MAY 1 1929
2657-8-361
3
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CHINA (Political)

Subject: The Third National Congress.

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. APR 30 1929

Two major problems confronted the Kuomintang with the opening of the new year. One was the National Disbandment and Reorganization Conference which was successfully held in Nanking and was duly reported by this office, and the other was the Third National Congress.

To understand why there has been so much to-do in Kuomintang circles over this congress, it is necessary to look briefly at the political structure, the Kuomintang. In its original inception and throughout a part of 1927, the members of the organization exposed a fairly uniform front. They were revolutionists, mildly communistic, anti-imperialistic, and as a whole truly patriotic. The membership was not large and due to cleverly manipulated propaganda, and to uniformity of purpose, presented a consubstantiality of aim and idea which permitted a large degree of harmony. With the accomplishment of their purpose, the military subjugation of China, and the rapid influx of new members as well as new ideas, the homogeneity of the party broke down into heterogeneous groups. There were not enough offices or prizes to go around, or to even partially satisfy the hunger of those whose appetites had been over-stimulated on the aperitifs of communistic propaganda. Therefore the Kuomintang came to represent not a single party or purpose or idea, but rather became an electorate with all of the cross-purposes and varied ambitions of the combined voters in our own country, for instance. The Kuomintang then, has its center, right, and left, and its "Bull Moosers", quite like an electorate but not like a unified party.

Not so marked at the time of

One of the groups which go to make up this above-mentioned party, a group which is certainly not right and certainly not center, but contains leading figures of both the right and the center, and the powerful Chekiang clique, is the governing group. This group is led

CHINA (Political)

Subject: The Third National Congress.

by the able politician, Chiang Kai-shek, and is in fact the government of China.

When the time came to plan for the congress, a congress which had been often promised and once postponed, the governing group saw at once that they were outnumbered and embraced the need of protecting their own interests, which are also the interests of the Chinese Government, by permitting friendly delegates only to attend the congress and keeping their enemies, as far as possible, at a distance.

Since the government was wholly in the hands of this governing group, it was not difficult for regulations to be promulgated which guaranteed that only friends should attend, and so when the congress opened on March 15th, of the 211 delegates, there were only a very few whose vote could not be depended upon. 356 delegates had been allowed as the full quota by law.

Naturally the repercussions of this political move, or more strictly, this series of political moves which "packed" the congress, shook the country and were evidenced in fiery manifestoes from all over China, and by a genuine fear of a large and powerful minority in the Kuomintang that unless action were taken at once they would be forever outside the pale. Feng Yu-hsiang telegraphed advising that the congress be postponed, and later resigned as Minister of War; the leftists issued a statement to the effect that the congress was unconstitutional and Yu Yu-jen, one of the oldest members of the Kuomintang, threatened to convene an opposition congress in Canton; Hupeh and Honan Provincial Directory Committees protested against the selection of the delegates by the Central Government, pointing out that many of those appointed had never even visited the districts they were supposed to represent, and the Kalgan Provincial Directorate protested because out of the five

CHINA (Politica 1)

Subject: The Third National Congress.

delegates representing Kalgan, Suiyuan and Chahar, only one had any knowledge of or interest in the section he represented.

To an observer here it would seem that much of the protest could have been stifled had the political machinations of the government been more astute, for had all of the conflicting groups been represented in the congress, control would not necessarily have been lost, and the very just complaint of "packing" would not have been heard.

In spite of the opposition, which for a time made it appear that a quorum could not be assembled, the congress met according to the regulations appearing below, which were promulgated by the Central Executive Committee on December 15, 1928:

> Art. 1. -- The Third National Congress shall be composed of the delegates elected by the Provincial Party Headquarters, Special Municipality Party Headquarters, Special Party Headquarters attached to various Armies, Railways, Seamen's Special Party Headquarters and the Oversea Party Headquarters as well as those delegates designated by the Central Party Headquarters.
>
> Art. 2. -- The presidium of the Third National Congress shall be constituted by a number of members of the Central Executive Committee after their nomination shall have been passed by the Congress.
>
> Art. 3. -- The Session of the Congress shall be for 10 days, but it may be prolonged, if necessary.
>
> Art. 4. -- The functions and powers of the Congress shall be as follows:
>
> a) To receive and adopt the reports of the Central Executive Committee and other departments of the Central Party Headquarters.
> b) To revise the platforms and regulations of the Party.
> c) To decide upon the policies to be pursued according to existing conditions.
> d) To determine the number of the members and reserve members of the Central Executive and the Central Supervisory Committees.
> e) To elect the members and the reserve members of the Central Executive and the Central Supervisory Committees.
>
> Art. 5. -- The Congress shall be formally opened only when a quorum of more than one half of the delegates is present.

CHINA (Political)

Subject; The Third National Congress.

Art. 6. -- All members of the Central Executive and the Central Supervisory Committees shall attend the general sessions of the Congress; while the reserve members may also be present, they shall only have the right of expression but not the right of voting.

Art. 7. -- All questions before the Congress shall be decided by a majority of the delegates in attendance. When the delegates are evenly divided over any issue, the question shall be referred to the Chairman for decision.

Art. 8. -- The general sessions of the Congress shall be open to the public. Spectators and guests shall, however, be excluded, whenever the Chairman or more than ten delegates decide that the session should be closed to the public.

Art. 9. -- The rules of procedure of the Congress, the regulations governing the admission of spectators and the official tickets of admission for the spectators shall be separately determined.

Art. 10.-- The expenses of the Congress shall be determined by the Central Executive Committee.

Art. 11.-- The Congress shall be held at the Central Party Headquarters.

Art. 12.-- The Secretariat of the Congress and the Committee for examining the qualifications of the delegates shall consist of members of the Central Executive Committee.

Art. 13.-- The Congress shall have a Proposals Investigating Committee and a Committee for the drafting of the manifesto; members thereof shall be nominated by the Congress.

Art. 14.-- These regulations shall be adopted for enforcement by the Central Executive Committee.

Business of the Congress.

On the morning of March 18th, the 1st General Session was opened, and reports from the Acting Chief Secretary, Yeh Tso-chang, were submitted. The 2nd General Session was held the same afternoon and instructed the State Council to issue a mandate ordering the cessation of military activities in Hunan by General Yeh Chi, and promulgated a ruling providing that no Party Headquarters in any section of the country could carry on a convention or hold a meeting during the term of the present congress. Sic!

The 3rd and 4th General Sessions were held on March 19th, when more reports were submitted and resolutions adopted approving the action of the Central Executive Committee in dismissing members of its committee who showed communistic tendencies, and in dismissing Cheng Chien, the Commander of the old 6th Army.

#7478

CHINA (Political)

Subject: The Third National Congress.

On March 20th, the 5th General Session convened. Various reports on party affairs were submitted and resolutions adopted concerning the educational policy, and the punishment of Wang Ching-wei and eight others for their implication in the communist uprising in Canton in December, 1927.

The 6th and 7th General Sessions were held on March 21st. First, reports on party affairs were submitted, and then resolutions were adopted stating that the selection of the plum flower as the Chinese national flower was not a matter of urgency and might wait; and commending Chiang Kai-shek for his efforts for the party and the nation.

The 8th General Session was held on March 22nd. Reports on party affairs were first submitted and a special report from Chiang Kai-shek on military affairs was rendered, and a resolution was passed to the effect that the number of members of the Central Executive Committee and the Supervisory Committee remain the same as before.

On March 23rd, the 9th General Session of the Third National Congress was convened and formulated a procedure for the election of members to the Central Executive Committee. A motion was passed giving the government full authority and carte blanche in the Hunan-Hupeh situation. That afternoon the 10th General Session was held, at which party affairs were discussed.

The 11th General Session was held on the morning of March 25th, when the election of new members to both the Central Executive Committee and the Supervisory Committee took place. At the 12th Session in the afternoon there was a discussion of bills to revise the Party Constitution, on education, and a conference on Hunan party affairs.

On March 26th, the 12th and 13th Sessions were held. In the morning, the 12th Session, minor amendments were made in the constitution, and in the afternoon new members were elected to the Central Executive Committee and to the Supervisory Committee.

#7478

CHINA (Political)

Subject: The Third National Congress.

On March 27th, in the 14th General Session, elections were completed to the Central Executive Committee and to the Supervisory Committee. The 15th and final General Session was held in the afternoon. Following a fiery speech by Chiang Kai-shek in which he denounced them as traitors, a motion was put by Hu Han-min, usually a moderate, expelling Li Chai-sum, Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi from the party. This motion was adopted. Chiang Kai-shek stated that shortly he was leaving for the front.

On March 28th, the closing session of the Third National Congress was held. The following principles were adopted in regard to China's foreign relations:

1) That the government should take such steps as are deemed fit and proper for the purpose of effecting the abolition of all the unequal treaties to the end that China will gain complete equality in the family of nations.

2) That regulations should be drafted along the following lines regarding the most-favored-nation treatment: (1) That the most-favored-nation treatment should be accorded to only those countries which have given up their unequal treaties with China; (2) That the granting of the most-favored-nation treatment should be conditional and that the conditions must be beneficial to the economic development of China; (3) That the most-favored-nation treatment should not be granted unconditionally.

3) That with the sanction of the central executive committee of the central Kuomintang, the national government may negotiate foreign loans intended to advance the politic and economic development of China, but no local officials shall be allowed to raise foreign loans.

4) That on the basis of the foreign policy of the party, the central government should devise a plan for the repayment of China's foreign loans.

The closing ceremonies were marked by the absence of all members of the Kwangsi faction and many of the party elders of the Kuomintang—Wu Chi-hui, Dr. Tsai Yuan-pei, and others.

In the foregoing, I have aimed to show that the Third National Congress was not only not representative of the country at large but also was not representative of the Kuomintang. Paramount personages such

#7478

G-2 Report

CHINA (Political)

Subject: The Third National Congress.

as Yen Hsi-shan, Feng Yu-hsiang, Li Tsung-jen, Pai Chung-hsi and Chang Hsueh-liang did not attend. There was no representation from the Three Eastern Provinces, and by and large the best that can be said is that the congress represented only the present governing clique. Since no machinery for the impartial election of delegates exists, it is safe to state that whoever had been in power—the lefts or the rights— the results would have been the same, and the congress as little representative as this one. It is believed that the present regime has done itself more harm than good in convening the congress, and made far more enemies than friends.

Parker G. Tenney
Captain, Field Artillery,
Assistant Military Attache

1st Ind.

Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peking, China, March 29, 1929 - To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D. C.

Forwarded.

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

G-2 Report

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
JAN 17 1931
2657-D-361
4
WAR DEPARTMENT

4-1

THE FOURTH PLENARY SESSION

of the

CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE KUOMINTANG

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JAN 16 1931

The Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang held its Fourth Plenary Session between November twelfth and eighteenth. The first meeting opened with twenty-nine members of the Central Executive Committee, nine members of the Central Supervisory Committee, and seventeen reserve members of the above two committees in attendance. Chiang Kai-shek presided.

During the sessions fifty-eight proposals were submitted. By no means were all of these adopted, and several of those adopted were merely accepted "in principle".

Among the important items decided upon were the following:

1. Each governmental organ must submit a budget. Officials found guilty of embezzlement will be punished by life imprisonment or death.

2. Government revenues must be deposited in the Central Bank of China or other state (Chinese) banks. Accounting systems are to be standardized.

3. Officials of the National Government are forbidden to engage in private business.

4. Nepotism is strictly forbidden.

5. General Chiang Kai-shek is personally to assume command of the anti-communist and bandit campaign.

6. $2,000,000 were appropriated for the completion of the Sun Yat-sen Memorial in Nanking.

7. The National Disbandment and Reorganization Committee is abolished. The Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Navy and Air Force will hereafter take over the duties of this committee.

8. An $8,000,000 loan will be floated for famine relief in Shensi.

9. The proposed Customs barrier at Hongkong is cancelled as being likely to interfere with the development of Canton.

10. The construction of Chung-shan free port will be pushed to an early completion.

11. General amnesty is granted to all political offenders except "principal rebels against the party and the nation, incorrigible communists and those guilty of treasonable acts". This resolution is effected due to a recognition that China cannot afford to let her already limited number of talented men hold aloof from public service.

12. There were numerous resolutions passed calling for a

reform of government administration, the determination of fundamental government policies for the immediate future, etc.

13. In principle, it was decided to divide China into some seventy provinces. A committee of experts was appointed to devise means for demarcation.

14. The Ministry of Agriculture and Mining was amalgamated with that of Commerce, Industry and Labor. Likewise, the Ministry of Health was merged with the Ministry of the Interior.

15. It was decided to set aside certain grounds for foreign Legations in Nanking.

The Organic Law of the National Government was revised as follows:

The "State Council" (Kuo-Wu-Hui-I) under the old Law will be designated hereafter and be known as the "National Government Council" (Kuo-Min-Cheng-Fu-Hui-I) under the new Law.

Under the new Law, the "State Council" (Kuo-Wu-Hui-I) becomes a lesser organ, replacing and corresponding to the meetings heretofore of the Executive Yuan under the old Law, and will be composed precisely of the President and Vice-President of the Executive Yuan, the various Ministers, and the Chairman of the various Commissions, with the President of the Executive Yuan as Chairman of the new "State Council".

Also, whereas under the old Law, laws promulgated and mandates issued had to be signed by the President of the National Government and countersigned by the Presidents of all of the five Yuan: now, according to the revised Law, the countersignature of the President of the Legislative Yuan only is necessary in the case of promulgation of laws; and the countersignature only of the President of the Yuan concerned is necessary in the case of the issue of Mandates.

The changes in the Organic Law will therefore read as follows:

(Old Law) Art. XI. - The National Government shall conduct national affairs through the State Council (Kuo-Wu-Hui-I).

The State Council shall be composed of the State Councillors of the National Government, and the President of the National Government shall be the Chairman of the State Council.

(Revised Law) Art. XI. - The National Government Council (Kuo-Min-Cheng-Fu-Hui-I) shall be composed of the Councillors of the National Government and the President of the National Government shall be the Chairman of the National Government Council.

(Old Law) Art. XIII. - All laws promulgated and all mandates issued by virtue of a decision of the State Council shall be signed by the President of the National Government and countersigned by the Presidents of the five Yuan.

(Revised Law) Art. XIII. - All laws promulgated shall be signed by the President of the National Government and countersigned by the President of the Legislative Yuan. All mandates issued shall be signed by the President of the National Government and countersigned by the President of the Yuan concerned.

(Old Law) Art. XXI. - Meetings of the Executive Yuan shall be attended by the President, the Vice-President, the Ministers of the various

Ministries, and the Chairman of the various Commissions, and presided over by the President of the said Yuan.

(Revised Law) Art. XXI. - The State Council (Kuo-Wu-Hui-I) shall be composed of the President and the Vice-President of the Executive Yuan, the Ministers of the various Ministries and the Chairman of the various Commissions; and the President of the Executive Yuan shall be the Chairman of the State Council.

The following were announced as the Fundamental Policies of the Central Government:

1. Eradication of communism and banditry within six months,
2. Rigid enforcement of opium suppression,
3. Rehabilitation and financial adjustment of the army,
4. Improvement of communications and waterways,
5. Abolition of likin by Jan. 1, 1931,
6. Rewarding of persons who have rendered meritorious services to the country or revolution,
7. Realization of district autonomy in the shortest possible time,
8. Financial rehabilitation and the liquidation of foreign and domestic loans.

Party Affairs

Aside from matters directly concerning the administration of the government, the following party matters were discussed:

1. Determination of the work of Party Members,
2. Determination of the work of Party Headquarters,
3. Reduction of the number of Party organs,
4. Reorganization of Provincial and District Party Headquarters,
5. Removal of the names of rebels from the Party rolls,
6. Election of new members of the Central Executive Committee to take the places of those expelled.
7. Allocation of expenses for the various Provincial and District Party Headquarters.
8. Subject matter of the weekly memorial meetings to be based in future upon the teachings of the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen or reports from the various party Headquarters.

Responsible leaders of the Government have admitted from time to time that Party workers in some of the district Party headquarters have often exceeded their authority and interfered with the administration of the local governments. Party members are exhorted "to refrain absolutely from encroaching upon the jurisdiction of Government Administrative and Judicial organs, so as not to arouse the opposition of the people. They should exert themselves to promote the welfare of society, and, in order to attain their object, should pay particular attention to free schools, rural edication and public libraries."

Personnel

Important changes in personnel occurred when C. T. Wang and Chen Yao-ling were elected members of the Central Executive Committee to replace T'an Yen-k'ai (deceased) and Yen Hsi-shan (expelled) Chang Tseng replaced Chao Tai-wen (expelled) as a member of the Central Executive Committee.

Chang Hsueh-liang officially was made a member of the Party with authority to extend the activities of the Kuomintang in Manchuria. He was empowered to award certificates of membership to military and civil

officials in the Three Eastern Provinces who have rendered meritorious service to Party and State.

Conclusion

It is felt that comment and prophecy on each of the various resolutions would be idle speculation and would lead one afar. So much obviously depends on the future stability of the National Government and on the strength of its leaders that predictions, in view of China's recent history, could be but fraught with wholesale doubts as to the probable effectiveness of any of these resolutions.

However, the psychological moment for a fundamental change in Chinese government seems to have appeared. The stage settings appears in excellent order, the principal actors at least know their lines. What will happen behind the curtain can be judged only by the past. If China succeeds with this opportunity, it can be no less than a blow to the theories of those who hold that the Chinese are fundamentally unfit to govern themselves according to western standards.

Chang Hsueh-liang, by going to Nanking at the time of this session, has given "face" to the National Government and strength follows "face" in China. The immediate effect of this visit was the eclipsing of Hu Han-min who had hoped to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek by parliamentary moves. If Chang Hsueh-liang's words, "....I will follow President Chiang and all Party comrades in doing my duty to the country....I will faithfully obey the orders and wishes of the Central authorities in defending the borders of the country..." are not of the usual tenor of political speech (i.e., with the silent reservation of "according to my own ideas on the subject") then indeed a new type has emerged on the Chinese stage.

Chiang Kai-shek's concurrent posts of Chairman of the National Government and Chairman of the Executive Yuan confer upon him a virtual dictatorship. That Chiang is a strong man, when judged by any nation's political standards, cannot be denied.

The program of the National Government and of the Kuomintang is squarely before the leaders of the respective organs. Observers of China await with interest and with doubts the consummation of actual deeds.

TDW/edb

Distribution :

4 MID
1 File

N E Margetts

Nelson E. Margetts
Lieutenant-Colonel, Field Artillery
Military Attache

NO OBJECTION TO
UNLIMITED CIRCULATION
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

G-2 Report

2657-D-36/1
FEB 6 1932
WAR DEPARTMENT
RECEIVED G/2 W. D. FEB 1932

CHINA (Political)

Subject: First Plenary Session of the Fourth Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang

The first regular meeting of the First Plenary Session of the Fourth Central Executive Committee was held in Nanking on December 24, 1931. Mr. Sun Fo presided over the 100 members in attendance. The meeting ended without accomplishment after a lengthy debate on the proposed reforms of the central government system.

The second regular meeting took place on December 25th when the debate was continued, resulting in the adoption of 5 proposals, as follows:

1. Reform of the central government system.
2. Effective guaranty of the people's freedom of speech and of the press, right of free assembly and free formation of associations, freedom of conscience and right of freedom of residence.
3. Reorganization of the central financial system.
4. Stabilization of the domestic bonds.
5. Enlargement of the Standing Committee of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Committee by the addition of six members.

The proposal concerning the reform of the central governmental system as adopted at the meeting provides for the remodelling of the National Government along the lines of the Cabinet system, with the President of the Executive Yuan serving in the capacity of Prime Minister. The President of the National Government, though titular head of the State, will have no actual executive powers and will occupy a position similar to that of the French President.

The following is a translation of the proposal:

1. The President of the National Government shall be the Head of the Republic of China and shall represent the State both internally and internationally. He shall have no actual political responsibility and shall not hold any concurrent governmental post. His term of office shall be two years and he may be eligible for re-election for a second term; provided, however, that in the event of a Permanent Constitution being promulgated, a new election shall be held in accordance with the said Constitution.
2. There shall be a National Government Committee with an appropriate number of constituent members.
3. Before the promulgation of a Permanent Constitution, the Executive, Legislative, Judicial, Control and Examination Yuan shall be severally (but not jointly) responsible to the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang.
4. The President of the Executive Yuan shall have actual executive responsibility.
5. The President of the National Government and the Presidents of the five Yuan shall be elected by the Central Executive Committee.

For the purpose of preventing graft and other abuses inherent in the existing system of financial administration, a reorganization of the central system was adopted, the general principles of which are:

1. A system of independent financial control shall be put into effect. Members of government organs in charge of budgeting, accounting, and statistics shall be made independent of the heads of such organs and thus enabled to discharge their duties independently. The adoption of such a system will prove efficacious in preventing graft and corruption by making collusion between accounting officials and the heads of the various government organs a virtual impossibility.

CHINA (Political)

Subject: First Plenary Session of the Fourth Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang

2. An effective system of auditing and supervision shall be introduced so that auditors and inspectors may investigate the financial status of a given government organ without the intervention of third parties, thereby minimizing the possibility of misrepresentation and compilation of false reports.

3. Government officials responsible for the custody of public funds or in charge of revenue collection shall deposit cash securities with the National Treasury in order to prevent peculation and misappropriation

4. With the exception of the salt and customs revenues, for which efficient and separate revenue collection machinery has already been established, the collection of all government taxes, levies and other sources of revenues in a given locality shall be entrusted to a single organ so that centralization of administration may be ensured and efficiency increased. All unnecessary and superfluous tax collection agencies shall be abolished in order to curtail expenses.

5. The Central Bank shall not be under the direct jurisdiction of the Finance Ministry but shall occupy an independent position so that it may carry out its fiscal functions more effectively. Both the Governor and the Vice-Governor of the Bank shall be men possessed of knowledge and practical experience in banking and shall be given security of tenure. Their positions shall not be dependent upon political changes affecting the Ministry of Finance.

Relative to the stabilization of domestic bonds, the following general principles were proposed and adopted:

1. All banks of issue must keep a 100% reserve against their note-issues, that is, 60% in cash and 40% in securities. With regard to the security reserve, regulations shall be drawn up providing that such securities must be in the form of domestic government bonds. No other forms of securities will be acceptable as reserve against note-issues. Banks violating this rule shall be deprived of their privilege of issuing notes.

2. A circular order shall be issued requiring all financial institutions throughout the country, other than banks of issue, to purchase domestic bonds amounting to at least ten per cent. of their total capital.

3. A special fund shall be established, - partly to be appropriated by the Finance Ministry and partly to be raised by the various banks in Shanghai - for the purpose of forming a special organization, whose principal function it shall be to stabilize the value of domestic bonds. This special organization shall be under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance and shall have a general manager to be jointly elected by the various banks concerned.

In this connection, it may be mentioned that the reported proposal recommending a moratorium on domestic bond payments, which has aroused wide protest in the business world, is understood to have been withdrawn voluntarily by the proposers.

A sensation occurred during the second general meeting of the C.E.C. when the question of the imminent attack upon Chinchow by Japanese forces was brought up for discussion. A strained atmosphere prevailed during the debate when verbal thrusts were exchanged between Mr. Wu Chih-hui, veteran Party leader, and other members of the session. Retorting sharply to the suggestion made by one member that General Chang Hsueh-liang be punished for

CHINA (Political)

Subject: First Plenary Session of the Fourth Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang

his alleged default of duty, Mr. Wu declared that while General Chang might deserve punishment for the loss of Manchurian territory, "those who had traitorously invited Japanese invasion" must not be allowed to escape unpunished. Outraged by what they regarded as an unwarranted and malicious insinuation, a number of members rose to their feet protesting against such a slanderous and scurrilous statement. Mr. Sun Fo, Mr. Li Wen-fan and other Canton members withdrew from the meeting and went to Shanghai in protest against what they regarded as an insult to Cantonese honor.

Mr. Yu Yu-jen presided over the third general meeting held on December 26th. The Organic Law of the National Government was again amended in order to comply with the reforms of the central government system. The amended law consists of a total of 54 articles, divided into 9 chapters, namely, (1) General Principles, (2) National Government, (3) National Government Committee, (4) Executive Yuan, (5) Legislative Yuan, (6) Judicial Yuan, (7) Examination Yuan and (8) Control Yuan; and (9) Appendix. The chapter on the President of the National Government, in the old law, has been merged in that on the National Government.

The following is a translation of the more important articles embodying amendments in the law:

Art. 10. - The National Government shall have a President and from 24 to 36 State Councillors, and each of the Yuan shall have a President and a Vice-President, who shall be elected by the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang of China. (Note: The number of State Councillors, as provided by the old law, was from 16 to 32.)

Art. 11. - The President of the National Government shall be the Head of the Republic of China and shall represent the State both internally and internationally. But he shall have no actual political responsibility.

Art. 12. - The President of the National Government shall not hold any concurrent governmental post.

Art. 13. - The President of the National Government shall hold office for a term of two years, but shall be eligible for re-election; provided, however, that in the event of a Permanent Constitution being promulgated, a new election shall be held according to law.

Art. 14. - All mandates of the National Government and order for mobilization of military forces shall be issued upon the signature of the President of the National Government; but they shall not become effective unless countersigned by the President of the Yuan and the head of the Ministry concerned.

Art. 15. - Before the promulgation of a Permanent Constitution, the Executive, Legislative, Judicial, Examination and Control Yuan shall be severally responsible to the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang of China.

Art. 16. - The meetings of the National Government shall be attended by the President of the National Government and the State Councillors....

Art. 23. - The meetings of the Executive Yuan shall be attended by the President and Vice-President of the Yuan, the heads of the various ministries and the chairmen of the various committees. The President of the Executive Yuan shall preside at such meetings.

CHINA (Political)

Subject: First Plenary Session of the Fourth Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang

Art. 25. - All orders and acts of disposition of the Executive Yuan, in order to be effective, must be countersigned, in respect of those affecting general administrative affairs, by the entire body of Ministers; and in respect of those affecting only one ministry, by the Minister concerned.

Art. 30. - The Legislative Yuan shall have from 50 to 100 members, who shall be appointed, according to law, by the President of the National Government at the instance of the President of the Yuan.

One-half of the members mentioned in the preceding paragraph shall be elected by legally constituted people's organizations. The law governing such election shall be determined separately.

Art. 36. - The Judicial Yuan shall have a Supreme Court, an Administrative Court and a Committee for the Disciplinary Punishment of Public Functionaries.

Art. 37. - The President of the Judicial Yuan shall serve concurrently as President of the Supreme Court; and the Vice-President of the Yuan concurrently as Chairman of the Committee for the Disciplinary Punishment of Public Functionaries.

(Note: The old law contains no provision regarding the internal organization of the Judicial Yuan.)

Art. 48. - The Control Yuan shall have from thirty to fifty members, who shall be appointed by the President of the National Government, according to law, at the instance of the President of the Yuan.

The meeting also adopted a resolution providing that candidates for the Presidency of the National Government must be men of venerable age and unimpeachable character.

Two other resolutions were adopted, one calling for the introduction of the military conscription system, and the other for the provision of legal safeguards for military officers in active service. Both of these two resolutions are to be forwarded to the National Government to be dealt with after further consideration. A proposal calling for the provision of security of tenure and other safeguards for educationalists was referred to the National Government.

A proposal providing for a reorganization of Central Party Headquarters becomes ominous in its intent. The result if successfully carried out will be full of grave possibilities. A summary of the proposal as accepted is as follows:

1. Reorganization of Central Party Headquarters:

The Organization and Publicity Departments shall be reorganized into Committees; the Training Department shall be abolished, and in its stead, a special Committee for the direction of mass movements shall be established.

Although the committee system may have some inherent defects, it would however be more advisable, in view of existing circumstances, to substitute for the system of centralized control by departmental heads that of joint control by committees. Besides the advantages of joint deliberation which will result from the adoption of the committee system, the Central Party organization will also be considerably strengthened through the increase of responsible leaders.

The nature of the Training Department is such that it will conduce to more efficiency by merging this department into the Organization Committee.

CHINA (Political)

Subject: First Plenary Session of the Fourth Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang

Inasmuch as the success of the National Revolution depends upon the support of the masses, the Party must revive its previous close contact with the people. In order to attain this object, a special committee should be established for the direction of popular movements.

2. Secret Organization of Branch Party Headquarters.

The strength of the Party lies mainly in its lower branch Headquarters. The maintenance by such Party Headquarters of offices as imposing as yamens and of a staff of "officials" has led to the prevailing lethargy and corruption of such branch Party Headquarters. They have become completely estranged from the people and have turned into oppressors of the masses.

Moreover, various reactionary elements are still rife in the country. On account of their secrecy of organization, they have been able to secure an advantage over the Kuomintang in the struggle for supremacy.

It is therefore proposed that in order to curb the reactionary movements as well as regain the support of the people, all Municipal and District Party Headquarters should be secret organizations, carrying on their activities in secrecy.

3. Democracy within the Party.

The Executive Committees of the various branch Party Headquarters must be composed of members directly elected by the Party members of the locality concerned. This is the fundamental principle underlying the organization of a revolutionary party. Unfortunately, owing to the repeated complications within the Party, this principle has been disregarded, with the result that local Party authorities often act in contradiction to the wishes of the majority of the Party membership. As a result of the inevitable opposition and friction, centralization of Party authority has been rendered nearly impossible. Hence, the prevailing corruption and inefficiency of the various Party branches. In order to remedy this, all Committee members of Party branches should be directly elected by the Party members.

- - - -

Mr. Sun Fo and his Canton friends, after issuing a lengthy statement in regard to the remarks of Mr. Wu Chih-hui, returned to Nanking in time to take part in the 4th and final regular meeting of the 1st Plenary Session of the 4th C.E.C. on December 28th. The following general principles governing the organization of the Central Political Council were adopted:

1. The Central Political Council shall be composed of the members of the Central Executive and Supervisory Committees of the Kuomintang.
2. The Central Political Council shall have a Standing Committee of three, who shall preside at the meetings by turn.
3. Reserve members of the Central Executive and Supervisory Committees may attend meetings of the Central Political Council without the right to vote.

By this resolution the original character of the Council, that is, a political committee of the C.E.C., is restored, the Council hereafter to be composed of only C.E.C. and C.S.C. members.

CHINA (Political)

Subject: First Plenary Session of the Fourth Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang

A resolution was adopted which was aimed toward the early participation of the people in politics. The text reads as follows:

"That with reference to the various proposals concerning the National Emergency Conference, the People's National Salvation Conference, Assembly of People's Representatives, the shortening of the Period of Political Tutelage and the early realization of constitutionalism:

Be it resolved:

"1. That the National Government convene, within two weeks, a National Emergency Conference to discuss measures for the resistance of foreign aggression, the relief of natural disasters and the pacification of the country.

"2. That the Standing Committee of the C.E.C. be held responsible for the convocation of a People's National Salvation Conference as well as for the determination of the composition thereof.

"3. That steps be taken for the completion of the District Autonomy system within a specified time limit and preparations be made for the convocation of a people's representative organ; and that the Standing Committee of the C.E.C. be held responsible for the formation of measures relating thereto in accordance with the 'Fundamentals of National Construction'."

A resolution was adopted calling for the utilization of foreign capital and experts for the industrial development of China.

Various committees and government officials were elected as follows:

A. Nine Members of the Standing Committee of the C.E.C.:

Hu Han-min	Wang Ching-wei	Chiang Kai-shek
Yu Yu-jen	Yeh Chu-tsang	Ku Meng-yu
Chu Cheng	Sun Fo	Chen Kuo-fu

Mr. Yeh Chu-tsang was elected as concurrently Chief Secretary.

B. President of the National Government: Mr. Lin Sen.

C. Thirty-three Members of the National Government Committee:

Chiang Kai-shek	Wang Ching-wei	Hu Han-min
Tang Shao-yi	Chang Ching-kiang	Tsai Yuan-pei
Hsiao Fo-cheng	Teng Tse-ju	Hsieh Chih
Hsu Chung-chih	Wang Fa-chin	Li Lieh-chun
Tsou Lu	Shao Yuan-chung	Chen Kuo-fu
Yeh Chu-tsang	T. V. Soong	Wang Peh-chun
Fang Chen-wu	Hsiung Ke-wu	Yen Hsi-shan
Feng Yu-hsiang	Chao Tai-wen	Wang Shu-hen
Liu Shang-ching	Hsieh Tu-pi	Po Wen-wei
Cheng Chien	Ching Heng-i	H. H. Kung
En-Ke-Pa-Tu	Yang Shu-kan	Ma Fu-hsiang

CHINA (Political)

Subject: First Plenary Session of the Fourth Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang

D. Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the Five Yuan:

Yuan.	President	Vice-President
1. Executive	Sun Fo	Chen Ming-shu
2. Legislative	Chang Chi	Tan Chen
3. Judicial	C. C. Wu	Chu Cheng
4. Examination	Tai Chi-tao	Liu Lu-yin
5. Control	Yu Yu-jen	Ting Wei-fen

E. Three members of the Standing Committee of the Central Political Council:

General Chiang Kai-shek, Mr. Wang Ching-wei and Mr. Hu Han-min.

Prior to election of members for the National Government Committee, the Presidium called attention to the following two provisos:

1. The Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the various Yuan, Heads of the various Ministries and Chairmen of the various Committees shall not be concurrently members of the National Government Committee; and
2. Present military commanders (on the active list) shall not be concurrently members of the National Government Committee.

The First Plenary Session of the Fourth Central Executive Committee was formally closed at a special meeting on the morning of December 29th in the presence of 97 members of the two Central Committees and 600 government and Party officials. General Feng Yu-hsiang arrived in time to attend the closing meeting and delivered a characteristic speech. He alluded with pointed tenderness to his sworn brother, Comrade Chiang Kai-shek, "While he may have his shortcomings, he certainly has his special merits".

The usual manifesto was issued filled with the usual fine phrases and the usual high hopes. Sun Fo in his closing address summarized the objectives of the new government as first to cope with the present national crisis and second to solve the various domestic problems, with the inauguration of a Constitutional Government as the ultimate goal.

New heads of the various ministries and chairmen of various committees under the Executive Yuan were appointed at a meeting of the Central Political Council on December 29th. Mr. Yu Yu-jen was the presiding officer. The newly elected personnel is as follows:

Li Wen-fan	Minister of Interior
Eugene Chen	Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ho Ying-chin	Minister of War
Chen Shao-kuan	Minister of the Navy
Chen Ming-shu	Minister of Communications
Chu Chia-hua	Minister of Education
Lo Wen-kan	Minister of Judicial Administration
Huang Han-liang . . .	Officiating Minister of Finance
Chen Kung-po	Minister of Industry
Yeh Kung-cho	Minister of Railways
Shih Ching-yang . . .	Chairman of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Committees
Liu Jui-heng	Chairman of the National Opium-Suppression Committee

CHINA (Political)

Subject: First Plenary Session of the Fourth Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang

Three important military appointments were made as follows:

General Chu Pei-te - Chief of Staff of the National Army.
General Li Chi-sen - Inspector-General of Military Training.
General Tang Sheng-chih - President of the Military Advisory Council.

The first meeting of the Standing Committee of the 4th C.E.C. was held on December 29th under the chairmanship of Mr. Sun Fo. The following appointments were made to the various committees of the Central Party Headquarters:

A. Organization Committee:

Wu Te-cheng (Chairman)	Chen Li-fu (Vice-Chairman)
Tsou Lu	Shih Ching-yang
Pai Yun-ti	Chang Tao-fan
Yu Ching-tang	Tuan Hsi-peng
Chang Li-sheng	Fan Yu-sui
Ku Cheng-kang	Chao Pei-lien
Teng Fei-huang	Miao Pei-cheng
Chiao I-tang	Yang Hu

B. Publicity Committee:

Shao Yuan-chung (Chairman)	Liu Lu-yin (Vice-Chairman)
Ching Heng-i	Kan Nai-kuang
Huang Chi-lu	Liang Han-tsao
Lo Chia-lun	Chen Fu-mu
Teng Chia-yen	Wang Lu-i
Ke Hsing-ya	Chou Fo-nai
Tang Yu-jen	Kuei-Chung-chi

C. Committee for the Direction of Mass Movements:

Chang Chih-pen (Chairman)	Ma Chao-chun (Vice-Chairman)
Chu Chia-hua	Chen Kung-po
Wang Fa-chin	Wang Po-ling
Chen Chao-ying	Chang Wei-tsun
Fu Ju-lin	Chu Chi-ching
Wang Chi	Ho Shih-tseng
Tseng Kwang-cheng	Wang Mou-kung
Fang Chiao-hui	Kao Chun-tao
Hsiao Chung-chen	

D. Overseas Party Affairs Committee:

Chou Chi-kang (Chairman)	Chen Yao-yuan (Vice-Chairman)
Hsiao Chi-san	Chan Chu-shih
Hsien Tso-min	Kwan Su-jen
Cheng Chan-nan	Huang Mu-sung
Tai Kwei-sheng	Huang Chi-jen
Li Tzu-wen	Huang Fu-sheng
Tseng Yang-fu	Li Chi-sen
Tseng Chung-ming	Tsui Kwang-hsin

CHINA (Political)

Subject: First Plenary Session of the Fourth Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang

Mr. Liu Shou-chung, Admiral Yang Shu-chuang and Dr. C. T. Wang were elected as members of the National Government Committee in addition to the thirty-three elected on December 28th.

Mr. Tseng Chung-ming was made Chief Secretary of the Central Political Council.

By a mandate issued on the night of December 29th the National Government has postponed indefinitely the date for the enforcement of the "Regulations Governing the Exercise of Jurisdiction over Foreign Nationals in China" promulgated on May 4th, 1931.

It is curious to note that throughout the meetings of the 4th Plenary Session of the C.E.C. no publicity was given the questions of the new Anti-War Pact (Internecine) or the military organization of the national forces. Only one resolution was passed which dealt with the above questions and that was relative to the question of conscription.

Prior to the opening of the Plenary Session, Kuo Min broadcasted the idea that the Session was expected to lay down the principle that hereafter, unless with the approval of a specified majority of members of the Central Committees assembled in plenary session, no Party or political dispute should be settled by a resort to armed force. It was also to lay down a comprehensive program for military reorganization which provided as follows:

1. National Defense: The maximum peace standing of the National Army shall be fifty divisions, with the division as the unit of the army. A National Defense Commission shall be established at the capital, with branch commissions in some of the more important provinces.
2. Police and Gendarmerie: Peace and order in the various provinces shall be maintained by Provincial Gendarmerie, and, in case of necessity, special Peace Preservation Corps (Pao-an-tui). The various districts should also have police and self-defense corps of their own, which will however be under the direct control of the Provincial Government.
3. Bandit-Suppression: (a) Where provincial police and gendarmerie forces are inadequate to cope with bandit outrages the National Army shall assist in the campaign. (b) District gendarmerie forces shall be responsible for the suppression of lawlessness within their respective jurisdictions.
4. Conscription: The system of universal military service shall be put into effect as soon as possible.

If these questions were as completely ignored as reports on the session would indicate, it seems highly probable that the forecasts of a new internal military struggle for supremacy in the warm spring months will be realized.

NOTE: This report was compiled from Kuo Min News Agency releases.

N E Margetts

Nelson E. Margetts
Lieutenant-Colonel, Field Artillery
Military Attache

WGW

NO OBJECTION TO
UNLIMITED CIRCULATION

G-2 Report

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
3110
APR 12 1932
2657-9-361
WAR DEPARTMENT
RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 11 1932

CHINA (Political)

Subject: The Second Plenary Session of the Kuomintang Congress

From newspaper reports which have been vague, and from General Shang Chen, a delegate, the following information relative to the Second Plenary Session has been gathered:

Resolutions adopted were as follows:

1. To resist the Japanese on all fronts unceasingly.
2. To appoint Chiang Kai-shek Generalissimo of all armies.
3. To divide China into four districts, or commands, under
   1. Chang Hsueh-liang
   2. Chiang Kai-shek
   3. Ho Ying-chin
   4. Chen Chi-tang
4. To name Sianfu the co-capital or Hsi Ching.
5. To avoid a Russian alliance.
6. To repudiate Man Chou Kuo.

The session opened March 1st and closed March 6th. While the Canton clique did not attend, the gathering was given significance by the attendance of the following personages: Chiang Kai-shek, Feng Yu-hsiang, Ho ying-chin, Chu Pei-teh, Tang Sheng-chih, Ku Meng-yu, Shang Chen, Li Chai-sum and Chen Kung-po.

The Young Marshal was requested to attack Manchuria in order to relieve the pressure at Shanghai, but no orders were issued him.

In connection with the decision to avoid any Russian alliance there were many heated arguments. The leftists were all for friendship. The meeting decided that Russia's aid to Japan in letting her use C. E. R. rolling stock was suspicious, and that there was likelihood of a secret Sino-Russian alliance. Of prime interest is the fact that Wang Ching-wei is no longer a member of the leftist group seeking Russian friendship, but is working in harmony for the time being with Chiang Kai-shek.

For and in the absence of the Military Attache:

Parker G. Tenney
Captain, Field Artillery
Assistant Military Attache

From M/A, China Report No. 8234 March 15, 1932

CONFIDENTIAL

G-2 Report

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
MAY 9 1932
WAR DEPARTMENT
Y-1 2657-J-36/9
RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 9 1932

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Second Plenary Session of the Fourth Executive Committee of Kuomintang

General.

Although the 1st Plenary Session of the 4th Central Executive Committee had been held as recently as December 22, 1931, with the surrender of their positions of power by Sun Fo and Eugene Chen to Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei a second session was deemed necessary. By this means the new leaders planned to strengthen their positions and obtain support for the policies with which they were identified. Accordingly on February 18, when attention was centered upon the fighting at Shanghai, the Standing Committee of the C.E.C. resolved to convene the 2nd Plenary Session at Loyang on March 1, 1932.

Preliminary Conferences.

From March 1-3 a series of preparatory conferences were held. Yeh Chu-tsang was chosen general secretary and a presidium composed of Wang Ching-wei, Chiang Kai-shek, Yu Yu-jen, Chu Cheng, and Ku Meng-yu was elected to direct the proceedings of the session. Five important committees were organized:

1. A Drafting Committee;
2. A committee to "investigate and establish general principles of party activities in time of crisis";
3. A Military Affairs Investigating Committee;
4. A Foreign Affairs Investigating Committee;
5. A Political Affairs Investigating Committee.

In addition to organizing these, an agenda of the problems to which the session must limit its discussions was adopted in accordance with that already announced by Wang Ching-wei:

1. The location of the national capital;
2. Financial rehabilitation;
3. Resistance to Japan;
4. A punitive expedition against the Manchoukuo Government;
5. The invocation of Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

As this agenda disregarded many proposals submitted by individual members for consideration it was arranged to refer questions relating to the future organization of the Central Executive Committee to the Standing Committee of the C.E.C. itself. Resolutions defining powers and duties of the government agencies were similarly dealt with.

It was further decided that the Plenary Session should continue not longer than five days and of any proposals that might be brought up only those would be entertained which dealt with resistance to aggression, improvement of news transmission facilities, and the exposal of facts having to do with Japanese aggression.

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Second Plenary Session of the Fourth Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang

Session Proceedings.

Two formal meetings of the session were held March 4th and 5th. Four definite things were accomplished:

1. Loyang was made a temporary capital with Sianfu, Shensi, designated as "co-capital" and renamed Hsi Ching or Western Capital.
2. The establishment of a committee on pensions for officers and soldiers killed in battle.
3. The revision of Article 37 of the Organic Law (see Report No. 8255).
4. Adoption of general principles for the organization of the Military Affairs Committee.

With regard to 4. above, the principles adopted placed this committee under direct control of the National Government and made it the highest military organization in the country. It controls matters of national defense, pacification, military education, military expenditures and purchases of supplies, military construction, troop organization and disbandment, and the appointment and dismissal of military officers of the rank of lieutenant-general and above. While the chairman of this committee is responsible for the execution of military orders it is not clear whether or not he is empowered to issue independent orders in the name of the committee. Chiang Kai-shek was made Chairman and in effect, if not in theory, his power is substantially what it was when he held the position of Generalissimo of the Land, Sea and Air Forces.

In addition to the four accomplishments named above, the Plenary Session adopted several resolutions which sounded well but which as they stand are merely so many "paper resolutions". It was resolved that:

1. National Government finances be made public;
2. Civil expenditures be reduced;
3. A new and independent financial commission be organized;
4. Military and civil affairs be distinctly separated (note: How this is being carried out is already apparent);
5. Organs for expression of public opinion be established in order that the nation might quickly enter the constitutional period;
6. A method for carrying out a general amnesty be determined upon by the National Government;
7. The Central Political Council should consider the matter of unifying the criminal code.

Telegrams breathing patriotic sentiments were sent to civilians in the war zone, to troops in the Shanghai-Woosung area, to the 5th and 19th Route Armies, and to the National Armies, i.e., to "all our comrades in arms".

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Second Plenary Session of the Fourth Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang

A manifesto issued by the session begins with the statement that "the most important task to-day in China is to resist external aggression", and this is the keynote of the entire document.

The outstanding features of the session proceedings were:

1. The designation of Loyang as the temporary capital.

2. The appointment of Chiang Kai-shek as Chairman of the Military Affairs Committee.

3. The manifestations of the spirit of "continued resistance to the invader" which animated the session.

Conclusion.

This Plenary Session, beyond providing the requisite political means for establishing Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei in power, in no way solved or provided a means for solving the immediate problems besetting the country. It seems adequately to have served its purpose as a political stop-gap.

For and in the absence of the Military Attache:

Parker G. Tenney
Captain, Field Artillery
Assistant Military Attache

HSA

Distribution:
4 MID
1 File

4-1 2657-9.36 1928 3790 1 NOV 28
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Chinese Personalities: T. V. Soong, Shang Chen, Li Chi-shen, Yang Yu-ting, Nan Kuei-hsing, Fu Tso-yi.

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. NOV 27 1928

Name: SUNG TZE-WEN (commonly known as T. V. Soong.)

Title: None.

Birthplace: Chekiang Province.

Date of Birth: 1891.

Language & Dialect:

Political Party: Kuomintang (Moderate Group)

Historical Sketch: Elder brother of Madame Sun Yat-sen. Spent boyhood in America and graduated from Harvard University. Returned to China in 1920 and served as Secretary to Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Organized the Central Bank of Canton in 1924 and appointed Manager. Elected a member of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee in 1925. 1927 appointed Minister of Finance of the Nationalist Government of Nanking and later sent to Japan by the Kuomintang to persuade General Chiang Kai-shek to resume his post. Responsible for calling of Economic Conference at Shanghai and financial conference at Nanking in 1928 at which plans made for financial and economic rehabilitation of China later adopted by the Fifth Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee. At present a member of the Central Executive Committee and Minister of Finance of the new Government.

- - - -

Name: SHANG CHEN (Intimate name, Chi Yu.)

Title: General.

Birthplace: Paotingfu, Chihli.

Date of Birth: 1881.

Language & Dialect: Mandarin dialect.

Political Party: Kuomintang (Shansi faction)

Historical Sketch: Graduate of Army War College, Peking. Participated in campaign against "White Wolf" bandits as a regimental commander under General Lu Chiang-chang, 1914. When General Lu was defeated by Chen Shu-fang in 1915 fled to North Shansi with remnants of regiment and joined Yen Hsi-shan. Appointed Brigadier-General in Shansi Army, 1915. Commanded a Shansi brigade in campaign against Chang-hsun when latter attempted to restore the monarchy, 1916. Occupation Commander of North Shansi and concurrently

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Chinese Personalities: T. V. Soong, Shang Chen, Li Chi-shen, Yang Yu-ting, Nan Kuei-hsing, Fu Tso-yi.

Commander of 2nd Shansi Mixed Brigade, 1916. Badly defeated in campaign against Hunan, 1917. During Shansi-Kuominchun war of 1925 field commander of Shansi army. Tutung of Suiyuan and commander of Shansi 1st Army Corps, 1926. Launched campaign against C hang Tso-lin, 1927, and did excellent work along Peking-Suiyuan railway. F ield Commander of Shansi forces during anti-Northern campaign, 1928, and drove Fengtien forces out of Peking. Made Chairman of Hopei (Chihli) Branch Political Council, July, 1928. Considered an honest man and a good soldier.

- - - -

Name: LI CHI-SHEN (Intimate name, Jen-chao.)

Title: General.

Birthplace: Kuangsi Province.

Date of Birth: 1889.

L anguage & Dialect:

Political Party: Kuomintang (Kwangsi faction)

Historical Sketch: Graduate of a military school in Hunan and a Japanese military college. Joined revolutionary party in 1908. After retirement of Mo Jung-hsin from Kuangtung in 1920, served in various capacities and then made commander of Yuchi forces. 1922, severed relations with Chen Chiung-ming, who drove Sun Yat-sen out of Canton. When Sun Yat-sen re-entered Kwangtung, 1923, made commander of his 3rd Division and Occupation Commissioner at Chinchow. Occupation Commissioner at Hainan, 1925. Made Military Governor of Kwangtung when Chiang Kai-shek started anti-Northern campaign, 1926. Appointed member of Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, 1926. Put down Communists in Kwangtung who seized control when absent from Canton attending 4th Plenary Session of Central Executive Committee, 1927. Made Chairman of Kwangtung Branch Political Council, 1927. Attended Western Hills conference after taking of Peking, 1928, and opposed moving of capital to Nanking. Attended 5th Plenary Session of Central Executive Committee, August, 1928, where he was largely responsible for reconciling Kwangsi faction and Chiang Kai-shek. Recently appointed Chief of Staff of the Nationalist Armies under the new Nanking Government, and a member of the Government Council.

Estimate of C haracter: A leader of the Kuangsi faction, very able and progressive. Strong advocate of friendly foreign policy. Credited with restoring friendly relations with Great Britain.

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Chinese Personalities: T. V. Soong, Shang Chen, Li Chi-shen, Yang Yu-ting, Nan Kuei-hsing, Fu Tso-yi.

Name: YANG YU-TING (Intimate name, Ling-ke.)

Title: General.

Birthplace: Fengtien Province.

Date of Birth: 1886.

Language & Dialect: Mandarin dialect.

Political Party: Fengtien.

Historical Sketch: Graduated from Japanese Artillery School. Upon return to China appointed a Colonel of Artillery and concurrently a member of the staff of the Viceroy of Manchuria. In 1913 made Chief of Staff to the Military Governor of Fengtien. 1921, promoted to rank of Major-General and made Director-General of Mukden Arsenal and Chief Counselbr to the Civil and Military Governor of Manchuria. In 1925, following invasion of the province by Fengtien troops, appointed Military Governor of Kiangsu, but shortly after driven out by Sun Ch'uan-fang. An irreconcilable enmity arose between Yang and General Kuo Sung-ling, and when the latter revolted one of his demands was the dismissal of Yang. Chang Tso-lin refused to dismiss him, but from that time his confidence in Yang gradually diminished. The "Young General" has been especially suspicious of him and strong influences have always been at work to prevent his being given command of troops. In 1927, Chief Counsellor to Generalissimo Chang Tso-lin at Peking, and during campaign of 1928 Commander of Third and Fourth Fengtien Army Group.

Estimate of Character: A strong character and spokesman of the Fengtien Party. An able soldier but more able politician. ~~Believed to be pro-Japanese.~~

- - - -

Name: NAN KUEI-HSING (Intimate name, P'ei-lan.)

Title: None.

Birthplace: Ningwu, Shansi.

Date of Birth: 1884.

Language & Dialect: Shansi Mandarin dialect.

Party: Kuomintang (Shansi faction)

Historical Sketch: Sworn brother of Yen Hsi-shan. Graduate of Shansi University and Tokyo Police Institute. 1918, Assistant Superintendent of Police, Taiyuanfu. 1923, Director of Police, Taiyuanfu. 1923, Director of Police, Shansi Province. 1925, Counsellor to Tupan of Shansi. 1927, sent to Peking as Yen Hsi-shan's representative for special negotiations with Fengtien.

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Chinese Personalities: T. V. Soong, Shang Chen, Li Chi-shen, Yang Yu-ting, Nan Kuei-hsing, Fu Tso-yi.

Attempted to induce a number of Fengtien generals to join Yen Hsi-shan. Negotiations broke down and forced to flee to Tientsin. Lived in hiding in Japanese Concession, Tientsin, after war broke out following his flight from Peking. Aided by Fu Tso-yi, forced Hsu Yuan-chuan to go over to the Nationalists and paved the way for Shansi troops to occupy Tientsin with very little fighting, June, 1928. July, 1928, appointed Mayor of Tientsin as reward for work there during the war. Discharged in September, 1928, owing to opposition of Tientsin residents. At present Chairman of Tientsin Kuomintang organization.

- - - -

Name: FU TSO-YI (Intimate name, Yi Sheng)

Title: General.

Birthplace: Hsiaoyi, Shansi Province.

Date of Birth: 1895.

Language & Dialect: Shansi-Mandarin.

Political Party: Kuomintang (Shansi faction)

Historical Sketch: Graduate of Army War College, Peking. In 1920 Adjutant of 3rd Shansi Mixed Brigade, and in 1922 a regimental commander. 1924, Chief of Staff of 3rd Shansi Division. 1926, in command of 3rd Shansi Division during the Shansi-Kuominchun war. During the Shansi-Fengtien war of 1927, cut the Fengtien line between Paotingfu and Peking at Chochow, but was later cut off and himself beseiged at Chochow with 8,000 men for 80 days. Induced to surrender by residents of Chochow who were on verge of starvation. Taken with his forces to Tungchow for re-organization into Fengtien unit and later permitted to return to Paotingfu. Lived at Paoting several months under military restraint and escaped to Tientsin. In hiding in Japanese Concession, Tientsin, until beginning of Fengtien withdrawal. With remnants of old forces in plain clothes arose against Hsü Yuan-chuan, Chihli-Shantung commander at Tientsin, and forced his turn-over to Nationalists. At present Defense Commissioner of Tientsin.

Helmer W. Lystad
Helmer W. Lystad
First Lieutenant, Infantry

1st Ind.

Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peking, China.
October 18, 1928 - To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D.C.

Forwarded.

John Magruder
John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

G-2 Report

6290 - Replace
Personnel - Miscellaneous

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MILITARY INTEL. DIV.
JAN 30 1931
2657-D-363
WAR DEPARTMENT
RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JAN 29 1931

CHINA

Subject: Chinese Personalities.

1. A study of conditions in China, either of a political or military character, becomes a study of personalities. To know something of the life and character of some of the most important figures is of more moment than to have an intimate knowledge of the ever changing local conditions out in the provinces. Any study of China today must commence with a knowledge of the following men, holding office in some one or more of the below listed activities:

(1) The State Council (National Government Council).
(2) The Central Political Council.
(3) The Central Executive Committee.
(4) The Central Supervisory Committee.
(5) The Standing Committee of Central Executive Committee.
(6) The Executive Yuan.
(7) The Legislative Yuan.
(8) The Examination Yuan.
(9) The Control Yuan.
(10) The Judicial Yuan.
(11) The Standing Committee of the National Military Reorganization and Disbandment Committee. (Nanking announces that this will be abolished on January 1, 1931, and a Military Adjustment Committee established in its place.)
(12) The National Defense Council.
(13) The National Finance Council.
(14) The Land-law Committee.
(15) The National Reconstruction Committee.
(16) The National Reconstruction Board.
(17) The Central Party Reorganization Committee, Central Party Headquarters.
(18) Organization Department, Central Party Headquarters.
(19) Standing Committee, Capitol Construction Committee.
(20) Opium Suppression Committee.
(21) National Famine Relief Committee.

Chang Chih-chiang:
Chairman (20); Member (15); one of the "Elder Statesmen"; appointed with Ma Fu-hsiang to reorganize the Kuominchun after defeat of Feng at Chengchow, October 6, 1930.

Chang Fa-kwei:
Commander of the famous "Ironsides". At present operating with anti-government forces in Kwangsi.

Chang Hsueh-liang:
Better known as "The Young Marshal". Member (1), (11), (13) and (15). Chairman, The North-eastern Political Affairs Committee; C-in-C North-eastern Frontier Defense Forces; Deputy C-in-C, Nationalist Forces.

Chang Tso-hsiang:
Governor of Kirin Province. Vice C-inC, North-eastern Frontier Defense Forces; acts for the Young Marshal in his absence.

Ch'en Ming-shu:
Chairman of Kwangtung Provincial Government. Member (2).

From M/A, China Report No. 7914 December 27,1930

CHINA

Subject: Chinese Personalities.

Chiang Kai-shek -
Chief Executive of the National Government. Chairman (1), (2), (3), (5), (6) and (19). Member, (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), and (17); Director, (18). A man of pronounced military and political ability; C-in-C, Nationalist Forces.

Chu Pei-teh -
Member (3) and (15); Acting Chief of Staff, General Staff.

Chu Te
One of the important communist-bandit leaders; old style militarist, trained in Germany; leads over 10,000 armed peasants; operating in Kiangsi.

Feng Yu-hsiang -
"The Christian General". C-in-C of the recently defeated Kuominchun; probably the best field commander in China today. Has visited Russia and has two sons now being educated there; at present is in retirement.

Fu Tso-yi -
A Shansi general; leader of the Northern clique in that province. Commander of the 10th Army Corps in the recent anti-government rebellion in the North. At present consulting,with others in Tientsin, with Chang Hsueh-liang relative to the rehabilitation of the North.

Han Fu-ch'u -
Assistant Director of 5th Disbandment Office of (11). Chairman, Shantung Provincial Government. Member (15). At one time a commander in the Kuominchun. Supported the Government none too well in the recent anti-government rebellion in the North.

Ho Ch'eng-chun -
Member (3), and of General Disbandment Office of (11). Director of the Chief Military Department. Chairman, Hupeh Provincial Government.

Ho Lung -
One of the important communist-bandit leaders. Is a peasant and has a force of about 5,800 mainly recruited from unemployed peasants in west Hunan; operating in west Hunan and west Hupeh.

Ho Ying-ch'ing -
Chiang Kai-shek's right hand man; Member (1), (2), (3), (11), and of 1st Disbandment Office of (11), as well as (12),(15), (16), (17) and (20). Inspector-General of Military Training; Assistant Director of the Training Department, Central Party Headquarters. Minister of War.

Hsu Yung-ch'ang -
A Shansi general; one time commander in the old 3rd Kuominchun; affiliated with Northern clique of Shansi province. Upon recent retirement of Yen Hsi-shan was appointed to take charge of all military affairs of Shansi. At present conferring,with others at Tientsin, with the Young Marshal relative to the rehabilitation of the North.

Hu Han-min -
Member (1), (2), (3), (5), (13), (15), (16), (17) and(21). Director (7). Chairman (14).

CHINA

Subject: Chinese Personalities.

Hwang Shao-hsung - A leader of the Kwangsi faction.

H. H. K'ung -
Reserve member (2) and Member (14, (15), (16) and (19). Ex-officio member (21). Minister of Industries (formerly Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Labor).

Li Chai-sum -
Head of Canton Political Committee; senior Kwangsi militarist but at present not operating against the government.

Li Shih-tseng -
Member (2) and (21); one of the "Elder Statesmen".

Li Tsung-jen -
Old Kwangsi leader. Strongly opposed to Chiang K'ai-shek; at present associated with anti-government forces operating in Kwangsi.

Liu Chen-nien -
At one time served with Kuominchun. During recent anti-government rebellion in the north, he was courted by both sides, neither one of which he openly supported, playing each to his advantage. At present stationed in eastern Shantung.

Liu Hsiang -
A Szechwan general. Uncle of Liu Wen-hui, the Chairman of the province. At present loyal to Nanking, and holds the port of Chungking.

Liu Shih (Ch'ih) -
Member (3). Chairman, Honan Provincial Government. Was in command of government forces operating on the Tsin-Pu line during the recent war and contributed much to Nanking's success in same.

Liu Wen-hui -
Chairman of Szechwan Provincial Government.

Liu Ch'ung-lin -
At one time Minister of War, Nanking. Feng Yu-hsiang's right hand man; in retirement since recent defeat of Kuominchun.

Ma Fu-hsiang -
Member (21) and also of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Committee. Father of Ma Hung-kuei. Appointed with Chang Chih-chiang to reorganize the Kuominchun after the defeat of Feng Yu-hsiang at Chengchow, October 6, 1930.

Ma Hung-kuei -
Better known as "The Mohammedan General". One time commander in the Kuominchun. Fought on the side of Nanking during the recent anti-government rebellion in the North; at present in south Shantung along the Tsin-Pu line from Taianhsien to Tenghsien.

Pai Chung-hsi -
A Kwangsi leader; strongly opposed to Nanking; at present operating with anti-government forces in Kwangsi.

CHINA

Subject: Chinese Personalities.

P'eng Te-huai -
One of the important communist-bandit leaders. Old style militarist; operating in Kiangsi.

Shang Chen -
Reserve Member (4); Member (15), and Chairman, Shansi Provincial Government. Upon Yen's retirement was placed in charge of all civil affairs of Shansi. At present he and others are conferring in Tientsin with Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang relative to the rehabilitation of the North.

Shih Yu-san -
One of the most prominent "grey" generals during the recent anti-government rebellion in the North. At one time a commander in the Kuominchun. Though anti-government in the last campaign he did not seriously engage in same, and upon conclusion of hostilities was allowed to retain his command; at present is in south Hopei and north Honan, along the Kin-Han from Changte to Hsunteh.

T. V. Soong -
Member (1), (2), (3), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (19) and (21). Minister of Finance.

Sun Fo -
Member (1), (2), (3), (5), (13), (15), (16) and (21); Chairman (14); Vice-Director (8). Minister of Railways. Director, Training Department, Central Party Headquarters.

Sun Liang-ch'eng -
Former Kuominchun general. At one time Chairman of Shantung Provincial Government. Upon recent defeat of anti-government rebellion in the North he withdrew into south Shansi where his troops now are; at present he and others are in Tientsin conferring with Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang relative to the rehabilitation of the North.

Sun Lien-chung -
Former Kuominchun general who surrendered to the Central Government and was allowed to retain his command; troops at present are in south Shantung. Member (15). Chairman, Kokonor Provincial Government.

Sun Tien-ying -
Notorious bandit leader who fought against government in the recent rebellion in the North; troops are now in south Shansi.

Sung Che-yuan -
Former Kuominchun general. Upon recent defeat of northern rebellion he withdrew into Shansi; at present, he and others are conferring, in Tientsin, with Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang relative to the rehabilitation of the North.

Tai Chi-t'ao -
Member (2), (5), (15), (16) and (17); Director (8), and Chairman, Examination and Selection Committee of (8).

Tai Ch'uan-hsien -
Member (1) and (2).

CHINA

Subject: Chinese Personalities

T'an Yen-k'ao -
Member (1), (2), (3), (5), (11), (12), (13), (15) and (16); Director (6).

T'ang Shao-yi -
Minister in many cabinets; honorary adviser to National Government.

Ts'ao Yuan-p'ei -
Member (1) and (2). One of the "Elder Statesmen".

Wan Fu-lin -
Military Governor of Heilungchiang and Vice C-in-C, North-Eastern Frontier Defense Froces.

Dr. C. H. Wang -
Reserve Member (2) and (3); Member (12), (15) and (21). Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Wang Ching-wei -
Leader of left wing of Kuomintang. Organized, with Yen Hsi-shan and others, a short-lived government in Peiping in September, 1930; at present expected to go abroad. One of the most intelligent political thinkers of China today.

Wang Peh-chun -
Member (2). Minister of Communications.

Wu Chih-hui -
Member (2). One of the "Elder Statesmen".

Yan Sen -
Contender for control of Szechwan. Very anti-Nanking. Wu P'ei-fu, former war lord of the North, is now associated with him.

Yen Hsi-shan -
Better known as "The Model Governor" - for eighteen years governed the "model province" (Shansi). One of the major leaders of the 1929-30 anti-government rebellion in the North; organized with Wang Ching-wei and others a short-lived government at Peiping in September, 1930. Upon defeat of rebel armies withdrew into Shansi and retired from public life; at present on way to Dairen.

Yu Yu-jen -
Member (2), (5) and (15). President (9).

NOTE: The "Elder Statesmen" are the most influential members of the Kuomintang. They are often at variance over minor questions but to date have presented a united front in major issues.

It is probable that during the compilation of this report some of the above officials may have relinquished office; such changes as occur will be forwarded for posting of this report.

MBdeP

Nelson E. Margetts
Lieutenant-Colonel, Field Artillery
Military Attache

Distribution:
4 MID
1 Tientsin
1 File

G-2 Report FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 4-1 6290 - Personnel - Misc.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

REPLACE 78
ADD 78.1
" 78.11
" 78.12
" 78.13

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Chinese Personalities.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. OCT 16 1933
WAR DEPARTMENT

(These notes are submitted to amplify the data available in "Who's Who in China" and to replace Report No. 7914)

A study of conditions in China, either of a political or military character, becomes a study of personalities. To know something of the life and character of some of the most important figures is of more moment than to have an intimate knowledge of the ever changing local conditions out in the provinces. Any study of China to-day must commence with a knowledge of the following men, most of whom hold office in some one or more of the below listed activities:

(1) The State Council (National Government Council).
(2) The Central Political Council.
(3) The Central Executive Committee.
(4) The Central Supervisory Committee.
(5) The Standing Committee of Central Executive Committee.
(6) The Executive Yuan.
(7) The Legislative Yuan.
(8) The Examination Yuan.
(9) The Control Yuan.
(10) The Judicial Yuan.
(11) The Military Adjustment Committee.
(12) The National Defense Council.
(13) The National Finance Council.
(14) The Land-law Committee.
(15) The National Reconstruction Committee.
(16) The National Reconstruction Board.
(17) The Central Party Reorganization Committee, Central Party Headquarters.
(18) Organization Department, Central Party Headquarters.
(19) Standing Committee, Capitol Construction Committee.
(20) Opium Suppression Committee.
(21) National Famine Relief Committee.

Chang Chi:

Potent member of Central Political Council, both radical and anti-foreign.

Chang Chi-chung:

Commander of the 5th Route Army in Shanghai fight of 1931-1932. Now President of the Central Military Academy at Nanking. A well educated and conservative gentleman who has visited throughout the world. More of an administrator than a field commander.

Chang Chih-chiang:

Chairman (20); Member (15); one of the "Elder Statesmen"; appointed with Ma Fu-hsiang to organize the Kuominchun after defeat of Feng Yu-hsiang at Chengchow, October 6, 1930. At present head of the committee for advancement of boxing. A pleasant old gentleman who has apparently outlived his usefulness. Now retained in unimportant positions at Nanking because of his standing with the old Kuominchun.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Chinese Personalities

Chang Chun:
Mayor of Greater Shanghai in 1931; now Governor of Hupeh. Very close to Chiang Kai-shek and because of the many important traveling commissions he has performed for said leader has acquired the popular title of "the traveling general".

Chang Fa-kwei:
In 1930 was commander of the famous "Ironsides" and operated with anti-government forces in Kwangsi. While garrison commander at Ichang in 1930 he rebelled because of disagreement over control of Yangtze River opium trade. His rebellion being unsuccessful, he retreated to Kwangsi and later was allowed by Chiang Kai-shek to go to Germany to study. This officer is a man of the Feng Yu-hsiang type, a hard disciplinarian, and respected for his military ability rather than for his political successes.

Chang Hsueh-liang:
Better known as "The Young Marshal". In 1930 was Member (1), (11), (13) and (15) and Chairman of the Northeastern Political Affairs Committee; C-in-C Northeastern Frontier Defense Froces; Deputy C-in-C, Nationalist Forces. Due to fall of Jehol and invasion of North China, the Young Marshal was forced to leave the country in March 1933. It is reported that he was cured of his "drug habit" before leaving for Europe. The date of his return from Europe is still indefinite.

Chang Tso-hsiang:
In 1930 was Governor of Kirin Province; Vice C-in-C, Northeastern Frontier Defense Forces; acted for the Young Marshal in his absence. Because of the loss of the Three Eastern Provinces this thoroughly incompetent man is now without influence or position although he has the "face" of being a member of the Peiping Branch Military Council. During the recent fighting against the Japanese neither he nor his former troops gave effective support to the Young Marshal, and this failure to co-operate was in part responsible for Chinese reverses.

Ch'en Chi-t'ang:
By virtue of maintaining himself as Commander of the First Group of Armies, Ch'en has become the power in Kwangtung. Furnished with a liberal allowance, said to be $750,000 monthly, he has frustrated all attempts so far of the anti-Nanking clique in the Southwestern Political Council to bring about a military campaign against the Central Government.

Ch'en Kung-po:
Minister of Industries. Formerly of decided communistic leanings and now a close adherent of Wang Ching-wei.

Ch'en Ming-ch'u:
In 1930 was Chairman of Kwangtung Provincial Government and Member (2). Now among the "outs".

Ch'en Yi:
Vice-Minister of Military Affairs. A Japanese returned student with a Japanese wife. Although he has the reputation of being a champion of the German advisers, he is not held in respect by them. A man of no real ability or of any considerable influence.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Chinese Personalities

Ch'en Yu-jen (Eugene Chen):
This radical "out" has not yet succeeded in getting "in" although he is active politically around Canton.

Chiang Kai-shek:
In 1930 was Chief Executive of the National Government. Chairman (1), (2), (3), (5), (6) and (19). Member, (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), and (17); Director (18). In 1931 resigned from most positions of responsibility, retaining only his post as Chairman, Military Affairs Commission. Has retained his position as the most powerful man in China. He has shown himself to be a man of courage, determination and great political acumen. Assisted by his German advisers and the most powerful military group in China, he bids fair to continue in power for some time to come.

Chiang Kung-nai:
Formerly commander of famous 19th Route Army during Shanghai incident. Has entered politics and is at present Chairman of Fukien Government.

Chiang Tso-pin:
Formerly minister to Germany, now minister to Japan.

Chu Hsiao-liang:
Formerly in command of bandit suppression on Hunan, Hupeh, Kiangsi borders. Now Chairman of Kansu Government and Pacification Commissioner for Kansu, Ninghsia and Chinghai. Trusted subordinate of Chiang Kai-shek.

Chu Pei-teh:
Has been acting Chief of General Staff, Nanking, for past two years. Very close adherent of Chiang Kai-shek.

Chu Teh:
In 1930 was one of the important communist-bandit leaders; an old style militarist trained in Germany and led over 10,000 armed peasants operating in Kiangsi. At present remains most potent communist leader and is still holding out in Kiangsi. Titles are Commissioner of Military Affairs and Chairman of the Chinese Soviet Government.

Feng Yu-hsiang:
"The Christian General". C-in-C of the former Kuominchun which was decisively defeated in 1930; probably the best field commander in China to-day. Has visited Russia and has two sons now being educated there. Still unable to regain power, his last attempt being at Kalgan in summer of 1933. His influence is on the decline. He is associated with a military group which is bitterly anti-Chiang Kai-shek; even this group at present refuses Feng's leadership.

Fu Tso-yi:
A Shansi general; leader of the Northern clique in that province. Commander of the 10th Army Corps in the anti-government rebellion in the North in 1930. Has continued to retain position. Now Chairman of Suiyuan. A capable militarist. Very close to Yen Hsi-shan.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Chinese Personalities

Han Fu-ch'u:
In 1930 became Chairman, Shantung Provincial Government and Member (15). At one time a commander in the Kuominchun. Supported the Government none too well in the 1930 anti-government rebellion in the North. Still Chairman of Shantung where he has made an excellent record. Continues to be a threat and thorn in side of Chiang Kai-shek. One of the most powerful and capable warlords in China.

Ho Chien:
Chairman of Hunan. An official of the old school, cautious and unaggressive, who derives his power in national affairs because of being leader of the powerful Hunan clique. A man of no great ability.

Ho Ch'eng-chun:
Pacification Commissioner for Hupeh.

Ho Lung:
One of the important communist-bandit leaders. Is a peasant and had a force of about 5,800 in 1930 mainly recruited from unemployed peasants in west Hunan, who operated in west Hunan and west Hupeh. Although still an active communist, he is now conducting military activities in Szechwan.

Ho Ying-ch'ing:
Chiang Kai-shek's right-hand man; Member (1), (2), (3), (11), (12), (15), (16), (17) and (20). Appointed Minister of War in 1930, which position he still holds. Is one of very most trusted adherents of Chiang Kai-shek; now his representative in Peiping and acting Chairman of Peiping Branch Military Council. A man of no great ability.

Hsu Yung-ch'ang:
A Shansi general; one-time commander in the old 3rd Kuominchun, formerly affiliated with Northern clique of Shansi province. Upon retirement of Yen Hsi-shan in 1930 was appointed to take charge of all military affairs of Shansi. Has continued to be a Yen Hsi-shan man and is now Chairman of Shansi.

Hu Han-min:
In 1930 was Member (1), (2), (3), (5), (13), (15), (16), (17), and (21); Director (7) and Chairman (14). Later in 1930 he was arrested by Chiang Kai-shek and held prisoner for over a year. The breach causing this arrest has never been healed and Hu now lives in Hongkong actively working against Chiang's interests. He has resigned all government posts although still a member of the Kuomintang.

Huang Fu:
Recalled from political retirement to become Chairman of the Peiping Political Readjustment Commission, this man has been given the difficult task of making a settlement with the Japanese in North China. A Japanese returned student and with a record of former close liaison with the Japanese, he has had numerous troubles. He is now at Nanking awaiting a decision as to whether he has given away too much to Japanese influence and intimidation. Huang's decisions and policy have been very pleasing to the Japanese, who are doing everything in their power to advance his interests and influence.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Chinese Personalities

Huang Shao-hsiung:
At present Minister of Interior. Was the real power and representative of Chiang Kai-shek during defense of North China in spring of 1933. A very competent man who has produced excellent results.

H. H. K'ung:
Reserve member (2) and Member (14), (15), (16) and (19). Ex-officio member (21). Formerly Minister of Industries, now Governor of Central Bank of China. Due to his ancestry (a descendant of Confucius) and his wife (a sister of Madame Chiang Kai-shek) he is powerful in Chinese politics but has no outstanding ability. It is commonly reported that his decisions and policies are largely influenced by his exceptionally capable wife.

Li Chai-sum:
Held prisoner ("protected") by Chiang Kai-shek about one year in 1930. Now holds position as Director-General of Military Training in Nanking Government. Was formerly more powerful politically in Kwangtung than is now the case. At present it seems politically expedient for Li to support the Nanking group.

Li Chi-ch'un:
Formerly a regimental commander of Wu Pei-fu and divisional commander of Chang Tsung-ch'ang, this man has now been installed by the Japanese as leader of the "irregular" forces in the Luantung area.

Li Shih-tseng:
In 1930 was Member (2) and (21) and one of the "Elder Statesmen". Has continued to be a politician of many jobs. Is a returned student from France and prominent in educational activities.

Li Tsung-jen:
Strongly opposed to Chiang Kai-shek; long associated with anti-government forces operating in Kwangsi. Is now most powerful military leader in Kwangsi and still strongly anti-Chiang Kai-shek. Commanding officer of 4th Group of Armies; a capable soldier.

Lin Sen:
Chairman of the National Government. An honest "Elder Statesman" who does not take an aggressive part in politics.

Liu Chen-hua:
Chairman of Anhwei. An unscrupulous militarist with a most checkered career, being formerly a bandit, and adherent successively of Wu Pei-fu, Feng Yu-hsiang, Yen Hsi-shan and now Chiang Kai-shek, who regards him highly because of his aggressive conduct of bandit suppression in Honan and Hupeh in 1932.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Chinese Personalities

Liu Chen-nien:
At one time served with Kuominchun. During the 1930 anti-government rebellion in the North he was courted by both sides, neither one of which he openly supported, playing each to his advantage. Was later stationed in eastern Shantung, but after maintaining himself at Chefoo for two years as an independent, he was pushed out by Han Fu-chu in December 1932. Because of plotting against Chiang Kai-shek he was imprisoned in Chekiang in June 1933, where it is rumored he has been executed.

Liu Shih (Ch'ih):
Member (3). Chairman, Honan Provincial Government. Was in command of government forces operating on the Tsin-Pu line during the war of 1930 and contributed much to Nanking's success in same. Has remained Chairman of Honan although there are many rumors of his transfer to more important positions due to his continued loyalty to Chiang Kai-shek in spite of many temptations.

Liu Ch'ung-lin:
At one time Minister of War, Nanking, and Feng Yu-hsiang's right-hand man. In retirement in Tientsin since defeat of Kuominchun.

Liu Hsiang:
A Szechwan general. Uncle of Liu Wen-hui, the recent Chairman of the province. Due to his occupation of Chungking for the past three years and control of the opium business from Szechwan, he has become the most powerful leader in that region. He has apparently succeeded in pushing Liu Wen-hui out of Szechwan through armed conflict, and taken over complete control of that province. During recent years he has had the support of Chiang Kai-shek. This no doubt is an important factor in his recent success.

Liu Wen-hui:
Chairman of Szechwan Provincial Government in 1930. In 1932 lost some territory to Liu Hsiang. This summer it seems he has lost his entire province.

Lo Wen-kan:
Minister of Foreign Affairs for past year. His strong anti-Japanese policy has apparently caused his retirement. A doctor of law in England who formerly was generally allied with northern leaders.

Ma Chung-ying:
Twenty-one year old Moslem leader in Kansu who took leading part in Sinkiang rebellion in spring of 1933. A man of tremendous following who as head of one of the Mohammedan tribes can be expected to continue to give trouble to Nanking until they institute a provincial government sympathetic to Moslems.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Chinese Personalities

Ma Hung-kuei:
Better known as "The Mohammedan General". One time commander in the Kuominchun. Fought on the side of Nanking during the 1930 anti-government rebellion in the North; later stationed in south Shantung along the Tsin-Pu line from Tsianhsien to Tenghsien. At present Chairman of Ninghsia. Close adherent to Chiang Kai-shek and commander of some 20,000 excellent troops. A very influential Mohammedan leader.

Pai Chung-hsi:
A Kwangsi leader who has long been strongly opposed to Nanking. For the past five years has continued to be one of most aggressive and irreconciliable anti-Chiang Kai-shek militarists in China. Now subordinate of Li Tsung-jen. Nanking looks forward with keen delight to his anticipated death from advanced tuberculosis.

P'eng Te-huai:
Has operated as communist in Kiangsi for past few years but is not of unusual strength or importance.

Shang Chen:
Was Chairman of Shansi in 1931. Considered a supporter of Chiang Kai-shek. During the fighting around Hsifengkou in 1933 he emerged as a commander of outstanding ability. Since the Tangku armistice there are many rumors of new positions but as yet he has obtained none. His reputation now amongst Chinese of standing is of the very highest as it is known that he has become a poor man because of his heavy private expenditure on his own troops, which he unselfishly used against the Japanese invaders.

Shih Yu-san:
In 1930 was one of the most prominent "grey" generals during the anti-government rebellion in the North. At one time a commander in the Kuominchun. Though anti-government in the 1930 campaign he did not seriously engage in same, and upon conclusion of hostilities was allowed to retain his command. Later was stationed in south Hopei and north Honan, along the Kin-Han from Changte to Hsunteh. In June of 1931 he led an unsuccessful rebellion and was quickly crushed by Chang Hsueh-liang and Chiang Kai-shek. For a year he took refuge in Shantung from where he was expelled in May of 1933 because of pro-Japanese activities. Going to Manchoukuo, he has now taken employment under the Japanese and is at present one of the two leading irregular commanders in the demilitarized zone in northern Hopei.

T. V. Soong:
In 1930 Member (1), (2), (3), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (19) and (21), and Minister of Finance. Has continued to be with Chiang Kai-shek one of the two most powerful men in China. One of the most capable "statesmen" in China, he is a man of great energy, initiative, intelligence and influence. He has advanced (Westernized) ideas and is capable of recognizing the value and need of foreign advisers, many of whom he is employing.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Chinese Personalities

Sun Fo:
In 1930 Member (1), (2), (3), (5), (13), (15), (16) and (21). Formerly Minister of Railways and Director, Training Department, Central Party Headquarters. In 1931 joined opposition in Canton but accepted appointment as Chairman of Legislative Yuan in 1932. The political power of this man is apparently on the wane, for being an individual of influence only because of his father, he has proven himself lacking in ability.

Sun Tien-ying:
In 1930 was considered a notorious bandit leader who had fought against the government in the 1930 rebellion in the North. This man, formerly an infamous militarist of shifting allegiance, somewhat redeemed himself by actual conflict with the Japanese in northern Jehol, while his adjoining commanders' cowardice was notorious. He would take no part in Feng Yu-hsiang's attempted revolt in the summer of 1933. Although appointed to a position in Chinghai, his troops, now 50,000, are at Paotow. It is doubtful if he will go so far west.

Sung Che-yuan:
Former Kuominchun general. Upon their defeat in 1930 in northern rebellion he withdrew into Shansi. In 1932 appointed Chairman of Chahar. When troops were needed against the Japanese he led his troops from Chahar into northern Hopei. This is one of the few Chinese officers who has added greatly to his reputation during the past few critical years. His defense of Hsifengkou showed him a leader of merit and ability. His conduct during recent political developments in North China has shown him to be an astute politician. He is attempting now to rehabilitate Chahar, the chairmanship of which he has recently re-assumed.

Tai Chi-t'ao (Ch'uan-hsien):
Member (1), (2), (5), (15), (16) and (17); Director (8), and Chairman, Examination and Selection Committee of (8).

T'ang Shao-yi:
Formerly minister in many cabinets and honorary adviser to National Government. This elder statesman of past excellent record is now doing nothing constructive, but issues periodical blasts against the Nanking clique.

Ts'ai Ting-kai:
Commander of 19th Route Army and Pacification Commissioner of Fukien. The most ambitious and energetic warlord in China and probably the greatest threat to the power of Chiang Kai-shek.

Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei:
Member (1) and (2). One of the "Elder Statesmen". President of Academia Sinica. Continues to participate in politics, being used by the National Government mostly in educational matters because of his outstanding reputation as one of China's foremost intellectuals.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Chinese Personalities

Wan Fu-lin:
Until the Mukden incident of September 1931 was Military Governor of Heilungchiang and Vice C-in-C, Northeastern Frontier Defense Forces. He has been steadily losing reputation for the past two years. His continued use by Chang Hsueh-liang proved a sad mistake for he is without ability or courage. He now commands the 4th Group of Armies (eight divisions) stationed in North China. He rates next in rank (seniority) to Chang Hsueh-liang and consequently is considered the present head of the old Northeastern troops during the absence of the Young Marshal.

Wang Ching-wei (Chao-ming):
This man is one of the original revolutionists who brought about the fall of the Manchu dynasty, being held a prisoner for two years when released by the success of the revolution. He is now in power as President of the Executive Yuan and acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, which positions he holds because of sagacity and co-operation with Chiang Kai-shek. He is rated as capable, sincere and bitterly opposed to the militarists whose power he is attempting to reduce.

Dr. C. T. Wang:
In 1930 was Member (2), (3), (12), (15) and (21), and Minister of Foreign Affairs. As Foreign Minister he was notorious as pressing for a revision of the "unequal treaties" and the abrogation of the extraterritorial privileges of foreigners, then an important policy of the Kuomintang and of the Nanking Government. In 1932 after the Mukden incident he was attacked and severely injured by students who were demonstrating against the policy of Nanking in not declaring war on the Japanese. He then resigned as Foreign Minister. He is regarded as a hard, determined and possibly slippery diplomat with ability and courage above the ordinary.

Wu Chih-hui (Ching-heng):
Member (2). One of the "Elder Statesmen". Has continued an important politician, being a member of the Kuomintang Central Supervisory Committee. He is reputed to be a close political adviser to Chiang Kai-shek and is spoken of often as being his Political Chief of Staff.

Yen Hsi-shan:
Better known as "The Model Governor" - for 18 years governed the "model province" (Shansi). One of the major leaders of the 1929-30 anti-government rebellion in the North; organized with Wang Ching-wei and others a short-lived government at Peiping in September 1930. Upon defeat of rebel armies in 1930 withdrew into Shansi and retired from public life. Later, being forced to leave China, he went to Dairen. Returned to Shansi province in 1931. Although not now legally governor, he completely controls that province as its "Pacification Commissioner". During the past two years he has continued his former cautious, provincial policies. Lacking courage and interested only in his own province, he has lost both influence and reputation during the past two years.

G-2 Report

6290

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Chinese Personalities

Yu Yu-jen:

Since 1930 Member (2), (5), (15) and President (9). Has maintained an excellent reputation.

HLB

W. S. Drysdale

W. S. Drysdale
Lieutenant-Colonel, Infantry
Military Attache

Distribution:
4 MID
1 File

G-2 Report

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

6290 - Personnel Misc.

OFFICE OF CHIEF OF STAFF MIL. INTEL. DIV.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Chinese Army Personnel

General Chang Chih-chung (張治中)

WAR DEPARTMENT

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JAN 31 1934

a. Date and place of birth:

Tsaohsien, Anhwei Province, 1891.

b. Education:

Well educated and scholarly type. Graduated from Paotingfu Military Academy in 1916 and visited Europe, America and Japan in 1927-1928. Does not speak English or any other foreign language.

c. Social Status and antecedents:

Although his antecedents are unknown he is obviously a very high type of Chinese.

d. Outstanding accomplishments and abilities both professional and personal:

His command of the 5th Route Army (Chiang Kai-shek's 87th and 88th Model Divisions) during the Shanghai incident of 1931-1932. While the 19th Route Army and its commanders gained much publicity and profited by their fighting, Chang Chih-chung was satisfied to remain in the background and maintain unquestioned loyalty to his chief, Chiang Kai-shek. His talents are more pronounced as an administrator and staff officer than as a field commander.

e. Principal events of career both creditable and discreditable:

Commander of Cadet Company, Whampoa Military Academy, Canton;
Chief of Staff to Garrison Commander of Canton;
Chief of Staff, original 2nd Division of Revolutionary Army;
Dean of Wuhan Branch of Whampoa Military Academy;
Director of Training of Chiang Kai-shek's army;
Made a serious tour of Europe, Japan and America (not due to political adversity);
Dean of Central Military Academy, Nanking;
Director of Chiang Kai-shek's headquarters at Hankow;
Commander of 2nd Division;
Commander of 5th Route Army;
Dean of Central Military Academy.

It has frequently been rumored that General Chang will be promoted to the chairmanship of some province.

f. Political affiliations - powerful friends and enemies.

Unswerving and constant supporter of Chiang Kai-shek.

g. Pro- or anti-American, if known.

Decidedly friendly to and respectful of Americans.

From M/A, China Report No. 8726 January 3, 1934

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Chinese Army Personnel

General Chang Chih-chung

h. Character, morals, personal habits - strengths and weaknesses - likes and dislikes - hobbies.

A man of excellent character and temperate, conservative habits. Does not smoke and drinks only when he feels the occasion requires it.

i. Physique, physical and nervous stamina - ability to stand up under hardships of campaign.

A quiet man of not outstanding vigor but his record shows him as having stood up under strain of combat. Has recently been undergoing treatment in foreign hospitals for stomach trouble.

j. Mentality and temperament - intelligence, judgment, inclined to be rash and impulsive or timid and conservative.

Of above average intelligence and judgment. While not timid he is conservative.

k. Physical and moral courage - ability to perform under pressure-willingness to take heavy responsibility and make timely and important decisions followed by prompt action.

His Shanghai war experience in command of the 5th Route Army shows him to be capable of assuming responsibility and making decisions.

l. Anything that will aid in presenting an accurate and intimate personal picture of the man as well as officer.

m. Photographs or reproductions of photographs:

An excellent photograph attached hereto.

W. S. Drysdale

W. S. Drysdale
Lieutenant-Colonel, Infantry
Military Attache

HLB

Photo attached

Distribution:
4 MID
1 File

G-2 Report

6290 - Personnel
Miscellaneous

CHINA (Military) 6-1

Subject: Chinese Army Personnel

General Shang Chen

MAY 8 1934
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
2657-J-363
WAR DEPARTMENT

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 7 1934

a. Date and place of birth:

Paotingfu, Hopei province, 1884.

b. Education:

Graduate Paotingfu Military Academy. Studied in Japan. At present works very hard in studying English and has two teachers daily.

c. Social status and antecedents:

Antecedents unknown but occupies high social position. Is respected and liked by both foreigners and Chinese.

d. Outstanding accomplishments and abilities both professional and personal:

His defense of Lengkow in 1933 against the Japanese and his vigorous attack against Shih Yu-san's rear in 1931, thereby causing his downfall. For this he gained gratitude of both Chang Hsueh-liang and Chiang Kai-shek.

e. Principal events of career both creditable and discreditable:

Governor of Suiyuan 1928, Governor of Hopei 1929, and Governor of Shansi 1931. Following the anti-Japanese campaign in Hopei and Jehol in spring 1933, he occupied very important position in North China as commander of 32nd Army.

f. Political affiliations -- powerful friends and enemies:

Very close to and practically only Northern general who holds confidence of Chiang Kai-shek. Holds unusual position in that he has held office under both the Yen Hsi-shan and Chang Hsueh-liang regimes.

g. Pro- or anti-American, if known:

Decidedly friendly to Americans and is pro-American.

h. Character, morals, personal habits -- strengths and weaknesses -- likes and dislikes -- hobbies:

Man of excellent character, does not like to drink, has only one wife, a very estimable lady, who exerts a strong influence in all his affairs. Plays golf and likes modern western mode of living.

i. Physique, physical and nervous stamina -- ability to stand up under hardships of campaign:

Excellent physique, respects foreign doctors, takes exercise daily. Far above average in physique and stamina for Chinese officers of any grade.

From M/A, China Report No. 8799 April 5, 1934

G-2 Report

6290 - Personnel
Miscellaneous

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Chinese Army Personnel

General Shang Chen

j. Mentality and temperament -- intelligence, judgment, inclined to be rash and impulsive or timid and conservative:

A man of excellent mentality and high intelligence. He realizes the limitations of the Chinese military system and strives hard to overcome them. He is not inclined to be rash and is not so conservative as most Chinese.

k. Physical and moral courage -- ability to perform under pressure -- willingness to take heavy responsibility and make timely and important decisions followed by prompt action:

A man of high moral courage. Rumor has it that he was ordered by Yen Hsi-shan to have Chiang Kai-shek assassinated in Peking when on a visit in 1930 but refused. For the past four years he has always been in difficult political positions from which he has extricated himself with credit.

l. Anything that will aid in presenting an accurate and intimate personal picture of the man as well as officer:

This man is of a type far superior to those who have been his recent superior officers -- Chang Hsueh-liang and Yen Hsi-shan. To survive he has naturally been required to "play ball." Being loyal and honest in his dealings with Chiang Kai-shek he is very eligible to become the strongest man in North China. Unable to get supplies from Chang Hsueh-liang in his fighting against the Japanese in 1933, he is said to have spent the greater portion of his private fortune on his own troops. Respected by the Japanese and also by General Wetzell, formerly chief German adviser.

m. Photographs:

Photograph attached.

S. V. Constant.
S. V. Constant,
Major, Cavalry (D.O.L.),
Acting Military Attache.

Distribution:
6 MID
1 File

No. 8799

GENERAL SHANG CHEN (商　震)

Enclosure to Report No. 8799, April 5, 1934.

G-2 Report.

6290 - Personnel
Miscellaneous.

FOR OFFICIAL USE
ONLY

CHINA (Military)

Subject: General Ho Ying-chin.

MIL. INTEL. DIV.
2657-J-363
WAR DEPARTMENT
RECEIVED G/2 W. D. OCT 9 1934

a) Date and place of birth.

Born 1889, Hsingi, Kweichow Province.

b) Education.

Elementary education in local schools of Kweichow Province. Later Tokyo Military Academy (Staff College?)

c) Social status and antecedents.

Probably comes from ordinary Chinese stock. His position in recent years has thrown him considerably with persons of culture. Both he and his wife make a very presentable public appearance.

d) Outstanding accomplishments and abilities both professional and personal.

Without question his greatest virtue and strength is whole-hearted loyalty to Chiang Kai-shek.

He has not the reputation for brilliance or outstanding ability but has satisfactorily accomplished every assignment given him by Chiang Kai-shek. More of an administrator than a field commander.

e) Principal events of career both creditable and discreditable.

1924 a battalion-commander of cadets and senior instructor under Chiang Kai-shek during the first class to enter the Whampoo Military Academy at Canton.

From the period 1924-1928 Ho Ying-chin was a senior commander in all the campaigns incident to the Northern expedition launched from Canton. His experiences then and during the Kiangsi campaign against communists in 1927-1928 have made him an exceptionally well informed militarist.

1926 - Member, Kuomintang Executive Committee.

1928 - Chairman of Chekiang Province.

1929 - Minister of Military Affairs (Minister of War).

1931 - Vice-Chairman, Military Affairs Commission.

1932 - Vice-Chairman, Peiping Branch Military Council.

Note:- Chiang Kai-shek is the Chairman in fact but has never come north to assume charge but relies entirely upon Ho Ying-chin to carry out his policies.

General Ho Ying-chin has done his work in North China, a task which would tax the abilities of any man, in a very

From M/A, China. Report No. 8912. Sept. 13, 1934.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: General Ho Ying-chin.

creditable manner. While Ho Ying-chin's position ostensibly is one concerned chiefly with military affairs, it is in reality political also. There has been report of some friction and jealousy on the part of Huang Fu, Chairman of the Political Council. He is no doubt Chiang's check on Huang Fu's power in North China.

f) Political affiliations -- powerful friends and enemies.

A 100% follower of Chiang Kai-shek in everything, and as such, he says and believes exactly what is dictated by Chiang. As he is not an aggressive man he has not any unusually powerful personal enemies. Recognized leader of the Kweichow clique in the National Government. Is either the leader or a powerful member of the so-called "military clique" of Chinese politicians.

g) Pro- or anti-American, if known.

Cannot be said to be pro-American but is cordial and friendly.

h) Character, morals, personal habits -- strengths and weaknesses -- likes and dislikes -- hobbies.

A man of good character. As many of those close to Chiang Kai-shek, he has excellent moral habits. Does not smoke opium and drinks only a sip of wine when he believes the occasion requires it. Does not engage in any sport except hunting and riding.

i) Physique, physical and nervous stamina -- ability to stand up under hardships of campaign.

Far above the average physical condition for a Chinese of his age. Not excessively nervous but placid and has in the past year stood up under much nervous strain. Has not commanded an active field unit for the past six years.

j) Mentality and temperament -- intelligence, judgment, inclined to be rash and impulsive or timid and conservative.

A Chinese official above of average intelligence but not quick or brilliant. Has shown excellent judgment on most occasions. Is conservative and not impulsive.

k) Physical and moral courage -- ability to perform under pressure -- willingness to take heavy responsibility and make timely and important decisions followed by prompt action.

Ho Ying-chin's position in North China the past year and one half has been the most difficult one in China because of his close and difficult relations with the Japanese and Huang Fu. He has stood up against constant and vicious political attacks during the past two years showing him to be a man of moral courage. He does not as a rule either make important timely decisions or follow them with quick action but adopts typical Chinese methods of quiet negotiation and caution.

G-2 Report.

6290 - Personnel
Miscellaneous.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: General Ho Ying-chin.

l) Anything that will aid in presenting an accurate and intimate personal picture of the man as well as officer.

Ho can best be described as Chiang Kai-shek's administrative plow-horse whose honesty and loyalty can be trusted absolutely.

m) Photographs or reproductions of photographs.

See attached.

W. S. Drysdale

W. S. Drysdale,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

1 enclosure.

Distribution:
6 MID
1 File

No. 8912

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

b-1 22 2657-J-363

G-2 Report.

6290 - Personnel Department, Miscellaneous.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Chinese Army Personnel, General Yu Hsueh-chung.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. NOV 21 1934

(a) Date and place of birth:

Born in 1893, P'englai, Shantung Province.

(b) Education:

Has never had the advantages of an education. He joined the Army early in life and received his commission from a military training center. His military education has been mostly from experience.

(c) Social status and antecedents:

Little is known of his antecedents. He has reached the position he now occupies by virtue of his unswerving loyalty to his commanders.

(d) Outstanding accomplishments and abilities - both professional and personal:

He was battalion, regimental, brigade and division commander during the supremacy of Wu Pei-fu in the North and after Wu's defeat at the hands of the Fengtien contingent, which was assisted by the coup d'etat of Feng Yu-hsiang, Yu surrendered to the Northeastern Army and was appointed commander of the 20th Army Corps in 1927. He was later Commander of the Northeastern Frontier Defense 1st Army in 1930. From this position he returned to Peking and was made Commander of the Peking-Tientsin Defense Garrison.

He has been the Chairman of the Hopeh Provincial Government since September 1932.

(e) Principal events of career both creditable and discreditable:

His career has been one of no particular outstanding accomplishments. He has not had the opportunity to show any brilliant leadership through any important operations but he has shown unquestioned loyalty towards his commanders and due to that fact has been the recipient of favors from them.

(f) Political affiliations - powerful friends and enemies:

As Chairman of Hopeh Province he has been placed many times in embarrassing and compromising positions by the Japanese in their pressure and demands for certain concessions in the North. When the Japanese were striving to set up a buffer state between Souch China and Manchoukuo, Yu refused to be a party to the scheme. He has displayed undisputed loyalty to Chiang Kai-shek and the National Government under all pressure and inducement.

It is rumored that Huang Fu, the Chairman of the Peking Branch Political Council, is desirous of securing the Chairmanship of Hopeh Province. If this rumored plan materializes, Yu

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Chinese Army Personnel,
General Yu Hsueh-chung.

will no doubt be taken care of by the Government and he should by all tokens be considered in line for some important position. Where, it is not known but it is doubtful if he will be let out of the picture entirely because of his affiliation with the former Northeastern (Fengtien) military clique.

(g) Pro and anti-American, if known:

Has always been decidedly friendly with Americans.

(h) Character, morals, personal habits -- strengths and weaknesses -- likes and dislikes -- hobbies:

Man of excellent character, very much respected by Chinese and foreigners both socially and officially.

(i) Physique, physical and nervous stamina -- ability to stand up under hardship of campaign:

An energetic type with a good physique. Above the average Chinese in stamina. Should be able, according to appearances, to withstand hardship of campaign.

(j) Mentality and temperament -- intelligence, judgment, inclined to be rash and impulsive or timid and conservative:

A man of even temperament, above average intelligence and one whom it is believed is conservative but not timid.

His initiative has not been developed to the extent it might be due to the fact that practically all the positions he has occupied have necessitated his acting on direct orders of superiors which orders he has carried out with loyalty.

(k) Physical and moral courage -- ability to perform under pressure -- willingness to take heavy responsibility and make timely and important decisions followed by prompt action:

He has shown the ability to perform under pressure and has displayed the ability to make important decisions, but has been handicapped in his authority to carry them out according to his dictates.

(l) Anything that will aid in presenting an accurate and intimate personal picture of the man as well as officer:

After the advance and occupation of the province of Jehol when conditions in the North were very tense he displayed excellent judgment in mediating several incidents that might have provoked serious consequences.

(m) Photograph attached. (1 copy only)

For and in the absence of the Military Attache:

S. V. Constant.
S. V. Constant,
Major, Cavalry,
Assistant Military Attache.

Distribution:
6 MID
1 File

1-1
NOV 22 1934
Enc. 1
CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
2627-S-363
63
WAR DEPARTMENT.

General Yu Hsueh-chung

(于學忠)

Enclosure to Report No. 8947, dated October 25, 1934.

6-1 #2627-J-363 14 WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Military)

Subject: General Chang Hsueh-liang.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JAN 2 1935

(a) Date and place of birth:

Born at Haich'eng, Liaoning Province, Manchuria, in 1898.

(b) Education:

Has been given a thorough Chinese education under private tutors. He is able to carry on a conversation in English and can read and write English fairly well. He has no diploma from any university or college except the Military Academy mentioned below.

Graduate of the Mukden Military Academy, 1926.

(c) Social status and antecedents:

Chang Hsueh-liang, who is better known as the "Young Marshal", is the son of the late Marshal Chang Tso-lin, former war-lord and ruler of Manchuria, a forceful man of great determination who in his early life was the leader of a band of outlaws. He later surrendered to the Manchurian forces and was promoted step-by-step until he became the virtual ruler of Manchuria. There is doubt whether Chang Hsueh-liang, his son, has inherited these forceful traits since he has not shown the remarkable leadership and ability so characteristic of his father.

(d) Outstanding accomplishments and abilities, both professional and personal:

He was appointed a Colonel of Artillery by the Peking Government in 1919 and was appointed Commander of the Body Guards of the Tupan of Fengtien, then his father. Appointed Commander of the 3rd Mixed Brigade of the Fengtien Army in 1920.

In the war between the Chihli (now Hopei) and the Anhwei factions in 1920 he was in command of the brigade which sided with the Chihli faction at Shanhaikwan and rendered valuable service by defeating General Lung Chi-kuang.

In the fall of 1920 he was appointed a full Brigadier General of the Fengtien Army.

In 1927 he commanded an Army Group (Manchurian), which operated on the Peking-Hankow Railway south of Peking against the southern forces.

After travelling to Japan to witness maneuvers there, he returned and introduced many improvements in the Fengtien Army and reorganized the system of military training in the Fengtien Military Training Academy, of which he was in command.

(a) Date sent

G-2 Report.

G-2 Report. 6290 - Personnel - Miscellaneous.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: General Chang Hsueh-liang.

Upon the death of his father in 1928, he affiliated himself with the Nationalist Government and was appointed Commander-in-Chief for the preservation of peace in Manchuria from October 1928 to December 1931.

After the outbreak of the Mukden Incident in September 1931, Chang's property was seized by the Japanese and he was forced to establish his headquarters at Peiping, from which place he continued in control of his troops until the collapse in Jehol. While he was following a policy imposed by the Central Government, he could not escape a measure of responsibility for the failure and consented to go abroad. A leader of greater ability and force might have acquitted himself with more honor and retained the confidence of his people.

(e) Principal events of career, both creditable and discreditable:

Public opinion was so roused against the Marshal as a result of the debacle in Manchuria, he was given opportunity to make a prolonged tour of Europe. He returned from this trip in the winter of 1933-1934. During his absence a better understanding of his position and improved feeling resulted. He was then appointed by Chiang Kai-shek as Deputy Bandit Suppression Commissioner of the provinces of Honan, Hupei and Anhwei.

(f) Political affiliations - powerful friends and enemies:

He is an ardent Chinese patriot, thoroughly detests the Japanese and is a strong supporter of the National Government. He is now closely associated with Chiang Kai-shek and a group of the most powerful and influential Chinese politicians.

He has never been a character that would produce powerful enemies although he was subject to criticism for his ineffectual handling of the Japanese trouble in the North and was accused by many as being a traitor to his country in giving way as easily as he did.

His failure to cooperate with the Japanese in Manchuria naturally produced a feeling of enmity on the part of the Japanese who later forced his removal from the North China area.

(g) Pro- or anti-American, if known:

He has always been very friendly to and has sometimes shown a preference toward Americans. He is aware of America's traditional policy toward China and has been and is most favorably impressed thereby.

(h) Character, morals, personal habits - strengths and weaknesses - likes and dislikes - hobbies:

He enjoys dancing and attending social functions, is quite acceptable socially, has a pleasing and gracious manner and enjoys association with foreigners. He relies a great deal

CHINA (Military)

Subject: General Chang Hsueh-liang.

on his foreign adviser, an Australian, named W. H. Donald, who is probably partly responsible for the Marshal's extremely friendly relations with foreigners. He spends much of his spare time at the Hankow Club playing contract bridge which he plays very well.

As a young man he seemed lacking in strength of character - was easily influenced and fell naturally into many forms of dissipation.

While very abstemious in the use of alcoholic liquors, he became addicted to the use of morphine during a serious illness in his youth. In 1933 he was given the 'cure' at Shanghai. It is generally believed now, however, that the cure has been complete.

He enjoys most forms of foreign sports both as an onlooker and participant. Is particularly fond of horseback riding and golf. He has a handicap of 14 at golf. With this handicap he won a recent golf tournament at the Hankow Golf and Country Club.

(i) Physique, physical and nervous stamina - ability to stand up under the hardship of campaign:

Is of slight physique and gives the impression of being weak physically. Since his cure from the drug habit he has gained weight almost to the point of being obese. There is a possibility that he is lacking in the physical and nervous strength to work under pressure over extended periods of time and might possibly revert to the use of dope should such circumstances arise.

(j) Mentality and temperament - intelligence, judgment, inclined to be rash and impulsive or timid and conversative:

He is of average intelligence and fair judgment. Rather inclined to be rash and impulsive in his decisions.

(k) Physical and moral courage - ability to perform under pressure - willingness to take heavy responsibility and make timely and important decisions followed by prompt action:

A Chinese of average physical and moral courage - neither quick nor brilliant. He has always shown a willingness to accept heavy responsibilities and his decisions often indicate a judgment and foresight that is unexpected. He has a shrewd political mind and is amazingly accurate in his judgment on Chinese political problems.

(l) Anything that will aid in presenting an accurate and intimate personal picture of the man as well as officer:

He is making a serious and determined effort to reinstate himself in a position of trust and to regain the confidence of the nation. He has always supported the National

CHINA (Military)

Subject: General Chang Hsueh-liang.

Government, is an ardent advocate of a united China and is at present cooperating with Chiang Kai-shek in an effort to unify and regenerate the country.

There has been a remarkable improvement in his mental and physical vigor since his cure from the drug habit. He is now mentally alert and physically active.

The Marshal seems destined to remain an important and powerful figure in Chinese politics for years to come.

(m) Photograph attached. (1 copy only)

W. S. Drysdale

W. S. Drysdale,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Distribution:
6 MID
1 File

G-2 Report

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

6290-Personnel Misc.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF MIL. INTEL. DIV.

MAR 18 '35

2657-J-363

WAR DEPARTMENT

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAR 13 1935

CHINA (Military)

Subject: General Sung Che-yuan

a) Date and place of birth:
Born in 1885. Native of Hopei Province.

b) Education:
Information on his educational qualifications is lacking but it is believed that he attended the ordinary Chinese middle schools. After his entry into the military service he attended the military schools of the army to which he belonged.

c) Social status and antecedents:
His antecedents are unknown but it is believed that he comes of good Chinese stock. He is a typical Chinese of the old school. He has always exercised a great deal of authority over the districts he has controlled.

d) Outstanding accomplishments and abilities, both professional and personal:
As commander of the 28th Army and concurrently Chairman Chahar Province, he defended the Great Wall passes in the vicinity of Hsifengkow during the Japanese invasion of 1933 in which he made a very creditable showing.

e) Principal events of career both creditable and discreditable.
Has been Military Governor of Jehol Province.
Commander of the Kuominchun 4th Army under Feng Yu-hsiang, the "Christian General".
Chairman of Shensi Province 1927-1928.
Commander of the 28th Army since 1929.
Governor of Chahar Province since 1932.

When his chief, General Feng Yu-hsiang, staged a revolution against Chiang Kai-shek in 1929, he was very energetic in furthering the revolt. Again in 1930, when Yen Hsi-shan, the Governor of Shansi Province, staged an anti-Chiang uprising, Sung took an active part, this time also under his leader, Feng Yu-hsiang. Although both of the above mentioned efforts were failures, he was later appointed Chairman of Chahar Province by the Nanking Government which indicated that his strength was respected and that they would rather secure his cooperation than try to replace him with another man of their selection.

f) Political affiliations - Powerful friends and enemies:
During the period of control in the North by Feng Yu-hsiang, General Sung held many important positions and was linked with the governors of Shansi, Shantung and Suiyuan and other leaders in the North.
It is impossible to estimate what trust Chiang Kai-shek places in him at present due to his former participation in two revolts against him. However it is believed that he was given the post of Chairman of Chahar Province by the Generalissimo as a political necessity rather than run the risk of having Sung's many friends ally themselves against him.

From M/A, China Report No. 9047 February 13, 1935

CHINA (Military)

Subject: General Sung Che-yuan

g) Pro or anti-American if known:

He has always been unusually friendly to Americans. This was particularly evident when three officers of this office had occasion to call on him during the hostilities of 1933, at which time he personally conducted them on a tour of inspection of his lines. He was most friendly at that time and also to another member of this office who spent several weeks with his regiment in the Chihli-Fengtien trouble in 1924.

h) Character, morals, personal habits, strengths and weaknesses, likes and dislikes - hobbies:

General Sung has generally held positions in outlying districts where he has been in more or less complete control and not subject to the close supervision of the central authorities. Under these circumstances he has been a virtual dictator in his sphere.

It is understood that he has increased his personal income through the opium traffic in Chahar Province. He also receives $210,000 per month from the Central Government supposedly for the upkeep of his army but which is actually used to purchase his allegiance to the Nanking Government. On many occasions he has been known to be in arrears in the payment of his troops, indicating that there has been a leakage of the fund before it reached its destination.

i) Physique, physical and nervous stamina - ability to stand up under the hardships of campaign:

He is a man of unusually strong physique. His past life indicates that he has a great deal of stamina and nervous energy. He has also proven that he is capable of standing up under the rigorous hardships of campaign.

j) Mentality and temperament - intelligence, judgment - Inclined to be rash and impulsive or timid and conservative:

He is above the average in intelligence and judgment. It is believed that he is more conservative than rash. He has displayed excellent judgment in his handling of affairs in his province during the period of tension caused by the proximity of the Japanese to his positions. He has handled the situation with tact and good judgment and at the same time has maintained his allegiance to the Central Government.

k) Physical and moral courage. Ability to perform under pressure-willingness to take heavy responsibilities and make timely and important decisions followed by prompt action:

Although he has not been involved in many major conflicts, he has had a great deal of experience in smaller engagements in all of which he has displayed courage and loyalty to his commanders.

His efforts at the Great Wall to stem the attack of the Japanese were probably more efficiently executed than the resistance put up by the other Northern commanders along that front.

G-2 Report

6290-Personnel
Misc.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: General Sung Che-yuan

l) Anything that will aid in presenting an accurate and intimate personal picture of the man as well as officer:

Because of his conservatism and long association with individuals and a group not now wholly acceptable to Chiang Kai-shek and the Nanking Government, General Sung is still reluctant to give his complete loyalty to the present regime and is inclined to resent such control as the authorities impose on his actions or policies. He is particularly loath to permit the Japanese to include any part of Chahar into Manchoukuo, is inclined to disagree with the concessions made to the Japanese in this respect, and is prepared, on any reasonable pretext, to use his army to resist what he considers as Japanese aggression. The prospect that he will reach a high position under the present government is extremely small.

m) Photographs or reproductions of photographs:

One photograph attached.

Source: Study in M/A Office.

W. S. Drysdale

W. S. Drysdale
Lieutenant-Colonel, Infantry
Military Attache

1 encls. (1 copy only)

J E M

Distribution:
6 MID
1 Legation
1 File

G-2 Report

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

6-1

6290-Personnel

2657-d-363

APR 25

WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Military)

Subject: General Ho Chu-kuo

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 23 1935

(a) Date and place of birth:
Born in 1897. Native of Yunghsien, Kwangsi Province.

(b) Education:
Graduate of the Paoting Military Academy. Graduate of the Tokyo Military Cadet School, 1927. He speaks Japanese fluently and is believed to have had a good Chinese education. Does not read nor speak English.

(c) Social status and antecedents:
Little is known of his antecedents but it can safely be said that he comes of above average stock.

(d) Outstanding accomplishments and abilities, both professional and personal:
Was appointed garrison commander of Kaifeng, Honan, and was concurrently commander of the 23rd Division. In 1933 he was acclaimed the "Defender of Shanhaikwan", commanding the 9th Brigade, against the Japanese. Upon the cessation of hostilities he was delegated to reorganize the Northeastern Defense Force.

(e) Principal events of career, both creditable and discreditable:
In 1933 he commanded the troops stationed at Shanhaikwan which resisted the entry of the Japanese into the walled city until forced to withdraw due to lack of reinforcements. It was during this engagement that he was accredited with having put up a stubborn resistance which gained him the epithet of "The Defender of Shanhaikwan".
Since the above incident he has commanded the 109th Division and then the 57th Army in Hupeh.

(f) Political Affiliations - powerful friends and enemies:
Due to his association with the Japanese while attending their military school, he was selected to maintain a peaceful and friendly front with the Japanese and Manchoukuo officials inside and outside the Great Wall at Shanhaikwan. He maintained this position by clever diplomacy for some time until fighting broke out. It is believed that his resistance to the Japanese led Chiang Kai-shek to place a great deal of confidence in him and promote him to army commander. Prior to this time it is believed that there may have been some room for doubt as to his loyalty should the occasion arise whereby he might affiliate himself with the Manchoukuo regime.

(g) Pro - or anti - American, if known:
He has not manifested any desire to be closely associated with the Americans but he has always displayed a cordial and friendly front when with them. It is not believed that he is anti-American.

(h) Character, morals, personal habits - strengths and weaknesses - likes and dislikes - hobbies.
He is a commander who spends most of his time with his troops and is not inclined to engage in activities with foreigners to any extent. He has attempted to instil the

From M/A, China Report No. 9082 March 28, 1935

CHINA (Military)

Subject: General Ho Chu-kuo

military spirit of the Japanese in his troops. He has never shown an interest in foreign style athletics or games.

(i) Physique, physical and nervous stamina - ability to stand up under the hardships of campaign:

General Ho Chu-kuo is of slight stature, rather tall but is not the type inclined to obesity. He is rather nervous, high strung and energetic and gives the impression of having confidence in his ability. His self-assurance is manifested in his conversation. Although he is not a particularly strong appearing man he is the wiry type and it is believed would be able to stand up under the hardships of campaign.

(j) Mentality and temperament - intelligence, judgment, inclined to be rash and impulsive or timid and conservative:

He is quick witted and much above the average in intelligence.

It is believed that he has the courage of his convintions and is willing to back up his judgment. This was proved in his clash with the Japanese upon their entry into China proper through the Shanhaikwan pass in 1933. From his past performance it is believed that he is rather conservative in his judgment but not timid.

(k) Physical and moral courage - ability to perform under pressure-willingness to take heavy responsibility and make timely and important decisions followed by prompt action:

He has both physical and moral courage, believed to be far greater than the average Chinese officer. He has displayed a willingness to shoulder heavy responsibilities and make decisions involving the commitment of his troops to action.

(l) Anything that will aid in presenting an accurate and intimate picture of the man as well as officer:

See above.

(m) Photograph or reproductions of photographs:

1 photograph only attached.

Source: Personal observation and official records.

For and in the absence of the Military Attache:

1 photo attached

J E M

S. V. Constant
S. V. Constant
Major, Cavalry
Assistant Military Attache

Distribution:
6 MID
1 File

G-2 Report

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

5990 - Who's Who in National Defense

6-1

CHINA (Combat-)
General

AUG 14 1935
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
2657-J-363
WAR DEPARTMENT
AUG 12 1935

Subject: General Li Chi-shen (Li Chai-sum)

(a) Date and place of birth:

Born in 1886 in Ts'angwu, Kwangsi Province.

(b) Education:

Graduate of Peking Military College in 1917. Elementary education in Kwangsi and Kwangtung.

(c) Social status and antecedents:

Little is known of his family. He has been a military man all his life.

(d) Outstanding accomplishments and abilities, both professional and personal:

Is reported to be a good organizer and able to train troops.

(e) Principal events of career, both creditable and discreditable:

Following graduation from the old Peking Military College, which corresponded to our War College, he was assigned as Garrison Commander at Wuchow, Kwangsi. In 1922 when General Ch'en Ch'iung-ming revolted against the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen, General Li sided with the latter and helped crush the uprising. In 1926 he was Chief of Staff of the Nationalist Armies and Chairman of the Canton Branch of the Kuomintang Central Political Council. The next year he was made a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang and also of the Central Political Council.

When Chiang Kai-shek made his famous march from Canton to North China, Li Chi-shen was one of his most trusted assistants. In October 1928, General Li was made Chief of the General Staff and concurrently a State Councillor of the National Government. Some trouble arose between him and Chiang and he was persuaded to go to Nanking through a clever ruse planned by the Generalissimo. Upon his arrival he was kept under observation and remained there practically a prisoner for a year. In 1931 he was pardoned and appointed to the post of Director-General of Military Training.

Unable to forget the treatment he had received from General Chiang, he became involved in the Fukien Rebellion of 1933 which was led by Generals Chiang Kuang-nai and Ts'ai T'ing-kai. During this he was selected as Chairman of the so-called "People's Government" at Foochow. In 1934, after the suppression of the Fukien Rebellion by the National Government forces, General Li Chi-shen was expelled from the Kuomintang and deprived of his rank and titles. He is now living in Kwangsi.

From M/A, China Report No. 9163 July 16, 1935

CHINA (Combat - General)

Subject: General Li Chi-shen (Li Chai-sum)

(f) Political affiliations - powerful friends and enemies:

Li is a Kwangsi man and has always been in with the Kwangsi military clique. He is a great friend of General Li Tsung-jen, who commands the 4th Group of Armies, and of his assistant, General Pai Chung-hsi. In spite of his connections with the Kwangsi group he was always considered loyal to Chiang Kai-shek until his detention in Nanking. Since that time, quite naturally, he has been a bitter enemy of the Generalissimo.

(g) Pro - or anti - American:

Li is an ardent Nationalist and hence inclined to be anti-foreign in general principle.

(h) Character, morals, personal habits - strength and weaknesses-likes and dislikes:

Has the reputation of being a very forceful and positive character. When in school he was a leader in sports and recreation as well as being above average in studies. Makes decisions quickly and carries them out with vigor. Is known as being "li hai" among the Chinese which means "fierce, aggressive and strong willed".

Inclined to be ultra-progressive, slightly radical and out of patience with the old order of things in China. He takes violent likes and dislikes to people which is in keeping with his other characteristics. Because of his detention and treatment by Chiang Kai-shek, his strong support of the Generalissimo has centered into an equally strong opposition. Whether Chiang was correct in not trusting Li at that time cannot be known.

(i) Physique, physical and nervous stamina - ability to stand up under the hardships of campaign:

A man of strong physique and one who has always been active. He is highly strung, inclined to be nervous and often works on his nerve without paying much attention to his physical needs. How long he would be able to stand this method of working is problematical.

(j) Mentality and temperament - intelligence, judgment, inclined to be rash and impulsive or timid and conservative:

A man of above average intelligence. Reported sometimes to make snap judgments and is inclined to be rash and impulsive.

CHINA (Combat -
General)

Subject: General Li Chi-shen (Li Chai-sum)

(k) Physical and moral courage - ability to perform under pressure-willingness to take heavy responsibility and make timely and important decisions followed by prompt action:

Is believed to have both physical and moral courage. His past record shows that he can perform under pressure. He is willing to take responsibility and to make decisions and has the push to carry them out. He is a "stormy petrel" type and often backs the wrong plan but whatever he does he does with all his heart.

(l) Anything that will aid in presenting an accurate and intimate picture of the man as well as officer:

Because of his strong opposition to Chiang Kai-shek there are rumors to the effect that Li may be a candidate for a position in North China under Japanese protection.

(m) Photograph or reproduction of photographs:

1 photograph only attached.

Source: Study in M/A Office and conversations with Chinese officers who know him.

S. V. Constant
S. V. Constant
Major, Cavalry
Assistant Military Attache

Distribution:
6 MID
1 File
1 Legation

No. 9163 1st Ind. JWS:elh

Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peiping, China, July 16, 1935 - To: Chief, Military Intelligence Division, Washington, D.C.

Approved.

Joseph W. Stilwell
Joseph W. Stilwell
Lieutenant-Colonel, Infantry
Military Attache

G-2 Report

5990

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
2657-J-63
WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Combat)

Subject: Who's Who in National Defense

General Huang Shao-hsiung

AUG 26 1935

(a) Date and place of birth:
Born in 1886 in Yunghsien (Jungyun), Kwangsi Province.

(b) Education:
Graduate of the old Paotingfu Military Academy in 1916. His elementary education was received in Kwangsi.

(c) Social status and antecedents:
Of average Chinese stock.

(d) Outstanding accomplishments and abilities, both professional and personal:
While essentially a military man he has exhibited an unusual ability to adjust political questions and an excellent record of arranging settlements between opposing factions.

(e) Principal events of career, both creditable and discreditable:
After graduation from the Paotingfu Military Academy in 1916 he served in various ranks to division commander in Kwangsi, reaching the latter post in 1923. He was made Associate Director-General of Pacification in Kwangsi Province in 1923 and two years later was appointed Commissioner of Civil Affairs of that province.

In 1926, General Huang was promoted to the position of Chairman of Kwangsi. His detail to command of the 15th Army lasted from 1927 to 1931 during which period he was also made a member of the Canton Branch of the Kuomintang Central Political Council. Despite the fact of his close associations with the Kwangsi clique he has always maintained close relations with General Chiang Kai-shek and was sent by the latter on a mission to Kwangtung and Kwangsi for the purpose of patching up matters between this faction and the Nanking Government.

Because of his success in this mission he was appointed by the Generalissimo in 1932 to be Minister of the Interior. This office he held for two years and it was during this time that he was sent by Chiang Kai-shek to Mongolia in an effort to bring the Mongols closer to the Central Government. His mission there was connected with the establishment of the Mongolian Autonomy Council and the general impression is that he assisted materially in bettering relations between the Government and the Mongols.

In accordance with the scheme of the Nanking authorities to develop the Northwest, it was planned to send General Huang with an expedition into Sinkiang. Several hundred "Reo" light trucks were purchased and sent to Kweihwa, Suiyuan Province, which was selected to be the starting point of the expedition. A special corps of Middle School students was formed to drive the trucks and considerable activity was seen in Kweihwa in 1934, but the plan was given

CHINA (Combat)

Subject: Who's Who in National Defense

General Huang Shao-hsiung

up because of the announced opposition of the Chairman of Sinkiang, who stated that he would resist with armed force any such expedition into his territory.

General Huang was appointed Chairman of Chekiang Province in January 1935 and holds that position at the present time.

(f) Political affiliations - powerful friends and enemies:

One of the outstanding members of the Kwangsi group, he has been able to remain loyal to Chiang Kai-shek without hurting his own relations and friendships with the powerful personages of Kwangsi and Kwangtung. Huang is on good terms with General Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi, who are two of the most powerful military men in the Southwest.

(g) Pro - or anti - American:

So far as is known General Huang has no anti-foreign complex and has no particular preference for any nationality.

(h) Character, morals, personal habits - strength and weaknesses-likes and dislikes:

A man who has the reputation for having a good character and good morals. Is active and enjoys outdoor exercise such as riding and walking.

(i) Physique, physical and nervous stamina - ability to stand up under the hardships of campaign:

He is a strong and rugged type. Takes good care of himself and is probably one of the few high ranking Chinese generals who would be fit to take the field with his troops in a hard campaign. Is not the nervous, high strung type but the sort who would be unruffled by surrounding conditions.

(j) Mentality and temperament - intelligence, judgment, inclined to be rash and impulsive or timid and conservative.

Is not brilliant but deliberate and accurate in his mental processes. Is intelligent and carefully considers all the ramifications of a situation before placing himself in a position requiring a decision. In this manner he is prepared whichever way matters go, a most valuable attribute in negotiations in the Far East.

(k) Physical and moral courage - ability to perform under pressure - willingness to take heavy responsibility and make timely and important decisions followed by prompt action:

He has proved himself to have physical and moral courage and more than willing to undertake difficult and hazardous tasks. Is willing to go with his troops under all conditions. In the various special missions which he

CHINA (Combat)

Subject: Who's Who in National Defense

General Huang Shao-hsiung

has performed for Chiang Kai-shek he has shown himself capable of taking matters in his own hands and making decisions based upon his best judgment of conditions as they exist. He has been likened by his friends to a steam roller - slow in starting but very deliberate and sure in his action to accomplish a given end.

(l) Anything that will aid in presenting an accurate and intimate picture of the man as well as the officer:

In China where a man's birthplace and former affiliations play such a vital part it is significant that General Huang Shao-hsiung has reached his present position. His loyalty for Chiang Kai-shek, strangely enough, has not ruined his affiliations with his friends of the Kwangsi clique and this fact alone shows Huang to be an exceptional type. The average Kwangsi man could not attain such a position of confidence with the Generalissimo, and should he have done so, all but the exceptional man would have lost the friendship of his former Kwangsi allies. Huang Shao-hsiung is an exception to the rule and one of the conservative and reliable supporters of a central government for China.

(m) Photograph or reproduction of photograph:

1 photograph only attached.

Source: Study in M/A Office and personal observation and conversations with Chinese officers who know him.

S. V. Constant

S. V. Constant
Major, Cavalry
Assistant Military Attache

Distribution:
6 MID
1 Legation
1 File

No. 9177 1st Ind. JWS:elh
Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peiping, China, July 31, 1935 - To: Chief, Military Intelligence Division, Washington, D.C.

Approved.

Joseph W. Stilwell

Joseph W. Stilwell
Lieutenant-Colonel, Infantry
Military Attache

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
AUG 28 1935
WAR DEPARTMENT

1-1

2657-J-563

General Huang Shao-hsiung

黃 紹 雄

Report.

8890.

FOR OFFICIAL USE
ONLY

6-1

CHINA (Military).

Subject: Who's Who in National Defense.

New Lieutenant-Generals Appointed.

FEB 26 1936
MIL., INTEL. DIV.
WAR DEPARTMENT
2657-9-363
19

1. Chang Chih-chiang:

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. FEB 25 1936

Born 1881; native of Tunchan, Hupei. 1925, Tupan of Northwest frontiers. 1928-1930, Chairman, National Opium Suppression Commission. 1931, Bandit Suppression Commissioner, Kiangsu Province. President, National Physical Culture Institute, concurrently Senior Counseller, Military Advisory Council, since 1932. Christian leader. Is Feng Yu-hsiang's man.

2. Li Chung-lin:

Native of Hopei. Former Kuominchun commander under Feng Yu-hsiang and one time Minister of War of the National Government in 1929. Also served as Emergency Commandant in Peking in 1925.

3. Fang Pao-lan:

Born 1880; native of Huangkang, Hupeh. Graduate, Peking Military College. Sometime Military Governor of Kiangsi; Commander, 11th Army, Northern expedition. 1929-30, Chairman, Hupeh Provincial Government. Senior Counseller, Military Advisory Council, since 1931.

4. Chang Yi-pan:

A member of the Military Advisory Council.

5. Ma Chan-shan:

Born 1887; native of Huaiteh, Liaoning. Enlisted at age of twenty; rose rapidly after distinguishing himself in suppression of Mongol bandits. 1928, Garrison Commander, Heiho. Acting, then substantive Chairman, Heilungkiang Provincial Government, since November, 1931. Has become national hero in the Manchurian crisis for defense of Taitsihar, and then rallying the loyalists for unremitting resistance against the Japanese two months after feigning fealty to "Manchoukuo" Government. December, 1932, retreated into Soviet territory in face of superior Japanese armament. June, 1933, returned to China, via Europe. At present a member of the Military Advisory Council.

6. Liu Yu-fen:

1926, Military Governor of Suiyuan; 1927-30, Governor of Shansi and concurrently Commander of the 7th Route Army. At present a member of the Military Advisory Council. He is one of Feng Yu-hsiang's adherents.

7. Shih Ching-ting:

Native of Shantung. Is Feng Yu-hsiang's man. At present a member of the Military Advisory Council and concurrently a member of the Hopei-Chahar

CHINA (Military).

Subject: Who's Who in National Defense.

New Lieutenant-Generals Appointed.

Political Council. Formerly he served under Feng Yu-hsiang as an army commander and afterwards as his Chief of Staff.

8. Ma Liang:

Native of Shantung. Formerly Commander of the Frontier Forces under the Tuan Chi-jui regime and now a member of the Military Advisory Council.

9. Sun Liang-cheng:

Native of Shantung. Formerly Governor of Honan and later Governor of Shantung. He is a former Hsuanchun's man under Feng Yu-hsiang. At present a member of the Military Advisory Council.

10. Li Fu-lin:

At present a member of the Military Advisory Council.

11. Su Ping-wen:

Native of Heilungkiang. Formerly Garrison Commandant of the Chinese Eastern Railway in the Manchouli area and later became a leader of the North-eastern Volunteer Corps. At present a member of the National Military Council.

12. Lai Hsin-hsi:

Formerly an army commander in Szechwan and now a member of the Military Advisory Council.

13. Ma Hung-kuei:

Native of Kansu. Is now Chairman of the Ningsia Provincial Government and concurrently Commander of the 15th Route Army. Graduate, Kansu Military Academy. 1915, Bandit Suppression Commissioner, Kansu-Shensi-Mongolia borders. 1929, Commander, reorganized 64th Division.

14. Chu Shou-kuang:

Native of Shansi. Formerly Acting Minister of Military Affairs, 1929. Is Yen Hsi-shan's man.

15. Yu Han-mou:

Native of Kwangtung. At present Commander of the 1st Army Corps of the 1st Army Group under Ch'en Chi-t'ang.

CHINA (Military).

Subject: Who's Who in National Defense.

New Lieutenant-Generals Appointed.

16. Wu Shu-yu:

At present Departmental Director of the Military Affairs Council. Formerly served as Garrison Commandant at Nanking.

17. Liu Kuang:

At present Departmental Director of the Board of General Staff.

18. Hsiung Pin:

Formerly Chief of Staff to Feng Yu-hsiang. At present Vice-Chief of Staff of the National Government.

19. Chang Hsi-chien:

At present a member of the Department of Military Affairs of the National Government.

20. Liu Wei:

New Assistant Departmental Director of the Military Affairs Council.

Source: Chinese Government official notices and study in N.A. Office.

Comments: The appointment noted above are interesting when viewed from the standpoint of the former affiliations of the officers.

This is best given in tabulated form as below:

1. Formerly under Feng Yu-hsiang:

Chang Chih-chiang, Lu Chung-lin, Liu Yu-fen, Shih Ching-ting, Sun Liang-cheng, Hsiung Pin. Total 6.

2. Formerly under Chiang Kai-shek:

Wu Shu-yu, Liu Kuang, Chang Hsi-chien, Liu Wei. Total 4.

3. Formerly Fengtien Army under Chang Hsueh-liang:

Ma Chan-shan, Su Ping-wen. Total 2.

4. Formerly under Yen Hsi-shan:

Chu Shou-kuang. Total 1.

5. Mohammedan Generals: (important because of affiliations in Ningsia and Kansu).

CHINA (Military).

Subject: Who's Who in National Defense.

New Lieutenant- Generals Appointed.

Ma Hung-kuei, Ma Liang. Total 2.

6. Various Parties: (given office because it was better to have them close at hand as "advisers" in Nanking than on the outside where they might join with anti-Chiang movements).

Fang Fan-jen, Chang Yi-pen, Li Fu-lin, Lai Hsin-hsi. Total 4.

7. Canton Military Clique:

Yu Han-mou. Total 1.

Of the officers named above only two command troops. These are Ma Hung-kuei of the 15th Route Army and Chairman of Ninghsia and Yu Han-mou who commands the 1st Cantonese Army.

Joseph W. Stilwell,

Joseph W. Stilwell,
Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

SVC

Distribution:
6 MID
1 File

No. 2284

G-2 Report

5990

RESTRICTED 6-1

CHINA (Combat)

Subject: Who's Who in National Defence.

General Ch'en Ming-shu

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 19 1936

(a) Date and place of birth:

Born in 1890 in Hopu, Kwangtung Province.

(b) Education:

Graduate of the old Paotingfu (Hopei) Military Academy, and also studied in Japan.

(c) Social status and antecedents:

No information is available as to his family. He has been a military man all his life.

(d) Outstanding accomplishments and abilities, both professional and personal:

Is reported to have considerable ability as an organizer and in the training and handling of troops.

(e) Principal events of career, both creditable and discreditable:

Started his military career at the Paotingfu Military Academy and after graduation went to Japan for further military instruction. Served as a regimental and brigade commander under Li Chi-shen (Li Chai-sum, see G-2 Report No. 9163). In 1925 he was appointed commander of the 11th Army Corps of the National Revolutionary Army. Three years later he was made Governor of Kwangtung Province.

When Li Chi-shen was made Director-General of Military Training in Nanking, General Chen Ming-shu resigned from his post in Kwangtung and followed Li to Nanking. Shortly after his arrival he was made Garrison Commander of the Nanking-Shanghai area. The 11th Army Corps, his old command, was then moved into the Nanking-Shanghai area for garrison purposes and its designation changed to the 19th Route Army.

In January 1932 he was appointed Minister of Communications and concurrently Vice-Chairman of the Executive Yuan. He and Li Chi-shen were the main advocates of war with Japan in the Shanghai incident of January 28, 1932. In February of that year he was made a member of the National Military Affairs Commission and of the Executive Committee of the Kuomintang. After the Shanghai war, the 19th Route Army was moved to Fukien Province.

In November 1933 Li Chi-shen and Chen Ming-shu set up the "People's Government" in Fukien against the Nanking Government and Chiang Kai-shek. The rebellion was suppressed

CHINA (Combat)

Subject: Who's Who in National Defense

General Ch'en Ming-shu

by Nanking and the 19th Route Army defeated. Chen and Li fled to Hongkong for safety. He was ordered relieved of his rank and plased on the list for arrest.

(f) Political affiliations - powerful friends and enemies:

One of the more radical Southerners. Has always been intensely loyal to Li Chi-shen (Li Chai-sum) and has followed him.

(g) Pro - or anti - American: Inclined to be anti-foreign.

(h) Character, morals, personal habits - strength and weaknesses-likes and dislikes:

Very little known. Very loyal to Li Chi-shen, whom he has followed to fame and to defeat.

(i) Physique, physical and nervous stamina - ability to stand up under the hardships of campaign:

Said to be rather frail physically and nervous. Has bad eyesight. Not believed to have much resistance to hardships of campaign.

(j) Mentality and temperament - intelligence, judgment, inclined to be rash and impulsive or timid and conservative:

Is said to be intelligent and considerably above the average in mentality. Inclined to be impulsive and rash.

(k) Physical and moral courage - ability to perform under pressure-willingness to take heavy responsibility and make timely and important decisions followed by prompt action:

One of the few Chinese officers who announce publicly that they wish to fight Japan. His part in the Fukien Rebellion shows him to have considerable physical and moral courage, as well as willingness to take responsibility.

(l) Anything that will aid in presenting an accurate and intimate picture of the man as well as officer:

Is said to be a party with Li Chi-shen in the attempted assassination of Wang Ching-wei in October 1935 and in plots to kill Chiang Kai-shek and other leaders. This follows as the natural result of being defeated in their plan to set up a separate government in Fukien and overthrew the present Nanking regime.

CHINA (Combat)

Subject: Who's Who in National Defense
General Ch'en Ming-shu

(m) Photograph or reproduction of photographs:
Photograph attached hereto.

Source: Mostly newspapers.

For and in the absence of the Military Attache:

Bernard A. Tormey
Bernard A. Tormey
Captain, Field Artillery

SVC

Photograph attached -
1 copy only.

Distribution:
6 MID
1 Embassy
1 File

G-2 Report

6-1

5990

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL., INTEL. DIV.
APR 22 1936
2657-J-363
WAR DEPARTMENT

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CHINA (Combat)

Subject: Who's Who in National Defense

General Wu T'ieh-ch'eng

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 21 1936

(a) Date and place of birth:

Born in 1888 in the town of Chungshan, Kwangtung Province.

(b) Education:

Elementary education received in Kwangtung provincial schools.

(c) Social status and antecedents:

Of average Chinese stock.

(d) Outstanding accomplishments and abilities, both professional and personal:

Has had considerable experience in both civil and military offices and unlike most Chinese military men he has evidenced unusual ability in civil administration.

(e) Principal events of career, both creditable and discreditable:

Studied in Japan, but has never been identified with any pro-Japanese clique. He was a great personal friend of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. In 1918 he was appointed a Counsellor of the Canton Military Government and in 1921 was elected magistrate of his native district of Chungshan, Kwangtung.

The year 1924 saw him appointed Commissioner of Police of Canton and the next year he was made Commander of the Kwangtung Gendarmerie and of the 1st Independent Division. In 1925 he was made the Garrison Commander of Canton and given command of the 17th Nationalist Division.

General Wu was appointed to the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee in 1928 and made a member of the Legislative Yuan the same year. He was appointed Political Vice-Minister of the Interior in 1930 and has been Mayor of Greater Shanghai since 1932.

Since his appointment as Mayor of Shanghai, General Wu has made a great effort to enlarge the Shanghai Municipality. He has been instrumental in building the new Municipal Center and has backed many plans for the betterment of educational, commercial and industrial enterprises. The promotion of the use of native goods, enlargement of public utilities and the betterment of public and encouragement of physical training among the people have had his special attention.

Soon after his appointment as Mayor of Shanghai came the Japanese landing and the unofficial "war" there in the spring of 1932. During this period he displayed marked

CHINA (Combat)

Subject: Who's Who in National Defense

General Wu T'ieh-ch'eng

ability in handling the intricate problems both local and international and won the respect of both Chinese and foreigners alike.

(f) Political affiliations - powerful friends and enemies:

Born in Kwangtung and a great personal friend of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Wu's status is established as one of the pillars of the Kuomintang. His service under Chiang Kai-shek has caused the Generalissimo to place great confidence in him. Wu, however, is not one of the radical Kuomintang members but may be classed on the conservative and constructive side of the party.

(g) Pro - or anti - American:

His relations with Americans have always been cordial. He speaks English quite well and has many friends among the foreign community. He may be classed as very favorable toward Americans.

(h) Character, morals, personal habits - strength and weaknesses - likes and dislikes:

Wu T'ieh-ch'eng has an excellent reputation among the Chinese officials and business men. He is active and takes far more exercise than the average Chinese official; likes to ride horses and takes a great interest in racing and polo, though not competing himself in the latter two.

He entertains a great deal both in Chinese and foreign fashion and often takes his guests to one of the large Shanghai night clubs for dancing. He does this, however, to entertain those of his guests who like this sort of amusement and is not one of the "night club officials".

(i) Physique, physical and nervous stamina - ability to stand up under hardships of campaign:

General Wu is much larger and more strongly built than the average Chinese from South China and as far as is known does not suffer from any disease which would render him unfit for any type of service. He is a hard and steady worker. The fact that he was in charge of the administration of Shanghai during the period of the Japanese landing operations and the unofficial "war" there in the spring of 1932 is the best indication of his ability to work intelligently and efficiently under trying conditions. He acquitted himself with great credit and is respected both by foreigners and Chinese.

CHINA (Combat)

Subject: Who's Who in National Defense

General Wu T'ieh-ch'eng

(j) Mentality and temperament - intelligence, judgment, inclined to be rash and impulsive or timid and conservative:

He has education and intelligence far above the average Chinese official and has the reputation for having very sound judgment. He is mentally alert and has an excellent sense of humor. The position of Mayor of Shanghai is not an easy one and requires good judgment based on sound reasoning. He is neither rash nor timid but positive in carrying out his policies.

(k) Physical and moral courage - ability to perform under pressure-willingness to take heavy responsibility and make timely and important decisions followed by prompt action:

General Wu goes about freely without a bodyguard. His duties as Mayor of Shanghai have called for the making of many plans and decisions involving both foreign and Chinese business and political interests. His success has been based on his ability to investigate a problem thoroughly, get the best advice possible, make his decision and personally see that it is carried out. He thinks deliberately as though putting the pieces in a jig-saw puzzle but does not get irritable when under pressure.

(l) Anything that will aid in presenting an accurate and intimate picture of the man as well as officer:

Shanghai is certainly the one place in China where the conflicting interests, temperaments and culture of the East and West meet at their worst. To successfully keep the lid on such a cauldron even under the best conditions is no mean feat. General Wu has successfully administered the affairs of the Shanghai Municipality under the worst possible conditions - when the Japanese Army and Navy were battering at its doors.

In his work General Wu is handicapped by being so close to Nanking and by the fact that many officials of the Nanking Government spend more time in Shanghai than they do in Nanking. Thus he is always under observation and the target for any ambitious official who would like to supplant him. His record of performance therefore deserves great credit and places him easily among the best type of Chinese official of the present day.

His wife is a very intelligent and somewhat old fashioned person. Unlike many of the older type officials' wives she has not retired into seclusion nor has she gone to the other extreme of trying to be too foreign. She has grown with her husband and discharges her duties in a very attractive and dignified manner. She is studying English

CHINA (Combat)

Subject: Who's Who in National Defense

General Wu T'ieh-ch'eng

and takes a keen interest in persons and events about her. She has learned to dance and goes with her husband when necessary, not because she particularly enjoys it but because it is the thing to do, yet never does she give the impression that she is not the perfect hostess.

General Wu T'ieh-ch'eng and his wife represent the most able class of public servants in China to-day.

(m) Photograph or reproduction of photographs:

1 photograph only attached.

Source: Personal observation and conversations with persons who know him.

Joseph W. Stilwell

Joseph W. Stilwell
Colonel, Infantry
Military Attache

SVC

Distribution:
6 MID
1 Embassy
1 File

18

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
WASHINGTON

G-2
CHM/RSB

1 Enc
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL., INTEL. DIV.
2657-I-363
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2/2657-I-363

2-1
MAY 20 1941
23

January 9, 1941.

Subject: Revision of Who's Who File, China.

To: Military Attache, Peiping, China.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 19 1941

1. Enclosed with this letter there is a list of names of Chinese about whom no entry has been made in our Who's Who file in more than ten years. It is possible that a number of them are no longer living.

2. It is requested that you review this list and return it to G-2 with indication as to which cards may be withdrawn from our file.

For the Acting A. C. of S., G-2:

A. R. HARRIS,
Lieut. Colonel, General Staff,
Chief, Liaison Branch.

1 encl.
emb

-o-

No. 9984 1st Ind. FPM:elh

Office of the Military Attache, American Embassy, Peiping, China, April 16, 1941 - To: A. C. of S., G-2, War Department, Washington, D.C.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 19 1941

1. Paragraph 2, basic letter complied with.

MILITARY ATTACHE American Embassy RECEIVED 18. MAR. 1941 PEKING, CHINA.

and in the absence of the Military Attache:

F. P. Munson — File

F. P. Munson
Major, Army of the United States
Assistant Military Attache

G-S\5551-I-262

Enc. 1
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
265-7-I-363
MAY 20 1941
WAR DEPARTMENT

1-1

23

WHO'S WHO IN CHINA

	NAME	RANK	DATE OF LAST REPORT
1	CHANG, HENRY K. (Consul General at San Francisco)		1929
2	CHANG KUO KAN (Minister of Justice '24)		1924
3	CHEN, TING-CHIA (Called Colonel Chen; Member of Military Staff at Arms. Limit. Conf.)	Colonel	1921
4	CHEN, T. Y. (In Ministry of Navy, Peking)	Commander	1927
5	CHENG TIEN-KU (T.K.CHING) (Director, Board of Customs Adm., Ministry of Finance)		1928
6	CHOU LOU (Pres. of National Uni. at Canton)		1928
7	CHU CHANG-NIEN (Minister to Sweden and Norway)		1929
8	CHU CHI-CHIEN (Head of Norther Delegation, Chinese Internal Peace Conference 1919)		1921
9	CHU, TZU-CHIAO (Commander-in-Chief of Forces protecting China Eastern RR)		1923
10	HSIEH, YING-PAK (Labor Leader)		1922
11	HSIEH, YUAN-HAN (Civil Governor of Kangsi Province)		1922
12	HSU, SHOWIN WETZEN (Dr.) (President for Shanghai Provisional Court.)		1929
13	KING, WUNSZU (Minister to Netherlands in 1929)		1929
14	KUNG, HSIN-CHAN (Minister of Communications in 1926)		1926
15	LI, CHING HSI (Minister of Navy '21)	Rear Admiral	1921
16	LI, FUK-LUM ("King of Honam")		1927
17	LI, HOU-CHI (Military Gov. of Fukien, '20)	General	1922
18	LI, SHUN (Military Governor of Chekiang Province)		1920
19	LI, TING HSIN (Minister of Navy)		1922
20	LIANG, SHIH-YI (Premier Dec. 25, 1921)		1921
21	LIU, T'SUN-HOU (Northern leader)		1923
22	LU, CHIH-I (Vice Minister of Justice '21)		1922
23	LU, CHIN (Minister of War, 9/14/24)	General	1924
24	LU, HSIN (Minister of Justice '26)		1926
25	LU, YUNG-TING (Souther leader; Tuchun of Kwangsi Province)		1919

	NAME	RANK	DATE OF LAST REPORT
26	MA, CHUNG WU (Dr.) (Civil Governor of Kuangsi '21)		1924
27	MA SOO (Advisor to Gen. Chang Hsueh-liang '28)		1928
28	MA, Y'IN-CH'U (Prof. of Economy, Peking Gov. University in 1915)		1923
29	NAN, KUEI-HSING (Chairman Tientsin Kuomintang Org.)		1928
30	NIEH, HSIEN-FAN (Civil Governor of Anhwei '19)	General	1924
31	PAI, CHEN-WU (Political Advisor to General Wu)		1922
32	PAN FU (Premier 1927)		1927
33	PAO, KUEI-CH'ING (Minister of War '21)	General	1924
34	PI, SHU-CHENG (Native of Shantung, near Chefoo)	General	1925
35	SHEN, CHENG-SHIH (Associated with British-American Tobacco Company)		1924
36	SHUI, C. S. (Councillor to High Inspecting Comm. of Shantung, Chihli, and Honan '22)		1922
37	SUN, S. C. (SUN, HSIANG-CH'EN) (Assistant to Gen. (Hsu on Indus. Mission to U. S. in 1925)	Maj. Gen.	1925
38	TAI, EN-SAI, (Minister to Brazil '29)		1929
39	T'ANG, CHI-YAO (Civil Governor of Yunnan)		1926
40	TANG, HSIANG-MING (Civil Gov. of Hupeh '22)	Admiral	1922
41	TANG, TSAI-LI (Director-Gen. RR. Police '23)	General	1923
42	TSCHENG, SUOME (Miss) (Chief Justice, Prov. Court in Shanghai '27)		1928
43	TIEN, WEN-LIEH (Minister of Interior '22)		1922
44	TING, CHIN (Head, Air Service '21)	General	1919
45	TSAI, TING-KAN (Director Gen. Customs Service September 1924)	Vice-Adm.	1925
46	TSUI, SHIH-CHIEH (High Advisor to Sino-Russian Conference '23)		1926
47	TU, SHIH-KWEU (HSI) (Minister of Navy 1/1/26)	Admiral	1922
48	TUAN, CHIH-KWEI (Comm. In Chief Metr. Defence Guards '19)	Commander	1922
49	TUNG, KANG (Lawyer)		1928

	NG, TA-HSIEH (Premier and Minister of Finance of Cab. - 1922)		1922
51	WANG, TING-CHEN (Minister to Portugal)		1927
52	WANG, TIEN-PEI (Dhief of Staff for Gen. Yuan Tsu Ming '26)	General	1927
53	WANG, YUNG-CHIANG (Civil Governor of Fengtien Province)		1925
54	WU, CHIN-PIAO (Comm. of Defense Kiukiang '14)	General	1924
55	WU, CHING-SHEN (Military Gov. of Heilungchiang)		1921
56	WU, KUANG-HSIN (Minister of War '24)	General	1924
57	WU, YU LIN (Y.L.Woo) (Comm of Communications) Sept. 14, 1924)	Admiral	1924
58	YANG, CHUEN FENG (Comm. district Fengtu, Chung) Chow, Shikoku, Szechwan Province)	General	1923
59	YANG, SHU-KAN (Secretary of Commerce)		1924
60	YOUNG, KUANGSON C. (YANG KUANG-SHENG) (Assistant Director, Intelligence and Publicity Department, of the Ministry).		1929

Enc. 1
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL., INTEL. DIV.
2657-I-363
2-1
MAY 20 1941
-23-
WAR DEPARTMENT

1. Chang Ch'ien (Henry K. Chang) (張謙)

1929-32, consul general at San Francisco, then New York, Charge d'Affaires at Santiago, then Minister to Chile since November 1932. He is still at that post at present.

2. Chang Kuo-kan

Dead

3. Chen Ting-chia (陳鼎甲)

Not heard from since his retirement in 1921. (Believed to be dead.)

4. T. Y. Chen

No record of this man in this office.

5. Ch'eng T'ien-ku (T. K. Ching) (程天固)

Was appointed Minister to Mexico in February, 1941.

6. Tsou Lu (Chou Lou) (鄒魯)

Has been a member of the State Council of the Chinese National Government since 1932. A veteran Kuomintang leader.

7. Chu Ch'ang-nien (諸昌年)

1925-35 Minister to Sweden and Norway. 1936 adviser to Minister of Foreign Affairs. 1936-7 Superintendent of Customs, Shanghai. Later, director of Income Tax Administration, Shanghai. Nothing has been heard of this man since the summer, 1937. Is believed to be suffering political eclipse because of his relations with his father-in-law the late T'ang Shao-i, who was murdered in Shanghai in 1939 allegedly for pro-Japanese sentiments.

8. Chu Ch'i-ch'ien (朱啓鈐)

Has been living in retirement in Peiping since 1921.

9. Chu Ch'ing-lan (Chu Tzu-ch'iao) (朱慶瀾)

A well known relief worker in China. During the first few years after the Mukden incident (1931), was very active in raising subscriptions for the volunteer forces operating in Manchuria and Jehol. 1935-6 acting chairman of the National Famine Relief Commission. Is still associated with relief works in Free China.

10. Hsieh Ying-pak

No record of this man in this office.

11. Hsieh Yuan-han

Retired. (One source reports he has been dead for over ten years.)

12. Hsü Wei-chen (Hsü Showin Wetzen) (徐維震)

1927-8 President of Shanghai Provisional Court and concurrently councillor of Judicial Yuan. 1933-5 legal adviser, Central Bank. 1936 re-appointed President of Kiangsi High Court, 2d branch (Shanghai).

13. Chin Wen-ssu (King Wunsz) (金問泗)

1930 Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, Shanghai. 1931 Counsellor, Ministry of Industries. December, 1931 Administrative Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs. 1933 again Minister to Holland. January, 1934 concurrently delegate, League of Nations Assembly.

14. Kung Hsin-chan

Dead

15. Li Ching-hsi (李景曦)

1924 commander of naval forces in Shanghai and

Woosung. 1927-8 Superintendent of Customs, Shanghai. Retired until 1938 when he participated in the formation of the Reformed Government at Nanking.

16. Li Fuk-lum

No record of this man in this office.

17. Li Hou-chi

Dead

18. Li Ch'un (Li Shun)

Dead

19. Li Ting-hsin (李鼎新)

January, 1923 was appointed Navy Minister and remained at this post in January 1924 when a cabinet change occurred under the new premiership of Sun Pao-ch'i. Retired since then.

20. Liang Shih-i

Dead

21. Liu Ts'un-hou

Dead

22. Lü Chih-i (呂志伊)

1920-1 Vice Minister of Justice and Interior, Canton. 1924 Chief Justice of Supreme Court, Canton. Member of Legislative Yuan since December, 1928.

23. Lu Chin

Dead

24. Lu Hsin

No record of this man in this office.

25. Lu Yung-t'ing

Dead

26. Ma Chun-wu (Ma Chung-wu)

Dead

27. Ma Su (Ma Soo) (馬素)

Has not been heard of since 1928.

28. Ma Yin-ch'u (馬寅初)

1920-7 Departmental Chief of Bank of China and later member of Chekiang Provincial Government. Member of Legislative Yuan and Chairman of Finance Committee of the same yuan since 1928. A noted economist.

29. Nan Kuei-hsin (南桂馨)

1928 Mayor of Tientsin. Living in retirement in Peiping since 1931 when the Yen-Feng coalition against the National Government collapsed.

30. Nieh Hsien-fan

Dead

31. Pai Chien-wu (白堅武)

Retired following the defeat of the late General Wu P'ei-fu in 1927.

32. Pan Fu

Dead

33. Pao Kuei-ch'ing

Dead

34. Pi Shu-ch'eng

Dead

35. Shen Cheng-shih

No record of this man in this office.

36. Shui Chun-shao (C. S. Shui) (水鈞韶)

1925-6 First Secretary of Chinese Embassy in Moscow. Has not been heard of since then.

37. Sun, S. C.

No record of this man in this office.

38. Tai En-sai (戴恩賽)

1929-33 Minister to Brazil. February, 1935 - July, 1936 Superintendent of Customs, Amoy. Then transferred to Canton in the same capacity.

39. T'ang Chi-yao

Dead

40. T'ang Hsiang-ming

Dead

41. T'ang Tsai-li (唐在禮)

1923-6 Director General of Railway Guards, Ministry of Communications. No further information about this man has been received by this office since then.

42. Cheng Yu-hsiu (Miss Soume Tcheng) (鄭毓秀)

Was sent by the National Government to Europe to investigate legal conditions. 1928-30 member of Legislative Yuan. Legal practitioner in Shanghai and concurrently adviser, National Reconstruction Commission, since 1929. Is reported to be still practising law in Shanghai.

43. T'ien Wen-lieh

Dead

44. Ting Chin

Dead

45. Ts'ai T'ing-kan

Dead

46. Ts'ui Shih-chieh (崔士傑)

1927 Secretary of Headquarters National 2d Army.
1928-9 Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, Tsinan.
1929 detailed by Minister of Foreign Affairs as inspecting Commissioner in Shantung and Honan as well as member of Board of Directors of Kiaochow-Tsinan Railway.

47. Tu Hsi-kuei (杜錫珪)

Minister of Navy and Acting Premier, 1926. Retired until 1938 when he participated in the formation of the Provisional Government in Peking. In 1940 was made Director of Public Safety of North China Political Council in Peking.

48. Tuan Chih-kuei

Dead

49. Tung K'ang (董康)

1928-31 practised law in Shanghai and for a time Director of the Institute for the Training of Judicial Officials in Nanking. Invited to Japan to lecture on ancient Chinese jurisprudence after the Mukden Incident in 1931. Assisted, passively and under coercion it is said, in the organization of the Peking Provisional Government and was nominated chairman of its Judicial Council. When the said government was changed in 1940 to the North China Political Council, he remained as a member.

50. Wang Ta-hsieh

Dead

51. Wang Ting-chen

Dead

52. Wang Tien-pei

Dead

53. Wang Yung-chiang (王永江)

Has not been heard of since the death of the late General Chang Tso-lin.

54. Wu Chin-piao (吳金標)

Reported dead.

55. Wu Chun-sheng (Wu Ching-shen)

Dead

56. Wu Kuang-hsin

Dead

57. Wu Yu-lin (Y. L. Woo) (吳毓麟)

He was reported to have served in the government of Manchukuo during the first few years after its establishment in 1932.

58. Yang Chuen-feng

No record of this man in this office.

59. Yang Shu-k'an (楊庶堪)

Member of the State Council of the National Government from January, 1932 till the present. Reserve member of Kuomintang Central Supervisory Committee since 1931.

60. Yang Kuang-sheng (C. Kuangson Young) (楊光泩)

1929-30 Administrative Director of the Foreign Relations Commission of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. February, 1930 appointed special commissioner to Europe. In March, 1931 appointed

Consul General in London. 1931-33 member of the Chinese Delegation to the Extraordinary Session of the League of Nations. 1933, Counsellor of the Chinese Delegation to the World Economic Conference. 1934-35 special inspector of foreign affairs for the Provinces of Szechuan, Hupeh, Hunan, Kiangsi, and Anhwei, stationed at Hankow. 1936-8 managing director of The China Press. April, 1937 member of China's Delegation to the coronation of King George VI of England. 1937-8 Director of Press Bureau, Chinese Delegation to the League of Nations and the Nine Power Conference at Brussels. Consul-General in Manila since December, 1938.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
MAY 15 1929
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Party Central Officials.

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. MAY 14 1929

1. Herewith are listed the members and reserve members of the Central Executive Committee and Central Supervisory Committee of the Kuomintang Party elected at the Third National Congress. Also are given the nine members of the Standing Committee of the C. E. C. as elected by the new C.E.C. at the installation ceremony on March 28th.

Central Executive Committee

Chiang Kai-shek	Feng Yu-hsiang	C. C. Wu
Tan Yen-kai	Yang Shu-chwang	Ho Chen-chun
Tai Chi-tao	Fong Chen-wu	Li Wen-fan
Ho Ying-ching	Chao Tai-wen	Wang Peh-ling
Hu Han-min	Chow Chi-kang	Shao Yuan-chung
Sun Fo	Chen Li-fu	Chu Chia-hua
Yen Hsi-shan	Liu Chi-wen	Chang Chun
Chen Kuo-fu	Yu Yiu-jen	Liu Chih
Chen Ming-shu	Soong Ching-ling (Madame Sun Yat-sen)	Chen Chao-yin
Yeh Tsu-chang		Liu Lu-yin
Chu Pei-teh	T. V. Soong	Ting Wen-fan
Wu Te-chen	Wang Ching-wei	Tseng Yang-fu
		Fong Chia-hui

Reserve Members of C.E.C.

Wang Peh-chun	Lu Tih-ping	Ma Chao-chun
Ting Chao-wu	Chang Tao-fang	Lu Chung-lin
C. T. Wang	Miao Pin	Huang Shih
Chen Yao-yuan	King Heng-yi	Chen Cheh
Chang Tseng	Yu Ching-tang	Chen Tsi-tang
Chao Pei-lien	Hsueh Tuh-pi	Cheng Tien-fang
H. H. Kung	Kwei Tsung-chi	Miao Pei-chen
Liu Wen-tao	Chiao Yi-tang	Ke Hsin-kan

Central Supervisory Committee

Wu Chih-hui	Tsai Yuan-pei	Shao Li-tze
Chang Ching-kiang	Wang Chung-hui	Li Shih-tseng
Koo Ying-fen	En-Ke-Pa-Tu	Teng Chia-yu
Lin Sen	Chang Chi	Hsiao Fu-chen

Reserve Members of C.S.C.

Chu Min-yi	Chen Chia-yiu	Liu Siu-chung
Chen Puh-lui	Li Lieh-chun	Teng Tsing-yang
Shang Chen	Lin Yun-kai	

Standing Committee of C.E.C.

Chiang Kai-shek	Tan Yen-kai	Sun Fo
Hu Han-min	Tai Chi-tao	Yeh Tsu-chang
Ting Wei-fen	Yu Yiu-jen	Chen Kuo-fu

John Magruder
John Magruder
Major, G. S., Military Attache

From M/A, China Report No.7486 April 10, 1929

AMERICAN LEGATION
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE
PEKING, CHINA.

4-1

2 Enc

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
INTELLIGENCE DIV.
JAN 1
1929
2657-D-362
WAR DEPARTMENT

#7372

November 21, 1928.

Subject: List of Party and Government Officials.

To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D.C.

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. JAN 2 1929

1. Transmitted herewith are the following :

(a) List showing the present members of the Central Executive Committee, Supervisory Committee and the Central Political Council.

(b) List showing the appointees to date to the principal government organs.

(c) Table showing by numbers the factional affiliations of the members of the principal party and government organs.

2. The composition of the various party committees was obtained from lists on hand at the local Kuomintang headquarters and, while not exactly in accord with other lists we have seen, is believed to be the most authentic available. The government appointees, down to vice chairmen of the yuans, is believed to be complete to date. The government is still in such a fluid condition that official gazettes are not available, and our lists are necessarily prepared from daily newspaper clippings.

3. The figures showing the factional affiliation of the important party and government officials permit an interesting analysis. No two people will draw exactly the same conclusions from the analysis; however the favorable position of the Chekiang and Canton groups is evident at a glance, especially judged by civilian strength. Eliminating questions of military power, it will be seen that Feng Yu-hsiang's strength does not begin to appear until one reaches the lower government organs. Preponderant political influence (not taking into account armies) naturally resides in the party committees, since the government is merely a creature of the Kuomintang. The affiliations as listed are necessarily subject to wide variation, but in the main they are believed to be accurate enough to be informative.

4. Valuable collaboration was rendered by Lieutenant Lystad in the preparation of this data.

John Magruder
John Magruder
Major, G.S., Military Attache.

JAN 2 1937
DEPARTMENT

ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL GROUPS IN THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

Group	PARTY: Central Executive Committee	PARTY: Supervisory Committee	PARTY: Central Political Council	GOVERNMENT: State Council	GOVERNMENT: Yuan-Directors and Vice-Directors	GOVERNMENT: Ministers
Canton Conservative	4	3	7	3	3	1
Canton Radical	3	2	5	0	0	
Chekiang (Chiang Kai-shek)	9	4	19	3	2	4
Kwangsi	1	1	3	2	0	0
Kuominchun	2	1	3	1	1	3
Shansi	0	0	1	1	0	1
Western Hills	5	1	6	2	2	1
Hunan	2	0	2	1	1	0
Naval	0	0	1	1	0	0
Fengtien	0	0	0	1	0	0
Mongol	2	0	2	0	0	0
Szechuan	0	0	1	0	0	0
Unknown or Doubtful	6	3	16	1	1	0
Total	34	15	66	16	10	10

Note 1. Members of the Central Executive Committee and the Central Supervisory Committee are ipso facto members of, and are included in, the figures shown for the Central Political Council.

Note 2. The above figures include 4 absent members of the Central Executive Committee (2 Canton Conservative and 2 Canton Radicals), 2 absent members of the Supervisory Committee (Canton Radicals), 2 expectant appointees to the C. E. C. (unknown or doubtful) and 2 expectant appointees to the Supervisory Council (1 Kwangsi, 1 Kuominchun).

F-1
Exec 2
JAN 1929
2657-D-348
WAR DEPARTMENT

PERSONNEL TO DATE OF KUOMINTANG CENTRAL COMMITTEES AND THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT.

THE PARTY

CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Standing Committee

	Name	Political Group	Name	Political Group
Chairman	Gen. Chiang Kai-shek	Chekiang	Gen. Po Wen-wei	Chekiang
Members	Gen. T'an Yen-k'ai	Hunan	Mr. Tai Chuan-hsien	Western Hills
	Mr. Chang Ching-chiang	Chekiang	Gen. Li Lieh-chun	Kuominchun
	Mr. Chin Heng-yi	Unknown	Mr. Ting Wei-fen	Doubtful
	Mr. Yu Yu-jen	Kuominchun		

Members of Committee
(exclusive of Standing Committee)

Gen. Chu P'ei-te	Chekiang	Mr. Wang Ching-wei (absent)	Canton Radical
Mr. En Ke Pa-t'u	Mongol	Mr. Chin Heng-yi	Unknown
Gen. Li Chai-sun	Kwangsi	Mr. Chu Ch'i-kang	"
Mr. Liu Shou-chung	Chekiang	Mr. Ch'en Chia-yu	Hunan
Mr. Huang Shih	Chekiang	Mr. Ting Ch'ao-wu	Chekiang
Mr. Li Ch'i-ch'ing	"	Mr. Chang Chi	Western Hills
Gen. Ho Ying-ch'in	"	Mr. Ku Ying-fen	Canton Conservative.
Mr. Tai Chi-t'ao	Western Hills	Mr. Ch'u Ming-yi	Chekiang
Mr. Hsu Ch'ung-chih (absent)	Canton Conservative	Mr. Sun Ching-lin (absent)	Canton Conservative.
Mr. Tsou Lu	Western Hills	Mr. P'an Yun-chao	Canton Radical
Mr. Yeh Ch'u-ts'ang	" "	Mr. Ch'en Kung-po (absent)	"
Mr. Pai Yun-t'i	Mongol		

Expectant Appointees

Mr. Miao Pin	Unknown
Mr. Chen Chao-ying	"
Mr. Wu T'ieh-ching	Canton Conservative.

CENTRAL SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE

Name	Political Group	Name	Political Group
Mr. Ts'ai Yuan-pei	Chekiang	Mr. Shao Li-tze	Chekiang
Mr. Liu Ya-tze	Doubtful	Mr. Soong Tze-wen	"
Mr. Hu Han-min	Canton Conservative	Mr. Wu Chih-hui	Doubtful
Mr. Sun Fo	"	Dr. Wang Chung-hui	Canton Conservative
Mr. Li Shih-tseng	Western Hills	Mr. Kan Nai-kuang (absent)	Canton Radical
Mr. Lin Shen	Doubtful	Mme. Ho Hsiang-ning (absent)	"
Mr. Ch'en Ku-fu	Chekiang		

Expectant Appointees

Gen. Li Tsung-jen	Kwangsi
Mr. Kuo Ch'un-t'ao	Kuominchun

CENTRAL POLITICAL COUNCIL

All members of the Central Executive Committee and the Supervisory Committee are ipso facto members of the Central Political Council. The following are additional members who do not belong to the C. E. C. or the Supervisory Committee.

Mr. Hsueh Tu-pi	Kuominchun	Mr. Niu Yung-chien	Doubtful
Mr. Sun Yuan-yuan	Unknown	Mr. Yi P'ei-chi	"
Mr. Wang Po-ch'un	Chekiang	Mr. Chiang Tso-pin	Chekiang
Gen. Liu Hsiang	Szechuan	Mr. Wang Cheng-ting	Kuominchun
Gen. Chang Chih-kiang	Kuominchun	Mr. Chao Tai-wen	Shansi
Mr. Hsu Yuan-hao	Unknown	Admiral Yang Shu-chuang	Naval
Mr. Kung Hsiang-hsi	Chekiang	Gen. Chen Ming-shu	Chekiang
Gen. Ho Yueh-tsu	"	Mr. Chang Ching-chiang	Unknown
Mr. Wang Shih-chieh	"	Mr. Chiang Men-lin	Doubtful
Mr. Yang Ch'uan	Doubtful		

THE GOVERNMENT

STATE COUNCIL

	Name	Political Group	Name	Political Group
Chairman	Gen. Chiang Kai-shek	Chekiang	Gen. Chang Hsueh-liang	Fengtien
Members	Gen. T'ah Yen-k'ai	Hunan	Gen. Ho Ying-ch'ing	Chekiang
	Gen. Hu Han-min	Canton Conservative	Gen. Li Tsung-jen	Kwangsi
	Mr. Tai Chi-t'ao	Western Hills	Admiral Yang Shu-chuang	Naval
	Dr. Wang Chung-hui	Canton Conservative	Gen. Yen Hsi-shan	Shansi
	Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang	Kuominchun	Gen. Li Chai-sun	Kwangsi
	Mr. Sun Fo	Canton Conservative	Mr. Lin Shen	Doubtful
	Mr. Chen Ku-fu	Chekiang	Mr. Chang Chi	Western Hills

YUAN

Executive Yuan

Director - Gen. T'an Yen-k'ai	Hunan
Vice Director - Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang	Kuominchun
Director of Dept. of Political Affairs - Mr. Ch Ao	Canton Conservative
Counsellors - Mr. Tuan Pin-chang	Unknown
Mr. Li Ta-nien	"

Legislative Yuan

Director - Mr. Hu Han-min	Canton Conservative
Vice Director - Mr. Lin Shen	Doubtful

Judicial Yuan

Director - Dr. Wang Chung-hui	Canton
Vice Director - Mr. Chang Chi	Western Hills

Supervisory Yuan

Director - Mr. Tsai Yuan-pei	Chekiang
Vice Director - Mr. Chen Ku-fu	"

Examination Yuan

Name	Political Group
Director - Mr. Tai Chi-t'ao	Western Hills
Vice Director - Mr. Sun Fo	Canton Conservative

GENERAL STAFF

Chief of Staff - Gen. Li Chai-sun	Kwangsi
Ass't. Chief of Staff - Gen. Liu Ju-hsien	Kuominchun

Military Training Board

Superintendant - Gen Ho Ying-ch'ing	Chekiang
Ass't. Superintendants - Gen. Chou Ya-heng	Unknown
Gen. Ho Yueh-tsu	Chekiang

Military Council

Chairman - Gen.Li Tsung-jen	Kwangsi

The Ministries
(Under Executive Yuan)

Foreign Affairs

Minister - Dr. C. T. Wang	Kuominchun
Administrative Vice Minister - Mr. Tong Yueh-liang	"
Political Vice Minister - Mr. Chu Chao-hsin	Canton Conservative.

Military Affairs

Minister - Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang	Kuominchun
Vice Ministers - Gen. Lu Chung-lin	"
Gen. Chang Chun	Chekiang

Departmental Chiefs -

Army Affairs	- Gen. Tsao Hou-shen	Chekiang
Naval "	- Admiral Chen Shao-kuan	Naval
Aviation	- Gen. Hsiung Pin	Kuominchun
Q.M. General	- Gen. Yu Peng-fei	Chekiang
General Affairs	- Gen. Yu Tien-shu	Unknown
Surgeon General	- Dr. Ho Tsu-hua	Chekiang

Name	Political Group
Finance	
Minister - Mr. T. V. Soong	Chekiang
Vice Ministers - Mr. Li Tiao-shen	"
Mr. Chang Shou-yang	"
Communications	
Minister - Wang Peh-ch'un	Chekiang
Administrative Vice Minister - Mr. Wei Yi-fu	"
Political Vice Minister - Mr. Li Chung-kung	"
Commerce, Industry and Labor	
Minister - Mr. H. H. Kung	Chekiang
Agriculture and Mines	
Minister - Mr. Yi Pei-chi	Western Hills
Administrative Vice Minister - Mr. Mi Huan-chang,	Unknown
Political Vice Minister- Mr. Tseng Yang-fu	"
Railways	
Minister - Mr. Sun Fo	Canton Conservative
Vice Minister - Mr. Lien Hsing-hai	"
" " Mr. Wang Ching-wei	Canton Radical
Interior	
Minister - Gen. Wen Hsi-shan	Shansi
Vice Minister - Mr. Chao Tai-wen	"
Education	
Minister - Dr. Chiang Moh-lin	Chekiang
Vice Minister - Mr. Ma Shu-lun	"
" " Mr. Wu Chen-chun	Unknown

Name	Political Group
Health	
Minister - Mr. Hsueh Tu-pi	Kuominchun
Vice Minister - Mr. Chang Fang-chi	"
Administrative Vice Minister - Dr. Liu Jui-heng	"

[illegible] and commerce between [illegible] Belgium and China, which was signed, [illegible] the first [illegible]

[illegible] right to live, trade and acquire property in any part of China.

[illegible] Majesty the King of the Belgians, acting for his name and in the name of Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg in virtue of existing agreements, and the National Government of the Republic of China, [illegible] a [illegible] that the ties of friendship already happily existing between the Union of Belgium and Luxembourg and China, have decided to conclude a Preliminary Treaty of Amity and Commerce and have, for this purpose, named as their plenipotentiaries, that is to say:—

His Majesty the King of the Belgians,

Baron J. Guillaume, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Belgium in China;

His Excellency the President of the National Government of the Republic of China,

Dr. Chengting T. Wang, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the National Government of the Republic of China,

Who, having exchanged their full powers found to be in due order and proper form, have agreed upon and concluded the following Articles:

ARTICLE I.

The two High Contracting Parties, desirous of [illegible] amicable relations, they [illegible] looking of perfect equality, on the basis of this principle they agree that [illegible] shall be regulated [illegible] their respective nationals.

It is further [illegible] respect to all [illegible] customs as well as all questions relating thereto, neither of the High Contracting Parties shall be subject, in the territory of the other, to a treatment less favourable than that accorded to any other country.

In no case shall the nationals of one of the High Contracting Parties be compelled to pay, in the territory of the other, with respect to the importation as well as exportation of merchandise, [illegible] transit taxes, or taxes of any other kind other or higher than those which are paid by the nationals or the nationals of any other country.

ARTICLE II.

The nationals of each of the two High Contracting Parties shall be subject, in the territory of the [illegible] laws and the jurisdiction of the law courts of that Party.

ARTICLE III.

The two High Contracting Parties shall as soon as possible enter into negotiations with a view to the conclusion of a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation based upon the principle of reciprocity and equality of treatment.

ARTICLE IV.

The present Treaty is written in French, Chinese and English; in case of any difference of interpretation, the English text shall be held to be authoritative.

Nanking, November [illegible]

Monsieur le Ministre,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's Note of today's date, [illegible]

[redacted]

[redacted]

JOINT DECLARATION

The Chinese and Belgian Governments declare that it did not appear necessary to insert in the Sino-Belgian Treaty signed this day a clause guaranteeing to the Belgian and Luxemburg subjects in China and to the Chinese citizens in Belgium and Luxemburg the application of their respective national laws relating to their personal status, inasmuch as the High Contracting Parties recognize in a general way this principle which is based on Private International Law, except in the case where such laws will be contrary to the public order of the country to apply them.

(Signed)

Baron J. Guillaume,
Chengting T. Wang.

Annex 4

DECLARATION

In the name of the National Government of the Republic of China I have the honour to declare that, when Belgian subjects in China cease to enjoy the privileges of consular jurisdiction and when the relations between the two countries are on a footing of perfect equality, the Chinese Government, in view of the fact that Chinese citizens are permitted to live, and trade and to acquire property in any part of the territories of Belgium and Luxemburg, will permit Belgian and Luxemburg subjects to enjoy the same rights in China, subject to the limitations to be prescribed in its laws and regulations.

(S) Chengting T. Wang.

Annex 5

DECLARATION

In the name of my Government, I have the honour to

Treaty for Amity and Commerce, and have, for this purpose, named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Majesty the King of Italy:

Mr. Daniele Vare, Commander of the Order of the Crown of Italy, Officer of the Order of S.S. Maurice and Lazarus, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of Italy to China.

His Excellency the President of the National Government of the Republic of China:

Dr. Chengting T. Wang, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the National Government of the Republic of China:

who, having met and communicated to each other their respective full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles:

Article I.

The two High Contracting Parties agree that the customs tariff and all matters related thereto shall be regulated exclusively by their respective national legislations.

It is further agreed that each of the High Contracting Parties shall enjoy in the territory of the other, with regard to customs and all related matters, treatment in no way less favourable than the treatment accorded to any other country.

The nationals of each of the High Contracting Parties shall not be compelled under any pretext whatever, to pay within the territories of the other Party any duties, internal charges or taxes upon the importation or exportation of goods, other or higher than those paid [illegible] of each of the two High Contracting Parties shall [illegible] [illegible] of [illegible] [illegible] of the law courts of [illegible] Party, to [illegible] [illegible] and easy access for the enforcement and defence of their rights.

Article III.

The two High Contracting Parties have decided to enter as soon as possible into negotiations for the purpose of concluding a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation based on the principles of absolute equality and non-discrimination in their commercial relations and mutual respect for sovereignty.

Article IV.

The present Treaty has been drawn up in two copies in the Chinese, Italian and English languages. In the event of there being any difference of meaning, the English text shall be held to prevail.

Article V.

The present Treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible and shall come into force on the day on which the two Governments shall have notified each other that the ratification has been effected.

In faith whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Nanking this twenty-seventh day of November, nineteen hundred and twenty-eight (the seventh year of the Fascist Era), corresponding to the twenty-seventh day of the eleventh month of the seventeenth year of the Republic of China.

(*Signed*) *Daniele Vare*,
Plenipotentiary, etc, etc.
(*Signed*) *Chengting T. Wang*,
Plenipotentiary, etc, etc.

Annex I

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Nanking, November 27, 1928.

Monsieur le Ministre,

In the name of the National Government of the Republic of China, I have [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

[illegible] of China, I have the [illegible] to declare that [illegible] Italian subjects cease to enjoy the privileges of consular jurisdiction and other special privileges, and when the relations between the two countries are on a footing of perfect equality, the Chinese Government, in view of the fact that Chinese citizens, subject to the limitations prescribed in Italian laws and regulations, enjoy the right to live and trade and to acquire property in any part of the Italian territory, will grant the same rights to Italian subjects in China, subject to the limitations to be prescribed in its laws and regulations.

(*Signed*) *Chengting T. Wang.*

Annex IV

JOINT DECLARATION

It is understood that Italian subjects in Chinese territories and Chinese citizens in Italian territories shall hereafter pay such taxes or imposts as may be prescribed in the laws and regulations duly promulgated by the Chinese and the Italian Government respectively, provided that such taxes or imposts are not other than those paid by the nationals of any other country.

(*Signed*) *Daniele Vare*
Chengting T. Wang.

Sino-Foreign Treaties of 1928

The year 1928 saw the signature of a number of new treaties between China and various foreign powers. All of these provide for tariff autonomy for China and mutual equality in tariff matters on a most favored nation basis. Some of them also provide for the abolition of extraterritoriality under certain conditions. The official texts of these treaties are given on the following pages, except that the headings and sub-headings have been added.

Page

Sino-American Treaty 3
Signed July 25, 1928. Covers tariff

Sino-German Treaty 5
Signed August 20. Covers tariff

Sino-Norwegian Treaty 7
Signed November 12, 1928. Covers tariff

Sino-Belgian Treaty 10
Signed November 22, 1928. Covers tariff and extraterritoriality

Sino-Italian Treaty 14
Signed November 27, 1928. Covers tariff and extraterritoriality

Sino-Danish Treaty 18
Signed December 12, 1928. Covers tariff and extraterritoriality

Sino-Portuguese Treaty 22
Signed December 19, 1928. Covers tariff and extraterritoriality

Sino-Netherlands Treaty 27
Signed December 19, 1928. Covers tariff

Sino-British Treaty 33
Signed December 20, 1928. Covers tariff

Sino-Swedish Treaty 41
Signed December 20, 1928. Covers tariff

Sino-French Treaty 44
Signed December 22, 1928. Covers tariff

Sino-Spanish Treaty 49
Signed December 27, 1928. Covers tariff and extraterritoriality

The Sino-American Treaty

THE TREATY

(Official title: "Treaty Regulating Tariff Relations Between the United states of America and the Republic of China")

The United States of America and the Republic of China, both being animated by an earnest desire to maintain the good relations which happily subsist between the two countries, and wishing to extend and consolidate the commerical intercourse between them, have, for the purpose of negotiating a treaty designed to facilitate these objects, named as their Plenipotentiaries:—

The President of the United States of America:

J. V. A. MacMurray, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to China;

and the Government Council of the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China:

T. V. Soong, Minister of Finance of the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China;

who, having met and duly exchanged their full powers, which have been found to be in proper form, have agreed upon the following treaty between the two countries:

Tariff Autonomy and Most Favored Nation Treatment

ARTICLE I.

All provisions which appear in treaties hitherto concluded and in force between the United States of America and China relating to rates of duty on imports and exports of merchandise, drawbacks, transit dues and tonnage dues in China shall be annulled and become inoperative, and the principle of complete national tariff autonomy shall apply, subject, however, to the condition that each of the High Contracting Parties shall enjoy in the territories of the other with respect to the above specified and any related matters treatment in no way discriminatory as compared with the treatment accorded to any other country.

The nationals of neither of the High Contracting Parties shall be compelled under any pretext whatever to pay within the territories of the other Party any duties, internal

charges or taxes upon their importations and exportations other or higher than those paid by nationals of the country or by nationals of any other country.

The above provisions shall become effective on January 1, 1929, provided that the exchange of ratifications hereinafter provided shall have taken place by that date; otherwise, at a date four months subsequent to such exchange of ratifications.

Ratification

ARTICLE II.

The English and Chinese texts of this Treaty have been carefully compared and verified; but, in the event of there being a difference of meaning between the two, the sense as expressed in the English text shall be held to prevail.

This Treaty shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional methods, and the ratifications shall be exchanged in Washington as soon as possible.

In testimony whereof, we, the undersigned, by virtue of our respective powers have signed this Treaty in duplicate in the English and Chinese languages and have affixed our respective seals.

Done at Peiping, the 25th day of July 1928, corresponding to the 25th day of the 7th month of the 17th year of the Republic of China.

(SEAL) (SIGNED)
J.V.A. MacMURRAY.

(SEAL) (SIGNED)
T. V. SOONG.

The Sino-German Treaty

THE TREATY

The German Reich and the Republic of China, animated by the desire to further consolidate the ties of friendship which happily exist between the two countries and to extend and facilitate the commercial relations between the two countries, have, for this purpose, decided to conclude a treaty and have named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

The President of the German Reich:

Mr. H. von Borch, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the German Reich to China;

The President of the Council of the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China:

Dr. Chengting T. Wang, Minister for Foreign Affairs;

who, having communicated to each other their full powers and found them to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following treaty between the two countries:

Most Favored Nation Treatment on Tariff

ARTICLE I.

For the purpose of attaining absolute equality of treatment in customs matters and in supplementing the arrangements between Germany and China of the 20th of May, 1921, the two High Contracting Parties agree that in all customs and related matters either of the High Contracting Parties shall not, within the territories of the other Party, be subject to any discriminatory treatment as compared with the treatment accorded to any other country.

The nationals of each of the High Contracting Parties shall under no circumstances be compelled to pay within the territories of the other Party higher or other duties, internal charges or taxes whatsoever upon the importation or exportation of goods than those paid by nationals of the country or by nationals of any other country.

The provision in the exchange of notes annexed to the German-Chinese agreement of the 20th of May, 1921, according to which German import goods shall pay duties in accordance with the General Tariff Regula-

tions prior to the general application of the Autonomous Tariff Regulations, shall be hereby annulled.

Further Negotiations

ARTICLE II.

The two High Contracting Parties will enter as soon as possible into negotiations for the purpose of concluding a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation based on the principle of perfect parity and equality of treatment.

English Authoritative

ARTICLE III.

The present treaty has been drawn up in German, Chinese and English; in case of a difference of interpretation the English text shall prevail.

Ratification

ARTICLE IV.

The present treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible and shall become valid on the day on which the two Governments shall have notified each other that the ratifications have been effected.

Done in duplicate at Nanking on the Seventeenth Day of the Eighth Month of the Seventeenth Year of the Republic of China, corresponding to the Seventeenth Day of August, Nineteen Hundred and Twenty-Eight.

Sgd. *Herbert von Borch*
Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the German Reich.

Sgd. *Chengting T. Wang*
Plenipotentiary and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The Sino-Norwegian Treaty

THE TREATY

The Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of China both being animated by an earnest desire to maintain the good relations which happily subsist between the two countries, and wishing to extend and consolidate the commercial intercourse between them, have, for the purpose of negotiating a treaty designed to facilitate these objects, named as their Plenipotentiaries:—

His Majesty the King of Norway:

Mr. N. Aal, Charge d'Affaires of Norway in China,

and the President of the National Government of the Republic of China:

Dr. Chengting T. Wang, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the National Government of the Republic of China,

who, having met and duly exchanged their full powers, which have been found to be in proper form, have agreed upon the following Articles:—

Tariff Autonomy and Most Favored Nation Treatment.

ARTICLE I

All provisions which appear in the treaties hitherto concluded and in force between Norway and China relating to rates of duty on imports and exports of merchandise, drawbacks, transit dues and tonnage dues in China shall be annulled and become inoperative, and the principle of complete national tariff autonomy shall apply, subject, however, to the condition that each of the High Contracting Parties shall enjoy in the territories of the other with respect to the above specified and any related matters treatment in no way discriminatory as compared with the treatment accorded to any other country.

The nationals of neither of the High Contracting Parties shall be compelled under any pretext whatever to pay within the territories of the other Party any duties, internal charges or taxes upon their importations and ex-

portations other or higher than those paid by nationals of the country or by nationals of any other country.

Ratification

ARTICLE II

The English and Chinese texts of the present Treaty have been carefully compared and verified, but, in the event of there being a difference of meaning between the two, the sense as expressed in the English text shall be held to prevail.

The present Treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible and shall come into force on the day on which the two Governments shall have notified each other that the ratification has been effected.

In testimony whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty in duplicate in the Chinese and English languages and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Shanghai this twelfth day of November nineteen hundred and twenty-eight, corresponding to the twelfth day of the eleventh month of the seventeenth year of the Republic of China.

(signed) N. Aal

Plenipotentiary and Chargé d'Affaires of Norway in China.

(signed) Chengting T. Wang

Plenipotentiary and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the National Government of China.

THE NOTES

Further Negotiations

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nanking, November 15th, 1928

Monsieur le Charge d'Affaires,

I have the honour to state that more than three quarters of a century have elapsed since the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace, Amity and Commerce between China and Norway in 1847, and during that long period of time conditions in both countries have so changed that many provisions in the said Treaty have outlived their usefulness and, if allowed to continue to exist in their present form, would give rise to difficulties and complications. It is therefore my wish that your Government would soon enter into negotiations with the National Government of China for the conclusion of a new Treaty in place of the Treaty of 1847, on the basis of equa-

lity and mutual respect for sovereignty.

I avail, etc.

(signed) *Chengting T. Wang.*

Mr. N. Aal,

Norwegian Charge d'Affaires in China.

Acknowledged

Shanghai, Nov. 17th, 1928.

Monsieur le Ministre,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's Note of the 15th instant, suggesting that my Government enter into negatiations for a new Trealy in place of the Treaty of 1847, on the basis of equality and mutual respect of sovereignty.

The very fact that my Government did so readily meet the wishes expressed in Your Excellency's Note of September 12th, 1928, proposing a new Treaty on Tariff and related matters, would, in my opinion, give ample proof of the friendly feelings entertained in Norway toward the Chinese Republic, and when these feelings have found expression in the conclusion of the new Tariff Treaty between the two countries, I am confident that the friendly attitude of my Government will not be found to have changed at the time when the question of revising the whole Treaty of 1847 on the basis of equality and mutual respect for sovereignty is brought up for consideration.

I avail, etc.,

(signed) *N. Aal*

Charge d'Affaires

His Excellency

Dr. C. T. Wang,

Minister for Foreign Affairs of the National Government.

The Sino-Belgian Treaty

THE TREATY

(Official title: "Preliminary Treaty of Amity and Commerce Between the Union of Belgium and Luxemburg and the Republic of China")

His Majesty the King of the Belgians, acting in his name and in the name of Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxemburg in virtue of existing agreements, and the National Government of the Republic of China, being mutually animated by a desire to further strengthen the ties of friendship already happily existing between the Union of Belgium and Luxemburg and China, have decided to conclude a Preliminary Treaty of Amity and Commerce and have, for this purpose, named as their plenipotentiaries, that is to say:—

His Majesty the King of the Belgians,

Baron J. Guillaume, Charge d'Affaires ad interim of Belgium in China;

His Excellency the President of the National Government of the Republic of China,

Dr. Chengting T. Wang, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the National Government of the Republic of China.

who, having exchanged their full powers found to be in due order and proper form, have agreed upon and concluded the following Articles:

Tariff Autonomy and Most Favored Nation Treatment

ARTICLE I.

The two High Contracting Parties recognise that, in the matter of customs and all related matters, they are on a footing of perfect equality, and on the basis of this principle they agree that such matters shall be regulated exclusively by their respective national laws.

It is further agreed that, in respect of all questions of customs as well as all questions relating thereto, neither of the two High Contracting Parties shall be subject, in the territory of the other, to a treatment less favourable than that accorded to any other country.

In no case shall the nationals of one of the High Contracting Parties be compelled to pay, in the territory of the other,

with respect to the importation as well as exportation of merchandise, customs dues, transit taxes, or taxes of any other kind other or higher than those which are paid by the nationals of the country or by the nationals of any other country.

Under Local Laws

ARTICLE II.

The nationals of each of the two High Contracting Parties shall be subject, in the territory of the other Party, to the laws and the jurisdiction of the law courts of that Party.

Further Negotiations

ARTICLE III.

The two High Contracting Parties shall as soon as possible enter into negotiations with a view to the conclusion of a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation based upon the principle of reciprocity and equality of treatment.

English Authoritative

ARTICLE IV.

The present Treaty is written in French, Chinese and English; in case of any difference of interpretation, the English text shall be held to he authoritative.

Ratification

ARTICLE V.

The present Treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Nanking. It shall come into force on the day on which the two Governments shall have notified each other that the ratification has been effected.

In testimony whereof the representative Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty in duplicate and have affixed their seals thereto.

Done at Nanking this 22nd day of November, 1928, corresponding to the Twenty second day of the Eleventh Month of the Seventeenth Year of the Republic of China.

(*Signed*) *Baron J. Guillaume*,

Plenipotentiary and Charge d'Affaires ad interim of Belgium in China.

Personal Seal of Baron J. Guillaume.

(*Signed*) *Chengting T. Wang*,

Plenipotentiary and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the National Government of the Republic of China.

Personal Seal of Dr. Chengting T. Wang.

THE ANNEXES

Extraterritoriality Abolition Date

ANNEX I

Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Nanking, November 22nd, 1928

Monsieur le Charge d'Affaires.

In the name of the National Government of the Republic of China I have the honour to state that Article 2 of the Treaty signed this day between China and Belgium shall be understood to begin to be operative on January 1st, 1930. Before such date the Chinese Government will make detailed arrangements with the Belgian Government for the assumption by China of jurisdiction over Belgian subjects. Failing such arrangement on the said date, Belgian subjects shall thereafter be amenable to Chinese laws and jurisdiction as soon as the majority of the Powers now possessing Extraterritorial privileges in China shall have agreed to relinquish them.

(S) *Chengting T. Wang.*

Baron J. Guillaume, Belgian Charge d'Affaires, in China, Nanking.

Nanking, November 22nd, 1928

Monsieur le Ministre,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's Note of today's date, which reads as follows:—

(See previous letter)

I have the honour to express to Your Excellency the agreement of His Majesty's Government on this subject.

I avail myself, etc.,

(*Signed*) *Baron J. Guillaume.*

New Codes

ANNEX II

DECLARATION

I have the honour to declare that on or before January 1st, 1930, the Civil Code and the Commercial Code in addition to other Codes and laws now in force, will be duly promulgated by the National Government of the Republic of China.

(S) *Chengting T. Wang.*

Personal Status

ANNEX III

JOINT DECLARATION

The Chinese and Belgian Governments declare that it did not appear necessary to insert in the Sino-Belgian Treaty signed this day a clause guaranteeing to the Belgian and Luxemburg subjects in China and to the Chinese citizens in Belgium and Luxemburg the

application of their respective national laws relating to their personal status, inasmuch as the High Contracting Parties recognise in a general way this principle which is based on Private International Law, except in the case where such laws will be contrary to the public order of the country to apply them.

(Signed)

Baron J. Guillaume,
Chengting T. Wang.

Right to Own Property

ANNEX IV

DECLARATION

In the name of the National Government of the Republic of China I have the honour to declare that, when Belgian subjects in China cease to enjoy the privileges of consular jurisdiction and when the relations between the two countries are on a footing of perfect equality, the Chinese Government, in view of the fact that Chinese citizens are permitted to live, and trade and to acquire property in any part of the territories of Belgium and Luxemburg, will permit Belgian and Luxemburg subjects to enjoy the same rights in China, subject to the limitations to be prescribed in its laws and regulations.

(S) *Chengting T. Wang.*

ANNEX V

DECLARATION

In the name of my Government, I have the honour to declare that Belgium and Luxemburg subjects in China shall pay such taxes as may be prescribed in the laws and regulations duly promulgated by the Chinese Government, provided that the same taxes are paid by the nationals of all the Powers having treaty relations with China.

(S) *Baron J. Guillaume.*

Sino-Italian Treaty

THE TREATY

The Kingdom of Italy and the Republic of China, being equally animated by the desire to strengthen the ties of friendship which happily subsist between the two countries and to promote and consolidate their commercial relations, have resolved to conclude a Preliminary Treaty for Amity and Commerce, and have, for this purpose, named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Majesty the King of Italy.

Mr. Daniele Vare, Commander of the Order of the Crown of Italy, Officer of the Order of S.S. Maurice and Lazarus, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of Italy to China:

His Excellency the President of the National Government of the Republic of China:

Dr. Chengting T. Wang, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the National Government of the Republic of China:

who, having met and communicated to each other their respective full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles:

Tariff Autonomy and Most Favored Nation Treatment

ARTICLE I.

The two High Contracting Parties agree that the customs tariff and all matters related thereto shall be regulated exclusively by their respective national legislations.

It is further agreed that each of the High Contracting Parties shall enjoy in the territory of the other, with regard to customs and all related matters, treatment in no way less favourable than the treatment accorded to any other country.

The nationals of each of the High Contracting Parties shall not be compelled under any pretext whatever, to pay within the territories of the

other Party any duties, internal charges or taxes upon the importation or exportation of goods, other or higher than those paid by the nationals of the country or by the nationals of any other country.

Under Local Laws

ARTICLE II.

The nationals of each of the two High Contracting Parties shall be subject, in the territory of the other Party, to the laws and jurisdiction of the law courts of that Party, to which they shall have free and easy access for the enforcement and defence of their rights.

Further Negotiations

ARTICLE III.

The two High Contracting Parties have decided to enter as soon as possible into negotiations for the purpose of concluding a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation based on the principles of absolute equality and non-discrimination in their commercial relations and mutual respect for sovereignty.

English Authoritative

ARTICLE IV.

The present Treaty has been drawn up in two copies in the Chinese, Italian and English languages. In the event of there being any difference of meaning, the Engligh text shall be held to prevail.

Ratification

ARTICLE V.

The present Treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible and shall come into force on the day on which the two Governments shall have notified each other that the ratification has been effected.

In faith whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Nanking this twenty-seventh day of November, nineteen hundred and twenty-eight (the seventh year of the Fascist Era), corresponding to the twenty-seventh day of the eleventh month of the seventeenth year of the Republic of China.

(*Signed*) *Daniele Varè*,
Plenipotentiary, etc, etc.

(*Signed*) *Chengting T. Wang*,
Plenipotentiary, etc, etc.

THE ANNEXES

Extraterritoriality Abolition Date

ANNEX I

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Nanking, November 27, 1928.

Monsieur le Ministre,

In the name of the National Government of the Republic of China, I have the honour to state that Article II of the Treaty signed this day between China and Italy shall be understood to begin to be operative on January 1st, 1930. Before such date the Chinese Government will make detailed arrangements with the Italian Governments for the assumption by China of jurisdiction over Italian subjects. Failing such arrangements on the said date, Italian subjects shall be amenable to Chinese laws and jurisdiction from a date to be fixed by China, after having come to an agreement for the abolition of extra-territoriality with all the Powers signatory of the Washington Treaties, it being understood that such a date shall be applicable to all such Powers.

By "Powers signatory of the Washington Treaties" shall be meant those Powers, other than China, which directly participated in the discussion of Pacific and Far Eastern Questions in the Conference on the Limitation of Armaments held in Washington in 1921-22.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

(*Signed*) *Chengting T. Wang.*

Acknowledged

Nanking, November 27, 1928

Monsieur le Ministre,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's Note of today's date which reads as follows:—

(Then follows the Note as above.)

I have the honour to state that the Italian Government is in full agreement. with the above statements

I avail myself, etc.,

(*Signed*) *Daniele Vare.*

New Codes

ANNEX II

DECLARATION

I have the honour to declare that on or before January 1st, 1930, the Civil

Code and the Commercial Code, in addition to other codes and laws now in force, will be duly promulgated by the National Government of the Republic of China.

(*Signed*) *Chengting T. Wang.*

Right to Own Property

DECLARATION

In the name of the National Government of the Republic of China, I have the honour to declare that, when Italian subjects cease to enjoy the privileges of consular jurisdiction and other special privileges, and when the relations between the two countries are on a footing of perfect equality, the Chinese Government, in view of the fact that Chinese citizens, subject to the limitations prescribed in Italian laws and regulations, enjoy the right to live and trade and to acquire property in any part of the Italian territory, will grant the same rights to Italian subjects in China, subject to the limitations to be prescribed in its laws and regulations.

(*Signed*) *Chengting T. Wang.*

Taxes

ANNEX IV

JOINT DECLARATION

It is understood that Italian subjects in Chinese territories and Chinese citizens in Italian territories shall hereafter pay such taxes or imposts as may be prescribed in the laws and regulations duly promulgated by the Chinese and the Italian Governments respectively, provided that such taxes or imposts are not other or higher than those paid by the nationals of any other country.

(*Signed*) *Daniele Vare*
Chengting T. Wang.

The Sino-Danish Treaty

THE TREATY

(Official title : "Treaty of Amity and Commerce Between the Kingdom of Denmark and the Republic of China")

The Kingdom of Denmark and the Republic of China, being equally animated by the desire to strengthen the ties of friendship which happily subsist between the two countries and to promote and consolidate their commercial relations, have resolved to conclude a Preliminary Treaty for Amity and Commerce and have for this purpose named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Majesty the King of Denmark and Iceland:

Monsieur Henrik de Kauffmann, E voy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of Denmark and Iceland to China;

and His Excellency the President of the National Government of the Republic of China:

His Excellency Doctor Chengting T. Wang, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the National Government of the Republic of China;

who, having met and communicated to each other their respective full powers found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following articles:

Tariff Autonomy and Most Favored Nation Treatment

ARTICLE I.

The two High Contracting Parties agree that the customs tariff and all matters related thereto shall be regulated exclusively by their respective national legislations.

It is further agreed that each of the High Contracting Parties shall enjoy in the territory of each other, with regard to customs and all related matters, treatment in no way less favourable than the treatment accorded to any other country.

The nationals of each of the High Contracting Parties shall not be compelled, under any pretext whatever, to pay within the territories of the other Party any duties, internal charges or taxes upon the importation or exportation of goods, other or higher than those paid by the nationals of

the country or by the nationals of any other country.

Under Local Laws

ARTICLE II.

The nationals of each of the two High Contracting Parties shall be subject, in the territory of the other Party to the laws and jurisdiction of the Law Courts of that Party, to which they shall have free and easy access for the enforcement and defence of their rights.

Further Negotiations

ARTICLE III.

The two High Contracting Parties have decided to enter as soon as possible into negotiations for the purpose of concluding a Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, based on the principles of absolute equality and non-discrimination in their commercial relations, and mutual respect for sovereignty.

English Authoritative

ARTICLE IV.

The present Treaty has been drawn up in two copies in the Danish, Chinese and English languages. In the event of there being any difference of meaning, the English text shall be held to prevail.

Ratification

ARTICLE V.

The present Treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible and shall come into force on the day on which the two Governments shall have notified each other that the ratification has been effected.

In faith whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed their seals thereto.

Done at Nanking this 12 December 1928, corresponding to the 12th day of the twelfth month of the seventeenth year of the Republic of China.

Sign.

HENRIK KAUFFMANN.

L. S. Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of Denmark and Iceland to China.

Sign.

CHENGTING T. WANG.

L. S. Plenipotentiary and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the National Government of the Republic of China.

THE ANNEXES

Extraterritoriality Abolition Date

ANNEX I.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Nanking, December 12, 1928.

Monsieur le Ministre,

In the name of the National Government of the Republic of China, I have the honour to state that Article II of the

Treaty signed this day between China and Denmark shall be understood to begin to be operative on January 1st, 1930. Before such date the Chinese Government will make detailed arrangements with the Danish Government for the assumption by China of jurisdiction over Danish subjects: Failing such arrangements on the said date Danish subjects shall be amenable to Chinese laws and jurisdiction from a date to be fixed by China, after having come to an agreement for the abolition of extraterritoriality with all the Powers signatory of the Washington Treaties, it being understood that such a date shall be applicable to all such Powers.

By "Powers signatory of the Washington Treaties" shall be meant those Powers, other than China, which directly participated in the discussion of Pacific and Far Eastern qnestions in the Conference on the Limination of Armament held in Washington in 1921-22.

I avail myself etc.,

Sign. *CHENGTING T. WANG.*

His Excellency.

Monsieur Henrik de Knuffmens,

Danish Minister to China,

NANKING.

Nanking, December 12, 1928.

Monsieur le Ministre,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's Note of today's date which reads as follows:

(Dr. Wang's note repeated verbatim.)

I have the honour to state that the Danish Government is in full agreement with the above statement.

I avail myself etc.,

Sign. *HENRIKKAUFFMANN.*

His Excellency

Dr. Chengting T. Wang,

Minister for Foreign Affairs,

NANKING.

New Codes

ANNEX II.

DECLARATION.

I have the honour to declare that on or before January 1st, 1930 the Civil Code and the Commercial Code, in addition to other codes and laws now in force, will be duly promulgated by the National Government of the Republic of China.

Sign. *CHENGTING T. WANG.*

Right to Own Property

ANNEX III.

DECLARATION.

In the name of the National Government of the Republic of China, I have the honour to declare that, when Danish subjects cease to enjoy the privi-

leges of consular jurisdiction and other special privileges, and when the relations between the two countries are on a footing of perfect equality, the Chinese Government in view of the fact that Chinese citizens, subject to the limitations prescribed in Danish laws and regulations, enjoy the right to live and trade and to acquire property in any part of the Danish territory, will grant the same rights to Danish subjects in China, subject to the limitations to be prescribed in its laws and regulations.

Sign. *CHENGTING T. WANG.*

Taxes

ANNEX IV.

JOINT DECLARATION.

It is understood that Chinese citizens in Danish territories and Danish subjects in Chinese territories shall hereafter pay such taxes or imposts as may be prescribed in the laws and regulations duly promulgated by the Danish and the Chinese Government respectively, provided that such taxes or imposts are not other or higher than those paid by the nationals of any other country.

Signed:

HENRIK KAUFFMANN.

Signed:

CHENGTING T. WANG.

The Sino-Portuguese Treaty

THE TREATY

The Republic of Portugal and the Republic of China, being equally animated by the desire to strengthen the ties of friendship which have happily subsisted between the two countries for more than four hundred years and to promote and consolidate their commercial relations, have resolved to conclude a Preliminary Treaty of Amity and Commerce, and have, for this purpose, named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Excellency the President of the Republic of Portugal:

Mr. Joao Antonio de Bianchi, Grand Cross of the Order of Christ, Officer of the Order of S. Tiago de Espada and Grand Cross of Chia Ho, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Portugal to China;

His Excellency the President of the National Government of the Republic of China:

Dr. Chengting T. Wang, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the National Government of the Republic of China;

Who having met and communicated to each other their respective full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles:

Tariff Autonomy

ARTICLE I

The two High Contracting Parties agree that the customs tariff and all matters related thereto shall be regulated exclusively by their respective national legislations.

It is further agreed that each of the High Contracting Parties shall enjoy in the territories of the other, with respect to customs and all related matters, treatment in no way less favourable than the treatment accorded to any other country.

The nationals of each of the two High Contracting Parties shall not be compelled, under any pretext whatever, to pay within the territories of the other Party any duties, internal charges or taxes upon the importation or exportation of merchandise, higher or other than those paid by the nationals of the country or by the nationals of any other country.

Under Local Laws

ARTICLE II

The nationals of each of the two High Contracting Parties shall be subject, in the territories of the other Party, to the laws and jurisdiction of the law courts of that Party, to which they shall have free and easy access for the enforcement and defence of their rights.

To Negotiate New Treaty

ARTICLE III

The two High Contracting Parties have decided to enter as soon as possible into negotiations for the purpose of concluding a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation based on the principles of absolute equality and non-discrimination in their commercial relations and mutual respect for sovereignty.

English Authoritative

ARTICLE IV

The present Treaty has been drawn up in two copies in Portuguese, Chinese, and English. In case of any difference of interpretation, the English text shall be held to prevail.

Ratification

ARTICLE V

The present Treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible and shall come into force on the day on which the two Governments shall have notified each other that the ratification has been effected.

In faith whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereunto their seals.

Done at Nanking this nineteenth day of December, nineteen hundred and twenty-eight, corresponding to the nineteenth day of the twelfth month of the seventeenth year of the Republic of China.

(Seal) *JOAO ANTONIO DE BIANCHI*

(Seal) *CHENGTING T. WANG.*

THE ANNEXES

Concerning Extraterritoriality

ANNEX I

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Nanking, December 19, 1928.

Monsieur le Ministre,

In the name of the National Government of the Republic of China, I have the honour to state that Article II of the Treaty signed this day between China and Portugal shall be understood to begin to be operative on January 1st, 1930. Before such date the Chinese Government will make detailed arrangements with the Portuguese Government for the assumption by China of juris-

diction overPortuguese subjects in Chinese territory. Failing such arrangements on said date, Portuguese subjects shall be amenable to Chinese laws and jurisdiction from a date to be fixed by China, after having come to an agreement for the abolition of extraterritoriality with all the Powers signatory of the Washington Treaties, it being understood that such a date shall be applicable to all such Powers.

By "Powers signatory of Washington Treaties" shall be meant those Powers, other than China, which directly participated in the discussion of Pacific and Far Eastern Questions in the Conference on the Limitation of Armament held in Washington in 1921-22.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

CHENGTING T. WANG.

His Excellency
Mr. Joao Antonio de Bianchi
Portuguese Minister to China
NANKING.

Nanking, December 19, 1928.

Monsieur le Ministre,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's Note of today's date which reads as follows:

(Dr. Wang's note repeated verbatim.)

I have the honour to state that thePortugueseGovernment is in full agreement with the above statements.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

JOAO ANTONIO DE BIANCHI.

His Excellency
Dr. Chengting T. Wang
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
NANKING.

New Codes

ANNEX II

DECLARATION

I have the honour to declare that on or before January 1st, 1930 the Civil Code and the Commercial Code, in addition to other codes and laws now in force, will be duly promulgated by the National Government of the Republic of China.

CHENGTING T. WANG.

Right to Own Property

ANNEX III

DECLARATION

In the name of the National Government of the Republic of China, I have the honour to declare that, when Portuguese

subjects cease to enjoy the privileges of consular jurisdiction and other special privileges, and when the relations between the two countries are on a footing of perfect equality, the Chinese Government, in view of the fact that Chinese citizens, subject to the limitations prescribed in Portuguese laws and regulations, enjoy the right to live and trade and to acquire property in any part of the Portuguese territory, will grant the same rights to Portuguese subjects in China, subject to the limitations to be prescribed in its laws and regulations.

CHENGTING T. WANG.

Taxes

ANNEX IV

JOINT DECLARATION

It is understood that Portuguese subjects in Chinese territories and Chinese citizens in Portuguese territories shall hereafter pay such taxes or imposts as may be prescribed in the laws and regulations duly promulgated by the Chinese and the Portuguese Government respectively, provided that such taxes or imposts are not other or higher than those paid by the nationals of any other country.

JOAO ANTONIO DE BIANCHI.

CHENGTING T. WANG.

Most Favored Nation Treatment on Tariffs

ANNEX V

Nanking, December 19, 1928.

Monsieur le Ministre,

With reference to Article I of the Treaty signed between us this day, I have the honour to request Your Excellency to confirm my understanding that the said Article shall be interpreted to include the following principle:—

Articles produced or manufactured in the territory of either of the High Contracting Parties shall not be subject on their importation into the territory of the other Party or on their exportation from its own territory to the territory of the other Party, to any duties, internal charges or taxes other or higher than those paid respectively, on like articles produced or manufactured in and imported from any other country or on like articles produced or manufactured in the country and exported to any other country.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excel-

lency the assurance of my highest consideration.

JOAO ANTONIO DE BIANCHI

His Excellency
Dr. Chengting T. Wang
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
NANKING.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Nanking, December 19, 1928.

Monsieur le Ministre,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's Note of today's date which reads as follows:

(Mr. Bianchi's note repeated verbatim.)

I have the honour to confirm the correctness of the above.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

CHENGTING T. WANG

His Excellency
Mr. Joao Antonio de Bianchi
Portuguese Minister to China,
NANKING.

Includes Colonies and Possessions

ANNEX VI

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Nanking, December 19, 1928.

Monsieur le Ministre,

Referring to the Treaty signed between us this day and the Annexes thereto, I have the honour to state that it is my understanding that the word "territory" or "territories" used in the said Treaty as well as in the Declarations and Notes exchanged, includes the possessions and colonies of each of the High Contracting Parties.

I shall be happy if Your Excellency will confirm the correctness of the above.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

CHENGTING T. WANG.

His Excellency
Mr. Joao Antonio de Bianchi,
Portuguese Minister to China,
NANKING.

Nanking, December 19, 1928

Monsieur le Ministre,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's Note of today's date which reads as follows:

(Dr. Wang's note repeated verbatim.)

I have the honour to confirm the correctness of the above.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

JOAO ANTONIO DE BIANCHI

His Excellency
Dr. Chengting T. Wang,
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
NANKING.

The Sino-Netherlands Treaty

THE TREATY

(Official title: "Treaty Regulating Relations Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of China.")

Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands and the National Government of the Republic of China, animated by an earnest desire to consolidate the ties of friendship which happily subsist between the two countries and to further develop their commercial relations, have with this object in view resolved to conclude a treaty, and have for this purpose named as their respective Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands:

Mr. Willem Jacob Oudendijk, Commander in the Order of Orange Nassau, Knight in the Order of the Netherlands Lion, Her Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in China;

His Excellency the President of the National Government of the Republic of China:

Dr. Chengting T. Wang, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the National Government of the Republic of China;

Who, having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles:

Tariff Autonomy

ARTICLE I

All provisions which appear in the treaties hitherto concluded and in force between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and China relating to rates of duty on imports and exports of merchandise, drawbacks, transit dues and tonnage dues in China shall be annulled and become inoperative, and the principle of complete national tariff autonomy shall apply subject however, to the condition that each of the High Contracting Parties shall enjoy in the territories, possessions and colonies of the other, with respect to the above specified and any related matters, treatment in no way discriminatory as compared with the treatment accorded to any other country.

The nationals of neither of the High Contracting Parties shall be compelled under any pretext whatever to pay within the territories, possessions

or colonies of the other Party any duties, internal charges or taxes upon their importations and exportations other or higher than those paid by nationals of the country or by nationals of any other country.

English Authoritative

ARTICLE II

The present Treaty is drawn up in two copies in the Netherlands, Chinese and English languages. In the event of there being a difference of meaning between these texts, the sense as expressed in the English text shall prevail.

Ratification

ARTICLE III

The present Treaty shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties as soon as possible, and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Nanking. It shall come into force on the day on which the two Governments shall have notified each other that the ratification has been effected.

In faith whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty in duplicate and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Nanking, this nineteenth day of December, nineteen hundred and twenty-eight, corresponding to the nineteenth day of the twelfth month of the seventeenth year of the Republic of China.

(Signed) *W. J. OUDENDIJK.*

(Signed)

CHENGTING T. WANG.

THE NOTES

Most Favored Nation Treatment

Netherlands Legation in China,
Nanking, December 19, 1928.

Monsieur le Ministre,

With a view to eliminating all possible doubts with respect to the meaning and scope of Article I of the Treaty Regulating Tariff Relations between the Netherlands and China which we have signed today, I have the honour to state to Your Excellency that my Government holds that the said Article also includes the following:—

That there shall not be levied on the produce or the manufactures of either of the High Contracting Parties on their importation into the territories, possessions or colonies of the other Party, nor on the produce and the manufactures of either of the High Contracting Parties on their exportation to the territories, possessions or colonies of the other Party, any duties, internal charges or taxes other

or higher than are now or may hereafter be imposed on the like articles when imported from or when exported to any other country.

It is understood that the present Note and Your Excellency's reply thereto shall have the same force between the two High Contracting Parties as the Treaty itself.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed) *W.J. OUDENDIJK.*

His Excellency
Dr. Chengting T. Wang,
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
NANKING.

Confirmed

Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Nanking, December 19, 1928.

Monsieur le Ministre,

In reply to Your Excellency's Note of today's date I have the honour to state that with a view to eliminating all possible doubts with respect to the meaning and the scope of Article I of the Treaty Regulating Tariff Relations between China and the Netherlands which we have signed today, my Government holds that the said Article also includes the following:—

That there shall not be levied on the produce or the manufactures of either of the High Contracting Parties on their importation into the territories, possessions or colonies of the other Party, nor on the produce and the manufactures of either of the High Contracting Parties on their exportation to the territories, possessions or colonies of the other Party, any duties, internal charges or taxes other or higher than are now or may hereafter be imposed on the like articles when imported from or when exported to any other country.

It is understood that Your Excellency's Note and this reply thereto shall have the same force between the two High Contracting Parties as the Treaty itself.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed)

CHENGTING T. WANG.

His Excellency
Mr. Willem Jacob Oudendijk,
Netherlands Minister to China,
NANKING.

Conditions on Most Favored Nation Tariff Treatment

Nanking, December 19, 1928.

Having signed this day a

Treaty between the Netherlands and China on tariff matters, the undersigned hereby declare on behalf of their respective Governments that when a revision of the existing Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the two countries takes place, the following questions will also be discussed and dealt with:—

(1) The avoidance in their respective customs tariffs and regulations of such unreasonable detailed and minute specifications and differentiations of goods of the same nature and use as would evidently nullify the effect of the stipulations laid down in the first Article of the Treaty signed this day with regard to the non-discriminatory treatment to be accorded reciprocally within each other's territories.

(2) If in any International Treaty any special advantages in customs matters are attached to the fulfilment of certain obligations, the Governments of the Netherlands and of China will accord such advantages to each other only if they have both adhered to the International Treaty in question.

(Signed) *W.J.OUDENDIJK.*
(Signed)
CHENGTING T. WANG.

Tariff Rates

Nanking, December 19, 1928.

Monsieur le Ministre,

Referring to our conversations on the subject of Tariff Autonomy I understand that when the Chinese National Tariff shall become effective it is the intention of the National Government to apply to the goods which I mentioned during these conversations the following maximum rates for one year, beginning from the date on which the said tariff will come into force:

Molasses	at the rate of 7½% ad valorem
Sugar, Brown under No.11 Dutch Standard & "Green Sugar"	at the rate of 12½% ad valorem
Sugar, White over No. 10 Dutch Standard (including refined)	at the rate of 12½% ad valorem
Sugar, White, cube or loaf	at the rate of 17½% ad valorem
Sugar, Candy	at the rate of 17½% ad valorem
Petroleum &c. Kerosine oil per case of 2 tins a 5 Am. Gal.	Hk Tl. 0.877 per case
Kerosine oil in bulk	Hk Tl. 0.847 per 10 Gallons.

Gasolene, Naphta & Bensene, Mineral per case of 2 tins a 5 Am. Gal.	Hk Tl. 1.057 per case
Gasolene in bulk	Hk Tl. 1.012 per 10 Am. Gallons.
Lubricating oil	at the rate of 12½% ad valorem
Artificial Silk Yarn	at the rate of 10% ad valorem
Condensed Milk	at the rate of 12½% ad valorem
Woollen Goods and Mixtures (excluding yarns)	at the rate of 15 & 12½% ad valorem
Paper, Coated and/or enameled; Glazed; Art Printing; Bank note; Copying; Glascine; Pelure; Embossed or otherwise decorated	at the rate of 12½% ad valorem
Paper, containing rags	at the rate of 12½% ad valorem
Paper, free of mechanical wood-pulp, not otherwise specified	at the rate of 10% ad valorem
Paper, Kraft, packing	at the rate of 10% ad valorem
Paper of all kinds not otherwise specified	at the rate of 7½% ad valorem
Cocoa	at the rate of 17½% ad valorem

I also understand that the National Tariff will not become effective till two months after its promulgation.

I shall be happy if Your Excellency will be good enough to confirm whether the above is correct, and I avail myself of this opportunity to express to Your Excellency the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

(w. g.) *W. J. OUDENDIJK.*

His Excellency
Dr. Chengting T. Wang
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
NANKING.

Confirmed

Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Nanking, December 19, 1928.

Monsieur le Ministre,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's Note dated the 19th instant in which you state that you understand that when the Chinese National Tariff shall become effective, it is the intention of the National Government to apply to the goods which you mentioned during our conversations the maximum rates as quoted by you for one year, beginning from the date on which the said tariff will come into force and that you also understand that the Na-

tional Tariff will not become effective till two months after its promulgation.

I have the honour to confirm the above statement as correct although I should wish to verify once more some of the rates enumerated in Your Excellency's Note under reply.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

(sd) *CHENGTING T. WANG.*

His Excellency,
Mr. W. J. Oudendijk,
Netherlands Minister to China,
NANKING.

The Sino-British Treaty

THE TREATY

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and

His Excellency, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China,

Desiring to strengthen the good relations which happily exist between them and to facilitate and extend trade and commerce between their respective countries,

Have resolved to conclude a treaty for this purpose and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:—

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India:

For Great Britain and Northern Ireland,

Sir Miles Wedderburn Lampson, K.C M.G., C.B., M.V.O., His Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Republic of China;

His Excellency, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China:

His Excellency, Doctor Chengting T. Wang, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the National Government of the Republic of China;

who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:—

Tariff Autonomy

ARTICLE 1.

It is agreed that all provisions of the existing treaties between the High Contracting Parties which limit in any way the right of China to settle her national customs tariff in such way as she may think fit are hereby abrogated, and that the principle of complete national tariff autonomy shall apply.

Most Favored Nation Treatment

ARTICLE 2.

The nationals of either of the High Contracting Parties shall not be compelled under any pretext whatsoever to pay in China and the territories of His Britannic Majesty to which the present treaty applies respectively any duties, internal charges or taxes upon goods imported or exported by them other than or higher than those paid on goods of the same origin by Chinese and British

nationals respectively, or by nationals of any other foreign country.

Tonnage Dues

ARTICLE 3.

His Britannic Majesty agrees to the abrogation of all provisions of the existing treaties between the High Contracting Parties which limit the right of China to impose tonnage dues at such rates as she may think fit.

In regard to tonnage dues and all matters connected therewith, British ships in China and Chinese ships in those territories of His Britannic Majesty to which the present treaty applies, shall receive treatment not less favourable than that accorded to the ships of any other foreign country.

Ratification

ARTICLE 4.

The present treaty shall be ratified and the ratifications shall be exchanged in London as soon as possible. It shall come into force on the date on which the two Parties shall have notified each other that ratification has been effected.

The English and Chinese texts of the present treaty have been carefully compared and verified but in the event of there being a difference of meaning between the two the sense as expressed in the English text shall be held to prevail.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty in duplicate, and have affixed thereunto their seals.

Done at Nanking, the twentieth day of December, nineteen hundred and twenty-eight, corresponding to the twentieth day of the twelfth month of the seventeenth year of the Republic of China.

(Seal) *MILES W. LAMPSON.*
(Seal) *CHENGTING T. WANG.*

THE ANNEXES

Most Favored Nation Treatment on Tariff

ANNEX 1

Nanking, December 20, 1928.

Sir,

With reference to the Treaty concluded this day between His Britannic Majesty and the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, I have the honour to request that Your Excellency will be good enough to confirm my understand that:

1. Articles produced or manufactured in those territories of His Britannic Majesty

to which the present treaty applies, and imported into China, and reciprocally articles produced or manufactured in China and imported into the said territories of His Britannic Majesty, from whatever place arriving, shall receive, as regards import duties, internal taxation, transit dues and all matters connected therewith, treatment not less favourable than that accorded to goods the produce or manufacture of any other ~~foreign~~ country.

2. Articles produced or manufactured in China and exported to those territories of His Britannic Majesty to which the present treaty applies, and reciprocally articles produced or manufactured in the said territories of His Britannic Majesty and exported to China, shall receive, as regards export duties, internal taxation and transit dues, levied before export, and all matters connected therewith, treatment not less favourable than that accorded to goods exported to any other foreign country.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

MILES W. LAMPSON.

His Excellency,
Dr. Chengting T. Wang,
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
NANKING.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Nanking, December 20, 1928.

Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note of to-day's date reading as follows:—

(*Note*: Here follows a verbatim quotation of the British minister's note just preceding)

I hereby confirm that your understanding is correct.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

CHENGTING T. WANG.

His Excellency,
Sir Miles W. Lampson,
His Britannic Majesty's Minister to China,
NANKING.

Applies to Entire Empire

ANNEX 2

Nanking, December 20, 1928.

Sir,

With reference to the treaty concluded this day between His Britannic Majesty and the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, I have the honour to

assure Your Excellency, on behalf of His Majesty's Governments in Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa and the Irish Free State, and the Government of India, that the rights of those governments to benefit by those provisions of existing treaties which limit in any way the right of China to settle her customs tariff or to impose tonnage dues at such rates as she may think fit are renounced by His Majesty as from the entry into force of the treaty.

I have also the honour to assure Your Excellency that His Majesty similarly renounces His rights in respect of Newfoundland, Southern Rhodesia and all His non-self-governing Colonies and Protectorates.

I shall be glad to receive the assurance of the National Government of the Republic of China that goods produced or manufactured in any of the parts of His Majesty's territories mentioned above or in any of the territories under their administration or in any territory under His Majesty's suzerainty or in any territory in respect of which a mandate is exercised by His Majesty's Government in Great Britain, the Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand or the Union of South Africa will be accorded most-favoured-nation treatment in China, so long as goods produced or manufactured in China receive in such territory treatment as favourable as that accorded to goods produced or manufactured in any other foreign country.

I shall also be glad to receive the assurance of the National Government of the Republic of China that articles produced or manufactured in China and exported to any of the territories mentioned above will receive most-favoured-nation treatment as regards export duties, internal taxation or transit dues, levied before export, or matters connected therewith, so long as goods produced or manufactured in such territory and exported to China receive in corresponding matters treatment as favourable as that accorded to goods exported to any other foreign country.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

MILES W. LAMPSON

His Excellency,
Dr. Chengting T. Wang,
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
NANKING.

Acknowledged

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Nanking, December 20, 1928.

Excellency,

I hereby take note of the renunciation by His Britannic Majesty of the rights of His Governments in Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa and the Irish Free State, and of the Government of India, as from the entry into force of the treaty concluded this day between His Britannic Majesty and the President of the National Government of the Republic of China to benefit by the provisions of existing treaties which limit in any way the right of China to settle her customs tariff or to impose tonnage dues at such rates as she may think fit. I also take note of the renunciation by His Majesty of His rights in respect of Newfoundland, Southern Rhodesia and all His non-self-governing Colonies and Protectorates.

I have the honour, on behalf of the National Government of the Republic of China, to assure you that goods produced or manufactured in any of the parts of His Majesty's territories mentioned above or in any of the territories under their administration or in any territory under His Majesty's suzerainty or in any territory in respect of which a mandate is exercised by His Majesty's Government in Great Britain, the Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand or the Union of South Africa will receive most-favoured-nation treatment in China, so long as goods produced or manufactured in China receive in such territory treatment as favourable as that accorded to goods produced or manufactured in any other foreign country.

I have also to assure you, on behalf of the National Government of the Republic of China, that articles produced or manufactured in China and exported to any of the territories mentioned above will receive most-favoured-nation treatment as regards export duties, internal taxation or transit dues, levied before export, or matters connected therewith, so long as goods produced or manufactured in such territory and exported to China receive in corresponding matters treatment as

favourable as that accorded to goods exported to any other foreign country.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

CHENGTING T. WANG.

His Excellency,
Sir Miles W. Lampson,
His Britannic Majesty's Minister to China,
NANKING.

Tariff Rates and Likin

ANNEX 3

Nanking, December 20, 1928

Sir,

With reference to the treaty concluded this day between His Britannic Majesty and the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, I have the honour to state that it is my understanding that the *ad valorem* rates of duty or the specific rates based thereon in the National Customs Tariff to be adopted by the National Government are the same as the rates which were discussed and provisionally agreed upon at the Tariff Conference of 1926 and that these are the maximum rates to be levied on British goods: furthermore, that these will remain the maximum rates on such goods for a period of at least one year from the date of enforcement of the tariff: and that two months' notice will be given of the coming into force of the said tariff.

I shall be glad if Your Excellency will be good enough to confirm the correctness of the above.

In view of the doubt and anxiety that may arise amongst my nationals in regard to the effect which the new tariff may have on their trade if the various levies other than customs duties now being collected remain in force after the coming into operation of the national tariff rates, I would remind Your Excellency of the proclamation issued by the National Government of the Republic of China at Nanking on July 20th, 1927, announcing their intention to take as soon as possible the necessary steps effectively to abolish likin, native customs dues, coast trade duties and all other taxes on imported goods whether levied in transit or on arrival at destination, and I should welcome some assurance on behalf of the National Government that it is their intention that goods having once paid import duty to the Maritime Customs in accordance

with the rates imposed in the new or any subsequent national tariff will be freed as soon as possible from any levies of the nature specified in the above-mentioned proclamation.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

MILES W. LAMPSON.

His Excellency,
Dr. Chengting T. Wang,
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
NANKING.

Confirmed

Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Nanking, December 20, 1928

Excellency,

With reference to Your Excellency's note of today's date, I have the honour to confirm the correctness of your understanding that the *ad valorem* rates of duty or the specific rates based thereon in the national customs tariff to be adopted by the National Government are the same as the rates which were discussed and provisionally agreed upon at the Tariff Conference in 1926 and that these are the maximum rates to be levied on British goods: furthermore, that these will remain the maximum rates on such goods for a period of at least one year from the date of enforcement of the tariff: and that two months' notice will be given of the coming into force of the said tariff.

Furthermore, I am glad to be able to confirm, on behalf of the National Government, the terms of their proclamation of July 20th, 1927, and to give you the assurance which you request that it is their intention that goods having once paid import duty to the Maritime Customs in accordance with the rates imposed in the new or any subsequent national tariff will be freed as soon as possible from any levies of the nature specified in the above-mentioned proclamation.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

CHENGTING T. WANG.

His Excellency
Sir Miles W. Lampson,
His Britannic Majesty's Minister to China,
NANKING.

On All Frontiers

ANNEX 4

Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Nanking, December 20, 1928

Excellency,

With reference to the Treaty signed this day, I hereby declare on behalf of the National Government of the Republic of China that it is their intention to apply the new customs tariff uniformly on all land and sea frontiers of China and that, as from the date of coming into force of the new tariff, the preferential rates at present levied on goods imported or exported by land frontier will accordingly be abolished.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

CHENGTING T. WANG.

His Excellency
Sir Miles W. Lampson,
His Britannic Majesty's Minister to China,
NANKING.

Acknowledged

Nanking, December 20*th*, 1928.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the note of today's date in which Your Excellency declares on behalf of the National Government of the Republic of China that it is their intention to apply the new customs tariff uniformly on all land and sea frontiers of China and that, as from the date of the coming into force of the new tariff, the preferential rates at present levied on goods imported or exported by land frontier will accordingly be abolished.

I have taken due note of this declaration with which His Majesty's Government in Great Britain are in full agreement.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

MILES W. LAMPSON.

His Excellency,
Dr. Chengting T. Wang,
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
NANKING.

The Sino-Swedish Treaty

THE TREATY

(Official title: "Treaty Regulating Tariff Relations Between the Kingdom of Sweden and the Republic of China")

The Kingdom of Sweden and the Republic of China, mutually animated by a desire to maintain the ties of friendship which happily exist between the two countries and wishing to consolidate and extend the commercial intercourse between them, have, for the purpose of negotiating a treaty designed to facilitate these objects, named as their Plenipotentiaries;

His Majesty the King of Sweden:

Baron C. Leijonhufvud, Charge d'Affaires ad interim of Sweden in China;

His Excellency the President of the National Government of the Republic of China:

Dr. Chengting T. Wang, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the National Government of the Republic of China;

Who, having exchanged their full powers found to be in due and proper form, have agreed upon the following treaty between the two countries.

Tariff Autonomy and Most Favored Nation Treatment

ARTICLE I.

All provisions which appear in treaties hitherto concluded and in force between Sweden and China relating to rates of duty on imports and exports of merchandise, drawbacks, transit dues and tonnage dues in China shall be annulled and become inoperative, and the principle of complete national tariff autonomy shall apply subject, however, to the condition that each of the High Contracting Parties shall enjoy in the territories of the other with respect to the above specified and any related matters treatment in no way discriminatory as compared with the treatment accorded to any other country.

The nationals of neither of the High Contracting Parties shall be compelled under any pretext whatever to pay, within the territories of the other, any duties, internal charges or taxes upon their importations and exportations other or higher than those which are paid by the nationals of the country or by nationals of any other country.

English Authoritative

ARTICLE II.

The present Treaty has been drawn up in two copies in Swedish, Chinese and English. In case of any difference of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.

Ratification

ARTICLE III.

The present Treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible by the High Contracting Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional procedure, by Sweden subject to the approval of the Riksdag, and shall come into force on the day on which the High Contracting Parties shall have notified each other that the ratifications have been effected.

In testimony whereof, we the undersigned, by virtue of our respective powers have signed this treaty and have affixed our respective seals.

Done at Nanking the twentieth day of December nineteen hundred and twenty-eight, corresponding to the twentieth day of the twelfth month of the seventeenth year of the Republic of China.

L.S. (Signed)
CARL LEIJONHUFVUD

L.S. (Signed)
CHENGTING T. WANG.

THE NOTES

Most Favored Nation Tariff Treatment

Nanking, December 20, 1928.

Monsieur le Ministre,

With reference to Article I of the Treaty signed between us this day, I have the honour to request Your Excellency to confirm my understanding that the said Article shall be interpreted to include the following:—

Articles produced or manufactured in the territory of either of the High Contracting Parties shall not be subject, on their importation into the territory of the other Party or on their exportation from its own territory to the territory of the other Party, to any duties, internal charges or taxes other or higher than those paid respectively, on like articles produced or manufactured in and imported from any other country, or on like articles produced or manufactured in the country and exported to any other country.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my

highest consideration.
(Signed)

CARL LEIJONHUFVUD

His Excellency,
Dr. Chengting T. Wang,
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
NANKING.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Nanking, December 20, 1928.

Monsieur le Charge d'Affaires,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Note of today's date which reads as follows:

(Baron Leijonhufvud's note repeated verbatim.)

I have the honour to confirm the correctness of the above.

(Signed)

CHENGTING T. WANG

Monsieur le Baron C. Leijonhufvud,
Swedish Charge d'Affaires,
NANKING.

The Sino-French Treaty

Note: The Sino-French treaty of December 22, 1928 is drawn up in French and Chinese, with French as the authoritative language. The following is an unofficial but careful translation from the French text.

THE TREATY

(Title: "Treaty Regulating Customs Relations between France and China.")

The Government of the French Republic and the Government of the Republic of China, being animated by the desire further to consolidate the bonds of friendship which happily exist between the two countries, and wishing to develop their commercial relations, have decided to conclude a treaty and to this end have named as respective their plenipotentiaries:

The President of the French Republic:

H. E. the Count D. de Martel, Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary of the French Republic to China, Commander of the Legion of Honor;

The President of the national Government of the Republic of China:

H. E. Dr. Chengting T. Wang, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the National Government of the Republic of China;

who, having exchanged their full powers found to be in proper form, have agreed as follows:

Tariff Autonomy and Most Favored Nation Treatment

ARTICLE I.

All provisions which appear in treaties hitherto concluded and in force between France and China relating to rates of duty on importations and exportations of merchandise, drawbacks, transit dues, and tonnage dues in China, shall be annulled and become inoperative and the principle of complete autonomy shall henceforth apply in regard to the customs tariff and related matters, subject to the condition, however, that each of the High Contracting Parties shall enjoy in the territories, possessions, colonies, and protectorates of the other, both with respect to questions

hereinafter specified and other related matters treatment in no way less favorable than that actually enjoyed by any other power.

Taxes

ARTICLE II.

The nationals of neither of the High Contracting Parties shall be compelled under any pretext to pay within the limits of territories, possessions, to colonies or protectorates of the other party any dues, internal charges or taxes on their importations and exportations other or higher than those paid by nationals of the country or by nationals of any other country.

French Authoritative

ARTICLE III.

The present treaty has been drawn up in French and Chinese and the two texts have been carefully compared; but in the event of there being a difference of meaning between the two, the French text shall prevail.

The present treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible and the exchange o ratifications shall take place in Paris. The come into force on the day on which the two Governments shall have notifed each other that ratification has been effected.

In testimony whereof, the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty in duplicate and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Nanking the twenty-second day of December, nineteen hundred and twenty-eight, corresponding to the twenty-second day of the twelfth month of the seventeenth year of the Republic of China.

(S) *D. de Martel*

(S) *Chengting T. Wang*

THE NOTES

Reciprocal Tariff

Nanking, December 22, 1928.

M. le Ministre,

Referring to Article I of the treaty concluded today, I have the honor to confirm that the minimum French tariff will continue to be applied to the Chinese merchandise enumerated in the attached list until the conclusion of the accord provided for in the following paragraph.

Respecting other articles for which the Chinese government wishes to obtain the benefit of the minimum French tariff, it is understood, since it is impossible for the French

government, in view of its customs legislation, to accord its minimum tariff *en bloc*, that a separate accord shall be negotiated establishing a reciprocal conventional tariff.

Accept, M. le Ministre, the assurances of my very high consideration.

D. de Martel

H. E. Dr. Chengting T. Wang,
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
NANKING.

List of Chinese merchandise granted entry into France under the minimum tariff :

Tissus de sois pure (pure silk fabrics)
Foulards de sois pure (pure silk foulards)
Crepes de sois pure (pure silk crepes)
Tulles de sois pure (pure silk tulles)
Passementeries de sois pure (pure silk laces)
Poivre (pepper)
Piment (pimento)
Cannelle (cinammon)
Muscade en coque et sans coque (nutmeg, unshelled and shelled)
Girofle (cloves)
The (tea)

Acknowledged

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Nanking, December 22, 1928

M. le Ministre,

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this date relative to the application of Article I of the treaty concluded between the National Government and the French Government.

I hasten to appraise you that I am fully in accord with the ~~[illegible]~~ contained in that communication.

Accept, M. le Ministre, the assurances of my very high consideration.

Chengting T. Wang

H. E. le Comte de Martel,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the French Republic in China.

Understandings

Nanking, December 23, 1928

M. le Ministre,

In the course of the negotiations which have been brought to a successful conclusion, we have examined, in a spirit of mutual friendliness, various pending questions between our two countries, and I feel that I am able to define as follows the result of our exchange of views:

1.) The French Government is disposed without delay to enter into negotiatious for the conclusion of a new convention to replace the Franco-Chinese convention of April 25, 1886, the additional commerce con-

vention of June 26, 1887, and the supplementary convention to that convention dated June 10, 1895.

In the interests of the two Governments, no change will be made from the present state of affairs respecting Indo-China, during the period of negotiations, it being understood that the principle of a uniform tariff on maritime and land frontiers has been accepted, so that the tariff in force on the Chinese maritime frontiers will likewise prevail on the Indo-Chinese frontier. Nevertheless, the actual rates of reduction of duties on importations and exportations will remain in force for the period of the negotiations, which the French government on its part, is disposed, to conclude rapidly.

2.) In the interests of the development of Franco-Chinese economic relations, it is necessary that merchandise shold not bear excessive taxes. To this end, the suppression of likin has seemed desirable both to the French Government and the Government of China. The superposition on strictly customs duties of provincial taxes designed to replace likin likewise would tend to paralyze trade. The French Government does not doubt that the National Government will do away with likin as soon as possible after the new customs tariff goes into force, and that it will prevent the imposition of the said provincial taxes.

3.) The service of certain loans of interest to French finance concluded by the Chinese Government is at the present time interrupted through lack of funds. The earmarking of part of the increased customs funds for the service of these loans will tend to strengthen Franco-Chinese economic relations and the French Government does not doubt that the National Government will take the necessary steps to that end.

Accept, M. le Ministre, the assurances of my very high consideration.

D. de Martel

H. E. Dr. Chengting T. Wang,
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
NANKING.

Acknowledged

Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Nanking, December 23, 1928.

M. le Ministre,

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this date in regard to:

1.) The early application of the new Chinese customs tariff on the Indo-Chinese fron-

government, in view of its customs legislation, to accord its minimum tariff *en bloc*, that a separate accord shall be negotiated establishing a reciprocal conventional tariff.

Accept, M. le Ministre, the assurances of my very high consideration.

D. de Martel

H. E. Dr. Chengting T. Wang,
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
NANKING.

List of Chinese merchandise granted entry into France under the minimum tariff :

Tissus de sois pure (pure silk fabrics)
Foulards de sois pure (pure silk fou'ards)
Crepes de sois pure (pure silk crepes)
Tulles de sois pure (pure silk tulles)
Passementeries de sois pure (pure silk laces)
Poivre (pepper)
Piment (pimento)
Cannelle (cinammon)
Muscade en coque et sans coque (nutmeg, unshelled and shelled)
Girofle (cloves)
The (tea)

Acknowledged

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Nanking, December 22, 1928

M. le Ministre,

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this date relative to the application of Article I of the treaty concluded between the National Government and the French Government.

I hasten to appraise you that I am fully in accord with the ~~provisions~~ ~~points~~ contained in that communication.

Accept, M. le Ministre, the assurances of my very high consideration.

Chengting T. Wang

H. E. le Comte de Martel,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the French Republic in China.

Understandings

Nanking, December 23, 1928

M. le Ministre,

In the course of the negotiations which have been brought to a successful conclusion, we have examined, in a spirit of mutual friendliness, various pending questions between our two countries, and I feel that I am able to define as follows the result of our exchange of views:

1.) The French Government is disposed without delay to enter into negotiatious for the conclusion of a new convention to replace the Franco-Chinese convention of April 25, 1886, the additional commerce con-

vention of June 26, 1887, and the supplementary convention to that convention dated June 10, 1895.

In the interests of the two Governments, no change will be made from the present state of affairs respecting Indo-China, during the period of negotiations, it being understood that the principle of a uniform tariff on maritime and land frontiers has been accepted, so that the tariff in force on the Chinese maritime frontiers will likewise prevail on the Indo-Chinese frontier. Nevertheless, the actual rates of reduction of duties on importations and exportations will remain in force for the period of the negotiations, which the French government on its part, is disposed, to conclude rapidly.

2.) In the interests of the development of Franco-Chinese economic relations, it is necessary that merchandise shold not bear excessive taxes. To this end, the suppression of likin has seemed desirable both to the French Government and the Government of China. The superposition on strictly customs duties of provincial taxes designed to replace likin likewise would tend to paralyze trade. The French Government does not doubt that the National Government will do away with likin as soon as possible after the new customs tariff goes into force, and that it will prevent the imposition of the said provincial taxes.

3.) The service of certain loans of interest to French finance concluded by the Chinese Government is at the present time interrupted through lack of funds. The earmarking of part of the increased customs funds for the service of these loans will tend to strengthen Franco-Chinese economic relations and the French Government does not doubt that the National Government will take the necessary steps to that end.

Accept, M. le Ministre, the assurances of my very high consideration.

D. de Martel

H. E. Dr. Chengting T. Wang,
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
NANKING.

Acknowledged

Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Nanking, December 23, 1928.

M. le Ministre,

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this date in regard to:

1.) The early application of the new Chinese customs tariff on the Indo-Chinese fron-

tier and the maintenance of the present state of offairs in Indo-China until the conclusion of a new convention;

2.) The expediency of abolishing all likin charges;

3.) The desirability of taking proper measures to assure the service of certain loans.

I hasten to appraise you that I am fully in accord with the above.

Accept, M. le Ministre, the assurances of my very high consideration.

Chengting T. Wang

H. E. le Comte de Martel,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the French Republic in China.

By March 31, 1929

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Nanking, December 23, 1928.

M. le Ministre,

I have the honor to appraise you that the National Government hopes to be able to conclude with the French Government, before March 31, 1929, a new convention concerning Indo-China, the early negotiation of which has been provided for.

In any event, the provisions relative to the reduction of rates on importations and exportations on the Indo-Chinese frontier, the provision referred to in Your Excellency's letter of today's date shall cease to apply from March 31, 1929, even if the new convention has not yet been concluded.

Accept, M. le Ministre, the assurances of my very high consideration.

Chengting T. Wang

H. E. le Comte de Martel,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the French Republic to China.

Acknowledged

Nanking, December 23, 1928.

M. le Ministre,

Your Excellency sent me a note of today's date to appraise me that the current rates of reduction on duties for importations and exportations at the Indo-Chinese frontier shall cease to be applied on March 31, 1929, even if on that date the negotiations for the conclusion of a new convention have not yet come to an end.

I hasten to make a due acknowledgement of the receipt of this communication.

Accept, M. le Ministre, the assurances of my very high consideration.

D. de Martel

H. E. Dr. Chengting T. Wang,
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
NANKING.

The Sino-Spanish Treaty

THE TREATY

(Official title: "Preliminary Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the Kingdom of Spain and the Republic of China.")

The Kingdom of Spain and the Republic of China, being equally animated by the desire to strengthen the ties of friendship which happily subsist between the two countries and to promote and consolidate their commercial relations, have resolved to conclude a Preliminary Treaty for Amity and Commerce, and have for this purpose named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Majesty the King of Spain:

Don Justo Garrido Y Cisneros, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the King of Spain to China,

His Excellency the President of the National Government of the Republic of China:

Dr. Chengting T. Wang, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the National Government of the Republic of China,

who, having met and communicated to each other their respective full powers, found in good order and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles:

Tariff Autonomy and Most Favored Nation Treatment

ARTICLE I.

The Two High Contracting Parties agree that the customs tariff and all matters related thereto shall be regulated exclusively by their respective national legislations.

It is further agreed that each of the High Contracting Parties shall enjoy in the territories of the other, with regard to customs and all related matters, treatment in no way less favourable than the treatment accorded to any other country.

The nationals of each of the High Contracting Parties shall not be compelled, under any pretext whatever, to pay within the territories of the other party any duties, internal charges or taxes upon importation or exportation of goods, other or higher than those paid by the nationals of the country or by the nationals of any other country.

Under Local Laws

ARTICLE II.

The nationals of each of the

High Contracting Parties shall be subject, in the territories of the other Party, to the laws and jurisdiction of the law courts of that Party, to which they shall have free and easy access for the enforcement and defence of their rights.

Further Negotiations

ARTICLE III.

The two High Contracting Parties have decided to enter as soon as possible into negotiations for the purpose of concluding a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation based on the principles of absolute equality and non-discrimination in their commercial relations and mutual respect for sovereignty.

English Authoritative

ARTICLE IV.

The present Treaty has been drawn up in two copies in the Spanish, Chinese and English languages. In the event of there being any differences of meaning the English text shall be held to prevail.

Ratification

ARTICLE V.

The present Treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible and shall come into force on the day on which the two Governments shall have notified each other that ratification has been effected.

In faith whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have thereto affixed their seals.

Done at Nanking this twenty-seventh day of December, nineteen hundred and twenty-eight, corresponding to the twenty-seventh day of the twelfth month of the seventeenth year of the Republic of China.

(Signed)

GARRIDO Y CISNEROS

(Signed)

CHENGTING T. WANG.

THE ANNEXES

Extraterritoriality End

ANNEX I.

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Nanking, December 27th, 1928.

Monsieur le Ministre,

In the name of the National Government of the Republic of China, I have the honour to state that Article II of the Treaty signed this day between China and Spain shall be understood to begin to be operative on January 1st, 1930. Before such date the Chinese Government will make detailed arrangements with the Spanish Government for the assumption by China of jurisdiction over Spanish subjects. Failing such arrangements on the said date, Spanish subjects shall be amen-

able to Chinese laws and jurisdiction from a date to be fixed by China, after having come to an agreement for the abolition of extraterritoriality with all the Powers signatory of the Washington Treaties, it being understood that such date shall be applicable to all such Powers.

By "Powers signatory of the Washington Treaties" shall be meant those Powers, other than China, which directly participated in the discussion of Pacific and Far Eastern questions in the Conference on the Limitation of Armament held in Washington in 1921-22.

I avail myself of this opportunity to ~~extend~~ Renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed)

CHENGTING T. WANG

His Excellency,
Justo Garrido Y Cisneros,
Spanish Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to China,
NANKING.

Agreed

Nanking, December 27th, 1928.

Monsieur le Ministre,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's Note of today's date which reads as follows:—

(Here follows Dr. Wang's note as above.)

I have the honour to state that the Spanish Government is in full agreement with the above statements.

I avail myself of this opportunity to ~~extend~~ Renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed)

GARRIDO Y CISNEROS.

His Excellency,
Dr. Chengting T. Wang,
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
NANKING.

New Codes

ANNEX II.

DECLARATION

I have the honour to declare that on or before January 1, 1930, the Civil Code and the Commercial Code, in addition to other codes and laws now in force, will be duly promulgated by the National Government of the Republic of China.

(Signed)

CHENGTING T. WANG.

Right to Own Property

ANNEX III.

DECLARATION

In the name of the National Government of the Republic of China, I have the honour to declare that when Spanish sub-

jects cease to enjoy the privileges of consular jurisdiction and other special privileges, and when the relations between the two countries are on a footing of perfect equality the Chinese Government in view of the fact that Chinese citizens subject to the limitations prescribed in Spanish laws and regulations, enjoy the right to live and trade and to acquire property in any part of Spanish territories, will grant the same rights to Spanish subjects in China, subject to the limitations to be prescribed in its laws and regulations.

(Signed)

CHENGTING T. WANG.

To Pay Taxes

ANNEX IV.

JOINT DECLARATION

It is understood that Spanish subjects in Chinese territories and Chinese citizens in Spanish territories shall hereafter pay such taxes or imposts as may be prescribed in the laws and regulations duly promulgated by the Chinese and the Spanish Governments respectively, provided that such taxes or imposts are not other or higher than those paid by the nationals of any other country.

(Signed)

GARRIDO Y CISNEROS

(Signed)

CHENGTING T. WANG.

Synopsis of Treaties Concluded by the

Country and date of conclusion of treaty.	*Tariff autonomy conceded*	*Non-discriminatory treatment in tariff matters accruing to high contracting parties.*	*Non-discriminatory treatment specifically in respect of*		*Abolition of likin and other inland taxes to be undertaken "as soon as possible"*	*National to taxa discrimi*
			A nationals	*B goods*		
U. S. A. July 25th	X	X	X			
Germany August 17th	X	X	X			
Norway November 12th	X	X	X			
Belgium November 22nd	X	X	X			
Italy November 27	X	X	X			
Denmark December 12th	X	X	X			
Portugal December 19th	X	X	X	X		
Netherlands December 19th	X	X	X	(2) X		
Great Britain December 20th	X	(3) X	X	X	X	
Sweden December 20th	X	X	X	X		
France December 20th	X	(4) X	X	X	X	
Spain December 27th	X	X	X			

(1) Germany had already lost such rights.
(2) Certain goods in which The Netherlands are especially interested are specifically mentioned.
(3) Customs tariff to be applied uniformly on all land and sea frontiers of China.
(4) French customs legislation prevents according minimum tariff *en bloc* to Chinese products. Thos conventional tariff is to be negotiated Reductions of tariffs on Indo-China frontier to cease r

All treaties except that with the United States are to go into force upon mutual notification of ratifica

English text is authoritative in the case of all treaties except that with France in which French text go

RATIFICATIONS: (1.) American treaty by China, November 30, 1928. (2.) German treaty by Ge

ed by the Chinese Government in 1928.

n of likin inland taxes ndertaken s possible"	Nationals made liable to taxation on non-discriminatory basis.	Extraterritoriality in China conditionally given up on January 1, 1930.	Acquisition of property, residence and trade in interior of China conceded on relinquishment of extraterritoriality.	Further negotiations.
		(1)		Treaty of commerce and navigation on basis of perfect parity to be concluded as soon as possible.
				Treaty to replace that of 1847 envisaged.
	X	X	X	Treaty of commerce and navigation on basis of equality to be concluded as soon as possible.
	X	X	X	"
	X	X	X	"
	X	X	X	"
				Revision of existing treaty of commerce and navigation forecast.
X				
X				Convention respecting Indo-China to be negotiated before March 31, 1929.
	X	X	X	Treaty of commerce and navigation on basis of equality to be concluded as soon as possible.

y mentioned.

e products. Those products enjoying such treatment are listed. Special accord establishing reciprocal a frontier to cease not later than March 31, 1929.

ification of ratification: American treaty is to go into force four months subsequent to exchange of ratifications. hich French text governs.

rman treaty by Germany, December 14, 1928.